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Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The Emergence of Collaborative Federalism Author(s): David Cameron and Richard Simeon Source: Publius, Vol. 32, No. 2, The Global Review of Federalism (Spring, 2002), pp. 49-71 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330945 . Accessed: 09/09/2013 14:57
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Relationsin Canada: Intergovernmental The Emergenceof Collaborative Federalism
David Cameron ofToronto University RichardSimeon ofToronto University
or 'federal-provincial "Executive has longbeenconsidered thedefining federalism" diplomacy" whichcombines and Westminster-style characteristic cabinet of Canadian federalism, federalism in recent a number these havecome under stress However, from government. processes increasing years of nature that haveaffected the and conduct and intergovernmental relations in Canada. forces offederalism Executive has notbeen buthas been a setof that informed federalism displaced, increasingly by practices "characterized wecall "collaborativefederalism, more the national ofco-determination ofbroad by principle rather thanbythemore traditional pattern policies offederal-leadership.

The centralobjectiveof thisarticleis to describe and explain recent relationsin Canada at the changes in federalismand intergovernmental or "federalbeginningof the twenty-first century."Executivefederalism" has long been consideredthedefining characteristic provincial diplomacy" ofCanadian intergovernmental its combination with offederalism relations, and Westminster-style cabinetgovernment. In recentyears, therehavebeen some important changesin theconduct of federalism and intergovernmental relations in Canada. Executive has been increasingly federalism informed bya set of practicesthatwe call "collaborative federalism,"characterized more by the principle of codeterminationof broad national policies than by either the Ottawa-led cooperative federalism of the post-WorldWar II period or the more federalismof later periods. While co-determination in the competitive Canadian contextgenerally involves thetwoordersofgovernment working and territorial togetheras equals, itcan also entailprovincial governments on theirown-actingcollectively in the absence of the takingthe initiative federal formulate national Adherents ofcollaborative government-to policy. federalism(mostly and theirsupporters)viewthe provincialgovernments between twoequal, autonomous, governanceof Canada as a partnership and interdependent ordersofgovernment decide nationalpolicy. thatjointly
AUTHORS' NOTE: We wish to express our appreciation to the Canadian Centre for Management a largerworkfromwhichmuch of the thinking in thisarticle Development in Ottawaforcommissioning is derived,and to the manycolleagues whose commentshave helped us refineour analysis. ? Publius: TheJournal of Federalism32:2 (Spring 2002)


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39 on Mon. 1985). Intergovernmental of Toronto Press.compared withsome otherfederations. Governmentswere relatively decentralized. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .whilemostofitsmajorelements deeplyengagedfederal much of the policydesign and funding jurisdiction. We conclude withan assessment frompast practiceof intergovernmental thispatterndiffer relations. the intergovernmental agenda state.1990). There is muchcontinuity patterns of intergovernmentalrelations.50 2002 Publius/Spring AlthoughOttawa does not generallyshare thisviewof the nature of the in several thefederal ofthecases citedbelow. How does and practices. forexample. pattern and evaluation. Societyand theDevelopmentofCanadian Federalism(Toronto: This content downloaded from 142. exemplifiedby the policy instrument proliferation of shared-cost programs. intergovernmental growth ad hoc Canada remain. that is drawn into a has been premised on this process government assumption. We are not positinga thatwe describehas its dramatic breakwiththepast.is itlikely robust and democratic itsconsequencesforeffective policy-making? TRENDS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS Severalcaveatsshould be made clear at the outset. 3rd ed. "Reflections on the Workabilityof Executive Federalism. in others.so have intergovernmental relations. "See.thedistinctive pattern in theevolving rootsin whatpreceded it. 1980). WarII." "trust" agreements often reflects despite the aspirationsratherthan reality. ed. nationalpolicymaking process.how to be extendedto additionalpolicyareas. a traditionof cooperation has of dominatesthe relationship. Canada in Question: Federalism in theEighties. State. relationsin institutions of the of collaboration. Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson. relatively and under institutionalized. we describetheemergent functions. Smiley. and whatare is it. 1-32. University Donald V. Nevertheless.Itvariesaccordingto level (with intergovernmental relationships most dominated by strategic and status concerns) and according to issue area. Stefan Dupre.2 In the twodecades afterthe end ofWorldWar II.150. nor is there a single pattern of first ministers' relations. for example." of Toronto Press.' sinceWorld within Canadianfederalism After summarizing developments and explainitsorigins. and ministers provincialand federalofficials 'This was clearlythe case. came from adapted to thesenewrolesfor of power. foundin modernintergovernmental and "cooperation.190. pp. Richard Simeon (Toronto: University Relations. This project oftheCanadian welfare wasfocusedon theconstruction institutions because. Furthermore. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. In some areas. War SinceWorld Relations TheEvolution II ofIntergovernmental As Canada has evolved. withthe Social Union Framework Agreement. The key formal distribution withfewchangesin the government was the federal spending power. and close professional relationships developed among withinspecificpolicyareas.The rhetoric mistrust developed. laywithinprovincial thesystem Ottawa. The subject does not lend itself to analytically distinct ideal types.

(Montreal:McGill-Queen'sUniversity Banting. placing the Constitution at its heart.Relationsin Canada Intergovernmental 51 made the Canadian welfarestatepossible. Press.while "Cooperativefederalism" itstiming and itsdesign. The federalgovernment's and itsdetermination topatriate theConstitution or without with provincial consenthad an explosiveeffect on intergovernmental relations. about the of character Canada's communities and the questions political roleofgovernments in defining and shapingthem. theintergovernmental Bythemid-eighties. challenged the statusand self-image the issues in zero-sum terms in in whichnone ofthe circumstances framing could afford to lose. the Building Conservative ofBrianMulroney Progressive government promiseda newera of federal-provincial and cooperation.Moreover. concern.2nd ed. The was drawn into thesebattles. These two initiativesforced fundamentallydifferent visions of the and country-Ottawa-centered. later. Quebec and challengedtraditional assumptions This profoundly altered the intergovernmentalagenda.3 considerably influencing moved into a different During the 1960s.withfewconstitutional the a in the West. added to the pressure. Quebec-centered-into dividedthecountry and posed difficult painful publicdebate. conflict came to a head in theearly1980s. government as a participant in itsown right. participants public at thebeginningas a resourceforthebattling actorsand. theseconflicts of governments and politicalleaders. and an 1970s.and provincial with agreement wereat first insulatedfromfederalefforts at cuttingnational governments 3Keith Federalism and theWelfare State in Canada.190. led by Pierre Trudeau. Each order of government moved into new areas of public constraints to hold themback.On twokey Federal-provincial issues-theConstitution and energypolicy-thefederalgovernment. PierreTrudeau's assumptionof the primeministership in 1968 sharpened the ideological conflict betweenQuebec Cityand Ottawa. province-centered. an electoral coalitionthatincludedall sectionsof the country. This content downloaded from 142. challenged both Quebec nationalism and western National EnergyProgram (NEP) regionalism. The NEP was dismantled. Quebec's nationalismthat transformed Quiet Revolutionunleashed a progressive about Canadian federalism. and betweenOttawaand severalwestern capitals. Provinceswere less and less prepared to deferto federalleadership.particularly in assertiveness the as theirbudgets increasing English-speaking provinces and bureaucraciesgrewrelative to thoseof thefederalgovernment. agendahad changedonce again. by growingregionalism. the country phase. Moreover.150. The cooperativefederalism of the 1950s was supplantedbya more competitive dynamic. thenegotiation ofa free-trade theUnitedState. harmony werecloselyconsultedin thegovernment's provinces majorpolicyinitiative. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .39 on Mon.they regionally. 1987). The growthof the public sector at both levels meantthatgovernments wereincreasingly to bump intoone another likely in the execution of theirmandates and in the pursuitof theirpolitical ambitions.

Citizen have relationssince then has been much more muted. referred the draft Robert Bourassa's federalist Quebec government Only in it final form.150.the Charlottetown Governments came underintensepressure to make nationalreferendum. The patriationand the adoption of a Charter passionate debates surrounding and Freedomsin 1981-1982had fundamentally ofRights changed attitudes of governments no longerwas it a matter towardthe Constitution. It was developed in withthepublic deliberately excluded.but governments and accountability as had to take account of the demand fortransparency model. Vipond. immigration. and where provincesand municipalitieswere left to deal withthe economic and social challenges of integrating new immigrants. Mulroney'smajor achievementwas to secure the agreementof all Canadian governments to theMeech Lake Constitutional Accord (1987). If thiswas so. secret. reach.4 Citizenoppositionto executivefederalism grewduringthisperiod. TheJournal ofFederalism 21 (Summer 1991): 169-190.5 Twoyearslater.among heads ofgovernment.52 2002 Publius/Spring spending. to the before was signed legislature Despite the agreement swell of all Canadian a elites. ofFederalism 23 (Summer 1993): 39-55.39 on Mon. whereQuebec reached an unusuallyadvantageousagreementwithOttawa. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . which entailed sharingof the costsofwelfare. "Seeing Canada Through Referendum: Stilla House Divided. a cap placed on the growthof federal fighter paymentsto the wealthierprovincesunder the Canada AssistancePlan. toward the more collaborative have moved they failuresof thisperiod was A second consequence of the constitutional constitutional therealization thatfundamental changewasprobably beyond thatfollowedyetanotherfailure. thus undermining and accentuating inter-regional harmony federal-provincial rivalries. another intergovernmental attempt to engage citizens more directly. ground public opposition supportofvirtually after a processthatdid paved thewayforitsdefeatin 1990. was defeated in a agreement. the negotiation of the Meech Lake Accord exemplifiedthe old patternof executivefederalism. byaccording family" designedto bringQuebec back intothe"constitutional of itsdistinct within Canada. government itsemphasison regionalequityand a seriesof decisions thatcontradicted its commitmentto intergovernmental collaboration.however.Several their relationshipsmore open. status recognition theMulroney made Towardtheend ofthisperiod."Publius: C. provinces passed legislation to require popular approval of future on day-to-day mobilization constitutional intergovernmental changes. Withthe fatigueand frustration divisive political leaders and citizens turned awayfromsuch inherently exercises to focus on "making the federationwork.190. then what rightdid "eleven men in suits" have to shape the Canadian Constitution? However."findingsolutions flexible theinformal proveda highly through adaptationofwhathad already the manyexamples we notejust a few:a decision to award the maintenancecontractforthe 4Among Canada CF-18 military to Montrealinstead of Winnipeg. Watts'discussion:"Canadian Federalismin the 1990s:Once More in Question. sorting out jurisdiction. 5See Ronald L.now it was about citizensand theirrights. Constitutional Accord."Publius:The 6Robert journal This content downloaded from 142. transparent." and participatory.

impetusforthe move towarda more collaborative Relations Charlottetown Intergovernmental After Changes in governmentsand political leadership along with fiscal pressuresalso contributedto the shift. It was most 9This.Jean Chretien and the in Ottawa. ed. in workingwith his provincialcolleagues. theyhad little in developmentselsewherein Canada.deregulation.Both Harris and Klein initially focused on a provincialagenda. Change wasalso occuringin theotherprovinces. Liberals. as ithas been withtheresignation ofBouchard participation and the accession to the Quebec premiership of BernardLandryin 2000. the Parti Queb6cois (PQ) under Jacques Parizeau tookpowerin Quebec City. privatization.whichcommenced in 1993. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Chretienis a pragmatic Liberals took office politicianwho had in thepastand whoseevery been burnedbytheConstitution instinct was to fashion. was also driving the shift to a By the 1990s. rather than through constitutionalchange. Itwouldtakewhatever wasavailable.despite Ottawa'sown aggressive evidentin the health care field. All to governments began addressthesefiscalconcerns. "'See CaseyVander Ploeg. initiatedthe war againstbig government social democratic NewDemocraticParty Saskatchewan peersin neighboring not farbehind.1' 1997: Non-Constitutional Renewal Federation. RedInkIV BackFrom the ? (Calgary:Canada WestFoundation. (Kingston:McGill Queen's University 'Modeled in large part on the United StatesRepublican's "ContractwithAmerica. tookpowerin Ontario.' This was a major model. a Conservative led government. generation.withsome mixofcostrevenue cutting. In 1994. practical.and restructuring of government.39 on Mon. Both soon discoveredthat interest no first minister can ignoreintergovernmental concerns." deficitcuttingthatseverely affected the provinces.eschewingideologyor governin a low-key. In 1995. 1998).Relationsin Canada Intergovernmental 53 regime.and thatthe pain associated withbringing federaland provincial financesunder controlwould have to be borne.and thatcitizens angered by policy change withinthe province could and would turn to Ottawa to protect their interests.9 Success on their domestic agendas demanded some basic changes in how the federalsystem operated.190. that deficits had to be eliminated.AlbertaPremier Ralph withhis Klein. In 1993. but would decline to in themanagement oftheaffairs ofthefederationWhileLucien participate showedgreater interest Bouchard. elected in 1992. 7See the essaysin HarveyLazar. This displacingthefederalist set the stage for the drama of the 1995 referendum on sovereignty and soured intergovernmental relations.committed to a "Common Sense Revolution"'with dramaticcutbacks. the basic posture of minimal was sustained. efficiencymeasures..150. the politicsof fiscaldeficits new model of intergovernmental relations.The PQ had little interest in working withothergovernments.January Brink in a series. There was now a broad public and governmentalconsensus that public sector debt was too high. This is the fourth This content downloaded from 142.Parizeau's successoras Quebec premier.step-by-step dramatic gestures. and downloading. by Mike Harris.and complain about the alleged injusticesvisitedupon Quebec. Canada: TheState ofthe Press. 1998).

pp. not by the federalism. withintheirspheres ofjurisdiction.e.The net effect relationsthusreverberate of throughout thisexperience (i.whatright in fiscaltransfers." Relations (Kingston. (i.If the Canadian "social union" was to be preserved.1996).downsizingthe country's social." THE EMERGENCE OF COLLABORATIVE FEDERALISM of "collaborative These developmentsset the stage for the strengthening which are the national achieved.schools.it could only be done into the key and formally throughthe provincesactingtogether.Ottawa had neitherthe fiscalabilitynor the political legitimacy enforce national standards.thefederalcutsfostered a waveof"secondary in the transfers from downloading"-reductions provincesto theiragencies universities. and educationalsystems. the provincialinterest requires. and copingwith thefullbrunt ofthepublicanxiety theprovincial and oppositionthatthisentailed) was to invest governments theirresponsibility. health. and theirright witha stronger sense of theirautonomy. hospitals. prohibition againstrestricting The broad nationalconsensuson themagnitude ofthefiscal crisis meant thattheseactionsdid not occasion the intenseintergovernmental conflict The criticism thatmighthave been expected in othercircumstances.e.lateradjusted to $12. among others." This content downloaded from 142.39 on Mon. municipalities. did ithaveto call thetune? Third.ed. and ultimately to citizens.socialagencies. were on provincial mutedrelative to thedamage being inflicted budgets. The effects Canadian society. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Le malcanadien intellectualstimulus. demands intensifiedfor a of earlier fundinglevels." process by goals alone or the federal federal government acting by government shaping theexerciseofitsspendingpower. were drainingpower fromOttawa downwardto the provincesand upward to to set and supranational institutions.. '"Thomas Courchene. whichpromisedgreater (though those under the Canada Health Act remained.54 2002 Publius/Spring Central to Ottawa'sdeficit-reduction was whatmightbe called strategy the exercise of the federalspendingpower in reverse. 1995). colleges.190. Ottawa's power over the restoration and itslegitimacy.150. and highereducation). Globalization and fiscal (Montreal: Fides.Provincesmustbe brought"more fully based Burelle proposed a partnership and promotingsocial Canada. Second. Utilizingthis"disthe federalgovernment in 1995 substantially reduced its spendingpower. butbysome behaviorthrough provincial or all of the 11 governments and the territories actingcollectively. federalcuts. Instituteof Intergovernmental Assessing of Intergovernmental Ontario: Institute Relations. ACCESS: bTowards a New Social Union.added a powerful crisis.though as deficitpressures eased in the late 1990s. what the national as well as tojudge. Federal transfers under theseprograms were rolled into the new Canada Health and Social Transfer freedom from federalconditions (CHST). as did the social assistanceon the basis of residency).in federalsupport forhealthcare. 77-112and Andr6 Burelle. of federal-provincial and the like).Courchene argued. "ACCESS: A Convention on the Canadian Economic and Social Systems." to theprovinces forsocial programs(a reductionfrom transfers $18 billion to a floorof $11 billion. social assistance. werereducedalongwith thereduction provinces. certainly If Ottawawas no longerpayingthe piper..5 billion." societal goal of preserving Andreh on interdependenceanid "ion-subordination.

it is a nonit contains. butithas no significant authority and citizensdo not have directaccess to it. considering difficulty country a more economic and resistance union.Relationsin Canada Intergovernmental 55 is collaboration It can taketwoforms.150. the social union. governments and education are provincial thatunder the constitution. settlementmechanism. amongfederal.offer an example of theextenttowhichtransnational economic integration is imposing a discipline on domestic. they are to be expressed as intergovernmental "Accords. in the failures of issues unresolved the of Meech Lake and Many Charlottetown have re-emerged in the intergovernmentalarena-the economic union.effective policydepends on coordination and territorial them. markets. Manyrestrictive were practices the the in has had grandfathered. 1995." The first concreteexample of thiswas theAgreement on InternalTrade When Charlottetown was Ottawa's and defeated. and in severalcases againstthefirst oftherelevant Canadian governments themselves." and "Framework "Declarations. Herman Bakvisand Grace Skogstad(Toronto: OxfordUniversity Press. eds.FPT is based on the premisethatall fiscalandjurisdictional toolsand thatas a thesegovernments possessstrong resultof thisinterdependence. hopes to clarify (AIT). and enforcedby the uncompromising language of constitutional courts." Agreements. territorial roles and responsibilities. achieving fully integrated provincial a functional consolidationofCanadian stockexchanges.39 on Mon.190.The first provincial.2001). jurisdictions. health. The second is collaboration among provincial among on on theview with Ottawa the sidelines. This is based (PT). Althoughits signed theAIT in 1994. 179-196. This developmentof some aspects of national policy throughagreementsreached among autonomous but associated actors introducedan elementof "confederalism" into (provincesand territories) the Canadian system.people. First ministers mobility goods. therefore. The consolidation regulators. "National"policies and standardsin these areas.but its rulingsdo not have legal effect. rather than being expressed in the clauses. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . the centralgovernmentdoes are matters not have to do it. pp.provincial. Yet."CanadianFederalism. preferences See WilliamD. "who does what"jurisdictionally. A new InternalTrade Secretariat wasestablished. and the spending power. in recognition of the imperatives ofworldfinancial planningwasundertakenbythe exchangesthemselves. capital. The collaborativemodel is also an alternative to constitutional change. seekingan appropriatebalance betweenfederal. Now. forprovincesto decide together.non-governmental whetherthe governments will it or not.forexample. a formaldisputebindingpoliticalarrangement. "Federalism and FinancialServices.announced in theSpring '2Plansto implement of 1999.welfare. This content downloaded from 142.and itwas implementedinJuly structure and content mirrorthe approach of international agreements such as the NorthAmericanFree Trade Agreement(NAFTA). The federalgovernment therefore initiatedmultilateral with negotiations the provincialgovernments to reduce internal to barriers the designed of and in services Canada. Coleman. and territorial Canadian intergovernmental (FPT in thecurrent governments and jargon)."2 extend its powerswithrespectto the economic union wentdown withit.

fewrealize it is now in operation. "The Agreement for Economic Union and Federalism. Bakvisand Skogstad.D.56 2002 Publius/Spring to any increase in federalpower over the economy.and thatpublic education on the existence on Internal and purposesoftheAIT should be undertaken. as theycame to terms and policyrealities. goingto define and police the standards?In the case of the social union. consideringthe diversity proved government. Commentary.Drawing Union(C. interests and circumstances around represented The intergovernmental discussionsculminatedin February1999 when Ottawa and all the provinces except Quebec signed the Social Union Framework endorsesOttawa's (SUFA). Thus. Howe argue thatit needs to be strengthened. Howe Institute theCanadian Economic June 1996) and RobertHowse. Trade: Trade-offs pp. Securing Commentary.See also MarkR.39 on Mon. 138-158.190.while its substantive intergovernmental no public weak. with with to basic elements of social As the economic the citizenship. it is a useful first step. They recommend. responsible to developproposals. intergovernmental are at workwithrespectto the"socialunion.D. respect will common two arise: how national standards be balanced union. This content downloaded from 142. June 1996). It demonstrates that despite its constitutional responsibility for and international trade.'3 It was developed withvirtually FewCanadians realized theagreement wasbeing negotiated.150. thataccess to the dispute ratherthanbytheconsensussystem votebyqualifiedmajority currently settlement mechanismshould be extended to privateparties.thatthe membergovernments should analyzeobstaclesto implementation in place. The socialunion. joint present coherentproposals to the federalgovernment. the table. thatthe Secretariatshould be empowered to and to recommendsolutions.See Daniel Schwanen. Thisagreement Agreement explicitly '3Suchcriticsas Daniel Schwanen and RobertHowse. The AIT reflects dimensions ofcollaborative some important federalism. theprovincial and territories governments commissioned their ministers First ministers tooktheinitiative. to to fashion fiscal work began collaboratively provinces and to common policyapproaches and undertake initiatives.forexample. MacDonald. Hence. eds.and an intensive forsocial affairs periodofministerial withthe new and official meetingsfollowed. whileapplauding the AIT as a usefulfirst step. on OurInnerStrength (C. An alternative approach-to definethe rules in the constitution make themjudicially enforceable-isalso impossible. or opposition of the federal withthe indifference even when confronted of to be remarkably strong. negotiated collaborationbecame the onlywayto make progress."whichalso Identicalforces in theagenda ofCharlottetown. involvement."Canadian Federalism.Ottawahas neitherthe powernor interprovincial the legitimacy to defineand enforcethe Canadian economic union on its and own.Their evolving consensus. country aspirations.liketheeconomic figured that a of a unified is on the idea characteristic union.the AIT is a notable provisionsare accomplishment. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . questions and who is the variations that federalism against encourages. predicated defining a of and norms is shared and common set standards. a thirdquestion lies at thebase of Ottawa's arises:how is thefederalspendingpower-which in to the provincesand which was a crucial instrument fiscal transfers thewelfare state-to be exercisedand howis itto be controlled? constructing In theface offederalretreat.

The agreementis to be reviewedwithinthe first threeyears. and procedures for dispute avoidance and dispute resolution. to signtheFebruary 1999 agreement on thegroundsthatafter federal heavy pressure. it should be noted that the document remains and thatthe proofofthe agreement loose and generalin character.There is debate.'5 It wasnotuntiltheFebruary 1999 doors. Newjointprograms or existingones changed. itwouldhavesome political provincial difficultyjustifying itsnon-participation in theintergovernmental process.the finalcompromisefailedto protectQuebec's rightto opt out of new shared programswithout financialpenalty. withoutdue notice and substantialprovincial consent. But thispower can no willnotbe introduced. was a provincially driveninitiative untilthe last 1'There is no question but thatthe social-unionprocess about whetherthe social union agreement worksmore to the advantageof stage.39 on Mon. forexample. Regina. defacto constitutionally. who argues thatthe federalspending a good arrangement forQuebec. The earlyindicationsare not encouraging. See. 3-4 February2000). provision applying social-policy field. however. willbe foundin thecommitment and follow-through theparticipating governments bringto its implementation."' The Social Union FrameworkAgreement is purely the product of itwasnegotiated at meetings held behindclosed participating governments. the debate between David Cameron.190. recognizing that in the pending electioncampaign. It declined. longerbe exercisedunilaterally.SUFA contains the following elements:a statement of general a to the mobility principles.Alain Noel. government's spending power. The massivepublic mobilization.The Government to offer theirassessments oftheagreement.The variety of waysin which it has been interpreted is one of its more striking features.they wereconsistently negative. littlesense of a commitment The sovereignist government of Quebec joined the social-union negotiations in the summer of 1998. Intensivediscussionon a wide variety of policyfilescontinues. absence that itcontinuesto march means Quebec's to a different if not drummer.but thereis tojoint problemsolving. This content downloaded from 142. was broughtseriously to the attention of Canadians.150.makes the criticalargumentvery well in "WithoutQuebec: Collaborative Federalismwitha Footnote?"(paper presentedat the SaskatchewanInstitute ofPublic PolicyConference. "The Social-UnionAgreement: for Quebec?" Globeand Mail. rules the exercise of the federal governing provisions."The Agreementon the Canadian Social Union As Seen Bya Quebec Federalist. had notbeen repeated. While this frameworkagreement is a considerable achievement of collaborativefederalism. Provincial responsibility for program design and deliveryis affirmed. David Cameron.however. meeting agreement.and had a very of first which concluded the that the matter ministers.Relationsin Canada Intergovernmental 57 power to spend in areas of provincial jurisdiction. lowpublicprofile. and Directions: TheSocial UnionFramework Perspectives Agreement. This in Quebec is arrayedstrongly "Opinion on the French-speaking scholarlycommunity against the Social Union Framework ofQuebec commissioneda numberofacademics Agreement. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . commitments and notice respectingpublic accountability transparency."Inroads 8 (1999): 25-41. Claude Ryan. Ottawa or the provinces. The agreementis a classicexample of elite accommodation. a politicalscientist at the Universit6 de Montr6al. as had been agreed in earlierprovincial drafts.who contendsthatSUFA sharply increasesfederalscope foraction under the spending A BackwardStep powerand is unacceptable forQuebec. 9 February1999. so evidentin Meech Lake and Charlottetown. poweris subjected to regulationand controlunder SUFA and constitutes and Claude Ryan.

They agreed on a common "Vision"of providing publiclyfunded health care to Canadians "in a cost-effective and fair manner. Theyconstitute. when seek accommodationoutsidethe constitutional arena. of theirsocial programs.150.39 on Mon. Regina. agreed to restorea total of$23. HealthCare The designand funding of healthcare in Canada has been describedas a "politicalfootballgame . while the conditionsunder the federal Canada Health Act remained in force.Perspectives p. and reporting to Canadians usingan agreed framework and accountability. the agreement does seek to respond to democraticconcernsbyplacing considerableemphasison accountability. but by "independent." They committed themselves to "collaborate"in promoting access to healthcare. in this document shall be construed to derogate from the respective governments' jurisdictions. and the necessity of securingongoing inputand feedbackfromcitizensand interested parties.This additionalfunding wastobe on an equal." Mendelson and John McLean. healthcare."'" Provinces weredeeplyangry at thefederalcutsto the CHST (the bulk ofwhichfunds health care).alleviating one ofthemajorgrievances of the wealthier provinces.'6 The AIT and the SUFA are the clearestexamples of the collaborative in thewordsofone seniorprovincial "a official. In theircommunique. workplan forcooperation and a rulebook forcompetition. community care.""7 But it has been manifest in a wide variety of otherareas as well. Maioni.as withotheragreements.11 September 2000. 3-4 February 2000).and public engagementis less. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Some observers regardthe citizendimensionas one of the centralpillarsof the agreement."(paper presented at the SaskatchewanInstituteof Public PolicyConference." p. theneed to reportback to Canadians about theperformance transparency. eds. CanadianFederalism.thirdpartyverification. (Significantly.. even as thefederalshare ofcostswasdecliningrapidly. and otherareas. wellnessprograms.a First Ministers' Meeting on some common while Ottawa agreed purposes. thisis to be monitorednot by the comparable indicators. approach. Bakvisand Skogstad. '7Quoted in Bakvisand Skogstad. '9Canadian Intergovernmental ConferenceSecretariat-News Release Ref:800-038/004.. constrainingprovincial efforts to experimentwith alternative forms offunding and servicedelivery."Health Care in the NewMillennium. This content downloaded from 142. and Directions: The Social Union FrameworkAgreement. 101. per capitabasis.58 2002 Publius/Spring suggeststhat the stakes are lower. federal government. 11. "GettingEngaged: Strengthening SUFA Through Citizen 1'Matthew Engagement.eds. a sophisticated one.'9the first ministers echoed the language of the SUFA. '8Antonia CanadianFederalism. played by professional statebuildersin a chargedatmospherein whichthe politicaland financial stakes are considerablyhigher than theywere in the past.") In a prefatory note assertsthat"Nothing addition. primary They also committed themselvesto clear performance measurement..4 billionin funding overthenextfive years. governments Despite the elitistprocess.190. In September2000.

Second. Agreement betweenitand Ottawa wasfrustrated the bitter and between by political. planning." It is anyadditional federalfundingforearlychildhood developmentprogramswithout worthnotingthatQuebec is the onlyCanadian provinceto have a universal. In 1996.at a cost to parentsof$5 per day. This time. responsibility labor market" relatedto them. ideologicalrivalry the twogovernments.Relationsin Canada Intergovernmental 59 first ministers also agreed towork At thesame September2000 meeting. along withthefunding federal employees now involved in these programswould move to the provincial public services. to promoteearlychildhood development. This content downloaded from 142. The provinces were offeredthe choice of continued"co-management" or completedevolution. resulting in agreement with nine provinces and all three territories. twoimportant features First. publiclyprovidedchild care programforall childrenaged 4 to 12. An appended note says. 105-106. managing and deliveringearlychildhood developmentprograms.theexceptionwas Ontario. Ottawa initially soughtto ensure thatprovinces would be accountable to it forthe conduct of the devolvedprograms. partisan."Whilesharing the same concerns on early childhood development. but not the communique on earlychildhood development. Consequently.Bilateral negotiations followed. themselves together committing to report to Canadians on their investments and programs.News Release Ref:800-038/005. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .oftenoverallagreementsare followedup witha series of separately negotiatedbilateraldeals."The Child Care Agenda and the Social Union. thisallowsforconsiderableasymmetry 21CICS.Quebec does not adhere to the present federaldocument because sectionsof it infringe on itsconstitutional provincial-territorial jurisdictionon social matters.11 September2000. Quebec intends to preserve its sole responsibility for developing. pp. and the reluctanceof the 101 Liberal membersof fromOntario to concede moneyand powerto theirprovincial Parliament arch-rivals in Toronto. The agreement had been prepared during extensive discussions among officialsand but it received only briefdiscussionamong the first ministers ministers. collaborationis closelyassociatedwithdevolution of responsibilities to the provinces. programs. withno fundingspecified. Moreover. See Linda White." Canadian Federalism. It would phase out its purchase of trainingand apprenticeship and provinces wereoffered fora wide setof"active programs. This case illustrates of collaborativefederalism.20 Labor-Force Training In some policyareas. Ottawaagreed to allowjoint federal-provincial committees to oversee reporting and assessment. The clearestexample is in the fieldof labor-force an area oflong-standing because itmerges training. The commitments a shared framework forreporting results. but in the end. annually develop and the like.150. Quebec expects to receiveitsshare of new conditions. Five provincesopted forco-management(largely because of theirownweak capacityto absorb the new responsibilities) and fourforfulldevolution. Ottawaoffered field.39 on Mon. were vague and open-ended. Quebec signed the health accord.190. complexity the federal responsibility for overall economic policy with provincial to withdraw fromthe jurisdictionovereducation. themselves.

124-137. of the Environment. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . developments in theenvironmental field. As MarkWinfield suggests. A similar "harmonized. activities Trade Policy tradepolicy-bothin respectto the NorthAmericanFree International Trade Agreement and to global bodies such as the World Trade interests and policies.60 2002 Publius/Spring in the relationshipsthat develop-"checkerboardfederalism" as Herman Bakvisputs it. Winfield." Canadian eds. While expressing the commitment to "achieve the highest level of within the contextof sustainabledevelopment. Bakvisand Skogstad. Federalism. DevelopmentPolicyin Canada.150. The accord can be amended only with Assessment"2 withsix-months unanimousconsent. 1998.and gasproducingprovincesare deeply hostileto emissionsstandardsthatwould and the developmentof nationalstrategies to deal affect theseindustries). groups. see Herman Bakvis. Despite strongmisgivings bya parliamentary theoppositionofleadingenvironmental and a Supreme committee.such as implementing the Kyoto Protocol regarding climate change (in which oil.but (unlike in the to mean has been interpreted United Statesor Australia)."Environmental Policy and Federalism. 2For an excellentanalysis "CheckerboardFederalism?Labour Market eds. 197-219. these withsmog and acid rain. 22CanadianCouncil of Ministers 23Thisanalysisis drawn fromMark S.190.the Constitution ofthiscase.2' TheEnvironment The environment is anotherarea in whichboth ordersof government exercise broadjurisdiction. the federalgovernment ability and assessment regulation delegatedmost(but notall) ofitsenvironmental activities to the provinces.pp. This content downloaded from 142. conflict reducedintergovernmental havesharply oftheenvironment on theactualprotection effects theirpositive "However. (again exceptQuebec) signed the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonizationand a set of on Canada-Wide and Environmental Standards. collaborative intergovernmental approach" has been adopted forotherenvironmental Canada's environmental commitments under issues. engage bothfederaland provincial Organization-also Internationalcommerceis a clear federaljurisdiction." Canadian Federalism.pp.. 21Ibid. in in lightof weak infrastructure have been far less clear. Sub-agreements Inspections in January1998. Bakvisand Skogstad.althoughpartiescan withdraw notice.39 on Mon." the environmental quality on and is overcoming duplication overlapping bycreating primary emphasis setofdelivery mechanisms would a "one-window" bywhichanygivenservice for be providedbyonlyone order of government.23 Thus.The criteria allocation were to be based on such criteriaas proximity and the of responsibilities has to meet clientand local needs."24 particularly enforcement some small provincesand major cutbacksin environmental in others. 131. Ottawa'sability to use itscriminal-law Courtrulingthatstrengthened power all governments in environmental regulation.

and to consult closelywith them (and withindustry) as agreementsare being negotiated. 159-177. The chair has assumed a substantive role as the spokesperson forthepremiers betweenmeetings. it has become more prominent as the and of the FMCs have declined.It wasat one ofthesemeetings thatthe social-unioninitiative was begun. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Ottawahas takenconsiderablepains to involvethe provincesfully in trade policy. interprovincial supportand legitimacy and has meantthatindividualprovinces are "lessinclinedto takeunilateral efforts to secure best possible outcomes fortheirprovinceat the expense of a coherentnational tradestrategy. and launchesprojects tobe undertaken bytherelevant italso has an on-going ministers. working Trade Policyand Canadian Federalism:A Constructive Tension?"CanadianFederalism.pp. Skogstad consensus" has lent to theoutcomes. called fordirectparticipation in Canadian negotiating teams. 25"International eds.replaced byshort sessions. The set-pieceFMC.mostrecently in possible discussion of a North American energyregime. full-fledged intergovernmental professionally supported by The APC prepares and receivesposition papers. Perhaps the most obvious is in the role and positionof the Annual PremiersConference (APC). Nevertheless. premiers significant institution. some provinceshave impactson the provincesbecome wider.190."25 These and other examples demonstrate the varietyof forms that collaborationcan take. Bakvisand Skogstad. provincialcivilservants. Held frequency significance every August under a rotating thisassociationof provinces has become a chairmanship. THE INSTITUTIONS OF COLLABORATIVE FEDERALISM The collaborativemodel has had an important impacton the institutions of intergovernmental relations. agenda ofworkthatconnectsone meeting to another. intergovernmental Long overshadowed bythefederal-provincial FirstMinisters' Conference (FMC). issuescommuniques. Ottawa has refusedto permitthis. institution.in Canada Relations Intergovernmental 61 that the federal power does not extend to imposing the terms of internationalagreementson the provinceswhen theyinvolveprovincial treaties have movedbeyondtariffs to broader jurisdiction.150. Initiatedat the of Quebec in the 1960s as little more thana summerretreat for instigation and their the APC has evolved into a families. held in the National ConferenceCentre. As a result. As Grace "The extensive efforts to build a domestic.39 on Mon. thepotential procurement. In striking contrast to thegrowth oftheAPC is thedecliningimportance of the FMC.As international issuesofsubsidies. concludes. withfirst ministers surroundedbyphalanxes ofministers and officials.and the variability of itsoutcomes. and regulation ofbusinesses.have recently been absent. and witha combinationof public and private that were so meetings prominent fromthe 1960s to the 1980s. This content downloaded from 142.

under the instructions Acting particularly and fashioned and officials ministers strategies developed positionpapers for the consideration of the premiers and in preparation for federalin developingSUFA. go bynames of"Ministers suchas forums.62 2002 Publius/Spring Advocatesof collaborativefederalism have oftenseen the FMC as the conflicts at thehighest pinnacle oftheintergovernmental system. provincialdiscussion.including. manyyears. binding agreements intergovernmental or enforceable.and theenvironment. The are notlegally themselves. Numerous have suggestedthatFMCs be made at least annual events.in some cases. of the government's the supremacy accountability asserting should that thelogicofcollaboration Takento itslimit. provincial. commentators and perhapsevengivenconstitutional status. However.190. sometimesfederal-provincial. developing close relationshipswith related interestgroups. ofministers Othergroupings education."Some otherson an ad hoc basis. Responsible.However. first assuming a centralrole in the policyprocess. Council on Social PolicyRenewal has been The Provincial/Territorial of the premiers.forestry. however. resolving leveland providing directionto the network oflowerlevelmeetings. Recently. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and itwillplayan important A key question in this process is the legal and political status of agreements. much like the Council of Ministers in the European Union. implies governments accords and that theyshould be be legallybound by intergovernmental accountable to each other.This was made clear in a recentSupremeCourtjudgement that rejected a provincialappeal against a change in federal policy by to Parliament.They have become theworkhorses of the system. transportation. This reflects the federal government's suspicion that a fullydeveloped collaborative model willundermineits"senior"status. The council was instrumental role in helpingto make itwork. Councils now exist for concerned withsocial-policy ministries renewal. role. theirnumbershave increased. few havebeen called since the election of the Liberal federalgovernment in 1993. may thoughthey arrangements provincial later be enshrined in federal and provincial legislation. one reason whythe APC has takenon such an important forumthatis assumingmuch greaterimportance Anotherinstitutional is the ministerial sometimespurely council. out mandatesassignedby and have playeda more formalrole in carrying ministers. political they premiers provincial The weak presence of the FMC is politiciansto national decision-makers. sectoral active.theyhave become more institutionalized. and meetings committees. Many of the most importantfederalintergovernmental are not in factformal contracts. Such councils have existed for however.this is a major challenge in the be whichrequiresthateach government Canadian constitutional system. and thatgovernments cannotbind future responsibleto itsown legislature This content downloaded from 142. meet regularly. thatFMCs providea platform for attacks on and that elevate from Ottawa.39 on Mon.150.

principle thatsuccessiveind6pendantiste premiersof Quebec have been able to develop effective withtheirfellow working relationships the fundamental difference over Canada's premiers despite future. ASSESSING THE PATTERN OF COLLABORATIVE FEDERALISM ofintergovernmental Althoughthecontentand specificity processesand review of our several recent some agreements vary widely. * Most agreementsstressthatthe formalconstitutional powers assigned to governmentsremain unchanged. This offspring evolutiontowardprovincialstatushas evoked remarkably little comment. the goal is to exercisethese powers"in a coordinatedmanner. is remarkable." agreementsemphasize the need to share "best practices.even thoughit has some potentialforchangingthe relations because three more dynamic of intergovernmental voices are added to the six smallerand poorer provinces. Quebec's position is that fields like education. welfare.39 on Mon. newly withtheprovinces.thereis a deep tensionbetweenthelogic ofcollaborative legislatures. For Quebec.150. greaterefficiency * Consistent withthedoctrineofthe"NewPublicManagement.Meetingsare Federal/Provincial/Territorial or Provincial/Territorial despite the fact that the territories remainconstitutional ofthefederalgovernment. national standards and norms consensusare little betterin emergingfromintergovernmental than federal It unilateralism.190. intergovernmentalism and the logic of responsible parliamentary government." * Minimizingduplicationand overlappingin order to achieve and cost savingare universal themes. but the Quebec government has disassociated itselffromsome of the agreements. Usuallyits representatives participate in meetings. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . * The northernterritories of Canada-Yukon. * The equalitybetweenprovincesand Ottawais underlinedby the fact that most councils and meetingsare co-chairedby a federaland a provincialminister. however. the North West and the Nunavut-are nowintegrated established Territory. examplesdisplays common threads. the federal government to spend money in such areas is illegitimate.in Canada Relations Intergovernmental 63 Thus. * The relativeabsence of Quebec."to This content downloaded from 142.and health are exclusiveareas of provincial and thatthe ability of jurisdiction.

14 April2000). might constitute success if it leads to more cooperation and less conflict. disputeintergovernmental oftheAIT and SUFAremain mechanisms limited.150.27 findit advantageousor not. It is fartoo early tojudge thesuccessofthisnewmodel. Alberta. government Citizen's 2See discussionin F. Leslie Seidle. * All agreements pay lip service to the need for greater in and for clearer lines of citizen accountability transparency citizen access to the but relations."(paper environment. forauthoritative and no capacity no formal decision-rules. settlement very * An increasingnumberof agreementsexplicitly acknowledge the need to "engage stake holders" and to "build linkages to other structures in the broad social and economic reflect a greater Whilethesedevelopments degree ofinstitutionalization itis important not to exaggerate in Canadian intergovernmental relations. different For some. the COAG process. forexample. programs be less than will Forsmaller. offederaldollars. promising came to a halt when the national in intergovernmental collaboration. the change. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . develop performance in SUFA. exercise Australia.39 on Mon. remains relations This means thatthescope or extentofintergovernmental the first the on whether ministers. ones. effectively was changed in 1996. but "an end to the wrangling" themoreassertive Forprovinces. in shared and increasetheir and priorities. or the European Union.This is indicators. Indeed. ensuring autonomy important poorerprovinces. The relations remainhighly Canadian intergovernmental little no or has constitutional base.There is strongpublic opinion evidence that intergovernmental wantnot moreor lesspowersforanyorderofgovernment.'"26 Winnipeg. The system minister. mostevident the textof * Framework are agreementsreached among all governments oftenfollowedby individually negotiatedbilateralagreements or byadditionalsub-agreements.approaches thecontinuedflow to theextent with theemerging deep reservations. the process itself actors maydefine "success"verydifferently. Quebec. "Executive Federalismand Public Involvement: Integrating presented to the Conference on The Changing Nature ofDemocracyand Federalism in Canada.190. This content downloaded from 142. especially to and BritishColumbia. especially prime heavilydependent in thissense is fragile. legislative backupbybureaucrats process linkedto thesuccessof the processratherthanto individualgovernments. citizens suggests betweenthem. on theevidence.There a highly is also thecase in anotherparliamentary 27This federation. but bid to constrain thegovernment thatitprovides alliesin their federalism thatthe extensionof collaborative fearful replace mightsimply Voices. autonomy jurisdictions. Compared to Germany fluidand ad hoc.suchas Ontario. success will be measured chiefly by theirability on their limit Ottawa'sability to "intrude" from theinitiative wrestle Ottawa. seeingadvantages pattern ofCanada. decision-making.64 2002 Publius/Spring and to monitor results.

like it or not. To the extentthatgovernments This content downloaded from 142. in an era of budget surpluses. and it is a major reason whythe collaborative model is so fluidand ad hoc. Instead. Bythenewcentury. The SUFA is seen less as a provincial constraint on thefederalspendingpowerthanas a re-affirmation ofit. thisactivist impulsewillbe shaped by the fall out fromthe tragedy of 11 September2001. to withdraw from massively the of both devolution costs and areas. manypolicy including responsibility to the provinces.Ottawawasfaced witha fiscalcrisisthatforcedit.Both Ottawa and the provinces will continue to guard their turfand to exploit every opportunityto win credit and avoid blame. Most seek to maximize their freedom of action and to minimize external constraints.190. thereis some indicationof considerable cynicismamong officials at both levels withrespect to the rhetorical promisesof collaboration.Relationsin Canada Intergovernmental 65 and direction and direction Ottawa'soversight withthe collective oversight of the English-speaking provinces.150. It seeks to maintainlinks to particularly citizens benefits to themrather thanindirectly byproviding directly through theprovinces. but ratherwithsubstantive policy and its outcomes.Ottawa was anxious to itscommitment demonstrate to cooperation. On one hand. Success forOttawalies in itsability to retainitsinfluenceand visibility. In general. some ofthefactors thatinitially led Ottawato accept collaborative federalism have nowchanged.withsuccessiveelectionvictories. At the same time. In the 1990s.Indeed. "Success"willbe definedvery differently bythosegroupsand bycitizens not concerned withfederalism or the relativestatusof governments. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .in the aftermath of the "near-death" experience of the 1995 Quebec referendum. a slowing towardrecession. This historic dynamic of executivefederalismhas not changed. on the otherhand. Successful collaboration depends on high levels of mutual trustamong the participants and on their internalization of itsimplicitnorms.thusreducingOttawa's economymaybe pushed farther issuesto the top of scope foraction. fiscal or regulatory. Ottawaappears less prepared to take a back seat to the provincesand more concerned to reassert itspresence in the livesof Canadians. some-especially the weaker be to trade offsome autonomy fiscally jurisdictions-will prepared in returnfor adequate and stable financialassistance. with large fiscalsurpluses(at leastforthemoment). the riseof security thenationalagenda putsthefocussquarelyon matters within falling clearly federal jurisdiction. most governments take a pragmatic approach to collaboration.39 on Mon. They will ask: does this of thepolicyobjectives we are processenhance or impede theachievement interestedin? Answerswill vary.and with a slowbutsteady decline in supportforQuebec sovereignty. depending on the group in can achieve together whatnone question. Clearly. withno viableoppositionon thehorizon. of course.

Gibbins.it suggests a reasonable wayto balance the inevitabletensionbetweennational norms and standardson the one hand. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 39-69.noting thatfederalismvalues and democratic since discussion in tension.190." "AnOutsider'sObservations legislatures in Canada Today. ed.64. it weakens and dilutes the accountability ofIntergovernmental RelationsAmong and to thewiderpublic. on the European Union. "The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European 66 (Summer 1988): 236-278. This content downloaded from 142. Lazar.interestgroups and the public. thedean ofCanadian students 3"In 1979.30 federalism as with executive expectationsof citizens.elections. model that thereare manypotentialcoststo the collaborative However. then collaborative federalismserves all Canadians. concernsof the actors-for blame-can dominate the substantiveissues themselves. The time committed and cost of coordinationcan escalate. The have been well described in the literature 'joint decision trap" emerges when autonomous. interdependentactors to consensusdecision-making seek to make decisions.Donald Smiley.""' "at leastat models that collaborative would. solutionsmaybe avoided or simply The politicaland institutional expressthelowestcommon denominator. Services. pp. and into fora relatively out of legislatures 28See Fritz Scharpf. First. PublicAdministration Integration."The government "moves decisions ofdecentralization and intergovernmentalism combination insulatedfrompublic pressure." Canada: The "Keith Banting."Supplementary Statement. Approach Commentary Securing of Intergovernmental Relations. Richard Relations orCollaboration: Intergovernmental ConsentingAdults. of political the margins." He warns that it is "worthrememberingthe co-determination Another democratic critique of such potent intergovernmentalism. undulylow level of citizen secrecy public's of governmentto their participationin public affairs.Third. reduce the role and effectiveness parties. A on the the Social Union: Steven Decentralized Kennett. provincial on the other. 1985).it contributesto undue an it contributes to business. Keith Banting." discussionof thisin the Canadian context. Report. (Kingston:Institute of executive his offederalism. limited advancesthathavebeen made to democratize thatwillmake thistask federalism is nothingin the processofcollaborative anyeasier. claimsthatCanadiansocial-policy valuesare often of intergovernmentalism-the form WorldWarII is markedby"thestrongest model.and to the extentthatthe costs and frustrationsof overlap and duplication can be reduced."Confrontation of Canada.circumstances. whole policies and programsat all levels. and the desire to respond to the specific ofdifferent communities and preferences needs."The Past Speaks to the Future:Lessons fromthe Postwar Stateofthe Federation." Royal 29For Vol. argues Roger of legislatures.see AlbertBreton. 1979).lessdemocratic.29 collaborative federalism. in the conduct of the Second. Perhaps the mostacute challenge confronting is theneed to meetthedemocratic in general.66 2002 Publius/Spring to the extentthat theycan coordinate into a single could do separately. critique opened federalismthisway:"My charges against executivefederalismare these. 1997.1998).39 on Mon.150. observer. III (Ottawa: Supplyand Economic on the Unionand Canada's Development Commission Prospects. ed. These expectationsappear to outpace the very and there theprocess. None of these dilemmasis resolvedeasily.28 to win creditand avoid statusand recognition. and in thatsense. of Public Administration Simeon (Toronto: Institute Social Union. They would promote thatis lessaccountable. Moreover.

PatrickFafardand Policy Harrison(Kingston:Institute ofIntergovernmental Relationsand Saskatchewan Institute ofPublic Kathryn A Skeptical Reform: 2000). 36This viewis expressed most forcefully Statement. believingtheprovinces willto takea leadingrole. of a federalsystem-innovation. pp.Royal by AlbertBreton. "Groups." Federalism: and Governments Markets in a Changing Citizens. Report. Rethinking eds." Assessing ACCESS: Towards a NewSocial Union ofIntergovernmental Institute "The Canada Relations. forthe 1996). Center for European Integration Studies. 65-96. 1985). 195-218.Building Blocks NewSocial Union(Ottawa: Canadian PolicyResearch Network. Democracyand Regulatory Viewofthe Case forDecentralization.1996).1999). will be lost in an over-zealous search for harmonization. Douglas Brownand Jonathan Rose (Kingston:Institute of Intergovernmental Relations.36 COLLABORATIVE FEDERALISM: HOW DURABLE? Is the patternof collaborative federalism likelyto be a durable featureof the Canadian federation?Some observers believe thatitwas at rootsimply a response to the growing fiscalincapacity of the federalgovernment and that it will rapidly disappear with Ottawa's return to financial health. See also Susan Phillips.and MargaretBiggs. for example. Policy. Patrick Fafard. politics A finalline of criticism sees collaborative federalism as littlemore thana "cartelof elites. because Canada wasa moredecentralized federation. "Is DecentralizationConservative?" 35Alain Federation. views.190.33 expresssimilar thoseassociated ManyCanadian interest groupsand movements-notably withsocial policyand theenvironment34 -have historically looked to federal lack eithertheresourcesor the political leadership. 34See.Alain Noel and progressive disagrees." (Discussion paper C 11.in Canada Relations Intergovernmental 67 partisan debate and electoral combat."Federalism. Karen Knop et al. pp." Hence.Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat Bonn. agreement. He notesthatthereare "conservative arguments on both sides of the centralization/decentralization debate" and that"The Canadian welfarestate became betteranchored than the Americanone. 273-293.In thisview. pp. 43-44. seeing it as inherentlydecentralizing. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . In a carefullyargued rebuttal."35 theory." Canada: TheStateofthe Federation."Managing the Environmental Union:Intergovernmental Relations and Environmental in Canada. variety. pp. withnewrevenues-seemedto suggest a return to an earlierperiod in which Ottawaused itsresourcesto impose conditions on transfers to theprovinces Reservations 32"Democratic about the ACCESS Models. the ed. the Governmentof Canada's budgets of 1999 and 2000-flush Certainly. 81-104. and ServicesCanada. 1995. (Kingston: Health and Social Transfer. pp. in Canada and elsewhere. 1998).and the Environment." He concludes: largely on elites and on central intervention is not onlypoor "Betting everything it is also bad for the left. whilefreezing out citizenand system the dangeris thatsome of the primary virtues group interests. See his Supplementary on the Commission Economic Unionand Canada's Development Volume III (Ottawa: Supply Prospects. Government.see Marcus Horeth. theytend to be skepticalof the collaborativemodel. This content downloaded from 142."32 Many others. and consistency. and competitionexperimentation. pp.1995)."in whichfederaland provincial governments manage the in order to servetheirown interests. (Vancouver:University of BritishColumbia Press. eds. RobertYoung (Kingston: Noel.and RobertHowse.150.1997). World."The Trilemmaof Legitimacy-Multilevel in the EU and the Problem of Legitimacy. Governance 33Inthe European context. 6-7. Stretching Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. Theyworry about a possible"rushto thebottom.39 on Mon. eds.

has made itsfreedomto act in the old ways." to accept constraints of mutual distrust and deep unwillingness on one's ministers freedomof action. governments may exchange information. but equally often. cajole. and theircentralagencies thanitis among line ministers who are more likely to share policy goals and political constituencies. intergovernmental willremain federalism Yetthereare reasonsto believe thatcollaborative rate a feature of thescene in thefuture.these are of winningsupporton one's trumpedby the more immediateincentives to a deeper institutionalization ofcollaborative home turf. cooperation among collaborativefederalismin Canada emerged in part in response to that demand. more thanrhetoric. threaten. Past experience has shown that the federalismof public affluence can be at least as conflictual as the federalism of fiscalrestraint. thereis some evidencethatthe emphasison cooperationand Moreover.68 2002 Publius/Spring and to bolsterits public visibility fundsdirectly to citizens by transferring thanthrough (as in its"Millennium Scholarship" program)rather provincial governments.The finalbarrier in a Westminster federalism remainsthe logic of responsiblegovernment mustremainaccountable to theirlegislatures.there games.A thirdis commitments limiting sharply of collaborative federalism-the AIT and the Socialthatthe achievements it more likely that them-make chief Union Framework Agreement among in thefuture.150. they system.and even agree at an but theycannot bind each other." agreementsare full of commitments the reality oftenseems to be highlevels and othersuch sentiments. The institutionalization intergovernmentalism muscle councils adds administrative PremiersConferenceand ministerial This content downloaded from 142. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . bargain.It has notyetbecome collaborationmayoftenbe little in thewayfederaland provincial internalized fully politiciansand officials think about each other.39 on Mon.190. of two-level relationshave manyof the characteristics Intergovernmental in the must to two audiences. Hence. "trust. even though the SUFA and other to "consultation.recognizingthatthe game has changed.""collaboration. persuade. There is nowsome momentum theprocedurewillbe followed officials behind the approach. participants respond are often strongincentivesto collaborate. which Yes.One is thatCanadians consistently as an their governments important objective. Ottawa. and dynamicis a working among inter-provincial agenda thatclassically defined to the federal-provincial relationship counterpoint of the Annual in Canada. This is much more evidentat the leveloffirst and officials. theirown have learned thattheycan make significant progressbysetting The themselves. Anotheris thatearlierapproaches based on federalleadership and its use of the spending power are no longer as feasibleas theyonce were. conference. Federal and provincial reportthatSUFA is the of into calculations factored public administrators increasingly being A is that the fourth reason and interest provincesand territories groups. Indeed. Indeed.Governments cannot be accountable to others.

whereitsability toactwillbe unimpeded. has no a means been zero-sum intergovernmental Although by the of has altered the balance of maturing provincialgovernments game. have not municipalities figured in our analysis. This is so not onlybecause municipalities have no greatly butalso because provinces tendto control status. of others' examples. Ottawa to take in initiatives the field mightexploitevery opportunity social-policy via the tax system or by means of direct grants to individuals and is the Child organizations.although this initiative was the product of federal-provincial cooperation. Forexample. an example of the direct grant approach is Ottawa's MillenniumScholarshipFund. CONCLUSION Collaborative federalismalso needs to be set in the larger context of multilevel to governancein Canada. course. Tax Credit. during To say that collaborative federalism is likely to be a feature of relationsin the futureis not to say thatit will be the intergovernmental in town.150. thatmatter mostto Canadians-and onlygame Manyof the things therefore to the federal government-fall broadly within provincial of each other. so willthe provinces.and jurisdiction. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . independentconstitutional the structure and powers of local governments tightly. has followeda standardCanadian pattern. a controversial in undertaking. Collaborativefederalism fitslogically intothebroad development ofConfederation the last four decades. robbing the very This content downloaded from 142. the evolutionof the Canadian federationover the last fourdecades has been substantially definedbytwopowerful forces:nationelsewhere. Ottawawill collaboratewhen it feelsit has to.Relationsin Canada Intergovernmental 69 to thisdevelopment.190. Both forceshave building in Quebec and province-building had a major impacton the government of Canada and itsability to call the it shots. Thisarticle national. It willbecome increasingly necessary look to the role of local. territorial. and Aboriginalgovernments and their interface with and international institutions. particularly While the of these alternatives does of not. pursuit Ottawato avoid all politicalcontroversy. provincial. using the tax system.permit Quebec. itmaybe a result oftheneed to respondto similar or simply emulation problemsor pressures. To the extentthatOttawa'sfreedomof action is constrained whenitenters intocollaboration with itwillseekotherapproaches provinces.39 on Mon. policythatare impossibleto achieve in the constitutional More generally. rather than the result of explicit discussion and agreement. Provincesoftenact quite independently whenthereis coordination or parallelpolicydevelopment. An example of the first.in thefuture. itputsitin a freer positionin which its capacityto act is not subject to the will of the provinces. within Confederation has the in and redefined manner which Ottawa power can seek to achieve its objectives. A fifth reason is thatgovernments have found that theycan achieve accommodations throughcollaboration on substantive forum.

Penser quiebcoise tranquille (Montreal: EditionsQuebec-Am6rique. The creationof thenew territory protectorates.190. on one hand and by hard-linefederalists line sovereignists This is encouragingan as yetinchoate search in the provincefora fresh 1996 political discourse.2 percentas compared to 39. pp. in a multigovernance willbecome players in thedevelopment minorcharacter Quebec has been a relatively Finally. in politics and attitudes in Quebec. Leslie. tranquille: Bilan dela rivolution la Nation (Montreal:EditionsVaria. June 2000. quality This has occurredat a timewhen citiesand cityregionsare the centersof are increasingly economic and culturalinnovation. compared participated (38 was the that the federal fact seats in 1993)." Publius:TheJournal of This content downloaded from 142. ofthepopularvotein Quebec Liberalsin 2000 receiveda higherproportion thandid the BQ (44. multigovernance withyetotherinstitutional In addition.150. are increasingly rather than to their provincial hinterlands. More significant.R. There are signs. the sovereignist ithad seatsthanithad in eitherof theothertwopreviouselectoralcontests in 44 1997 and 54 in to seats in as seats 2000. full defacto made up largelyof Inuit people. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . in linkedto nationaland international networks manycases. Bloc Queb6cois (BQ) won fewer on 27 November2000. Aboriginalpeoples elsewherein Canada are also seekingto definetheirown models of self-government. dominated by hardon the other. wrotea series forMontreal'slargestdailynewspaper. Dubuc.Withthesovereignist of collaborative for much of the period under review(from 1994 to the present). it has of a been a limitedand reluctantparticipant. multicultural. 2000). Court Sets Rules forthe Secession ofQuebec. did nationalist sentiment.C.70 2002 Publius/Spring thatare closestto the citizenand the mostinvolved withthe governments of their lives of much of their and daily potentialdynamism vitality. 1999). See also Gilles Paquet. Canada's outside the traditional federal-provincial-municipal are actingmore and more like provincesthanfederal territories northern itspopulation ofNunavut.39 on Mon. MichelVenne. Jean-LucMigu.Ideas forGettingOut of the Dead End"). Reprintedas "We Must Break sac" ("Re-inventing la Revolution This Vicious Circle. and. PartiQueb6cois in office federalism. [1998] Supreme "3Reference ofQuebec. Federalism 29 (Spring 1999): 135-151.37 Many thoughtthatthe federalgovernment's referenceof the question of Quebec secession to the Supreme Court of Act"outliningthe Canada" and thepassage in 1999 of thefederal"Clarity bid would arouse to a secession federalgovernment's possible approach federalelection in the but this not occur. 217.however." PolicyOptions. Enriching democratic mustinvolvethem. They too world..9 percent).particularly Party La Presse. "Canada: The Re See Peter S.6. 8-28.ed. in a federalist rather thatQuebec mayre-engage This raisesthepossibility of if Liberal the federalist than a sovereignist discourse. Finally.There appears to be a deep publicfatigue is currently movement withthe perpetual debate on the national question. The sovereignty transformation in retreat.Canada is experimenting forms framework. is Canada's first experiment withAboriginalself-government. a senioreditorialwriter "7Alain du cul-denotreavenir:Des idWes of eighteditorialsexploringthisissue entitled"RWinventer pour sortir our Future.1999). perhaps. Secession 2 also. Oublier etd&clin du Quibec: Etatisme PouruneNouvelle Socialiti(Montreal: Liber.

39 Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill "3The Ryerson. It willgrow. as they face the challengesof the new millennium." impulse.Relationsin Canada Intergovernmental 71 Quebec underJean Charestwins the next provincialelection. As Canada enters the new millennium. Yetmuch ofthelogic ability of Canadian federalism standsin the way. partners that this may result in a substantialelement of asymmetry or "variable then the collaborative model will take on added geometry.190. administrative and and the interests of citizens in the efficiency clarity.the competition to gain creditand avoid blame. mobility politicians twolevels. thecollaborative and ifitsprovincial are preparedto accept system. This content downloaded from 142.and theirconstituents.1987). the importance ofregionaland ideologicaldivisions and theinequality amonggovernments. 9 Sep 2013 14:57:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .39 on Mon. or not.these does not opposing forcesremainin contention. It is now partofwhatDonald Smileydescribedas the federal"condition"in Canada. collective ofgovernments to meettheirneeds.onlyinsofaras it meets the needs of federaland provincialelites.and if the federal Liberals can overcome their deep distrustof their provincial IfQuebecers do opt forthe beaurisque offullparticipation in counterparts.150. in wealth distributionamong the provinces-all these push toward an adversarialrelationship. elaborationof the collaborative modelStrongforcespush fora further the relatively even balance of federaland provincialpowerand status. the of the desire for high degree interdependence among governments. The lack of a unifying national the lack of of officials and between the partysystem. Collaborativefederalism have itsown internaldynamic.

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