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Contemporary Polemics Between Neo-Wahhabis and Post-Khomeinist Shiites

ISAAC HASSON

Research Monographs on the Muslim World Series No 2, Paper No 3, October, 2009 HUDSON INSTITUTE

The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Department of Defense position, policy, or decision.

CENTER ON ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM WORLD

Contemporary Polemics Between Neo-Wahhabis and Post-Khomeinist Shiites


ISAAC HASSON

Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World

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Contents

Contemporary Polemics Between Neo-Wahhabis and Post-Khomeinist Shiites . The Post-Khomeini Shiites View of the Wahhabis . . . .

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The Wahhabi View of the Shia

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Neo-Wahhabi Arguments Against the Shiites . The Mutual Relations Between the Shia and Judaism . . . . . . . . Ridiculing the Shiites .

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Appendix I: Sultan Abd al-Azizs Document Giving Palestine to the Jews . . . . Appendix II: Surat al-Walaya. Notes .

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Contemporary Polemics Between Neo-Wahhabis and Post-Khomeinist Shiites1

he contemporary conict between Sunnis and Shiites came into prominence at the time of the Iranian Revolution, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,2 in February 1979. The revolution brought about the ouster of the Pahlavi dynasty and the establishment of an Islamic republic. For Khomeini and his followers, the revolution and the clerical regime that it created were to serve as an example and model for others to follow, and in repeated declarations they expressed their desire to export their revolution to all the downtrodden peoples (al-Mustadafun) throughout the Muslim world and beyond.3 As one consequence of the revolution, a politically-charged Shiite awakening swept through the Middle East. Not surprisingly, it was felt especially in those countries with disaffected or oppressed Shia populations who were denied political representation (including, for instance, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates). As Shia throughout the Middle East expressed growing enthusiasm and admiration for Khomeini and his revolution, fears mounted among regional governments that their subjects might attempt to topple them in an effort to replace them with Islamic regimes. As a consequence, many Middle Eastern governments implemented a range of measHUDSON INSTITUTE

ures aimed at arresting the spread of Irans inuence. One such measure for these states was to revive anti-Shiite hostility and rhetoric within Sunni populations. Anti-Shiite rhetoric had once ourished during certain historical periods, and especially in the Middle Ages, yet by the latter half of the twentieth century it appeared to some observers to be in decline.4 Reviving anti-Shiism proved not only an inexpensive means for states to rein in Khomeinist inuence, but it also was quite popular among Sunni Arab publics. One important Sunni group that participated in the revival of anti-Shiism was the ulama of Iraq. These religious scholars were under the orders of Saddam Hussein, who had launched a bloody eightyear war against the Islamic Republic of Iran (19801988). The Iraqi ulama, while employing some of the Wahhabi arguments, also invoked powerful historic memories by calling the Iraqi campaign against the young Islamic Republic Qadisiyyat Saddama reference to the famous Battle of al-Qadisiyya that took place in 637. This battle is etched in the ArabMuslim conscience as the decisive event leading to the collapse of the Sassanid Empire5the pre-Islamic, Persian state that once ruled over the territory of present-day Iraq, Iran and parts of Greater Syria. By expressly linking the modern struggle against Khomeinist Iran to the Battle of al-Qadisiyya, the Iraqi religious scholars had revived the ancient
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ethnic-cultural argument that stemmed from Arab hostility toward the Persian Shuubiyya movement of the eighth and ninth centuries.6 They stressed that Khomeinism, in fact, represented a re-awakening of the Shuubiyya movement, and the revival of a virulent Persian nationalism that was aggressively hostile to the Arabs. These accusations came naturally for the Baath party, whose ideology was rooted in Arabism.7

n many ways, anti-Shiism became a unifying cause among some Sunnis, as hatred and fear of the Shia led to the merging of Sunni factions that were notoriously hostile to each other. One especially hostile reaction to Iran and the Shia came from the Wahhabis (or, as they prefer to be referred to these days, the Salas, a term that carries a more positive connotation than Wahhabi). The Wahhabis, who remain the dominant interpreters of Islam on the Arabian Peninsula, invoked earlier rulings of leading Sunni ulama and castigated Shiism as a meaningless faith, and as a corruption of true Islam. These arguments, which became entrenched and widely accepted over time, accused Shiism, among other things, of being too close to Judaism. They further claimed that Shiism had been created either by the Jews or by the Zoroastrians (Majus in Arabic). The two camps seem to have understood perfectly the need to make the best use of modern technology, reaching out to the greatest numbers of people while skirting borders, censorship, police, and secret services. The computer offered a myriad of possibilities, and they did not hesitate to use it. The rst to do so were probably the Wahhabi followers of the Taliban, who seized power in Afghanistan in 1996. In 1998, they inaugurated the rst dialogue website in Arabic, which they named Al-Sahat al-Arabiyya (The Arab Arenas).8 Meanwhile, the administrators of anti-Shiite websites complained that the Shiite websites offer more serious material because great ayatollahs actively participate in the writing.9 The origins of the Sunni and Shia conict are, of
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course, traceable back to the quarrel that erupted during Islams earliest period over the rightful successor to Muhammad as the ruler of the Muslim polity. That quarrel took place between, on the one hand, those who accepted the rule of the rst three so-called rightly-guided caliphs, and on the other hand, those who believed that Ali Ibn Abi Talibs claim to rule the Muslim polity took precedence over all others. The subsequent transformation of Alis early partisans into a political party, and a distinctive sect within Islam, boosted these early intraIslamic debates. This also led to the growth of a prolic literature that is of great value for the historical study of Islam.

hroughout Islams history, the quarrel between Sunnis and Shias has waxed and waned in intensity, though it has remained a formative and central dispute within Islamic political and religious thought. However, by the second half of the 20th Century, a number of developments were taking place, indicating that the quarrel was fast becoming a thing of the past. These included, of course, the increasing secularization of Muslim politics, which came to be dominated by secular, rather than religiously-rooted, ideologies. At the same time, new innovations in religious ideology were also contributing to what appeared to be the overall decline of the Sunni-Shia controversy. For example, within Sunni Islam a new, ecumenical intellectual trend had emerged, known as the rapprochement between the various religious legal schools (al-taqrib bayna al-madhahib). This rapprochement was aimed at minimizing the differences between the various Islamic legal schools, including those between Sunni and Shia.10 This ecumenical trend generally seems to have been initiated by distinguished Salas who were followers of Rashid Rida (d. 1935). At the start of his career, Rida was a modernist, but later on he began professing more of a Wahhabist perspective. Today, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a leading adherent and interpreter

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of Ridas thought, very often quotes Rida as enjoining his fellow Muslims: Let us cooperate [with the different sects of Islam, including the Shiites] on all subjects we all agree upon and let us forgive ourselves for the disagreements that keep us apart (nataawanu ma ittafaqna alayhi wa-yadhuru baduna badan ma ikhtalafna hi).11 By mid-century, efforts were being made among the Sunni establishment to reconcile with the Shia. For example, in 1959 the al-Azhar University of Cairo, Sunni Islams most prestigious center of learning, recognized the Shiite Jafari legal school as the fth legal madhhab in Islam. This recognition occurred following a fatwa by Mahmud Shaltut, the Shaykh al-Azhar, which allows Sunni Muslims to pray with Shiites.12 Moreover, after having been banned for centuries by Sunni authorities, some Shiite books began to be taught at al-Azhar. The Shiites, too, had undertaken to have some of their dogma accepted by Sunni authorities. Thus the clerical establishment of Shiite Iran established in Cairo (a predominantly Sunni city, thats conventionally hostile to Shiism) an institution called the Dar al-Taqrib bayna al-Madhahib. This organizations aim, like the rapprochement tendency within Sunnism, was to bring the different Muslim legal schools closer to one another. Dar al-Taqrib bayna al-Madhahib was very active between 1947 and 1979, and succeeded in publishing many Shiite and pro-Shiite works in Egypt.13

problems of ritualan area where the differences between Sunnites and Shiites are minimalas compared to problems of dogma, where Sunni and Shia thought tend to diverge sharply. In the 1960s, in yet another effort to smooth over Sunni-Shia tensions, the Shiite publishers of Bihar al-Anwar, the monumental work of classical Shiism compiled originally by Allama al-Majlisi (d. 1698), abstained from including certain chapters of the original lithographic edition. These chapters were excluded because they contain grave insults of the Prophet Muhammads companions (sabb al-Sahaba) who are revered by Sunnis. Apparently, the publishers believed it was more appropriate to selectively edit this classical Shiite work than to risk aggravating old quarrels and antagonisms.

etween 1949 and 1972, the Shiites also published a periodical called Risalat al-Islam, which contained articles on religious matters written by both Sunni and Shiite scholars. This project originated in an ecumenical vision aiming to harmonize the two principal schools of Islam. To achieve and preserve this harmony, the journal sought to put thorny questions of theology and politics aside to be dealt with at a later time and to focus instead on areas of commonality. For these reasons, a majority of the journals articles deal with
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ith the Iranian Revolution of 1979, this era of rapprochement seemed to come to an abrupt close. Khomeinis declarations concerning the need to export the Iranian Revolution throughout the Islamic world rekindled the Sunni-Shiite polemics. It is possible, in fact, to distinguish between the pre-Khomeini and the post-Khomeini Shiites on a number of levels. Before the Khomeinist revolution in Iran, the Shia felt themselves to be morally superior to other Muslims, so certain were they of the truth of the path chosen by their ancestors, and of their own path with regard to religious or political issues. They viewed themselves as the only group representing the true tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, the elite (al-khassa) among Muslims. They referred to the Sunnis, by word of mouth and in their writings, as the masses (al-amma). Historically, however, the Shiites were a persecuted group within many Muslim societies, and they faced a nearly continuous wave of attacks on their beliefs. This, of course, included their claim that Ali Ibn Abi Talib was the legitimate successor to the Prophet Muhammad, and that his right of rule was passed from Ali to his offspring.14
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These polemics also attacked a range of other central aspects of Shiite belief and practice, including the status of the graves of Ali, of his son Hussein and of the other Shiite Imams; the importance of the pilgrimage (ziyara) to these graves (which in the Shiites view was more important than the pilgrimage to Mecca, the hajj); the infallibility of the Imams; the appeal to them to serve as advocates with Allah (shafaa); the absence of the twelfth Shiite Imam (ghayba), who is to reappear in the future (raja) as a sort of messiah (Mahdi); the obligation to curse most of the companions of the Prophet (sabb alSahaba) and the enemies of the Shia,15 to reject them (baraa), and to acknowledge the right of the Prophets descendants (Al-Sada) to claim a fth of the wars bounty (khums).16 In response to these Sunni attacks on their faith, most Shiite apologetics tended to be defensive and reactive, rather than missionary. These apologetics were intended largely for internal consumption within the Shiite community, and were designed to prevent a Shiite drain toward the Sunni in general, or toward one of the Sunni schools, hostile to the

Shiites, in particular.17 It is also true that, from time to time, Shiite authors emerged whose writings were aimed at Sunnis with the purpose of winning them over to Shiism. This occurred mainly at times when the Shiites busied themselves with missionary activity (dawa), whether with the assistance of Shiite regimes (the Ismaili Fatimis in North Africa and Egypt, or the Safavids in Iran beginning in the sixteenth century), or with regime assistance. In any case, the purpose of such efforts was to attract as many as possible adherents to their camp. But in the last three decades, the post-Khomeini era, the Shiites have adopted a far more militant position. Today they do not limit themselves to protecting their faith and their leaders. Rather, they attack their enemies on all possible fronts: the major aspects of the Sunnis faith; their commentary on the Quran; the contradictions in the traditions (Hadith) attributed to Muhammad and his Companions; the apostatizing from Islam (ridda) of most of the Prophets Companions; the different explanations given to history; and also the psychological warfare intended to cast scorn on the enemy and even demonize it.

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The Post-Khomeini Shiites View of the Wahhabis

uring the Middle Ages, Shiite polemics against Sunnis centered mainly around the legitimacy of the Sunni regime and its oppression of the declared candidates of the Prophet Muhammad, Ali Ibn AbiTalib and his descendants,18 as well as the secondary issues that developed through the ages as accessories to this claim. However, since the appearance of the Wahhabiyya movement in the eighteenth century, a new branch of Shiite claims developed, which only continued to grow in size and signicance with the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Clearly, most of these claims existed prior to the Khomeini revolution but were used only on a small scale, in most cases only for internal Shiite consumption. After Khomeini, the reins were taken off, and ofcial institutions in Iran, alongside non-governmental public institutions, participated very actively in spreading anti-Wahhabi material. Throughout the history of the Shiite-Sunni conict, the Shia have routinely employed the time-tested method of borrowing materials from their opponents opponents. By using materials originating from non-Wahhabi Sunni sourceswhich were accepted by most of the Sunni factionsthey were able to denigrate the Wahhabis and to counter their claims. Throughout their existence the Wahhabis, by their constant verbal and physical attacks on those they deemed heretics, have caused many Sunni groups to spring up against them. This meant that the Shiites, in fact, had available to them an abunHUDSON INSTITUTE

dance of anti-Wahhabi material from a variety of Sunni sources from which to draw. As one member of a Shiite internet forum points out, All Muslim legal schools, whether Sunni or Shiite, wrote articles against the Wahhabis. Among the Sunnis, mention may be made of the Asharis, led by the Hanbalis to whom the Wahhabis themselves belong and who claim to follow Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (founder of the Hanbali religious legal school). Followers of this school deny that Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhabs [false] claims tie in with the opinions of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal or of the sages of other legal schoolsthe Hanas, Shais and Malikis; The Su orders such as Al-Rifaiyya and the Naqshabandiyya; the Zaydis (Shiites) and even the Ibadis (Kharijis) in Uman.19 In attacking the Wahhabis, the Shiites have utilized a number of other prominent anti-Wahhabi books or articles composed by Sunni authors. These include, for example, a famous booklet entitled The Godly Lightning in Response to the Wahhabiyya (Al-Sawaiq al-Ilahiyya -al-Radd ala alWahhabiyya). The author of this book was none other than Sulayman Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the brother of the Wahhabi movements founder, and one of the rst Sunni scholars to categorically condemn the Wahhabiyya teaching. This book has enjoyed great circulation among the enemies of the Wahhabis, particularly the Shia.20 Among other things, Sulayman attacks Ibn Abd al-Wahhabs credentials as a religious scholar and as a mujaddid (reformer), and disputes the Wahhabi argument that Muslims who adhere to awed, folk customs
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are to be considered apostates. (In taking issue with this Wahhabi contention, Sulayman appeals to the higher authority of the classical jurist Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, who, while rejecting certain folk customs, does not consider those who follow them to be heretics.) Another representative Sunni text utilized by Shiites against the Wahhabis is an article entitled The Wahhabiyya Civil War (Fitnat al-Wahhabiyya),21 which was written by the nineteenth-century Shai Mufti of Mecca, Ahmad Ibn Zayni Dahlan, who also wrote a comprehensive biography of the Prophet (Al-Sira al-Nabawiyya). (This article appeared as a chapter in the muftis book, History of the Islamic Conquests (Al-Futuhat alIslamiyya).) Despite the muftis declared opposition to the Shiites,22 contemporary Shiites have frequently circulated this article in various publications and have even translated it into Persian in order to embarrass the Wahhabis. In the article, Mufti Dahlan examines the history of the Wahhabi movement from its beginning, with descriptions of the destruction and horror wreaked by the Wahhabis upon the local inhabitants of Medina, Al-Taif, and other places. He further attacks the Wahhabis indiscriminate use of takr (the designation of the other Muslims as heretics), stating that whoever considers a majority of other Muslims as heretics is himself guilty of heresy.23 Mufti Dahlan additionally cites the story of the Meccan and Medinan scholars who tried to discuss the principles of Wahhabiyya with Wahhabi emissaries, during which it dawned on the scholars that the very same emissaries were funny clowns as though they were frightened asses who ed from a lion (wajaduhum duhka wa-sukhara ka-humur mustanra farrat min qaswara; see the Quran, Sura 74 Al-Muddathir:51). Similarly, the Shiite Center for Studies of Faith publicized Al-Sayyid Abd Allah Muhammad Alis A List of Compositions by Sages of the Muslim Community who Respond to the Nonsense of the Wahhabiyya (Mujam ma Allafahu ulama al-Umma
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al-Islamyya li-al-Radd ala Khurafat al-Dawa al-Wahhabiyya). This contains 213 Sunni and Shiite compositions against the Wahhabiyya teaching and movement. 24 Some of these pieces were again published by the Organization for Islamic Information in Tehran (Munazzamat al-Ilam alIslami Tahran). The fact that this is an ofcial organization of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran indicates the importance that the Iranian regime attaches to the struggle against the Wahhabiyya.

he main Shiite criticisms of the Wahhabis and their movement are that they are primitive, violent, intolerant, and motivated by blind hatred of the Shia, the Sus, and anyone else who does not accept their way. Moreover, the Shiites claim that a Wahhabi victory within Islam would take the Muslims back to the backwardness and darkness of the past. In this way, the Shiites claim that the Wahhabis are in effect serving the interests of Western countries. Shiites commonly describe the Wahhabis as the Khawarij of this [contemporary] age (Khawarij hadha al-asr).25 The Khawarij refers to a group of early Muslims who were originally allied with the followers of Ali Ibn Abi Talib when the latter ruled as the fourth caliph after Muhammad and led a military campaign in Sifn in the year 657 against Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan, who would later establish the Umayyad Caliphate. When Ali received Muawiyas proposal to arbitrate the dispute, a group made up of Bedouin combatants broke away from Alis camp, demanding that the ghting continue until Allah decides the issue between the two enemies. Ali was subsequently forced to ght these Khawarij (which means in Arabic those who withdraw from the community), but he did not manage to overcome them. They continued to operate in various locations in the Muslim world, trying to impose their principles on those around them. Their faith was characterized by puritanism and fanaticism,

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strictness in matters of belief and the observance of customs. Their view was that any non-Khariji Muslim was a heretic, and they included the holy war (jihad) as one of the main pillars of Islam (rukn). They also allowed the killing of Muslims and their wives and children whom they considered heretics.26 The term Khariji has a negative connotation for most Muslims, both Shiite and Sunni, because the image of the Khawarij continues to be that of divisive groups outside the consensus made up of anarchists or zealots who are impatient and intolerant. On more than one occasion the Shiite authors go beyond attaching the Khawarij label to the Wahhabis, and in fact draw a parallel between the two groups. Salih al-Wardani, an Egyptian Sunni fundamentalist who joined the Shia,27 devoted several pages to a detailed description of this parallel. He wrote: My attention was attracted by the streams of zealots [in Egypt], who, just as they adopted the Wahhabi assumptions also adopted the Wahhabi character, which is characterized by rudeness, zealotry, and the bloodletting of enemies I was surprised to nd out that the stands of these [Wahhabi] groups and their characteristics are identical with those of the Khawarij, concerning whom we have in our possession texts [by the Prophet Muhammad]28 that censure them and caution the Muslim community about them. The self-image of the Khawarij and their theories accented their crooked character and bad behavior, just like [the Wahhabi] streams. The Khawarij were also markedly rude and stern and this term suits these streams [of Islamists and Wahhabis]. The Khawarij swords were always drawn against the Muslims allowing their blood to be spilled and their property ravaged, and the same goes for the fundamentalist Wahhabis. The Wahhabi stream from which these other [Sunni fundamentalist] streams draw satisfaction was founded by rude and ossied people who willed this rudeness
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and ossication upon their followers, who later became the modern-day copy of the Khawarij. They later split from the camp of the Imam Ali [Ibn] Abi Talib. The Wahhabi stream that emerged holds that all Muslims, who defy the Wahhabiyya, are polytheists (Mushrikun) and that they may be killed. This is the trend which this stream willed to the Islamic streams.29

ut in some respects, Shiite polemicists claim that the Wahhabis are even more radical than the Khawarij. They argue, for instance, that the Wahhabis view all Islamic states and all their leaders as heretics, and thus, as heretics who must be executed according to Sharia law. In their opinion, there is no administration that applies the religious law anywhere in the world apart from the Taliban.30 As far as the Wahhabis are concerned, all Muslims are heretics because they have declared a ceasere (hudna) on their [so-called Muslim] treacherous rulers and the heretics, and did not wage a holy war against them.31 The conclusion therefore is: the Wahhabis are worse than the Khawarij (al-Wahhabiyya sharrun mina al-Khawarij) since the Khawarij dealt with things that the Muslims unanimously declared to be very sinful (Kabair) and they determined that whoever commits one such sinful act is a heretic, while the Wahhabis concentrate their attacks not only on Muslims who commit acts that are not considered as sins (dhunub) but that are desired (mustahabbat), acts that the Companions of the Prophet, their disciples and the following generations did without any disagreement.32 For these reasons, Shiites claim that the Wahhabi doctrine is corrupt and anti-Islamist, and is similar to a wayward faction (alana dawatahu al-laIslamiyya al-fasida ka-hizb shadhdh).33 Moreover, according to Shiite polemics, Wahhabis are rude and uncivil Bedouins (Arab ajlaf ). Beyond this mocking of the Bedouin, this accusation implies many more negative aspects. In the
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Quran, the term Arab is mostly used as an adjective to describe the heretic Bedouins (Sura 9: 97) whose faith is only outward and not internal (Munaqun, Sura 9: 101), or who refused to assist the Prophet at a time of need (Sura 9: 120; Sura 11: 48). When these accusations are made by Iranians, they undoubtedly reect the anti-Arab claims raised by the Persian Shuubis during the second and third centuries after the Hijra. Following are further Shia observations about the Wahabists: The story of the Wahhabi movement is in fact exceptionally violent. Their movements history is riddled with acts of violence against all, even against Muslims who did not accept their way. In fact their movement spread only as a result of military power and acts of cruelty committed anywhere they met with resistance. Today they make extensive use of cash to spread their faith. The Najd [Wahhabi] Sultan (Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, the founder of the third Saudi state,) rests on two clear arguments the cutting sword and the dirham and dinar, the sword and pointed spear and the resounding gold(sultan najd lahu hujjattani qatiatani al-husam al-battar wa-al-dirham wa-al-dinar, alsayf wa-al-sinan wa-al-ahmar al-rannan).34

he Wahhabi ideology is full of internal contradictions. The Wahhabis claim that they base their faith and habits on two types of sources: First, on rules that are categorically laid down in the Quran and the Prophets Sunna. In such cases the Wahhabis are not prepared to accept any other interpretation (ijtihad) of the Prophets Companions (al-Sahaba), their disciples (al-Tabiun), or of the greatest imams. Second, where there is no specic mention in the Quran and Sunna, they make do with the provision laid down by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya. And indeed, according to the Shiite source, the Wahhabis failed, became entangled, and their way was full of contradictions: their thought is frozen, they act contrary to the stands of Ibn Hanbal (who never
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declared any Muslim to be a heretic, apart from those who refuse to pray) and contrary to Ibn Taymiyyas specic provision that Those who cause a split in the Muslim community and determine that their opponents in matters of thought (ara wa-ijtihadat) are heretics, and the person who allows to wage war against them, are themselves traitors to Islamic unity.35 Given the above, the Shiite author (he does not identify himself) concludes that the Wahhabis, according to the rules laid down by their spiritual father Ibn Taymiyya, are the people behind factionalism and differences of opinion [inside the Islamic community] (hum min ahl al-tafarruq wa-al-ikhtilaf).36 The Wahhabis live in a bubble, or to be more precise: in the darkness of the cave and they are ossied, and are thus unwilling and unable to change. This is the description given by the Al-Kawthar Institute in the Iranian city of Qom (Muassasat alKawthar li-al-Maarif al-Islamiyya) in the introduction to the book The New and Correct Way for a Dialogue with the Wahhabis (Al-Minhaj al-Jadid waal-Sahih -al-Hiwar maa al-Wahhabiyyina) by Dr. Isam al-Imad, a former Wahhabi from Yemen who converted to Shiism (taharrara min kahf al-Wahhabiyya bi-kull ma yahmiluhu al-kahf min maani al-zhulma wa-l-hajariyya).37 The Wahhabis are now in fact radicals (ghulat) in their uncompromising stance in all matters that have to do with the attributes of Allah (al-sifat alilahiyya) and their accusation of anyone who upholds views other than their own as a heretic. (The use of the term ghulat is somewhat exceptional given that it was previously used in medieval polemical literature to designate extreme Shiite groups who, for example, deied Ali.)38 The Wahhabis, and the Salas in particular, allow themselves to lie when they argue with opponents, and to falsify early sources to tie in with their stand (tahrif al-turath wa-istihlal al-kadhib ala alkhusum). Muhammad al-Kuthayri claims that Ibn Taymiyya was not the inventor of this method.

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Rather he mimicked the Hanbalis who came before him and willed it to the Wahhabis, who turned it into a rule that they follow.39 By the same token, they knowingly falsied Muslim history to align it with their stands.40

he Shiites claim that in his youth Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabiyya, was very fond of reading the stories about the false prophets. These prophets appeared during the early period of Islam prophets such as Maslama Ibn Habib or Ibn Thumama, known in Muslim sources as Musaylima al-Kadhdhab (Maslama the poor liar), who appeared among the tribe of Hanifa in the Najd area; Sajah Bint al-Harith, the prophet of the tribe of Tamim; Al-Aswad al-Anasi in Yemen; and others.41 Indeed, the Shiite author Saib Abd alHamid stresses this fact, yet does not mention its source;42 his intention is clear and transparent: Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab is a cheat who is no different from the false prophets. The placards carried by Hezbollah supporters in Lebanon following the al-Taif agreement of 1989 that put a stop to the civil war in Lebanon, read: The Wahhabis are the lthy work of Satan (alwahhabiyyun rijs min amal al-shaytan).43 In this case the word Wahhabis replaced the words wine, gambling, the altars and the arrows [used to distribute the meat of animals slaughtered on the altar as a custom practiced by Arab idol worshipers] (see Quran, Sura 5: 90). Shiite publications refer to the Wahhabis as supercial and of limited intelligence. According to them, the Wahhabis are unable to delve deeply into the ner details, especially regarding their adversaries. They want to understand everything at the simplest level (al-fahm al-sathi li-afkar al-mukhalin).44 One of the mustabsirun who went over to the Shia while studying for a doctorate at the alImam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Mecca wrote a book; at the end of it he described how to
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debate with the Wahhabis: The Wahhabis are not the enemies of this wonderful school of thought [Shiism], and as soon as they familiarize themselves well with it they will not hesitate to adopt it. But we must descend to the intellectual level of the Wahhabi when we present to them the exclusive, noble and deep characteristics of the Twelver Shia school of thought so that we may elevate them to the intellectual level of the Twelver Shia.45 According to the Shia, the Wahhabis have always served Western imperialism in the Islamic countries what did these countries do in order to withstand the Crusader and Zionist inuence? They always opened their gates to the West so that it could take control of the Muslim countries and their sovereignty and honor.46 Abd al-Aziz, the founder of the (current) third Saudi [Wahhabi] state, is described as having warmly supported the handover of Palestine to the Jews. Shiite sources show a photograph of a document written by Abd al-Aziz in which he declared to Percy Cook, Britains emissary to Saudi Arabia, that his country (Saudi Arabia) has no objection to presenting Palestine to the Jews or to others, as Britain sees t. Sultan Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, even before declaring himself king of Saudi Arabia, declared that he would never until Judgment Day disobey Britain.47 The full text reads: In the name of Allah, the Merciful and the Compassionate, I, Sultan Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd al-Rahman of the House of Faisal of the House of Saud, acknowledge and admit a thousand times to Sir Percy Cook, representative of Great Britain, that I have no objection to giving Palestine to the Jews or to others, as Britain sees t. I will never disobey Britain until Judgment Day.48 Saib Abd al-Hamid, a former Hana (from Iraq) who became Shiite, attacks the Wahhabis
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and describes them as the malignant bacteria that prepared the ground for the West to plant Israel, the foundling, in the heart of the Islamic nation. And they are the malignant bacteria working still today to strengthen the Wests hold on the heart of the Muslim world There are the cursed hands that the West motivates in order to suppress the Islamic awakening and to support the two-faced regimes (al-anzima almunaqa), there are agents of the West who oppress the awakening with blood and re.49 The two-faced regimes means the Muslim regimes who work against Islam and real interests of Muslims. The Wahhabis believe themselves to be the only ones who totally serve Allah. The other Muslims worship gods other than Allah (Mushrikun) and their lives, descendants and properties are not immune, their land must be fought against (Dar Harb)... In point of fact they, the Wahhabis, brought a despicable innovation to the world (bida kubra).50 In conclusion, the post-Khomeinist Shiites have been trying for the past thirty years to wage a savage war

against the Wahhabis, their primary enemy for more than two hundred years. The Wahhabis have denigrated them, desecrated their holy sites, and fought a terrible campaign against thema quite successful effort in various Islamic countries and among the Muslim diaspora in various locations throughout the world.

o this end the Shiites have acted methodically, as they still do, with the aid of Islamic history. They compare the Wahhabis with the false prophets who appeared early on in Islamic history such as Musaylima, or groups such as the Khawarij, whose doctrine and way of life the Islamic consensus rejected. The Shiites make use of classical Sunni writings to denigrate all Wahhabi factions, presenting them as false and lacking in intellect, as misled and misleading heretics, servants of the West, whose only purpose is to prevent a true Islamic awakening. This Shiite campaign long ago violated the accepted limits of inter-religious or, more correctly, inter-sectarian controversies. As we have seen, the Shiites demonize the Wahhabis, comparing them to malignant bacteria that must be exorcised from the Islamic body.

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The Wahhabi View of the Shia

he sheer volume of anti-Shiite texts produced by Wahhabi authors in the past few decades is staggering. A great number of these works are written in accordance with the model typical of medieval polemical texts. The authors of these works cite Shiite arguments, and refute them one by one by one, comparing them either to other Shiite texts (to demonstrate the Shiisms fallacies), or to verses from the Quran and the traditional sayings (Hadith) attributed to the Prophet. There is a growing body online of antiShiite literature written by Wahhabi and Neo-Wahhabi authors that follows this centuries-old method, and the authors of these texts often strive to present their works as reective of the highest standards of scholarly rigor.51 Another body of anti-Shiite literature is, by scholarly standards, quite mediocre, despite the fact that its authors claim to be religious scholars. The general purpose of this literature is to reach a popular audience, and to reassure an uneasy public that it possesses the truth, at the exclusion of others. Very often, these texts are published anonymously, or their authors use deceptive pseudonyms. This is the case of one work entitled Li-Llah thumma li i-Tarikh (For Allah and for History), which was attributed to an imaginary Shiite scholar from Najaf who identied himself Hussein al-Musawi. The manager of the publishing house that originally published this article was condemned by the Court of Appeals in Beirut to two years of prison and to a ne of 50 million Lebanese pounds. The reason for such a heavy sentence was that, according to the Court, the works supposed authorwho was said to be a
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repentant Shiite and a convert to Sunnism, and who later was supposedly assassinated by his former Shiite coreligionistsin fact never existed.52 Another work bears the title Fadaih al-Hawza al-Ilmiyya -al-Najaf, Siyaha Alam al-Tashayyu, al-Hawza al-Ilmiyya, or Asrar wa-Khafaya (The Scandals of the Religious College [which educates the Shiite ulama] in Najaf, A Voyage in the World of the Shia, the Ulama College, or Secrets and Hidden Facts). This work is said to have been written by an author whose name is Muhibb al-Din Abbas al-Kazimi. Shiite apologists dispute the fact that this author ever belonged to their faith; more likely, he is a disguised Wahhabi.53 Sometimes these anti-Shiite works are so blatantly over-the-top and clearly false that, presumably, even the most naive reader understands their true nature. Such texts can nevertheless be quite spicy, and have a certain popular attraction emanating from their bawdy and direct allusions to the muta (temporary marriage) and the sodomy of women, considered permissible by the Shiites though inadvisable (makruha). A perfect example is given by a man calling himself the Ayatollah al-Uzma waHujjatullah al-Baligha Abu Ishaq Yaqub Ezra alAmili of Qom. It appears that this man was in fact from Dearborn, Michigan, where over the course of two evenings he answered questions put to him by Shiite students. All the questions concerned the muta.54 The real authors did not refrain from quoting at length obscene details bordering on pornography. Obviously, when reading the name Yaqub Ezra, it is easy to guess the real objective of these falsications: to show that Shiites and Jews are
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one and the same and that the Shiites, just like their brethren Jews, didnt spare any effort in disseminating hedonism, licentiousness and debauchery. Other examples come from a text that may be found on the anti-Shiite website www.fnoor.com under two different titles: Brutukulat Ayat Qumm hawla al-Haramayn al-Muqaddasayn (The Protocols of the Ayat of Qumm Concerning the Two Holy Cities) whose author is Dr. Abd Allah al-Ghifari,55 and Al-Khutta al-Sirriyya li-Ayat al-Shia Iran (The Secret Plan of the Shia Ayat in Iran) with an introduction by Doctor Abd Al-Rahim Al-Balushi.56 This document is sometimes referred to as the Protocol, a name that readers might immediately associate with the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. As with the latter text, this document claims the Shiites are using the same methods as the Jews in a plot to dominate the world. In some ways, however, the Secret Plan ascribes to the Shiites far lesser ambitions than the Protocols does the Jews: Whereas the latter claims that the Jews intend to control the whole world, The Secret Plan claims that the Shiites aim only to take control of the Muslim oil-producing countries in the next 50 years. The document further describes the methods that Shiites will use to attain this objective. It asserts that the Shiites may appear to be harmless and moderate and even willing to engage in dialogue, but warns that they will tirelessly seek to sow discord between those in power and the religious leaders. The text further claims that the Shiites will also seek to undermine the economic stability of the Middle East and upset the social order of the countries they have set their sights on, while encouraging the inhabitants of these countries to become morally lax and to indulge in debauchery and pornography. Finally, the texts claim that the Iranian regime is encouraging ordinary Iranians to immigrate to countries throughout the Middle East, inltrating subversive agents and buying real estate and commercial establishments for the use of Shiites who will arrive in those countries in the future. The doc[ 12 ]

ument describes in detail every clause and insists on the following point: fty years are but a very short, and therefore insignicant, period in the history of peoples and religions. One should not forget that present-day Shiites assert that they are the descendants of millions of martyrs who were assassinated by the sons of Satan disguised as Sunni Muslims (nahnu warathatu malayin al-shuhadai lladhina qutilu bi-yad al-shayatin al-mutaslimuna [sic] lSunna).57

Neo-Wahhabi Arguments Against the Shiites

he richest and most scathing anti-Shiite source: the popular discussion forums on the Internet (muntadayat) that are maintained by Neo-Wahhabi activists. Among these, Shabakat al-Difa an al-Sunna (The Network for the Defense of the Sunna) deserves special mention. These forums give unqualied and ignorant people the occasion to participate in such polemics. They may express their opinions and disseminate ideas that have been widely held by the Sunni population, perhaps for centuries. Mockery is always present, since many of these arguments aim at ridiculing the Shiites. The Internet has thus succeeded in introducing into this controversy arguments stemming from the local collective folklore of the Muslim world, thereby intensifying the negative and ridiculing portrayal of the Shiites. These forums report in detail real or ctitious accusations, complete or partial quotations, serious or vain discussions: anything goes, and everything is permissible. Certain formulas used by the Neo-Wahhabis to dene the Shiites are utterly offensive, using Shiites as the butt of jokes, and describing them as odious creatures. Among other things, they claim that the

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Shia are a Christian seed planted by Judaism on Zoroastrian land (al-Shia hiya bidhra nasraniyya gharasatha al-yahudiyya ard majusiyya.) 58 This description constitutes the preamble to an article titled The Resemblance between Shiites, Jews and Christians (Mushabahat al-Shia li-al-Yahud wa lial-Nasara.) The author explains that Shiisms founder was in fact a Jew named Abd Allah Ibn Saba alYahudi59 who used the authority of Ali in an effort to falsify the Quran, just as St. Paul, the author claims, used the authority of Jesus to alter Christianity.60 The Shiite followers of Ibn Saba al-Yahudi, the author claims, are actually Persian Magi or Zoroastrians who hate Islam because it has destroyed their state. In an effort to provide a scholarly basis for his arguments, the author quotes freely from the Minhaj al-Sunna, the classical work of the 13th Century scholar Ibn Taymiyya, on the role that Ibn Saba alYahudi supposedly played in the early development of Shiism. In their effort to link Shiism with Christianity, the Neo-Wahhabis charge that the Shiite institution of the husainiyyaan establishment where various Shiite religious and social activities take place, including mourning celebrations of the murder of the Imam Hussayn in Karbala in 680is no different than the Christian church. Both the husainiyya and the church, the Neo-Wahhabis point out, are decorated with images and paintings, and both use choirs on various occasions, which demonstrates from where the Husainiyyat took their inspiration.61 Moreover, the Neo-Wahhabis argue that the Shiite Sayyids (those whose genealogy is supposedly traced back to the Prophet Muhammad) perform in the husainiyyat certain rites and tasks similar to members of the church clergy.62 Regarding the relations of the Shia with Zoroastrianism, certain writers, as well as the authors writing for the Internet, do not always make the distinction between the terms Zandaqa (heretics)63 and Majusiyya Zaradushtiyya (Zoroastrians.) Many articles and even booklets have been published to
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prove that such relations do indeed exist.64 The same circles also insist on the connection between the Shia, or the rawad (literally those who refuse, or who refuse to accept the rst three righteous caliphs as legitimate) and the Zandaqa. These accusations are commonly used in the various Islamic controversies against those who, on the face of it, appear to belong to the faithful but in reality are indels.65 The Neo-Wahhabis often claim that even today the Zanadiqa use the Shiites to disseminate their ideas and implement their designs. 66 Equating the Shia with Zandaqa probably originates with the Hadith, which is recognized as authentic by Sunni scholars, and which states: Whoever assails the Companions of the Prophet is a zindiq (idha raayta al-rajul yatanaqqasu ahad min ashab al-rasul fa-lam annahu zindiq).67 The texts seeking to establish links between Shiism and Zoroastrianism are very supercially argued, and they recycle many of the same attacks put forth in the Middle Ages. Among other things, they argue that that Imam Hussayn married a Persian princess, and that this marriage explains why the Shiites (who are alleged to be Persian) worship the descendants of Husain only, and not those of his elder brother Hasan (Intisab al-rada li-al-majus al-furs).68 Some Neo-Wahhabi activists quote experts on the Shia to give their accusations a semblance of legitimacy.

he Shiites celebrate the Nowruz (the New Year for the Persians, in Arabic Nayruz). And even today the Shiites still celebrate the murder of the Caliph Umar Ibn al-Khattab in the year 644 by a mawla, or client, of Al-Mughira Ibn Shuba, of Persian descent, known under the name of Abu Lulua.69 Some Shiites confer upon him the title of Baba Shuja al-Din.70 All this goes to prove, in the Neo-Wahhabi mind, the existence of a Zoroastrian conspiracy aimed at avenging the destruction of the Sassanid Empire. All these polemics are meant to lead the reader to
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one obvious conclusion: the Shiites are either renegades (kuffar) or heretical innovators (ashabBida, mubtadiun). The Neo-Wahhabis like to repeat that whoever claims that the Vulgate, the present version of the Quran, has been altered (muharraf), or that the Companions of the Prophet, who are praised in the Quran (al-Sahaba al-ladhina zakkahum al-Quran), are renegadeswhoever claims that is himself a renegade. The Neo-Wahhabis base their arguments on traditions attributed to the Prophet or on opinions expressed by many Hanbali and Wahhabi scholars and exegetes. They often quote Ibn Taymiyya, but also other authors from the Middle Ages and from modern times who belong to all the legal schools (without mentioning the sources), such as Malik b. Anas, Ahmad b. Hanbal, Al-Bukhari, Ibn Qutayba, Ibn Hazm, Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali, al-Qadi Iyad, Ali al-Qari, Ibn Kathir, Al-Samani, Bahjat al-Bitar, Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Mustafa al-Sibai, Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, Rashid Rida, etc.71 Having raised the problem of the Shiites status, the question many Sunni authors ask is whether all Shiites should be considered as kuffar, or should not one rather accept the position of the moderate Sunni authors who consider that only the Shiite ulama are kuffar, while an ordinary Shiite (awammuhum) is simply a heretical innovator (mubtadi )? 72 The question of the Imamate has also been addressed in these polemics. According to the Wahhabis, the Shiites have committed perjury because they have endowed Ali and the other Imams with supernatural, almost divine faculties, as guides in the path of rectitude. Literally, They are polytheists and total apostates who deserve to be executed (hadha shirk akbar wa-ridda an al-Islam yastahiqquna al-qatl alayha).73 The Shiites are the target of other grave accusations, every possible sin on earth being dumped on them. The Neo-Wahhabis do not fail to point out that certain proverbs related to treachery, avarice,
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and lying refer to the Shiites (madrib al-mathal -alghadr wa-al-bukhl wa-al-kadhib). They base their arguments on stories told by the traditional adversaries of the Shia. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the Shiites are the biggest liars on earth. The Neo-Wahhabis often quote the following sentence, which they attribute to Ibn Taymiyya, without bothering to indicate an exact source: subhana man khalaqa al-kadhib wa-ata tisata asharihi li-al-Rawad (blessed be He who created lying and who gave the Rada nine tenths of it).74

o illustrate this accusation, they recount an anecdote attributed to Muhammad Ibn Idris, the warraq (librarian) of al-Humaydi (d. 834), following the traditionalists of Medina: We have fabricated seventy traditions to test the Iraqi traditionalists. We sent them to Kufa [a traditionally Shiite center] and to Basra [a traditionally Sunni center]. The traditionalists of Basra sent them back to us, refusing them point-blank because all were faked; the Kutes sent them back after fabricating an isnad (transmission chain) for each tradition.75 The Shiites are said to have become masters in the art of treachery (ghadr). Their ancestors betrayed the following great gures: First, Al-Hasan Ibn Ali in Sabat al-Madain just before the battle against the Syrian army of Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan in 661; second, Al-Husain Ibn Ali, who was invited by them to Kufa to rebel against the Caliph Yazid Ibn Muawiya (reigned 680 83); the Shiites sided, however, with the Umayyad force, resulting in his martyrdom at Karbala in 680; and third, Zayd Ibn Ali Ibn al-Husain, who was abandoned by his troops and then crucied by the Umayyad governor Yusuf b.Umar in 740.76 Using the pseudonym Khalid Ahl al-Sunna, the inspector of the Islamic Dialog on the website Al-Difa an al-Sunna (The Defense of the Sunna) adds: such were the ancestors of the Shiites, how spiteful they are and how spiteful their descendants are! (Haulai kanu al-

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Shia al-aslaf fa-bisa al-salaf salafuhum, wa-bisa alkhalaf khalafuhum). To make matters worse, the Shiites are accused of working hand in hand with the Freemasons in arms and narcotics deals.77 In their internal ghts, the Shiites themselves accuse their opponents of being members of Freemason lodges. Thus, Shaykh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, one of the most notorious Lebanese Shiite leaders, is described by his ideological enemies as a well-implanted agent of the British Intelligence Service and a veteran of the Freemasons lodges (amma Fadlullah fa-amil muattaq li-al-mukhabarat al-Baritaniyya wa-unsur asil -al-Masuniyya).78 In the eyes of the Islamic fundamentalists, this accusation is very serious indeed since, for more than half a century, the Freemasons have been considered in those circles as the agents of world Judaism and as bitter enemies of Islam.79

The Mutual Relations Between the Shia and Judaism

he relations between certain Shiite traditions and Judaism have not yet been thoroughly studied: Israel Friedlander,80 Georges Vajda,81 and Shlomo Pines82 have touched the topic without analyzing it in depth. More recently, Meir Bar-Asher has published two important articles on the place occupied by Jews and Judaism in the religious literature of the early Shia.83 This presentation examines this question from another anglethat of the anti-Shiite polemics. We know that since the dawn of Islam, one of the most humiliating insults has been to call a Muslim a Jew.84 The Shiites are accused by the Neo-Wahhabis of having been inuenced by the Jews or of behaving like Jews. The question of the authentiHUDSON INSTITUTE

city of these accusations will not be examined: they have been uttered by scholars who went no further than simply mentioning the insulting attributes of Jews. This insult of the Shiites is legitimized by reference to the exegetical literature where it is said that being a Jew means belonging to the category of the maghdub alayhim, who are the objects of Allahs wrath (Quran 1: 7), and to that of the al-mufsiduna -al-ard, those who do their utmost to sow scandal on earth (5:64; 17:4). Moreover, according to the Neo-Wahhabis, this accusation is plainly justied since they regard Shiism as a heretical teaching sect rst established by a former Jew, Ibn Saba. These trivial and threadbare arguments have been used for ages. However, I would like to draw attention to an original contribution from modern times that has been enthusiastically endorsed by the Neo-Wahhabis: the Hebraic title Hakham (Rabbi, especially among Oriental Jews) is now being used to designate the great leaders of the Shia. It seems that the term has been accepted by certain Sala, anti-Shiite activists. One can thus nd on the forums of the Internet the following word combinations: kibar Hakhamat al-Shia or Hakhamatuhum al-masuma (the great Rabbis of the Shiites, or their infallible Rabbis.) Finally, regarding Jews and Shiites, we must recall one aspect of the Imami eschatology decried by Neo-Wahhabi circles, namely the Shiites belief that the Twelfth Imam will appear before the end of times to wreak vengeance on those who mistreated Ali, his offspring, and their disciples. The NeoWahhabis call him kalb yahudi ibn yahudi (Jewish dog, or son of a Jew) because he will judge humanity according to the law of David and his offspring (Yahkumu bi-shariat Dawud wa Al Dawud). They ask with an affected ingenuousness: why wont he judge according to the law of Muhammad and Muhammads family?; (shariat Muhammad wa Al Muhammad?). They answer: Because the Jew Abd Allah b. Saba is the founder of your damned
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religion! (Abd Alah b. Saba al-yahudi l-ladhi awjada dinakum al-lain). We can nd an additional example of this scurrilous style in the article titled, Evidence That the Mahdi Awaited by the Rada Is the One-Eyed Jewish Antichrist (ithbat anna mahdi l-rada l-muntazar huwa nafsuhu 'l-awarm al-dajjal al-yahudi).

n order to support these attacks likening the Shiites to the Jews, the author selectively cites from a number of the most eminent Shiite sources. These include, for instance, Al-Kulini, who is described as the Bukhari of the Rada, and who allegedly claimed: When Qaim al Muhammad (the Twelfth Imam) appears, he will rule/judge according to David and Solomons law. We will have to refrain from asking him any kind of evidence (idha qama qaim al Muhammad alayhi lsalam hakama bi-hukmi Dawud wa-Sulayman wa la yusala bayyinatan).85 The author also cites various versions of this Hadith, including a detailed version specifying that the Twelfth Imam will rule according to the code of Allah and of Davids family, and according to Muhammads law (bi-hukni lLahi wa-hukm al Dawud wa hukn Muhammad). In addition, he will be escorted by the Holy Spirit (la-talq n bihi ruh al qudus). Al-Numani: When the Imam calls to [prayer], he will call Allah by his name in Hebrew (idha adhdhana l-imamu daa Laha bi smihi l ibrani).8 This seems to refer to what is known as al-Ism al-Azam, known by the prophets only. Al-Saykh al-Mud: When he appears in the region of Kufa, the Qaim will be accompanied by twenty-seven men from the people of Moses, seven from the people of the Cave, Joshua b. NunAll will be his auxiliaries.87 On the basis of these three Hadiths, neo-Wahhabis draw a number of conclusions. First of all, the Mahdi of the Rada will base his judgments on the law of the Dawud family and on a new Koran that is not similar to the one we have. It seems that the law of the Dawud family must be the Talmud. The
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Mahdi will use Hebrew as a vernacular language. The Jews will be his support, which means he is the awaited king (Redeemer) of the Jews. In other words, the Mahdi of the Shiites is none other than the Antichrist announced by the Prophet Muhammad. The Iqaz bulletin published in London by Rabitat Ahl al-Sunna Iran (the Sunni League in Iran) contained in its issue of April 12, 2002 an article titled The Similarities between the Radas and the Jews (mushabahat al-Rada li-l Yahuud). The author recounts a Hadith attributed to Amir b. Sharahil alShabi (d. 722), the famous Kufan Epigone. There the Shiites are described as Yahud hadhihi l-umma88 (the Jews of the Islamic community) because they hate Islam the same way Jews hate Christianity (yubghiduna l-Islama kama yubghidu l-Yahudu lNasraniyyata). Al-Shabi adds: If [the Shiites] were turned into pack animals, they would surely have been donkeys (fa-law kanu mina l-dawabbi la-kanu hamiran). This reference contains an allusion to the Koran (Chapter 62, verse 5) in which Jews are compared to donkeys carrying books. In his argumentation, a neo-Wahhabi Internetforum author cites Ibn Taymiyya, saying that the Shiites help the renegades acting against Islam. Therefore they are considered by Muslims, Donkeys as the Jews (hatta jaalahumu l-nasu lahum kal-hamir).89 Others prefer to quote a more detailed text, attributed to Ibn Taymiyya,90 in which he compares the Shiites to the Jews. In order to do this, he draws a number of parallels. Ibn Taymiyya claims that Jews believe only Davids descendents can rule, while the Shiites believe that the imams can only be Alis descendents. The Jews ban jihad until the coming of their Messiah (this ban, imposed by the rabbis of the Talmud, forbids rebellion to free themselves from submission to the Gentiles), while the Shiites insist on not taking part in the jihad before the coming of the Twelfth Imam. The Jews falsied the Torah;91 the Shiites distorted the Koran.92 The Jews hate the archangel Gabriel, claiming he is their enemy;93 the

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Shiites believe that Gabriel, who was sent by Allah to Ali, made a mistake and gave the prophecy to Muhammad.94 The Jews allow themselves to do as they like with the property and the blood of the Gentiles; the Shiites allow themselves to take hold of Muslims properties and to spill their blood. The Jews are described in the Koran as al-mufsidun lard (workers of corruption in the earth); Shiites also are mufsidun. The Jews are condemned to wander and to be scattered amongst other peoples; Shiites are condemned to similar punishments. In completing this comparison, Ibn Taymiyya adds that Jews and Christians are better than Shiites, because the Jews believe that the best generation is that of the Moses Companions and the Christians consider the Apostles to be the best Christians. However the Shiites claim that Muhammads Companions are the worst kind of Muslims.95

fadaha llah sirrahu (may God reveal his secret). In one discussion, the name ayat Allah al-uzma alSistani is distorted: the rst i is replaced by the letter k to become al-Sextani. This distortion appears immediately following the citing of a few of Sistanis legal opinions, one of which allows the husband to sodomize his wife, if such is his wish. The neo-Wahhabi author does not say a word on Sistanis personal opinion, which is completely opposed to such acts.100 The Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah (Allahs party) is called in a few publications Hizbu al-Shaytan (Satans party) or Hizbu al-Lat (the party of pre-Islamic goddess al-Lat, one of Allahs daughters).101 One of the participants on a chat, writing under the pseudonym Abu l-Dahdah, states: Hakamtu bayna l-millatayni falam ajid min farqin bi l-kufri wa l-ijrami Kilahuma bayna l-shuubi jaraimu nabatat ka-sillin aw ka-I-judhami Wa-ara dimaa l-kufri khayra wasilatin li-taharati l-dunya mina l-athami.102 After comparing the two religions [of the Jews and the Shiites], I found no difference regarding their apostasy and criminality. Each of these two communities has committed numerous crimes among [other] peoples and emerges like tuberculosis or leprosy. In order to purify the world from the impurity caused by these crimes, there is no better solution than to spill the blood of apostasy. The errant and deceptive Shiites at times replace the Devil, especially in the very common Islamic expression al-shaytan al-rajim (Satan worth stoning). On one neo-Wahhabi forum, one of the most prestigious modern Shiite leaders, Ayatullah alSistani, is called Ayatu l-shaytan al-Sistani.103
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Ridiculing the Shiites

t seems that the Salas were not convinced of the efcacy of these arguments in restraining the Shiite tide. Therefore they resorted to other tactics that seem to be more effective in certain Sunni circles. The Salas replaced honorics and even epithets of sanctity with epithets of debasement and scorn: thus the attribute al-ashraf (the noble one, the lofty one), usually used to describe the holy city al-Najaf, is sometimes replaced by al-anjas (the impure)96 or by al-akhsaf (buried in the earth, a literal antonym of al-ashraf);97 Karbala becomes Sharrbala, which can be broken down into sharr and bala (the worst of [all] torments);98 Nimat Allah (the grace of Allah) al-Jazairi99 is designated as Niqmat Allah (Allahs punishment); the customary addition to the names of the great ulema, qaddasa llah sirrahu (may Allah bless his secret) becomes, in the case of Khomeini,
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Another forum opens with the following formula: Bismi Lahi l-Rahmani l-Rahim wa-bihi nastain, ala l-dallin min a l-Shia l-mudillin, wa-naudhu bihi minhum ila yawmi l-din In the name of God the compassionate and merciful! We ask for His help to face the errant Shiites who continuously deceive others, and we seek a shelter in Him [because of the fear they arouse in us] until Judgment Day. 104 Regarding this matter, we must not forget that Quranic exegetes attest unanimously to the fact that the word dallin in the rst Sura refers to the Christians. In another instance, one of the neo-Wahhabi authors quotes a verse by the famous poet al-Qahtani in which Shiites are designated as hizbat [sic] al-shaytan (Satans party).105 Once we reach the end of this long (though not exhaustive) series of accusations, we cannot but ask: in the eyes of neo-Wahhabis and even Wahhabis in general, are Shiites Muslims or have they transgressed the limits of what is deemed within the fold of Islam?

he terminology used by neo-Wahhabis is all too clear: the shia or the rafd constitute a separate religion, not a sect of Islam. The Shiites who convert to the sunna are described as muhtadun (guided by Allah on the path of truth, i.e. of true Islam). It should be noted that this is how Jews and Christians who join the fold of Islam are usually termed. On the other hand, those who convert from sunna to shia are dall (errant, on the way to perdition). Ali al-Tijani, the alim (scholar) of Tunisian origin who converted to Shiism, gives the following title to his book, in which he describes abandoning the Sunna and adopting the Shia: Thumma htadaytu.

Afterwards, I was guided [by Allah] to the true path. The neo-Wahhabi response, authored by Khalid al-Asqalani, was: Bal dalilta, Oh no! you are [in fact on the way] of perdition!106 The answer to the question Are Shiites Muslims in the eyes of the neo-Wahhabis? if we conne ourselves to these texts, ignoring the replies of the Shiites and the writings of many moderate Sunnis, seems very simple. However, one must not forget that Wahhabis and neo-Wahhabis are still a minority in Islam whose views represent only their own perspective. What makes them important is their activism and the huge funds placed at their disposal, as well as their skill at spreading their ideas through traditional as well as ultra-modern means. Those who dare to oppose their positions and doctrine are afraid of being called kuffar (indels), murtaddun (renegades), bidiyyun (heretical innovators), quburiyyun (tomb worshippers), mulhidun (apostates), etc. The resources they enjoy allow them to ood the Arab and Muslim world, as well as the Muslim minorities in the West, with their tracts, books, disks, video cassettes and CDs. There is no doubt that this all-out offensive has been successful in convincing a number of unsophisticated minds regarding bida (heretic innovation), jihad (holy war against the indels) and animosity toward the West and its values. However it seems to be less successful in its anti-Shiite endeavor. The Islamic Republic of Iran has succeeded not only in curbing the neo-Wahhabi propaganda; it has also made its way in the Arab world. It has done so through its far more intelligent responses, and to the policy adopted by Iran and Shiite organizations regarding current problems.

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a p p e ndi x i Sultan Abd al-Azizs Document: Giving Palestine to the Jews

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a p p e n di x i i Surat al-Walaya

The Chapter establishes that the wiliayat of Ali Ibn Abi Talib requires the duty of unquestioned loyalty and obedience to him. Some anti-Shiite circles claim that this is a part of the secret Shiite version of the Quran.

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notes

1.A note about our sources: almost all of the material used in the preparation of this paper can be found on the Internet. This medium grants a number of advantages to those partaking in the debate, but it also has its disadvantages. There is no way to establish the true identity of the author; moreover, in certain cases the article is merely intended to provoke public opinion for or against an idea, a faith or a certain group; it is possible to forge material and accredit it to people who have no connection with it, especially if the person belongs to the opposing side; the denials, if any, of those connected with the issue will not necessarily appear in the same site and this prevents the reader from knowing of the existence of the denial; and there is partial or misquotation of the opponents words on the assumption that the regular reader is unable or will not go to the source to nd out the true quotation. For our purposes, it is unimportant whether the texts that appear in the Internet are true or not, or whether they truly reect what was said or authorized by the Shiite or Wahhabi leaderships. Their importance is in their being said and disseminated by Shiites and Wahhabis. Note: A version of the section dealing with the Shia in the eyes of the Neo-Wahhabites has been published in French in Arabica 53, no. 3 (2006), 299-330, under the title Les Shiites vus par les No-Wahhabites. The author wishes to thank Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, for permission to republish this section. 2. In this article I have used, where possible, the common spelling of names and terms rather than a precise transliteration. 3. See David Menashri, Iran in Revolution (in Hebrew), 2nd ed. (Tel Aviv: Kav Adom Library-Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1989), pp. 216-21. 4. Rainer Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century: The Azhar and Shiism between Rapprochement and Restraint (Leiden: Brill, 2004). I owe this last reference to my friend Professor Etan Kohlberg. 5. Concerning this battle see Fred McGraw Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 201-9. 6. The Shuubiyya was a socio-cultural protest movement that operated in the above-mentioned period, led mainly by Persian Muslims who demanded full equality with the Arab Muslims and claimed that the Arabs had no right to preferential standing over non-Arabs. See The Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), vol. 11, 513 (s.v. Shuubiyya, by S. Enderwitz). Regarding the revival of the term Shuubiyya during modern times, see A. Hanna and G. H. Gardner, Al-Shuubiyya Updated: A Study of the 20th Century Revival of an 8th Century Concept, Middle East Journal 20 (1966): 335-52. 7. See, for example, the book written by the Baath Party member Mundhir al-Mawsili, Qiraat Harb al-khalij: Arab wafurs (Readings Regarding the Gulf War: Arabs and Persians), (Cairo: Dar al-Uruba, 1988); see also Dr. Bashshar Awwad Ma ruf, Al-Islam wa-Mafhum al-Qiyada al-Arabiyya li-al-Umma al-Islamiyya (Islam and the Concept of Arabic Leading of the Muslim Community), with an introduction by Said Hawwa [the radical Syrian Islamic leader], (Baghdad, 1989). 8. See al-mili, al-Intisar: ahammu munazarat al-Shia -al-internet, ed. Markaz al-abhath al-Aqaidiyya, series of the kutub al-munazarat, no. 7, 37 in www.aqaed.les/shialib/index.htm, where the Shiite author reviews the rst stages of the SunniShiite polemics on the Internet. 9. Al-Malak al-Tair, www.fnoor.com/fn0315.htm, 27.02.01. 10. Concerning this subject, see the excellent survey of Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism. 11. Al-Qaradawi in his CD al-Fiqh wa-usuluhu; this attitude was severely criticized by Salas, see for example Ayaltaqi alnaqidani? Hiwar maa fadilat al-shayh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, www.khayma.com/fnoor/fn0990.htm; recently, al-Qaradawi changed his attitude and attacked the Shiites for their efforts to convince the Sunnites in Egypt and other Arab countries to adopt Shiism; Muhammad al-Ghazali, Humum daiya (al-Dawha 1985), 278.

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12. See Wilfrid Buchta, Teheran Ecumenical Society (Majma al-taqrib): A Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of Iran? in Brunner and Ende, The Twelver Shia in Modern Times, 336. A photocopy of this Fatwa can be found on the anti-Shiite website www.fnoor.com. 13. The fnoor.com website published two lists of Shiite or pro-Shiite books that were published in Egypt either by Dar altaqrib or by other publishers. The rst list is sloppy, since it never indicates the author or the year of publication. In the second list, the name of the author appears together with his religious or political views, but the list also contains antiShiite books. Buchta (Teheran Ecumenical Society, 334-35) mentions that all through Khomeinis era, the Iranian ofcial Islamic propaganda took no interest whatsoever in this institution and its ecumenical role. 14. Ali Ibn Abi Talib was the Prophet Muhammads cousin and son-in-law and was the fourth righteous Caliph after Muhammad. The Shia movement sprang from his and his offsprings supporters (Shiat Ali means Alis faction), who claimed that he and his descendants are the sole legal inheritors of the Prophet. In the Shiite view, the legitimacy of Alis and his descendants rule is ordained by Allah; thus, the three rst caliphs (preceding Ali) changed the will of Allah by preventing Alis rule. 15. The attitude of the Shiites concerning the majority of the Prophets companions has been thoroughly studied by E. Kohlberg in his typed thesis, The Attitude of the Imami-Shiis to the Companions of the Prophet (Oxford University, 1971); also see his Some Imami Shii Views on the Sahaba, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 5 (1984): 143-75. 16. According to the Quran (see Sura 8:41), a fth of the booty belongs to Allah, to the Apostle, to the nearest ones [to him], to the orphans and to the voyager. The Shiite imams are considered by the Shiites to be the sole heirs of the Prophet, and thus have the right to collect certain taxes imposed by Allah, the khums being one of them. In this case, the khums means the fth of the wealth of the Shiite. 17. See Abd al-Aziz al-Tabatabai, Mawqif al-shia min hajamat al-khusum wa-khulasa an kitab abiqat al-anwar (The Shias Stand vis--vis the Attacks of the Enemies and a Choice Part of the Book The Scents of the Lights), especially p. 4, in www.aqaed.com/shalib/books/04/mawqef/index.html. 18. The Shiite relate a number of Hadiths (traditions) attributed to the Prophet in which he determined categorically that Ali and his descendants are his inheritors and that this is by the will of Allah. One example is the tradition known as the Hadith of Ghadir Khumm (delivered near a stream known as Khumm), which states that Alis status in comparison with that of Muhammad is the same as that of Aaron compared to Moses, only that Ali cannot be a prophet (unlike Aaron who is considered a prophet in Islam) since Muhammad is the last of the prophets; another example is the Hadith that holds that Muhammad, on his death bed, dictated a will mentioning the twelve Shiite Imams by their full names, stating that Ali and his descendants will serve in turn in his place (caliphs) over his people (the Muslims), see Bihr al-anwar, vol. 36, p. 260. 19. Abd Allah Muhammad Ali, Mujam ma allafahu ulama al-umma al-islamiyya li-al-radd ala khurafat al-dawa al-wahhabiyya (A List of Compositions by Sages of the Muslim Community Who Respond to the Nonsense of the Wahhabiyya), www.aqaed.com/book-books3-wahabie3-index.html. 20. It appears in full in the publications of The Center for Studies of Faith (Markaz al-Abhath al-Aqaidiyya), which has been run for more than eleven years under the guidance of Ayatollah al-Sistani, www.aqaed.com/book/bookw3/sawaeq/sawaeq.html. 21. www.aqaed.com/book/books3/fetne/index.htmk. The book is titled History of the Islamic Conquests (Al-Futuhat alIslamiyya). 22. See, for example, his Risala kayyyat al-muhawara maa al-Shia wa-al-radd alayha (A Treatise Regarding the Method by Which to Debate with the Shia and Respond to It), Cairo, 1905. 23. Ibid., 7: The religious sages of Mecca and Medina studied the faith [of the Wahhabis] and found that they contained many statements regarding declarations of others as heretics... And wrote a report against them with the Shari Qadi of Mecca determining that they [the Wahhabis] are heretics because of their beliefs in those faiths [declaring others as heretics] (wa-nazaru ila aqaidihim fa-wajaduha mushtamila ala kathir min al-mukafrt wa-katabu alayhim hujja inda qadi al-shar bi-makka tatadammanu al-hukm bi-kufrihim bi-tilka al-aqaid). 24. See above n. 19; for another partial list of anti-Wahhabi, particularly Sunni, compositions, see in Saib Abd al-Hamids article www.aqaed.com/shialib/books/05/w-s-h/index, Paragraph 11. 25. See al-mili, Kitab al-Intisar, p. 1 and all of chapter 2, www.aqaed.com/shialib/books/06/enternt/html.

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26. For additional details about this group see The Encyclopaedia of Islam (New edition), vol. 4, pp. 1074-77 (s.v. Kharidjites, by G. Levi Della Vida). 27. He served in the past as the editor of an Egyptian Islamist publication al-Balagh, and afterwards as a correspondent for the al-Risala weekly. He abandoned this work when he found out that Saddam Husseins Iraqi regime funded the magazine. Following a lengthy stay in Egypt he adopted the Shia some ten years ago and became an active Shiite. He wrote a number of books, among them al-Shia misr (The Shia in Egypt), Firaq ahl al-Sunna (The Sunni Sects), and most important of all al-Khuda: rihlati min al-Sunna ila al-Shia (The Imposture: My Journey from the Sunna to the Shia) publicized on the site www.shiaweb.org/shia/khedaa/index.html, as well as in Iran by the Ashura Institution. 28. The Khawarij appeared for the rst time some twenty years after the Prophet Muhammads death, but in the framework of the struggle against them, traditions attributed to the Prophet were invented in which he foresaw the appearance of the Khawarij and cautioned the Muslim people about them, calling them deviants from Islam (Mariqun) who are doomed to hell. 29. Al-Khuda, www.shiaweb.org/shia/khedaa/index.html, 16; Saib Abd al-Hamid, Al-Wahhabiyya Suratiha al-haqiqiyya, www.aqaed.com/shialib/books/05/w-s-h/index, quoted in its entirety in a Sunni site, without mentioning the authors name or the source; see the Shiite-Sunni free discussion forum (Muntada al-Hiwar al-Shii al-Sunni al-Hurr), www.alrakiza...ForumMessage. 30. Al-Amili, Kitab al-Intisar, 100. 31. Ibid. 32. Saib Abd al-Hamid, see above note 25 (Asl al-Wahhabiyya). 33. Abd Allah Muhammad Ali, Mujam, 2. 34. Muhhammad al-Kuthayri, Al-Salayya bayna ahl al-sunna wa-l-imamiyya (The Sala Movement between Sunnis and Shiites), www.aqaed.com, in the series Al-Radd ala Ibn Taymiyya wa-l-Wahhabiyya, essay no. 16, pp. 465-6. 35. Saib Abd al-Hamid (see above n. 24), Masadir al-kr al-Wahhabi (The Sources of Wahhabi Thought). 36. Ibid. 37. www.aqaed.com, in the series Al-Radd ala Ibn Taymiyya wa-l-Wahhabiyya, essay number 28, in the Introduction. 38. See Goldziher, Lectures on Islam (the Hebrew translation), Jerusalem: 1951, 150-1. 39. Al-Salayya bayna ahl al-sunna wa-l-imamiyya, 482. 40. Ibid, 473. 41. This phenomenon is known in Muslim historiography as al-Ridda (apostasy from Islam). For the most part this was an attempt to break away from the reign of Muhammad and his inheritors: see H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century (in Hebrew, translated by Emmanuel Kopelevich), Jerusalem: 1998,. 48-51; Ella Landau-Tasseron, Aspects of the Ridda War (in Hebrew), PhD thesis, (Hebrew University of Jerusalem: 1981), Introduction, 2-6. 42. Saib Abd al-Hamid (see above n.34), Al-Wahhabiyya wa-muassisuha (The Wahhabiyya and its Founder). 43. Abd al-Munim Shaq, Haqiqat al-Muqawama: Qiraa awrq al-Haraka al-siyasiyya al-Shiiyya Lubnan, www.fnoor.com/books.htm. 44. Al-Kuthayri, Al-Salayya baynaAahl al-Sunna wa-l-Imamiyya, 480. 45. Isam al-Imad, Al-Minhag al-jadid wa-al-sahihi -al-hiiwar maa al-Wahhabiyyina), www.aqaed.com/shialib/books/03/manhaj-jadid, 179. 46. SaibAbd al-Hamid (see above n. 29), Al-Wahhabiyya khidmat man? (In Whose Service Does the Wahhabiyya Operate?). 47. See www.aqaed.com, Shubuhat al-Salayya (Suspicions [Reagarding] the Salayya) by Jawad Hussayn Al-Daylami, in the series Al-Radd ala ibn Taymiyya wa-l-Wahhabiyya, essay no. 33. 48. The Shiite author does not disclose the source this documents photocopy. Unfortunately, its authenticity is difcult to verify, and it is highly likely that it may be forged. 49. See above note 46. 50. Ibid., section 6: al-Wahhabiyya wa-l-Muslimun (The Wahhabis and rhe Muslims). 51. One Sunni website containing a great deal of anti-Shiite material is www.fnoor.com. The treatises published on this website, which is run by Faysal Nur, are as a general rule well documented and draw their material from classical Shiite texts (with the exception of the discussions of the muntada al-Hiwar al-Shii al-Sunni al-Hurr The Forum of Free Dialogue

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between Shiites and Sunnites). Faysal Nur is probably also the author of a series entitled Silsilat al-Haqaiq al-Ghaiba (The Chain/Series of Hidden Truths), which consists of the following anti-Shite works: 1) Naqd Aqidat al-Isma (Criticism of the Dogma of [the Imams] Infallibility); 2) Al-Khums wa-Sahm al-Imam (The Fifth and the Share of the Imam); 3) AlImama wa-al-Nass (The Imamate and the Textual Determination [of the heir who should rule after the death of the Prophet]); 4) Al-Taqiyya, al-Wajh al-Akhar (Taqiyya: the Hidden Side); 5) Ayat al-Tathir wa-Hadith al-Thaqalayn (The Verse Declaring that [the Descendants of the Prophet] Are Pure and the Tradition Attributed to the Prophet Concerning the Thaqalayn); 6) Riwayat al-Tasadduq bi-al-Khatam (The Traditions Telling that [Ali] Gave [his] Ring as Charity); 7) Mawqif al-Shia mina al-Sahaba (The Attitude of the Shiites towards the Companions of the Prophet). All these treatises have been published on the Internet (www.khayma.com/fnoor/index2.htm). Additionally, the series called Shubuhat waRudud (Suspicions and Retorts), which appears without signature on the same website (fnoor/shubuhat.htm), consists of more than a hundred articles copiously annotated, aiming rst of all at defending the Sahaba (the Companions of the Prophet) and the righteous caliphs. The series bearing the title Tanbih al-Hair ila Mawadi al-Malak al-Tair (The Caling to Arms of the Perplexed Concerning the Subjects of the Flying Angel). This series is also copiously annotated and has no qualms about telling racy stories (fnoor/almalak1.htm). This latter series has disappeared from its original website, without any explanation given. Some articles belonging to the series continue to appear on other websites, such as muntada al-Hiwar al-Shii al-Sunni al-Hurr in fnoor.com. 52. alrakiza.com/forumNo1=1&Message No=594, 23.05.2002. This book attacks the Shiites, asserting that the Shia is nothing but a Jewish Bida (religious innovation). It blames the Shiites for practicing certain rites termed qabahat mushina (abominable and shameful actions). Some Sunnites reacted to this sentence by saying that this judicial decision is not surprising since a third of the court was Shiite, and the remaining two thirds were Christians. 53. www.albrhn.com, 19.06.2002). 54. (alrakiza.../forum messagepage.asp?userNo489, 05.05.2002. 55. www.ayma.com/fnoor/fn0300.htm, 06.01.2002). 56. (www.fnoor/book13, 28.01.2002). 57. www.fnoor/book13, 28.01.02). 58. islamicweb.com/arabic/shia/shia-jews-christians.htm. 59. Concerning the historicity of this gure and the declaration attributed to him, according to which Ali b. Abi Talib is God, see al-Shahrastani, al-Milal wa-l-nihal, ed. Abd al-Aziz al-Wakil, Cairo: 1968, vol. 1, p. 174 ; The Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition), vol. p. 51 (s.v. Abd Allah b. Saba, by M.C.S. Hodgson). Nowadays, these discussions continue to be a focus of interest; see for example Salah al-Din al-Munajjid, al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 13.05.85, and the reply of Qasim al-Zuhayri, published in the same journal on May 13, 1985. 60. See also www.khayma.com/fnoor/fn0441.htm. 61. One should not forget, in this respect, that the Wahhabiyya rejects categorically all pictorial representations of persons or living creatures, as well as music and songs. 62. www.alrakiza. ./ForumMessagePage.asp?UserNo=489..., 04.04.02. 63. Concerning the different meanings of this term and its use through the ages, see The Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition), (s.v. Zindik, by F. C. de Blois). 64. See, for example, Abd Allah al-Gharib, Wa-jaa dawr al-Majus (At Last, the Turn of the Zoroastrians Has Come), or the article al-Shia... al-Furs... al-Majus... hal hunaka alaqa? (The Shiites...The Persians...The Zoroastrians. Is There a Connection?), at www.fnoor/fn0226. The adjective al-Majus is often added to the noun al-Rada; see www.khayma.com/fnoor/fn0336, 20.06.02. 65. The Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edition), vol. 5, pp. 1110-17 (s.v. Madjus, by M. Morony). 66. khayma.com/fnoor/fn0441, 08.05.02. 67. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, al-Isaba tamyiz al-Sahaba, ed. Adil Ahmad Abd Al-Mawjud et.al., vol. 1 (Beirut: 1995): 22, quoting Abu Zura al-Razi. 68. islamicweb.com/arabic/shia/shia_R-persians. 69. Muhammad Mal Allah, Yawm al-ghufran, ihtifal al-rada bi-maqtal Umar b. al-Khattab (The Day of Atonement, the Celebration of the Murder of Umar b. al-Khattab by the Rada), www.khayma.com.fnoor/fn0936.htm, 11.11.01.

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70. islamicweb.com/arabic/shia/shia_R_persians.htm, 06.10.02; www.pureislam.org/montada/showthread.php?s=86d7a3944c22cbc, 28.03.04. 71. arabic.islamicweb.com/shia/dialog.htm, 25.12.2001; for a partial but well-annotated survey containing the opinions of certain Muslim scholars, see. E. Kohlberg, Some Imami Shii views on the Sahaba, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 5 (1984): 143-75 (particularly 143-44, 171-75). 72. khayma.com/fnoor/fn0189, 26.05.1999; see also the article Hal nukafru Umum al-Shia? (Do We Consider All Shiites to Be Renegades?), www.fnoor/fno0148, where the author quotes Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi, Al-Farq bayna lraq, 37. 73. khayma.com/fnoor/fn0417, 16.06.99. 74. www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread.php?s, 08.07.03. 75. www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread.php?s, 08.07.03, quoting al-Haz al-Haliki, al-Irshad, vol. I, p. 421; al-Humaydi was well known for his hostility towards the Ulamas of Iraq, see al-Haz al-Humaydi, al-Musnad, ed. Habib al-Rahman al-Azami, Beirut: 1382/1962, p. 7 of the publishers introduction. 76. www.d-sunnah.net/forum: Rawad al-kufa madrib al-mathal al-ghadr, 28.03.03. 77. Iqaz (bulletin published in London by a group called Rabitat ahl al-Sunna Iran, or the Association of the Sunnite Iranians), 03.05.2002 Al-Masuniyya khidmat dawlat al-tashayyu wa-wilayat al-faqih (Freemasonry at the Service of the Shia State and of the Government of the Doctors of Religious Law). 78. fnoor/fn0051, 29.01.2002. This accusation is quoted on an anti-Shiite website, but one needs only to read what is written against Fadl Allah on the websites close to Ayatollah al-Uzma al-Sistani, the great Shiite religious leader of Iraq, to get an idea of the internal struggles within the Shia. 79. See for example, the additions by one of the translators in Arabic of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, AjajNuwayhid, (no place of publication specied), 1967, vol. 1, p. 22, explaining that the Jews consist of Kabbalists, Talmudists, Freemasons, and Zionists who are all made of the same stuff. See also the pamphlets of the Turkish general Jawad Rifat Atilhan that have been widely translated and distributed among Islamist circles; the article: Hum al-aduww faHdharuhum al-masuniyya, in Filastin al-muslima (Manchester: February 1986), 21-23. 80. The Heterodoxies of the Shiites according to Ibn Hazm, Journal of the American Oriental Society 28 (1907): 1-80, and 29 (1908): 1-183; idem, Jewish Arabic Studies, The Jewish Quarterly Review 2 (1912): 481-561, and 3 (1912): 235300. 81. De quelques emprunts dorigine juive dans le Hadith Shiite, in Studies in Judaism and Islam, ed. S. Morag et al. (Jerusalem: 1981), 45-53. 82. Shiite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevis Kuzari, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 2 (1980): 165-251. 83. The Place of Judaism and Jews in the Religious Literature of the Ancient Shia (in Hebrew), Peamim: Studies in Oriental Jewry (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1993): 16-36; Banu Israil ka-anmat awwaliyya li-al-Shia (The Children of Israel as Prototypes of the Shiites), al-Karmil: Studies in Arabic Language and Literature 18-19 (Haifa: University of Haifa, 1997-8): 49-61. 84. The Umayyads and their auxiliaries called the Ansar. Jews, see for example the letter of Muawiya b. Abi Sufyan to the chief Ansari Qays b. Sad b. Ubada in al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashraf, ed. M. Schloessinger and M.J. Kister (Jerusalem : 1971), vol. 4a, p. 26. 85. Al-rakiza, Forum 1 message 48, 04.05.02. 86. Islamicweb.com/arabic/shia/mahdi_jew.htm. 87. Abu Jafar Muhammad b. Yaqub al-Kulini, al-Usul min al-Ka, ed. Ali Akbar al-Ghifari, Beirut, 1401H/1981,I, 397-98. 88. The neo-Wahhabi author cites Kitab al-Ghayba by al-Numani without providing further details. I could not nd this tradition in the edition I had (1317 H lithographic edition). 89. Al-Irshad, 402. 90. Quoted by E. Kohlberg, op. cit. 143-44. 91. www.khayma.com/radah/tbn/tbninttrz, 13.03.02. 92. www.kotob.hypermart.net/joso4htm, quoting Abd Allah al-Ghunayman, Mukhtaar Minhaj al-sunna li-Ibn Taymiyya, I, 12. 93. A reference to the Koranic accusation reproaching the Jews with modifying or falsifying their holy scriptures, see for

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example Koran, 4 : 46 and 75 ; 5 : 13 and 41. Regarding the word Tora (Pentateuch), it is almost always used in Muslim and Arab sources to refer to the Old Testament as well as to any other Jewish scripture. 94. In fact, the Shiites accuse the Sunnis of distorting the Koran; see R. Brunner, Die Schia und die Koranflschung, Wrzberg, 2001. The Sunnis claims are based on certain Shiite traditions that regard the Fatima mushaf as the complete version of the Koran. It is much more extensive than the Utman b. Affan mushaf, which makes up the Muslims traditional Koran. 95. A reference to a tradition recounted in various biographies of the Prophet (siyar nabawiyya) in which the Jew Abd Allh b. Sallam asks the Prophet which angel tells him the prophecies. When Muhammad answers it is Gabriel, Ibn Sallam replies: He is the enemy of the Jews (dhaka, yani Jibril, aduww al-Yahud); see Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, Uyun al-athar funun al-maghazi wa- l-shmail wa-l-siyar, Beirut, 1974 (2), I, 207; Ahmad b. Zayni Dahlan, al-Sira l-nabawiyya, Beirut, 1973, I, 342. 96. This is the opinion of a few Shiite sects from the Middle Ages belonging to the extremist trend (ghulat) who believed that the archangel Gabriel was mistaken when passing on the prophecy to Muhammad instead of Ali. The best known sect to adopt this idea is called al-Ghurabiyya, see EI 2, Ghur biyya, (I. Goldziher). 97. Quoted by E. Kohlberg, Some Imami Shii views on the Sahaba, 143-44. 98. www.al-rakiza.../Forum 1Message 48, 05.04.02. 99. D-sunnah, 64.4.16.250/cgi-bin, in a forum named al-ikthar min dhikr al-jins l-kutub wa-l-rasail al-qhiyya lada kahanat al-Najaf al-akhsaf wa-Qumm al-qumama (The abundance of the mentioning of sex in the priests books and Jurisprudence epistles of buried al-Najaf and Qumms sweepings). As for Qum, the holy city of the Shiites, it is described as al-qumama (sweepings). The Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem was described in the same way in most Muslim historical and polemical sources, until the beginning of the twentieth century, replacing its Arabic name al-Qiyama, the Resurrection [of Christ]. 100. www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread, under the title madha taquluna ya ahla l-Sunna? (What do you have to say, Sunnites?); this is the contribution of a forum member writing under the pseudonym al-Mutazz bi-dinihi. 101. Nimat Allah b. Abd Allah al-Jazairi (d. 1700-01), a Shiite author, one of those who aided (saada) al-Majlisi in his huge work Bihar al-anwar; see Muhsin al-Amin, Ayan al-Shia, ed. Hasan al-Amin, Beirut, 1986, vol. 10, 226-27. 102. Yajuzu ala karahatin idha radiyat, wa- l-ahwatu wujuban tarkuhu (lawful if she agrees but not recommended it is preferable to avoid), www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread.php_?s. The forum is named nisaukum harthun la-kum (Koran 2 : 223, Your wives are a tillage for you, 20.07.03). 103. www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread under the title madha taquluna ya ahla l-Sunna? (What do you have to say, Sunnites?) (al-Mutazz bi-dinihi and Asrars contributions); see also R. Paz, Hizballah or Hizb al-Shaytan: recent SalaJihadi attacks against the Shiite group, PRISM Occasional papers I/2 (2004), www.e-PRISM.org. 104. Al-rakiza, Forum Messagepage.asp?userNo=489 & Forum No=1&message No= 34,02.04.02. 105. www.d-sunnah.net/forum/showthread.php?s=&threadid=22593, 08.11.03. 106. Al-rakiza, Forum 1 Message 48,05.01.02. 107. www.khayma.com/radha/tnb/tnbintro.htm,13.01. 02. 108. Regarding al-Tijani and his book, see www.aqaed.net, al-mustabsirun (those who wanted to see the truth are the Sunnis who became Shiites). As for al-Asqalans book, see the fnoor site. A partial response to the al-Tijani book was published in English on www.ansar.org/english and titled Exposing al-Tijanis lies in his book Then I was guided. It is attributed to Abu Sulayman.

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Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World

AB O UT TH E AUTH O R
Isaac Hasson is professor emeritus at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Arabic Language and Literature. The principal focus of his scholarship has been on Jerusalem in Islam, the transition from Jahiliyya to Islam, and contemporary Sunni-Shia relations. His publications include: Fadail al-Bayt al-Muqaddas of Abu Bakr al-Wasiti (1979); Le voyage de Said ibn Muhammad al-Suwaysi au Yaman 1890-1895 (2008) (in collaboration with A. Arazi); Muslim Literature in Praise of Jerusalem: Fadail Bayt al-Maqdis, The Jerusalem Cahedra, 1 (1981); The Muslim View of JerusalemThe Quran and Hadith in J. Prawer and H. Ben-Shammai (eds.), The History of Jerusalem, The Early Muslim Period 638-1099, (1996); Judham entre la Jahiliyya et lIslam, Studia Islamica (1995); La conversion de Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan, JSAI (1998; Les Shiites vus par les Neo-Wahhabites, Arabica (2006).

AB O UT TH I S S E R I E S
This second series of research monographs on the Muslim world is the product of a research project undertaken jointly by Hudson Institute and the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Herzilya, Israel for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Department of Defense position, policy, or decision.

ABOUT TH E CE NTE R
Hudson Institutes Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World conducts a wide-ranging program of research and analysis addressed to the political, religious, social, and other dynamics within majority Muslim countries and Muslim populations around the world. A principal focus of the Centers work is the ideological dynamic within Islam, and the connected issue of how this political and religious debate impacts both Islamist radicalism as well as the Muslim search for moderate and democratic alternatives. By focusing on ideology, the Center aims to contribute to the development of American policy options and to effective strategies to prosecute and to win the worldwide struggle against radical Islam.

To learn more, visit www.futureofmuslimworld.com ABOUT H U DSON INSTITUTE


Hudson Institute is a non-partisan policy research organization dedicated to innovative research and analysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom. We challenge conventional thinking and help manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary and collaborative studies in defense, international relations, economics, culture, science, technology, and law. Through publications, conferences and policy recommendations, we seek to guide global leaders in government and business.

To learn more, visit www.hudson.org

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