Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-11371 August 1, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CECILIA MEMORACION and DALMACIO URI, defendants-appellants. Manly, Goddard and Lockwood, Rafael de la Sierra and D.R. Williams for appellants. Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee. JOHNSON, J.: These defendants were charged with the crime of adultery. On the 7th of June, 1915, a complaint was presented against them in the court of the justice of the peace of the municipality of Albay. A preliminary examination was held, at the close of which the justice of the peace found that there was probable cause for believing that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint, and held them for trial in the Court of First Instance. On the 26th of June, 1915, the offended party presented a complaint against the said defendants. Later, on the 23d of August, 1915, the said offended party presented an amended complaint, which alleged: That the said accused, Cecilia Memoracion, on or about June 6, 1915, within the district of the municipality of Albay, Province of Albay, P. I., being legally and lawfully married to the complainant, the offended party Eustaquio Abrigo, did, willfully and criminally, unite, lie and have carnal intercourse with her coaccused, Dalmacio Uri; that the said accused, Dalamcio Uri, then knowing that his coaccused, Cecilia Memoracion, was legally and lawfully married to the aggrieved party, Eustaquio Abrigo, did, willfully and criminally, unite, lie and have carnal intercourse with his coaccused, Cecilia Memoracion; acts committed with violation of law. Upon said complaint the defendants were duly arraigned and each pleaded not guilty of the crime charged in the complaint. The cause was brought on for trial and after hearing the evidence the Honorable J. C. Jenkins, judge, in a carefully prepared opinion, found that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced each of them to be imprisoned for a period of four years, nine months and eleven days of prision correccional with the accessory penalties of article 61 of the Penal code and each to pay one-half the costs. From that sentence each of the defendants appealed to this court. In this court the appellants make the following assignments of error: (1) In not sustaining the objection filed by the defense during the trial of the case to the following questions, Q. How are you related to the defendant woman?

Mr. SIERRA. Objected to as not best proof.

The COURT. I will allow the evidence. A. She is my wife.

And, therefore, is allowing the taking of evidence with respect to the alleged marital relation between the complaint and the coaccused Cecilia Memoracion. (2) In admitting as evidence the alleged marriage certificate issued by the parish priest of Daraga; and, therefore, in overruling the objection filed by the attorney for the defense against the introduction of Exhibit G, as evidence for the prosecution. (3) In the court himself personally addressing the following questions to the witness Nicolas Briola: Q. A. Q. A. Did you know her (referring to the defendant) when she was married to Eustaquio? — Yes, sir. Where you at the wedding? — I was there.

And in refusing to strike out of the record the testimony of the witness Nicolas Briola, overruling the motion so to do, made by the defense. (4) In holding in the judgment that the alleged marriage of the complainant Eustaquio Abrigo with the coaccused Cecilia Memoracion is a proven fact. (5) In holding that there is legal presumption of the existence of the marriage between the complainant Abrigo and the coaccused Memoracion. (6) In holding as a proven fact that the accused Dalmacio Uri knew, on the night of June 6, 1915, that Cecilia Memoracion and Eustaquio Abrigo were husband and wife. (7) In holding that the accused are guilty of the crime of adultery, and in sentencing them to the penalty of fours years nine months and eleven days of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties and costs. With reference to said assignments of error, the first, third and fourth may be discussed together for the reason that they present but one question. The question presented by the said assignments of error is whether or not oral testimony is competent proof of a marriage in the case of the crime of adultery. The first assignment of error is based upon the fact that the husband was asked the question whether or not he and the defendant Cecilia Memoracion were married and whether or not they were husband and wife. The appellants contend that his declaration was not competent evidence upon that fact. If a man and a woman are married, the declaration of either of them is competent evidence to show the fact. No witness is more competent than they are. Whether the declaration of a husband alone is sufficient to prove that fact must depend upon each particular case. There might, perchance, be a case where the judge would not believe the declaration of the husband or wife upon the question of the marriage. In such a case corroborative proof might become necessary. Corroboration of the fact is not absolutely necessary if the declaration of either the husband or wife is sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the court. Certainly there are no witnesses more competent than the husband and wife to testify as to whether they were married or not. Under the third assignment of error, the same question is presented with reference to the oral declaration of Nicolas Briola. The appellant contends that his oral declaration should not have been accepted upon the question whether the marriage existed or not. He testified that Cecilia Memoracion and Eustaquio Abrigo had been married and that he was present to the wedding. A witness who is present at the time a marriage takes place is certainly a competent witness to testify as to whether a marriage took place or not. Whether or not his declaration should be accepted depends upon his credibility, but his declaration is admissible for the purpose of showing that fact.

Villafuerte (4 Phil. With reference to the fifth assignment of error. in a criminal action. but it is now excluded from the record and will not be considered by the court as evidence.S. That fact alone gave rise to the presumption that they were husband and wife. therefore. it remains to be seen whether or not the alleged spouses had "deported themselves as husband and wife. With reference to the second assignment of error. That fact is not denied. The lower court said in the course of his decision: It is true that certificate of marriage by the parish priest (Exhibit G) was. therefore there is the presumption that they had entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Rep. united by virtue of a legal marriage contract. In view of the above quoted provision of Act No. we find no reason for sustaining the contention of the appellant.. and this presumption can only be rebutted by sufficient contrary evidence. In discussing that provision of said Act No. the appellant claims that the lower court committed an error in admitting as proof Exhibit G. . We are fully convinced that Eustaquio Abrigo and Cecilia Memoracion were legally married and that they were husband and wife. the lower court in the course of his opinion said: They (the alleged husband and wife) deported themselves as husband and wife and. upon an examination of the decision of the lower court. nor even questioned by anything found in the record. Subparagraph 28 of section 334 of Act No. and had been cohabiting together for a long period of time.) In that case the court simply said that the substantially uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness in a case of adultery as to the fact of the marriage is not sufficient to establish the fact. independent of the positive testimony of an eyewitness and the husband. under the same roof. it will be noted. 190 which relates to disputable presumptions provides: That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Rep." The record shows that they had been living in the same house. 190. and purports to certify that Eustaquio Abrigo and Cecilia Memoracion were married. Exhibit G was not considered as proof for the purpose of determining the existence of the marriage in question. In view of that fact. that it was rejected and was not considered as proof. but the declaration of the husband was supported by the testimony of another witness who was present at the time the marriage took place. Nebrida and Saorda (32 Phil. While it is true that the lower court admitted Exhibit G over the objection of the defendant. Exhibit G purports to be a marriage certificate issued by the parish priest.. 190 and the decision of this court upon the same. In the present case the declaration of the husband as to the marriage was corroborated by proof that he and his alleged wife had been living together for a period of twenty years. on the trial. improperly admitted. beyond a reasonable doubt. And not only that. 160.In reaching the foregoing conclusion we have not overlooked the decision of this court in the case of U. 559): A man and woman who are living in marital relations under the same roof are presumed to be legitimate spouses. this court said in the case of United States vs. vs.

. it may be said. That the said Uri and Memoracion had had illicit relations at the time and place described in the complaint is not denied. in the absence of positive proof to the contrary. Trent. in view of the fact that he had visited the house of Eustaquio and Cecilia twenty or more times before the commission of the crime. petitioner. we are convinced. one toward the other. that the fact that they were husband and wife was well known in that community. STREET. appellees. The proof shows beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreland. the appellants contend that the defendant Dalmacio Uri. that he did not at least know that they were married and were husband and wife. and Araullo. It can scarcely be believed. With reference to the seventh assignment of error. UY PIAN NG SHUN and ORENCIO RAMON LIM TINGCO. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. It is also shown that the defendant Dalmacio Uri has visited the house of Cecilia and her husband a great number of times. with costs. In view of the fact that he had frequently visited the house where Eustaquio and Cecilia were living and saw their relations. 1928 Estate of the deceased Lim Tingco. ET AL.With reference to the sixth assignment of error. at the time the alleged illicit relations took place. by eyewitnesses. Filemon Saavedra for Balbina Lim Tingco and Benigno Barnes. No appearance for other appellees. Therefore the sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed. that he had seen them together in the same house. beyond a reasonable doubt. FELIPE ALKUINO LIM PANG. No. The defendant Uri had been in the community where the crime was committed for a number of months. vs.. that we are convinced. concur. So ordered. did not know that Cecilia Memoracion was a married woman. J. The husband of Cecilia declared that they had lived together as husband and wife in the community where the crime was alleged to have been committed for a number of years. Torres. JJ. after a careful examination of the evidence. L-29236 December 29. and that he knew that they were living there together. that he must have known that they were at least living together as husband and wife. that they had had the illicit relations charged in the complaint.: . appellant. JUSTINA OLONDRES. Domingo and Lim Reyes for appellants.R. that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and that the sentence of the lower court is in accordance with the facts and the law.

Leyte. as widow. 1927. and Ramon Lim Tingco. or intervention. a reply was interposed by Uy Pian Ng Shun. deceased. no doubt. already mentioned. and sometimes called Imbina Barnes. This daughter.000. wife of Benigno Barnes. who usurped the place of the lawful wife. acting upon her own account and as representative of her son Ramon. Ramon Lim Tingco. The cause was then . now married to Benigno Barnes. and they agreed to make no claim in court with respect thereto. the appellant. in the fact that. making his home in the municipality of Baybay. abandoned the conjugal hearth and went to live elsewhere. To this opposition. On October 2. as heir. without opposition from any source. Benigno Barnes. excluding the appellant Uy Pian Ng Shun from sharing in the estate of the testator. Mateo Lim Tingco. Notwithstanding the making of this compromise and the acceptance by Justina Olondres and Balbina Lim Tingco of the portions assigned to them respectively. Uy Pian Ng Shun. Balbina Lim Tingco. for the purpose of reversing an order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. and declared that he wanted his property to be shared by her and their son Ramon as his only heirs. where he lived until his death on April 18. The testator. a few days before the petition for the probate of the will was filed. Justina Olondres and Balbina Lim Tingco. and filed what may be described as an opposition. The portions conceded to Justina Olondres and Balbina Lim Tingco by this agreement were of respectable size. a marriage was duly celebrated by Mateo Lim Tingco and Justina Olondres. but no children resulted from the union. in which she relied upon the compromise agreement. and asked the court to ascertain who were the true heirs of Mateo Lim Tingco. are entitled to share in the same estate respectively as widow and recognized natural daughter of the testator. named Ramon. came to the Philippine Island some forty-five or fifty years ago. 1925. is entitled only to support from the estate and that the appellees. dated October 29. In consideration of the portions so received Justina Olondres and Balbina Lim Tingco in turn renounced whatever rights they might have had in the estate of the deceased. with whom was joined the latter's husband. The general purport of these documents is that Uy Pian Ng Shun assigned a part of the property belonging to the estate of Mateo Lim Tingco to Justina Olondres and another part to Balbina (or Imbina). in the matter of the will of Mateo Lim Tingco. Lim Tingco executed a will in due form of Law at Baybay. For the effectuation of this purpose formal documents were drawn up and acknowledged before a notary public by Uy Pian Ng Shun. and declaring that Ramon. In the early years of his abode in Baybay he became the father of a daughter. regardless of the statements contained in the will. Balbina and her husband appeared in court on July 6. After Lim Tingco's death this will was duly admitted to probate on July 5. and in course of time Lim Tingco formed an irregular connection with a Chinese woman. of Chinese nationality. as the trial court found was recognized in life by Lim Tingco as his natural daughter. 1886. and by Justina Olondres and Balbina Lim Tingco. Justina Olondres. in which they impugned the intrinsic provisions of the will with respect to the right of Uy Pian Ng Shun. was born. On November 27. or intervention. the adult parties interested in the division of Lim Tingco's property had gotted together and compromised their claims to said estate. in which he stated that he was married to Uy Pian Ng Shun. otherwise known in the record as Angela Olondres and Martina Londres. becoming disgusted with her husband's infidelity.This appeal is prosecuted on behalf of Uy Pian Ng Shun and her minor son. Province of Leyte. The pair lived together for many years as husband and wife. This boy is now some 8 or 9 years of age and is the minor appellant in this case. As a result of the irregular connection between Lim Tingco and Uy Pian a son. Thereupon Justina. amounting together to more than P3. and to make declaration accordingly. The fact that no opposition was interposed to the probate of this will by Justina Olondres or Balbina Barnes finds its explanation. 1927. 1927. 1927. as an illegitimate child.

But while admissible as prima facie proof in favor of the appellant. are the only persons entitled to participate in the testate estate of Mateo Lim Tingco. in view of the compromise agreement to which reference has already been made. . The effect of this agreement undoubtedly is to estop Justina Olondres and Balbina Lim Tingco from claiming any further share in the estate of the deceased. The appellees were competent to bind themselves by said agreement. this statement is not conclusive. by said agreement.. Malcolm. the statement in the will must be considered rebutted. as against the appellees. and the disposition of the property made in the will is always open to question with respect to the intrinsic legality of the disposition (Ramirez vs. without pronouncement as to costs. Whatever weakness may have been inherent in the appellants' title. 42 Phil. concur. found that Justina Olondres. The circustance that the will had been admitted to probate is conclusive only of the due execution of the will. Villamor. as the widow of the deceased.net But consideration of the relative proportions in which the four litigants would have been entitled to share under the will of Lim Tingco becomes an academic question. were alone entitled to share in the inheritance of the deceased. But although Uy Pian Ng Shun and her son Ramon are thus excluded from taking under the will in so far as the disposition in their favor would prejudice the rights of the widow and the recognized daughter. in conformity with its provisions they accepted a fair share of the estate in full satisfaction of their claims. Johnson. that defect has been cured. It becomes our duty therefore to reverse the appealed decision and to declare that the appellant Uy Pian Ng Shun and her son. But it is never too soon for the court to give effect to binding contracts when issues are properly raised with respect thereto. 855). as stated in the first paragraph of this opinion. the same to be shared by them in the proportions contemplated in the will. that Justina Olondres was the true of the decedent by virtue of an undissolved canonical marriage. whereupon Justina Olondres intervened. Upon hearing the cause the trial court. and Balbina Lim Tingco. that she was his wife at the time the will was made. JJ. Romualdez and Villa-Real. The consequence is that the appellees must be excluded from further participation in the property. Ramon Lim Tingco. Gmur. Ostrand. and it cannot be disposed of by merely ignoring it.. and when it is demostrated. We note that no extrinsic proof was introduced by the appellant Uy Pian Ng Shun for the purpose of establishing her status as wife. and no suggestion has been made that the contract was vitiated by fraud or error. In the case before us the appellants rely upon said agreement. making common cause with Balbina. Upon this point reliance is placed by her exclusively on the declaration of the testator. contained in his will. The trial court appears to have been of the opinion that the time had not yet come to consider the effect of this agreement. as a recognized natural daughter. In her reply to this intervention Uy Pian Ng Shun again set up the compromise agreement. it should not escape notice that the testamentary provision would have complete efficacy in so far of the court to declare that Uy Pian Ng Shun and her son could not take anything under the will. So ordered.set for hearing upon the matter of the determination of heirs. Johns. of date anterior to the creation of the relation between Uy Pian and the decedent. as in this case. 1awphi 1.

ENRIQUE J. Luis R. Yangco. No. AMALIA CORPUS. 1944 at Palauig. 527. two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus. Zambales." The Probate court in its order of December 26. Atty. RAFAEL CORPUS. and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus. (2) his half sister. Cruz. CORPUS. Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus. 73 Phil. vs. SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO. L-22469 October 23. It was also opposed by Atty. Teodoro R. Corpus. plaintiff-appellant. the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. the widow of Tomas Corpus. CORPUS. S. Pablo Corpus. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. and Ramon L. V. defendants-appellees. should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. Yangco. Cruz appeared as her counsel. Yangco. his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother. JOSE A. Juanita died in October. 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years.: Teodoro R. the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus. Roman A. Paz Yangco. At the time of his death. V. Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. the children of his half brother. STAGG. 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs.R. Jose A. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco. RAMON L. Yangco died in Manila on April 20. Pursuant to the order of the probate court. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision. Atty. Yangco had no forced heirs. who represented Juanita Corpus. a project of partition dated November 26. AQUINO. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles. 1946 approved the project of partition. 1978 TOMAS CORPUS. His will dated August 29. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a Perpetual . 54863. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate. J. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestadocon respecio a los raismos y que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared Because the will does not contain an institution of heir.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. CORPUS. Corpus. W.

Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate? . as the sole heir of Juanita corpus. entries of judgment were made on those dates. Tomas Corpus. 1951.prohibition against alienation.000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz. Tuason. In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 2613). Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal became. In the compromise dated October 7. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See Barretto vs. D or 17). It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December 26. Court of Appeals.) From that order. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. 27 SCRA 546. Juliana de Castro . the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches. it concluded that "no hay motives legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. and Rodriguez vs. Pedro Martinez. the heirs of Pio V. 17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. No. Yangco was a natural child. 1969. the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. On October 5. final and executory on October 14 and November 4. Corpus. Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R. the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. R. 1949. 888. Pursuant to the compromise agreement. Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23.000 to Pedro Martinez. The trial court in its decision of July 2. Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31. which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate. 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise agreements. 1964 in CA-G. L-28734. 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2. our attorney in this case" (Exh. therefore. that conch tion would be regarded "como no puesta o no existents". The estate of Luis R. On September 20. March 28. That did not set at rest the controvery over the Yangco's estate. 1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35. Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October 24. The appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. 50 Phil. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 1947.

Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales Diez Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69. Hamados Teodoro. that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles. Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to haya reconocido. the mother of Teodoro. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas.To answer that question. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco). Yangco". 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. . ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos. Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. pp. it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco. Aguas. and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec.. 54863. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother. On the other hand. 287. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus. he (Tomas Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 4th Ed. in Yangco's estate. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record. "that a child born in lawful wedlock. dated June 14. Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman. Yangco was a natural child. los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos (Exh. Juanita Corpus. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father. himself a legitimate child. 455-6). Yangco. as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. . there being no divorce. Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R.. as a legal heir. The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. as reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Civil Code. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus. hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. [bb] and cc Rule 131. Identified as Exhibit 1 herein. 5[z]. Yangco. absolute or from bed and board. 63 Phil. 1907. appellant's brief). See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil. Luisa y Luis.. These contentions have no merit. It is disputably presumption "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage". Rules of Court). Since Teodoro R. that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. Luis Rafael Yangco. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. 8. is legitimate". Paz. His exact words are: Primera. 279. the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas. which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.

Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two acknowledged natural children of her uncle. 128). "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue. had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.6). Where the testatrix. No. WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. hated by the illegitimate child. vs. and if both acknowledged it and are alive. EMILIA DIVINAGRACIA.R. 57 Phil. 10 Phil. they shall inherit from it share and share alike. L-42615 August 10. 185. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side. Centeno vs. No costs. who were legitimate. ROSARIO DIVINAGRACIA and JUANITA DIVINAGRACIA. Sevilla. The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle. 38 Phil. Allarde vs. Aquino and Ortiz. were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs.19996. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa. either legitimate or acknowledged. See De Guzman vs. formerly article 943. 909). Centeno. . April 30. DOLORES DIVINAGRACIA. SO ORDERED. in turn. Codigo Civil. 1976 SALUD DIVINAGRACIA. Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code. Following the rule in article 992. it was held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. 29). 52 Phil. 7th Ed. 991).. petitioners. the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. 585. nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child". natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters. a legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate. 1965. Rodriguez. Teodoro R. 13 SCRA 693.The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. pp. That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is. Table 88 Phil. By reason of that same rule. Udan L." Hence. 47 Phil. In default of natural ascendants. Ramon Table her father's brother. Abaya. 322. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.

a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the settlement of his estate (Spec. Veloso in his order of April 17. Dolores. Two days after his death. Judge Veloso did not act on it before he retired in the early part of 1975. The case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Valerie V. Regala & Cruz for petitioners. In April. Paterno. Feliciano Divinagracia died in Iloilo City on February 1. that there is no allegation in the motion that Camilo's filiation was acknowledged by the decedent. June 30. No. Angara. She paid the estate and inheritance taxes. Emilia Divinagracia qualified as administratrix on May 22. and that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain Camilo's action for acknowledgment. On June 8. subject to the condition that the heirs shall assume all the outstanding obligations of the estate". 1752). Rovira who issued the questioned order dated October 18. 1971 approved the final accounting and project of partition and declared the proceeding "closed and terminated. and that he came to know of the intestate proceeding only when he was transferred as a government employee from Masbate to Iloilo a few days before June 8. Judge Castrense C. 1964. Enojas for private respondent. (1) an inventory of the assets of the decedent's estate as of December 31. 5 and 6). The order setting the petition for hearing was published on April 22 and 29 and May 6. 8). She administered the estate for seven years. that he was born on November 9. Concepcion. (3) a statement that the five heirs (the widow and four daughters) had received their respective shares. 1975 reopening the intestate proceeding. J. The facts are as follows. That pleading. contains. and (4) an assumption by the heirs of the obligations of the estate (par. 1964. as held in Paterno vs. . 1970 (par. and CAMILO DIVINAGRACIA. respondents. Court of First Instance. Proc. He prayed for the determination of his share in the decedent's estate. 1930. and Juanita. Camilo Divinagracia filed a motion to reopen it and to set aside the order of closure. 1971 she submitted to the court a final accounting and project of partition with a prayer for the closure of the proceeding. each consisting of a one-fifth proindiviso participation in the decedent's estate (pars. Branch IV. Panfilo B. that its expediente had already been archived. can still be reopened so as to allow a spurious child to present evidence on his filiation and to claim his share in the decedent's estate. Abello. which had already been closed. The motion remained unresolved for more than four years. an English and Ilongo weekly circulating in Iloilo City and Western Visayas. Iloilo City. The notice of his death was published in two local periodicals and in the Manila times. aside from the accounting. Salud and their four daughters named Emilia.JUDGE VALERIO V. L-23060. He alleged that he was an illegitimate child of the decedent. Rosario. He was survived by his wife. 1964 in the Yuhum. (2) a declaration as to who were the heirs of the decedent and their respective shares in the estate (par. The partition was duly registered. 1971 or after the order closing the intestate proceeding had become final. ROVIRA in his capacity as Presiding Judge.: The question in this case is whether an intestate proceeding. 20 SCRA 585. The administratrix in her opposition to the motion contended that the proceeding could no longer be reopened. AQUINO. 4). 1967. which was signed by the widow and her four daughters. 3).

Jerez vs. 30 SCRA 904. 83. 1974. Villanueva. Moreover. provides: SECTION 1. which took effect on June 18. The probate court in its questioned order directed the administratrix to submit a complete liquidation of the conjugal partnership and an inventory of the decedent's estate after the payment of its debts. At the hearing. December 27. Compare with Ramos vs. It further directed that the liquidation and the inventory should be set for hearing with notice to movant Camilo Divinagracia. The motion to reopen it was not filed within the thirty-day reglementary period counted from the date the order of closure was served on the administratrix. 5440. September 28. That question falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo. 4834. We hold that the probate court erred in reopening the intestate proceeding. 35 SCRA 80. 1970. Provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding. 248). contained a liquidation of the conjugal partnership and a statement as to who were the decedent's heirs and what were their respective hereditary shares. 730. 1969. Republic Act No. which was submitted by the administratrix and approved by the probate court. Thereafter. de Lopez vs. The lower court denied the administratrix's motion for reconsideration of its order reopening the intestate proceeding. shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The probate court further erred in entertaining Camilo Divinagracia's motion to reopen the intestate proceeding. 1976. Lopez. 1976 the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. The truth is that the project of partition and distribution. 89 Phil. another hearing should be held to determine the decedent's heirs. who was left out in the partition. 909. 95 Phil. for which a judge who shall possess the same qualifications. Camilo could present evidence to prove his claim that he was an Id acknowledged spurious child of the deceased. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations court. 58 SCRA 678. L-26876. Vda. should be allowed to secure relief in the intestate proceeding by filing the proper motion within the reglementary period. with final accounting. It erred because that motion involved the determination of his status as the decedent's spurious child. the order for the reopening of the intestate proceeding was predicated on the false assumption that there had been no liquidation of the conjugal partnership and no declaration of heirs. and that an interested party. with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. It is really an appeal under Republic Act No. — There shall be a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in the Province of Iloilo. Nietes. Muñoz. 1966. August 29. a proceeding in rem of which Camilo Divinagracia is deemed to have had constructive notice (Varela vs. The order closing it was already final and executory. Ortuzar. L-23195.The probate court set aside its prior order of closure because it assumed that there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Feliciano Divinagracia and Salud Bretaña that there was no declaration of heirs. That project of partition was a substantial compliance with articles 179 et sequentia of the Civil Code. enjoy the same privileges and receive the same salary as judges of courts of first instance. A copy of the order of denial was received by the administratrix on January 7. The closure order could not be disturbed anymore (Imperial vs. L-30787. She filed on January 31. 741. where the motion to reopen the intestate proceeding was filed within the reglementary period). the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases after the effectivity of this Act: .

and Bartolome vs. adoption. or (b) he may intervene in the administration proceeding for the settlement of his deceased parent's estate and there ask for recognition and at the same time enforce his hereditary rights (Briz vs. 1967. paternity and acknowledgment. is good in provinces where there are no Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and where the administration proceeding has not been instituted or is already closed. Suarez vs. 278. commonly known as bastards include adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married woman cohabiting with a woman other than his . 11 SCRA 48. But that legal provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not been terminated. or illegitimate children other than natural children. which created its Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. where it was held that cases involving paternity and acknowledgment fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Rules of Court) is not violated by the holding that the action to establish plaintiff's filiation as an illegitimate child should be filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and cannot be joined to the action of the illegitimate child for partition and recovery of his hereditary share in his putative father's estate. 33 SCRA 252). if the parent is dead. 1976). Uriarte vs. 409). 227. Briz and Remigio. July 13. said incident shall be determined in the main case. Zaldarriaga vs. Lopez. L-19566. Lopez vs. 763. Those provisions are similar to the provisions of Republic Act No. 4. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. L-42215. 1964. 43 Phil. xxx xxx xxx If any question involving any of the above matters (seven classes of cases) should arise as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary courts. 1401 in Republic Act No. supra. 903. 68 Phil. Bartolome. In this connection. Mariño. who has not been voluntarily acknowledged (Art. May 25. There is a rule that the remedy of a natural child. guardianship. L-23661. Civil Code) but who can justifiably compel recognition. This rule. The Paterno and Bartolome cases involve provisions of the Charter of Manila inserted by Republic Act No. The so-called spurious children. Suarez. is either (a) a separate action against his parent to compel recognition. The instant case is similar to the Paterno case. 21 SCRA 1324. against all the potential heirs who would be prejudiced by his recognition together with an action for the enforcement of his rights against his parent or the latter's heirs. Rule 2. Ines Luciano. 43 Phil.xxx xxx xxx (b) Cases involving custody. a review of the rules governing the filiation of a spurious child may be useful in ascertaining the remedy open to Camilo Divinagracia. which is cognizable by the Court of First Instance: It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. It was clarified in the Paterno case that the rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause of action (Sec. 4834 a case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. 4834 which created the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo. December 20. L-21938. which may be applied to the spurious child's action to establish his filiation and assert his hereditary rights. or.

64 O. Galeon. 278. May 24. 887). That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged. or in any authentic writing. as that term is used with respect to natural children. Edades vs. The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children. Edades vs. 522). 1973. in the result. a statement before a court of record. Edades. 109 Phil. (Cf. 24 SCRA 720. Art. supra). Paterno vs. 99 Phil. Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. Clemeña. Ponce Enrile. In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child. 113 Phil. applies to spurious children (Vda. Pactor vs. as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code. concur. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children (Pactor vs. Civil Code). Pestaño. August 22. 107 Phil. 685. then his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284 Noble vs. In the instant case. 1973.G. February 28. Workmen's Compensation Commission. 52 SCRA 190. Velez vs. Camilo Divinagracia did not disclose whether he has any evidence of voluntary recognition of his filiation. 354). What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children (Barles vs. SO ORDERED. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children (Paulino and Nieto vs. 1975. 697. 107 Phil. Sotto vs. Ponce Enrile. reopening the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Feliciano Divinagracia. is set aside. 17 SCRA 243. Pauline. Sotto. the probate court's order of October 18. Antonio. 1966. Reyes vs. 1968. There is no allegation in his motion that would sustain his claim for compulsory acknowledgment of his filiation. How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. Velez.wife. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children (Art. 13 SCRA 272.. Paterno. Zuzuarregui 102 Phil. Civil Code). Edades. 287. A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth. L-28873. Costs against private respondent. . 1753. J. L-20921.. supra). Concepcion. 675. concurs. They are entitled to support and successional rights (Art. infra. 700). L30380. Noble. July 31. a will. L-19946. But their filiation must be duly proven (Ibid. Pestaño. L-24845. 49 SCRA 516. 346. Galeon vs. Republic vs. February 26. Barles vs. 1965. In view of the foregoing considerations. 685).. de Clemeña vs. Jr. J.

a spurious child can no longer prove his paternity otherwise. in their being born as such are more unfortunate than the latter. I feel that spurious children who are certainly without fault. as also are natural children. no matter how convincing his evidence may be. the commendable objective of the Civil Code of giving to all innocent children more in law than what their indiscreet and perhaps inconsiderate parents care to bestow on them. as also are natural children. for obvious reasons of convenience? Fernando. I do not feel prepared at this time to share his views as to the modes open to spurious children to establish their illegitimate paternity as basis for entitling them to the successional and other rights granted to them by the Civil Code. no matter how convincing his evidence may be. if only because there is bound to be more antagonism against them from the legitimates and naturals and it is an unusual philanderer who openly and formally acknowledges spurious children. for obvious reasons of convenience? Fernando. I have yet to be convinced that allowing spurious children to prove such paternity by means other than those indispensably prescribed for natural children places the former "in a better position" than the latter. if not nullifying indirectly. . I feel that spurious children who are certainly without fault.. J. in their being born as such are more unfortunate than the latter. Presently. J. However. if not nullifying indirectly. And if without such direct acknowledgment. Justice Aquino resolving the issues of jurisdiction and procedure raised in the petition and in the resulting judgment rendered by him. Presently. Justice Aquino resolving the issues of jurisdiction and procedure raised in the petition and in the resulting judgment rendered by him. concurring: I concur in the scholarly and comprehensive opinion of Mr.. concur. concur. I do not feel prepared at this time to share his views as to the modes open to spurious children to establish their illegitimate paternity as basis for entitling them to the successional and other rights granted to them by the Civil Code. if only because there is bound to be more antagonism against them from the legitimates and naturals and it is an unusual philanderer who openly and formally acknowledges spurious children. the commendable objective of the Civil Code of giving to all innocent children more in law than what their indiscreet and perhaps inconsiderate parents care to bestow on them. J. And if without such direct acknowledgment. J. I have yet to be convinced that allowing spurious children to prove such paternity by means other than those indispensably prescribed for natural children places the former "in a better position" than the latter.Separate Opinions BARREDO. a spurious child can no longer prove his paternity otherwise. However... would that not amount to practically diluting. concurring: I concur in the scholarly and comprehensive opinion of Mr. Separate Opinions BARREDO. would that not amount to practically diluting.

her daughter by her first marriage. in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Marciana Escaño. granting to the administrator fees in the sum of P10. (3) holding it unwarranted to declare that the properties of the intestate estate are paraphernal properties of said deceased. Hipolito Alo and Ciriaco S.000 charged by the administrator were highly unreasonable and unconscionable. and (5) ordering the presentation of another project of partition and final account. and the remaining part to Angelita Jones. (4)setting aside the order of January 10. who was a minor. her widower by her second marriage.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. and even granting that it were valid. Vicente L. 1934. In a motion filed with the conformity of the guardian of the heiress Angelita Jones. as administrator.000. as administrator. be fixed at P10. (b) that her husband appointed special administrator without bond. 1933.R. and the properties were turned over to the respective grantees by virtue thereof. and a project of partition of the intestate estate wherein he adjudicated to himself a part of the estate in payment of his share of the conjugal properties and his usufructuary right. As Marciana Escaño had died intestate. Felix Hortiguela. that there never was a valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage been celebrated. No. her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her entire estate. CONCEPCION. prayed that his fees. petitioner-appellant-appellee.: This is an appeal taken from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu on March 14. it was null and void. Felix Hortiguela was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the inheritance. declaring the heirs of said deceased. ANGELITA JONES. The latter. and in an order issued on May 9. She prayed: (a) for the reopening of the proceedings.000 which was granted by the court in its order of January 10. a final account of his administration. and Felix Hortiguela. J. The project of partition and final account were approved in an order of June 26. Salvador E. filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother. approving the project of portion and the final account. were declared her only heirs. 1933. Imperial for petitioner-appellant-appellee. On May 3. was represented in the proceedings by her guardian Paz Escaño de Corominas. denying thereby: (1) the motion to appoint a new administrator and (2) to set aside the order of May 9. 1933. oppositor-appellant-appellee. Salazar for oppositor-appellant-appellee. L-43701 March 6. that during said proceedings there had been committed many errors and inaccuracies which impaired her rights and that the fees of P10. The administrator later presented an inventory of the properties left by said deceased Marciana Escaño. that the petitioner was a minor and that during the hearing of the intestate proceedings she had not been assisted by counsel but was represent by the same attorney of Felix Hortiguela. the heiress Angelita Jones. FELIX HORTIGUELA. Angelita Jones. 1932. 1935 . 1932.. widower and heir. then married to Ernesto Lardizabal. 1937 In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escaño. (c) that her . the deceased Marciana Escaño. as such. but reserving to the parties the right to discuss which of said properties are paraphernal and which are conjugal. and that of June 26. vs. Faelnar . 1933.

The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. On January 10. . Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the provisions of article 186 of the Civil Code. the provisions of which are stated in the first paragraph of this decision. Said marriage is. 1920. and that from the latter date to May 6. the errors in the administrator's account be corrected. and from said date to May 6. Pursuant thereto." On May 6. 1927. Hortiguela be declared not entitled to the widower's usufruct.mother's alleged marriage to Felix Hortiguela be declared null and void. and they signed the certificate of marriage. the court issued the order of March 14. the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence. In October. the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño is null and void. 68. Now. It is a fact that in December. Said order directed the publication thereof in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper "El Ideal". of General Orders. Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. 1919. 68). Leyte. 1919. and new partition of the properties be made. This court does not believe so. 1914. For the purposes of the civil marriage law. After Hortiguela's answer had been filed and the evidence for both parties received. 1927. to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. 1935. 1921. Jones in the suburban catholic church of San Nicolas. 1918. Province of Cebu. and in accordance with section III. valid and lawful. 1921. of course. No. Leyte. to the fault or negligence of Felix Hortiguela or Marciana Escaño. paragraph 2. the absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband should be counted from January 10. only 6 years and 14 days elapsed. but in that of April 23. more than nine years elapsed. May and June. General orders. the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. the date of the celebration of the marriage. with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers. and (e) that in case there was a valid marriage between Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño. therefore. and January. the court issued an order declaring Arthur W. 1919. Angelita Jones assigns as one of the errors of the court its having declared that failure to record said marriage does not affect the efficacy and validity thereof. that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III. is whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage to Marciana Escaño was celebrated. Both parties appealed therefrom. In accordance with the foregoing legal provision. February. (d) that the partition of the properties made by administrator or Hortiguela be declared null and void that petitioner be declared the only universal heir of her deceased mother. 1927. Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made not in the order of October 25. publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal. On the 25th of said month. however. said order was published in the Official Gazette during the month of December. it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. March. at the instance of Marciana Escaño. No. proceedings were institute in the Court of First Instance of Maasin. paragraph 2. On April 23. Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño were married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog. Jones was received. the latter be granted a remuneration of only P4 a day. Marciana Escaño married Arthur W. the marriage contracted does not appear recorded in the marriage register of the municipality of Malitbog. For some unknown reason not attributable. April. the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage. For the celebration of civil marriage. 1918. The principal question upon the resolution of which depends that of the others. that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living.

the court a quo very correctly stated as follows: Section VIII of General Orders. since she lived with her mother after the latter had married Hortiguela. 1932." In another case (U. but does not provide that failure to transmit such certificate to the municipal secretary annuls the marriage. while the latter was in articulo mortis failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary. it was not duly entered or recorded in the municipal register. She certainly would not have behaved so if she had not believed her father to be dead. a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead. vs. respectively). according to section 334. the evidence shows that of the P10. not only in testate but also in intestate succession. the Supreme Court. 105). as in the present case (6 and 7 Manresa. 68. as amended.. and lived and traveled with him together with her mother. 1933. declaring that the heirs of the deceased were her widower and her daughter Angelita Jones. and failure to transmit such certificate shall be fined not less than twenty-five and not more than fifty dollars. De Leon. provides that the person solemnizing the marriage must transmit the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary. No. in its decision of September 5. pages 497-499 and 134-141.. there is no reason to annul the order of May 9. 24.000 paid by the administrator is a reasonable and moderate compensation. treated Hortiguela as her true stepfather. of the Code of Civil Procedure. are not the only ones that can attest and prove such facts to such an extent that other proofs established by law may not be presented or admitted at trial. Still furthermore. S. the court said: "Certificate issued pursuant the provisions of section 20 of the Municipal Code by municipal secretaries. 28 Phil. 1931 (Madridejo vs. does not invalidate said marriage. since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present. Taking into consideration the nature of and the amount involved in this and in the other cases wherein Attorney Faelnar has rendered his services this court is of the opinion that the sum of P8. De Vera. Angelita Jones' objection to the effect that she had no reason to contribute . approving the partition of the properties of the intestate estate. As to the administrator's fees. 1 ) said: "The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother. therefore. be considered that the petitioner has desisted from her intention relative to this alleged ground for the nullity of the proceedings.000 granted by the court to Hortiguela as his own sum of P8. Jones to be dead when she contracted her second marriage. No.On this point. Interpreting this legal provision.000 for the latter's professional services in this as well as in other cases affecting the estate of his deceased wife. the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one said requisites." Furthermore. Therefor. Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escaño and was divorced from her at the time of her death there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct. Neither is there any reason to annul the order of June 26. 55 Phil. Marciana Escaño believed Arthur W. The inaccuracies and error attributed to the administrator Felix Hortiguela in Angelita Jones' motion and alleged therein as one of the grounds for asking for the reopening of any assignment of error. when through the omission or fault either of the municipal secretary himself or of the person who solemnized the marriage. marriages recorded in their respective registers. It should. Her daughter Angelita Jones herself was of the same belief.

CONCEPCION JR. 1974 by the respondent Court of Appeals. J. is based. Villa-Real. C. approving the partition and the final account? Had the court jurisdiction to order the presentation of another project of partition and final account? These are the questions raised by Felix Hortiguela and this court is of the opinion that said orders having therefrom.. based on the following — . 1974 and his motion dated July 5. petitioner. Lastly. SANTOS. GUILLERMO S. approving the administrator's fees and the order of June 26. the court has lost jurisdiction that no appeal was ever taken therefrom. FERNANDEZ. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. THE HON. 1935. denied the appointment of Angelita Jones husband as administrator.R. For all the foregoing consideration this court reverses the appealed order of March 14. 1932.. 1974 to consider the motion for reconsideration in the alternative as a motion for new trial. said administrator is entitled to collect the sum of P4 for every day employed by him as such. RAMON G. 1933. Abad Santos. vs. Diaz and Laurel. 1933.000. So ordered.. relative to the administrator's fees and the order of June 26.J. the court has lost jurisdiction over the case and it could not resume it under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under section 598 thereof because the above-cited section refer to grounds other than those upon which Angelita Jones' motion of May 3. concur. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL DIVISION OF FIVE COMPOSED OF ACTING PRESIDING JUSTICE ANTONIO G. approving the final account and the project of portion. as it did. L-39310 January 27. in so far as it set aside the order of January 10. 1935. affirms the order of May 9. and considering the importance of the inheritance in question and the time elapsed since the inception of the administration proceedings this court is of the opinion that the sum of P2. As to the remainder of P2. the order of January 10. LUCERO and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON C. had the court jurisdiction to set aside. relative to declaration of heirs. and PACIFICO DE CASTRO) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.to the payment of Faelnar's fees is untenable. 1934. required the presentation of a new project of partition. Avanceña. JR. 1933. 1981 JOHN A. respondents. and in so far as said order of March 14. IMUTAN.000 is an adequate compensation for said administrator's services. and holds it unwarranted to make a finding as to whether or not the properties of this intestate estate are paraphernal properties of the deceased Marciana Escaño reserving to the parties the right to discuss which are paraphernal and which are conjugal properties. JJ.: Action for certiorari to annul the resolution promulgated on September 2. GAVIOLA. No. considering the fact that said attorney's professional services were rendered for the benefit of the administration of the estate of the deceased Escaño prior to the controversy provoked by said heiress. 1933. which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated April 25.

While the motion for reconsideration was pending. if admitted. SECOND GROUND: That assuming that petitioner's motion for reconsideration is properly deemed denied. in reality. Thus. and to pay the costs. would establish the fact that the second marriage was entered into by petitioner under duress and intimidation. 3 denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. thru its Special Division of Five. as maximum. clear-cut votes of conviction without any qualifications or reservations. To sustain the alleged polarization of voting in the Special Division. Alleging that there was. there is no concurrence of a majority vote for conviction and the accused should be acquitted. he contracted a second marriage with Leonida Limpiada on August 6. On September 2." 4 At the very least. 1974 a motion to consider his motion for reconsideration in the alternative as a motion for new trial. petitioner filed on July 8. the petitioner. to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor. in a 3-2 Resolution. 2 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on April 30. acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in considering petitioner's motion for reconsideration the Court's decision of March 13. 1974 as denied and said decision of March 13. affirmed the conviction of petitioner in a 3-2 decision. 1974 affirmed in spite of the fact that only two Justices voted for outright denial of said motion while two voted for the granting of said motion and for outright acquittal of the accused. for a judgement finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed upon him. there must be a concurrence in the Special Division of Five of three unequivocal. respondent court nevertheless acted with grave abuse of discretion in not considering the alternative motion of petitioner for the granting of a new trial as deemed approved or granted. The petitioner was found guilty of bigamy by the Court of First Instance of Cavite on the charge that while his first marriage with Aurea Martin whom he married on June 25. The basic premise of the present petition is that. it is contended. no majority vote for his conviction in the case at bar. the motion for new trial should have been granted. He was sentenced to suffer "an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years. quoting extensively from the dissenting opinion of Justice . The facts that follow are on record. so the petitioner postulates. while the ponenteof the original decision voted to consider said motion for reconsideration as a motion for new trial which should be granted to give an opportunity to petitioner to present in evidence certain documents which. two for acquittal and one for new trial. Santos.GROUNDS FIRST GROUND: That the respondent Court of Appeals. as minimum. composed of Acting Presiding Justice Lucero. Gaviola and de Castro. 1974 and the Solicitor General thereafter filed his comment thereon. 1956 was still valid and subsisting. the respondent Court through its Special Division of Five. 1974 its Special Division of Five 1 formed after the Division of Three failed to reach a unanimous verdict. the petitioner argues that the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction "in maintaining the judgment of conviction on the basis of an equally divided and inconclusive vote on the motion for reconsideration. where the polarization of voting in a Special Division of Five is two for conviction. 1960. THIRD GROUND: That the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in not granting the motion for new trial." Petitioner appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals and on March 13. Justices Fernandez. 1974. four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional.

Justice de Castro. With the comment. the appellant submitted a second motion dated July 8. bringing up to three the member of justices in favor of denying the first motion. traced the development in the voting — that eventually led to the questioned resolution of the respondent Court dated September 2. I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration and acquit the accused-appellant. Justice Fernandez voted as follows: Consistent with my dissenting opinion. followed by that of Justice Fernandez. in an extended opinion voted to deny outright appellant's motion for reconsideration. Thus — Acting upon the motion for reconsideration. the first vote of the original ponente. I took into account the following: (a) the Close voting. however. could be taken to resolve the said motion for reconsideration. for sustaining the judgement of conviction. not because the application was not duly notarized. inasmuch as no three justices had voted for or against it. said: In proposing to treat the motion for reconsideration as one for new trial. not more than 10 days as found by the trial court. xxx xxx xxx The disposition of the voting. he had. in effect. as a motion for new trial) is as follows: a) Two Justices — for acquittal b) Two Justices — for denial of the two motions and. on July 2. among other things. because the license was applied for on the very day the marriage was celebrated. as thus crystallized. and for granting the second motion. Considering the said second motion. and c) One Justice — for treating the first motion as for new trial. 3-2. being for outright acquittal. Justice Lucero and Justice Santos reiterated their vote to deny outright the first and second motions referred to. voted that "the motion for reconsideration may be treated as one for new trial so as to give a chance to appellant to present documentary evidence annexed to the motion. therefore. in substance observed that. but also the "rush" celebration of the marriage which would prove a "gunshot" marriage. Justice de Castro the new ponente. Jr. voted to acquit the accused-appellant. 1974 — of the five justices on the petitioner's motion. xxx xxx xxx Before a final vote." Amplifying. asking. the new ponente. I therefore. Justice de Castro. in the alternative. This interpretation or observation appears in the remarks of a supplemental agendum . which is the main defense of appellant. and Justices Fernandez and Gaviola. Acting Presiding Justice Lucero. Interpreting the foregoing disposition of the voting of this Division. as a motion for new trial. 1974.. with the close scrutiny of the prosecution. Justice Gaviola. 1974. the first motion is impliedly denied because. in effect. Justice de Castro voted to grant it. denied the first motion.Gaviola. (b) the documents that may be presented in a new trial would prove not only the doubtful validity of the marriage license. on the first motion (motion for reconsideration) as well as on the second motion (motion that the first motion be considered in the alternative. pass on the agendum to the Justices named as suggested by Justice Lucero. with his voting to grant a new trial. that the first motion previously filed be considered. by implication. (herein referred to as the second motion).

7 For certiorari to lie. Namely. there must be a capricious. as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion. The resolution dated September 2. 6 It has been held that abuse of discretion alone is not sufficient to warrant the issuance of the writ." The petitioner cannot turn his back to the reality of a 3-2 vote against his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial and insist that the "vote of Justice de Castro. is really for the granting of a new trial and not an unconditional vote for conviction. 5 Grave abuse of discretion as basis for the issuance of the writ of certiorari is a well-defined concept. 8 The present petition cannot survive the test of these authoritative pronouncements. Justice Fernandez voted: 'Make it of record that I vote for the acquittal of the accused-appellant. acting on the supplemental agendum. and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment. incorporated the opinion of Justice Lucero as an integral part thereof. 1974 cannot be tainted with grave abuse of discretion and certiorari cannot lie against the respondent Court. Justice Gaviola expressing the view that the stand taken by the five members constituting this Special Division is much too equivocal to permit a clear-cut disposition of the motion which would result. voted: as correctly observed in the "remarks" the result is the motion in either of its alternative prayer is denied. the fifth member.which the Deputy Clerk of Court submitted to this Division to find out whether the other members of the Division shared the same. forming a division of five Justices. and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all. Justice Santos who concurred with Justice Lucero and Justice de Castro who likewise concurred with Justice Lucero and who. these were Acting Presiding Justice Lucero who filed an extended opinion reciting his reasons for the outright denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or for new trial. according to in a . He stated that: Doubt now seems to have been generated by the vote of writer for the granting of a new trial. but that the abuse must be so grave. xxx xxx xxx The (aforequoted) "remarks" were subsequently confirmed by Justice de Castro who. for the purpose of the resolution. It is therefore clear that there was compliance with the provisions of Section 33 of the Judiciary Act as amended which provides that "(I)n the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote. Justice de Castro declared in no uncertain terms in the resolution under litigation that his vote was for an outright denial of the motions presented by the petitioner before the respondent Court. in contemplation of law. arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power." First and most evident. in which vote Justice Lucero concurred along with Justice Santos. the Presiding Justice shall designate two Justices from among the other members of the Court to sit temporarily with them. prejudice or personal hostility. There is no denying the fact that three justices out of the five members of the Special Division of the respondent Court of Appeals voted to deny the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and his motion to consider the motion for reconsideration in the alternative as a motion for new trial. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.

based largely on the configuration of and the explanations accompanying the preliminary voting on his motions. There can be no equivocation in the import of the vote of the writer (Justice de Castro) who hereby affirms categorically that he is for an outright denial of the motions now before us. is hereby denied. WHEREFORE. Jr. Petitioner should not harp upon the notations written by Justice de Castro during the time when his motions were passing hands for evaluation by the members of the respondent Court. They are explanatory in nature. in which the writer concurs. Justice de Castro wholly adopting the opinion of then Acting Presiding Justice Lucero which detailed the reasons why the motions of petitioner should be denied. And so it was in this case.judgment of acquittal on the theory that the votes are evenly divided — two for conviction. 1974.. This is. the opinion of Justice Lucero is. deemed incorporated herein as integral part thereof. Justice de Castro clearly voted for "an outright denial of the motion. the reasons being those stated in the opinion of Justice Lucero. by voting for new trial the Reconsideration of defendant-appellant is deemed denied. if discussions are to be truly productive of the results intended by a judicial inquiry. If the writer has correctly stated Justice Gaviola's position. For the purpose of this Resolution. 1974. two for acquittal — and one for new trial. there is no clear-cut vote of three Justices. as well as the motion dated July 8. we have absolutely no justification at all to question the meaning he (Justice de Castro) wanted to convey by his vote. Accordingly. formulated to elicit a full commentary on all the aspects of the issues presented by a cause. set forth separately. revising his original vote for new trial since it counts with no support even from Justices Fernandez and Gaviola who insist on acquittal refusing to vote in the alternative. the vote of Justice de Castro for the granting of a new trial should be deemed impliedly as a vote for the denial of the motion for reconsideration. to grant a new trial. to favor the said accused. the petitioner's insistence on the nature of Justice de Castro's vote. as it should be. Rather than being constitutive of the final word on the matter at hand. therefore. Indeed they must. change when so dictated by the entire body of reasons and arguments tabled at the end of the study. the doubt to be resolved in favor of the accused since the vote for a new trial of the writer tends likewise. it need only be stated that as Justice Lucero has observed: Accordingly to the dissenting opinion of Justice Gaviola. Thus: The reasons for denial of the motions are stated in the extended opinion of Justice Lucero. 9 Against this definitive contrary statement of Justice de Castro made after the respondent Court had thoroughly deliberated on the motions. Positions initially taken when issues are yet under study and consideration do not decide cases. cannot stand. And there is no reason for petitioner to hang on to what has been said when the issues were yet on the balance and to persist on his observation that the majority of the Special Division of Five considered "that because only two (Justice Fernandez and Gaviola) are in favor of granting the motion for reconsideration. I am of the opinion that the reconsideration was denied by a vote of three." . together with Justice Santos. When he says that. if acquittal is not obtainable. I believe that no one can interpret Justice de Castro's vote better than himself. "incorporated as an integral part" of the resolution of September 2. they are merely the means by which a well considered conclusion can be reached. In the end. the motion for reconsideration dated April 30. 1974. the determinative statement that should finally dispose of the petitioner's motions.

At most they are merely private documents whose genuineness and due execution must be established before they can be received in evidence" (Reconsideration. after he had already been charged with bigamy on February 4. In defendant-appellant's brief. 2. (1) the Lower Court's not giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of the defendant-appellant and his witnesess . best manifest that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Court correctible by certiorari. the Lower Court. namely. Likewise. Under Revised Rule 121.The extended concurring opinion of Justice Lucero. Replying to this argument. according to defendant-appellant carried no notarial number of Notary Public Magin Dones the brother of Cavite City Mayor Fidel Dones In the language of defendant-appellant. marriage applications. appellant John Imutan does not deny his signature in Exhs. So with Leonids Limpiada. They cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. not a mere formality for it is an insurance against false certifications and antedating of documents. it detailed the reasons why the petitioner's motions should be denied outright. is not demanding from this tribunal. page 3). would probably change the judgment. The opinion. As priorly pointed out. and by Leonids Limpiada. which was filed on August 12. please note. defendant-appellant's main reliance is that he was coerced or intimidated into contracting a second marriage with Leonids Limpiada. 2-A. cannot be considered public documents. 2 and 2-A. It will be a waste of time to remand the case to the lower court for new trial which. In defendant-appellant's lengthy Reconsideration. constitutes an adjudication on the merits of said case. Sections I and 2. the defendant-appellant himself. These objections do not appear to have been raised in the Lower Court. "the requirement of the placing of the document and page numbers is therefore. the second wife. the Solicitor General said: "We respectfully submit that Exhibits 2 and 2-A were correctly admitted in evidence. the grounds for new trial are: (a) that new and material evidence has been discovered which the defendant could not with reasonable deligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted. in the first place. there is nothing to be gained by directing a new trial which defendant-appellant himself had not even asked for. it is claimed that said marriage applications do not bear the seal of the Notary Public. The documents therefore were properly Identified even if we were to characterize them in arguendo as private writings" (Roll 189). Besides. the said documents. Exh. had refused to believe for reasons well discussed in the majority opinion. and (2) in dismissal of defendant-appellant's complaint for annulment of the second marriage before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. which Justice de Castro incorporated into the questioned resolution as an integral part thereof cannot itself be faulted for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. was not raised at all in the Lower Court. and the failure to comply with said requirement affects the integrity of the document as a public document" (Reconsideration. In the trial of this case in the lower court. This story. 2 and 2-A as not public documents because of their alleged defective jurats must fail. 1963. The attempt to discredit Exhs. 1963. as written. . It reads: My stand is to deny outright the defendant-appellant's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Please take notice that the validity of the marriage applications. page 5). two (2) errors were assigned. as well as this Court. signed by defendant-appellant John Imutan Exh. irrespective of their characterization as public or private writings. the main thrust of his arguments is that "Exhibits 2 and 2-A. let alone in a motion for reconsideration. As shown from the foregoing. In any event. The main points raised in the petitioner's motions were discussed and the conclusions made were amply supported by existing jurisprudence.

Nov. What the law declares as null and void are marriages solemnized without a marriage license (Art. 215-216. 1974. This must be so. Exhibits 2 and 2-A. he alludes to the preliminary voting on his motions stating that even Justice de Castro when voting to consider the motion for reconsideration as a motion for new trial believed that the admission of the newly discovered evidence would prove the rush marriage and his contention that the second marriage was a "gunshot marriage. VALIDITY.G. Magin Dones the notary public before whom the marriage applications. pp. which appears to have been issued by a competent official. Lack of authority on the part of the subscribing officer would not render the marriage void where the essential requirements for its validity were present. 102 Neb. then there exists no ground for the Court's not believing petitioner and his witnesses.. xxx xxx xxx ADDENDUM: After my dissenting opinion was submitted to the Division of Five on July 2. Marydeen Guerra and Froilan Guerra. let alone the point that his new issue was not raised in the lower court nor before this Court on the appeal of the bigamy case." He contends that "since the respondent Court's as well as the trial court's principal basis in considering petitioner and those of his witnesses' testimonies as not credible. a 'Motion to Consider as Motion for Reconsideration. NCC)." Again. was legally obtained. et al. 61 O. which is the fact that on July 13. No. 790. LICENSE WRONGFULLY OBTAINED DOES NOT INVALIDATE MARRIAGE. 1960 ed." 11 Without ruling on the decision rendered by the respondent Court on March 13. Dones as notary public.Squarely on point is the case of Eduardo Eigenman vs. 10 Still and all the petitioner insists on a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent dent Court for having denied his alternative motion for new trial.R. defense counsel apparently got knowledge of the grounds for the dissent and immediately adjusted his stand by filling on July 8. was not a notary public on the date he acted as such. citing Melchor vs. 1960.. CA-G. San Gabriel. 1959). and neither is the person solemnizing the marriage required to investigate as to whether or not a marriage license. He states that his position is "not that as a legal proposition the marriage was null and void because the marriage license that was issued was based on a defective marriage application. 1974. 169 NW 720). vs. as Motion for new Trial' (Roll 200202). 1974 since this has not been placed squarely before Us. Melchor. A marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained (I Tolentino on the Civil Code. (31) 4722: MARRIAGE. for the local civil registrar who issues the marriage license is not required to inquire into the authority of the officer administering the oath. apart from the rule that We are bound by the findings and conclusions of fact made by the respondent Court. This fact. 80. 12 We hereby quote a portion of the said decision if only to show that petitioner does not stand on solid ground and to demonstrate that he cannot thereby . were sworn to. REASON. Jr. even if proven in the new trial. petitioner and Leonida subscribed and swore to their marriage applications before Atty. In the Alternative. This irregularity is primarily the lookout of the subscribing officer or his superior (San Gabriel. putting emphasis on the fact that Atty. 27. is shown to be false. 23729-R. will not alter my conclusion that the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial is without merit because a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained.

According to Aurea. he himself could have offered marriage or willingly accepted a proposal for it to avoid conviction and punishment under the law. Thus. This is indeed an admission that the accused committed bigamy to prevent scandal. 1963. Appellant would rely mainly on the testimony of Leonida as her star witness. JJ. 13 WHEREFORE. which discounts the employment of force. as is evident from how she testified in his favor. Unwittingly. the petition should be. She would be almost that woman scorned who knows no fury against the man who humiliated her. With costs against the petitioner. the second wife. Barredo (Chairman).. taking pity on him. much less. to give corroboration to his claim of force or intimidation having been employed to get him to enter into marriage with her. long after the supposed shotgun marriage on August 6.force the conclusion that there has been no clear vote for his conviction. appellant's mother. aside from the fact that the marriage license was applied for long before the marriage. In other words. That reason is not exculpatory of the offense. The pertinent portion of the decision of March 13. But from his story that he left and abandoned her practically from the first day following their marriage. J. concurring: . Leonids made it plain to see that the force that impelled appellant to marry her is his fear of being prosecuted for the serious offense imputed to him by Leonida. 1974 states that: The version of the defense by which it attempts to make out what it terms as a "gunshot marriage" is inherently weak and improbable. as it is hereby dismissed. appellant contends that marriage was the only solution to prevent scandal to the family of Limpiada. threat or intimidation as already noted. however. Separate Opinions AQUINO. 1963 after the recent charge for bigamy had already been filed on February 4. by her story of how she was abducted and assaulted against her will by appellant. 1960. Leonids could not have consented to take the witness stand in defense of one who virtually spurned her. when she caned up by phone Leonida for a heart-to-heart talk about the matter of their marriage to a common husband.. appellant got all his clothes from his first wife a few months after the second marriage. concur. As the Solicitor General stated in appellee's brief: 'In a desperate move to exculpate himself. from facts and circumstances established not only the State evidence but also by that of the defense itself. The action for annulment of the second marriage was filed only on August 13. (Emphasis supplied). Leonids was living with her mother-in-law. SO ORDERED. Guerrero * and Abad Santos. instead of showing cordiality to.

The petitioner assailed that denial resolution in his instant petition for certiorari. The petitioner assailed that denial resolution in his instant petition for certiorari. Justices Lucero and Santos concurred in that denial in a separate opinion. he asked that his motion for reconsideration be considered as an alternative motion for new trial. What is controlling and conclusive is the final and indubitable vote of Justice De Castro in the resolution of September 2. which he opened categorically denying the motion for reconsideration and the alternative motion and reaffirming the judgment of conviction set forth in the decision of March 13. 1974. Justice De Castro voted to grant a new trial. J. which he opened categorically denying the motion for reconsideration and the alternative motion and reaffirming the judgment of conviction set forth in the decision of March 13. Justices Lucero and Santos concurred in that denial in a separate opinion. Justices Gaviola and Fernandez dissented from the resolution denying the motions. 1974. 1974 denied the two motions. 1974 of a Special Division of Five Justices of the Court of Appeals. he asked that his motion for reconsideration be considered as an alternative motion for new trial. Justice De Castro penned the decision. Justice De Castro in a resolution dated September 2. Justices Gaviola and Fernandez dissented.The trial court's judgment convicting the petitioner of bigamy was affirmed in the decision dated March 13. He relies on the fact that during the deliberation on the motion for reconsideration. Separate Opinions AQUINO. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated April 30. Justice De Castro voted to grant a new trial.. In a supplemental motion dated July 8. In a supplemental motion dated July 8. Justices Lucero and Santos concurred in the judgment of conviction. 1974. He relies on the fact that during the deliberation on the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated April 30. Justices Lucero and Santos concurred in the judgment of conviction. What is controlling and conclusive is the final and indubitable vote of Justice De Castro in the resolution of September 2. But that was only his tentative vote. But that was only his tentative vote. He also allegedly voted to grant the alternative motion for the granting of a new trial. Footnotes . 1974 denied the two motions. 1974 of a Special Division of Five Justices of the Court of Appeals. Justices Gaviola and Fernandez dissented. 1974. Justice De Castro penned the decision. 1974. 1974. 1974. He also allegedly voted to grant the alternative motion for the granting of a new trial. concurring: The trial court's judgment convicting the petitioner of bigamy was affirmed in the decision dated March 13. 1974. Justice De Castro in a resolution dated September 2. Justices Gaviola and Fernandez dissented from the resolution denying the motions.

pp. concurred in by Justice Santos. CA-L-23258. concurred in by Justice Fernandez. 3-4. 67 Phil. vs. now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. 6 Liwanag. 12 Associated Realty Development Co. pp. 375 citing Abad Santos vs. July 1. 1966. 11 SCRA 618. 9 Rollo. 20 SCRA 536.22395. 27. vs. 18 SCRA 973. L-20047. Justice Ramon C. 3 Justice de Castro penned the resolution. Castro. Inc. 5 Id. 18 SCRA 107. Province of Tarlac. 1967. Jr. Dec.67 SCRA 176. Court of Appeals. Nable. on this point. 67 Phil. 10 Id. 17. 27.1 The Members of the Special Division of Five were then Acting Presiding Justice Antonio Lucero. Vallarta No. Sta. Rueda vs. 72 Phil. 300. 1975. pp. 64-66. L-2187 1. pp. People. * Mr. 106 Phil. 480. vs. Haw Pia vs. 20 SCRA 620). Court of Agrarian Relations. June 30. September 30. Justice Gaviola filed an extended dissent and Justice Fernandez likewise dissented from the majority resolution "consistent with (my) dissenting opinion. 1965. 39-43. Jr. 17. Marave. 35-37. 88 Phil. July 31.. Nable. State Bonding Insurance Co. Court of Appeals. 18 SCRA 1139. Dec. Justice Pacifica P. June 30. Inc.. 1967. et al. L. 7 Ibid. Alafriz vs. Tan vs. de Castro. 13 Rollo. L. a member of the First Division. 1980. 1965. 340.Manila Port Service. Inc. June 26. Adolfo. vs. citing Talavera-Luna. Panaligan vs. 278. L-32728. Fernandez. 1966. vs. L-17647. Ana. and Justice Ramon Gaviola. Hernandez. 1977. Justice Lucero and Justice Santos each filed a separate concurring opinion. 106 Phil. pp. 11 Id. The same cases on grave abuse of discretion were also cited in People vs. Montroy vs. 8 People vs. Sept. vs. January 30.. was designated to sit in the Second Division. . Justice Juvenal K. Justice Guillermo S. Justice Gaviola dissented in an extended opinion. L-18056. 2 Justice de Castro wrote the majority opinion. L-16396. Inc." 4 Rollo. 9-13. No. p. 609. in turn. 1966. 14 SCRA 282. incorporating thereby the concurring opinion of Justice Lucero which was. Guerrero. 1964. later appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court who retired as such on January 23.. now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Philippine Refining Co. Goduco vs. Santos. 13 SCRA 152. Garcia.24100.Court of Appeals. L-19023. 77 SCRA 476 citing.

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