You are on page 1of 8

TAADA VS.

TUVERA Case Digest FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential of the law where the issuances law themselves provides for in their own effectivity question. dates. Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity

ISSUES: Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication RULING: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity?

Bellis

vs

Bellis

FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.

Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Consunji vs. CA Facts: On Nov. 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a compalint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable.

Ruling. The deision of the CA is affirmed.

Ratio: The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private resppondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund

Philippine International Trading Corp. vs. Angeles Facts:

PITC is a gov't owned and controlled corp duly organized to regulate trading between RP and SOCPEC countries including PROC (pursuant to PD1071, LOI 444 & EO 133)

PITC issued an AO which requires that application for importation from PROC must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program, such AO was not publish in OG

Petitioner withheld the applications of private respondents for some requirements were not complied with PR filed for prohibition and mandamus with TRO and PI against P. Private respondent judge granted the petition and ordered the P to approved PR applications

Pursuant to the trade balancing measures issued by Ramos, PITC amended the AO and published the same in the National Administrative Register

Issue: W/N the admin order issued by PITC were ineffective due to lack of publication in the OG? Held:

Until PITC's AO is published it is ineffective within the context of Art. 2 of NCC and the facts that amendments to it were publish in the National Administrative Register does not cure the defect related to its ineffectivity.

Admin rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, pursuant to a valid delegation.

Minciano vs. Brimo 50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924 Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is based on the f act that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition. Held: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen , though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore, the testators national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code

Aznar vs Garcia ON NOVEMBER 5, 2010

7 scra 95 Nationality Principle Internal and Conflict Rule


Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs. HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the determination of the successional rights under Philippine law only.

Case Digest on Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee GR No.18081 March 3, 1922 GR. No. 18081 March 3, 1922 Mora Adong, petitioner and appellant vs. Cheong Seng Gee, opponent and appellant Agpalos Statutory Construction quoted this case to wit: The policy of the la w, once ascertained should be given effect by the judiciary. One way of accomplishing this mandate is to give a statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will promote public policy. FACTS: Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on August 5, 1919 and left property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed by two parties - (1) Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriag contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boos estate were ventilated in the lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The lower court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the Philippine Islands law s this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws. ISSUES: Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid RULING: The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them under the law.

HELD: (FOR STATCON) The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. The presumption as to marriage is that every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency of the law. As to retroactive force, marriage laws is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can properly incline the scales of their decision in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. (FOR PERSONS) Sec. IV of the Mar riage law provides that all marriages contracted outside the islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these islands. To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts ofthe Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage followed by 23 years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, save upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment. A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a so -called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines.