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CERVANTES On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal. Whether the Article 133 of the civil code applies to donations between live-in partners?


While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.

PROPERTY RELATIONS FOR MARRIAGES BEFORE THE FAMILY CODE DELIZO VS. DELIZO Nicolas Delizo contracted two marriages. The first was with Rosa Vilasfer, from 1891 until her death in 1909, a period of 18 years. The second with Dorotea de Ocampo, from 1911 until the death of Nicolas in 1957, or a period of 46 years. The action for partition was instituted in 1957 by the 3 children and the heirs of the first marriage, all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their nine 9 children, the herein petitionersappellants. Involved are the properties acquired by Nicolas Delizo, among which are 66 hectares of agricultural lands in Caanawan, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; 58 hectares of riceland in Muoz of the same province; and a lot in Manila. It was found by both the TC and the CA that the Caanawan lands were acquired as homesteads during the existence of the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Villasfer and there being no affirmative showing that they belonged exclusively to said Nicolas Delizo, should therefore correspond to the first conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. With regards to the other properties, the CA found that these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo. However, since these properties were acquired from the produce of the Caanawan properties although such produce is the result of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage. Whether the property acquired by homestead is conjugal property of the 1st or 2nd marriage? From the findings of the Appellate Court that 66 hectares of the Caanawan properties were acquired by Nicolas Delizo as homesteads during the period of the first marriage, it does not necessarily follow that they should be considered as properties of the first marriage, considering that being homesteads they were part of the public domain, and it was not shown that all the requirements of the Homestead Law to warrant the grant of a patent to the homesteader have been complied with prior to the death in 1909 of Delizo's first wife, Rosa Villasfer. Under Act 926, which was then the applicable law, the right of the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law. The decisive factor, therefore, in the determination of whether a parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage, is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent. What was transferred to Nicolas Delizo were not rights of ownership, but inchoate rights as applicants for homesteads over portions of the public domain. Having received the homestead only in 1905, Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights thereon by the completion of the fiveyear occupancy and cultivation requirement of the law, in 1909. The CA erred in, holding that the entire Caanawan properties belong to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. Considering, however, that about twenty (20) hectares were cultivated and rendered productive during the period from 1905 to 1909, judgment and equity demand that the rights to said properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land laws had been complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership. In connection with the other properties, the CA held that "there is no controversy that these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo." Since these properties were acquired from the produce of the Caanawan properties although such produce is the result of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage. It would have been facile to hold that those afteracquired properties belong to the second conjugal partnership in view of the statutory presumption enunciated in Article 1407 of the old Civil Code (now Article 160, New Civil Code). There are, however, important considerations which preclude Us from doing so. There is the established fact that the produce of the Caanawan lands contributed considerably to the acquisition.


Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION JOCSON VS. COURT Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. OF APPEALS The wife died first intestate then the husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina. The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents. Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete.

WON the property registered under the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete is conjugal property or exclusive property.

EL 2 the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter. Contrary to petitioners position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocsons, the registered owner. This is so because the words married to preceding Alejandra Poblete are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.


Appellee Angel Ansaldo stood as guarantor for Romarico Agcaoili. He promised to indemnify the Surety Company for any damage that they may incur from Agcaoilis credits. Agcaoili defaulted and thus theSurety Company was forced to pay the Philippine Trust Bank the amount of 19,065.17 pesos. Thus, the Surety Company instituted an action to get the said amount from Angel Ansaldo. The Sheriff of City of Manila favored the Surety Company and levied on a property that belongs to the conjugal property of Angel and Margarita Ansaldo. The spouses brought an action to the Court of First Instance of Manila and the court ruled in their favor to the extent that the Sheriff should not have deducted from the same property and that the Surety Company should pay the spouses the amount of 636.80 pesos.

Whether or not the Sheriff was right in deducting from the conjugal property of the Spouses

NO. The decision of the lower court is affirmed by the Supreme Court Ratio: The Civil Code provision, in Article 1408, that the conjugal property of the spouses should be liable for all the debts and obligations contracted by either spouses during the marriage, should be construed in line and be reconciled with Articles 1385 and 1386 of the same code. Construing the 3articles together leads to the conclusion that the conjugal property should be held liable only when the said debt or obligation contracted by either party was proved to have produced some level of benefit for the family. It not being showed to be such, the Sheriff could not have levied from the said property. The issue of the spouses is not that the said property was part of their conjugal property but that whether it could be subject to the levy of the Sheriff or whether it falls under the purview of 1408. (1) Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by Moises and at the time it was paid, his wife had long been dead, the SC disagrees on the grounds of the new Civil Code (which was applicable because marriage was celebrated before FC): Art 153 (1) The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; x x x. Records show that property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal property. Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioners reliance on Lorenzo v. Nicolas), Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal. (2)Yes. The validity of the agreement is apparent in (a) latter of the father to his sons (the one which stated that he didnt favor any of his sons), (b) the testimony (see above) of


Father of two children, Moises, widower (wife died in 1978), originally intended his two properties, one in Paco and the other in Paranaque for his offspring but reverted to keeping the latter for himself while in Dubai, UAE. He modified the original agreement upon return to the Philippines in 1984. Proof of this was given by Moises brother, Cerefino Miat, who said testified the original agreement that Paco would go to Moises sons. This was reiterated at the death bed of Moises wife and affirmed upon Moises return to the Philippines. The Paco property, being the land in dispute, was paid for on an installment basis from May 17, 1977 to December 14, 1984. Full payment was made on the latter date and title was secured under Moises name as widower. Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on the property with their wives and paid its realty taxes and fire insurance premiums. Alexander and his wife, however, left the property in August 1985 for personal reasons. February 1988, Romeo learns from godmother of his wedding that son of godmother, Virgilio Castro (VC, petitioner), who happens to be Romeos neighbor, that the Paco property was being sold to VC. A thirty thousand peso downpayment was made by godmother to Moises for her son. April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of the Paco property for P42,750.00; a partial payment was made in the sum of P6,000 by Romeo but Alexander did not execute a deed of assignment in favor of his brother because he had lots of work to do and the title was already in Romeos possession.

(1) WON Paco property is conjugal or capital (2) WON valid oral partition between Moises and his sons involving the said property is valid (3) WON Castro spouses were buyers in good faith.

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION Downpayment information corroborated by Virgilio Miat (brother of Moises) and Pedro Miranda (who worked with Moises in two hotels: Bayview Hotel and Hotel Filipinas) but Alexander later said that he did not consider the money to be a downpayment but a personal debt due to Romeo. Romeo had possession of the title because he borrowed it from his father when he mortgaged the land to his friend Lorenzo. But when Moises ran into financial difficulties, he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco property to parents of petitioner VC. December 1, 1988, Romeo and VC met in MTC Manila to discuss status of Paco property. On the 16th, a letter from petitioners lawyer informed Romeo that the Paco property had been sold to VC by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated Dec. 5, 1988 for P95,000.00. Buyer, petitioner, VC admitted that the title of the property was with Romeo but bought it anyway on the assurance of Moises that hed be able to retrieve it from his son. Romeo files in the RTC action to nullify sale and compel Moises and Alexander to execute deed of conveyance/assignment. RTC ordered (1) Alexander to pay the remaining balance due his brother, (2) Romeo to recognize sale made by Moises, (3) dismissal of defendants counterclaim and (4) defendants to pay the costs of suit. Both parties appealed to the CA which modified the decision by saying that: (1) the deed of sale was nullified, (2) Moises and Alexander had to execute a deed of conveyance, and (3) for defendants to pay cost of suit (as applied for by the petitioner). VC subsequently brings the action to the SC.

EL 3 Moises brother, Ceferino, and the oral agreement between the brothers to divide the property between themselves (attested to by extended Family members). We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco property. Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro Miranda, who testified regarding the sale of Alexanders share to Romeo, were intensely questioned by petitioners counsel. (3)In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual knowledge of the adverse claim of plaintiff-appellant. The most protuberant index that they are not buyers in good faith is that before the sale, Virgilio Castro talked with Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a right over the property. Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the property. xxx Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the property, they being neighbors. A purchaser who was fully aware of another persons possession of the lot he purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent purchaser for value.


EXCLUDED FROM CPG: EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY 1. The Laperals instituted a complaint against LAPERAL VS. Katigbak and Kalaw seeking the recovery of P14000 evidenced KATIGBAK by various promissory notes and for the return of jewelry delivered to Katigbak for sale on commission. 2. Upon confession of judgment by Katigbak, the court rendered judgment against him to pay the Laperals the said sum and return of jewelry. 3. About a month after the decision was rendered, Kalaw filed a complaint against her husband Katigbak for judicial separation of property and separate administration 4. Court granted the said complaint. 5. Laperals filed another complaint against Kalaw and Katigbak seeking the annulment of the proceedings for the above complaint, to enforce judgment secured by the Laperals on the fruits of Kalaws paraphernal property and to secure a ruling declaring the real property as conjugal property of Katigbak and Kalaw. 6. Court dismissed the complaint and rendered the property as paraphernal. a. Ramon and Evelina got married in 1938. b. The subject property was registered in the name of Evelina Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak on December6, 1939 only two years after the marriage. c. Evelina declares that her mother Pua was the one that had bought the property for her BARCILLES VS. GSIS Judge Pascual Berciles died of cardiac arrest. His retirement benefits, unpaid salary, retirement premiums and terminal leave and representation and transportation allowances are being contested in this case by two families. Iluminada Ponce Berciles and her four children Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione (lawful heirs) allege that they are the lawful legal heirs of the deceased. Iluminada presents as proof, evidence of her marriage with the deceased which entitled her and their legitimate children to a share in the said benefits. On the other hand, Flor Fuentebella and her four children Pascual Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda (contending claimants) also claim a share in the benefits. The GSIS resolved to grant the benefits in the following proportion: 77/134 for Iluminada as surviving spouse; 10/134 each for the legitimate children Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione; 5/134 for Pascual Voltaire as acknowledged natural child;

WON the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina. Whether or not Evelina may be held liable for the debts of her husband against the spouses Laperal.

NO Indeed, all properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. The presumption however is not conclusive but merely rebuttable. This is a case where the presumption has been sufficiently and convincingly proven. 1. The land in question was purchased for the wife with her own separate funds. Other than invoking the presumption, the burden of denying the evidence so presented was shifted to the appellant. 2. Deed to the disputed land is in the name of the wife. 3. At the time of its purchase, the property was already of such substantial value as admittedly, the husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy, considering that singular source of income then was his P200.00 a month salary from a Manila Bank.

Is the GSIS decision valid? NO

The marriage between Iluminada and the deceased was sufficiently proved and ruled upon by this court, fully supported by appropriate evidence as certified by the civil registry therefore the four children begotten by said spouses during their marital union are all legitimate. They are entitled to their share in the benefits. The marriage between Flor and the deceased was not proved. She only presented a certification that their marriage records could not be found or located in the civil registry. As to Pascual Voltaire, his paternity cannot be sufficiently proved. His birth certificate was not signed by either the father or mother and under the law, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void. Pascual Voltaire therefore cannot be considered as an acknowledged natural child. Under the law, illegitimate children are entitled to support and such successional rights so long as there is admission or recognition of paternity. As a result, the illegitimate children of Flor cannot share in the benefits as the marriage between Flor and the deceased was not sufficiently proved and paternity was not

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 4/134 each for the illegitimate children Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda. Both parties appealed. The lawful heirs contend that the GSIS ruling is erroneous, that they are the only legal heirs under the law. The contending claimants also appealed claiming that they should be the only ones entitled to the benefits.

EL 4 established. The retirement benefits and the terminal leave pay, unpaid salary and allowances accruing to the deceased shall be distributed equally to the 5 heirs: Iluminada, Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione. As to the retirement premiums, the same is presumed conjugal, there being no proof that the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased. One half belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and the other half shall go to the estate of the deceased to be distributed to his legal heirs.

EXCLUDED FROM CPG: ACQUISITIONS BY GRATUITOUS TITLE DURING THE MARRIAGE VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ Lucia Martinez is the widow of Domingo Franco and administratrix of his estate. Before Domingo died, he borrowed Php 4,500 from Mariano Veloso secured by jewelry. Veloso claims the husband pawned the jewelry to him with full knowledge and consent of Martinez. Martinez claims that the jewelry in question was her own property, inherited from her mother. Who is entitled to the jewelry? MARTINEZ. The record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited.

EXCLUDED FROM CPG: ACQUISITION BY REDEMPTION PLATA VS. YATCO Amalia Plata while single, sold a parcel of land to Celso Saldaa. The latter again resold the property to Amalia Plata, married to Gaudencio Begosa. In consideration of a Php 3,000 loan, "Amalia Plata of legal age, Filipino, married to Gaudencio Begosa" mortgaged the identical property to Cesarea Villanueva, signed by Gaudencio Begosa as comortgagor. The mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially and Villanueva obtained said property by being the highest bidder. Villanueva sued Begosa for illegal detainer and obtained judgment that became final. A writ of execution was issued but Plata resisted all efforts to eject her from her property and filed a claim averring ownership of the property. Is Plata bound by the detainer/judgment against Begosa? NO She had acquired the property while still single. Evidence before us against the marriage of petitioner Amalia Plata to Gaudencio Begosa is weak. The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaa, and the reconveyance of her several months afterward of the same property, did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to Saldaa came from common or conjugal funds. The deed of mortgage in favor of respondents Villanueva actually recites that the petitioner was the owner of the tenement in question and so does the conveyance of it by Saldaa to her. Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers were aware of it, the fact being clearly spread on the land records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore, was not derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's possession of her paraphernal, which by law she holds and administers independently, and which she may even encumber or alienate without his knowledge or consent. The TC was of opinion that the evidence offered in support of this contention was not sufficient to overcome the presumption established in article 1407 of the Civil Code, which provides that all the estate of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property (bienes gananciales) unless and until it is proven that it is a part of the separate estate of the husband or the wife, and we think after a careful examination of the record that this finding must be sustained. The setting aside of 700 pesos (which appears to have been taken as the value of the lot sold during the administration) as the separate property of the husband who brought the lot to the marriage, and the treatment of the balance of the price received for this lot, together with the buildings thereon, as conjugal partnership property, it appearing from the record that these buildings were constructed out of the conjugal partnership funds, was in entire accordance with the provisions of article 1404, which provides that "the buildings erected during coverture on land belonging to one of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property, after allowing the owner of the land the value thereof." The foregoing disposes of all the errors assigned by counsel for the appellant, except the alleged error of the trial court in refusing to order the inclusion in the inventory of the estate of the deceased of three parcels of land, held in the name of the appellee and claimed as her separate estate. It is contended by the appellant that these parcels of land were conveyed to the appellee during the coverture (thats marriage, incase youre wondering) by the said Hilario Lim either as a gift or for valuable consideration, and that in either event such conveyance was void under the provisions of articles 1334 and 1458 of the Civil Code. It appears from the evidence, however, that these parcels of land were not acquired by the appellee by conveyance from her husband, and that they were in fact conveyed to her by third parties by way of exchange for certain property inherited by her from her father's estate during the coverture, and they are, therefore, her separate property under the provisions


Hilario Lim died intestate some time in the year 1903, leaving a widow (Isabela Garcia) and nine children and an interest in an estate valued at some 50,000 pesos EXCEPT: 1. A house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga, and the sum of 10,000 pesos which, it was admitted, had been brought to the marriage by the said Hilario Lim 2. 700 pesos, the purchase price paid by said Lim for a certain lot which it was also admitted had been brought by him to his marriage, and which was sold in the course of the administration of his estate, together with improvements TC - the entire estate as shown in the inventory prepared by the administrator was conjugal property. Counsel for the administrator,surviving children - none of the said property should be treated as the property of the conjugal partnership, because, as they allege, the deceased Hilario Lim, brought to the marriage property worth more than double the amount of the intestate estate, and the defendant, his widow, brought nothing to the conjugal partnership, either at the time of the marriage or at any time thereafter.

Should the property be considered conjugal? YES


EL 5 of paragraph 3 of article 1396, which provides that property acquired by exchange for other property belonging separately to one of the married couple is the separate property of the owner of the property for which it is exchanged. The trial court speaks of this property as dowry of the appellee, but there is nothing in the record which tends to prove that it was acquired as a part of her dowry, and indeed the evidence strongly supports the presumption that it was and continued to be a part of her separate estate (paraphernalia) which never acquired the "dotal" character.

CPG: ADMINISTRATION OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY BY THE OTHER SPOUSE VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ Lucia Martinez is the widow of Domingo Franco and administratrix of his estate. Before Domingo died, he borrowed Php 4,500 from Mariano Veloso secured by jewelry. Veloso claims the husband pawned the jewelry to him with full knowledge and consent of Martinez. Martinez claims that the jewelry in question was her own property, inherited from her mother. Who is entitled to the jewelry? MARTINEZ. The record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited. There is nothing in the records that will show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which was entered into by the private respondent and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of Dona Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the former for and on behalf of the latter, but was only consummated after her death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting. Art. 136 NCC. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property. Art. 137 NCC. The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it. In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the movables, the husband shall give adequate security. We are, therefore, led to the inevitable conclusion that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court. Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court (143 SCRA 40, 49) Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning. It cannot be ratified neither can the right to set up the defense of its illegality be waived. (Art. 1409, Civil Code). After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court approved the request, then Don Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the respondent. Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the administrator to comply with the above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his interests or to pay the balance of the installments to the court appointed administrator.


Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would eventually buy the lot. Apr 2,50 - the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent were placed under custodia legis. Apr 28,50 - Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate. Meanwhile the private respondent remained in possession of the lot in question. Mar 13,20,59 - Manotok Raealty became the successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company, as administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in dispute was one of those covered by the sale. The Deed of Sale, among others, provided for the following terms and conditions: The VENDEE renounces the right to warranty in case of eviction with the knowledge of the risks of eviction and assumes its consequences with respect not only to the lots subject-of the above mentioned cases and claims but also with respect to any other lots subject of contracts of sale or promises to sell that may have been executed by the deceased, Clara Tambunting de Legarda and/or Vicente L. Legarda, and it hereby relieves the estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda and the Philippine Trust Company, in its capacity as Administrator thereof, of any and all liability with respect thereto in case of eviction. The VENDEE assumes the risk and expenses of ejecting the tenants or squatters on the said parcels of land if it decides to eject them In its effort to clear the Tambunting Subdivision of its squatters and occupants, the Manotok Realty caused the publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the Taliba advising the occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow. Madlangawa was one of the many occupants who refused to vacate the lots they were occupying TC dismissed the petitioner's action. CA ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to enforce the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor (Don Vicente Legarda). Manotok Realty - Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in holding that the sale by Don Vicente Legarda in favor of the private respondent is valid, binding, and enforceable against the petitioner. Since there is no dispute that the property in question was the paraphernal property of Clara Tambunting, who died on April 2, 1950, Vicente Legarda had

Whether Don Vicente Legarda could vlidly dispose of the paraphernal property? NO

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION no authority whatsoever to sell the said property to the private respondent on May 12, 1950 since the former was appointed as administrator of the estate of Clara Tambunting only on August 28, 1950. Therefore, the questioned sale could not have bound Clara Tambunting's estate because the vendor Vicente Legarda neither acted as the owner nor the administrator of the subject property when the alleged sale took place. Madlangawa - the provisions of the deed of sale are a declaration or admission against the interest of the petitioner, and shows that the acts of Vicente Legarda had been ratified by the Philippine Trust Company and approved by the probate court. The petitioner, therefore, is allegedly estopped from questioning the authority of Vicente Legarda in selling the property in dispute. CPG: ENCUMBRANCE / DISPOSITION OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY PALANCA VS. SMITH BELL Smith, Bell , pending in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila obtained a judgment against the said Emiliano Boncan for a sum of money. Later the said Smith, Bell & Co. obtained an execution out of said court which was levied upon the property in question in this case, which property was known as No. 16, situated in an alley without name running toward the old Santa Mesa race track, upon property belonging to the hacienda of Tuason & Co. After said execution was levied upon the property in question, the plaintiff and appellant herein commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the defendant herein, asking that said court dictate a sentence declaring her to be the only and exclusive owner of the property described in the complaint, with a right to the possession of the same, and that said attachment be dissolved. To this petition the defendants filed a general denial. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court denied the prayer of the petition of the plaintiff and appellant, absolving the defendants therefrom and charged the plaintiff with the costs. From this decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following assignment of error - The court erred in not allowing as proven the transfer of property No. 16, above described, made on September 20, 1904, by Emiliano Boncan Yap in favor of his wife, Alejandra Palanca de Boncan, and in not finding that she is the sole and exclusive owner thereof, Emiliano Boncan Yap having no interest whatever in the property in question. SPANISH Is the property conjugal property? YES


An examination of the evidence brought to this court shows that the said Alejandra Palanca was the owner of certain property in the city of Manila, which was given by the said Emiliano Boncan, with the consent of the said Alejandra Palanca, as a guaranty for the payment of the sum of P14,000, which Emiliano Boncan borrowed from the International Banking Corporation. With the money so borrowed the said Emiliano Boncan constructed the house in question, and later, by a public document executed on the 20th of September, 1904, conveyed the house in question to the plaintiff and appellant herein as a guaranty for the payment of the debt to the International Banking Corporation, for the guaranty of the payment of which the said plaintiff and appellant had given her private property. This P14,000, borrowed by the said Emiliano Boncan upon the credit of the property of his wife, became conjugal property (paragraph 3, art. 1401, Civil Code), and when the same was reinvested in the construction of a house, the house became conjugal property and was liable for the payment of the debts of the husband. (Art. 1408, Civil Code.) Believing that the foregoing conclusions in effect answer the assignments of error made by the appellant, and without discussing the same in detail, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs. So ordered.


PRESUMPTION OF CPG Decree 440157 was issued by the CFI of Negros Occidental in TORELA VS. TORELA favor of Felimon Torela, married to Gallego, decreeing that he is the owner of a parcel of land (Lot 3770), and ordering that the same be registered. Consequently, OCT 29257 covering lot was issued in favor of Felimon. As the certificate of title was either lost or destroyed during the last world war, he filed a verified petition for reconstitution praying that after due publication in the Official Gazette, an order be issued setting the petition for hearing. Thereafter the court, orders the Register of Deeds to reconstitute the original as well as the owners duplicate of OCT 29257. Thus, OCT 6898 was in favor of Felimon, in lieu of the lost and/or destroyed one. Torela, filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot. 3770 having been acquired by him by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife, Graciana Galeego, the Cadastral court ordered that land be registered in the name of Torela, married to Graciana Galeego, that his first wife died many years ago; and that he is married by second nuptial to Marciana Gepanago. He, therefore, prayed that the court order the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to change his (movants) civil status, appearing on the face of OCT, from Felimon, married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon Torella married to Marciana Gepango. The court, finding no opposition thereto and with the conformity of Clara Torela, daughter of Felimon by First marriage, granted the motion and ordered the Register of Deeds to change the civil status of the movant from Felimon Torela, married to Marciana Gepanto which is the actual civil status of the movant, upon payment of the required fees. Felimon executed a definite deed of sale, whereby, for and in consideration of P3,000.00, he sold said lot to Marcos and Maria Luna Mahilum, He also stated in the deed of sale that he was a widower by first marriage to Graciana Gallego, and now married to Marcina Gepango, that he is the registered owner of lot, having acquired it by inheritance from his parents before his marriage to Graciana Gallego, deceased.

Whether or not the parcel of land herein involved is a conjugal property of the spouses Felimon Torela and Graciana Gallego (plaintiffs mother).

The property question is one of those documented in Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code. On the other hand, as it was inherited by Felimon from his parents and brought to the marriage with his first wife, the same is deemed his separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code). For these reasons, defendant Felimon had lawfully disposed of his property to the exclusion of his children by his first marriage. Accordingly, plaintiffs complaint was correctly dismissed by the court below. Petitioners claim that since the lot in questions was registered in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, it must be presumed to be the conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana so that one-half thereof should be adjudicated to them as their inheritance from their mother. While it is rule that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless the party who invoke the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua not for the application of the presumption. In the instant case there in is nothing in the record to show that the lot in question was acquired during the marriage of Felimon Torela and Graciana gallego. On the contrary, the factual finding of the CA is to the effect that Felimon acquired the land through inheritance and this conclusion is bolstered by that fact that no one of the petitioners herein, Clara Torela, gave her conformity to her fathers Ex-Parte Motion, wherein it was recited, inter alia, that Felimon had acquired the property by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife, Graciana Gallego. The circumstances that Decree 440157 of the CFI of Negros Occidental which confirmed the ownership of Felimon over the land in question described him as married to Graciana Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil status at that time and cannot be taken as proof that the land was acquired

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION The document was acknowledged before Notary Public. Upon its registration, Transfer Certificate was issued to spouses. According, however, to the plaintiffs while in their youth they had seen their father Felimon and their mother Graciana clean the lot in question, and when their mother died, their father married Marcina Gepango. In other words, the plaintiffs want us to believe that the parcel of land is a status and in conveying the land to another, they now assert their right to the estate appertaining to their mother. Alleging that they were deprived of their corresponding share from the property thus sold. PNB VS. COURT OF APPEALS Clodualdo Vitug died intestate so his estate was settled and distributed in special Proceeding 422 in the CFI of Pampanga wherein Donata Montemayor, his second wife, was the Administratrix. Meanwhile, Donata Montemayor executed a contract of lease of Lot 24, which is covered by TCT 2887-R in favor of her children Pragmacio and Maximo both surnamed Vitug. This lease was extended. By virtue of a general power od attorney executed by Donata Montemayor in favor of Pragmacio Vitug, the latter executed a contract of lease of the said lot in favor of Maximo Vitug. Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug filed an action for partition and reconveyance with damages in the CFI of Pampanga against Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of the estate of Donata Montemayor who died earlier, Jesus Vitug, Sr., Salvador, Natalia, Prudencio all surnamed Vitug, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesusand Luz all surnamed Fajardo and the PNB. The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be conjugal property of the spouses Donata Motemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs. Motemayor, decided on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties were found to be conjugal in nature. Does the presumption of conjugal life of properties acquired by the spouses during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code apply to properties covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow?

EL 7 during their coverture. The further circumstances that the land was registered during their marriage cannot in itself constitute proof that it was acquired during their marriage for land registration under Act. 496 does not confer title; it confirms a title already existing and which is registerable.

When the properties were mortgaged to the PNB, they were registered in the name of Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on the Torrens certificate of title covering properties, the mortgage loan applications of Donata were granted by the PNB and the mortgage were duly constituted and registered in the office of the Registered of Deeds. In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemaor, the PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its face the properties owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of said registered owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances covering the same. The well known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land gas a right to rely upon the face of the torrens certificate of title and to dispose with the need if inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautions man make such inquiry. Article 160: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. The PNB had no reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of the title of the properties mortgaged. For all legal purpose, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the mortgage covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flow of the title of the mortgagor. At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and partitions are real actions, however, they are actions in personal that bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB not being a party in said is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear that the PNB was aware of the said decisions when it extended the above descriptive mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have approved the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without requiring the consent of all other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith. So its right thereto is beyond question.


The petition seeks the annulment of a writ of execution issued by the respondent Judge. Case was instituted by the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) against Martin Lacerna to compel partition of parcel of land in Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, to which defendant had perfected a claim by homestead. The plaintiffs, claiming to be the common children of Martin and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan, asserted a right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her conjugal partnership with Martin. While said defendant denied having contracted marriage with Eustaquia although he admitted living with her without benefit of marriage until she allegedly abandoned him as well as paternity of two of the plaintiffs who, he claimed, were fathered by other men, the Trial Court gave his denials no credence. The Trial Court further found that Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. The plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of the land claimed by them. The IAC affirmed. It appears that at the time the case was brought, no certificate of title to the land had yet been issued to Martin Lacerna, although he had already complied with all the conditions necessary to a grant thereof. OCT P-11 568 was issued only while Lacerna's appeal was pending in the IAC.

Is petitioner bound by final judgment rendered in an action to which she was not made a party? YES

This ruling presumes that petitioner is the legal wife of Lacerna though no marriage contract was presented by Lacerna to prove his marriage to the petitioner either before or after the death of Eustaquia. Indeed, it is clear that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land other than by virtue of her supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a mere mistress, she cannot pretend to any right to it. The petitioner relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact that the certificate of title to the land carries her name as the "wife" of the owner Martin. Such entry on the certificate of title has been established by evidence no longer disputable as resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through fraud. Moreover, the phrase "married to Epifania written after the name of Martin in said certificate of title is merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin and does not necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal" property. Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in Article 160 that property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin except that which arises by implication from the entry in the certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason that the homestead claim

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION While it is not disputed that said certificate of title refers to the same land homesteaded by Lacerna during his coverture with Eustaquia, for reasons to which the record before the Court offers no clear clue, it states on its face that it is issued in the name of " ... MARTIN LACERNA married to Epifania Magallon," the latter being the present petitioner. After the confirmative Decision of the IAC had become final and executory, the respondent Judge, on motion of the plaintiffs issued an alias writ of execution commanding the Provincial Sheriff to order the defendant Martin to divide and partition the property, of which is the share of Eustaquia in the conjugal property, and plaintiffs being Pichan's children are also entitled thereto; and deliver portion of 5 hectares of the lot to the plaintiffs as their share to satisfy the said judgment and your fees thereon. Apparently, said writ was served on both Martin and petitioner, the latter filed with the Trial Court a "Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution" alleging that the land subject of the writ was conjugal property of herself and Martin under a certificate of title issued way back 1978 without legal impediments, and now incontestable," as well as valid, binding and legal unless declared otherwise in an independent proceedings, and praying that the property of herein intervenor be excluded from the enforcement of the writ of execution." Said motion was denied. The facts found by the lower courts which, in view of the finality of the latter's decisions, are binding upon this Court and can no longer be controverted, as when as the pertinent allegations of the petition, leave no doubt that the land, which rightfully pertained to the conjugal partnership of Martin and Eustaquia, the plaintiff's mother, and should have been titled in the names of said spouses, was, through fraud or mistaken, registered in the names of Martin and petitioner Epifania. In such a situation, the property should be regarded as impressed with an implied, or a constructive, trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Clearly, the petitioner, as the trustee of a constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to the private respondents that part of the land to which she now claims an ostensible title, said portion rightfully pertaining to the respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal partnership with Martin. Private respondents Restituto and Meladora Cuenca filed a complaint for recovery of real property and damages against the petitioners before the then CFI of Davao del Norte. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The lower court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court. It rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents. This Case involves parcels of land which were claimed by two sets of families. Private respondents Restituto and Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership on the ground that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased. They alleged that some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties of Maria and Agripino. They also alleged that Agripino and Engracia Basadre were not legally married because at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar. The petitioners (defendants below) denied the legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino and Maria as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children. They claimed that Agripino and their mother Engracia were legally married and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They contend that the subject parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. The documents presented are proofs that the properties belong exclusively to Maria as her paraphernal property, a fact declared by the husband in a declaration against his interest. It was error for the trial court to brush aside the importance of the declaration in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria. These public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin of the properties and the nature of their ownership as properties brought into the marriage by Maria to Agripino as against the bare testimony of the defendants and their witnesses. These, and other, pieces of evidence established that the

EL 8 on the land was shown to have been perfected during Martin's marriage to Eustaquia, mother of the private respondents. The writ of execution, however, must be set aside, though not for the reasons urged in the petition. The judgment of the respondent Trial Court merely declared the private respondents entitled to one-half of the land, without specifically ordering partition and delivery to them the same. A writ of execution cannot vary the terms of the judgment it is issued to satisfy, or afford relief different from, or not clearly included in, what is awarded by judgment. Both the lower courts appear to have overlooked the fact that the surviving spouse is the legal and compulsory heir of the deceased husband or wife; otherwise, consistent with the finding that the half portion of the land sued for pertained to the late Eustaquia as her share in the conjugal partnership with Martin, they should have ruled that Martin concurred with the three private respondents in the succession to said portion, each of them taking an equal share. Unfortunately, said error is beyond review because Martin allowed the judgment to become final and executory without raising that point of law, even on appeal. The writ of execution is set aside. Instead of enforcing said writ, the respondent Trial Court is ordered to effect the partition of the land in accordance with the terms of its now final and executory decision and the provisions of Rule 69.


The appellate court declared Engracia Basadre as surviving spouse. There was, therefore no need to prove the legality of marriage between petitioners Engracia and Agripino much less to prove the legitimacy of the other petitioners who are undoubtedly the children of Agripino and Engracia. The petitioners also alleged the finding of newly discovered evidence to prove that the lands were conjugal properties of Agripino and petitioner Engracia. The petitioners alleged that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino and approved when Agripino was already married to Engracia as indicated in the documents, hence, there is the presumption that these are conjugal properties and therefore petitioners have hereditary rights over these properties. Article 160: "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," this Court ruled that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not show that the claims to the parcels were perfected during the marriage of Agripino and petitioner Engracia. The perfection of the homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The fact that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino and approved during their marriage is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were conjugal properties. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora or Restituto. The presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. The nonapplicablility of the presumption should also be upheld. The petition DISMISSED. The resolutions of the appellate court are AFFIRMED.

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION plaintiffs are the forced heirs of Maria and Agripino, who by law should succeed to the possession and ownership. On the other hand, defendants' evidence consist only of the oral testimonies which proved nothing concrete as they merely are inferences conveniently tailored to support their claim. Agripino and Maria were legally married with Restituto and Meladora Cuenca as their issues; that Maria Bangahon brought properties into her marriage; that the couple acquired properties during the marriage; that by virtue of the extrajudicial settlement executed by Agripino Cuenca and his children, Restituto is the absolute owner of the land; that one half of the land belongs to Agripino and the other half to Maria the same having been acquired by them during their marriage-conjugal partnership property. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal relationship by the death of spouses, one half goes to Agripino which portion after the death of Agripino goes to his alleged third wife, Engracia Basadre-Cuenca together with the plaintiffs as forced heirs of Agripino. The petitioners attached to their motion an alleged newly discovered evidence consisting of a certified true copy of the Register of Birth of petitioner first child of Agripino and petitioner Engracia which discloses that he is a legitimate child of the couple and a notarized public document which discloses that Jesusa Pagar was married to someone disproving the respondents' evidence. The dispositive portion of the CA decision states that petitioner Engracia Basadre was entitled to inherit from Agripino Cuenca together with the latter's legitimate children by Maria, the private respondents herein. WHAT IS INCLUDED IN CPG? ZULUETA VS. PANAM In an action for damage against Pan-am, plaintiff, his wife and their daughter were awarded moral and exemplary damage as well as attorneys fee. Said action was based on a breach of contract of carriage coupled with quasi-delict. Pending appeal, Mrs. Zulueta separated from the case insofar into compromise agreement with Pan-am wherein she settled for P50,000.00. A motion to dismiss the case insofar as Mrs. Zulueta is concerned was filed, but was denied in the ground that a wife cannot bind conjugal partnership without the husband consent, except in cases provided by law. Hence this motion for reconsideration. Whether or not the damages involved in the present case are among those forming the part of the conjugal partnership.



This case originated with the filing of a complaint by Ponciano S. Reyes with the CFI of Rizal, for the annulment of a deed of sale of 2 parcels of land with their improvements, executed by his wife, Julia R. De Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees. Ponciano S. Reyes averred that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent. Petitioners Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza alleged in their answer that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia R. de Reyes and that they had purchased the same in good faith and for adequate consideration. In a separate answer, petitioner Julia R. De Reyes, supported the spouses Mendozas' contentions. CFI dismissed the complaint and declared the properties in question exclusive and paraphernal properties of petitioner Julia R. De Reyes. It ruled that she could validly dispose of the same without the consent of her husband and that the Mendozas are innocent purchasers. CA reversed the decision. Hence, this petition.

Whether the properties are the conjugal properties of the spouses? YES

The damages in question arose from a breach of plaintiffs contract of carriage with defendant, for which plaintiff paid their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal property. Said damages, therere fall under Article 153(1), the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The damages in the case at bar do not come also under any of the provisions of Article 148 NCC or other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title IV of Book I NCC, which chapter is entitled Paraphernal Property. What is more if that which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses and that which is purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or of the husband: belonging exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that which is acquired with money of conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof. Motion denied. The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code which provides: The following are conjugal partnership property: That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be overcome by one who contends that the disputed property is paraphernal Article 160 provides: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage. But were the funds used to buy the lot and build the improvements at the expense of the common fund? The records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership. If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife. Any person who buys land registered in the married name of the wife is put on notice about its conjugal nature. Furthermore, the consent of the Ponciano Reyes to the mere lease of the properties was demanded by the Mendozas allegedly for their own protection, yet when it came to the deed of sale which entailed a greater transfer of rights such consent was not required. CA ruling affirmed that properties are conjugal properties.

IMPROVEMENTS ON CPG PROPERTY Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas (petitioner) and Fernando CALIMLIM VS. Canullas were married Dec 19, 1962. They begot 5 kids. They FORTUN lived in a house on the residential land in question, located at Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After Fernandos dad died in 1965, he inherited the land. In 1978, Fernando abandoned

(1) WON the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive

(1)Yes. A correct interpretation of Art 158 yields that: Both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION this family and lived with Corazon Daguines (private Respondent) During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage by the CFI, which judgment had become final. On april 15, 1980, Fernando sold the subject property with the house thereon to Corazon Daguines for the sum of P2000. In the deed of sale, Fernando described the house as also inherited by me from my deceased parents. Corazon however was unable to take possession of the house and lot because of Mercedes, so she initiated a complaint against Mercedes for the quieting of title and for damages. Mercedes claims that the house in dispute where she and her children were residing, including the coconut trees on the land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through her industry; she also claims that the sale of land together with the house and improvements to Corazon was null and void because they are CONJUGAL PROPERTIES and she had NOT GIVEN CONSENT to the sale. The original judgment declared Corazon as the lawful owner of the land in question as well as the of the house erected on said lands. Upon reconsideration prayed for by Mercedes, respondent court amended the prior decision and resolved that the plaintiff (Corazon) is (still) the true owner of the land in question and the 10 coconut trees, (but) declared the sale of the conjugal house to plaintiff including 3 coconut trees and other crops planted during the conjugal relation between Fernando Canullas and his legitimate wife (Mercedes). Hence this case: MARAMBA VS. LOZANO

property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property

EL 10 the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Fernando could not have alienated the house lot to Corazon since Mercedes had not given her consent to said sale.

(2) WON the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction

(2)No, the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of the stability of the family. As provided by Art 1409, contracts such as this shall be void and inexistent. Also, art 1352 states contracts with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from donating or selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. This applies even to couples who are not married but are living as husband and wife Wherefore, the decision of respondent judge and his resolution on petitioners motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and the sale of the lot, house and improvements in question, is hereby declared null and void.

CHARGES UPON & OBLIGATIONS OF CPG: WITH CONSENT In 1890, Petrona Javier (Javier), daughter of FJ and MC, JAVIER VS. OSMENA married Florentino Collantes. Before 1892, Florentino, husband, was employed by his father-in-law, FJ, in a commission business. One of their clients was Osmena who consigned tobacco to them from Cebu. Upon retirement of FJ, Florentino took over the commission business as an independent commission merchant (broker). He also assumed the debt owed by FJ to Osmena. In 1901, MC, mother of Petrona died. FJ subsequently married one PS. In 1908, however, FJ dies as well, allowing Javier to inherit two properties. For purpose of consolidating full ownership of the properties, Javier secured a loan and then purchased from FJs second wife, PS, the latters usufructory rights. In 1913, FC, husband of Javier, was ordered by the court to pay his debt to Osmena . The sheriff was thereby ordered to auction rights, title, interests, and shares of the property of FC (including the inherited properties of his wife and the usufructory rights purchased in 1911.) Notwithstanding protests from Javier, the two properties were sold to the estate of Osmena for P500 each. This included the usufructory rights. Javier filed a complaint against Osmena alleging that the inherited properties, as well as the usufructory rights were exclusive and not part of conjugal property and thus prayed for the sale to be annulled. Respondent estate of Osmena, admitting that the properties involved were indeed exclusive, still claimed that the usufructory rights, being purchased from the conjungal funds, should be deemed conjugal in nature. He also claimed that the payment due should come from the fruits of the said properties and thus, a receiver should be appointed to manage such revenues due to the respondent. CFI annulled the sale and cancelled the registration of property in the name of respondent Osmena. Osmena then appealed to the SC. VDA. DE STA. ROMANA VS. PCIB

(1) WON sum owed to Osmena estate can/should be paid from fruits/revenues of the exclusive properties of the wife, PJ. (2) WON a receiver should be assigned to collect fruits of exclusive properties as prayed for by Osmena estate.

(1) Yes. The court delved into the nature of the debt. It stated that there was a presumption in fact that family expenses come from salaries for services rendered. Since debt was incurred by the husband during the marriage (by virtue of him assuming the debt from his father-in-law) and such a debt was for the support of the family fruits and revenues of separate properties, being conjugal in nature, should answer the obligation . These debts are not personal or private debts at all.

(2)No. Art. 1984 of the CC says that the wife has the right to manage her paraphernal property and Art. 1412 says that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property. Appointment of a receiver shall deprive both the husband and the wife of these rights. There is therefore no need for such an appointment.


Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained a P2k agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now the

Whether the execution of the 2nd PN by the

Prescription has set in as to the 1st PN as of February 10, 1940. However, when Confesor executed the 2nd PN on April 11, 1961 whereby he promised to pay the amount covered by the previous PN on or before June

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION Development Bank, as evidenced by a PN whereby they bound themselves solidarily to pay in 10 equal yearly amortizations. But the obligation remained unpaid and had prescribed. Confesor, then a member of Congress, executed a 2nd PN acknowledging the loan and promising to pay on or before June 15, 1961 otherwise he would agree to the foreclosure his mortgage and he would pay the amount if he can secure a certificate of indebtedness from the government of his back pay. Still, the amount remained unpaid. DBP sued the spouses for the payment of the loan. MTC ORDERED the spouses to pay P5,760.96 plus additional daily interest of P1.04 from September 17, 1970 (date of filing of complaint), P576 equivalent to 10% of the total claim by way of AF and incidental expenses plus interest at the legal rate as of September 17, 1970, until fully paid and the costs of the suit. CFI REVERSED and DISMISSED the complaint and counter-claim, holding that Confessor cannot bind the CPG without his wifes consent under Art. 166, NCC. DENIED DBPs MR. DBP: Judge Midpanto Adil refused to recognize that the right to prescription may be renounced or waived; and that in signing the 2nd PN, Patricio Confesor can bind the conjugal partnership or otherwise became liable in his personal capacity. CHARGES UPON & OBLIGATIONS OF CPG: WITHOUT CONSENT LUZON SURETY VS. DE GARCIA Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and Luzon Surety Co. executed a surety bond in favor of the PNB to guaranty a crop loan of P9k to Chavez. Vicente Garcia, together with Chavez and Ramon Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement binding themselves solidarily for any and all damages and other burdens Luzon Surety Co. may at any time sustain. The PNB sued Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to recover the amount of P4,577.95. Luzon Surety Co. filed a third-party complaint against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia, based on the indemnity agreement. CFI ORDERED Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to pay and likewise ordered Chavez, Garcia, and Lacson, to pay Luzon Surety Co. the total amount to be paid by it to PNB. Then, it issued a writ of execution against Garcia for the satisfaction of the claim of Luzon Surety Co. Thereafter, the sugar quedans of the Sps. Garcia were levied and garnished from their sugar plantation. The Sps. Garcia filed for preliminary injunction, which was made permanent CA AFFIRMED the permanent preliminary injunction. BA FINANCE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

husband alone, confirming the loan by the spouses, can bind the CPG? YES

EL 11 15, 1961, and upon failure to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage, he thereby effectively and expressly renounced and waived his right to the prescription of the action covering the first promissory note. This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new PN is the pre-existing obligation under the 1st PN. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt. Under Art. 165, CC, the husband is the administrator of the CPG. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the CPG are chargeable thereto. Confesor signed the 2nd PN for the benefit of the CPG. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.

Whether the CPG, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company? NO

The husband, as such administrator, the only obligations incurred by him that are chargeable against the CPG are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. The husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement did not act for the benefit of the CPG. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is no proof that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor received consideration therefor, which may redound to the benefit of the CPG. Nor could there be, considering that the benefit was clearly intended for a third party, Ladislao Chavez. While the husband by thus signing the indemnity agreement may be said to have added to his reputation or esteem and to have earned the confidence of the business community, such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the provision. To make the CPG respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective --- solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. REYES, concurring: I concur in the result, but the words "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the CPG" in describing the charges and obligations for which the CPG is liable, do not require that actual profit or benefit must accrue to the CPG from the husband's transactions; but that it suffices that the transaction should be one that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership. Obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his profession are collectible from the CPG.



Honorio Garcia claims that Maria Theresa CarlosAbelardo approached him and requested him to advance $25k for the purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own, Carlos issued a check in the name of Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged its receipt. When Carlos inquired the status of the loan, the spouses acknowledged their obligation but pleaded they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement. He made a formal demand but they failed to comply, hence the collection suit. Since the spouses were separated in fact for more than 1 yr. prior to the filing of the complaint, they filed separate answers. The wife admitted securing a loan together with her husband, however, it was payable on a staggered basis. The husband claimed that the money was not a loan since he offered his services for Carlos construction company and such was his share of the profits

Whether a written instrument by the wife, acknowledging the loan for the conjugal home, without the signature of the husband can bind both? YES

According to the records: (1) there was a check in the amount of US$25k issued by Carlos; (2) the spouses received it and gave it to Vallejo as full payment of a house and lot; (3) this house and lot became the spouses conjugal dwelling; and (4) only the wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but which the husband did not sign. All the checks of the husband were all in the account of H.L. Carlos Construction. On the other hand, the $25k check was drawn from the personal account of Carlos. Assuming to be true that the checks presented were his profits from the corporation, then all the more does this prove that the $25k was not part of such profits because it was issued by Carlos from his own account. Moreover, the husband failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the profits and income of the corporation. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the CPG except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The spouses never denied the money was used to purchase the conjugal dwelling. Hence, the acknowledgment of the loan by the wife binds the CPG since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family so both are solidarily bound to pay the loan. While the husband refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION from the contracts he obtained for Carlos. RTC ORDERED the spouses to pay $25k, plus legal interest thereon and P100k AF and the husband to pay P500k as MD and P50k ED. CA REVERSED and DISMISSED the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned to the spouses because there was evidence that the $25k was the husbands share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction. Carlos: To prove his claim, he showed an instrument executed by the wife acknowledging her and her husbands accountability. Manuel Abelardo: To prove his claim, he presented 10 BPI checks allegedly given to him by Carlos and argued that if indeed, he and his wife were indebted to him, the latter could have easily deducted the amount of the said loan from his share of the profits. CHARGES UPON & OBLIGATIONS OF CPG: PERSONAL DEBTS PEOPLE LAGRIMAS

EL 12 the family because it was used to purchase the conjugal home. Notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of the husband, under Art. 21, FC, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.

The heirs of the victim, sued Froilan Lagrimas for murder and subsequently, moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on his property, which was granted. LC GUILTY of MURDER and ordered to indemnify the heirs P6k plus P10k as damages, AF and burial expenses. A levy was had on 11 parcels of land under the name of the accused. The sale thereof at public auction was scheduled, but before which, the wife of the accused, Mercedes, moved to quash the writ of attachment and execution because the property belonged to the CPG which cannot be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity of the husband.

What practical effect would be given this particular liability of the CPG for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife?

Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Art. 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient. The period during which such a liability may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still existing. Partnership assets contemplates that the responsibilities to which enumerated in Art. 161 chargeable against such assets, must be complied with first. The termination of the CPG is not a prerequisite. Considering that the obligations mentioned in Art. 161 are peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of the wife whose conjugal partnership is made liable, the proof required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity should not be of the most exacting kind, ordinary credibility sufficing. Otherwise, the husband or the wife, as the case may be, representing the CPG may find the temptation to magnify its obligation irresistible so as to defeat the right of recovery of the family of the offended party. The case was remanded for the proper receipt of evidence for recovery.


Juan Ysasi, petitioner, and Maria de Ysasi, one of the respondents, are husband and wife. Juan concedes Hacienda Manucao-A is conjugal property. Since 1948, the spouses have been commuting between the Philippines and Spain where they also own real properties. But the husband shuttled more frequently between the two countries on account of the management of the hacienda. Hacienda Manucao-A was managed by Valentin Bilbao, from 1952-1965 but Juan maintained overall supervision. Then in 1965, Jon, their son, took over as manager. Juan instructed their younger son, Jose, to assist in the management. Jon did not allow him to participate. He also refused to let Jose act as Cashier even as the latter was so designated by the father. Dissension between the two developed. This prompted Maria to leave for the Philippines to iron out the differences between the two brothers and to inquire into the affairs of the hacienda. Juan claims Maria never made any such report. When Jon resigned, Juan designated Bilbao as manager. Jon refused to turn over the hacienda because Maria already took possession and administration of the hacienda since his resignation. Subsequently, Maria filed for administration of the CPG or, in the alternative, a separation of property with ex parte petition that she be appointed receiver pendente lite because her husband was already 77 yrs. and has a blind left eye and he abandoned her and their conjugal properties without just cause. LC GRANTED ex parte petition on the same day. Juan moved to set aside the order appointing his wife receiver pendente lite. Maria filed a supplemental petition asking to appoint a disinterested person, preferably BPI, as receiver. Juan set up affirmative defenses and

Whether a husband may be deprived of his powers of administration over conjugal partnership properties upon mere allegations of abuse of such powers? NO

The changes introduced by the code have not relegated the husband to the position of an ordinary administrator of another's property. He himself has an interest in the community property. Although certain rights are now recognized in the wife, authorizing her to intervene in and question some acts of the husband, the code still assumes the existence of a residuary authority in the latter with respect to the administration of community property. The grant of certain rights to the wife is specific, and must be restrictively construed, so that all others not granted expressly cannot be considered as enjoyed by her. The right to require the husband to render an accounting is not among those granted to her. Neither may the husband be divested of his administration upon mere assertions of fraud. These must first be proven. The law presumes good faith. The husband, accordingly, is entitled to take over possession and management of the hacienda. At stake here are the husband's power of administration and the wife's right to be protected from abuse thereof. The wife's right rests upon proof of such abuse. Absent that proof, the wife's right does not exist. The husband may not be forced to surrender his statutory right to administer the conjugal properties by the simple expedient of merely charging him with the naked averment that he has forfeited that right. Receivership at this stage is improper. Because of the possible abuses that may ensue from the husbands administration, which may result in damage to the wife, mandatory injunction should issue but only upon bond. Maria and Jon are to turn over to Juan the possession and control of Hacienda Manucao-A, and all the agricultural machinery, implements, work animals, and other properties used in the operation of the hacienda, as well as its records, papers, documents and books of accounts, upon Juan's filing, and Judge Jose Fernandez' approval, of a bond in the sum of P50k to answer for any and all damages which private respondents or any of them may suffer by reason of the issuance of said injunction.

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION counterclaim and filed a third-party complaint against Jon and moved for a writ of preliminary mandatory and preventive injunction to compel his wife and son to turn over to Bilbao Hacienda Manucao-A. The BPI, mortgagee of the hacienda, filed an Urgent Motion to Authorize Crop Loan Releases. Juan asked the court that the releases be made to him. LC DENIED writ of preliminary injunction but reserved for a later date the decision for the release of the crop loan lines. Meanwhile BPI was ordered to give monthly allowance of P1,500 to the spouses. And declared BPI to be the receiver. Juan: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. The wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration. The husband may even enforce right of possession against the wife who has taken cover the administration without his consent. And, the wife may be punished for contempt for her refusal to deliver to him the conjugal assets. She may be required to render full and complete accounting of such properties. CPG: DISPOSITION & ENCUMBRANCE FELIPE VS. HEIRS OF ALDON Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara and they bought parcels of land. Later, the lands were divided into 3 lots of the San Jacinto Public Land Subdivision. Gimena sold the lots to Sps. Eduardo and Hermogena Felipe without the consent of her husband. The heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena and their children sued the Sps. Felipe claiming they orally mortgaged the lots and they offered to redeem the mortgage, but was refused, hence the complaint. The Sps. Felipe claimed they acquired the lots by purchase and subsequent delivery. TC - DECLARED the Sps. Felipe to be the lawful owners thereof CA REVERSED and ordered the Sps. Felipe to surrender the lots and muniments of title, make an accounting of the produce derived and to solidarity turn over the NET monetary value of the profits, after deducting the sum of P1,800. Whether the sale of conjugal property by the wife without the consent of the husband is valid? YES



The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, CC) Subject to certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the CPG without the wife's consent. (Art. 166) And the wife cannot bind the CPG without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law. (Art. 172). Here, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband and the sale is not covered by the phrase "except in cases provided by law." Hence, the sale made was a voidable contract. Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband alone but to both spouses. The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold. The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the CPG by the death of Maximo did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter. The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of Maximo they acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow. The Sps. Felipe have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was only in 1976 when the heirs filed action to recover the lands. In the meantime, Maximo Aldon died. Anent the first question, We quote with approval the following statement of the Court of Appeals: Since the Sps. Felipe acted in BF because as relatives they never sought the consent of Maximo, the period for extraordinary prescription (30 years) should be applied and it had not yet lapsed. The children filed action within the period so their shares of the lands was awarded. AQUINO, concurring: I concur in the result. With more reason, the wife cannot make such a disposition without the husband's consent since the husband is the administrator of the conjugal assets. In the instant case, the CA did not err in voiding the wife's sale of the conjugal land without the husband's consent. As that sale is contrary to law, the action to have it declared void or inexistent does not prescribe. Moreover, there are indications that the contract between the parties was an antichresis, a transaction which is very common in rural areas.


Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto since 1974. The disputed lot and the apartments built thereon were part of the spouses conjugal properties having been purchased using conjugal funds from their garments business. In 1984, Ignacia learned that in 1983, Vicente sold the lot to Sps. Cipriano and Florentina Mijares for P40K and that Vicente filed a petition for administration and appointment of guardian, he had misrepresented that his wife died in 1982, and that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs. LC APPOINTED Vicente as the guardian of their minor children and authorized Vicente to sell the

Whether the sale of conjugal property by husband without consent of the wife can be annulled? YES

The husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Ignacias action to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the 10 yr. prescriptive period under Art. 173,CC. Even if reckoned from November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and the spouses entered into a contract, Ignacias action would still be within the prescribed period. The spouses are not purchasers in good faith because of circumstances that should have placed them on guard. The death certificate of Ignacia, shows that she died on March 22, 1982. The same death certificate, however, reveals that (1) it was issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lubao Pampanga on March 10, 1982; (2) the alleged death of Ignacia was reported to the Office of the Civil Registrar on March 4, 1982; and (3) her burial or cremation would be on March 8, 1982. These obvious flaws in

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION estate of Ignacia. Ignacia demanded the return of her share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed in 1996 an annulment of sale. Sps. Mijares: They claimed to be purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because it was duly approved by the court. Vicente: He contended to have sold his share only and never represented she was already dead. He claimed that the Sps. Mijares took advantage of his illiteracy by filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and appointment of guardian without his knowledge. LC DECLARED the sale void with respect to the share of Ignacia. The purchase price of the lot was P110k and ordered Vicente to return thereof to the spouses. Ignacia prayed the sale be declared void in its entirety and that the respondents be ordered to reimburse the rentals they collected on the apartments built thereon. LC DECLARED the sale void in its entirety and ordering Vicente Reyes to reimburse the spouses the purchase price of P110k, but did not award the rentals. Ignacia and the spouses appealed. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs. CA REVERSED, notwithstanding the absence of Ignacias consent to the sale, it is still valid because the spouses were innocent purchasers for value. CPG: EFFECT OF ABANDONMENT DE LA CRUZ VS. DE LA CRUZ Estrella de la Cruz complained her husband, Severino, had not only abandoned her but as well was mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties, and prayed for (1) separation of property, (2) monthly support of P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and (3) payment of P20k as AF and costs. LC GRANTED alimony pendente lite, which however, upon Severino's motion, was reduced to P2,000. ORDERED the separation and division of the conjugal assets, and directing Severino to pay P20k AF. On appeal to the CA, the same was certified to the SC because of the hefty amount involved. Estrella: She claimed that her husband did not sleep in the conjugal dwelling, but paid short visits during which they engaged in brief conversations and left her for his concubine. Severino: He denied having a concubine and admitted that they were living separately but explained that he was never amiss in his obligation to support his family and manage the conjugal property. Did the separation of the husband and wife constitute abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties? NO

EL 14 the death certificate should have prompted them to investigate further, especially so when Florentina Mijares admitted on cross examination that she suspected Ignacia was still alive. The prayer for payment of rentals should be denied. In awarding rentals which are in the nature of actual damages, the Court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss. (1) The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is ordered to issue a new certificate of title over Lot No. 4349-B-2, in the name of petitioners as co-owners thereof; (2) Vicente Reyes is ordered to reimburse the respondent spouses the amount of P110,000.00 as purchase price of Lot No. 4349-B-2, with interest at 6% per annum from June 4, 1986, until finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final, interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal and interest (or any part thereof) shall be imposed until full payment. (3) Vicente Reyes is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Was Severino's failure or refusal to inform the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of the matrimonial assets? NO

The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by Art. 178 when she has been abandoned by the husband for at least 1 yr. are the same as those granted to her by Art. 167 in case of abuse of the powers of administration by the husband. To entitle her to any of these remedies, under Art. 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact Severino never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and children, the wife's petition for separation of property must be denied. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of separation as not in harmony with the unity of the family and the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses, the CC requires that separation of property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage and in the latter case, it may only be ordered by the court for causes specified in Art. 191, NCC.

There is absolutely no evidence to show that he has squandered the conjugal assets. Upon the contrary, he proved that through his industry and zeal, the conjugal assets at the time of the trial had increased to a value of over a million pesos. The mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family businesses does not constitute abuse of administration. For abuse to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

SUPPORT DURING CPG LIQUIDATION SANTERO VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE The petitioners Princesita, Federico and Winy are the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private Whether allowance to the respondents Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed and one is married. Petitioners allege there was misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel are four of the seven children begotten by Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was married to Pablo. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. During the intestate proceedings the respondents moved for allowance on the ground they were of schooling age. CFI GRANTED the motion without conducting a hearing thereon

should be on the mere allegation that they are still schooling without conducting a hearing thereon? YES

EL 15 tuition fees, books and other school materials and other miscellaneous expenses for school term. They further allege that the administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit properties from where these funds now held by the administrator are derived. The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here). Under Art 191, there must be abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property of the husband, or in case of abandonment by the husband, separation of property may also be ordered by the court according to the provisions of Arts. 167 and 173(3). In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment which has been entered against the guilty or absent spouse. The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of Arts. 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in Arts. 498 to 501 shall be applicable. This enumeration must be regarded as limitative, in view of the Code's restrictive policy. In the event of such maladministration by the wife (and disregarding the case of judicial authorization to have the wife manage the partnership, since such a case is not involved), the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the wife and resume the administration of the community property and the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal partnership. He may enforce his right of possession and control of the conjugal property against his wife and seek such ancillary remedies as may be required by the circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized alienations or incumbrances, upon proper action filed for that purpose. For this reason, the articles above quoted contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife (who is not the legal administrator of the partnership) against the abuses of her husband because normally only the latter can commit such abuses. The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the CPG during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. The spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the dissolution of their CPG. It does not appear that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by these arrangements. Being separated in fact for at least 5 yrs., there is propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is manifest. However, in so approving the regime of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their CPG, the Court does not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses. The new article in the CC recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. No matter how large the income of a working wife compared to that of her husband, the major, if not the full responsibility of running the household remains with the woman. She is the administrator of the household. The fact that the two involved in this case were not legally married at the time does not change the nature of their respective roles. It is the woman who traditionally holds the family purse even if she does not contribute to filling that purse with funds.

JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: FOR SUFFICIENT CAUSE Gonzalo Garcia sued his wife Consolacion for the GARCIA VS. judicial declaration of the separation of their MANZANO CPG. Gonzalo claimed they have been living separately from each other and all attempts at reconciliation have failed. He claimed that during the separation, his wife had assumed complete management and administration of the CPG and enjoyed its fruits without filing any ITRs. Consolacion MTD for lack of cause of action because none of the grounds under Art. 191, NCC for decreeing a judicial separation of properties was alleged. LC DISMISSED the complaint Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Whether the complaint establishes a sufficient cause for judicial separation of property? NO

JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: VOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY Carmen San Jose-Lacson left the conjugal home Whether the LACSON VS. SAN to reside in Manila and filed for custody of her agreement to JOSE-LACSON children with Alfonso. The Sps. succeeded in voluntarily reaching an amicable settlement respecting dissolve the CPG custody of the children, support, and separation is valid? of property. YES JDRC GRANTED the compromise Alfonso delivered all the four children to Carmen and remitted money for their support. Carmen wanted to modify the arrangement regarding their children and the compromise regarding the separation of their property.

LIVE IN PARTNERS OR THOSE UNDER A VOID MARRIAGE Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both MAXEY VS. COURT deceased) were married in a military fashion OF APPEALS and thereafter, lived together as husband and wife and had 6 children. During their cohabitation, Melbourne acquired the parcels of land and sold it to the Sps. Monday. The Maxey children sued for the annulment of the documents of sale claiming these were common properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital. The sale by their father after the death of their mother was without their

Whether the NCC should apply retroactively as to award the household efforts of the wife and allow her a claim on the property gathered during the live in relationship?

CILR1 DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION knowledge and consent. The Sps. Monday claim to be purchasers for value. TC DECLARED that the rules on co-ownership should govern because there was only a live in relationship and held that justice demands that the woman should be entitled to the share of the property and ORDERED the return of the lands.


EL 16 The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include not only the earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife. Thee disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. The Sps. Monday are ordered to return one-half of the properties to the heirs of Regina Morales.

CA REVERSED because the lands were the exclusive properties of the late Melbourne. BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES, ADULTEROUS / CONCUBINAGE RELATIONSHIPS, RELATIONSHIPS SAME MAN Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and Whether the JUANIZA VS. JOSE operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an concubine, who is accident of collision with a freight train of the not a registered PNR, which resulted in the death of 7 and owner of the physical injuries of 5 passengers. At the time of jeepney, can be the accident, Eugenio was legally married to held solidarily Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with liable for Rosalia Arroyo, for 16 yrs. damages with her live in partner? CFI - ORDERED Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo to indemnify the victims solidarily and DENIED NO the MR of Rosalia (insofar as it condemns her to pay damages solidarily with her co-defendant) because of her liability as co-owner of the jeepney under Art. 144, CC. GOMEZ VS. LIPANA

WHERE BOTH ARE MARRIED TO OTHERS, MULTIPLE ALLIANCES OF THE Art. 144, CC requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under Art. 144, CC, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the CPG of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision. Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages caused by its operation. Only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.




SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least onehalf of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, NIcdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license.

(1) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void; (2) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.