ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO Case Digest ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO FACTS: For resolution is the problem of whether RA No.

6126 may be held applicable to the case at bar. For convenience we reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in question: ―Section 1 – no lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another’s dwelling is located shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed 300php a month. Section 6- This At shall take effect upon its approval. Approved June 17, 1970 ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bara Held: It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered by the aforecited law. We rule, otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected. Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may. Therefore given retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction therefore is in order. Article 4 of the civil code ordains that law shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that

where the law is clear. Our duty is equally plain. The law being a temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation, it has limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that ―no lessor of a dwelling unit or land shall during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this act. Hence the provision against the increase in monthly rental was effective only from March 1970 up to March 1971. Outside and beyond that period the law did not by the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law did not, by express terms, purport to give retroactive effect. We therefore rule that R.A. No. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

2. Case of Regalado vs. Yulo No. 42935 15February1935 FACTS OF THE CASE: This case was brought about by the action quo warranto to determine the respective rights of the petitioner Felipe Regalado and one of the respondents, Esteban T. Villar, to the office of Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Felipe Regalado qualified for the office of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay on April 12, 1906. On September 13, 1934 Regalado became 65 yrs old. As a consequence thereafter the judge of first instance of Albay, acting in accordance w/ instructions from the Sec of Justice,

subsequent to the approval of the Act which was on November 16 1931 and who by law is required to cease to hold office on January 1.R.) ISSUES OF THE CASE: Whether or not under the provisions of section 203 of the Administrative Code. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a coterminous employee. being a coterminous employee. supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law. the Justices and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act No. the National Irrigation Administration and the Department of Budget and Management. the courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an intent and 7. Facts: In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy. temporary and emergency employees. Chua Vs. AND THAT THE PETITIONER FELIPE REGALADO BE PLACED IN POSSESSION OF THE SAME. 1933 is not affected by the said act. G. 88979 February 7.designated Esteban T. The Civil Service Commission. as amended by the Act No. casual. with rendered service minimum of two years. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authoruty (NIA) for over 15 years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects.A. HELD: RESPONDENT ESTEBAN VILLAR BE OUSTED FROM THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF MALINAO. She was instead offered a severance of ½ monthly basic pay for each year of service. Because justices appointed prior to the approval of the act and who completed 65 yrs of age on September 13 1934. R. 3899. Regalado surrendered the office to Villar under protest. ALBAY. No. 3899 who reached the age of 65 yrs after said Act took effect shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65 yrs.6683 was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees affected due to reorganization. She availed of the above mentioned law only to be denied as the CSC who deemed her unqualified. because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the . Held: It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees. STAT CON LESSON: The intent of the law is to be ascertained from the words used in its construction. Villar. No. Justice of the peace of Malinao. (If legislative intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner. 1992 Lydia O. Albay. those who may avail were regular.

Under RA 875. the court believes that the denial of petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits by the NIA and CSC is unreasonable. oppression or dilatory appeals) on the employer’s part. Backwages under RA 875.] An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his back wages computed from the time his compensation was was withheld from him up to the time of his reinstatement. the CIR can increase or diminish the award of backpay. Historical Backdrop Prior to the present case. which in this case. backwages equivalent to three years (unless the case is not terminated sooner) was made the base figure for such awards without deduction. In four (4) governmental projects. the petition is granted.law. was done by Linda Chua. among them. This method caused undue delay in the disposition of illegal dismissal cases. the good faith of the employer. 1974.‖ . On that note.g. Article 279 of the said code provides: ―[. the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) was given wide discretion to grant or disallow payment of backpay (backwages) to an employee. CIR. Wherefore. In the exercise of its jurisdiction. or the probability that the employee could have realized net earnings from outside employment if he had exercised due diligence to search for outside employment. the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that backwages due an employee on account of his illegal dismissal should not be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. Mercury Drug Rule . This case finally abandoned the ―Mercury Drug‖ rule and ―deduction of earnings elsewhere‖ rule then prevailing at that time.. the employee’s employment in other establishments during the period of illegal dismissal. subject to deduction where there are mitigating circumstances in favor of the employer but subject to increase by way of exemplary damages where there are aggravating circumstances (e. In order prevent undue delay in the disposition of illegal dismissal cases. the SC found occasion in the case of Mercury Drug Co vs. depending on several circumstances. Cases are usually held up in the determination of whether or not the computation of the award of backwages is correct. On 1 November 1974. to rule that a fixed amount of backwages without further qualifications should be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee. unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to the benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2) years which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. the Labor Code of the Philippines took effect. SC had applied different methods in the computation of backwages.. In subsequent cases (adopting the proposal of Justice Teehankee). it also had the implied power of reducing the backpay where backpay was allowed. -Statutory ConstructionSTAT CON chapter 4 Significance of the Case In this landmark case.

inclusive of allowances.. and during the effectivity of P. NLRC. while full backwages have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee. the pertinent portion of Article 279 of the Labor Code was amended to read as follows: ―[. 1993. Pines City Educational Center vs. if any. In other words. the rule generally applied by the Court after the promulgation of the Mercury Drug case. must still earn a living to support himself and family. ―Deduction of Earnings Elsewhere‖ Rule. Issue Whether or not the income derived by the employee elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal should be deducted from the award of backwages.e. Thus. while litigating the legality (illegality) of his dismissal.The above provision nothwithstanding. No. and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. so as not to unduly or unjustly enrich the employee at the expense of the employer. Ruling Conformably with the evident legislative intent of RA 6715.. should be deducted from the full amount of backwages which the law grants him upon reinstatement. however. i. backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee. In effect. this qualified the provision under P. The clear legislative intent of the amendment in RA 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the ―deduction of earnings elsewhere‖ rule. The underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee.. should not. without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal.D. 442 was still the Mercury Drug rule. the earning derived elsewhere by the dismissed employee while litigating the legality of his dismissal. should be deducted from backwages.] An employee who unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. the Court returned to the rule prior to the Mercury Drug rule that the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement. in a subsequent case. a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind RA 6715 points to ―full backwages‖ as meaning exactly that.D. an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to his full backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal up to the time of his actual reinstatement. No. 442 by limiting the award of backwages to 3 years. The rationale for such ruling was that.‖ In accordance with the above provision. Despite the amendment. the provision calling for ―full backwages‖ to illegally . When RA 6715 took effect on 21 March 1989. as a general rule.

filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which.3.dismissed employees is clear. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP.A. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari. In the interest of substantial justice. like casual and emergency employees. must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. J. as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. [T]he Court believes. Index animi sermo est (literally ―speech is the index of intention‖). i. casual. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. No.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. RATIO: Petitioner was established to be a coterminous employee. 6683. Petition was granted. she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. It will be noted that Rep. temporary. Act No. temporary or regular employment.R. however. unjustified. instead. denied the same. or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. HELD: YES. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. 1992] 15Aug Ponente: PADILLA. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits under R. February 07. It can be argued that. therefore. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular. and so holds. and oppressive. 89-1. FACTS: Republic Act No. . No. casual and emergency employees. a non-career civil servant. 88979. 6683 is unreasonable. Chua vs. her application must be granted. emergency. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.e. plain and free from ambiguity and. CSC and NIA [G. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that “what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed”. 2 of the Act.

and the first sentence of par. 1991. 9.R.‖ Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R. 2313. its significance.A. and for Other Purposes. its reason for being. 7166. and maintained that election of Sanggunian members be ―at large‖ instead of ―by district‖. much less inutile. 7166. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the singledistrict cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila. CuevasGR L-33693-94. 2313.A. the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. 2379. May 06. 1861. signed into law by the President on November 26. divine its meaning. 1992 elections.A. and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative intent. 1 took no part Facts: . No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless. (d). 7166 will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11. Authorizing Appropriations Therefor.A.A. by district. 92-010 holding that pars. FACTS: [C]ongress passed R. We must therefore. It is ―An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms. 3. R. As it has oft been held. Manuel de Guia vs. (a). approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No.3 of R.8. 3 of R. 1992] 15Aug Ponente: BELLOSILLO J. adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment. Resolution No. 1992. HELD: NO. Vera vs. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit RATIO: Spirit and purpose of the law – The reason for the promulgation of R.A. and Resolution UND. No. 31 May 1979 First Division. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions. COMELEC [G. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec. 104712. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. The true import of Par. 7166 is correct in assailing the aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions. which remained single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. as far as we can. De Castro (J): 4 concur. elections. apply to the May 11. 7166. all of Sec. of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars. (b) and (c).

Consolidated Philippines Inc. SMA. respectively. would offend againstthe Constitution." In support of her claim. As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. Section 169 has lost its tax purpose. Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals No. and thus the Commissioner necessary lost his Taxation Law I.ENFAMIL. petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. Such . Further. The Commissionerrequired the companies to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear theinscription required by Section 169 (Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk) of the Tax Code within 15days from receipt of order with explicit warning of prosection for non-compliance. No. sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed milk such as SIMILAC. Issue: Whether Section 169 of theTax Code can be enforced against the companies. Section 169 is only being enforced against the respondent companies nad not a g a i n s t manufacturers.. allegedly vexed. Ester Garcia. The Institute ofEvaporated Fulled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines is a corporation organized to uphold and maintainthe highest standards of local filled milk industries.. good customs and public policy. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. for the law. 10. if not equally enforced to persons similarly situated. ―contrary to morals. Held: With Section 141 (specific tax imposed on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (penalty on sale ofskimmed milk without payment of specific tax and legend required in Section 169) repealed by RA 344 andRA 463. of which the companies are members.F u r t h e r m o r e . and Milk Industries Inc.) Inc. and Other Purposes. entitled ―An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication. (Phil. in a confrontation in the latter’s office." Digests (Berne Guerrero) authority to enforce the same. which is different to filled milk. 93833 September 25 1995 Facts: A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent. The companies filed anaction for prohibition and injunction. Section 169 applies to skimmed milk. are engaged inthe manufacture. private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200. BREMIL. R. 2 Case Digests: Statutory Construction Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals 248 SCRA 590 G. and OLAC. insulted and humiliated her in a ―hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality. General Milk Co. 2004 ( 22 ) kind of enforcement amounts to an unconstitutional denial of the equalprotection of the laws.

Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person. insulted and humiliated her in a ―hostile and furious mood‖ and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality. agreeing with petitioner. Katipunan Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent. petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought . From the trial court’s Order. Legal Maxims: Verba Legis (the statute must be interpreted literally if the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity) RAMIREZ V CA 7Nov G." Consequently. 1995 | J. not authorized by all parties to any private communication. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications.R. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. as respondent CA correctly concluded. the law is applied according to its express terms. good customs and public policy. which forthwith referred the case to the CA. to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. allegedly vexed. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court’s order null and void. in lieu of a plea.‖ contrary to morals. petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense particularly a violation of RA 4200. Issue: W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation. in a confrontation in the latter’s office. the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court. Where the law makes no distinctions. Ester Garcia. one does not distinguish. and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. ―even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of RA 4200. No. 93833 | September 28. Stat Con Principle: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute. Held: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash.‖ In support of her claim. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier ―any.Upon arraignment.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation Held: Yes. not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR. 4200. intercept. ―even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator‖ under this provision of R. 4200. It shall be unlawful for any person. moreover. or however otherwise described. entitled ―An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication. Section 1 of R. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal. Consequently.A.A. 4200 entitled. particularly a violation of R. or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder. 1. Sec. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person.‖ provides: . and other purposes. private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records. to tap any wire or cable.damages. or by using any other device or arrangement. not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word. supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting R. unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier ―any‖. which the RTC later on granted.A. hence the instant petition.‖ Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. to secretly overhear. as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded.A. ‖ An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute.R. in the privacy of the latter’s office. Because of this.‖ In its ordinary signification. Issue: . 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. the petitioners pray.‖ Petitioner’s contention that the phrase ―private communication‖ in Section 1 of R. with the representation of their labor group. intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. 2000) Facts: Petitioners are employees of the Patalon Coconut Estate in Zamboanga. furthermore. National Labor Relations Commission G. 127718 (March 2. on February 22. put to rest by the fact that the terms ―conversation‖ and ―communication‖ were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill. meaning ―to share or to impart. as in a conversation. 4200.A. retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation. or signifies the ―process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)‖ These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal. redundancy. 4200 does not include ―private conversations‖ narrows the ordinary meaning of the word ―communication‖ to a point of absurdity. With the advent of the RA No. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase ―private communication‖ are.A. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: ―Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator. written or expressive communications of ―meanings or thoughts‖ which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange. 1988. between petitioner and private respondent. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare. Now. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing. claiming that they were illegally dismissed. as well as its communication to a third person should be professed. What R.A. the government sought the compulsory acquisition of the land for agrarian reform. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R. the nature of the conversation. They cite Article 283 of the Labor code where an employer ―may‖ terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices. communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification. the private respondents who are owners of the estate decided to shut down its operation. No. 12. communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting. NLRC National Federation of Labor vs. National Federation of Labor vs. Petitioners did not receive any separation pay. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.

Delfin filed with the COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution by People’s initiative. Section 4 of Art VII and Section 8 of Art X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The peculiar circumstances in the case at bar. involves neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel as contemplated under the article. MABINI. denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. et al. (2) cause the publication of such order in newspaper of general and local circulation. In his petition. complainants are not entitled to any separation pay. Consequently. Issues: . it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the constitution through the system of initiative. His proposal is to lift the term limits of elective officials and thus amending Sections 4 and 7 of Art VI. filed a special civil action for prohibition before the Supreme Court. Senator Santiago. Reasoning: Where the words of a statute are clear. The Patalon Coconut Estate was closed down because a large portion of the said estate was acquired by the DAR pursuant to the CARP. and (3) instructing municipal election registrars in all regions of the Philippines to assist him and his volunteers in establishing signing stations. Delfin asked the COMELEC to issue an order (1) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country.. Miriam Defensor Santiago. as a result of an act of the State.Whether or not the Court should apply the legal maxim verbal legis in construing Article 283 of the Labor Code as regards its applicability to the case at bar. DIK. Also. Article 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the employees. LABAN – petitioners/intervenors Facts: Atty. The severance of employer-employee relationship between the parties came about involuntarily. Policy: Article 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of establishment and reduction of personnel. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. Alexander Padilla. IBP. At the hearing. however.‖ in its plain meaning. the legal maxim is applicable in this case. 13. Thereafter. The use of the word ―may. Ma. plain and free from ambiguity. Alberto & Carmen Pedrosa (PIRMA). Isabel Ongpin – petitioners Jesus Delfin. SANTIAGO VS COMELEC Nature: Petition for prohibition. COMELEC – respondents Raul Roco. Held: Yes. The COMELEC then issued an order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition and set the case for hearing.

It does not have that power under R. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by Delfin and that it becomes imperative to stop the COMELEC from proceeding any further. the law does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. 6735.A. the law is incomplete. given the Roco motion filed with the COMELEC seeking dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution. and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid. or has jurisdiction over.A. The SC said that despite the pendency of the Delfin Petition in the COMELEC. the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution. while there are subtitles for national and local initiatives. adequately covers such initiative.The issues in the instant petition are the following: (1) Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering. as worded. thus. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is . (2) RA 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative to amend the constitution because while Sec 3 mentions initiative on the Constitution and Sec 5 restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of registered voters needed for a proposal. No. entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefore." would constitute a revision of. and if so. No. whether the Act. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution. the SC had jurisdiction over the Defensor-Santiago petition because the petition may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (4) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials. (3) Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 6735. (5) Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of. or an amendment to. (2) Whether R. as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution. inter alia. (3) It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. and this inadequacy cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate implementing rules and regulations. (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations. there is no subtitle for the initiative on the Constitution. Rulings of the Court: The Supreme Court held that: (1) The instant petition is viable despite the pendency in the COMELEC of the Delfin Petition. the Constitution. and (c) directing or causing the publication of.

the Constitution because. and for failure to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. 14. 1147. or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests. It does not become effective until passed by voters and its availability does not remedy the denial of the right to referendum. The Office of the Solicitor General opined that extension of term of elected officials constitute a mere amendment to the Constitution. branding. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is. A. the carabao described in the information. R. Delfin in his memoranda contend that the lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective officials provided under the 1987 constitution is not a "revision" of the constitution. Revision contemplates a reexamination of the entire document to determine how and to what extent it should be altered. such as. Joaquin Bernas it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure. on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. No. Word of the Day: Initiative is a form of direct legislation by the people consisting of two parts: petition and election. (4) Santiago’s petition contend that the people's initiative is limited to amendments to the constitution. in the words of Fr. NO. an Act regulating the registration. therefore. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution is declared void. It was held that COMELEC is without jurisdiction to entertain the Delfin Petition because it did not contain the signatures of the required number of voters as required by the Constitution. but a revision of. not a revision thereof. Those parts of Resolution No. outside the power of the people's initiative. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption. without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. G. L-5060. January 26. Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the . it can affect other provisions. 6735 is declared inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The petition therefore is granted. "Amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific provisions of the constitution. and the Commission on Elections is ordered to dismiss the DELFIN petition. not to revision thereof.misplaced. is limited to amendments. and slaughter of large cattle. THE UNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO. for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution. A revision cannot be done by initiative which. and although the change might appear to be an isolated one. It is only an amendment.R. by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. In its amended petition in intervention DIK and MABINI contend that the Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to. 1910 (15 Phil 85) Facts: Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. (5) COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely. 113 U. the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities. Beyond this. and of interments in burial grounds. the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases. so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership.. Connolly. even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected. it must appear. that the interests of the public generally. the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration. and morals. but is subject to the supervision of the court. the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food. (27 Vt. beggars. under the guise of protecting the public interests. 27. From what has been said. 140). the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame. we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally. said (p. Held: The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. the compulsary vaccination of children. require such interference. the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance. health. Co. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers‐by. In other words. however. S. not only what the interests of the public require. as distinguished from those of a particular class. and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 128 U. The legislature may not. but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Chief Justice Redfield. the restraint of vagrants. 149) that by this "general police power of the State. Rutland & Burlington R. Kidd vs. to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners. the slaughter of diseased cattle." and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption. as distinguished from those of a particular class. R. by summary proceedings. first. arbitrarily interfere with private business. and to justify the destruction or abatement. (Barbier vs. tempted either by greed of momentary gain. and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine.. its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive. S. the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it. Pearson. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered. or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food. Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No.. and. in Thorpe vs.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public. of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. 1. persons and . second. and habitual drunkards. or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities.animal but was not given one because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural work” which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse.

93177 August 2. Nos. 1910 Facts: In the town of Carmen.R. and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer. or. In order to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to dispose of them to others.‖ is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress. No. Counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of the Act do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. 1147 ―An Act Regulating the Registration. in the Province of Bohol. 1991 Facts: These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same incident. Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer. But the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of identification. if such animals were requiring proof of ownership and the production of certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. ever can be made. Comendador v. health. Toribio G. and the said is in violation of the Act No. 1. liberty. in order to secure the general comfort. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in .‖ Issue: Whether Act 1147 applies in the case of the petitioner? Held: The Act primarily seeks to protect the ―large cattle‖ of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost." US v. which provides that ―no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life. L-5060 January 26.R. without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in the event that the animal is not unfit ―for agricultural work or draft purposes.R.property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens. No. of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was. would be largely impaired. upon acknowledge and general principles. so far as natural persons are concerned. if not totally destroyed. and prosperity of the State. The appellant slaughtered carabaos for human consumption. Slaughter of Large Cattle‖. The petitioners in G. Branding. and this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Counsel for appellant contends that the statute. in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption as food. July 1. De Villa G. the animal was slaughtered and there is no municipal slaughterhouse. or property without due process of law. strayed. Nos. or stolen. resting as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each separate animal throughout the Islands. 1902).

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul. As their motions appeared to be dilatory.R. Whether GCM No. Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg. 2045. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians. the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. cessat ipsa lex. No. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena sent them that ―failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence. Issue: 1.. Applying these rules. Act No. we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P. 1957 Facts: 1.the failed coup d’ etat that took place on December 1 to 9. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. No. 2. 1989. Whether petitioners were denied of their right of due process due to the investigation was resolved against them in failure to submit a counter affidavit? 2. Germany.D. AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree. If it is not availed of. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. 14 has a legal ground denying the petitioners their right of peremptory challenge? 3. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the . the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 3.‖ They chose not to heed the warning. v. As a result. RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS. 2. Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial were formed. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and do not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge. L-9274 February 1. The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny). Whether denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection? Held: 1. the law itself ceases. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases. During their trial. 3. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS G. Cessante ratione legis. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. INC. petitioners invoked their right to peremptory Challenge.

decisions of the Collector of Customs. Yu Hai alias ―Haya‖ having acted as maintainer of the game of panchong or paikiu and of hazard was accused in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan of a violation of Article 195. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. And it is a sound rule that before one resorts to the Courts. creating said tax court Issue: Whether Section 11 of RA 1125 allows the respondent court to review decisions of the Collector of Customs? Held: The court holds that under the law. whereas. if he took the appeal directly to the Tax Court. 1125. if the person affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Commissioner of Customs. the Customs Law and Republic Act No. he may not appeal said decision to the Commissioner of Customs because the Commissioner as an administrative officer may not review the decision of the Court. 1125. 1956 Facts: 1. L-9598 August 15. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v YU HAI alias ‖ HAYA‖ G. citing section 7 of Republic Act No. and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment. Subsequently. the Tax Court may refuse to entertain said appeal. In the second place. it had no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Collector of Customs. should the Court of Tax Appeals decide against him. as was done in the present case. sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.R. The accused moved to quash the information and was sustained on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense which. The Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative. on the ground that under section 7 of Republic Act No. under the literal meaning of section 11. that would ordinarily cut off his remedy before the Commissioner of Customs for the reason that. the two remedies suggested by the petitioner would result in confusion because a person adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs could not be sure where to seek the remedy. No. On May 23. he may yet appeal wherefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals. additional customs duties were levied and imposed upon petitioner. the administrative remedy provided by law should first be exhausted. even if the person affected by an adverse ruling of the Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. 1125. section 7 clearly limiting its appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. however. as advocated by counsel for the petitioner. and it might even be difficult for him to decide because. under Article 90 of the . the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review by appeal. and there receives an adverse decision. particularly. On the other hand. a motion to dismiss was filed at the Court of Tax Appeal but was dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila. appeal to the Court of Tax Appeal is manifestly judicial.corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplies invoices. whether with the Commissioner of Customs or with the Court of Tax Appeals. 2. In the third place. 1955.

1954. prescribed in two months.People vs.P. As it would be more favorable to the herein accused to apply the definition of ―light felonies‖ under Article 9 in connection with the prescriptive period of the offense charged. and the Justice of the Peace of Court. 38216 15August1956 FACTS OF THE CASE: On October 22. being a light offense. Yu Hai alias ―HAYA‖ GR Nos. under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.Construction to avoid Absurdity committed as a light felony? No. accused moved to quash the information on the ground that it charged more than one offense and that the criminal action or liability therefore had already been extinguished. prescribed in two months. since the light offenses as defined in art 9 of the R. prescribed in two months.Headnotes and Epigraphs . sustained the motion to quash on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense which.Revised Penal Code. a game of hazard. for having allegedly permitted the game of panchong or paikiu. L." The argument of the SolGen on the matter is erroneous since the basis for his argument of classifying the Case of People of the Philippines vs. the accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan of a violation of Article 195. Yu Hai alias “HAYA” Statutory Construction . is Art 26 of the RPC which classifies fines not offenses. Issue: Whether the sustainment granted on the motion quashing the information was proper? Held: Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. and 1 peso will mean the difference of 9 years and 10 months. and there is no reason for a law-maker to raise the . subparagraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.C states that ―an offense which penalty arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. if the SolGen’s interpretation of the law is accepted then it will lead to and absurd situation wherein a light felony as defined by Art 9 will have 2 prescriptive periods. Also. 1954. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Did the court err in considering the offense Statutory Construction. in its order of December 24. The offense committed as a correctional penalty.9598. and having acted as maintainer thereof.

. Construction to avoid absurdity. it must be presumed that the provisions of each article are controlling upon the subject thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such questions therein.prescriptive period for certain light offenses over other light offenses Therefore it is more sensible and to apply Art 9 over Art 26 since we are discussing the prescription of a crime not the penalty.When a statute is divided into several subjects or articles. HELD: THE DECISION IS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS DE OFICIO. An as this construction is more favorable to the accused. the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong argument against its adoption.If the words of the statute are susceptible of more than one meaning. having respective appropriate headings. and in favor of such sensible interpretation as will avoid such result. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON: Headnotes or epigraphs. it should be the one to be adopted.

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