[G.R. No. 179446. January 10, 2011.] LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs.

GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822, entitled "R&B Insurance Corporation v. Glodel Brokerage Corporation and Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.," which held petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. (Loadmasters) liable to respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) in the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity which R&B Insurance Corporation (R&B Insurance) paid to the insured-consignee, Columbia Wire and Cable Corporation (Columbia). THE FACTS: On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date. Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbia's warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City. The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6) truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbia's warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo. Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without the copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39. After the requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity. R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103040. It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss." 2 On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision 3 holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters' counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees against R&B Insurance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: ECDHIc WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the plaintiff having established by preponderance of evidence its claims against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the latter: 1.To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of P1,896,789.62 as actual and compensatory damages, with interest from the date of complaint until fully paid; 2.To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the amount equivalent to 10% of the principal amount recovered as and for attorney's fees plus P1,500.00 per appearance in Court; 3.To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of P22,427.18 as litigation expenses. WHEREAS, the defendant Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.'s counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees against plaintiff are hereby dismissed. With costs against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation. SO ORDERED. 4 Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed decision which reads in part: Considering that appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by appellee Loadmasters.

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WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED in that the appellee Loadmasters is likewise held liable to appellant Glodel in the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity appellant Glodel has been held liable to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation. Appellant Glodel's appeal to absolve it from any liability is herein DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 5 Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court presenting the following: ISSUES 1.Can Petitioner Loadmasters be held liable to Respondent Glodel in spite of the fact that the latter respondent Glodel did not file a cross-claim against it (Loadmasters)? 2.Under the set of facts established and undisputed in the case, can petitioner Loadmasters be legally considered as an Agent of respondent Glodel? 6 To totally exculpate itself from responsibility for the lost goods, Loadmasters argues that it cannot be considered an agent of Glodel because it never represented the latter in its dealings with the consignee. At any rate, it further contends that Glodel has no recourse against it for its (Glodel's) failure to file a cross-claim pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Glodel, in its Comment, 7 counters that Loadmasters is liable to it under its cross-claim because the latter was grossly negligent in the transportation of the subject cargo. With respect to Loadmasters' claim that it is already estopped from filing a cross-claim, Glodel insists that it can still do so even for the first time on appeal because there is no rule that provides otherwise. Finally, Glodel argues that its relationship with Loadmasters is that of Charter wherein the transporter (Loadmasters) is only hired for the specific job of delivering the merchandise. Thus, the diligence required in this case is merely ordinary diligence or that of a good father of the family, not the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers. R&B Insurance, for its part, claims that Glodel is deemed to have interposed a cross-claim against Loadmasters because it was not prevented from presenting evidence to prove its position even without amending its Answer. As to the relationship between Loadmasters and Glodel, it contends that a contract of agency existed between the two corporations. 8 Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or securities. 9 Doubtless, R&B Insurance is subrogated to the rights of the insured to the extent of the amount it paid the consignee under the marine insurance, as provided under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, which reads: EScHDA ART. 2207.If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrong-doer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury. As subrogee of the rights and interest of the consignee, R&B Insurance has the right to seek reimbursement from either Loadmasters or Glodel or both for breach of contract and/or tort. The issue now is who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it paid Columbia. At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to determine their liability for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. 10 The distinction is significant in the sense that "the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers." 11 In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the contract between Loadmasters and Glodel was private in character. There is no showing that Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to Glodel. In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier. 12 In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. In its Memorandum, 13 it states that it "is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and is engaged in the business of customs brokering." It cannot be considered otherwise because as held by this Court in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., 14 a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business. Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such

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case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property or rights. 15 This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have been lodged for shipment. 16 Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. 17 This presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary diligence over the goods. With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. 18 Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, "the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary." aEcSIH Loadmasters' claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly provide: ART. 2176.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Pertinent is the ruling enunciated in the case of Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix Assurance Company of New York/McGee & Co., Inc. 19 where this Court held that a tort may arise despite the absence of a contractual relationship, to wit: We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee against Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states a cause of action. The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party to the contract of service between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a cause of action in light of the Court's consistent ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. In the present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from quasi-delict. [Emphases supplied] In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides: ART. 2180.The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse. Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. 20 To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. 21 In this regard, Loadmasters failed. Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated destination. It should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures, such as providing escorts to accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing. At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-agent relationship between Glodel and Loadmasters, as erroneously found by the CA. Article 1868 of the Civil Code provides: "By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter." The elements of a contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority. 22 Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between the parties. Loadmasters never represented Glodel. Neither was it ever authorized to make such representation. It is a settled rule that the basis for agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal. On the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable

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HSaCcE What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent R&B Insurance Corporation for the insurance indemnity it paid to consignee Columbia Wire & Cable Corporation and ordering both parties to pay.' is applied only in the absence of. SO ORDERED. Glodel did not even pray that Loadmasters be liable for any and all claims that it may be adjudged liable in favor of R&B Insurance. it may appear that one of them was more culpable. and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. Under the Rules. a cross-claim cannot be set up for the first time on appeal. The cross-claim belatedly prayed for by respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation against petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services. however. 24 . it cannot succeed in seeking judicial sanction against Loadmasters because the records disclose that it did not properly interpose a cross-claim against the latter. even partially. which has been aptly described as 'a justice outside legality.789. For the consequence. "Equity. judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services. Court of Appeals.62 representing the insurance indemnity. is DENIED. and c] the amount of P22. there must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it.427. while on the part of the agent. . without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. 25 Thus. a compulsory counterclaim. Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters for breach of contract of service as the latter is primarily liable for the loss of the subject cargo. As stated in the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED to read as follows: WHEREFORE. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. The August 24. Inc. In this case. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened. although acting independently. and never against. The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable grounds. it having failed to file a cross-claim against the latter. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons. not set up shall be barred. the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. WHEREFORE. STADIH 4 . Inc.18 for litigation expenses. are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage." 26 The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent.from his words or actions. jointly and severally. Undoubtedly. or a crossclaim. R&B Insurance Corporation a] the amount of P1. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would not have resulted. Glodel has no one to blame but itself. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. . Where there are several causes for the resulting damages. [Emphasis supplied] The Court now resolves the issue of whether Glodel can collect from Loadmasters. b] the amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent thereof for attorney's fees.896. a party is not relieved from liability. 23 Such mutual intent is not obtaining in this case. . It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone. the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case. statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party.

and costs. 1978. the mother. On January 14.[G.000.000. P30. 1992. Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend. this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.000.000. Julie Ann and Wendell died. Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors. wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their years. denial of defendants-appellees' counterclaims is affirmed.R. Alex Y. upon the guardian. In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately initiated by the parties. from January 7 to 13.R. P20.CIVIL LAW.Exemplary damages. or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment. Ortiz for private respondents. Under said Article 2180. LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN. at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets. posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence. in case of his death or incapacity. without such alternative qualification. the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's complaint is hereby reversed. 70890. upon the mother or. While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage. 2. 1979. HON. in case of her death or incapacity. Cebu City. the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code. such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm. in case of his death or incapacity. respondents. CV No. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age. QUASI DELICT. to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts: prcd 1.] CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI. Ortiz and Danilo V. the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and. During the first and second weeks of January. 1979. a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents. unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. 3. jointly and solidarily. a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. who are the contending parties herein." 1 Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts. documents and evidence of physical facts. petitioners. and who also died in the same event on the same date. In order to avoid him. SYLLABUS 1. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case. P10. available reports. Mario D. Cebu City. and instead. — The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control. Tan for petitioners. at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January 14. However. was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors. Malou Alfonso. with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under. this civil liability is now.Moral damages. 5 . but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. 1985 in AC-G. as so modified. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and. No. and. September 18. Jakosalem streets of the same city. the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. their parents. judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants. 69060 with the following decretal portion: "WHEREFORE. RULE. under the Family Code. For more than two (2) years before their deaths. Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December. DECISION REGALADO.00. 1979. prompting the former to resort to threats against her. Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal. However. which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. or who live in their company.00. FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG.Attorney's fees. is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of love. it appears that respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who. while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi. it has been said. petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated on January 2. J p: One of the ironic verities of life.

ORTIZ: QYes. the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are concerned. on cross-examination. the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor mortis. undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance wound. he never saw the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the head which he examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. doctor. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification: "QIs it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no black residue or tattooing that could result from these guns because they are what we call clean? AYes. disregarding those other matters that you have noticed. must have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test on Wendell Libi. to be exact. eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the record of death. Wendell Libi. respectively. he had earlier admitted that as far as the entrance of the wound.Private respondents. whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU). rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party. but it was dried. puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son. submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. therefore. After trial. . It should be emphasized. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or. premises duly considered. he admitted that during the 8-hour interval. thereafter. However. there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the crime. 4 However. and that said body was not washed." 7 As shown by the evidence. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder. those indications that you said may not rule out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches. that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes. 3 In the proceedings before the trial court." 2 On appeal to respondent court. On the other hand. the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation. petitioners. QAt any rate. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu. . assuming that the gun used was . Cerna states: 6 . LexLib More specifically. it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. Dr.. However. each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi. etc. It will also be noted that Dr. Dr. Dr. the court below rendered judgment on October 20. now submit for resolution the following issues in this case: 1. LibLex As a result of the tragedy. considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the occurrence wherein he died. bereaved over the death of their daughter. that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not. Cerna. because it shows a point of entry a little above the right ear and point of exit a little above that. in cases..Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari. on redirect examination. Jesus P. the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. sir. said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who. from . So. of guns where the powder is smokeless. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. 1980 as follows: "WHEREFORE. it could have been fired by the victim. The necropsy report prepared by Dr.Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established decisional laws. hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendell's hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried. Defendants' counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit. Dr. and 2. the bullet used was a smokeless powder. based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own sketch. 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the right temple of Wendell Libi. the singeing. the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor. judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. from the trajectory. Also. ATTY. On direct examination. however. as pointed out by private respondents. 5 In fact. . the victim himself. is that correct? AIf the . is it not a fact that the gun could have been fired by the person himself. to be very fair and on your oath? AAs far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned. . submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and. 6 He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim and that he found no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire.

right. upward and to the left. but denied having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. temporal region. she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy.xxx xxx xxx "Gunshot wound. or separation of the skin from the underlying tissue. that his house is next to Felipe Gotiong's house. extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance." 14 Analyzing the foregoing testimonies. and he further gave the following answers to these questions: prcd "ATTY. gunpowder tatooing (sic)." 11 Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of defendants' witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan. who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom. behind and 12. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS) QAnd where were you looking from? WITNESS: AFrom upstairs in my living room. that it is the second apartment. ATTY. she talked with James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop. thus: "QNow. Later on.5 x 0. lacerating extensively along its course the brain tissues. edges (e)verted.. 0. edges inverted. ATTY. parietal region. left. oriented upward. right. sir.8 cms.5 cms. smudging.9 cms. ATTY. singeing of hair.2 cm. since the visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in 7 .0 cms. behind and 5. involving skin and soft tissues. Dr. located at the head. Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces the gas station. such as burning around the gunshot wound of entrance.. the 24 inches is approximately one arm's length.. a resident of the house adjacent to the Gotiong residence. that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas station. ENTRANCE. He explained that he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it. are absent. James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the Gotiongs. 2. will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi. penetrating cranial cavity. and following the entrance of the wound. we agree with respondent court that the same do not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses' observations. and measuring yourself 24 inches." 10 On cross-examination. with contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0. irregular. 2. but not very clear because the wall is high. making a punch-in fracture on the temporal bone. directed slightly forward. that from her window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs and. above right external auditory meatus. and finally making an EXIT wound. the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound. fracturing parietal bone.8 cms.4 cm. QWhat is the height of the wall of the Gotiong's in relation to your house? WITNESS: AIt is about 8 feet. the first being a resident of an apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the second. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record. ovaloid. SENINING: I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right arm almost straight towards his head. 13 However. 2. above left external auditory meatus. On cross-examination. is that correct? WITNESS: AYes. will you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches? WITNESS: AActually. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans.0 x 1. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS). ORTIZ (TO WITNESS) QFrom Your living room window. left. LLjur xxx xxx xxx "Evidence of contact or close-contact fire.

for all they know. so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio's gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Malou Alfonso. as explained at the start of this opinion. Cresencio Libi. they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. et. because to hold that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasidelicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son. the mother. testifying on rebuttal. that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 3 SCRA 361-367). They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun.C." llcd xxx xxx xxx "Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors.relation to the house of herein private respondents. 15 Manolo's direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell. In the instant case. may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers. is not borne out by the evidence on record either. We have perforce to reject petitioners' effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. 1961. he heard another shot. mother of Wendell. defendantsappellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for 8 . Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was. despite his minority and immaturity. al. testified that her husband. 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm. . to a large extent. On the other hand. cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away.' 'The subsidiary liability of parent's arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acted with discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180. 16 We. were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream. his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation. Therefore. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son. owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. prominent of which is the case of Fuellas vs. Julie Ann Gotiong. Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart. She admitted. not more than five (5) seconds later. and in keeping said gun from his reach. N. and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. . Consequently. Cadano.' "Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box. Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car.' (3 SCRA 361-362). and. all of which facts were known to Wendell. witness Manolo Alfonso. (L14409. . appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides: 'The father. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe. 17 or even drug users. attested without contradiction that he and his sister. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases. ". hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son. accordingly. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag. . defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. and in case of his death or incapacity. of the instruction and supervision of the child. In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who. It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. documentary and pictorial — the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann. LibLex Petitioners' defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family. Oct. The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists. . respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say: "." Nor can we sustain the trial court's dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial. which held that: 'The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. Wendell. he went down from the fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. however. no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. minor son of herein defendants-appellees. would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son. that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house. in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . 31. are responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company. . Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi. with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof.C. he heard the first shot. this Court holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants' complaint because as preponderantly shown by evidence. also since then.

hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that "(t) he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. the parents liable. We take this opportunity. vs. who has acted without discernment. 22 Araneta vs. . the civil liability for acts committed by . . the minor . or if such person be insolvent." The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has. to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification. Bangkili. this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code. with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder. . however. however. and not primary. but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed. et al. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back. the persons responsible for the act or omission. there are unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court's determination of whether the liability of the parents. We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children. said . in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children. to wit: "Should there be no person having such ." (Emphases supplied. . Arreglado. a person under nine years of age. 26 Parenthetically.) 19 We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. minor under his authority. that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense. Revised Penal Code.Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases . that is. On the other hand. and 3 of Article 12. 25 and Elcano. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary. viz. if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors. in accordance with civil law. and also of minors 15 years of age or over. been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court. Cadano. . 23 Salen. is primary or subsidiary.. or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age. an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. in nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. et al. legal guardianship or control. Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that "(i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian. if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary." For civil liability ex delicto of minors. then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. Accordingly.. That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former." We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary. but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict. and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part." (Emphases ours. Hill.they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock. the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age. . respondent court cites Fuellas vs. minor shall respond with (his) own property. primary liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty of frustrated homicide.. aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas. . Capuno. the mother. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "ARTICLE 101. unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part. not subsidiary. who acted with discernment. just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 9 . 24 Paleyan. LLphil Now. since these situations are not covered by Article 101. et al. In both instances. such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary. . In fact. Balce. et al. the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In cases of subdivisions . shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control. are solidarily liable. Thus. under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary. In Exconde. et al." followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children. in this case the minor and the father and.) 21 Accordingly. et al. is primary and not subsidiary. for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors. we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding. where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence. In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners. in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. 2. . . but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary. etc. The same liability in solidum and.: Exconde vs. In said cases. — xxx xxx xxx First. vs. 20 which supposedly holds that "(t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. vs. excepting property exempt from execution. et al. shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. in case of his death of incapacity. therefore.

And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted. by applying Article 2180 but. after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde. tavern-keepers and proprietors of establishments. that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear." but "is now of age. A careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present case. such categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. ACCORDINGLY. 10 . in Elcano. with costs against petitioners. 2177). such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code." it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages. was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence. 30 Also. this Court concluded its decision in this wise: "Moreover. whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi. with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment. in Paleyan. the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. in case of his death or incapacity. 28 employers. coming back to respondent court's reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present case. as so modified. but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties. was the syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. in Salen. In the present case. in case of his death or incapacity. It bears stressing. and. as already explained. In the case at bar. disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment.However. who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age." Under the foregoing considerations. unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. Finally. since the son. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under. is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code (Art. respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. this time. teachers. upon the guardian. persons and corporations engaged in industry. and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated. the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. or who live in their company. independent of the criminal case. it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. 31 Under said Article 2180. however. the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the conviction of his son. therefore. in case of her death or incapacity. under the Family Code. this civil liability is now. we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control. although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of intent. 27 innkeepers. as a matter of equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable. upon the mother or. the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code. However. or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age. On the other hand. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and. SO ORDERED. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained. coupled with mistake. we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages. the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and. 3 2 However. any discussion as to the minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment. 29 and principals. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors. without such alternative qualification. In fact. and which it attributed to Fuellas. accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other classes. "although married. the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. the mother. Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage. The basis of this vicarious. 1962. the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents. and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child. Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye. or the act which caused it. were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. No. decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals. 13. first on July 20 and again on August 4. tossed the object at her. vs. minor represented by her father ULISES P. to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented. for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1. in the different cases enumerated therein. in case of his death or incapacity. as he had the right to expect her to be. the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180." The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission. 2180. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband.703. it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and. the mother. Despite the medical efforts. although primary. defendant-appellant. CUADRA. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. On July 9.703.R. Torres & Abraham E.] MARIA TERESA Y. Such fault or negligence. evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180. She underwent surgical operation twice. J p: This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. is obliged to pay for the damage done. however careful.00 as attorney's fees.75. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible.. 2176. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend. Maria Teresa Monfort's father. who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. ET AL. On the contrary." Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case. The father and.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Smarting from the pain. July 10. Rodolfo J.000. ALFONSO MONFORT. In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care. would have any special reason to 11 . But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated. Herman for plaintiffs-appellees." "ART. L-24101. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. as in Article 2176. and P2. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. P20. which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. where it was his duty to send her and where she was. plaintiffsappellees. 1962 their teacher assigned them. 1970. particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof. which certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue. CUADRA. however. especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable. there being fault or negligence. 12. Tionko for defendant appellant. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. September 30. liability is. which read: "ART. DECISION MAKALINTAL. and the object hit her right eye. an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair. under the care and supervision of the teacher. to weed the grass in the school premises. and Maria Teresa Monfort. Luis G. fault or negligence.[G. the burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes damage to another under the specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code. In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort. together with three other classmates. she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. the defendant was ordered to pay P1.000.00 as actual damages. there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned.The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Maria Teresa Cuadra. The next day. such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted.00 as moral damages. his child was at school. plus the costs of the suit. and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days.

JJ. Actg. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering. Dizon. C.anticipate much less guard against. she was hurt.. Barredo." it was likely that something would happen to her friend. Concepcion. the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court.. but only the moral compulsion of good conscience. dissenting: I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed colleagues in holding that the act of appellant's daughter does not constitute fault within the contemplation of our law on torts. Separate Opinions BARREDO. The decision appealed from is reversed. deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her..L. as in fact.J. C. J. I prefer to hold that there being no evidence that he had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates. J.. 12 . without pronouncement as to costs. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon plaintiff child. or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents. Villamor and Makasiar..J. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity.B. The victim. and the complaint is dismissed. is on leave... evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl. As to the liability of appellant as father. J. he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. She was 13 years and should have known that by jokingly saying "aloud that she had found an earthworm and. Fernando. tossed the object at her. concur. did not take part. dissents in a separate opinion. Zaldivar. no doubt. Reyes. Teehankee. J. Castro.

ID. 85044. RTC Judge.e. elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court. 768 [1918]) 5. the Rapisura spouses.. — In the instant case. constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.. RUBIO. only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. DOCTRINE OF "IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE" OR VICARIOUS LIABILITY. BASIS. ID. the Court. not the adopting parents. in any case. i. INDISPENSABLE PARTIES TO ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON TORT. moreover.. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT WHERE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES ARE ALREADY BEFORE THE COURT CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing.. EFFECT OF ADOPTION THEREON. In the instant case. of the nature of the issue raised in the instant Petition. — It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. not having complied with the requirements of Section 13. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION. THE HON. THE HON. 6. ID. of course. Such a result. the law imposes civil liability upon the father and. the trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting.ID. — Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. PARENTS WHO HAD ACTUAL CUSTODY OF MINOR. — The parental dereliction is. the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. (Cangco v. in other words. SUPREME COURT. ONLY A PRESUMPTION.ID. the mother..CIVIL LAW. in case of his death or incapacity. DECISION 13 . June 3. 7. CASE AT BAR. CONSIDERED PRO FORMA WHERE NOTICE OF TIME AND PLACE OF HEARING NOT CONTAINED THEREIN. had become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period. but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. however. DOCTRINE OF "IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE" OR VICARIOUS LIABILITY. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto. could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.R. CERTIORARI. we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses. — We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents. Parental liability is.. Accordingly. Court of Appeals. — It will be recalled that petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court. Manila Railroad Co.. are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. were considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the motions. and the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. COURT OF APPEALS. of the Revised Rules of Court. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious act. No. at the time the air rifle shooting happened. TORTS.CIVIL LAW. 2. 8. the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority.. (Article 2176 of the Civil Code) Upon the other hand. CIVIL ACTIONS. SYLLABUS 1. were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners. ARISTON L. the Rapisura spouses. invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice. 1992. controlling and disciplining of the child. and CLARA BUNDOC. — The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them. CIVIL ACTIONS. Thus. CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO. — In view. and Section 4. PARTIES. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period . SUSPENSION OF APPLICATION OF TECHNICAL RULES EXERCISED IN CASE AT BAR. 72 SCRA 120 [1978]) 3. parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody. vs. actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents.. before the issuance of a decree of adoption. parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing.REMEDIAL LAW. what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. 4. however. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child . for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them.ID. petitioners..REMEDIAL LAW. and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint. the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses. or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law. ID. As in fact repeatedly held by this Court.] MACARIO TAMARGO. Ilocos Sur. Rule 41. Branch 20. 36 Phil. would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. the indispensable parties being already before the court. VICTOR BUNDOC. where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself.[G. (Article 2180 of the Civil Code) This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.REMEDIAL LAW. and in order that substantial justice may be served. Put a little differently. Adelberto's natural parents. In the instant case. CONSTRUED. PARENTAL DERELICTION. (Gregorio v. respondents. Rule 15. no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents. TORTS. ID. Vigan.

is called a quasi-delict . 1. the law imposes civil liability upon the father and. and that said notice shall state the time and place of hearing — both motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. and Section 4. Court of Appeals: 3 "Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court. insofar as parental authority is concerned. Jennifer's natural parents. Adelberto Bundoc. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Adelberto's natural parents. the trial court dismissed the notice of appeal. notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made. was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment. however. and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption. Prior to the incident. As the Court held in Gregorio v. a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court. that is. Jennifer's adopting parent. ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal. This petition for adoption was granted on 18 November 1982. On 28 April 1988. and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo. invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice. the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No.It will be recalled that petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court. for acts committed by the latter when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents. a criminal information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. Adelberto Bundoc. claimed that not they. reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption. the mother. after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.FELICIANO. Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. however. parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption." 4 2. Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. In the present Petition for Review. their aim would be defeated. Rule 15. Branch 20. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads: "The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court. or on 10 December 1981. for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them.It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. of the Revised Rules of Court. In their Answer. what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing." Upon the other hand. Ilocos Sur. then a minor of 10 years of age. however. It appearing. 3457-V. not having complied with the requirements of Section 13. shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Within the 15-day reglementary period. and in order that substantial justice may be served. namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. by Petitioner Macario Tamargo. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. . 14 . rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override. substantial justice. not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing. whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even though petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time. of the nature of the issue raised in the instant Petition. or on 14 December 1987. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid technical sense. may still file the instant Petition. petitioners filed a notice of appeal. and the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child. In its Order dated 6 June 1988. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not petitioners. Such fault or negligence. Rule 41. there being fault or negligence. Adelberto. this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December 1987. in case of his death or incapacity. the Court. had become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period. . respondent spouses Bundoc. In addition to this case for damages. ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. Vigan. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. docketed as Civil Case No. against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc. Accordingly. but rather the adopting parents. 2 In view. that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child. is obliged to pay for the damage done. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988. The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint. conversely. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents. J p: On 20 October 1982. were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. . were considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the motions.

it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or. the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom. are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parental liability is. but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses. by reasons of their status . Manila Railroad Co. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct. Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows: LLjur "Article 36. in other words. the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses. however. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. As earlier noted. The decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. the parents exercise supervision and control. under the Civil Code. parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing. anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. In the instant case. the natural parents of the minor Adelberto." (Emphasis supplied). that the trial custody period has been completed. care for.The father and. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto. for reasons of public policy. re-enacted this rule: "Article 58. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious act. The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code: "Art. the mother. occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct. which shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed . and educate the child. Thus. before Adelberto had shot Jennifer with an air rifle. may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. controlling and disciplining of the child.Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code. in case of his death or incapacity. cdll xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." (Emphasis supplied) This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability. The natural parents of Adelberto. after considering the report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted before it. or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants. the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. 15 ." 7 (Emphasis supplied) The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts. or in the control of persons who.Decree of Adoption. the law presumes. so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable. 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself. except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent. parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing the petition for adoption that is. to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. 39." (Emphasis supplied). the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain. to extend that liability. only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The parental dereliction is. on the contrary. — The adoption shall: xxx xxx xxx (2)Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents . a decree of adoption shall be entered." xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) and urge that their parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the petition for adoption was filed. and that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption. of course. The Court is not persuaded. whether of act or omission. — If.Effect of Adoption. without regard to the lack of moral culpability. or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law. 6 in the following terms: "With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence. by a legal fiction.

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage: "Art. 221.Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law." (Emphasis supplied) We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows: "Art. 35.Trial Custody. — No Petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents." (Emphasis supplied) Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents. llcd Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

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[G.R. No. 188288. January 16, 2012.] SPOUSES FERNANDO and LOURDES VILORIA, petitioners, vs. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J p: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the January 30, 2009 Decision 1 of the Special Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88586 entitled "Spouses Fernando and Lourdes Viloria v. Continental Airlines, Inc.," the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, dated 03 April 2006, awarding US$800.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, plus legal rate of interest from 21 July 1997 until fully paid, [P]100,000.00 as moral damages, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages, [P]40,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of suit to plaintiffs-appellees is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendant-appellant's counterclaim is DENIED. Costs against plaintiffs-appellees. SO ORDERED. 2 On April 3, 2006, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74 (RTC) rendered a Decision, giving due course to the complaint for sum of money and damages filed by petitioners Fernando Viloria (Fernando) and Lourdes Viloria (Lourdes), collectively called Spouses Viloria, against respondent Continental Airlines, Inc. (CAI). As culled from the records, below are the facts giving rise to such complaint. On or about July 21, 1997 and while in the United States, Fernando purchased for himself and his wife, Lourdes, two (2) round trip airline tickets from San Diego, California to Newark, New Jersey on board Continental Airlines. Fernando purchased the tickets at US$400.00 each from a travel agency called "Holiday Travel" and was attended to by a certain Margaret Mager (Mager). According to Spouses Viloria, Fernando agreed to buy the said tickets after Mager informed them that there were no available seats at Amtrak, an intercity passenger train service provider in the United States. Per the tickets, Spouses Viloria were scheduled to leave for Newark on August 13, 1997 and return to San Diego on August 21, 1997. DaACIH Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their flight to Newark to an earlier date or August 6, 1997. Mager informed him that flights to Newark via Continental Airlines were already fully booked and offered the alternative of a round trip flight via Frontier Air. Since flying with Frontier Air called for a higher fare of US$526.00 per passenger and would mean traveling by night, Fernando opted to request for a refund. Mager, however, denied his request as the subject tickets are non-refundable and the only option that Continental Airlines can offer is the re-issuance of new tickets within one (1) year from the date the subject tickets were issued. Fernando decided to reserve two (2) seats with Frontier Air. As he was having second thoughts on traveling via Frontier Air, Fernando went to the Greyhound Station where he saw an Amtrak station nearby. Fernando made inquiries and was told that there are seats available and he can travel on Amtrak anytime and any day he pleased. Fernando then purchased two (2) tickets for Washington, D.C. From Amtrak, Fernando went to Holiday Travel and confronted Mager with the Amtrak tickets, telling her that she had misled them into buying the Continental Airlines tickets by misrepresenting that Amtrak was already fully booked. Fernando reiterated his demand for a refund but Mager was firm in her position that the subject tickets are non-refundable. Upon returning to the Philippines, Fernando sent a letter to CAI on February 11, 1998, demanding a refund and alleging that Mager had deluded them into purchasing the subject tickets. 3 In a letter dated February 24, 1998, Continental Micronesia informed Fernando that his complaint had been referred to the Customer Refund Services of Continental Airlines at Houston, Texas. 4 In a letter dated March 24, 1998, Continental Micronesia denied Fernando's request for a refund and advised him that he may take the subject tickets to any Continental ticketing location for the re-issuance of new tickets within two (2) years from the date they were issued. Continental Micronesia informed Fernando that the subject tickets may be used as a form of payment for the purchase of another Continental ticket, albeit with a re-issuance fee. 5 On June 17, 1999, Fernando went to Continental's ticketing office at Ayala Avenue, Makati City to have the subject tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket to Los Angeles, California under his name. Therein, Fernando was informed that Lourdes' ticket was nontransferable, thus, cannot be used for the purchase of a ticket in his favor. He was also informed that a round trip ticket to Los Angeles was US$1,867.40 so he would have to pay what will not be covered by the value of his San Diego to Newark round trip ticket. aTSEcA In a letter dated June 21, 1999, Fernando demanded for the refund of the subject tickets as he no longer wished to have them replaced. In addition to the dubious circumstances under which the subject tickets were issued, Fernando claimed that CAI's act of charging him with US$1,867.40 for a round trip ticket to Los Angeles, which other airlines priced at US$856.00, and refusal to allow him to use Lourdes' ticket, breached its undertaking under its March 24, 1998 letter. 6

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On September 8, 2000, Spouses Viloria filed a complaint against CAI, praying that CAI be ordered to refund the money they used in the purchase of the subject tickets with legal interest from July 21, 1997 and to pay P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and P250,000.00 as attorney's fees. 7 CAI interposed the following defenses: (a) Spouses Viloria have no right to ask for a refund as the subject tickets are non-refundable; (b) Fernando cannot insist on using the ticket in Lourdes' name for the purchase of a round trip ticket to Los Angeles since the same is non-transferable; (c) as Mager is not a CAI employee, CAI is not liable for any of her acts; (d) CAI, its employees and agents did not act in bad faith as to entitle Spouses Viloria to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. CAI also invoked the following clause printed on the subject tickets: 3.To the extent not in conflict with the foregoing carriage and other services performed by each carrier are subject to: (i) provisions contained in this ticket, (ii) applicable tariffs, (iii) carrier's conditions of carriage and related regulations which are made part hereof (and are available on application at the offices of carrier), except in transportation between a place in the United States or Canada and any place outside thereof to which tariffs in force in those countries apply. 8 According to CAI, one of the conditions attached to their contract of carriage is the non-transferability and non-refundability of the subject tickets. The RTC's Ruling Following a full-blown trial, the RTC rendered its April 3, 2006 Decision, holding that Spouses Viloria are entitled to a refund in view of Mager's misrepresentation in obtaining their consent in the purchase of the subject tickets. 9 The relevant portion of the April 3, 2006 Decision states: Continental Airlines agent Ms. Mager was in bad faith when she was less candid and diligent in presenting to plaintiffs spouses their booking options. Plaintiff Fernando clearly wanted to travel via AMTRAK, but defendant's agent misled him into purchasing Continental Airlines tickets instead on the fraudulent misrepresentation that Amtrak was fully booked. In fact, defendant Airline did not specifically denied (sic) this allegation. SDHETI Plainly, plaintiffs spouses, particularly plaintiff Fernando, were tricked into buying Continental Airline tickets on Ms. Mager's misleading misrepresentations. Continental Airlines agent Ms. Mager further relied on and exploited plaintiff Fernando's need and told him that they must book a flight immediately or risk not being able to travel at all on the couple's preferred date. Unfortunately, plaintiffs spouses fell prey to the airline's and its agent's unethical tactics for baiting trusting customers." 10 Citing Articles 1868 and 1869 of the Civil Code, the RTC ruled that Mager is CAI's agent, hence, bound by her bad faith and misrepresentation. As far as the RTC is concerned, there is no issue as to whether Mager was CAI's agent in view of CAI's implied recognition of her status as such in its March 24, 1998 letter. The act of a travel agent or agency being involved here, the following are the pertinent New Civil Code provisions on agency: Art. 1868.By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. Art. 1869.Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority. Agency may be oral, unless the law requires a specific form. As its very name implies, a travel agency binds itself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. This court takes judicial notice of the common services rendered by travel agencies that represent themselves as such, specifically the reservation and booking of local and foreign tours as well as the issuance of airline tickets for a commission or fee. The services rendered by Ms. Mager of Holiday Travel agency to the plaintiff spouses on July 21, 1997 were no different from those offered in any other travel agency. Defendant airline impliedly if not expressly acknowledged its principal-agent relationship with Ms. Mager by its offer in the letter dated March 24, 1998 — an obvious attempt to assuage plaintiffs spouses' hurt feelings. 11 Furthermore, the RTC ruled that CAI acted in bad faith in reneging on its undertaking to replace the subject tickets within two (2) years from their date of issue when it charged Fernando with the amount of US$1,867.40 for a round trip ticket to Los Angeles and when it refused to allow Fernando to use Lourdes' ticket. Specifically: Tickets may be reissued for up to two years from the original date of issue. When defendant airline still charged plaintiffs spouses US$1,867.40 or more than double the then going rate of US$856.00 for the unused tickets when the same were presented within two (2) years from date of issue, defendant airline exhibited callous treatment of passengers. 12 CScaDH The Appellate Court's Ruling

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if they would hold the principal liable. Finally. By the contract of agency. Proceeding from this premise. On the other hand. the word "nonrefundable" clearly appears on the face of the subject tickets. Furthermore. 2009 Decision and whether Spouses Viloria have the right to the reliefs they prayed for. The matter of fixing the prices for its services is CAI's prerogative. of the parties to establish the relationship. and in case either is controverted. Issues To determine the propriety of disturbing the CA's January 30. and (4) the agent acts within the scope of his/her authority. Absent such mutual intent. which Spouses Viloria cannot intervene. an actual intention to appoint. Spouses Viloria. who have the burden of proof to establish the fact of agency. Holiday Travel was without capacity to bind CAI. Spouses Viloria claim that CAI acted in bad faith when it required them to pay a higher amount for a round trip ticket to Los Angeles considering CAI's undertaking to re-issue new tickets to them within the period stated in their March 24. a person binds him/herself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another. neither is it created by the mere use of the word in a trade or business name. Also. to ascertain not only the fact of agency but also the nature and extent of authority. As the basis of agency is representation. Mager included. 1998 letter.867. CAI also denies that it is bound by the acts of Holiday Travel and Mager and that no principal-agency relationship exists between them. the CA reversed the RTC's April 3.On appeal. this Court deems it necessary to resolve the following issues: 19 . which constitute their contract with CAI. CAI argued that Spouses Viloria's sole basis to claim that the price at which CAI was willing to issue the new tickets is unconscionable is a piece of hearsay evidence — an advertisement appearing on a newspaper stating that airfares from Manila to Los Angeles or San Francisco cost US$818. 14 The Petitioners' Case In this Petition. Agency is never presumed. Notably. In particular: It is within the respective rights of persons owning and/or operating business entities to peg the premium of the services and items which they provide at a price which they deem fit. they contend that Continental Airlines should be held liable for the acts of Mager. the transaction in issue was simply a contract of sale. As an independent contractor. the contractual relationship between Holiday Travel and CAI is not an agency but that of a sale. no matter how expensive or exhorbitant said price may seem vis-à-vis those of the competing companies. the grant of their prayer for a refund would violate the proscription against impairment of contracts. (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person. the burden of proof is upon them to establish it.00. it is CAI's duty to inform its passengers of the terms and conditions of their contract and passengers cannot be bound by such terms and conditions which they are not made aware of. express or implied. contrary to Spouses Viloria's claim. We have perused the evidence and documents so far presented. the CA held that CAI did not act in bad faith when they charged Spouses Viloria with the higher amount of US$1. sells it at a premium to clients. According to the CA. 13 The CA also ruled that refund is not available to Spouses Viloria as the word "non-refundable" was clearly printed on the face of the subject tickets. the time when Fernando asked CAI to apply the value of the subject tickets for the purchase of a new one. (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for him/herself. Therefore. 1998 letter. Plaintiffs-appellees assert that Mager was a sub-agent of Holiday Travel who was in turn a ticketing agent of Holiday Travel who was in turn a ticketing agent of Continental Airlines. CAI likewise acted in bad faith when it disallowed Fernando to use Lourdes' ticket to purchase a round trip to Los Angeles given that there is nothing in Lourdes' ticket indicating that it is non-transferable. holding that CAI cannot be held liable for Mager's act in the absence of any proof that a principal-agent relationship existed between CAI and Holiday Travel. the petitioners are no longer questioning the validity of the subject contracts and limited its claim for a refund on CAI's alleged breach of its undertaking in its March 24.40 for a round trip ticket to Los Angeles. there must be an intention on the part of the agent to accept the appointment and act upon it. this Court is being asked to review the findings and conclusions of the CA. According to the CA. We do not agree. any ambiguities should be construed against CAI. failed to present evidence demonstrating that Holiday Travel is CAI's agent. 2006 Decision allegedly lacks factual and legal bases.00. there is generally no agency. ECcTaS The Respondent's Case In its Comment. As a common carrier. the subject contract of carriage is a contract of adhesion. From all sides of legal prism. there is no compulsion for CAI to charge the lower amount of US$856. an intention naturally inferable from the principal's words or actions. It is likewise a settled rule that persons dealing with an assumed agent are bound at their peril. through its employees. In the same manner. With respect to Spouses Viloria's claim that they are not aware of CAI's restrictions on the subject tickets and that the terms and conditions that are printed on them are ambiguous. The elements of agency are: (1) consent. as the latter's reversal of the RTC's April 3. We find nothing except bare allegations of plaintiffs-appellees that Mager/Holiday Travel was acting in behalf of Continental Airlines. The trial court held the same view. there must be. 15 Also. therefore. The Spouses Viloria may not intervene with the business judgment of Continental Airlines. 2006 Decision. CAI claimed that Spouses Viloria's allegation of bad faith is negated by its willingness to issue new tickets to them and to credit the value of the subject tickets against the value of the new ticket Fernando requested. the advertisement pertains to airfares in September 2000 and not to airfares prevailing in June 1999. wherein Holiday Travel buys airline tickets from Continental Airlines and then. CAI denies any ambiguity and alleged that its representative informed Fernando that the subject tickets are non-transferable when he applied for the issuance of a new ticket. with the consent or authority of the latter. on the part of the principal. 16 CAI likewise argued that it did not undertake to protect Spouses Viloria from any changes or fluctuations in the prices of airline tickets and its only obligation was to apply the value of the subject tickets to the purchase of the newly issued tickets. which Spouses Viloria claim to be the fee charged by other airlines.

20 . whereby Holiday Travel would enter into contracts of carriage with third persons on CAI's behalf.Assuming that an agency relationship exists between CAI and Holiday Travel.Alternatively. sprung the creation and acceptance of the relationship of agency whereby one party. representative. Spouses Viloria. did CAI act in bad faith or renege its obligation to Spouses Viloria to apply the value of the subject tickets in the purchase of new ones when it refused to allow Fernando to use Lourdes' ticket and in charging a higher price for a round trip ticket to Los Angeles? This Court's Ruling I. agency is never presumed and that he who alleges that it exists has the burden of proof." SITCcE Considering that the fundamental hallmarks of an agency are present. and (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority. The CA failed to consider undisputed facts. Furthermore. As categorically provided under Article 1869 of the Civil Code. CAI recognized the validity of the contracts of carriage that Holiday Travel entered into with Spouses Viloria and considered itself bound with Spouses Viloria by the terms and conditions thereof. With respect to the first issue." 19 Contrary to the findings of the CA. knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority. The distinctions between a sale and an agency are not difficult to discern and this Court. Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation. discrediting CAI's denial that Holiday Travel is one of its agents. and derivative in nature. 1998 letters. in erroneously characterizing the contractual relationship between CAI and Holiday Travel as a contract of sale. the CA failed to apply the fundamental civil law principles governing agency and differentiating it from sale. This Court cannot therefore allow CAI to take an altogether different position and deny that Holiday Travel is its agent without condoning or giving imprimatur to whatever damage or prejudice that may result from such denial or retraction to Spouses Viloria. called the principal (mandante). and this constitutes an unequivocal testament to Holiday Travel's authority to act as its agent. is CAI bound by the acts of Holiday Travel's agents and employees such as Mager? c. his act is the act of the principal if done within the scope of the authority. Prior to Spouses Viloria's filing of a complaint against it.Does a principal-agent relationship exist between CAI and Holiday Travel? b. That CAI admits the authority of Holiday Travel to enter into contracts of carriage on its behalf is easily discernible from its February 24.Assuming that CAI is bound by the acts of Holiday Travel's agents and employees. Qui facit per alium facit se. We disagree. who relied on good faith on CAI's acts in recognition of Holiday Travel's authority.Is CAI justified in pegging a different price for the round trip ticket to Los Angeles requested by Fernando? f. to act for and in his behalf in transactions with third persons. CAI consistently maintains the validity of the contracts of carriage that Holiday Travel executed with Spouses Viloria and that Mager was not guilty of any fraudulent misrepresentation.Is CAI justified in insisting that the subject tickets are non-transferable and non-refundable? e. Estoppel is primarily based on the doctrine of good faith and the avoidance of harm that will befall an innocent party due to its injurious reliance. It is well-settled to the point of being axiomatic that this Court is authorized to resolve questions of fact if confronted with contrasting factual findings of the trial court and appellate court and if the findings of the CA are contradicted by the evidence on record. 17 ISAcHD According to the CA. Agency is basically personal. on whose shoulders such burden rests.a. authorizes another. In fact. In Rallos v. which is a question of fact that would require this Court to review and re-examine the evidence presented by the parties below. the failure to apply it in this case would result in gross travesty of justice. (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself. "He who acts through another acts himself. from his silence or lack of action. or implied from the acts of the principal. The authority of the agent to act emanates from the powers granted to him by his principal. "[a]gency may be express. The first and second elements are present as CAI does not deny that it concluded an agreement with Holiday Travel. CAI did not deny that Holiday Travel is its authorized agent. 20 Estoppel bars CAI from making such denial. The third element is also present as it is undisputed that Holiday Travel merely acted in a representative capacity and it is CAI and not Holiday Travel who is bound by the contracts of carriage entered into by Holiday Travel on its behalf. this Court finds it rather peculiar that the CA had branded the contractual relationship between CAI and Holiday Travel as one of sale. had already formulated the guidelines that would aid in differentiating the two (2) contracts.A principal-agent relationship exists between CAI and Holiday Travel. The fourth element is also present considering that CAI has not made any allegation that Holiday Travel exceeded the authority that was granted to it. 1998 and March 24. this Court takes exception to the general rule that the CA's findings of fact are conclusive upon us and our jurisdiction is limited to the review of questions of law. CAI never refuted that it gave Holiday Travel the power and authority to conclude contracts of carriage on its behalf. called the agent (mandatario). express or implied of the parties to establish the relationship. all the elements of an agency exist in this case. 18 this Court explained the nature of an agency and spelled out the essential elements thereof: Out of the above given principles. or his failure to repudiate the agency. (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person. The essential elements of agency are: (1) there is consent. presented evidence that fell short of indubitably demonstrating the existence of such agency. where it impliedly recognized the validity of the contracts entered into by Holiday Travel with Spouses Viloria. As clearly extant from the records. as early as 1970. When Fernando informed CAI that it was Holiday Travel who issued to them the subject tickets. can the representation of Mager as to unavailability of seats at Amtrak be considered fraudulent as to vitiate the consent of Spouse Viloria in the purchase of the subject tickets? d.

control and ownership in such a way that the recipient may do with the property as he pleases. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agent's employees and the principal-agency relationship per se does not make the principal a party to such tort. but as the property of the principal. even as it delivered possession unto the dealer for resale to customers. Considering that Holiday Travel is CAI's agent. Tiedeman on Sales. it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in which 21 . who remains the owner and has the right to control sales. Since the company retained ownership of the goods. there is nothing which could justify extending the liability to a person other than the one who committed the tort. However. Court of Appeals. 1 Mechem on Agency. and terms. it is not necessary that there be evidence of the airline company's fault or negligence. It may likewise be argued that CAI cannot deny liability as it benefited from Mager's acts. the records are devoid of any evidence by which CAI's alleged liability can be substantiated.In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. aHTCIc On the other hand. The decisions say the transfer of title or agreement to transfer it for a price paid or promised is the essence of sale. That the principal is bound by all the obligations contracted by the agent within the scope of the authority granted to him is clearly provided under Article 1910 of the Civil Code and this constitutes the very notion of agency. As this Court previously stated in China Air Lines and reiterated in Air France vs. the contract is clearly a sale if the parties intended that the delivery of the property will effect a relinquishment of title. Without such control. in order to deny Spouses Viloria's request for a refund or Fernando's use of Lourdes' ticket for the re-issuance of a new one. v. If such transfer puts the transferee in the attitude or position of an owner and makes him liable to the transferor as a debtor for the agreed price. In an agency. there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between them. considering that CAI is the one bound by the contracts of carriage embodied by the tickets being sold by Holiday Travel on its behalf. tested under the following criterion: "The difficulty in distinguishing between contracts of sale and the creation of an agency to sell has led to the establishment of rules by the application of which this difficulty may be solved. Williston on Sales. acCTIS However. Brooks. 1. and simultaneously claim that they are not bound by Mager's supposed misrepresentation for purposes of avoiding Spouses Viloria's claim for damages and maintaining the validity of the subject contracts. it was incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI was equally at fault. 1. if the passenger's cause of action for damages against the airline company is based on contractual breach or culpa contractual. It is undisputed that CAI and not Holiday Travel who is the party to the contracts of carriage executed by Holiday Travel with third persons who desire to travel via Continental Airlines. and not merely as an agent who must account for the proceeds of a resale. 21 this Court extrapolated that the primordial differentiating consideration between the two (2) contracts is the transfer of ownership or title over the property subject of the contract." (Salisbury v. A prior determination of the nature of the passenger's cause of action is necessary. It may seem unjust at first glance that CAI would consider Spouses Viloria bound by the terms and conditions of the subject contracts. et al." Spouses Viloria's cause of action on the basis of Mager's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is clearly one of tort or quasi-delict. 118-119) 22 As to how the CA have arrived at the conclusion that the contract between CAI and Holiday Travel is a sale is certainly confounding.. Ltd. the need to prove the principal's own fault or negligence. Sec. the relationship between the company and the dealer is one of agency. on the tortfeasor. Sec. The mere fact that the employee of the airline company's agent has committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline company liable. hence. An examination of this Court's pronouncements in China Air Lines will reveal that an airline company is not completely exonerated from any liability for the tort committed by its agent's employees. II. 1 Mechem on Sales. Constantino. Apart from their claim that CAI must be held liable for Mager's supposed fraud because Holiday Travel is CAI's agent. not as his property. As this Court explained in Cangco v. whether of act or omission . 94 SE 117. 48. there must be an independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its agent. the principal retains ownership and control over the property and the agent merely acts on the principal's behalf and under his instructions in furtherance of the objectives for which the agency was established. does it necessarily follow that CAI is liable for the fault or negligence of Holiday Travel's employees? Citing China Air Lines. All that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier. the price and terms of which were subject to the company's control. the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. which Mager entered into with them on CAI's behalf. whether absolute or limited. Gillego. the transaction is a sale. There is no vinculum juris between the airline company and its agent's employees and the contractual relationship between the airline company and its agent does not operate to create a juridical tie between the airline company and its agent's employees. 24 "in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage. Therefore. a person's vicarious liability is anchored on his possession of control. Manila Railroad Co. and this conclusively indicates the existence of a principal-agent relationship. a principal can only be held liable for the tort committed by its agent's employees if it has been established by preponderance of evidence that the principal was also at fault or negligent or that the principal exercise control and supervision over them. Spouses Viloria did not present evidence that CAI was a party or had contributed to Mager's complained act either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel and Mager to issue the said misrepresentation. If the passenger's cause of action against the airline company is premised on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline company's agent. On the other hand. while the essence of an agency to sell is the delivery to an agent. 43.: 25 With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence. demand and receive the proceeds less the agent's commission upon sales made.In actions based on quasi-delict. fix the price. 23 CAI argues that it cannot be held liable for the actions of the employee of its ticketing agent in the absence of an employer-employee relationship. which were performed in compliance with Holiday Travel's obligations as CAI's agent.

it must be the causal (dolo causante). without them. this Court ruled that it was enough for defendant to deny an alleged employment relationship. etc. Citing Belen v. the other is induced to enter into a contract which without them. As ruled by this Court in Sierra v. including their fruits and interest. Under Article 1338 of the Civil Code. 28 that: In Belen v.the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or. provides that if the consent of the contracting parties was obtained through fraud. by reasons of their status." 34 After meticulously poring over the records. it was possible that during the intervening period of three (3) weeks from the time Fernando purchased the subject tickets to the time he talked to said Amtrak 22 . fraud must be serious and its existence must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Article 1390." 32 Also. 1338. IDEHCa Whether the subject contracts are annullable. TCAScE Art. The defendant is under no obligation to prove the negative averment. Belen. As CAI correctly pointed out and as Fernando admitted. or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agent or servants. the contract is considered voidable and may be annulled within four (4) years from the time of the discovery of the fraud. Hon. This [rule] is in harmony with the provisions of Section 297 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. not merely the incidental (dolo incidente). Court of Appeals. this Court is required to determine whether Mager's alleged misrepresentation constitutes causal fraud. through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties. 33 mere preponderance of evidence is not adequate: Fraud must also be discounted. To quote Tolentino again. which is Fernando's testimony that an Amtrak had assured him of the perennial availability of seats at Amtrak. III. the other is induced to enter into a contract which. 31 causal fraud was defined as "a deception employed by one party prior to or simultaneous to the contract in order to secure the consent of the other. In order that fraud may vitiate consent.There is fraud when. The deceit must be serious. on the contrary. Belen. 30 In Samson v. The circumstances of each case should be considered. Spouses Viloria failed to prove that (a) there were indeed available seats at Amtrak for a trip to New Jersey on August 13. clear.In order that fraud may make a contract voidable. and that if he fails satisfactorily to show the facts upon which he bases his claim. Spouses Viloria failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mager's statement was fraudulent. whether fraud attended the execution of a contract is factual in nature and this Court. he would not have agreed to. or to lead an ordinarily prudent person into error. Similar to the dispute on the existence of an agency. it is plainly apparent that their demand for a refund is tantamount to seeking for an annulment of the subject contracts on the ground of vitiated consent. so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable. there is fraud when." 29 (citations omitted) Therefore. (b) Mager knew about this. this Court finds that the fraud alleged by Spouses Viloria has not been satisfactorily established as causal in nature to warrant the annulment of the subject contracts. This Court finds the only proof of Mager's alleged fraud. 27 this Court ruled in Jayme v. 1344. he would not have agreed to. The existence of control or supervision cannot be presumed and CAI is under no obligation to prove its denial or nugatory assertion. Specifically. without regard to the lack of moral culpability.Even on the assumption that CAI may be held liable for the acts of Mager. in relation to Article 1391 of the Civil Code. This Court said: "It is an old and well-settled rule of the courts that the burden of proving the action is upon the plaintiff. for according to the Civil Code: Art. On the basis of the foregoing and given the allegation of Spouses Viloria that Fernando's consent to the subject contracts was supposedly secured by Mager through fraudulent means. by a legal fiction. or in the control of persons who. to be wanting. and (c) that she purposely informed them otherwise. through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties. inducement to the making of the contract. Mager's statement cannot be considered a causal fraud that would justify the annulment of the subject contracts that would oblige CAI to indemnify Spouses Viloria and return the money they paid for the subject tickets. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct. The fraud is serious when it is sufficient to impress. Apostol. 1997. without a modicum of evidence that CAI exercised control over Holiday Travel's employees or that CAI was equally at fault. as discussed above. no liability can be imposed on CAI for Mager's supposed misrepresentation. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts. to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. may scrutinize the records if the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the RTC. In fact. the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exceptions. still. the parties are obliged under Article 1398 of the same Code to restore to each other the things subject matter of the contract.. Spouses Viloria are not entitled to a refund. and convincing evidence. it should be serious and should not have been employed by both contracting parties. for reasons of public policy. 1997 at the time they spoke with Mager on July 21. Court of Appeals. the "misrepresentation constituting the fraud must be established by full. 26 (emphasis supplied) It is incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI exercised control or supervision over Mager by preponderant evidence. taking into account the personal conditions of the victim. to extend that liability. et al. that which cannot deceive a prudent person cannot be a ground for nullity. Once a contract is annulled. and not merely by a preponderance thereof.

IDSaTE The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the rescission of the obligation. v. He may also seek rescission. 38 this Court ruled that a claim for a reimbursement in view of the other party's failure to comply with his obligations under the contract is one for rescission or resolution. Resolution. 1393. annulment under Article 1390 of the Civil Code and rescission under Article 1191 are two (2) inconsistent remedies. 23 . Implied ratification may take diverse forms. The court shall decree the rescission claimed.00. or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom. CAI stated that "non-refundable tickets may be used as a form of payment toward the purchase of another Continental ticket for $75. it is good faith that is. 39 V. Spouses Viloria are nevertheless deemed to have ratified the subject contracts. there is nothing in the above-quoted section of CAI's letter from which the restriction on the non-transferability of the subject tickets can be inferred. However. Under the Rules of Court. it is presumed that "a person is innocent of crime or wrong" and that "private transactions have been fair and regular. It is understood that there is a tacit ratification if. CAI cannot insist on the non-transferability of the subject tickets. the action referred to in Article 1191." 35 Spouses Viloria failed to overcome this presumption. 1998 letter. the words used by CAI in its letter supports the position of Spouses Viloria. Moreover. IV." Ratification of a voidable contract is defined under Article 1393 of the Civil Code as follows: Art. by pursuing the remedy of rescission under Article 1191. Indeed.employee. such as by silence or acquiescence. litigants are enjoined from taking inconsistent positions. per ticket. as CAI admitted." Clearly. In resolution. forfeiting their right to demand their annulment. Considering that the subject contracts are not annullable on the ground of vitiated consent. the subject contracts have been impliedly ratified when Spouses Viloria decided to exercise their right to use the subject tickets for the purchase of new ones. Spouses Viloria likewise asked for a refund based on CAI's supposed bad faith in reneging on its undertaking to replace the subject tickets with a round trip ticket from Manila to Los Angeles. which is consent. in accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law. the existence of fraud cannot be proved by mere speculations and conjectures. In fact. the Vilorias had impliedly admitted the validity of the subject contracts. per ticket. Fraud is never lightly inferred. in annulment. Under Article 1392 of the Civil Code.Assuming the contrary. Davao Corrugated Carton Corporation . Spouses Viloria are actually asking for a rescission of the subject contracts based on contractual breach. 36 Simultaneous with their demand for a refund on the ground of Fernando's vitiated consent. IEAaST In doing so. A party cannot rely on the contract and claim rights or obligations under it and at the same time impugn its existence or validity. one of the essential elements to a formation of a contract. In resolution. 1997). making it possible for Amtrak to accommodate them. all the elements to make the contract valid are present. it was only when Fernando had expressed his interest to use the subject tickets for the purchase of a round trip ticket between Manila and Los Angeles that he was informed that he cannot use the ticket in Lourdes' name as payment. CAI acted in bad faith and breached the subject contracts when it refused to apply the value of Lourdes' ticket for Fernando's purchase of a round trip ticket to Los Angeles and in requiring him to pay an amount higher than the price fixed by other airline companies. Accordingly. the defect is in the consummation stage of the contract when the parties are in the process of performing their respective obligations. as presently worded. if the latter should become impossible. that each of them can use the ticket under their name for the purchase of new tickets whether for themselves or for some other person.Contracts cannot be rescinded for a slight or casual breach. with the payment of damages in either case. in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. Indeed. This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing. in annulment. states: The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones. According to Spouses Viloria. even after he has chosen fulfillment. other passengers may have cancelled their bookings and reservations with Amtrak. Inc. reissue fee ($50. the defect is already present at the time of the negotiation and perfection stages of the contract. with knowledge of the reason which renders the contract voidable and such reason having ceased. is absent. unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. the next question is: "Do Spouses Viloria have the right to rescind the contract on the ground of CAI's supposed breach of its undertaking to issue new tickets upon surrender of the subject tickets?" Article 1191.00. by acts showing approval or adoption of the contract. the person who has a right to invoke it should execute an act which necessarily implies an intention to waive his right. Even assuming that Mager's representation is causal fraud. for tickets purchased prior to October 30. "ratification extinguishes the action to annul a voidable contract. In its March 24. a violation of the reciprocity between the parties 37 and in Solar Harvest. is based on the defendant's breach of faith.Ratification may be effected expressly or tacitly.

In other words. CAI's refusal to accept Lourdes' ticket for the purchase of a new ticket for Fernando is only a casual breach. CAI is proscribed from taking advantage of any ambiguity in the contract of carriage to impute knowledge on its passengers of and demand compliance with a certain condition or undertaking that is not clearly stipulated. The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach. As ruled in Feria v. the same shall be deemed extinguished. albeit under her name and for her exclusive use. Nonetheless. that is. or all of its passengers for that matter. . they are both liable for damages. it was clearly stated that "[n]on-refundable tickets may be used as a form of payment toward the purchase of another Continental ticket" 42 and there is nothing in it suggesting that CAI had obliged itself to protect Spouses Viloria from any fluctuation in the prices of tickets or that the surrender of the subject tickets will be considered as full payment for any ticket that the petitioners intend to buy regardless of actual price and destination. . It cannot be denied that Spouses Viloria had the concomitant obligation to pay whatever is not covered by the value of the subject tickets whether or not the subject tickets are transferable or not. the news article is admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated. much less prove. Spouses Viloria have no right to insist that a single round trip ticket between Manila and Los Angeles should be priced at around $856. This Court takes note of CAI's willingness to perform its principal obligation and this is to apply the price of the ticket in Fernando's name to the price of the round trip ticket between Manila and Los Angeles.00 and refuse to pay the difference between the price of the subject tickets and the amount fixed by CAI. unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. If it cannot be determined which of the parties first violated the contract. 1998 cannot be doubted. (emphasis supplied) Therefore. The endorsability of the subject tickets is not an essential part of the underlying contracts and CAI's failure to comply is not essential to its fulfillment of its undertaking to issue new tickets upon Spouses Viloria's surrender of the subject tickets. albeit tainted with its erroneous insistence that Lourdes' ticket is nontransferable. Court of Appeals. Article 1192 of the Civil Code provides that in case both parties have committed a breach of their reciprocal obligations. AaHcIT Moreover. which does not preclude CAI from fixing the price of a round trip ticket between Manila and Los Angeles in an amount it deems proper and which does not provide Spouses Viloria an excuse not to pay such price. twice removed. that the subject tickets are non-transferable cannot be implied from a plain reading of the provision printed on the subject tickets stating that "[t]o the extent not in conflict with the foregoing carriage and other services performed by each carrier are subject to: (a) provisions contained in this ticket. Moreover. 41 While CAI's refusal to allow Fernando to use the value of Lourdes' ticket as payment for the purchase of a new ticket is unjustified as the non-transferability of the subject tickets was not clearly stipulated. CAI cannot refuse to apply the value of Lourdes' ticket as payment for Fernando's purchase of a new ticket. Island Savings Bank failed to comply with its obligation to furnish the entire loan and Sulpicio M. 1998 letter. that CAI had obliged itself to issue to them tickets for any flight anywhere in the world upon their surrender of the subject tickets. Since the prohibition on transferability is not written on the face of the subject tickets and CAI failed to inform Spouses Viloria thereof. hence. WE rule that the liability of 24 . CAI's willingness to comply with its undertaking under its March 24.00 debt within 3 years as stipulated. the contract between them remains. (iii) carrier's conditions of carriage and related regulations which are made part hereof (and are available on application at the offices of carrier) . but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement. 40 Whether a breach is substantial is largely determined by the attendant circumstances. The CA was correct in holding that it is CAI's right and exclusive prerogative to fix the prices for its services and it may not be compelled to observe and maintain the prices of other airline companies.In case both parties have committed a breach of the obligation. . The only evidence the petitioners presented to prove that the price of a round trip ticket between Manila and Los Angeles at that time was only $856. twice removed" and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not.000. however be considered substantial. hence. . albeit subject to a reduction coming from the value of the subject tickets. 45 (citations omitted) The records of this case demonstrate that both parties were equally in default.Contrary to CAI's claim. CAI was likewise willing to accept the ticket in Lourdes' name as full or partial payment as the case may be for the purchase of any ticket. In its March 24. of all the terms and conditions governing their contract of carriage. This Court made a similar ruling in Central Bank of the Philippines v. There is also no showing that Spouses Viloria were discriminated against in bad faith by being charged with a higher rate. The petitioners failed to allege." Newspaper clippings are hearsay if they were offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter alleged. 1192. Court of Appeals.00 is a newspaper advertisement for another airline company. 43 The conflict as to the endorsability of the subject tickets is an altogether different matter. the liability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. . In this case. Spouses Viloria's demand for rescission cannot prosper as CAI cannot be solely faulted for the fact that their agreement failed to consummate and no new ticket was issued to Fernando. and each shall bear his own damages. it cannot. none of them can seek judicial redress for the cancellation or resolution of the subject contracts and they are therefore bound to their respective obligations thereunder. which is not covered by the subject tickets. the right to rescind a contract for non-performance of its stipulations is not absolute. the liability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts." As a common carrier whose business is imbued with public interest.: 44 [N]ewspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence. 46 Thus: Since both parties were in default in the performance of their respective reciprocal obligations. Tolentino failed to comply with his obligation to pay his P17. CAI's liability for damages for its refusal to accept Lourdes' ticket for the purchase of Fernando's round trip ticket is offset by Spouses Viloria's liability for their refusal to pay the amount. As the 1st sentence of Article 1192 provides: Art. which is inadmissible for being "hearsay evidence. CAI is duty bound to issue new tickets for a destination chosen by Spouses Viloria upon their surrender of the subject tickets and Spouses Viloria are obliged to pay whatever amount is not covered by the value of the subject tickets. the exercise of extraordinary diligence requires CAI to inform Spouses Viloria. .

Island Savings Bank for damages in not furnishing the entire loan is offset by the liability of Sulpicio M. Tolentino for damages, in the form of penalties and surcharges, for not paying his overdue P17,000.00 debt. . . . . 47 Another consideration that militates against the propriety of holding CAI liable for moral damages is the absence of a showing that the latter acted fraudulently and in bad faith. Article 2220 of the Civil Code requires evidence of bad faith and fraud and moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except when bad faith had been proven. 48 The award of exemplary damages is likewise not warranted. Apart from the requirement that the defendant acted in a wanton, oppressive and malevolent manner, the claimant must prove his entitlement to moral damages. 49 HDAECI WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

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[G.R. No. L-25142. March 25, 1975.] PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALANGAN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO PINEDA, defendants-appellees.

Angel A. Sison for plaintiffs-appellants. Fidel Zosimo U. Canilao for defendants-appellees.

SYNOPSIS As a result of a vehicular accident, complaint for damages based on culpa-aquitiana was filed against the Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Fernando Pineda, and Balingit as manager of the company. The trial court dismissed the complaint against Balingit on the ground that he is not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code making owners and managers of an establishment responsible for damages caused by their employees, since Balingit himself may be regarded as an employee of the PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc. On appeal, plaintiffs urged that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced, the Phil-American Forwarders Inc. being merely a business conduit of Balingit, since he and his wife are the controlling stockholders. The Supreme Court held that this issue cannot be entertained on appeal, because it was not raised in the lower court. Order of dismissal affirmed.

SYLLABUS 1.QUASI-DELICT; EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES; "EMPLOYER" AND "OWNER AND MANAGER OF ESTABLISHMENT OF ENTERPRISE" DO NOT INCLUDE MANAGER OF CORPORATION. — The terms "employer" and "owner and manager of establishment or enterprise" as used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code do not include the manager of a corporation owning a truck the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose. 2.WORDS AND PHRASES; "MANAGER" UNDER SEC. 2180 OF CIVIL CODE USED IN THE SENSE OF "EMPLOYER". — Under Article 2180 the term "manager" is used in the sense of "employer" and does not embrace a "manager" who may himself be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer. 3.APPEAL; ISSUES NOT RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT CANNOT BE ENTERTAINED ON APPEAL. — A new factual issue injected in the brief which was not alleged in the complaint or raised in the trial court cannot be entertained on appeal. An appeal has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court, and appellants can ventilate on appeal only those legal issues raised in the lower court and those within the issues framed by the parties. 4.ID.; ID.; CHANGE OF THEORY; PARTY-LITIGANT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO CHANGE THEORY OF CASE ON APPEAL. — When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal because that would be unfair to the adverse party.

DECISION

AQUINO, J p: Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed on pure questions of law from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, dismissing their complaint against Archimedes J. Balingit. The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is not the manager of an establishment contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865). In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for seventynine days, thus depriving the company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company and its driver appealed. The Civil Code provides:

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1913 Enciclopedia Juridica Española 992). injected a new factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint.25 and P25. no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of PhilAmerican Forwarders. it was held "que es dependiente. 5th Ed. Inc. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. Such fault or negligence. has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses. (1903a)" The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" (dueños o directores de un establicimiento o empresa ) used in article 2180 of the Civil Code. Codigo Civil Español. WHEREFORE. Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40. Rodolfo Limjuco. the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.x del (art. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. 662. Thus. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. 1970 Ed. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. xxx xxx xxx "The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The bus company and its driver. Rule 46. respectively. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Phil-American Forwarders.000 and they paid P10. Rules of Court). is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. 3.. p. the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck. "ART. a los efectos de la responsabilidad subsidiaria establecida en el num. 2180. It was not raised in the lower court. is one which was raised in the lower court and which is within the issues framed by the parties (Sec. 1912 cited in 12 Manresa."ART. porque cualquiera que sea su jerarqu!a.) 1903. 18. is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41. formerly article 1903 of the old Code. Inc. They argue that Phil-American Forwarders. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-American Forwarders. in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer. which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this appeal. namely. We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. 505). That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders. would be unfair to the adverse party (2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court. Inc. to permit him to do so. he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal because. while the other incorporators.200. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer". under the allegations of the complaint. xxx xxx xxx "The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. 2176. Inc. there being fault or negligence. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below. Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants. "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The legal issue. 28 . in their appellants' brief. y aunque lleve la direccin de determinadas convicciones politicas. el director de un periodico explotado por una sociedad. is obliged to pay for the damage done.000 on their subscription. no por eso deja de estar subordinado a la superior autoridad de la Empresa" (Decision of Spanish Supreme Court dated December 6. SO ORDERED. Inc. Hence. Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.

Jr. an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle. 132266. EXCEPTIONS.ID. Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his 29 . if any.CIVIL LAW.. For. Navarro for respondents Vasquez. to hold the employer liable. EVIDENCE.B. Negligent acts of employees.REMEDIAL LAW. & So Vasquez. — No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ. subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations. PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. 4. In Filamer Christian Institute v. Abad.. to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise. Petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation was absolved of any liability for the damages caused by its employee. Expedito Bugarin for J. that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship. The material dates required to be stated in the petition are the following: (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition. Fernan Mercado Cordero Dela Torre & Bael for respondent CDH. while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. to employers in general. the result varies with each state of facts. however. manager of petitioner herein. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. December 21. (212 SCRA 637. SPECIAL CONTRACTS. ID. respondents. title or designation but which. petitioner. the petition need not indicate the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and the filing of a motion for extension of time to file the petition. admittedly. 2180.REMEDIAL LAW. ART. the same is unfounded. Hence. This rule is.. NO HARD AND FAST RULE WHETHER ACT DONE BY EMPLOYEE IS IN FURTHERANCE OF EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS. JR. Thus. A criminal case was filed against Abad. — A distinction must be made between the fourth and fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to determine what is applicable. SYNOPSIS Benjamin Abad. APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT. 1999. employees oftentimes wear different hats. — Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect. 643 [1992]) this Court had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks includes "any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages. at the time of the vehicular accident. but rather. Castilex filed the instant petition. The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph. TORTS COMMITTED BY EMPLOYEE. and the fifth paragraph. Vasquez's parents then commenced an action for damages against Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER. vs. petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the first page of the petition the date it filed the motion for extension of time to file the petition. the plaintiff must show. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents spouses and ordered Abad and petitioner herein to pay jointly and solidarily. Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz for petitioner. NEW CIVIL CODE. At any rate.R. (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. VICENTE VASQUEZ. aside from the material dates required under Section 4 of Rule 45. INC. petitioner had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing Abad with a service vehicle. an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. CONTENTS OF PETITION.[G. Contrary to private respondent's claim. The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner corporation with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. SYLLABUS 1. which caused the latter's death. surmises. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. nevertheless. Castilex and Abad separately appealed the decision. CIVIL PROCEDURE. was driving a company owned car which collided with the motorcycle driven by Romeo So Vasquez. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions. ID. — As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under Section 4 of Rule 45." 3. Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties. whether or not engaged in any business or industry. whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry. so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction. and even finality at times. which was subsequently dismissed. once this is done. Intermediate Appellate Court. or conjectures. MATERIAL DATES REQUIRED. 2. No.] CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task. They perform functions which are beyond their office. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. cAHIaE The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding Abad and Castilex liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER DISTINGUISHED. FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE GENERALLY ENTITLED TO GREAT RESPECT. are still within the call of duty. and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the denial of the motion. However. Rolindo A. justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle. Hence. and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL.

duties as a manager. . . . Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. It was enough for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. DCASEc

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J p: The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. cdll The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur. cdrep After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. 1 The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts of P8,000.00 for burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (2) Cebu Doctor's Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and hospital bills at 3% monthly interest from 27 July 1989 until fully paid, plus the costs of litigation. 2

CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision. In its decision 3 of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. It reduced the award of damages representing loss of earning capacity from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80; and the interest on the hospital and medical bills, from 3% per month to 12% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid. Upon CASTILEX's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by (1) reducing the award of moral damages from P50,000 to P30,000 in view of the deceased's contributory negligence; (b) deleting the award of attorney's fees for lack of evidence; and (c) reducing the interest on hospital and medical bills to 6% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid. 4 Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that as a managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to have been always acting within the scope of his assigned task even outside office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner; and (3) ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not acting within the scope of his assigned task. LLphil Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of petitioner which holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of the deceased. On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their son's death was caused by the negligence of petitioner's employee who was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his way home from overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is

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thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor. They moreover argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reducing the amount of compensatory damages when the award made by the trial court was borne both by evidence adduced during the trial regarding deceased's wages and by jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover, they point out that the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the following grounds: (1) lack of an explanation for serving the petition upon the Court of Appeals by registered mail, as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack of a statement of the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and of the filing of the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. For its part, respondent Cebu Doctor's Hospital maintains that petitioner CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death of Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home from taking snacks after doing overtime work for petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD was not working anymore "the inescapable fact remains that said employee would not have been situated at such time and place had he not been required by petitioner to do overtime work." Moreover, since petitioner adopted the evidence adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the latter's employer, inveigle itself from the ambit of liability, and is thus estopped by the records of the case, which it failed to refute. We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents regarding some alleged procedural lapses in the petition. Private respondent's contention of petitioner's violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 and Section 4 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure holds no water. Cdpr Section 11 of Rule 13 provides: SECTION 11.Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed. The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of Appeals was done by registered mail is found on Page 28 of the petition. Thus, there has been compliance with the aforequoted provision. As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under Section 4 of Rule 45, the same is unfounded. The material dates required to be stated in the petition are the following: (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the denial of the motion. Contrary to private respondent's claim, the petition need not indicate the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and the filing of a motion for extension of time to file the petition. At any rate, aside from the material dates required under Section 4 of Rule 45, petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the first page of the petition the date it filed the motion for extension of time to file the petition. Now on the merits of the case. The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD. Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply. cdasia Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. 5 A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty. This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators 6 and banks. 7 The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. 8 It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.

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Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. 9 Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager. Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other reason invoked by the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable for ABAD's negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. 10

Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. llcd ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts. 11 In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 12 this Court had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks includes "any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages." The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle: I.Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. 13 II.Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle. 14 cda The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. III.Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. 15

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which was located in Cabangcalan. petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle.m. it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner's office. 20 WHEREFORE. and drug pushers and addicts. testified that Fuente Osmeña is a "lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Jose Benjamin Abad. justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence. Daddy!" 19 This woman could not have been ABAD's daughter. using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position. prostitutes.The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. and the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability for the damages caused by its employee. which is about seven kilometers away from petitioner's place of business. Rather. cdtai Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him. Mandaue City. who then shouted: "Daddy. as petitioner put it. ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. was known as a "haven for prostitutes. 17 A witness for the private respondents. 33 . way beyond the normal working hours. 18 At the Goldie's Restaurant. pimps. His being at a place which. That same witness for the private respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident. his overtime work had already been completed. To the mind of this Court. ABAD was with a woman in his car. or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours. a sidewalk vendor. ABAD's working day had ended. and drug addicts littered the place. of 28 August 1988. It was then about 2:00 a. 16 In the case at bar. SO ORDERED. Thereafter. pimps. he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Cebu City. Moreover. it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task. the petition is GRANTED." had no connection to petitioner's business. Thus.

34 .

its provisions cover only the protection of BSP's properties. 3 1 2 The Antecedent Facts Spouses Benjamin C. The other monetary awards are DELETED for lack of merit and/or basis. Mamaril filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.00." It also claimed that Sps. Cesario Peña and Vicente Gaddi are held jointly and severally liable to pay plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Benjamin C. 2007 Decision and August 16. and 6.00 per appearance.000.R. Peña and Gaddi even admitted their negligence during the ensuing investigation.000. To pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of P50.000.R. Sps..000. 2001 and the Order dated June 11. Mamaril averred that the loss of the subject vehicle was due to the gross negligence of the above-named security guards on-duty who allowed the subject vehicle to be driven out by a stranger despite their agreement that only authorized drivers duly endorsed by the owners could do so. Mamaril) are jeepney operators since 1971. Inc. 2001 in favor of Sps. In addition to the foregoing defenses. SO ORDERED. To pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the cost of the vehicle which is P250. and (f) cost of suit. AND VICENTE GADDI. Defendant-Appellant Boy Scout of the Philippines is absolved from any liability..00. however. Petitioners. Mamaril and Sonia P.00) representing the cost of the lost vehicle.500. Malate. BSP and AIB did not heed Sps.000. AIB SECURITY AGENCY. (b) P275. On May 26. In its Answer.000. 9 7 6 35 . 5. Mamaril (Sps. 179382 January 14. AIB. CESARIO PEÑA. be held liable for: (a) the value of the subject vehicle and its accessories in the aggregate amount of P300. all these vehicles were parked inside the 4 BSP compound. MAMARIL AND SONIA P.000. DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE. On November 20. Mamaril the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200. judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants Boy Scout of the Philippines and AIB Security Agency. Mamaril.00 representing daily loss of income/boundary reckoned from the day the vehicle was lost. Manila for a fee of P300. To pay jointly and severally the attorney's fees of P50. but the parking ticket itself expressly stated that the "Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein. Respondents. Thus. Mamaril have no cause of action against them.00. training and supervision of its security guards while Peña and Gaddi claimed that the person who drove out the lost vehicle from the BSP compound represented himself as the owners' authorized driver and had with him a key to the subject vehicle. (e) attorney's fees.00 and appearances in court the amount of P1. 1995 at 8 o'clock in the evening. To pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the daily loss of the income/boundary of the said jeepney to be reckoned fromits loss up to the final adjudication of the case. Notwithstanding. Apart from not being parties thereto. Mamaril and Sonia P. 2013 SPOUSES BENJAMIN C. According to the security guards Cesario Peña (Peña) and Vicente Gaddi (Gaddi) of AIB Security Agency. The following morning. They therefore prayed that Peña and Gaddi.00. * THE BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES. BSP denied any liability contending that not only did Sps. Mamaril directly deal with AIB with respect to the manner by 8 which the parked vehicles would be handled. and employees. In support thereof. AIB alleged that it has observed due diligence in the selection. 75978.00 a day.G. To pay cost. its officers. (d) moral damages. No. Mamaril erroneously relied on the Guard Service Contract. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: WHEREFORE. Mamaril's demands for a conference to settle the matter.00 plus accessories of P50. one of the vehicles with Plate No. Inc. the Decision dated November 28. and to pay the cost of suit. To pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs exemplary damages in the amount of P50. 2002 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 3. a male person who looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the compound. (AIB) with whom BSP 5 had contracted for its security and protection. together with AIB and BSP. CV No. J. the RTC rendered a Decision dated November 28. 4. Sps. DCG 392 was missing and was never recovered. Branch 39 is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that only defendants AIB Security Agency. They would park their six (6) passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines' (BSP) compound located at 181 Concepcion Street. 1996. Branch 39. 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. with security guards Cesario Pena and Vicente Gaddi: 1.00 per month for each unit. against BSP. which is P275. Peña and Gaddi. vs. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads: WHEREFORE.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the May 31. (c) exemplary damages. The RTC Ruling After due proceedings. INC. they contended that Sps. 2. MAMARIL.

However. such as Sps. The CA Ruling In its assailed Decision. contrary to law. the RTC modified its decision reducing the cost of the stolen vehicle from P250. As such. willfully or negligently causes damage to another. Mamaril and BSP was substantially a contract of lease whereby the former paid parking fees to the latter for the lease of parking slots. BSP. Mamaril. IV. Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person.00 a day for loss of income in the absence of proof to support them. and security guards Peña and Gaddi were held jointly and severally liable for the loss suffered by Sps. Sps. the lessor. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION OF LAW WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PETITIONERS A CONTRACT OF LEASE.000.SO ORDERED. III.000. On the matter of damages. the said contract stipulated AIB's obligation to indemnify BSP for all losses or damages that may be caused by any act or negligence of its security guards. Only BSP appealed the foregoing disquisition before the CA. which necessarily included Sps. shall indemnify the latter for the same. and (2) the CA erred in deleting the RTC awards of damages and attorney's fees. Nor was there evidence sufficient to establish that BSP was negligent. Moreover. AIB. Mamaril maintain that: (1) BSP should be held liable for the loss of their vehicle based on the Guard Service Contract and the parking ticket it issued. Sps. the CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of security guards Peña and Gaddi. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS MISTAKE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE GUARD SERVICE CONTRACT IS PURELY BETWEEN BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AIB SECURITY AGENCY. Mamaril's vehicles.. 2002. Issues Before the Court Hence. In fine. BSP was also adjudged liable because the Guard Service Contract it entered into with AIB offered protection to all properties inside the BSP premises. Similarly. was not an insurer nor bound to take care and/or protect the lessees' vehicles.00 to P200. to wit: I. Article 2176 of the Civil Code states: 13 12 11 36 .000. On June 11. AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING IN THE SAID CONTRACT THAT WOULD INDICATE ANY OBLIGATION AND/OR LIABILITY ON THE PART OF THE PARTIES THEREIN IN FAVOR OF THIRD PERSONS. holding that the Guard Service Contract is purely between BSP and AIB and that there was nothing therein that would indicate any obligation and/or liability on the part of BSP in favor of third persons. Accordingly. WHEREBY THE BOY SCOUT IS NOT DUTY BOUND TO PROTECT OR TAKE CARE OF PETITIONERS' VEHICLES. who. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ABSOLVING RESPONDENT BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM ANY LIABILITY. 10 The RTC found that the act of Peña and Gaddi in allowing the entry of an unidentified person and letting him drive out the subject vehicle in violation of their internal agreement with Sps. 2007 Resolution. the BSP. rendering AIB and its security guards liable for the former's loss. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT 14 ENTITLED TO DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. INC. the CA deleted the award of P50. Mamaril constituted gross negligence. the instant petition based on the following assignment of errors. SUCH AS PETITIONERS HEREIN.00 representing the value of the accessories inside the lost vehicle and the P275. Mamaril's motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in the August 16. It also deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees for lack of factual and legal bases.00. Mamaril. it absolved BSP from any liability. It further ruled that the agreement between Sps. The Court's Ruling The petition lacks merit.

in the ordinary course of events. Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code apply in this case. It may be observed that although the whereas clause of the said agreement provides that defendant-appellant desires security and protection for its compound and all properties therein. Otherwise stated. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency. the security agency would then be held responsible therefor. Jr.Art. 16 that they readily admitted being at fault during the investigation On the other hand. except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. as well as that of its officers and employees. it is undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of Sps. by itself. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Mamaril's contention that ensued. Nowhere can it be inferred in the Guard Service Contract that AIB was appointed as an agent of BSP." The 21 basis for agency therefore is representation. In the case of Soliman. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests 20 commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. assigned security guards. The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it. under the principle of 23 relativity of contracts. 19 17 the Court enunciated thus: It is settled that where the security agency. 1âwphi1 Neither did the subject agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui. 2176. the same should be correlated with paragraph 3(a) thereof which provides that the security agency shall indemnify defendant-appellant for all losses and damages suffered by it attributable to any act or negligence of the former's guards. recruits. Instead. 1311. while inside the premises. Clearly. Mamaril are not parties to the Guard Service Contract. render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. However. there being fault or negligence. defendant-appellant sought the services of defendant AIB Security Agency for the purpose of the security and protection of its properties. There is absolutely nothing 37 . It is uncontested that Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. in turn. in order that a third person benefited by the second paragraph of Article 1311. Thus. Records show that BSP merely hired the services of AIB. Contracts take effect only between the parties. however. solely for the protection of its properties and premises. v. none of the foregoing elements obtains in this case. a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. what the parties intended was a pure principal-client relationship whereby for a consideration. in natural and continuous sequence. In this case. Tuazon. Consequently. no employeremployee relationship existed between BSP and the security guards assigned in its premises. the latter's negligence 18 cannot be imputed against BSP but should be attributed to AIB. or are not authorized. which element is absent in the instant case. which. which. (4) The favor is unconditional and uncompensated. he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. does not. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. (5) The third person communicated his or her acceptance of 22 the favor before its revocation. AIB rendered its security services to BSP. they cannot validly claim any rights or favor under the said agreement. hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards. or by stipulation or by provision of law. (2) The stipulation is a part. the following requisites must concur: (1) There is a stipulation in favor of a third person. a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it. As correctly found by the CA: First. Peña and Gaddi failed to refute Sps. Moreover. Nor can it be said that a principal-agent relationship existed between BSP and the security guards Peña and Gaddi as to make the former liable for the latter's complained act. Hence. of the contract. not the whole. If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person. no reversible error was committed by the CA in absolving it from any liability for the loss of the subject vehicle based on fault or negligence. And even if there was. Mamaril insist that BSP should be held liable for their loss on the basis of the Guard Service Contract that the latter entered into with AIB and their parking agreement with BSP. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person. as well as for its officers and employees. the agency is the employer of such guards and watchmen. and without which 15 the result would not have occurred.the favor is not merely incidental. Such fault or negligence. Such contention cannot be sustained. Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act of security guards Peña and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle. the records are bereft of any finding of negligence on the part of BSP. (3) The contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person . referred to as a stipulation pour autrui. Article 1311 of the Civil Code states: Art. Thus. with the consent or authority of the latter. Notwithstanding. Mamaril did not convey any acceptance thereof. and not to the clients or customers of such agency. the Guard Service Contract between defendant-appellant BSP and defendant AIB Security Agency is purely between the parties therein. the true employer of Peña and Gaddi. be demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by the security guards. as here. Sps. Article 1868 of the Civil Code states that "by the contract of agency. It is undisputed that Sps. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause. produces the injury or loss. by the third party. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. may demand its fulfillment. As a general rule. therefore. is obliged to pay for the damage done. so much so that in case of loss of [sic] damage suffered by it as a result of any act or negligence of the guards. the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot. their assigns and heirs. Sps. and (6) The contracting parties do not represent.

a lessor-lessee relationship indubitably existed between them and BSP. In the instant case. Anent Sps. It has been held that the act of parking a vehicle in a garage. the owners parked their six (6) passenger jeepneys inside the BSP compound for a monthly fee of P300. is a 27 lease. the Court concurs with the finding of the CA that the contract between the parties herein was one of lease as defined under 26 Article 1643 of the Civil Code. the instant petition is DENIED. Hence. 2001 decision. On the matter of damages. Even in a majority of American cases. Moreover. 25 38 . the agreement with 29 respect to the ingress and egress of Sps. If the terms thereof are accepted without objection. The May 31. 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. the Court noted that while Sonia P. 75978 are AFFIRMFED. Moreover." Here. BSP. parks his car in any available space in the lot. suffice it to state that contracts of adhesion are not void per se. It is binding as any other ordinary contract and a party who enters into it is free to reject the stipulations in its entirety. do not 28 pass to the parking lot operator. it should not be held liable for the loss suffered by Sps. SO ORDERED. (2) to make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use to which it has been devoted.00. absent any 36 competent proof of the amount of damages sustained. the awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees were properly disallowed by the CA for lack of factual and legal bases. hence. the mishandling of the parked vehicles that resulted in herein complained loss should be 30 recovered only from the tort feasors (Peña and Gaddi) and their employer.00 for each unit and took the keys home with them. the CA properly deleted the said awards. It bears to reiterate that the subject loss was caused by the negligence of the security guards in allowing a stranger to drive out plaintiffs-appellants' vehicle despite the latter's instructions that only their authorized drivers may do so.000. then the contract serves as the law 33 between them. Mamaril's vehicles were coordinated only with AIB and its security guards. unless there is a stipulation to the contrary." In relation thereto. Thus. the contractual relationship between the parties is one of lease. BSP was not remiss in its obligation to provide Sps. CV No. and (3) to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. 32 where plaintiffs-appellants have been leasing BSP's parking space for more or less 20 years. Mamaril's claim that the exculpatory clause: "Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its 31 accessories or article left therein" contained in the BSP issued parking ticket was void for being a contract of adhesion and against public policy. necessary elements in bailment. it failed to provide 37 sufficient justification therefor. upon payment of a fixed amount.R. Neither did she submit any record or journal that would have 35 established the purported P275. but the lessee shall have a direct action against the intruder.00 daily earnings of their jeepney. hence. On this score. It is axiomatic that actual damages must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty and a party is entitled only to such compensation for the pecuniary loss that was duly proven. While the RTC granted these awards in the dispositive portion of its November 28. WHEREFORE premises considered. Mamaril a suitable parking space for their jeepneys as it even hired security guards to secure the premises.00 a day for each unit is too minimal an amount to even create an inference that BSP undertook to be an insurer of the safety of plaintiffs-appellants' vehicles. the parking fee of P300. without the knowledge and consent of BSP. the possession and control of the car. 2007 Decision and August 16. Mamaril. Accordingly.in the said contract that would indicate any obligation and/or liability on the part of the parties therein in favor of third persons such as 24 herein plaintiffs-appellees. Similarly. Article 1664 of the same Code states that "the lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased.00 per month or P10. AIB. locks the car and takes the key with him. Mamaril testified that the subject vehicle had accessories worth around 34 !J50. as in this case. Besides. she failed to present any receipt to substantiate her claim. Article 1654 of the Civil Code provides that "the lessor (BSP) is obliged: (1) to deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to render it fit for the use intended. and not against the lessor. it has been ruled that where a customer simply pays a fee.

ID. and its employee Juanito Fidel jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Mario Dionisio the following amounts: P50.. the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care. for repair of its brake system. On 2 November 1990. J p: The wages earned by Mario Dionisio were the lifeblood of his family — his wife Divina and their children Mark Angelo and Ma. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. both minors..691.00 as death indemnity. A work-related disruption unfortunately abruptly ended the means of livelihood of Mario prompting his dependent family to sue his employer and a co-employee for damages. namely. loss of support and service.000. sandwiched between Bus No. Alfonso Osias for private respondents. 117 and another bus parked thereat owned by the same petitioner. of the Civil Code. INC. The presumption however may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it had exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.00 for moral damages. and the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs should be fixed.00 for loss of earning capacity. Hence.. On 3 February 1993 the trial court rendered a decision ordering petitioner Baliwag Transit. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. 1 Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 23 March 1994 rendered a decision modifying the appealed judgment and ordering petitioners instead to pay jointly and severally P50. 2208. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.000. to escape solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee. the heirs of Mario suffered no small amount of mental anguish brought about by the manner he died and bearing in mind that he was the sole breadwinner of the family. September 20. The loss of earning capacity is based mainly on two factors. 1764. P30. P6. petitioner.00 as death indemnity. Thereafter a complaint for damages was lodged by private respondents Divina Vda. P60. par. Inc. of the Civil Code provides that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. petitioner's Baliwag Transit Bus No. Maria and Associates for petitioner. vs. for herself and in behalf of her minor children MARK ANGELO and MA. DIVINA VDA. QUASI-DELICTS. Juanito Fidel returned to the bus and sat on the driver's seat. this petition. namely: (a) life expectancy (considering the health of the deceased and the mortality table being deemed conclusive) and loss of earning capacity. Juanito Fidel told mechanic Mario Dionisio to inform the headman about the matter so that proper order to the mechanics could be made.000. Caloocan City. P3. MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. When he went down to investigate he saw Mario Dionisio lying on the ground bleeding and convulsive. several factors are considered.000.. Fidel then alighted from the bus and told the gasman to fill up the gas tank.000. DAMAGES. under Art. P1. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN FIXING THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES FOR DEATH CAUSED BY A QUASIDELICT.000.429. LIZA. (b) pecuniary loss.00 for funeral expenses.050. Indisputably. and costs of suit. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. They rushed him to St. COURT OF APPEALS.e. as well as established jurisprudence.[G. plus the costs of suit. Suddenly the bus moved.00 as attorney's fees. recovery of attorney's fees follows under Art.000. (c) moral and mental sufferings. P3.00 for attorney's fees. the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed. 117 was driven by Juanito Fidel to its terminal on 2nd Avenue.00 as funeral expenses. in failing to take the necessary precaution while doing repair work on the brake 39 . ID.CIVIL LAW. Liza. for herself and in behalf of her minor children Mark Angelo and Ma. 2 On 8 August 1994 the motion to reconsider the decision was denied. legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased moral damages for mental anguish by reason of death. at about 3:30 in the afternoon. i. 2176. Fidel summoned his co-employees and they all helped to extricate Mario Dionisio. and. 1996. On 6 November 1990 however he expired as evidenced by his Certificate of Death issued 22 November 1990. (1). ATTORNEY'S FEES. Exemplary damages having been awarded. 3. P50. Article 2231 also awards exemplary damages if the defendant acted with gross negligence.ID.. — As regards the reasonableness of the damages awarded. in conjunction with Art 2206. SYLLABUS 1.000. Sta. PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. — Article 2206 grants the spouse. when he moved Bus No.00 for exemplary damages. Liza as heirs of the deceased. EMPLOYER'S FAILURE TO PROVE THAT IT EXERCISED THE DUE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEE WILL MAKE IT SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE LATTER FOR DAMAGES.] BALIWAG TRANSIT. DE DIONISIO. 2. DECISION BELLOSILLO.00 as litigation expenses. No. de Dionisio. in relation to Art. Shortly after.. both surnamed DIONISIO. — Article 2180. as Juanito did.R. 117 without first ascertaining if the repair of its break system was already undertaken. of the Civil Code. 116624. Petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver Juanito Fidel will make it solidarily liable with the latter for damages caused by him. 3 Hence. P10. Petitioners maintain that respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the appealed judgment despite the contributory negligence of the deceased Mario Dionisio. he felt something was hit. respondents.

After alighting from the bus to tell the gasman to fill the tank.24-total annual net income Multiply:34-life expectancy of Mario (2/3 x 51 [80 . is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. sat on the driver's seat and was at the steering wheel when the bus moved pinning down the deceased who was repairing the defective brake system below. as well as established jurisprudence. legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased moral damages for mental anguish by reason of death. the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed.16-total loss of earning capacity Article 2206 grants the spouse. considering that he was the sole bread-winner of the family and only 29 years old when he met his untimely death.00 x 12 mos. (c) moral and mental sufferings. several factors are considered. pinning down the deceased which resulted in his serious injuries and eventual death. . The petition must fail.148. 40 . 2180 which states — The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. loss of support and service. we here opine that the correct computation of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased.system of Bus No. The presumption however may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it had exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. to escape solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee. Fidel should have parked the bus properly and safely.00 x 12 mos.776. 117 causing it to move and roll. under Art. Article 2180. Driver Fidel should have known that his brake system was being repaired as he was in fact the one who told Dionisio to do the repair. The reckless imprudence of Juanito Fidel makes him liable to the heirs of offended party for damages together with his employer. 117. Hence. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible .72 x 12 mos.273. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.00-annual expenses (P500. . and. But without taking the necessary precaution he boarded Bus No. Indisputably. the heirs of Mario suffered no small amount of mental anguish brought about by the manner he died and bearing in mind that he was the sole breadwinner of the family. Such fault or negligence.00-13th month pay P40.29 {age at time of death}]) P712. there being fault or negligence. is obliged to pay for the damage done. The loss of earning capacity is based mainly on two factors. (b) pecuniary loss.60-gross annual income (P2. of the Civil Code. should be based on the formula: 2/3 x 51 (80 — 29 [age at time of death]) = life expectancy. .244.) 3. The circumstances clearly show that the proximate cause of the death of Mario Dionisio was the negligence of driver Juanito Fidel when he failed to take the necessary precaution to prevent the accident.24-total annual income Less:6.199.717. 4 Petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver Juanito Fidel will make it solidarily liable with the latter for damages caused by him. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides — Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. He boarded his bus. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.000. and that the increase of the award of damages is unreasonable being unsupported by law and the evidence.002. 1764. Complementing Art.941.) 13. 5 Finding discrepancies in the computation of respondent Court of Appeals. namely: (a) life expectancy (considering the health of the deceased and the mortality table being deemed conclusive) and loss of earning capacity. Thus — P33.) Add:4.64-gross annual allowance (P353. and the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs should be fixed. of the Civil Code provides that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter.) P20. As regards the reasonableness of the damages awarded. 2176. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. namely. 2176 is Art.80 x 12 mos. 2206. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry .00-annual pension (P1.772. in conjunction with Art. in relation to Art. . he should have placed a stopper or any hard object against a tire or two of the bus.

and JUANITO FIDEL are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Mario Dionisio (a) P50.002. 2208. and. (d) P40.000. when he moved Bus No.Article 2231 also awards exemplary damages if the defendant acted with gross negligence.00 for exemplary damages (f) P20.000. recovery of attorney's fees follows under Art. as Juanito did. (b) 712.00 for death indemnity. 41 ..16 for loss of earning capacity. INC. SO ORDERED. 117 without first ascertaining if the repair of its break system was already undertaken. Exemplary damages having been awarded. (1). (c) P3.000. of the Civil Code.00 for attorney's fees. the decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals subject of the instant petition are MODIFIED as follows: petitioner BALIWAG TRANSIT.00 for funeral expenses. (e) 15. (g) to pay the costs of suit. par.000.00 for moral damages. WHEREFORE.000.

42 .

respondents.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P15. wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach. And indeed the fears of the plaintiffs that the picnic area was dangerous was confirmed by the fact that three persons during the picnic got drowned at the same time. one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves. P20.00 as actual damages. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo. Rollo) "The students. Francis High School. moral and exemplary damages. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ. Benjamin Illumin (its principal). Jr. and the case against them. 60. Sariaya. with the following modifications: (1) Exemplary damages in the amount of P20. Ferdinand's parents. Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. Contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning.000. because of short notice. Thereupon." (p. 82465. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic. ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. Flores. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO LACANDULA. Rollo) "xxx xxx xxx "While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site. but in the process.00 as attorney's fees. with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. de Chaves.000. (2) St. 2930. Yoly Jaro. Luna in Sariaya. In fact. Had the defendant teachers made an actual and physical observation of 43 . Vinas. respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers Arquio. they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students. ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay respondents the sum of P30. such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability. "SO ORDERED. and Benjamin Illumin. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL. the precautions and reminders allegedly performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of the standard required by law under the circumstances. Aragones. represented by the Spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula.000.000. attorney's fees and expenses for litigation. LibLex During the picnic and while the students.00 as moral damages. including Ferdinand.00 awarded to plaintiffs in the decision under appeal.000. No.000. Luisito Vinas. and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are hereby absolved from liability. because of persuasion of the teachers. Branch LVIII of Lucena City. Nida Aragones. the supposed lifeguards of the children did not even actually go to the water to test the depth of the particular area where the children would swim. this Court believes that the defendant teachers namely: Connie Arquio. 8834. and to pay the costs." (pp. the decision under appeal is hereby affirmed. 1991. Ferdinand Castillo. Quezon. LUISITO VINAS. Some of the students. it could be said that by coming late. Carmel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Jaro and Cadiz. BENJAMIN ILUMIN. it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. is hereby ordered dismissed. February 25. While the defendants-teachers admitted that some parts of the sea where the picnic was held are deep. Jose C. moral damages. for Damages which respondents allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year old son. came to her rescue. Quezon and later to the Mt. Francis High School. together with their respective counterclaims.00 are hereby awarded to plaintiffs.R." (p. and Patria Cadiz. Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the payment to plaintiffs of the abovementioned actual damages. as represented by SPS. vs. petitioners. He was brought to a certain Dr. exemplary damages and attorney's fees. P15.] ST. Tirso de Chaves.000. Luisito Vinas. Talabong for private respondents. young as they were then (12 to 13 years old). were in the water. are hereby held jointly and severally liable with defendants Connie Arquio. respondents prayed of actual. DECISION PARAS. J p: This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals. Connie Arquio. Yet. Jovito E. and for costs. were easily attracted to the sea without aforethought of the dangers it offers. TIRSO DE CHAVEZ. However. against the St. the drowning incident had already occurred. in the Regional Trial Court. Francis High School. in addition to the actual damages of P30. Tirso de Chaves.00. 30. for petitioners. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ. including Ferdinand. Rollo) The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo. The court a quo reasoned: "Taking into consideration the evidence presented. moral damages of P20. Nida Aragones and Patria Cadiz had failed to exercise the diligence required of them by law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had foreseen. respondents spouses Dr. Yoly Jaro.[G.

' We find from the evidence that. Rollo). St.000. as such. and those whom she invited to help her in supervising the class during the picnic. We find that the amounts fixed by the court a quo as actual damages and moral damages (P30. We believe that exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P20. are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st.00 may and should be. nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid that the same was held under the supervision of the teachers employed by the said school. Sariaya. the school principal had knowledge of the picnic even from its planning stage and had even been invited to attend the affair. especially the victim's mother who. On the other hand. the defendants-teachers). 55-56. imposed in the present case by way of example of correction for the public good. according to appellants. petitioners-teachers assigned the following errors committed by the trial court: 44 . Rollo) Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. And not only that. the defendant school and defendant school principal must be found jointly and severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son. The record does not disclose such evidence as would serve to overcome the aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. had acquiesced to the holding of the picnic. it may be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this case. "As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-appellants. Respondents-spouses assigned the following errors committed by the trial court: "1. 1982. they could have found out that the area where the children were swimming was indeed dangerous. 56-57.The lower court erred in not declaring the St. respectively) are reasonable and are those which are sustained by the evidence and the law. no evidence has been shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna responsible for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together with the other defendant teachers. the male teachers who according to the female teachers were there to supervise the children to ensure their safety were not even at the area where the children were swimming. Benjamin Illumin. for the tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in a picnic at Talaan Beach. At the least. were charged with the supervision of the children during the picnic. the St. Francis High School and its principal). 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. "Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a school sponsored activity.. Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna.The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St. Francis High School. Rollo) The Court of Appeals ruled: "We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.00. They cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that the picnic was not an 'extra-curricular activity of the St. 57-59. and yet he did not express any prohibition against undertaking the picnic. nor did he prescribe any precautionary measures to be adopted during the picnic. particularly the principal. Francis High School. Francis High School and its principal from liability under the above-cited provisions. Said the court a quo: "As shown and adverted to above. It is the rule that in cases where the above-cited provisions find application. Considering that the court a quo found negligence on the part of the six defendantsteachers who.The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for actual and moral damages for the untimely and tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in favor of plaintiffs-appellants against all the defendants. as it is hereby. 30.00 and P20. Sariaya. "2. On the other hand." (pp.000. defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs.the water before they allowed the students to swim. as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants. "However. (pp. Quezon. Quezon. suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of the tragedy. this Court cannot find sufficient evidence showing that the picnic was a school sanctioned one. the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the establishment (in the present case. Rollo) On the other hand.000. supra. et al. last March 20. Francis High School and its administrator/principal Benjamin Illumin as equally liable not only for its approved co-curricular activities but also for those which they unreasonably failed to exercise control and supervision like the holding of picnic in the dangerous water of Talaan Beach." (p. "3. Francis High School and principal Benjamin Illumin as jointly and solidarily liable with their co-defendants-teachers Rosario Lacandula. We must find that the school and the responsible school officials. Similarly. while We cannot but commiserate with the plaintiffs for the tragedy that befell them in the untimely death of their son Ferdinand Castillo and understand their suffering as parents. particularly the teacher in charge of Class I-C to whom the victim belonged. They were somewhere and as testified to by plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking spree. the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Benjamin Illumin. "Under Article 2180. Francis High School and the school principal. and while this presumption is not conclusive. It has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil Code." (pp.

Luisito Vinas. this petition. sir. "However. The evidence shows that these two defendants had satisfactorily explained why they were late in going to the picnic site. We may not attribute any act or omission to the two teachers. As to them. as already pointed out. QAnd after giving the money." (pp.". We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The petition is impressed with merit. We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two of the defendants-teachers. Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones. in finding the defendants Connie Arquio. and when I asked him where. Accordingly. In fact. the drowning incident had already occurred. Nida Aragones. when your son asked you for money to buy food. by Atty. Flores QNow. it should be noted that respondent spouses. Tirso de Chavez. it cannot be said that they had any participation in the negligence attributable to the other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise diligence in the supervision of the children during the picnic and which failure resulted in the drowning of plaintiffs' son. "C)Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar. sir. they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students. Rollo) In the resolution of January 16. 45 . . petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under them. If at all petitioners are liable for negligence. Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones. . Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind. he did not answer. as correctly found by the trial court. they must be absolved from any liability. I am going to the picnic. it could be said that by coming late. However.". . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendants. namely. Rollo) Hence." (pp. At the outset. Since they were not at the picnic site during the occurrence in question. parents of the victim Ferdinand. an affirmative reply to this question has been satisfactorily established by the evidence. that they had to attend to the entrance examination being conducted by the school which is part of their duty as teachers thereof. Castillo on cross exam. did you not ask him where he will bring this? AI asked him where he was going. respondent Court ruled: "The main thrust of defendants-appellants' appeal is that plaintiffs. The issues presented by petitioners are: "A)Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will warrant the award of damages to the plaintiffs. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar. What is material to such a determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of defendants vis-a-vis the supervision of the victim's group during the picnic. as to make them liable for the injury caused to the plaintiffs because of the death of their son resulting from his drowning at the picnic.1. 2180. it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. are concerned. "Testimony of Dr. Rollo) On this score. "As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-appellants. you did not tell him anything more? ANo more. 59-60. 59. . "B)Whether or not Art. allowed their son to join the excursion. Thus. this is because of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them. the trial court found: "While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site. in relation to Art. 81-82. Yoly Jaro and Patria Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly and severally liable for damages such finding not being supported by facts and evidence. such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability. We agree with the trial court in its finding that whether or not the victim's parents had given such permission to their son was immaterial to the determination of the existence of liability on the part of the defendants for the damage incurred by the plaintiffs-appellants as a result of the death of their son. as will be shown hereunder. We agree with the court a quo that the counterclaim must be dismissed for lack of merit. "2. the parents of the victim Ferdinand Castillo. he answered." (p. Hence. and. In the instant case however. 1989. were not able to prove by their evidence that they did not give their son consent to join the picnic in question.

Furthermore. sir. I did not know.QAnd after that you just learned that your son joined the picnic? AYes. QAnd during that time you were too busy that you did not inquire whether your son have joined that picnic? AYes. p. the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. 4 states that: "The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions." Under this paragraph. is that correct? AYes. sir. not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair. sir. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. pp. Article 2180. QYou did not ask your wife? AI did not. Lazaro on cross examination: QHow did you conduct this mental and physical examination? AI have interviewed several persons and the patient herself. 19. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. a picnic. QWhy were you able to say she was feeling guilty because she was the one who personally cooked the adobo for her son? AIt was during the interview that I had gathered it from the patient herself. sir. it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee. par. QDid you not look for your son during that time? AI am too busy with my profession. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. She even felt guilty about the death of her son because she cooked adobo for him so he could join the excursion where her son died of drowning. Lazaro — witness) Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son. 1984 witness Romulo Castillo) The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will be held. you did not know that your son joined the picnic? ANo. 1982." (TSN. Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity. sir. (Emphasis Supplied) (TSN. that is why I was not able. Dr. 16-17. I don't know if she actually permitted her son although she said she cooked adobo so he could join. the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. 1984. "Testimony of Dr. hearing of April 30. sir. hearing of April 2. In the case at bar. QFrom 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of March 20. The incident happened not within the school premises. prLL 46 . is a sign of consent for his son to join the same. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. sir. QAnd neither did your wife tell you that your son joined the picnic? ALater on after 12:00. She was very sorry had she not allowed her son to join the excursion her son would have not drowned. QAnd you came to know of it after the news that your son was drowned in the picnic came to you.

the section where Ferdinand belonged. mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. QYou were rattled at that time. Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P. QYou mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of your body on the body of Ferdinand Castillo? AYes. Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child. sir. Petitioners Connie Arquio. If we were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score. sir. sir. QAfter you have applied back to back pressure and which you claimed the boy did not respond. pp. even respondents' witness." (TSN. sir. "nababahala" in the process of your application of the first aid on the body of Ferdinand Castillo? ANo. 85.E. QWill you please describe how you applied a single act of back to back pressure? AThis has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards. no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. In fact. sir. QAnd while you were applying the so called first aid. 32-35. QDespite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to your application of first aid? AYes. because we were attending to the application of first aid that we were doing. FLORES: 47 . The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. then the face was a little bit facing right and doing it by massaging the back of the child. Finally. Ferdinand Castillo. sir. you approached the boy and claim also having applied first aid on him? AYes. QYou mean you were in calm and peaceful condition? AYes. QAnd when you saw the boy. sir. is it not? ANo. sir. sir. the class adviser of I-C. Segundo Vinas. were you not disturbed anyway? AI was disturbed during that time. LexLib "Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination. hearing of July 30. sir. did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. 1984) "Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination. sir. ATTY.As earlier pointed out by the trial court. the children were covering you up or were surrounding you? AYes. testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency. QFor how many minutes have you applied the back to back pressure? AFrom 9 to 11 times. QYou have never been disturbed. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover." (p. employers will forever be exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.

Vinas? AAlmost the same a little longer. serious anxiety. there being no merit. Sarmiento and Regalado. with the help of Mr. Hence. Rollo) With these facts in mind. Luisito Vinas.. this does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. QFor how long did you apply this back to back pressure on the boy? AAbout 10 seconds. sir." (pp. no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages. PREMISES CONSIDERED. moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. 48 . cdphil SO ORDERED. We placed the feet in a higher position.QWho actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to the child? AMyself." Moreover. fright. sir. While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic. sir. sir. that of the head of the child. we changed the position of the boy by placing the child facing upwards laying on the sand then we applied the mouth to mouth resuscitation. petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. as already pointed out hereinabove. QHow did you apply the first aid to the guy? AThe first step that I took. 2217. concur. hence. was that after putting the child in that position. was I applied back to back pressure and took notice of the condition of the child. where the feet were on a higher level than that of the head. and similar injury. 1987. QAfter you noticed that the boy was not responding. "Art. mental anguish. the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless. I applied the back to back pressure and started to massage from the waistline up. for 15 seconds. but I noticed that the boy was not responding. social humiliation. sir. 92-93. wounded feelings. QAfter you have placed the boy in that particular position. moral shock. But in the case at bar.Moral Damages include physical suffering. finding petitioners herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the respondents damages. is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein are concerned. Though incapable of pecuniary computation. what did you do? AWhen we noticed that the boy was not responding. no moral damages can be assessed against them. particularly myself. is hereby AFFIRMED. besmirched reputation. the questioned decision dated November 19. but the portion of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim. QWhat about Mr. petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence. sir. what did you do next? AThe first thing that we did. JJ.

00) as doctor's fee (Exh. "(8)to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20. finding the averments in the complaint as supported by preponderance of evidence to be reasonable and justified. 49 . 4 On December 14. prLL Thereafter. SUSA KAPUNAN GENUINO. commenced a civil case for damages 3 before the RTC of Roxas City. His son. Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan. POTENCIANO KAPUNAN. the trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa. to turn over the wheels to him.. HONORABLE ENRIQUE P. Kapunan.] FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE.00) pesos as moral damages.00 a day. namely: Daniel Funtecha and Filamer Christian Institute. Sr. SANTIAGO KAPUNAN. his conviction was affirmed by the then Court of First Instance of Capiz.000.000. Brotarlo for petitioner. "(2)to pay TWO HUNDRED FORTY ONE PESOS (P241. and ERLINDA KAPUNAN TESORO . Aquilina B. "(3)to pay THREE HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P390. Thus: "WHEREFORE. petitioner. vs. Filamer Christian Institute and Allan Masa are at fault and negligent of the acts complained of which causes (sic) injury to plaintiff. SUPLICO. Evidence showed that at the precise time of the vehicular accident. instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone in the City Court of Roxas City for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa.000. JESUS KAPUNAN. 75112. Kapunan for the Substituted Heirs of the late respondent. October 16.R. and that defendants Daniel Funtecha. "(6)to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20. the employer whose liability is primary and direct. Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days. Roxas City and the late POTENCIANO KAPUNAN. 'C'). in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court. PAZ KAPUNAN PUBLICO.50) as medical expenses (Exh. The inferior court found Funtecha guilty as charged and on appeal.950. namely: LEONA KAPUNAN TIANGCO. Branch 14 in Civil Case No. only one headlight of the jeep was functioning. the authorized driver. CICERO KAPUNAN. "(4)to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4. Sr. "(5)to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3. who was with Funtecha at the time of the accident. respondents. Rhodora G. Allan Masa. to pay plaintiff the following: "(1)to pay the sum of TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P2. a non-party. Funtecha. Named defendants in the complaint were petitioner Filamer and Funtecha. V-4222 which found petitioner Filamer Christian Institute and Daniel Funtecha negligent and therefore answerable for the resulting injuries caused to private respondent Potenciano Kapunan. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious victim to the hospital. As a result of the accident. Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20. Kapunan.00) as loss of earnings capacity. 'A'). Sr. Branch XIV. was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee. jointly and severally.000.[G. SR. 1977. Sr. reserved his right to file an independent civil action. was walking along Roxas Avenue. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. as Kapunan. Sr. an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased). DECISION FERNAN. for remuneration of plaintiff's helper while recuperating.00) as Court litigation expenses. Kapunan. "(7)to pay FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4. Also included was Agustin Masa. to drive the vehicle in question despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not have the necessary license or permit to drive said vehicle. The two fled from the scene after the incident.00) as attorney's fees.00) as additional expenses incurred for thirty-nine days at P10. Funtecha. JR. Kapunan.500. as substituted by his heirs. No. the director and president of Filamer Christian Institute. who only had a student driver's permit. Sr. was not impleaded as a codefendant. in his personal capacity "in that he personally authorized and allowed said Daniel Funtecha who was his houseboy at the time of the incident. 2 Pursuant to his reservation.. 1990.. J p: This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.00) as insurance indemnity on the policy contract. 1983.

00) as moral damages.000.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. "For failure to prove their respective counterclaims filed by the defendant Daniel Funtecha. 1984. cause he was not in the vehicle during the alleged incident. "The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant has failed to prove that there was a policy violation made by the defendant Filamer Christian Institute which absolves them from liability under the aforesaid insurance policy. the court absolved defendant Agustin Masa from any personal liability with respect to the complaint filed against him in his personal and private capacity. is obliged to pay for the damage done. "Finding the averments in the third party complaint filed by defendant Filamer Christian Institute as supported by preponderance of evidence as shown by their exhibits to be reasonable and justified. 1985.and without prejudice to the right of defendant Filamer Christian Institute to demand from co-defendant Daniel Funtecha part-time employee and/or Allan Masa a full time employee reimbursement of the damages paid to herein plaintiff.The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. and Filamer Christian Institute. '2').000. The Civil Code provides: "Art. "(3)to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4. On December 17. Filamer Christian Institute and third party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation are hereby ordered jointly and severally. "The defendant Agustin Masa as director of defendant Filamer Christian Institute has also failed to exercise the diligence required of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employee Allan Masa. 2180.000. the Appellate Court rendered the assailed judgment affirming the trial court's decision in toto. "(4)to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3." "Art. as against the herein plaintiff. However. In disclaiming liability. "The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant is hereby ordered to pay in favor of the defendant and third party plaintiff. "(2)to pay TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10. being his son. its appeal was dismissed on September 18.00) as third party liability as provided in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy (Exh. For failure of the insurance firm to pay the docket fees. to pay the costs of the suit.000. said lower court's decision became final as to Funtecha. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the said defendant and third party plaintiff Filamer Christian Institute as against third party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation. The record shows that the defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle was having a student drivers license marked Exh. '3' "This Court finds that defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle is considered as authorized driver in accordance with the policy in question marked Exh. Filamer Christian Institute. there being fault or negligence. 6 Hence. 2176. petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code. same are hereby dismissed. 7 specifically Section 14. "The defendants Daniel Funtecha. Dr. The legal issue in this appeal is whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha.00) as attorney's fees. '2-Masa and FCI'." (Emphasis supplied). the following: "(1)to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20. Such fault or negligence. It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be held responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha on the ground that there is no existing employer-employee relationship between them. "xxx xxx xxx "The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." 5 Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation appealed the lower court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and as a consequence. `1' and accompanied by Allan Masa who is the authorized driver of said vehicle with a professional drivers license as shown by Exh. Rule X of Book III which reads: 50 . if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. We agree. "xxx xxx xxx "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.00) as Court litigation and actual expenses. Agustin Masa. the present recourse by petitioner Filamer. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

14. His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha.. Funtecha was not included in the company payroll." (Emphasis supplied). with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. Jr. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. such conclusion would not be binding on Allan. It is axiomatic that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer directly and primarily answerable to the injured party under Article 2180 of the Civil Code would have prospered had they proceeded against Allan Masa. the authorized driver of the Pinoy jeep and undisputably an employee of petitioner. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a. J. I concur but limit my concurrence on the employee-employer relationship to labor law situations. — There is no employer-employee relationship between students on the one hand. But under the present set of circumstances. the decision under review of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. classes. It was Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the wheels of the vehicle to the inexperienced Funtecha which set into motion the chain of events leading to the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan. Gutierrez. Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed. Bidin and Cortes.m. concur. necessary to finish their chosen courses under such arrangement. where students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of charge. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court. It must be recalled that Allan was never impleaded in the complaint for damages and should be considered as a stranger as far as the trial court's judgment is concerned. as espoused by private respondents.. is on leave. LLpr SO ORDERED.Working scholars. still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident. 51 . 8 The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocation. colleges or universities on the other. provided the students are given real opportunity.. J."Sec.m. 9 WHEREFORE. Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused.. in view of the foregoing. even if the trial court did find Allan guilty of negligence. to 6:00 a. and schools.m. To dismiss the implementing rule as one which governs only the "personal relationship" between the school and its students and not where there is already a third person involved. at the time of the injury. it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer. including such facilities as may be reasonable. is to read into the law something that was not legislated there in the first place. but for some purpose of his own. In other words. The provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to eliminate an erstwhile gray area in labor relations and seeks to define in categorical terms the precise status of working scholars in relation to the learning institutions in which they work for the privilege of a free education. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition. No costs. It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law. JJ. Sr. Feliciano. The complaint for damages 10 is ordered DISMISSED as against petitioner Filamer Christian Institute for lack of cause of action.

52 .

Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over Venturina after his selection. in Civil Case No. The Supreme Court also held that for the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee.R. remains unrebutted. MELCHORITA C. Hence. For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee. 581-M-92. The appellate court affirmed the judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City. The "diligence of a good father" referred to in the last paragraph of the aforecited statute means diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. as well as the evidence on record. unsubstantiated by evidence. he should not be satisfied with the applicant's mere possession of a professional driver's license. 53 . ADEQUATE PROOF REQUIRED TO SHOW THAT EMPLOYER EXERCISED THE "DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER" IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEES. . ZUÑIGA — both represented by their legal guardian. as the employer of bus driver Venturina. as affirmed by the CA. The Supreme Court held that the issue whether a person is negligent. REGINALDO C. his experience and record of service. CIVIL CODE. among others. Her allegation that before she hired Venturina she required him to submit his driver's license and clearances is worthless. 3. when an employee. ACaEcH SYLLABUS 1.. Petitioner's claim that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her driver. we find that petitioner has failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on her part. The Court affirmed the trial court's finding. causes damage to persons or property due to his own negligence. In the instant case. FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL. dated September 8. safety record. . are not equivalent to proof under the rules of evidence . LEOVIGILDO C.ID. 2003. while performing his duties.. Semproniano S. — In the instant case.[G. 2000.] CECILIA YAMBAO. Esmeraldo R. No. that it was Venturina's reckless and imprudent driving of petitioner's bus. liable for the untimely death of Herminigildo Zuñiga in a vehicular accident and ordering her to indemnify his legal heirs. — Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. a pedestrian. AND THE MINORS. 2. which was the proximate cause of the victim's death. and driving history. that it was Venturina's reckless driving of petitioner's bus. SYNOPSIS Petitioner. ZUÑIGA.. Venturina. the petitioner has failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on her part. binding on this Court. the record is bare of any showing that petitioner required Venturina to attend periodic seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency. — The law governing petitioner's liability. . ZUÑIGA. the respondents herein. EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR EMPLOYEES. ID. we sustain the trial court's finding. 146173. in CA-G. SEHACI DECISION QUISUMBING. . Acorda for petitioner. as a general rule. In fact. The bus owned by petitioner bumped Zuñiga. the registered owner of a passenger bus. The presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection of her bus driver. was held jointly and severally liable with the bus driver for damages for the untimely death of one Herminigildo Zuñiga. ZUÑIGA. an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee. AND LOVELY EMILY C. QUASI-DELICTS. in view of her failure to offer in evidence certified true copies of said license and clearances. vs. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the trial court and its findings on these matters are. there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent. Petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she went to this extent of verifying Venturina's qualifications. petitioner cannot claim exemption from any liability arising from the recklessness or negligence of Venturina.. which this Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari.. denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. more so where these have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. respondents.CIVIL LAW. 2000. which is the proximate cause of the victim's death. ID. HERMINIGILDO C. much less to reverse the factual findings of the trial court as upheld by the court a quo. Hence. For as pointed out by the Court of Appeals. Thus.REMEDIAL LAW.R. Bulacan. 52275. as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. CASE AT BAR. CV No. Bare allegations. ID. dated November 27. an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. ZUÑIGA. Case law teaches that for an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. JR. ID. deserves but scant consideration. the aforenamed MELCHORITA C. The CA affirmed the decision on appeal. and find no cogent reason to disregard the cited general rule. is Article 2180 of the Civil Code . he must also carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications. petitioner did not present any proof that she drafted and implemented training programs and guidelines on road safety for her employees. he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family. We have carefully examined and weighed the petitioner's arguments on the first issue submitted. either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after the selection. petitioner. ZUÑIGA. J p: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals. thus. finding herein petitioner.. CASE AT BAR. Also challenged in this petition is the resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals. December 11. Ochoco for respondents. Branch 8. or not is a question of fact which the Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari.

The complaint essentially alleged that Venturina drove the bus in a reckless.P30. the petitioner vehemently denied the material allegations of the complaint. 1995.To pay the cost of the suit to be paid by all the herein defendants and third party defendants within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision. docketed as CA-G. the trial court applied Article 1756 7 of the Civil Code. On September 8. Herminigildo. Jr. careless and imprudent manner.00 as exemplary damages. and Lovely Emily are their children. docketed as Civil Case No. 52275 as follows: 54 . without due regard to public safety. No sane person would bump his head or body against a running bus along a big highway like EDSA at Bagong Barrio.00 as moral damages.R.m.00 as litigation expenses. with a public transport franchise to ply the Novaliches-via Quirino-Alabang route. On September 8. 581-M-92 at the RTC of Malolos City. The facts. 3. but due to the massive injuries sustained. 2. Such was the force of the impact that the left side of the front windshield of the bus was cracked. Fernando Dumaliang.00 as indemnity for the death of Herminigildo Zuñiga. In her Answer. Kalookan City.Petitioner Cecilia Yambao is the registered owner of "Lady Cecil and Rome Trans" passenger bus with Plate No. 6 In holding the petitioner liable for Herminigildo's death. of May 6. is incredible if not preposterous. .P200. The counterclaim of the defendant Cecilia Yambao is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.. both in the selection and supervision of her bus driver. while avoiding an unidentified woman who was chasing him. a pedestrian. CVK 606. Reginaldo. filed a Complaint 4 against petitioner and her driver. Venturina along the northbound lane of Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA). 1992. SO ORDERED. she exercised the proper diligence of a good father of a family. She tried to shift the blame for the accident upon the victim. the dispositive portion of which reads: In view of the foregoing consideration. She further alleged that she was not liable for any damages because as an employer.P50. observing that petitioner had failed to prove that she observed the diligence required by Articles 1733 8 and 1755 9 of the said Code. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering the herein defendants jointly and severally. Suddenly.000. 2000. 5 In finding for the respondents herein.000. for damages.. Dissatisfied. are as follows: At around 3:30 p.000. The respondents are the legal heirs of the late Herminigildo Zuñiga.P92. and 7. CV No.00 as attorney's fees. 4. the bus bumped Herminigildo Zuñiga. he succumbed shortly thereafter. Venturina. Inc. and Times Surety & Insurance Co. in violation of traffic rules and regulations. Melchorita Zuñiga is the surviving spouse. with Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co.P5. Zuñiga was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was given medical attention. the trial court observed: [T]he allegations and evidence presented by the defendants that it was the victim Herminigildo Zuñiga who bumped the bus owned by defendant Cecilia Yambao and her husband . as established by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court.000. one Ceferino G. as heirs of the victim. Yambao filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Private respondents.R. within the vicinity of Bagong Barrio.000. With Venturina was the bus conductor. 52275. to the extent of their respective liabilities under their respective insurance policies to pay the herein plaintiffs the following sums of money: 1. faulting the trial court for failing to appreciate that: (a) it was the victim who ran into her bus.P30.00 as funeral expenses. Caloocan City and neither did any of the defendants presented (sic) any evidence or proof to show that the victim was mentally deranged at the time of the accident and the presumption therefore is that he was in his normal senses. the bus owned by the petitioner was being driven by her driver. CV No. 5. while Leovigildo. . theorizing that Herminigildo bumped into her bus. the driver of said bus. the trial court rendered judgment. 6.000. thus resulting in the victim's premature death. and (b) she had exercised the proper diligence of a bonus pater familias in the selection and supervision of her employee. the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.

Petitioner contends that as an employer. and the barangay where he resides. both in the selection and supervision of her driver and therefore. To support her claim. 10 While sustaining the trial court's findings that Venturina had been reckless and negligent in driving the petitioner's bus. found the trial court's reliance on Articles 1755 and 1756 of the Civil Code misplaced. and find no cogent reason to disregard the cited general rule. but her motion was denied for want of merit. is Article 2180 of the Civil Code. as a general rule. therefore. on the foregoing modificatory premises. 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. the appellate court. is relieved from any liability for the latter's misdeed. the mother. its Decision dated September 8. The law governing petitioner's liability. and considering that the same result has been reached by the trial court. binding on this Court. She likewise stresses that she inquired from Venturina's previous employer about his employment record. however. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. this petition for review. The father and. in case of his death or incapacity. 12 At the outset. but also clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). that it was Venturina's reckless and imprudent driving of petitioner's bus. 11 Hence. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. we must state that the first issue raised by the petitioner is a factual one. The petitioner's arguments ring hollow and fail to sway this Court. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. she observed the proper diligence of a good father of a family. Costs against defendant-appellant. we sustain the trial court's finding. 2180. The court a quo then found the petitioner directly and primarily liable as Venturina's employer pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code as she failed to present evidence to prove that she has observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees.WHEREFORE. Hence. cDCaTS SO ORDERED. THE VICTIM HERMINIGILDO ZUÑIGA WAS THE ONE WHO BUMPED THE BUS OWNED BY HEREIN PETITIONER CECILIA YAMBAO AND HER HUSBAND AND WHO DISREGARDED THE TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS AT THE PLACE AND TIME OF THE INCIDENT WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY AND CONCLUSIVELY PROVED THAT IT WAS THE PLAINTIFF'S OWN NEGLIGENCE THAT WAS THE IMMEDIATE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS DEATH. thus hitting the victim with fatal results. To our mind. the full text of which reads: Art. PETITIONER CECILIA YAMBAO IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES AND THAT SHE EXERCISED THE PROPER DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY. 15 more so where these have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. she points out that when Venturina applied with her as a driver in January 1992. anchored on the following formulation of issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry . Yambao then duly moved for reconsideration. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. II WHETHER OR NOT. 55 . she required him to produce not just his driver's license. which is the proximate cause of the victim's death. the only issue before the Court properly is whether petitioner exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees. It held that this was a case of quasi-delict. She also required him to present his Social Security System (SSS) Number prior to accepting him for employment. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions . much less to reverse the factual findings of the trial court as upheld by the court a quo. 14 The resolution of factual issues is the function of the trial court and its findings on these matters are. as the employer of bus driver Venturina.The obligation imposed by Article 2176 17 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. and only hired him after it was shown to her satisfaction that he had no blot upon his record. thus absolving her from any liability. the law on common carriers was inapplicable. as well as the evidence on record. 13 which this Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari. as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. BOTH IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF HER DRIVER AND/OR EMPLOYEE. there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties. Hence. the Philippine National Police. 16 We have carefully examined and weighed the petitioner's arguments on the first issue submitted.

Costs against the petitioner. In other words. or on the very day of the fatal accident itself (italics for emphasis). the instant petition is DENIED. thus. this Court has no option but to uphold the ruling of the appellate court. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage .The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent. petitioner's own admissions clearly and categorically show that she did not exercise due diligence in the selection of her bus driver. 21 Moreover. in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. (Italics ours). but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. his experience and record of service. dated September 8. the record likewise shows that she did admit that Venturina submitted the said requirements only on May 6. petitioner did not present any proof that she drafted and implemented training programs and guidelines on road safety for her employees. as the court a quo aptly observed.R. Her allegation that before she hired Venturina she required him to submit his driver's license and clearances is worthless. he should not be satisfied with the applicant's mere possession of a professional driver's license. are not equivalent to proof under the rules of evidence. causes damage to persons or property due to his own negligence. we find that petitioner has failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on her part. 22 Petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she went to this extent of verifying Venturina's qualifications. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. WHEREFORE. She declared that Venturina applied with her sometime in January 1992 and she then required him to submit his license and clearances. Lastly. 1992. as well as its resolution dated November 27. the record is bare of any showing that petitioner required Venturina to attend periodic seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency. so long as they remain in their custody. petitioner's liability to private respondents for the negligent and imprudent acts of her driver. petitioner contradicts herself. 23 Thus. assuming arguendo that Venturina did submit his license and clearances when he applied with petitioner in January 1992. Venturina. is responsible for damages. the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence. In sum. Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over Venturina after his selection. For as pointed out by the Court of Appeals. The presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection of her bus driver. Petitioner. safety record. he must also carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications. there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent. In fact. Hence. either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after the selection. having failed to rebut the legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of her driver. an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee. in CA-G. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is both manifest and clear. 18 Thus. petitioner cannot claim exemption from any liability arising from the recklessness or negligence of Venturina. 2000. in view of her failure to offer in evidence certified true copies of said license and clearances. CV No. denying petitioner Cecilia Yambao's motion for reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 20 In the instant case. Venturina. The "diligence of a good father" referred to in the last paragraph of the aforecited statute means diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family. unsubstantiated by evidence. remains unrebutted. 56 . deserves but scant consideration. Case law teaches that for an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. and driving history. Petitioner's claim that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her driver. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals. 19 For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee. 2000. Bare allegations. the latter still fails the test of due diligence in the selection of her bus driver. In any case. 52275. when an employee. However. while performing his duties.

The unsubstantiated and selfserving testimonies of petitioner and his mechanic were. did not slow down even when he was already approaching a busy intersection within the city proper. SYNOPSIS The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court that awarded actual and moral damages to respondent Salvador Begasa who suffered physical injuries when the truck owned by petitioner Ernesto Syki and driven by Elizalde Sablayan bumped the rear end of the passenger jeepney where the respondent was then boarding. without doubt. ID. 3. 4. The factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals are given great weight and even finality by the Supreme Court. This factual finding was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. vs. but he must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary evidence. ALLEGATION OF DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY MUST BE SUPPORTED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.. petitioner. Since the negligence of 57 . ID. Thus. — It must be emphasized that petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should deal only with questions of law. respondent was already partly inside the jeepney when petitioner's driver rear-ended it. This factual finding was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. Felino A. The impact was so strong that respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone (femur). In this case. No doubt petitioner's driver was reckless. 2003.. to pay damages to respondent Begasa for injuries sustained by him. we find no reason to overturn the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Francisco L. The trial court also found no negligence on the part of respondent Begasa. All the facts showed was that the passenger jeepney was near the corner of Araneta and Magsaysay Streets. No city resolution. 149149. Thus. traffic regulation or DPWH memorandum was presented to show that the passenger jeepney picked up respondent and his three companions in a prohibited area. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. — The employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.. as found by the lower courts.CIVIL LAW. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. the appellate court upholds the findings of fact of the trial court.. The trial court also found no negligence on the part of respondent Begasa.. as in the present case. ID. CASE AT BAR. ID.] ERNESTO SYKI.ID. 5. NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR.[G. FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE GIVEN GREAT WEIGHT AND EVEN FINALITY BY THE SUPREME COURT. The reason for this is to obviate the biased nature of the employer's testimony or that of his witnesses. No. October 23. 2. Syki filed this petition for review arguing then that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding respondent Begasa guilty of contributory negligence and that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver. ID.. — There was no evidence that respondent Begasa and his three companions flagged down the passenger jeepney in a prohibited area. meaning.. the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner's driver who. that no negligence could be attributed to them. EMPLOYERS MUST SERIOUSLY OBSERVE SUCH DEGREE OF DILIGENCE THAT WOULD EXCULPATE THEM FROM LIABILITY. — It should be emphasized that the legal obligation of employers to observe due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees provided in Article 2180 of the Civil Code is not an empty provision or a mere formalism since the nonobservance thereof actually becomes the basis of the employers' vicarious liability. — Article 2179 on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. and suffered severe wounds in his left knee and leg.. In fact. capricious and arbitrary. in fact. Garcia for petitioner. 6. Employers should thus seriously observe such a degree of diligence (and prove it in court by sufficient and concrete evidence) that would exculpate them from liability. the trial court dismissed the case against the driver and owner of the passenger jeepney on the ground that they were not liable. Bacolod City when petitioner's driver bumped it from the rear.R. SYLLABUS 1. In this case.CIVIL LAW. SALVADOR BEGASA. insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that petitioner was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver. petitioner's evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence.ID. but he must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary evidence. ID.REMEDIAL LAW. especially when the appellate court upholds the findings of fact of the trial court.. Since the negligence of petitioner's driver was the sole and proximate cause of the accident.ID. EVIDENCE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. specially when. Alisan for respondent. petitioner is liable. we affirm the appellate court's finding that there was no contributory negligence on the part of respondent. It must be emphasized that petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should deal only with questions of law. — In sum. or contrary to the factual findings of the trial court. The factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals are given great weight and even finality by the Supreme Court. A PARTY WHO IS PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS OWN INJURY SHOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES IN FULL. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals can only be overturned if it is shown that such findings are obviously whimsical. QUASI-DELICT. The Court ruled that the employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. The passenger jeepney had long stopped to pick up respondent and his three companions and. respondent. OWNER OF THE TRUCK IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS DRIVER. QUASI-DELICT.

under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 5 Aggrieved. affirming the decision dated May 5. arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding respondent Begasa guilty of contributory negligence. While respondent was boarding the passenger jeepney (his right foot already inside while his left foot still on the boarding step of the passenger jeepney). 1992. the owner of the passenger jeepney. DECISION CORONA.. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.55 or a total amount of P44. 2. 2. a legal presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of said employee. when an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee. left leg anterior 2. J p: Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision 1 dated January 31.petitioner's driver was the sole and proximate cause of the accident. a truck driven by Elizalde Sablayan and owned by petitioner Ernesto Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger jeepney.65. 2 On October 29. junction of middle and distal third.000. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. jointly and severally. as follows: 1. 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. the damages awarded to him (respondent) should have been decreased or mitigated. 7458 for damages. petitioner Ernesto Syki filed the instant petition for review. From the above provision.Fracture left femur. 3.20 less the financial assistance given by defendant Ernesto Syki to plaintiff Salvador Begasa in the amount of P4. On June 22. to pay damages to respondent Begasa for the injuries sustained by him. near the corner of Araneta and Magsaysay Streets. the owner of the truck. The facts follow. 1992. He also suffered lacerations and abrasions in his left leg. left poplitial 10 cm. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.m.5 cm. actual and moral damages plus attorney's fees as follows: 1. to pay respondent Salvador Begasa. the owner and operator of the passenger jeepney but ordered petitioner Ernesto Syki and his truck driver. The trial court awarded actual and moral damages to herein respondent Salvador Begasa who suffered injuries in an accident due to the negligence of Elizalde Sablayan. and Elizalde Sablayan. Hence.152. Bacolod City. However. The said presumption may be rebutted only by a clear 58 . Respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone (femur). the appellate court found no reversible error in the decision of the trial court and affirmed the same in toto. He asserts that he presented sufficient evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee.308. respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companions flagged down a passenger jeepney driven by Joaquin Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuena. Elizalde Sablayan. the truck driver of petitioner Ernesto Syki.The amount of P30. herein petitioner Ernesto Syki.000. Branch 48.00 as moral damages.The amount of P20. 2001 of the Court of Appeals. the trial court dismissed the complaint against Aurora Pisuena.Lacerated wounds. AHDaET 3. petitioner is liable. thus he should not be held liable for the injuries sustained by respondent. around 11:20 a.155. the driver of the truck.Abrasion left knee. 3 Petitioner Syki and his driver appealed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner also contends that the appellate court erred in ruling that he failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver. The petition has no merit. Bacolod City.Actual damages of P48. comminuted. After hearing. in Civil Case No. respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of common carrier's contractual obligations and quasi-delict against Aurora Pisuena. 4 The appellate court also denied their motion for reconsideration.00 as reasonable attorney's fees.

the records of his interview. argues strongly against its pretensions. Petitioner's attempt to prove its "deligentissimi patris familias" in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability. whether plaintiff or defendant. of the results of his examinations. certifications of work experience. . and of his service were not presented. employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications. notwithstanding the calls therefore by both the trial court and the opposing counsel. . inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities. applicants are required to submit professional driving licenses. xxx xxx xxx It is noteworthy that. We are fully aware that there is no hard-and-fast rule on the quantum of evidence needed to prove due observance of all the diligence of a good father of a family as would constitute a valid defense to the legal presumption of negligence on the part of an employer or master whose employee has by his negligence. According to MMTC. and standard operating procedures during emergency cases. which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony . caused damage to another. and vision. .showing on the part of the employer that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. . reflexes. 6 In other words. employers must submit concrete proof. where we held that: The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any 'record' or other documentary proof tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers and buses. In this case. No proof was presented that Musa did not have any record of traffic violations. CaSHAc Coming now to the case at bar. was held to be insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against it . the burden of proof is on the employer. On the other hand. We are of the considerable opinion. that the believable evidence on the degree of care and diligence that has been exercised in the selection and supervision of Roberto Leon y Salazar. while there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence. to complete training programs on traffic rules. the employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. concentration. ever presented. and. experience. The question is: how does an employer prove that he indeed exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee? The case of Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs. . xxx xxx xxx Although testimonies were offered that in the case of Pedro Musa all these precautions were followed. and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. object or documentary. . . is not legally sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against the defendant company. in another case involving MMTC. but he must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary evidence. Ex-Meralco Employees Transportation Co. we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. with respect to the supervision of employees. which MMTC presented to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of employees and thus avoid vicarious liability for the negligent acts of its employees. to undergo tests of their driving skills. In making proof in its or his case. Our view that the evidence for petitioner MMTC falls short of the required evidentiary quantum as would convincingly and undoubtedly prove its observance of the diligence of a good father of a family has its precursor in the underlying rationale pronounced in the earlier case of Central Taxicab Corp. who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment . (emphasis ours) The 1993 ruling in Metro Manila Transit Corporation was reiterated in a recent case again involving the Metro Manila Transit Corporation. vs. 9 59 . it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence is formally entered. et al. therefore. and service records. If the employer successfully overcomes the legal presumption of negligence. (emphasis ours) Based therefore on jurisprudential law. 8 thus: In the selection of prospective employees. we do not have enough trustworthy evidence left to go by . Nor were records of daily inspections. monitor their implementation. Court of Appeals 7 is instructive: In fine. allegedly conducted by supervisors. the party.. employers should formulate standard operating procedures. . set amidst an almost identical factual setting. he is relieved of liability.. . The reason for this is to obviate the biased nature of the employer's testimony or that of his witnesses. (R)educing the testimony of Albert to its proper proportion. including documentary evidence . must be corroborated by documentary evidence. to hold sway. [T]here is no record that Musa attended such training programs and passed the said examinations before he was employed. The failure of MMTC to present such documentary proof puts in doubt the credibility of its witnesses. . testimonial evidence of identical content. vehicle maintenance. and clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation. MMTC sought to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family with respect to the selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure.

traffic regulation or DPWH memorandum was presented to show that the passenger jeepney picked up respondent and his three companions in a prohibited area. 13 In the present case. the plaintiff may recover damages. Esteban Jaca. he required him to submit a police clearance in order to determine if he was ever involved in any vehicular accident. as in the present case. had respondent flagged down the passenger jeepney at the proper place. the award of damages given to respondent should be decreased or mitigated because respondent was guilty of contributory negligence. and suffered severe wounds in his left knee and leg. the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner's driver who. 60 . on the other hand. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals can only be overturned if it is shown that such findings are obviously whimsical. specially when. the appellate court upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. All the facts showed was that the passenger jeepney was near the corner of Araneta and Magsaysay Streets. insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that petitioner was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver. meaning. capricious and arbitrary. 12 Petitioner's contention has no merit. did not slow down even when he was already approaching a busy intersection within the city proper. he cannot recover damages. the accident could have been avoided. Petitioner claims that his driver was allegedly caught unaware when the passenger jeepney hailed by respondent suddenly stopped at the intersection of a national highway. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. The underlying precept of the above article on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. He also required Sablayan to undergo a driving test conducted by his mechanic. Bacolod City when petitioner's driver bumped it from the rear. 10 Petitioner. petitioner is liable. petitioner's evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence. never presented the alleged police clearance given to him by Sablayan nor the results of Sablayan's driving test. Sablayan was taught to read and understand traffic signs like "Do Not Enter. testified that Sablayan passed the driving test and never figured in any vehicular accident except the one in question. 15 In this case. Thus. But if his negligence was only contributory. in fact. No city resolution. No doubt petitioner's driver was reckless. He also testified that he maintained in good condition all the trucks of petitioner by checking the brakes. In fact. It should be emphasized that the legal obligation of employers to observe due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees provided in Article 2180 of the Civil Code is not an empty provision or a mere formalism since the non-observance thereof actually becomes the basis of the employers' vicarious liability. 14 It must be emphasized that petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should deal only with questions of law. DECSIT WHEREFORE. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. should not recover the full amount of the damages awarded by the trial court? We rule in the negative. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. Petitioner next contends that. without doubt. The trial court also found no negligence on the part of respondent Begasa.In this case. 16 The passenger jeepney had long stopped to pick up respondent and his three companions and. respondent was already partly inside the jeepney when petitioner's driver rear-ended it. In sum. horns and tires thereof before providing hauling services. Petitioner argues that. or contrary to the factual findings of the trial court. we find no reason to overturn the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Since the negligence of petitioner's driver was the sole and proximate cause of the accident. The impact was so strong that respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone (femur). The factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals are given great weight and even finality by the Supreme Court. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Petitioner claimed that he." ISAaTH Petitioner's mechanic. even if he is liable. we affirm the appellate court's finding that there was no contributory negligence on the part of respondent. Accordingly. to pay damages to respondent Begasa for the injuries sustained by him. in fact. SO ORDERED. the petition is hereby DENIED. we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for the injuries suffered by respondent. Petitioner also did not present records of the regular inspections that his mechanic allegedly conducted. He testified that before he hired Elizalde Sablayan. that no negligence could be attributed to them. as found by the lower courts. This factual finding was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals." "Left Turn" and "Right Turn. Esteban Jaca. accompanied Sablayan during the driving test and that during the test. The unsubstantiated and selfserving testimonies of petitioner and his mechanic were. 11 Employers should thus seriously observe such a degree of diligence (and prove it in court by sufficient and concrete evidence) that would exculpate them from liability. There was no evidence that respondent Begasa and his three companions flagged down the passenger jeepney in a prohibited area. Article 2179 provides: When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury." "One Way. however. was respondent partly negligent and thus. the trial court dismissed the case against the driver and owner of the passenger jeepney on the ground that they were not liable.

800. On September 24. 2000.07 for medicine expenses incurred after confinement 3. Fausto fell on the pavement and suffered injuries. 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. The van sideswiped Fausto who was walking along the pedestrian lane in front of the Monumento Market in Caloocan City.P20. BALDOVIZO.000. and father of respondents Edgar and Carmelo Baldovizo. The trial court denied the petition in a Resolution dated November 20. and its Resolution 2 dated April 1.R.000. premises considered. at about 11:30 a. EDGAR R.. Baldovizo. Branch 225. and CARMELO R. REYES. CARMEN R. Times Surety and Insurance Company was declared in default for failure to file an Answer.00 for medical expenses and hospital bills. AGUILA and DANILO D. On March 7. 1994. 61 . 2000.R. 2007. February 28.00 as moral damages 5.[G. Marlun Lisbos was driving.800. Edgar and Carmelo R. petitioners Aguila and Reyes filed a petition for relief from judgment before the RTC of Quezon City. which found petitioners jointly and severally liable for damages as a consequence of the death of Fausto T. spouse of respondent Carmen R. 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. and children. Marlun Lisbos was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City. SO ORDERED. petitioner Emerlito F. Marlun G. DECISION QUISUMBING. Reyes denied ownership of the van. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Amended Decision 3 dated August 13. the actual operator and possessor of the van. Inc. the trial court rendered a decision.00 as death indemnity for the victim 4. 4 On May 4. 2004. BALDOVIZO. Although the van was registered in his name. Aguila. Reyes claimed that Aguila was its actual possessor and operator. and P15.P43. registered under the name of petitioner Danilo D. On the other hand. Summons were served on the defendants except Marlun Lisbos whose whereabouts were unknown according to the Sheriff's Report. ordering the latter to jointly and severally pay the following amounts: 1. Branch 225. J p: This petition for review seeks to reverse the Decision 1 dated June 30.. Subsequently. Baldovizo. a separate complaint for damages against Marlun Lisbos. Reyes claimed he could not be liable for damages. and that Aguila provided assistance and support during the hospitalization of Fausto.00 as exemplary damages 6. Lisbos and Times Surety [a]nd Insurance Co. respondents.P110. Reyes. Danilo D.P50. Edgar and Carmelo. CV No. Aguila. a van with Plate No. Fausto died on July 6. Meanwhile. petitioners.000. Branch 52. On May 20. and Times Surety and Insurance Company. After the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. 73321. 163186. the insurer of the van under a third-party liability insurance contract. Hence. Carmen R.m.P50. Branch 225. 1994. Danilo Reyes. trial ensued. Reyes. BALDOVIZO. 1993. Fausto's wife. filed before the RTC of Quezon City. vs. along the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Caloocan City. 1993.700.00 for loss of earning capacity 2. Petitioners were considered to have waived their right to present their evidence due to their failure to appear on the December 1. that Aguila exercised due diligence in the selection of Lisbos as driver.COSTS OF SUIT.] EMERLITO F. and was brought to the Manila Central University Hospital for treatment. Baldovizo. No. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Carmen. 2000.. Aguila claimed that Fausto disregarded traffic rules when he crossed EDSA. TER-883. In his Answer. He was crossing EDSA. The facts are as follows: On April 19. Its decretal portion reads: WHEREFORE. 1999 hearing. Baldovizo and against the defendants Emerlito F.

the appellate court sustained the Amended Decision which deleted the name of Marlun Lisbos among the parties held liable. Unfortunately for the petitioners. On June 26. 2000 Decision on April 24. The appellate court also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. the trial court issued an Amended Decision 8 dated August 13. this petition for review. the decision became final and executory. which deleted the name of Marlun Lisbos as a party liable for damages. 2001. Further. 2000 Decision was made within the reglementary period. the trial court resolved to strike off the name of Marlun Lisbos in the dispositive portion of its March 7. Under Section 2. the trial court denied the second motion for reconsideration as well as the reconsideration of the order for the issuance of the writ of execution. 2000 Decision for having been inadvertently included therein. the petition for relief from judgment did not toll the running of the reglementary period and. the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. their petition for relief from judgment was not the proper remedy because it is an extraordinary remedy available only if there are no other remedies. 2000 to file an appeal or a motion for new trial or reconsideration. accordingly. the court loses its jurisdiction to amend. In denying the appeal for being improper. 2000 and the Court hereby issues an Amended Decision. They pray that they be absolved from liability. In any event. Upon finality of the judgment. SO ORDERED. petitioners filed instead a petition for relief from judgment on May 4. the name of defendant Marlun Lisbos is ordered stricken off in the dispositive portion of the Decision dated March 7. 2000 Decision became final and executory after the lapse thereof. Hence. motion for reconsideration. none of those are present in this case. During this period. hence. 2000 Decision. The Amended Decision did not give the parties a fresh period within which to file an appeal. However. 2000. petitioners filed (1) a motion for reconsideration of the November 20. said name was ordered stricken off. 7 Accordingly. 9 Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless. However. the ensuing Amended Decision rendered on August 13. Petitioners Aguila and Reyes appealed the Amended Decision before the Court of Appeals. stated that the name of Marlun Lisbos was inadvertently included in the dispositive portion. We find petitioners' contentions devoid of merit. The remedies available to petitioners were the filing of an appeal. 2001. the Baldovizos moved for the issuance of a writ of execution after the judgment in their favor attained finality. 2001. correcting the March 7. a judgment or final order becomes final and executory if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed within the period provided by the Rules. 62 . 2000 Resolution. They add that the Court of Appeals should have taken cognizance of their appeal since their notice of appeal was approved by the trial court. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order for the issuance of the writ of execution and informed the trial court of their intention to appeal the November 20. Upon review of the records of this case. their right to appeal the August 13. 2001. while the Resolution dated August 13. The appellate court also held that petitioners' attempt to revive their rights in the case failed after their petition for relief from judgment was denied for lack of merit. the Second Motion For Reconsideration on the Resolutions/Orders denying the petition for relief from judgment is hereby DENIED and the Motion For Reconsideration To The Resolution Granting The Issuance Of A Writ of Execution is likewise DENIED for lack of merit. 5 Simultaneously. 2001 Amended Decision remained. 6 On August 13. 10 Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which causes no prejudice to any party. Petitioners invoke substantial justice for this Court to consider the merits of the case which the appellate court failed to address. Thus. In addition. 2000 Resolution denying their petition for relief from judgment. 11 This is the principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject only to a few exceptions. On May 21. or motion for new trial. 2001 is null and void because any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. They claim that the Amended Decision superseded the original decision because the amount of their liabilities increased as a result of the exclusion of Marlun Lisbos. The decretal portion reads: WHEREFORE. 2000 Resolution and (2) a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the certification against forum shopping was defective. we note that petitioners received the March 7. The lone issue to be resolved in this case is: Do the petitioners have the right to appeal the amended decision after the original decision had become final and executory? Petitioners contend that while their right to appeal the March 7. the March 7. 13 Although the rule that a judgment that becomes final and executory cannot be disturbed admits of exceptions. Since no appeal of the March 7. that judgment may be amended. 2000 Decision of the trial court had been lost.Meanwhile. 2000 and had until May 9. or where the judgment is void. modify or alter the same. 12 None of the exceptions are present in this case. the trial court denied the petition. 2001. the appellate court ruled that Aguila and Reyes had lost their right to appeal. petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration of the November 20. Before a judgment becomes final and executory. premises considered. the trial court granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution and denied petitioners' motions.

it is not necessary to amend the original decision holding the petitioners. the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. are solidarily liable in accordance with Article 2180 15 in relation to Articles 2184 16 and 2194 17 of the Civil Code. and its original Decision dated March 7. For utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by merely harking on the policy of liberal construction. we have reminded the litigants that the Rules of Court are not mere tools that they can readily use or discard to serve their own purpose.Besides. but they are purposively devised for the proper administration of justice. the total amount adjudged shall earn an interest rate of 12% per annum until it is fully paid. then cry for liberal construction of these rules. Thus. respectively. The total amount adjudged therein shall earn an interest rate of 6% per annum from the date of judgment of the trial court until finality of this Decision. petitioners are directly and primarily liable. 2000 is hereby reinstated. there is no basis for petitioners to appeal the Amended Decision which is void. after resorting to a wrong remedy. However. In an action based on quasi-delict. and the insurance company solidarily liable. In view of the foregoing. As for petitioners' plea for substantial justice. Marlun Lisbos. even if the driver was included albeit not served with summons. 18 WHEREFORE. the Amended Decision dated August 13. is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. 63 . Branch 225. 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. petitioners Aguila and Reyes as employer and registered owner or possessor-operator of the van. Litigants should not. 14 Thus. subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. time and again. the liability of the employer is direct and primary. Thereafter. Cost against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

64 .

aASDTE 2. the RTC rendered judgment in favor of spouses Jayme. Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident. that was the employer of the negligent driver. Mayor Miguel of Koronadal. South Cotabato. 1989. the vehicle insurer. it insisted that its liability is contributory and is only conditioned on the right of the insured. and Mayor Fernando Miguel of Koronadal. MAYOR FERNANDO Q.. South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano. Yet. 3. and litigation expenses. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. all respondents denied liability for Marvin's death. Cotabato City. an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. the parents of Marvin. filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against respondents. PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO. defendants Fidel Lozano. Jayme.Twenty Thousand (P20. The complaint against defendant First Integrated Bonding Insurance Company. petitioners.[G. MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL). The Facts On February 5. 4 The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. respondents. RTC Disposition On January 25.One Hundred Seventy Three Thousand One Hundred One and Forty Centavos (P173. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME. 6 Marvin sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma and diffused cerebral contusion. South Cotabato. a minor. HcTEaA In their respective Answers. 5 The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters away from the point of impact. and THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY. 11 In their complaint. but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. attorney's fees. 1999.00) Pesos as Attorney's fees. 10 Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme. Inc. The CA absolved Mayor Miguel from any liability since it was not he. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pickup truck without their consent. is hereby ordered dismissed there being no cause of action against said insurance company. MIGUEL. a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. 4. and exemplary damages. the defendant Municipality of Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages incurred by other defendant (sic) being an agency of the State performing a (sic) governmental functions. but the Municipality of Koronadal. Polomolok. The Municipality of Koronadal adopted the answer of Lozano and Miguel. 9 Despite medical attention. Polomolok.101. represented by the MUNICIPAL TREASURER and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q. Likewise. * Branch 39. As for First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company. RODRIGO APOSTOL.40) Pesos as actual damages with legal interest of 12% per annum computed from February 11. Miguel is concerned. they prayed that all respondents be held solidarily liable for their loss. who was then crossing the National Highway in Poblacion. 163609. 65 . Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvin's sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid the accident. TcHEaI However.000. November 27. moral. any cause of action against it had prescribed. MIGUEL.000. vs. ERNESTO SIMBULAN. The same with defendant Hermogenes Simbulan. not being the owner of the subject vehicle.. FIDEL LOZANO. R. in view of the foregoing. 8 Due to the seriousness of his injuries. J p: MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him. are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff (sic) the following sums: 1. Miguel denied being on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin. They pointed out that that proximate cause of Marvin's death was Lozano's negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle. 3 Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight. 1989 until fully paid. he is absolved of any liability. Rodrigo Apostol. Inc.. Since the insured did not file a claim within the prescribed period. They prayed for actual.000. 2008.] SPS.00) Pesos as exemplary damages. No. 2 The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol. INC.Fifty Thousand (P50.Twenty Thousand (P20.T.R. DECISION REYES. insofar as defendant Mayor Fernando Q. he was airlifted to the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao City for more intensive treatment.00) Pesos as moral damages. 7 He was initially treated at the Howard Hubbard Memorial Hospital. which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian? DSIaAE Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

000. inter alia.00) Pesos for the death of Marvin Jayme. being Lozano's superior. but instead one who had direct control and supervision over Lozano during the time of the accident. Not being the employer of Lozano. Mayor Miguel also denied that he did not exercise due care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano. the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another.5. Mayor Miguel interposed an appeal to the CA. II. (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times. the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.000. IT IS SO ORDERED. but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. Records showed that the Municipality of Koronadal was the driver's true and lawful employer.00) as litigation expenses. the CA granted the appeal. SO ORDERED. MOREOVER. 17 Significantly. 13 The CA held that Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for damages for the death of Marvin Jayme. still had control over the manner the vehicle was operated. Spouses Jayme contend. 6.Fifty Thousand (P50. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger in the Isuzu pick-up at the time of the accident. insofar as defendant-appellant Mayor Fernando Q. solidarily liable for the latter's negligent act. He was not a mere passenger. CA Disposition In his appeal. to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180.Three Thousand (P3. Thus. hence. Said the appellate court: Moreover. paragraph 9 of the complaint alleged that the Municipality of Koronadal was the employer of both Mayor Miguel and Lozano . To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees. that vicarious liability attaches to Mayor Miguel. 15 Our Ruling The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application in the present case. aDSTIC On October 22. it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MAYOR FERNANDO MIGUEL CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MARVIN JAYME WHICH CONCLUSION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE SETTLED PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL. 12 Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling. According to petitioners. disposing as follows: WHEREFORE. TacESD Article 2180 16 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one's own quasi-delictual acts. Mayor Miguel. Mayor Miguel contended that the RTC erred in ruling that he was Lozano's employer and. and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. Issues The spouses Jayme have resorted to the present recourse and assign to the CA the following errors: I. 14 (Emphasis supplied) DACcIH The CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered owner of a vehicle who is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of the vehicle. plaintiffs-appellees admitted that Mayor Miguel was not the employer of Lozano. 18 66 . although unfortunate. The incident. and the complaint against him is DISMISSED.To pay the cost of this suit. 2003. and 7. was unexpected and cannot be attributed to him. Miguel is concerned. THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ARE ALL BASED ON CONJECTURES AND SURMISES AND AGAINST ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH URGENTLY CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURT'S SUPERVISION. Mayor Miguel could not thus be held liable for the damages caused by the former. This liability is popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. the element of direct control is not negated by the fact that Lozano's employer was the Municipality of Koronadal.

41 Mont. Copper Co. In Benson v. 141 [108 Pac. Belen. Sorrell. McQuown. We rely on the four-fold test. The defendant is under no obligation to prove the negative averment. and that if he fails satisfactorily to show the facts upon which he bases his claim. Firme. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. but only by virtue of the fact that they were both employed by Kruse. R. by itself. Lombardi 28 is instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious liability: Plaintiff was not the master or principal of the driver of the truck.Furthermore. . the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts of the latter. the CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. 21 Applying the foregoing test. 29 The rule was reiterated in Bryant v. The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it. Tuazon. 588]. 115 Cal. . This Court said: It is an old and well-settled rule of the courts that the burden of proving the action is upon the plaintiff. .. 2 Cor. does not. Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme. however. Ellis v. 425].. Jur. Nevertheless. 290. 37 where this Court held: It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.) We can see no logical reason for drawing any distinction in this regard between actionable negligence and contributory negligence. 27 Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious liability. Hollingshead Co. Co. . 22 In the case under review. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin's death. the rule is well settled both in this state and elsewhere that the negligence of a subordinate employee or subagent is not to be imputed to a superior employee or agent. indeed. They. Co. 34 In the case at bar. 72 S. the driver's negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. In the case of actionable negligence. 35 The driver's duty is not one that may be delegated to others. 24 ruled in a similar vein. 31 In Swanson v. 26 In the absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious liability. This Court. A. failed to buttress this claim. (2d) 528]. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. etc. La Union v. the doctrine of respondeat superior or qui facit per alium is not properly applicable to him. the true and lawful employer of Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal. 297. This being so. Pittsburgh & M. This involves: (1) the employer's power of selection. Ry. render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts and omissions. . (N. and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal. This rue is in harmony with the provisions of Section 297 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. 374 [1 Pac. 228]. C. or direct or encourage it. on several occasions. To determine the existence of an employment relationship. by providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter's negligent acts. 829. it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano. held that an employeremployee relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists. v. 52 S. . . the Colorado Supreme Court adhered to the general rule that a public official is not liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates on a vicarious basis since the relationship is not a true master-servant situation. 19 this Court ruled that it was enough for defendant to deny an alleged employment relationship. Guild v. in Soliman. Handley v. he still can not be held liable. they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the 67 . . S.. 464 [2 L. 20 In resolving the present controversy. R. Jr. . Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the vehicle's registered owner. but only to the master or principal. no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation. (3) the employer's right to control the method of doing the work. the municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and. Thurman v. Brown. 277. and particularly that part commencing at p. In Belen v. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident. 32 a case involving a military officer who happened to be riding in a car driven by a subordinate later involved in an accident. His power to direct and control the driver was not as master. 33 The court went on to rule that the only exception is when they cooperate in the act complained of. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. E. App. to wit: . . (Hilton v. Oliver. the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano's employer notwithstanding Lozano's assignment to Mayor Miguel. but only an intermediate and superior employee or agent. L. and see the elaborate note in 61 A. 36 As correctly held by the trial court. 204 Cal. and the further fact that as Kruse's agent he was delegated Kruse's authority over the driver. CHaDIT Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least supervision and control over Lozano and how the latter operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up during the time of the accident. 23 the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando. R. 30 and again in Sichterman v. (2) payment of wages or other remuneration. the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exceptions. p. This Court has. 25 (Emphasis supplied) HSTAcI Significantly. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. Southern Ry. immune from suit.) 378. ECSHAD Parenthetically. it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver. 269 Pac. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant evidence. hence. Pacific Elec. L. 535 [61 A. .

the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons. Justice can not sway in favor of petitioners simply to assuage their pain and loss. the driver's employer. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is. 68 . the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. 38 Verily. the negligent driver and his direct employer. justice demands that only those liable under our laws be held accountable for Marvin's demise.discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. . The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver. SO ORDERED. HAaScT WHEREFORE. the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. 39 The accidental death of Marvin Jayme is a tragic loss for his parents. However. and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident (sic) to its operation . liability attaches to the registered owner. The CA observation along this line are worth restating: Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. . Failing this. In permitting such entities to be sued. . the claimant cannot recover. and the registered owner of the vehicle are liable for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle.

Susan Chuay. Macario Yuro and Magdaleno Lugue. and two (2) passengers of the mini bus. the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue.000. SYLLABUS 1. liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of its employees subject. Capas.P. — While an appellee who is not also an appellant may assign error in his brief if his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds. There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code where his employee has not been previously criminally convicted. and Mrs. liability originates from a delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. 4.00. respondents. Consequently.ID.. herein private respondents. The first type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code while the second kind is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. the mini bus landed right side down facing south in the canal of the highway. this Court respects the factual findings of the appellate and trial courts and accord them a certain measure of finality. No. Dragged fifteen (15) meters from the point of impact (midway the length of the parked truck with trailer). DISTINGUISHED.. ID.ID.00 each remains. vs. the amount of actual damages cannot exceed that awarded by it. Mrs. (b) that as a consequence of the vehicular mishap.C.. Branch IV. Antonio Reyes.000. The wisdom of this stance is made more apparent by the fact that the appellate court's conclusions are based on the findings of the lower court which is in a better position to evaluate the testimonies of the witnesses during trial. a total wreck. 5. XY-320-PUB he was driving to the left to avoid hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing north along the cemented pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga. The complaint alleged that: (a) the recklessness and imprudence of the Franco Bus driver caused the collision which resulted in his own death and that of the mini bus driver and two (2) other passengers thereof. 2. Lolita Lugue.ID. ID. The records show that plaintiffs-private respondents limited their claim for actual and compensatory damages to the supposed average income for a period of one (1) year of P6. We feel that our award should not exceed the said amounts. LIABILITY BASED ON CULPA AQUILIANA. SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYEE UNDER THE PRC AND THE EMPLOYER'S PRIMARY LIABILITY UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. ACTION FOR DAMAGES. — Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the Revised Penal Code and the employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character.. Macario Yuro swerved the northbound Franco Bus with Plate No. MRS. The conviction of the employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. ANTONIO REYES. it is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved.000. APPELLEE WHO DID NOT APPEAL NOT ENTITLED TO MODIFICATION ON REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT. FRANCO. APPEAL. If no criminal action was instituted.CIVIL PROCEDURE. 6. SUSAN CHUAY and LOLITA LUGUE. — Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. DECISION FERNAN.] SPOUSES FEDERICO FRANCO and FELICISIMA R.ID. to appeal the lower court's judgment. YL-735 being driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision between the two (2) vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous eventuality. — Under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.00 monthly multiplied by a minimum of one more year of serviceability of said mini bus or P40.. The Franco Bus was also damaged but not as severely. docketed as Civil Case No. — The increase in awards for indemnity arising from death to P30. FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS OF APPELLATE AND TRIAL COURTS ACCORDED A CERTAIN MEASURE OF FINALITY BY THE SUPREME COURT. Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay.. the Court is inclined to likewise reject petitioners' affirmative defense of due diligence. — A painstaking review of the evidence presented in the case at bar fails to disclose any evidence or circumstance of note sufficient to overrule said factual findings and conclusions. 3. & Mrs.00 for the driver Magdaleno Lugue and P12. 71137.00 for the Chinese businessman Fernando Chuay. J p: The instant petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals deals mainly with the nature of an employer's liability for his employee's negligent act.00 and the loss of an average net income of P120. the owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company. the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus. the same having been made in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence decreeing such increase in view of the depreciated Philippine currency. DEPENDENT UPON THE EMPLOYEE'S ACTUAL LIABILITY FOR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. petitioners. thereby taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus bearing Plate No. October 5.R. however. (c) that in view of the death of the three (3) passengers aforementioned. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. ID. 1989. 69 .00 daily or P3.ID. 1974. the employer's liability would not be predicated under Article 103. Federico Franco. the wife of victim Fernando Chuay.600. he cannot ask for modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. to the defense that the former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. 2154 against Mr. filed an action for damages through reckless imprudence before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Angeles City. Tarlac.[G. At about 7:30 in the evening of October 18. As a rule. For failure of plaintiffsappellees. and. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against. EMPLOYER'S SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY UNDER THE R.000.200. The collision resulted in the deaths of the two (2) drivers. INCREASE IN AWARDS OF DEATH INDEMNITY JUSTIFIED. the Isuzu Mini Bus became a total wreck resulting in actual damages amounting to P50...

among others. may properly increase the award of damages in favor of the private respondents Chuay and Lugue. was guilty of reckless or criminal imprudence punishable by law in driving appellants' bus that the civil obligation of the appellants arises from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code resulting in the subsidiary liability of the appellants under the said provision. We find merit in this contention. the widow of Fernando Chuay. actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P90. All with legal interests from the filing of this suit on November 11. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid respondent appellate court's decision dated January 2. who did not appeal said court's decision. 1974 until paid. defendants set up. and (4)To pay attorney's fee in the amount of P5. (2)To pay Lolita Lugue. Lolita Lugue. 70 . 1978.000. however. herein petitioners. 6 Respondent appellate court increased the award of damages granted by the lower court as follows: WHEREFORE. tavern-keepers and proprietors of establishments. SO ORDERED. are jointly and severally liable to the latter for the damages suffered by them which thus makes Civil Case No. (3)To pay Susan Chuay. prevailing parties in the lower court. 1985. ordering the latter: (1)To pay Antonio Reyes. and Susan Chuay. and second. Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the Revised Penal Code and the employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. and Mrs.00 for the Isuzu Mini Bus. 2154 unequivocally claim that the former as the employers of Macario Yuro. rejected by the trial court in its decision 1 dated May 17. they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of all their employees. 2154 an action predicated upon a quasi-delict under the Civil Code subject to the defense that the employer exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. and against the defendants Mr.000.000. the driver of the Franco Bus who caused the vehicular mishap. It said: "This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises.00. 7 On April 1. SO ORDERED. respondent appellate court.00 each of the driver and one of the passengers and P12. widow of Magdaleno Lugue. 3 On appeal by herein petitioners as defendants-appellants. and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments.00. — In default of the persons criminally liable. the trial court ruled as follows: WHEREFORE. agreeing with the lower court.000. for the reason that the act of the Franco Bus driver was a negligent act punishable by law resulting in a civil obligation arising from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code and not from Article 2180 of the Civil Code. the decision appealed from is hereby modified as follows: 1. the instant petition raising two (2) legal questions: first. The first type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provide as follows: Art.00 of the Chinese businessman passenger. In answer to the complaint. 5 and that there is nothing in Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code which requires a prior judgment of conviction of the erring vehicle driver and his obligation to pay his civil liability before the said provisions can be applied. the affirmative defense that as owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company. 2. including the deceased driver Macario Yuro. the widow of Magdaleno Lugue. actual and compensatory damages in the total sum of P18. whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private respondents was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict.000.000. premises considered. 102. whether respondent appellate court in an appeal filed by the defeated parties.000. the sum of P30. and the costs of this suit. actual and compensatory damages in the total sum of P24. Costs against defendants-appellants. held that defendants-appellants' driver who died instantly in the vehicular collision. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Antonio Reyes. 1985 but the same was denied on May 13. Federico Franco.To pay Susan Chuay. Hence. widow of Fernando Chuay." 2 On this premise.Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers. innkeepers.000. The rest of the judgment appealed from is affirmed. in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulations shall have been committed by them or their employees. and not a case of civil negligence and the defense of having acted like a good father of a family or having trained or selected the drivers of his truck is no defense to avoid civil liability.000. 4 that the case subject of appeal is one involving culpable negligence out of which civil liability arises and is not one of civil negligence.00.00 and the expected average income of P6. Petitioners contend that the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint 8 of herein private respondents as plaintiffs in Civil Case No.00 for the latter's death and P62.00 for loss of earning capacity.To pay Lolita Lugue. Said defense was.the heirs of each should be awarded a minimum of P12. the sum of P30.00 for loss of earning capacity.00 for the latter's death and P112. 1985.000. tavernkeepers..000.

No independent evidence was presented as to the alleged supervision of appellants' bus drivers. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees. Having thus established that Civil Case No. 2154 is a civil action to impose the primary liability of the employer as a result of the tortious act of its alleged reckless driver. while the second kind is governed by the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. On the other hand. persons. at the same time. provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself. Art. pupils. It is likewise dangerous because. Such fault or negligence. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. or for the payment of the value thereof. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. The appellants in fact admitted that the only kind of supervision given the drivers referred to the running time between the terminal points of the line (t. especially with regard to driving habits and reaction to actual traffic conditions. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against. liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of its employees subject. supra. workmen. p. The Court in the aforecited M. where it was held that the defense of observance of due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of employees is not applicable to the subsidiary liability provided in Article 20 of the Penal Code (now Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code). to wit: Anyway. under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 2180. the employer's liability would not be predicated under Article 103.s. On this point.The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. It is erroneous because the conviction of the employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability 10 and. apprentices. there being fault or negligence. Transit case went further to say that there can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code where his employee has not been previously criminally convicted. the employer's subsidiary liability would partake of a solidary obligation resulting in the law's amendment without legislative sanction. Logically therefore. and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by the servants. however. it is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved. absurd because we will be faced with a situation where the employer is held subsidiarily liable even without a primary liability being previously established. to the defense that the former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.D. September 16. a perusal of the record shows that the appellants were not able to establish the defense of a good father of a family in the supervision of their bus driver. By such reliance. 21). The evidence presented by the appellants in this regard is purely self-serving. or employees in the discharge of their duties. liability originates from a delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. 9 In the case at bar. Art. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers. petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that their liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary liability. it would seem that respondent appellate court seeks to enforce the subsidiary civil liability of the employer without a criminal conviction of the party primarily liable therefor. or the person representing him. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. 2177. Moreover. the appellants who ran a fleet of 12 buses plying the Manila-Laoag 71 . is obliged to pay for the damage done. 103. we confront ourselves with the plausibility of defendants-petitioners' defense that they observed due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another.Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein. Thus. the appellate court has unequivocally spoken in affirmation of the lower court's findings. 2176.. in effect. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Art. 1976.n. recourse under this remedy is not possible. Respondent appellate court relies on the case of Arambulo.Subsidiary civil liability of other persons . xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. This is not only erroneous and absurd but is also fraught with dangerous consequences.Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. of the deposits of such goods within the inn. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. teachers. If no criminal action was instituted. no criminal action was instituted because the person who should stand as the accused and the party supposed to be primarily liable for the damages suffered by private respondents as a consequence of the vehicular mishap died.

he cannot ask for modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. The rest of the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. 13 For failure of plaintiffs-appellees. have only two inspectors whose duties were only ticket inspection. the Court finds that these determinations are factual in nature. 12 Consequently. 16 However. This decision is immediately executory. 14 Furthermore. Costs against the private respondents.000. While an appellee who is not also an appellant may assign error in his brief if his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds. the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified decreasing the award to private respondents of actual and compensatory damages for loss of average income for the period of one year to P6. we find petitioners liable for the damages claimed pursuant to their primary liability under the Civil Code. the Court is inclined to likewise reject petitioners' affirmative defense of due diligence. neither of whom appealed the decision of the lower court.000.00 for the driver Magdaleno Lugue and P12.00 for the Chinese businessman Fernando Chuay.00 each remains. The wisdom of this stance is made more apparent by the fact that the appellate court's conclusions are based on the findings of the lower court which is in a better position to evaluate the testimonies of the witnesses during trial. the same having been made in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence decreeing such increase in view of the depreciated Philippine currency. to appeal the lower court's judgment. There is no evidence that they are really safety inspectors.000. we agree with petitioners' contention that the Intermediate Appellate Court (later Court of Appeals) is without jurisdiction to increase the amount of damages awarded to private respondents Chuay and Lugue. the increase in awards for indemnity arising from death to P30. the records 15 show that plaintiffs-private respondents limited their claim for actual and compensatory damages to the supposed average income for a period of one (1) year of P6. SO ORDERED. As a rule. As a painstaking review of the evidence presented in the case at bar fails to disclose any evidence or circumstance of note sufficient to overrule said factual findings and conclusions. 17 WHEREFORE.line. On the second legal issue raised in the instant petition.000.000. therefore. 72 .00 for the deceased Fernando Chuay. this Court respects the factual findings of the appellate and trial courts and accord them a certain measure of finality. herein private respondents. 11 Basically.00 for the deceased Magdaleno Lugue and P12. We feel that our award should not exceed the said amounts. the amount of actual damages cannot exceed that awarded by it.

The second question of law is whether the lower court could properly suspend the hearing of the civil action against Domingo Pontino and dismissed the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the fact that a criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence is pending in the lower court against Domingo Pontino... driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan. even without such a reservation. the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt. 77188 entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez. he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee. 92944 for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino by the Manila City Fiscal's Office. The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. we held: "However. J p: This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from the Order of March 10. SYLLABUS 1. 1969. — In cases of negligence. ID. III.R. 1988. only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages (Article 29. Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27. 2. respondentsappellees. No. 1970 of the Honorable Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila. the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict.R. — In the case at bar. was riding. Ligon. Civil Code). Sr. Plaintiffs. and ADONITA YABUT BERMUDEZ. subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.The last question of law is whether the suspension of the civil action against Domingo Pontino and the dismissal of the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the pending criminal case against Domingo Pontino for homicide thru reckless imprudence in the lower court could be validly done considering that the civil case against said defendants-appellees also sought to recover actual damages to the jeep of plaintiffsappellants.. et al." the trial court stated that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their right to file a separate civil action. Court of Appeals. the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is finally terminated. As a result. Criminal Case No.ID. plaintiffs filed the present appeal. the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. ID. JUDGE A. entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez. dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint in Civil Case No. 92944). In fact. defendants. to file a separate civil action. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict. HON. From said order. In People vs. also pending before the court. Rules of Court. G. stating as their main reasons the following: I.[G.] REYNALDO BERMUDEZ. petitioners-appellants. and Adonita Yabut Bermudez. L-32055. DECISION YAP.. Said the trial court: 73 . The heart of the issue involved in the present case is whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict.. a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants. No. MELENCIO-HERRERA." We find the appeal meritorious. RIGHT TO FILE ACTION MAY BE MADE EVEN WITHOUT RESERVATION. The background facts of the case are as follows: A cargo truck. If a party chooses the latter. vs. INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS. we have allowed the injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict. versus Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan.The main issue brought before this Honorable Court is whether the present action is based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore could proceed independently of the criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Padilla vs. February 26. plaintiffs. DOMINGO PONTINO y TACORDA and CORDOVA NG SUN KWAN. Sr. Defendants." On July 28. it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. The boy sustained injuries which caused his death. Branch XVII. 74041. 1969 in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action. 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. That being so. 1970 denying plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for Reconsideration. vs.." and from the Order of May 7. II. 77188. Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan. DAMAGES." Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10.CIVIL LAW. bumped a jeep on which Rogelio. The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111. SR. OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO A VICTIM OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE. 129 SCRA 559).

only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages (Article 29. which provide: "Section 1. he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee. Court of Appeals. even without such a reservation. we held: "However. subject to the provisions of Article 2177. in a criminal case. provides that — "Article 2177. Article 1161 of the New Civil Code provides: 'Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws. 32. 33. No.R. quasi-contract. 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action . provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. "Section 2. Aniceto. If a party chooses the latter. unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. If. G. 1970 and May 7. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31. 1970. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt." We do not agree. — Independent civil action. cited in Section 2. Oct. and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2. 1964. may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case. obligations arise from law. we grant the petition and annul and set aside the appealed orders of the trial court. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case. the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. crime and quasi-delict. Civil Code). But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. the right to file a separate civil action for damages is reserved. While that case was pending. and remand the case for further proceedings. In the case at bar. (2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability. 74041. In Joaquin vs. her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from crime. dated March 10. L-18719. (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. regulating damages. and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Rules of Court. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Padilla vs. Without the conviction of the employee. the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable. Criminal Law. the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict 1 The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. SO ORDERED. The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. 92944 of this Court. WHEREFORE. it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. of Rule 111. subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. contract.' xxx xxx xxx It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable. Title. on Human Relations." In cases of negligence." Article 2177 of the Civil Code. the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. In Criminal Case No. Preliminary. such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. and of Title XVIII of this book. In fact. — When a criminal action is instituted. With respect to obligations arising from crimes. 129 SCRA 559). (1 Padilla. the Court held: "The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and his employer's subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while the criminal case against the employee is still pending? To begin with. Revised Penal Code 794 [1964]). — Institution of criminal and civil action. we have allowed the injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict. According to appellant. In People vs."It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10. No costs. 74 . plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. Ligon. 31.Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. the following requisites must be present: (1) that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties. The Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. Aniceto." The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111. an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

therefore. Court of First Instance of Quezon & Lucena City. HON. Basilica de Gala." (Emphasis supplied). Felicisimo S. respondents" setting aside its earlier decision of 16 May 1980. and review stages. the court rendered judgment against the accused. the heirs of the deceased Juan Briones. the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15. SP-10069. . to Joselito Leonor and Cenon Leonor. On 13 December 1977.R. "The records show that Maximiliano Alvarez is engaged in his business of buying coconuts and copra for resale. 1988. hospitalization and incidental expenses. He should indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rodolfo Briones. RULE OF CONVENIENCE TO STABILIZE JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF TRIBUNALS OF COORDINATE JURISDICTION. No. . petitioner. be subsidiarily liable and pay the amount above-mentioned to the persons concerned jointly and severally with Renato Ramos. We note his action with great disapproval. as actual damages.00) PESOS. . . 19077-CR. versus Hon. and to obviate undue prolongation of litigation. ** and the Resolution dated 20 January 1982 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 23 October 1980. No. purposes which would be negated if Pajarito were not to be applied in this case simply because of purely technical reasons not touching on the merits of the case.000. the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but deleted that part thereof making herein petitioner. the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12. FORTUNADO. ELENO M.00) PESOS. the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15. .00) PESOS. No. As had been aptly stated. He is civilly liable for the death and physical injuries that resulted from the collision of the sakbayan and the weapon's [sic] carrier. CAGUIOA. The rule cannot be utilized to accomplish injustice or manifest delay in the execution of justice.00) PESOS. COURT OF APPEALS. . Milagros V. it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.00) PESOS. hospitalization and incidental expenses. DECISION PADILLA.00) PESOS and for attorney's fees.000.R. for actual damages and for permanent facial deformity.CRIMINAL LAW.R. He is warned that any repetition of this or similar misconduct will be dealt with severely. Exaltacion de Gala. Garin. reasoned thus: 75 . et al. in said CA-G. He wanted it served on him at his own convenience. entitled "Maximiliano Alvarez. AUTOMATICALLY ATTACHES UPON EMPLOYEE'S CONVICTION AND PROOF OF INSOLVENCY. — It is already a settled rule that the subsidiary liability of an employer automatically arises upon his employee's conviction.] MAXIMILIANO ALVAREZ. as employer of Renato Ramos. In this light. Socorro Briones. engaged in any kind of industry ." 1 The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. the amount of THREE THOUSAND (P3. SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS. and subsequent proof of inability to pay.000. Caguioa. Deputy Sheriff of Quezon and ATTY. — There is sufficient evidence to hold that counsel for respondents. and where the Supreme Court still has the power to decide on the applicable doctrine to the issue at hand. etc. appellate. "A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a time remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII. where the appeal was docketed as CA-G. therefore. 3. "LAW OF THE CASE". HON. — The principle of "law of the case" as discussed in People vs. The principle is merely a rule of convenience and public policy to stabilize judicial decisions of tribunals of coordinate jurisdiction. No. 19077CR.LEGAL ETHICS. he is '. As an officer of the court. CENSURABLE. the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12.REMEDIAL LAW. ACTIONS. subsidiarily liable for payment of the adjudged indemnities to the offended parties. SYLLABUS 1. 2. to prevent re-litigation of questions in the same action. hospitalization and burial expenses. 59621. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. the dispositive part of which reads as follows: "This Court.00) PESOS. ATTORNEYS. GARIN. the amount of THREE THOUSAND (P3. as actual damages. deliberately skirted the first service on him of the Court of Appeals judgment of 16 May 1980.[G.R.000. finds the accused Renato Ramos guilty of negligence and sentences him to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED (P200. respondents. The Court of Appeals. Pinuila is not applicable to a Court of Appeals decision at odds with this Court's decision.000. the application of Pajarito is merely the enforcement of a procedural remedy designed to ease the burden of litigation for recovery of indemnity by the victims of a judiciallydeclared criminally negligent act. These do not exist in this case. . FELICISIMO S. therefore. CIVIL LIABILITY. J p: Petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution * of the Court of Appeals dated 23 October 1980 in CA-G.000. JOYAS. After trial. . REFUSAL TO RECEIVE SERVICE OF JUDGMENT.00) PESOS . petitioner.000.' He should. as Provincial Sheriff of Quezon. he must conduct himself with candor and sincerity. vs. FRANCISCO T. the amount of TWO THOUSAND (P2.. The bail bond filed by the accused Renato Ramos for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled. . Considering more over the delays suffered by the case in the trial. MILAGROS V. Renato Ramos was charged with Double Homicide with Multiple Serious Physical Injuries Through Reckless Imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province. Atty. February 23.

SP-10069. Atchison T. Tax." In proceedings to apply justice. does not authorize that the subsidiary liability of the employer be adjudged in the criminal action. Supp.C. 2d 411. 20 471. respondent Judge ordered the issuance of the subsidiary writ of execution. Barredo. . . & S. On 16 May 1980. not being a party. 986. on 14 November 1979. 56 Cal. which expressly declared that a separate action should be instituted to enforce petitioner's subsidiary civil liability. It is true that the judgment of conviction in the criminal case binds the person subsidiarily liable with the accused (Martinez v. 19077-CR was not appealed. respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 2d 452. 2d 997. as well as the Subsidiary Writ of Execution issued on 15 November 1979 null and void. At any rate.R.. 2d 984. . No. The law. 58 S. and inexpensive determination of their rival claims. of California vs." 2 The appellate court's decision in CA-G. prevails. CA. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of the contending parties. 2d 768. Under the circumstances. Maximilliano Alvarez is not a party in this action. inexorable command. or incorrect principles were announced or [a] mistake of fact was made on first appeal. Pajarito was promulgated by the Supreme Court only on 14 December 1978. App. the final judgment in the criminal case."There is merit in the appellant's contention that the trial court erred in ordering Maximiliano Alvarez to be subsidiarily liable with the appellant in the payment of the indemnities awarded in favor of the offended parties and the heirs of the deceased. questioning the acts of the respondent Judge and the Sheriff who had levied on his properties pursuant to said subsidiary writ of execution. had long become the "law of the case" 6 and. This would certainly facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of the contending parties. the case was remanded to the trial court where..R. In re Taylor's Estate. 80. the enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability may be conveniently litigated within the same proceeding because the execution of the judgment is a logical and integral part of the case itself. (Wills vs. 129 A. No. Greenwood Country vs. E. . 108 F.R. 110 Vt. it would serve no important purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent action against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary civil liability. C. on 14 December 1978. holding inter alia that — "Considering that the judgment of conviction. In view of the foregoing principles.G. such subsidiary liability is not litigated in connection with the criminal prosecution of the employees and may not therefore be adjudged therein (Philippine Railways Company v. 51. 132 P. 2A. This is because. . dated 14 November 1979 and 26 November 1979. and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. 1). 772). and it is therefore the duty of the employer to participate in the defense of his employee (Miranda v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. Consequently. 352). Johnson. there are some cases which hold that the doctrine is in applicable where [the] prior decision is unsound (Standard Oil Co. On 23 October 1980. such as. 474. vs.L. the Motion was granted and the decision of 16 May 1980 was set aside on the strength of the Pajarito decision. . On 24 July 1980. Altho it is the law that employers are subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of their employees for felonies committed in the discharge of the latter's duties if they are engaged in any kind of industry (Art.I. the court has no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision . 21 Cal. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings. Thus. "The purpose of procedure. It reasoned that. . 319. 99 Phil.W. but it is not a universal. Du Pont De Nemours & Com. speedy. Due regard to due process and observance of procedural requirements demand that a separate action should be filed against the supposed employer to enforce the subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Pajarito v. Morris vs.F. is conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the latter's civil liability but also with regard to its amount. Lloyd. 81 Phil. 19). Indeed. 76 . whereas. The petition was docketed as CA-G. 2d 910. the Rules require that they should be liberally construed "to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just. 19077-CR. Ballard. 19077-CR) was promulgated on 13 December 1977. 126. No.C.A. A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied in an order dated 26 November 1979.R. 40 O. observed this Court in Manila Railroad Co. However. Ry Co. . it would not only prolong the litigation but would require the heirs of the deceased victim to incur unnecessary expenses. his not being engaged in any kind of industry or that the crime committed by his employee was not on the occasion of the discharge of the latter's duties. as its judgment in the criminal case (CA-G. Malate Garage. v. Jalandoni. the employer. 2d 317. 346 Mo." 4 After finality of the Court of Appeals judgment in CA-G. (Nation of Match Co. 139 S. on 29 November 1979. however. in the criminal proceeding. in the action to enforce the employer's subsidiary liability. is denied the opportunity to present his defense against such subsidiary liability. 115.R. sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. said the Court of Appeals: "The doctrine of the "law of the case" is ordinarily a very wise role of action. the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution. "is not to thwart justice. the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared the Orders of the respondent Judge. . vs. the private prosecutor filed a "Motion for Issuance of Subsidiary Writ of Execution" after the writ of execution against the accused was returned unsatisfied on 27 February 1979. Seneris 3 was decided by this Court. 2d 545. Watkins. Revised Penal Code). it is the duty of the courts "to assist the parties in obtaining just. 227 Mo. 913. on 2 July 1979. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. 550). 196 S. 670). 12 S. Meanwhile. speedy. 5 Petitioner opposed the Motion. No. therefore.W.E. Attorney General. 103. For while the doctrine is generally deemed applicable whether the former determination is right or wrong. 132 p.

And this Court. Our deletion from Our decision in CA-G. therefore. the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment.] considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. 8 Phil. it behooves us to correct the application of the doctrine of "the law of the case" upon such questions which prove to have been mistaken. strictly speaking. G. to him. In other words. to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense of his employee. 320. unless he is allowed his day in court in the enforcement of his subsidiary liability in a separate civil action. in Miranda. "It is true that an employer. Albaroa. to answer for the civil liability of the convicted employee. on the subsidiary liability of the employer. et. Francisco vs. 19077-CR. At any rate. 1978. 476. No. such a pronouncement and a direction of such subsidiary liability is a surplusage. therefore. Hon. Onrubia. vs. for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability. 829. Seneris ruling to the 77 . We deleted the trial court's direction.R. In other words. It was. 403)" (Martinez vs. 1978. just the same the trial court. . A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. even if the pronouncement and direction of the subsidiary liability of the employer were not written in the dispositive portion of the decision. 81 Phil. December 14. II. affirmed in 218 U. "On the issue of the deprivation of the employer of due process. the enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability may be conveniently litigated within the same proceeding because the execution of the judgment is a logical and integral part of the case itself. Barredo. although We should not. this Court further amplified the rule that the decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer. "To underscore. in the least. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is also his.It is a peculiar virtue of our system of law that in the search for truth through the process of inclusion and exclusion.S. No. 56 Phil. begrudge the trial court in having done so. Tolentino. Alberto V. he cannot later be heard to complain. among such modifications. modified the decision of the trial court when. that Maximiliano Alvarez "should. if brought to court. 314. 178. the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. can order the employer." (pp. Malate Garage & Taxicab Inc. . or if not. 282. 1977 while the case of Pajarito vs.R. of the trial court's pronouncement and directions on the subsidiary liability of Maximiliano Alvarez would have not prevented the respondent court from issuing the writ of subsidiary execution and all other matters now under question. it would serve no important purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent action against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary civil liability . Seneris. the Supreme Court went on to say: "In Miranda vs. Comments on the Rules of Court. because the situation before us is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under articles 1903 of the Civil Code. 45 Phil. No. . 327. Maximiliano Alvarez. vs. p. . yet such modification does not reduce the effectiveness nor prevent the application of the ruling laid down in the case of Lucia S. is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his employee. as well as of his employee. It does not matter now that Our decision in CA-G. 19077-CR.. in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. No. upon the finality of its decision. perhaps. because the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability (Articles 102 and 103) are deemed written in the judgment in the respective cases in which they are applicable. 19077-CR was promulgated on December 13. if the latter is shown to be unable to satisfy his civil liability because of his insolvency. 34186. No. Seneris was promulgated later on on [sic] December 14. the Honorable Supreme Court.. Province of Ilocos Sur vs. or any part of the decision for that matter. be subsidiarily liable and pay the amount above-mentioned to the persons concerned jointly and severally with Renato Ramos. on its subsidiary liability. . In a word. Moran. Vol. it was not necessary at all for the trial court to have pronounced. Seneris. 283) [W]hile We had. 116. Indeed.R. . 54 Law ed. considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the registered operator of the bus . . et." and all other references of the trial court of Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. . al. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded against him. in the dispositive portion of its decision. Then. al. in the dispositive portion of said decision. [T]he Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Lucia Pajarito vs. 46 Phil.R. It is his concern.R. L44627. 87 SCRA 275) has definitely set the rule that: — ". Alberto V. further explained that the employer is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case. . . a matter of legal taste than an answer to a legal requirement. Wise & Co. . This fact alone would not prevent the application of the Pajarito vs. that he was not given his day in court. 1). considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. Larion. but in substance and in effect he is [. Hon. but one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. by our Decision in CA-G. (Almeda et al. "not only with regard to (the latter's) civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer can not be separated but follows that of his employee . an attempt to be emphatic. citing relevant holdings in previous cases said: "The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court." "This is the rule that governs the case at bar. (G." xxx xxx xxx Indeed. Pajarito vs.

. the day judgment of conviction against the accused employee Renato Ramos was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.R. dated 23 October 1980 and 20 January 1982.execution of the case at bar. "We hold. deliberately skirted the first service on him of the Court of Appeals judgment of 16 May 1980. It is already a settled rule that the subsidiary liability of an employer automatically arises upon his employee's conviction. No. the petition is hereby DENIED. As has been aptly stated." 9 (Emphasis supplied). filed their Motion for Reconsideration. because. We note his action with great disapproval. He argued that the 16 May 1980 decision was already the "law of the case" as far as petitioner's subsidiary liability is concerned. even retroactively if private respondents think it that way. 1980. through counsel. the Seneris case is merely a reiteration and perhaps an amplification of the previous rulings in the Miranda and the Martinez cases adopted much earlier than the rendition of the trial court's decision. The rule cannot be utilized to accomplish injustice or manifest delay in the execution of justice. it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed. He is warned that any repetition of this or similar misconduct will be dealt with severely. purposes which would be negated if Pajarito were not to be applied in this case simply because of purely technical reasons not touching on the merits of the case. One last word: there is sufficient evidence to hold that counsel for respondents. according to petitioner. 19077-CR. while he was still in the United States. . The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. In this light. Pinuila 10 is not applicable to a Court of Appeals decision at odds with this Court's decision. The principle is merely a rule of convenience and public policy to stabilize judicial decisions of tribunals of coordinate jurisdiction. Costs against the petitioner. Garin. the principle of "law of the case" as discussed in People vs. He wanted it served on him at his own convenience. We set aside Our decision promulgated on May 16. are AFFIRMED. and secondly. No. for all purposes of the execution of Our decision in CA-G. appellate. firstly. Respondents could not." 7 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Resolution He pointed out that the 16 May 1980 decision of the Court of Appeals had already become final and executory when respondents. "A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case . the said case is still pending and there is no legal impediment to the application. that the respondent Court has not committed any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the questioned orders for such issuance has been made in pursuance of law and jurisprudence. and enter another dismissing the instant petition for lack of merit. with the consequent finality of the decision thirty (30) days from the day it should have been received by respondents' counsel. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated 20 January 1982. the Court of Appeals no longer had jurisdiction to reverse itself. petitioner's present recourse to this Court. notwithstanding Pajarito. SO ORDERED. 19077-CR. Moreover. have belatedly asked for reconsideration on 24 July 1980. Petitioner also cited the "bad faith" of respondents' counsel in deliberately instructing his clerks not to receive the 16 May 1980 decision on the day of its service on 22 May 1980. therefore. his censurable act cannot be made the basis for a strict and rigorously technical interpretation of procedural rules on grounds which do not touch on the merits of the criminal case but will only needlessly prolong its course and unjustly delay relief to the victims of petitioner-employer's criminally negligent driver. because. he must conduct himself with candor and sincerity. Considering more over the delays suffered by the case in the trial. 8 He further pointed to the non-existence of the Pajarito doctrine on 13 December 1977. WHEREFORE. and review stages. With costs against petitioner. and where the Supreme Court still has the power to decide on the applicable doctrine to the issue at hand. subject of the appeal in CA-GR. As an officer of the court. While counsel for respondents could have been more efficient and even scrupulous in the receipt of the adverted to decision of 16 May 1980. WHEREFORE. to prevent re-litigation of questions in the same action. Felicisimo S. of the Seneris ruling to the execution of Our decision. and to obviate undue prolongation of litigation. The petition is not impressed with merit. 78 . excluding the trial court's order finding petitioner-employer subsidiarily liable in case Ramos was found insolvent. and subsequent proof of inability to pay. Hence. These do not exist in this case. hence. the application of Pajarito is merely the enforcement of a procedural remedy designed to ease the burden of litigation for recovery of indemnity by the victims of a judicially-declared criminally negligent act.

Branch 56 ("trial court"). and bus driver Danilo A.[G.At the time of the incident. CEREZO. and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent loss of lives or injuries.R. The alias summons and a copy of the complaint were finally served on 20 April 1994 at the office of Atty. 8 On 27 September 1994. Subsequently. with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut[. Valera filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of Tuazon's motion to litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of new summons on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper service in accordance with the Rules of Court. Cerezo ("Mrs. did then and there willfully. his son who is working in Malaysia helps him and sends him once in a while P300. the Court shall proceed to resolve the Motion for Bill of Particulars. AaIDHS The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted testimony of the plaintiff that he is entitled to prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper under existing rules.] 4 On 1 October 1993. Cerezo ("the Cerezo spouses") at the Makati address stated in the complaint. Cerezo"). the defendants do not question on appeal this Order of this Court. plaintiff [Tuazon] was in his proper lane when the second-named defendant [Foronda]. Mabalacat. Sta. and a Certification by the Office of the Municipal Assessor that he has no landholding in the Municipality of Mabalacat. and that he does not have any real property.] HERMANA R. Valera ("Atty. SP No. Atty. Atty. petitioner. his negligence. Valera") of Valera and Valera Law Offices appeared on behalf of the Cerezo spouses. Cerezo.R. the plaintiff [Tuazon] testified that he is presently jobless. the trial court issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file a comment to the opposition to the bill of particulars. 7 On 30 August 1994. J p: The Case This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 to annul the Resolution 2 dated 21 October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Cerezo. carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and becoming disabled. March 23. moral damages. Atty. the Cerezo spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion for reconsideration. a Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate number NYA 241 collided with a tricycle bearing plate number TC RV 126 along Captain M. the Court denies the prayer in the Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion requiring new summons to be served to the defendants. a Certification by the Barangay Captain of his poblacion that his income is not enough for his family‟s subsistence. The trial court ordered petitioner Hermana R. the trial court issued summons against Atty." 5 The records show that the Cerezo spouses participated in the proceedings before the trial court. her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo ("Atty. The order reads: At the hearing on August 30. that at the time of the filing of this case. Cerezo") to pay respondent David Tuazon ("Tuazon") actual damages. the trial court issued an order resolving Tuazon‟s motion to litigate as a pauper and the Cerezo spouses' urgent exparte motion. 6 On 1 August 1994. ano ang gusto mong mangyari? Gusto mong hindi ka makalabas ng buhay dito? Teritoryo ko ito. On 1 October 1993. On 29 August 1994. 141538. 2004. Antecedent Facts Around noontime of 26 June 1993. On 18 April 1994. Atty. 7415. The complaint alleged that: 7. Foronda ("Foronda").00 a month. If within 15 days from receipt of this Order. Pampanga. Attached to the Motion to Litigate as Pauper are his Affidavit that he is unemployed. The Court is of the opinion that any infirmity in the service of the summons to the defendant before plaintiff was allowed to prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper has been cured by this Order. tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. On the other hand. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. the trial court issued alias summons against the Cerezo spouses at their address in Barangay Sta. being then the driver and person in charge of the Country Bus with plate number NYA 241. careless. Tarlac. DAVID TUAZON. The Cerezo spouses filed a comment with motion for bill of particulars dated 29 April 1994 and a reply to opposition to comment with motion dated 13 June 1994. Wala ka sa teritoryo mo . Elpidio B. Camiling. DECISION CARPIO. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of the Decision 3 dated 30 May 1995 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. vs. as well as its Resolution dated 20 January 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration. loss of earnings. 53572. 79 . in Civil Case No. Cerezo reacted angrily on learning of the service of summons upon his person. there being a "Slow Down" sign near the scene of the incident. who was then working as Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor. unlawfully. as owner of the bus line. the summons was returned unserved on 10 November 1993 as the Cerezo spouses no longer held office nor resided in Makati. Maria. Cerezo allegedly told Sheriff William Canlas: "Punyeta. 1994. Palo Street. respondent. and imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules and regulations. Ines. However. Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. Cerezo and Mrs. Province of Pampanga. and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a negligent. and costs of suit. No.

Exhibit 6-A—Postal certification dated January 13. Exhibit 4-A—Signature of the defendant‟s counsel. SO ORDERED. 1994. 11 Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to prove the participation of the Cerezo spouses in the case. 10 Mrs. 1995 80 . Exhibit 3—Minutes of the hearing held on August 1. Exhibit 3-A—Signature of defendant‟s counsel. 1994. Exhibit 7-B—Court‟s return slip addressed to Spouses Juan and Hermana Cerezo. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo‟s business benefited the family. Mrs. mistake or excusable negligence. Exhibit 2—Comment with Motion. Exhibit 4—Minutes of the hearing held on August 30. Valera denied receipt of notices of hearings and of orders of the court. Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default. Cerezo received a copy of the decision on 25 June 1995.000. On 27 January 1995. Cerezo sent him a copy. the trial court issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file their answer within fifteen days from receipt of the order. Atty. 1994. Exhibit 7—Order dated February [illegible]. On 6 February 1995. Exhibit 6—Order dated November 14.300. 1994. The docket fees and other expenses in the filing of this suit shall be lien on whatever judgment may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Exhibit 1-A—Alias summons dated April 20.485. "when he was a senatorial candidate for the KBL Party." Testifying before the trial court. pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Cerezo‟s employee.00 b)For loss of earnings43. pursuant to Article 121(3) of the Fa mily Code.On 14 November 1994. the trial court ruled in Tuazon's favor. The Cerezo spouses did not file an answer. The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda‟s liability because there was no service of sum mons on him. and very busy. Exhibit 8—Decision dated May [30]. Valera claimed that he was able to read the decision of the trial court only after Mrs.35 2)Cost of repair of the tricycle39.00 c)For moral damages20. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera added that he received no notice before or during the 8 May 1995 elections. judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Hermana Cerezo to pay the plaintiff: a)For Actual Damages 1)Expenses for operation and medical treatmentP69. 1995. using his office and residence as Party National Headquarters. The dispositive portion of the trial court‟s decision reads: WHEREFORE. Exhibit 5—Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion. 9 On 30 May 1995. Tuazon presented the following exhibits: Exhibit 1—Sheriff‟s return and summons.921. the trial court issued an order declaring the Cerezo spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to present his evidence." Atty. both Mrs. Cerezo filed before the trial court a petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of "fraud. Exhibit 7-A—Court‟s return slip addressed to Atty. after considering Tuazon's testimonial and documentary evidence. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs.00 d)And to pay the cost of the suit. The trial court did not hold Atty. On 10 July 1995. Elpidio Valera.

53572. 18 On 20 January 2000.R. the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the trial court's order denying the petition for relief from judgment. 14 The petition questioned whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service of summons on Foronda. Cerezo himself signed the petition. the Court of Appeals denied the Cerezo spouses' motion for reconsideration. The trial court stated that having received the decision on 25 June 1995. The former is acquired by the proper service of summons or by the parties' voluntary appearance. while the latter is conferred by law. records show that the petitioner previously filed with the lower court a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground that they were wrongfully declared in default while waiting for an amicable settlement of the complaint for damages. whom the Cerezo spouses claimed was an indispensable party. Exhibit 9-A—Second Page of Exhibit 9. Atty.Exhibit 8-A—Court‟s return slip addressed to defendant Hermana Cerezo. Exhibit 9-B—Third page of Exhibit 9. considering that they continued to participate in the proceedings without filing an answer. Daga") represented Mrs. Exhibit 9-C—Fourth page of Exhibit 9. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment in a resolution dated 21 October 1999. SO ORDERED. The trial court noted that the Cerezo spouses failed to appeal because they relied on an expected settlement of the case. No. 12 On 4 March 1998. Daga ("Atty. SP No. The petition was docketed as CA-G. Atty. and Exhibit 9-E—Court‟s return slip addressed to plaintiff‟s counsel. 48132. the Court would still have denied the petition as the Cerezo spouses failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of Appeals on 6 July 1999 a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 with prayer for restraining order. The Court of Appeals declared that the Cerezo spouses' failure to file an answer was due to their own negligence.R. The court a quo correctly ruled that such petition is without merit. Atty.R. Resolving the matter of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Exhibit 9—Order dated September 21. Exhibit 8-B—Court‟s return slip addressed to defendant‟s counsel. There was also nothing in the records to show that the Cerezo spouses actually offered a reasonable settlement to Tuazon. Section 19(1) of B[atas] P[ambansa] 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the 81 . the trial court issued an order 13 denying the petition for relief from judgment. The resolution reads in part: In this case. Therefore. petitioner having availed of a petition for relief. 16 HCTDIS Undaunted. Exhibit 9-D—Court‟s return slip addressed to Atty. Atty. Even if the petition complied with this requirement. The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Wherefore. this Court rendered a resolution denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure to attach an affidavit of service of copies of the petition to the Court of Appeals and to the adverse parties. Thus. Dionisio S. Norman Dick de Guzman. The proper action for the petitioner is to appeal the order of the lower court denying the petition for relief. 137593. the remedy of an annulment of judgment is no longer available. docketed as G. The Court of Appeals also denied Cerezo spouses' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The Court‟s resolution was entered in the Book of Entries and Judgments when it became final an d executory on 28 June 1999. The trial court refused to grant relief from judgment because the Cerezo spouses could have availed of the remedy of appeal. Moreover. docketed as CA-G. Valera and Atty. the Cerezo spouses should have filed a notice of appeal instead of resorting to a petition for relief from judgment. 17 The petition prayed for the annulment of the 30 May 1995 decision of the trial court and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining execution of the trial court's decision pending resolution of the petition. they also failed to prove that they had a good and substantial defense. The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65. the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant spouses. The defendant spouses admit that during the initial hearing they appeared before the court and even mentioned the need for an amicable settlement. 1995. On 13 April 1999. the instant petition could not be given due course and should accordingly be dismissed. accident. Elpidio Valera. SP No. the Cerezo spouses not only failed to prove fraud. Cerezo in the petition. Elpidio Valera. 19 The Court of Appeals stated: A distinction should be made between a court's jurisdiction over a person and its jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case. mistake or excusable negligence by conclusive evidence. In a resolution 15 dated 21 January 1999.

jurisdiction over the person of defendant Foronda was not acquired. improper filing of civil complaint or improper service of summons) may be waived by the voluntary appearance of parties. alleging "fraud. They even mentioned conferences where attempts were made to reach an amicable settlement with plaintiff. Cerezo claims she did not receive any copy of the order declaring the Cerezo spouses in default.. Despite their number. to the detriment of pauper litigant Tuazon. Records show that the petitioner previously filed with the lower court a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground that they were wrongfully declared in default while waiting for an amicable settlement of the complaint for damages. and Atty. the Court of Appeals assumes that the issues raised in the petition for annulment is based on extrinsic fraud related to the denied petition for relief notwithstanding that the grounds relied upon involves questions of lack of jurisdiction. Cerezo asserts that she only came to know of the default order on 25 June 1995.In dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment. SO ORDERED. Atty. the motion for reconsideration could not be given due course and is hereby DENIED. Valera. However. Mrs. Mrs. 3. 2.In dismissing the Petition for Annulment. it has been proven that jurisdiction over the other defendants was validly acquired by the court a quo. The court a quo correctly ruled that such petition is without merit.In dismissing the Petition for Annulment. The defendant spouses admit to having appeared in the initial hearings and in the hearing for plaintiff‟s motion to litigate as a pauper. the petitioner cannot now raise such issue and question the lower court‟s jurisdiction because petitioner and her husband have waived such right by voluntarily appearing in the civil case for damages. namely. 21 The Court’s Ruling The petition has no merit. Cerezo. Therefore. Thus. Based on the foregoing. xxx xxx xxx Assuming arguendo that private respondent failed to reserve his right to institute a separate action for damages in the criminal action. Mrs. the Court of Appeals ruled that assuming arguendo that private respondent failed to reserve his right to institute a separate action for damages in the criminal action. Mrs. Once again. Mrs. 20 The Issues On 7 February 2000.In dismissing the Petition for Annulment. the petitioner cannot now raise such issue and question the lower court‟s jurisdiction because petitioner [has] waived such right by voluntarily appearing in the civil case for damages notwithstanding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived. It is either by sheer ignorance or by malicious manipulation of legal technicalities that they have managed to delay the disposition of the present case. jurisdiction having been acquired by the voluntary appearance of defendant spouses. Atty. As the issues are interrelated. Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case which is absolute and conferred by law. Cerezo. Cerezo filed before the trial court a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38. Thus it was proper for the lower court to decide the instant case for damages. filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court. when she received a copy of the decision. Cerezo. On 10 July 1995. the findings and the decision of the lower court may bind them. Mrs.litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Daga alone representing her.e. we shall discuss them jointly. The lower court admits the fact that no summons was served on defendant Foronda. Cerezo claims that: 1. it bears stressing that having availed of a petition for relief. the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available. Daga. for which reason he was not held liable in this case. or excusable negligence" as grounds. Cerezo's counsels failed to avail of the proper remedies. However. IAcTaC Remedies Available to a Party Declared in Default An examination of the records of the entire proceedings shows that three lawyers filed and signed pleadings on behalf of Mrs. the Court of Appeals ignored the allegation that defendant-driver Danilo A. the possibility of amicable settlement is not a good and substantial defense which will warrant the granting of said petition. the Court of Appeals disregarded the allegation that the lower court['s] findings of negligence against defendant-driver Danilo Foronda [whom] the lower court did not summon is null and void for want of due process and consequently. any defects [sic] in the acquisition of jurisdiction over a person (i. 4. such findings of negligence which is [sic] null and void cannot become the basis of the lower court to adjudge petitioner-employer liable for civil damages. Foronda whose negligence is the main issue is an indispensable party whose presence is compulsory but [whom] the lower court did not summon. this time with Atty. 82 . mistake.

or could have been used as a ground. Cerezo admitted that she received a copy of the trial court‟s decision on 25 June 1995. in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment. Cerezo‟s petition for relief from judgment. Extrinsic fraud is not a valid ground if such fraud was used as a ground. Cerezo‟s motion for reconsideration. 7415. Cerezo filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the trial court under Rule 47. questioning the denial of the petition for relief from judgment. in her last ditch attempt to evade liability. mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal. On 11 March 1999. 3(b). he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1] of Rule 38. a motion for new trial. he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37. The trial court stated that Mrs. there was no fraud. and he was not prevented by fraud. or a petition for certiorari. Indeed. or excusable negligence that prevented Mrs. even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him (Sec. On 7 February 2000. Cerezo could have availed of appeal as a remedy and that she failed to prove that the judgment was entered through fraud. the trial court denied Mrs. a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is also available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default. Cerezo‟s petiti on. and if based on lack of jurisdiction. the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment. Lina v. She could have availed of the power of the Court of Appeals to try cases and conduct hearings. but before the same has become final and executory. 30 Tuason v. 25 Mrs. a motion for new trial or a petition for certiorari. b)If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default. Court of Appeals 22 enumerates the remedies available to a party declared in default: a)The defendant in default may. pursuant to Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which has been lost thru inexcusable negligence. An order of default is interlocutory. Based on this admission. (Emphasis added) Moreover. before laches or estoppel bars the petition. Cerezo from filing an appeal. and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment. the appellate court may declare void both the order of default and the judgment of default. Mrs. Meanwhile. After our resolution denying Mrs. if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. Clearly. as far as the same is material and competent to establish the issues. accident. file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud. Mrs. mistake. which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court. Cerezo an order of execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. accident. Rule 41). Cerezo also had the alternative of filing under Rule 65 28 a petition for certiorari assailing the order of default within 60 days from notice of the judgment. If based on extrinsic fraud. 3. a party must file the petition within four years from its discovery. The recorded evidence taken in the former trial. Mrs. shall be used at the new trial without retaking the same. accident. the trial court issued over the objection of Mrs. receive evidence. On 21 January 1999. and perform all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its appellate jurisdiction. or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default. and d)He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law. If the trial court grants a new trial. On 6 July 1999. Evidently. On 21 October 1999. and the action will stand for trial de novo. Rule 18 [now Sec. which is available only in exceptional cases. It was error for her to avail of a petition for relief from judgment. 27 Mrs. Cerezo could have appealed under Rule 41 24 from the default judgment within 15 days from notice of the judgment. a mere eight days after our resolution became final and executory. Mrs. and an aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. However. Cerezo opted to file a petition for relief from judgment. On 24 February 1999. or excusable negligence. Court of Appeals 31 explained the nature of a petition for relief from judgment: When a party has another remedy available to him. Cerezo also had the option to file under Rule 37 26 a motion for new trial within the period for taking an appeal. Cerezo's petition for relief became final and executory. Cerezo then filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 assailing the denial of the petition for relief from judgment. mistake or excusable negligence. Cerezo filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the dismissal of her petition for annulment of judgment. accident. We denied the petition and our resolution became final and executory on 28 June 1999. c)If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory. 23 Mrs. relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. Rule 9]). Cerezo filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. 29 In a petition for certiorari. 32 CaASIc 83 . Mrs. the Court of Appeals denied Mrs. Ce rezo had at least three remedies at her disposal: an appeal. on 25 August 1999. Mrs. Annulment is available only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. 2. he cannot avail himself of this petition. mistake. filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the trial court. A petition for relief from judgment should be filed within the reglementary period of 60 days from knowledge of judgment and six months from entry of judgment. On 20 January 2000. Mrs.On 4 March 1998. Mrs. Cerezo had every opportunity to avail of these remedies within the reglementary periods provided under the Rules of Court. the appellate court denied Mrs. the Court of Appeals dismissed Mrs. the original judgment is vacated. Mrs. Cerezo. Cerezo's motion for reconsideration.

Cerezo insists that lack of jurisdiction. as in this case. 45 The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another).Mrs. The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover. In contrast. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. The trial court‟s acquisition o f jurisdiction over Mrs. Mrs. the present petition should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. The choice of remedy." 38 The trial court thus found Mrs. while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil Code. Moreover. we shall discuss the issues raised in the present petition to clear any doubt about the correctness of the decision of the trial court. a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. Cerezo's person. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. while the employer's liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. Thus. Cerezo actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the party. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court‟s action in the litigation. not extrinsic fraud. When an employee causes damage. Hence. which was denied with finality. Cerezo's liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary. the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. There is no merger or renunciation of rights. Cerezo could have availed of a new trial or appeal but through her own fault she erroneously availed of the remedy of a petition for relief. The defense of lack of jurisdiction fails in light of her active participation in the trial court proceedings. affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action. but only mutual representation. the 84 . The extraordinary action to annul a final judgment is restricted to the grounds specified in the rules. the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. However. not delict under the Revised Penal Code. an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct. appeal. Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on Foronda. the trial court clearly acquired jurisdiction over Mrs. Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda‟s "recklessness. 33 Mrs. 35 Nevertheless." aggravated by Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 42 Therefore. particularly Foronda. however. Mrs. Cerezo may no longer avail of the remedy of annulment. Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition for annulment is lack of jurisdiction. the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. Mrs. gross negligence and imprudence. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. 44 Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee. each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. Cerezo's assertion. Cerezo." as contrasted with "subsidiary. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. it is also primary and direct." refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. 40 Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon‟s action for damages against Mrs. 37 Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Cerezo alone. Article 2180 states in part: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least. as what happened in this case. 46 Thus. "without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her employees and buses. In his complaint. Cerezo‟s contention proceeds from the point of view of criminal law and not of civil law. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case on the merits. that it is subsidiary to the principal action. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee's criminal negligence. There would be no end to litigation if parties who have unsuccessfully availed of any of the appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault could still bring an action for annulment of judgment. Cerezo’s Liability and the Trial Court’s Acquisition of Jurisdiction Mrs. Mrs. was her ground for filing the petition for annulment of judgment. without including the author of the act. whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict. 39 However. In any event. petition for relief from judgment." hired Foronda as her driver. 34 For these reasons. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action. either of the parties is indispensable. The idea that the employer‟s liability is solely subsidiary is wrong. Such contention betrays a faulty foundation. an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. 36 There is. Mrs. Tuazon alleged that Mrs. a party may avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 only if the ordinary remedies of new trial. Cerezo. Estoppel or laches may also bar lack of jurisdiction as a ground for nullity especially if raised for the first time on appeal by a party who participated in the proceedings before the trial court. Mrs. and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. Cerezo‟s "lac k of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees. 41 Where the obligation of the parties is solidary. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict. Contrary to Mrs. or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 43 The words "primary and direct.

Contrary to Mrs. in lieu of 6% per annum. The words of Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. [T]o hold that there is only one way to make defendant‟s liability effective. 53572. 51 The 6% per annum interest shall commence from 30 May 1995. because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay. but there is also a more expeditious way. .R. interest at 12% per annum. to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter‟s) property first. Garcia still hold true today as much as it did in 1942: . 47 If the present action proceeds from a delict. 48 Moreover. SO ORDERED. 85 . Why. is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount due shall earn legal interest at 6% per annum computed from 30 May 1995. unnecessary. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the present case. courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice. the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per annum. then. Cerezo even in the absence of Foronda. then the trial court‟s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. we DENY the instant petition for review. would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. The Resolution dated 21 October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. any irregularity in the service of summons that might have vitiated the trial court‟s jurisdiction over the persons of t he Cerezo spouses was deemed waived when the Cerezo spouses filed a petition for relief from judgment. the present ac tion is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. True. the date of the decision of the trial court. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action because he opted to file a civil action for damages against Mrs. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs. in lieu of 6% per annum. and that is. as well as its Resolution dated 20 January 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration. should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout. Upon finality of this decision. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for her own civil negligence. Upon finality of this decision. WHEREFORE. SP No.aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee‟s delict and corresponding primary liability are establish ed. until full payment. it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and other similar public conveyances do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. To uphold the Cerezo spouses' contention would make a fetish of a technicality. which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article [2180] of the Civil Code. is due on the amount of damages adjudged by the trial court until full payment. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda. 50 Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is due on the amount of damages adjudged by the trial court. there is such a remedy under our laws. However. The Cerezo spouses' contention that summons be served anew on them is untenable in light of their participation in the trial court proceedings. and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws. 49 HTaIAC We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction and was competent to decide the case in favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo's contention. the date of the trial court‟s decision. .

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imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic complaint for damages in Civil Case No. an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action. entitled People of the Philippines v. 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA). 1998. Branch 43. the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint 3 for damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver.[G. like the conviction of the accused employee and his insolvency. as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10. Bacolod City. the CA denied the petition and upheld the trial court. No. docketed as Criminal Case No. During pre-trial. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 67787. hence the of lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. Civil Code. a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera.] L. petitioners. PHILADELFA B. which was already dismissed. Truly enough. vs. they contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. 2003. before the trial could be concluded. Vincent Norman Yeneza . principally arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an employer" under the provision of Article 103 5 of the Revised Penal Code. 2003.R. September 26. the MTCC.R. 67600. and SPS. 2001. Partly says the CA in its challenged issuance: xxx xxx xxx It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that the responsibility charged was the petitioner's subsidiary liability under Art. 2001. of the required memorandum of authorities. the defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. Verily. 103. 2006. 1999. SP No. the petitioners then went on certiorari to the CA in CA-G. claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action. Bacolod City. In an Order dated September 4. 67600. the complaint does not even allege the basic elements for such a liability. in the RTC of Bacolod City. 99-10845. 2 in CA-G. Ergo. HON. basically alleging that as such employers. cITCAa Instead. dismissed the criminal case. On June 23. DECISION GARCIA. affirming an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City. the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled. Charles Vallereja. in its order of September 30.G.R. 87 . In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. IEHDAT xxx xxx xxx Specifically. the accused driver committed suicide. They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR. FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA. On account thereof. Vice-President and General Manager. 99-10845. the trial court required them to file within ten days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their position. With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its subsequent order 7 of September 26. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR. 158995. Revised Penal Code. which is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code. In time. 2176. including the deceased driver. Civil Case No. 99-10845. Charles died as a result of the accident. 6 the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial. an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident thereat instituted by the herein private respondents — the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera — against the petitioners. evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. 1996. the defendant petitioners insisted that their dismissal prayer be resolved. CcADHI Unfortunately. however. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. Prescinding therefrom. a civil action to enforce subsidiary liability separate and distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary. The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows: On February 26. J p: Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision 1 dated April 25. As pointed out [by the trial court] in the Order of September 4. SP No. Hence. the complaint was raffled to Branch 43 of the court. In the herein assailed decision 8 dated April 25. Branch 43. 4 the petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son. in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court. 2001. which denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. respondents. Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple.

then remorse-stricken [accused] committed suicide.That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered owner of a Ford Fiera Van with Plate No. Admittedly.That as a result of said incident. 13 the intentional torts.) In time. 16 Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender. 7 years old. Bacolod City. inter alia. 14 and culpa aquiliana 15 ). 99-10845. 11 Corollarily. 7.That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employee." but the same was dismissed because pending litigation.That a criminal case was filed against the defendant's employee.That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence of defendant's employee. 1) civil liability ex delicto. docketed as Criminal Case No. the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in its resolution 9 of July 10. was hit and bumped by above-described vehicle then driven by said employee. We DENY.) CTaSEI Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests. even remotely. the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners.therefore. plaintiffs' son suffered multiple body injuries which led to his untimely demise on that very day. Case No. or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Charles Vallejera. if exercised. is direct and immediate. Yeneza" for "Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide. 2003. cEaTHD 4. NMS 881 and employer sometime February of 1996 of one Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. (earlier filed as Crim. Rule 2. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees. the petitioners' present recourse on their submission that the appellate court committed reversible error in upholding the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. would have prevented said incident. As the Court sees it. (Bracketed words and emphasis ours. as maintained by the petitioners.That sometime February 26. herein defendants LG Food Corporation who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee.g. the liability under Art. and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee or prior showing of the latter's insolvency.That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant death suffered by the late minor Charles Vallejera were due to the negligence and imprudence of defendant's employee. Clear it is. as follows: xxx xxx xxx 3. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law. the complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. as employers.M. (Underscoring in the original. 99-10845 is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. i. Hence. It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. contracts. Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. 5. 2180. negligently and at a high speed without regard to traffic condition and safety of other road users and likewise to the fault and negligence of the owner employer. an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender. that the herein petitioners are being made to account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. however. entitled "People v. As correctly pointed out by the trial court in its order of September 4. xxx xxx xxx 8.e. could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son. recklessly. Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if exercised. 9. Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. at Rosario St.. 6. who drove said vehicle. 17 88 . 2001 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss. as ruled by the two courts below. delicts or quasidelicts." Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come from law. 67787. such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency. 1996 at around 2:00 P. That complaint alleged. or derived from Article 2180 10 of the Civil Code.. quasi contracts. of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the "act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.. a salesman of said corporation. 12 and 2) independent civil liabilities. from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. 96-17570 before RTC) before MTC-Branch III. the minor son of said plaintiffs [now respondents]. To stress. IEHTaA Section 2. the sole issue for resolution is whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action in Civil Case No. which diligence. Civil Code. such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.

it is worthy to note that the petitioners. There. If. To start with. CA. 99-10845 was filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy can be obtained by them against the petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal case against their driver during the pendency thereof. All told. 24 repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and anchored their defense on their allegation that "they had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their] employees. The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any pronouncement having been made therein. they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. as here. the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. Costs against the petitioners. In reality. if exercised. the driver. in their Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim. the criminal case against the employee driver was prematurely terminated due to his death. Civil Case No. Civil Case No. Citing Maniago v. that such accused driver is insolvent. which diligence. that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Plainly. therefore. the spouses' recourse was. SEDIaH The argument is specious.Stated otherwise. and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee. it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. would have prevented said accident." The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the private respondents' cause of action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. and of Title XVIII of this Book. 89 . It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. Preliminary Title on Human Relation. subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee. the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible. SO ORDERED. CETDHA Besides. the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was caused by the negligent act of the petitioners' driver. 22 Here. if the action chosen is for culpa criminal. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. On the other hand. 23 Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver. precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings. therefor. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. the action chosen is for quasi-delict. 99-10845 should have been dismissed for failure of the respondent spouses to make a reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages when the criminal case against the driver was filed. to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict. Here. victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint. Thus." Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. 18 Article 1161 19 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 2177 20 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2. the civil case was filed while the criminal case against the employee was still pending. regulating damages. the petitioners' reliance on Maniago is obviously misplaced. even though the former is not engaged in any business or industry. and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 — Civil Code to recover damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee. IN VIEW WHEREOF. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. 25 petitioner would argue that Civil Case No. 21 and not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action or lack of it based on the defendant's perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Precisely.

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(Exhs. Jr. 1971 and then from September 15 to 25. Bayot (67 Phil. that at first. JR.25 as evidenced by receipts in his possession. Jr. Acting through the Third Division. sustained injuries on his leg. respondents.200. H to H-7). that plaintiff Virgilio Catuar was shown to the middle of the road. Inc. was running moderately at 20 to 35 kilometers per hour — and while approaching Roosevelt Avenue. that likewise plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento. petitioner. that suddenly. Antonio Sarmiento. ABSOLUTE RULES NOT APPLIED UNQUALIFIEDLY UNLESS THEY FIT FOUR SQUARE WITH PENDING CASES.TORTS AND DAMAGES. The facts are summarized in the contested decision. Plaintiffs likewise tried to prove that plaintiff Virgilio Catuar. the records of the petition fail to indicate the slightest indicia of an employer-employee relationship between the owner and the erring driver or any consent given by the owner for the vehicle's use. "Evidence also shows that as a result of the incident. to August 29. K). No. with a salary of P500. and then was transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital.[G. 1971). particularly the windshield. Sr. the differential. that plaintiff's jeep. and as a result of the incident. 131-133-134) [1939] that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him.00 for repairs of the jeep. plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento. "Defendant Gualberto Duavit. plaintiff Sarmiento was unable to perform his normal work for a period of at least 8 months. medicine and allied expenses. consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Virgilio Catuar. San Juan. Sr. owned by plaintiff. and that for hospitalization and medical attendance. 91 . and Norberto Bernarte it appears that on July 28. spent no less than P13.00 a month. another jeep with plate number 99-97-F-J. immediately after the accident was taken to Immaculate Concepcion Hospital. he also works as accountant of United Haulers. Dela Cruz for petitioner. is employed as Assistant Accountant of the Canlubang Sugar Estate with a salary of P1.] GILBERTO M. vs. THE HON. Sr. that while plaintiff Catuar was not confined in the hospital. 99-07-F-J Manila. while admitting ownership of the other jeep (Plate No. Where. Sr. J p: This petition raises the sole issue of whether or not the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of the latter. 1971. 2. he was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital (Exh. Virgilio Catuar slowed down. as follows: "From the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs. 1971 plaintiffs Antonio Sarmiento. SYLLABUS 1. plaintiff Catuar spent P5.464.000. his wrist was broken and he sustained contusions on the head. Ortega & Castillo for respondents. SR. Sr. his wrist was in a plaster cast for a period of one month. and ANTONIO SARMIENTO. and one of his legs was fractured. and the contusions on his head were under treatment for about two (2) weeks. "Proofs were adduced also to show that plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento. that his leg was in a plaster cast for a period of eight (8) months. OWNER OF A VEHICLE IS NOT LIABLE FOR AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING THE VEHICLE IF DRIVEN WITHOUT THE OWNER'S CONSENT BY ONE NOT EMPLOYED BY HIM. Manila 1971 driven by defendant Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff's jeep on the portion near the left rear wheel.R. that for hospitalization. & VIRGILIO CATUAR. that as sideline. "The plaintiffs have filed this case both against Oscar Sabiniano as driver. the part near the left rear wheel and the top cover the jeep. he was incapacitated to work for a period of one (1) month. 1971. — The Court cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on precedents whose facts do not jibe four square with pending cases. Ruperto Catuar was driving the said jeep on Ortigas Avenue. and against Gualberto Duavit as owner of the jeep. we cannot hold the owner liable. May 18. denied that the other defendant (Oscar Sabiniano) was his employee. Every case must be determined on its own peculiar factual circumstances. Lozada. COURT OF APPEALS. as shown by the receipts of payment of labor and spare parts (Exhs. — The Supreme Court ruled in Duquilleo v. Rizal. N to N-1). and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep with plate number 77-99-F-1-Manila.00 a month. "Evidence also shows that the plaintiff Virgilio Catuar spent a total of P2. 1989.. DUAVIT. as Public Respondent.00. Ruperto Catuar. and as a result of the impact plaintiff's jeep fell on its right and skidded by about 30 yards. at the time.00 a month. DECISION GUTIERREZ. Bito. Duavit claimed that he has not been an employer of defendant Oscar Sabiniano at anytime up to the present.CIVIL PROCEDURE.. as in this case. 82318.785. that as a result plaintiff's jeep was damaged. plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento. Rodolfo d. was trapped inside the fallen jeep. evidence shows that the other plaintiff Virgilio Catuar is a Chief Clerk in Canlubang Sugar Estate with a salary of P500. and that as a result of this incident. but later he was confined at the Makati Medical Center from July 29. On the other hand.

thus. as regards the public and third persons. 26-27). relying on his representation. 103 [1957] and Vargas v. the defendant-appellee Gualberto Duavit cannot be allowed to prove that the driver Sabiniano was not his employee at the time of the vehicular accident. . neither the defendant nor Father Ayson. "Defendant Oscar Sabiniano. 63 O. in his testimony. just before the accident occurred. pp. This Court sustained the trial court's ruling that since Jepte represented himself to be the owner of the truck and the Motor Vehicles Office. We further ruled that the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law. cited by the appellant. this petition. . and much less by a chauffeur who was not in charge of driving it. It necessarily follows from all this that articles 1101 and following of the Civil Code. As early as in 1939. supra. 8). Soberano (1966). (Rollo. he was still held liable for the death of Erezo. Jepte. therefore. and as such is responsible for the consequences incident to its operator. September 7. "The ruling laid down in Amar V. the errors attributed to the inferior court are without basis. It is a conclusive presumption of fact and law. Sabiniano claims that it was plaintiff's vehicle which hit and bumped their jeep. When the Supreme Court ruled. registered the vehicle in his name.G." (Rollo. categorically admitted that he took the jeep from the garage of defendant Duavit without the consent or authority of the latter (TSN. The appellate court in part ruled: "We cannot go along with appellee's argument. 1966 up to January 4. 1988. and it is even not necessary to prove who the actual owner of the vehicle and who the employer of the driver is. and is not subject to rebuttal of proof to the contrary. have no application in this case. Otherwise. the truck belonged to the Port Brokerage in an arrangement with the corporation but the same was not known to the Motor Vehicles Office. the driver of the truck was fully authorized to drive it. He testified further. who was in charge of her business. The petitioner contends that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in holding him jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano in spite of the absence of an employer-employee relationship between them and despite the fact that the petitioner's jeep was taken out of his garage and was driven by Sabiniano without his consent. Langcay (6 SCRA 174 [1962]) cannot be sustained. 131-133-134) [1939] we said: "Under the facts established." The Court upholds the above ruling as still relevant and better applicable to present day circumstances. affirmed Vargas' liability since she failed to surrender to the Motor Vehicles Office the corresponding AC plates in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and Commonwealth Act No. makes it appear that he was taking all necessary precaution while driving and the accident occurred due to the negligence of Virgilio Catuar. The respondent court's misplaced reliance on the cases of Erezo v. The vehicle 92 . Thus.' it cannot be construed other than that the registered owner is the employer of the driver in contemplation of law. Court of Appeals. . as it was a holy day."On the other hand documentary and testimonial evidence show that defendant Oscar Sabiniano was an employee of the Board of Liquidators from November 14. Langcay. so that at the time of the accident she was no longer the owner of the jeepney. the registered owner of the truck which collided with a taxicab. it may. 1978. It will be seen that in Vargas v. absolved from liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. pp. that Duavit even filed charges against him for theft of the jeep. Hence. claimed that at the time of the accident. but which Duavit did not push through as his (Sabiniano's) parents apologized to Duavit on his behalf. by this Court to the effect that the burden of proving the non-existence of an employer-employee relationship is upon the defendant and this he must do by a satisfactory preponderance of evidence. (See Tugade v. Thus. 230). Likewise. Jepte (102 Phil. and. be said. "Defendant Sabiniano. The private respondents appealed the case. 146. consented to have any of her trucks driven on the day of the accident. as stated in the decision. in the Vargas case. Significantly. that there was not the remotest contractual relation between the deceased Pio Duquillo and the defendant. we have ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him. nor did he have anything to do with the latter's business. has to defer to the doctrines evolved by the Supreme Court in cases of damages arising from vehicular mishaps involving registered motor vehicle. James McGurk was driving the truck. the Court of Appeals rendered the questioned decision holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano. in Duquillo v. the Government and all persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on his declaration of ownership and registration. In the Erezo case. 85 SCRA 226. p. and he was not an employee of the defendant. the use of the defendant's truck in the circumstances indicated was done without her consent or knowledge. 6850. therefore. of the driver. it was held that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually employed by the operator of record or registered owner.' " Along the same vein. Bayot (67 Phil. and which resulted in the killing of Erezo. nevertheless. we quote: " 'The purpose of the principles evolved by the decisions in these matters will be defeated and thwarted if we entertain the argument of petitioner that she is not liable because the actual owner and employer was established by the evidence. 21-23) The trial court found Oscar Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but found no employer-employee relationship between him and the petitioner because the latter was then a government employee and he took the vehicle without the authority and consent of the owner. . 1973 (Annex A of Answer). This court. At the time of the accident. Vargas had sold her jeepney to a third person. even if Jepte were not the owner of the truck at the time of the accident. thus: `We must hold and consider such owner-operator of record (registered owner) as the employer in contemplation of law. On January 7. The appellate court also denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. the defendant cannot be held liable for anything. on the other hand in an attempt to exculpate himself from liability. The petitioner was.

without the owner's consent. therefore.involved was a public utility jeepney for hire. 1981 is REINSTATED. In this regard. In such cases. the law does not only require the surrender of the AC plates but orders the vendor operator to stop the operation of the jeepney as a form of public transportation until the matter is reported to the authorities. as in this case. Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in the mishap but completely denies having employed the driver Sabiniano or even having authorized the latter to drive his jeep. To hold. the petition is GRANTED and the decision and resolution appealed from are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Branch 6. Every case must be determined on its own peculiar factual circumstances. WHEREFORE. dated July 30. SO ORDERED. 93 . the records of the petition fail to indicate the slightest indicia of an employer-employee relationship between the owner and the erring driver or any consent given by the owner for the vehicle's use. the circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those in the present case. Where. the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. find that the respondent appellate court committed reversible error in holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano to the private respondent. we cannot hold the owner liable. The decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna. vehicles entrusted to them for servicing or repair. As can be seen. LLpr We cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on precedents whose facts do not jibe four square with pending cases. therefore. we cannot ignore the many cases of vehicles forcibly taken from their owners at gunpoint or stolen from garages and parking areas and the instances of service station attendants or mechanics of auto repair shops using. We. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner's garage. 8th Judicial District.

94 .

and costs of suit. Fausto Leus Retrita.. PROPERTY RELATIONS. 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. Leus. Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant..TORTS AND DAMAGES. Javier and Ricardo A." 95 . et al. etc. Fabros. for appellees. for appellants. EUGENIO JOSE.00 for the life of each of said deceased. 47-48. decision was rendered. SYLLABUS 1. Luis Viscocho and Francisco E.500. Nestor del Rosario Añonuevo and Arceli de la Cueva in the sum of P12.00 plus legal interest from date of complaint until fully paid and costs of suit. or their marriage is void from the beginning. prcd In the resulting cases for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. At the time of the accident. the registered owner of the subject passenger jeepney. vs. The lower court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code which reads: "When a man and woman living together as husband and wife.[G. defendants and appellants. but they are not married. Rollo). Rosalia Arroyo. New Civil Code). or may be caused to any of the passengers therein. SP-872.. Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23. and that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation. The Supreme Court held that the co-ownership contemplated in the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not be incapacitated to contract marriage.MARRIAGE. L-50127-28. ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to pay the respective heirs of the deceased Josefa P. Jr.000. ordering Eugenio Jose. 1979. but was denied. Victoriano O. but they are not married. Decision modified. Jr. a legally married man. INC. or may be caused to any of the passengers therein. — It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation." (pp. the dispositive part of which reads as follows: "(4)In Civil Case No. however. with legal interest from date of complaint.R. DECISION DE CASTRO. THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY. SP-867 ordering defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to pay plaintiff Victor Juaniza the sum of P1. March 30. the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership (Article 144. and ROSALIA ARROYO. requires that both parties are not in anyway incapacitated to contract marriage. plaintiffs and appellees. or their marriage is void from the beginning. (5)In Civil Case No. COMMON LAW SPOUSES. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant. Rosalia claims that it was error for the trial court to consider her a co-owner of hte said jeepney. and Rosalia Arroyo to jointly and severally pay damages to the victims of the accident. Rodrigo. Heirs of Josefa P. the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The co-ownership contemplated. just because she had cohabited for many years as wife of Eugenio Jose. — When a man and woman live together as husband and wife. J p: This case was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court on the ground that the questions raised in the appeal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna are purely questions of law. Nos. for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife. Leus.] VICTOR JUANIZA. SYNOPSIS The trial court rendered a decision in a civil case for damages arising from a vehicular accident. REGISTERED OWNER OF PUBLIC SERVICE VEHICLE SOLELY LIABLE. 2.

1964. concur. 1959. Rosalia Arroyo is hereby declared free from any liability for damages and the appealed decision is hereby modified accordingly. 1055. 96 . Appellant's Brief). 102 Phil. Rosalia Arroyo. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos. who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages caused by its operation. L-8561. Makasiar. are co-owners of said jeepney. the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision. certified the same to Us. without the benefit of marriage. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. No costs. Rodriguez. 1955. Fernandez. Aznar. Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. Montoya vs. 54 OG 5526.Rosalia Arroyo then filed her appeal with the Court of Appeals which. prcd Teehankee (Chairman). Osmeña vs. having lived together as husband and wife. and (2) whether or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with the registered owner of the same. Malajacan vs. and physical injuries suffered by. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE. L-11483.. (Camporedondo vs. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of. 2. February 4. the question raised being purely legal as may be seen from the lone assigned error as follows: "The lower court erred in holding defendant-appellant Rosalia Arroyo liable 'for damages resulting from the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers' of the jeepney registered in the name of Eugenio Jose. Roque vs. July 31. May 29. L-5868. Rubi. December 29. Mangusang. Ignacio. JJ. 11 SCRA 598. Aquino. 1953). as previously stated. L-12634 and L-12720. on the erroneous theory that Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo. 1068. there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Tamayo vs. L-18110." (p. (De Peralta vs. It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. in view of the foregoing. November 18. 1958. or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein. 42 OG 5576). Malibay Transit. Guerrero and Melencio Herrera. The issues thus to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry.

This petition was denied by the Supreme Court and the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint was affirmed.[G. Ferrer & Evangelista Law Offices and Santiago Arevalo Tomas & Associates for petitioner. its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle? LLjur This was a two-car collision at dawn. DAMAGES. Consequently." 2. petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict. petitioner insists that respondents FILCAR and Fortune are liable on the strength of the Supreme Court ruling that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another.ID. 2184 of the same Code which provides: " In motor vehicle mishap. ACcDEa SYLLABUS 1. At around 3 o'clock of 21 April 1987. DEFINED.. ID.. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. is obliged to pay for the damage done. because only the fault or negligence of DahlJensen was sufficiently established. 97 .R. prevented the misfortune . The trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation. REQUISITES. could have by the use of due diligence. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. No. — The liability imposed by Art. Carpio. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of the negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder. Art.] FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION. the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable . 2180 with Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Nicolas A. . — To sustain a claim based thereon. QUASI-DELICT. there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation paid Soriano an amount in accordance with their insurance contract. One car is owned by Lydia F. cruising northward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. the owner is solidarily liable with his driver. 1998. 2180 of the Civil Code arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of the negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder. Petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict. J p: For damages suffered by a third party. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen. figured in a traffic accident. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Gerochi. As such. logically. The car bearing Plate No..ID. ID. aTEHIC DECISION BELLOSILLO. who was in the vehicle. petitioner. and FORTUNE INSURANCE CORPORATION. Mandaluyong City. CASE AT BAR. Jr. ID. WHEN CAR OWNER MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE. as lessee. . as correctly observed by respondent court. We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite. i. there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Soriano and driven by Benjamin Jacildone. it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. 2184 of the Civil Code is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. while the other car is owned by FILCAR Transport... March 23. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. with Plate No. Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone.. NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. Yet. this provision of Art. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties." Obviously. for Filcar. not that of FILCAR. if the former . INC. is called a quasi-delict . Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein. ICHcTD 3. while the other car. the former not being the employer of the latter. Inc.CIVIL LAW. The liability imposed by Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: " Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. two (2) vehicles. We now correlate par. PERSONS LIABLE. As such. COURT OF APPEALS. The provision of Art. Inc. the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff. there being fault or negligence. By way of subrogation. derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. Such fault or negligence.. ID. fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR. vs. . and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. — The pertinent provision is Art. 5 of Art. FILCAR TRANSPORT. In this appeal. Clearly. . and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen. its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen. may an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company and. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. 118889. both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers. respondents.. the former not being the employer of the latter. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle. SYNOPSIS This case involves a collision of two cars. consequently.e.

(b) fault or negligence of the defendant. . the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff. 3 On 31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court although based on another ground.. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. Art. Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasi-delict provides: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions. derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Vda. The father and. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. Such fault or negligence. 5 of Art. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. i.e. and. a Danish tourist. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. could have by the use of due diligence. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen. 2 it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. As such.20. i. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street. he was dropped from the complaint. 7 Yet.. the mother. but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. The liability imposed by Art. In this appeal.PCT 792. so long as they remain in their custody. If the 98 . Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein." To sustain a claim based thereon. At that time Dahl-Jensen. if the former. petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict. The pertinent provision is Art. 1 As a consequence. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. the owner is solidarily liable with his driver. Lastly. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. as correctly observed by respondent court. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder. . Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. in case of his death or incapacity. in view of its insurance contract with Soriano. paid the latter P25. is obliged to pay for the damage done. On 30 July 1991 the trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation. there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. upon motion of petitioner. only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR. 2184 of the same Code which provides: " In motor vehicle mishap. in fact. left of the other vehicle. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. . We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint. (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.382. the former not being an employer of the latter. petitioner insists that respondents are liable on the strength of the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. By way of subrogation. 2180 with Art. 6 We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite. there being fault or negligence. summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given address. because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established. owned by respondent FILCAR Transport. Unfortunately. 4 In other words. who was in the vehicle. was at the center lane. We now correlate par. is called a quasi-delict . . Inc. (FILCAR). 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. did not possess a Philippine driver's license. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR. de Caldo 5 that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another. prevented the misfortune . not that of FILCAR.e. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent. and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee.

and. The trial court was not persuaded as it found that the true nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the burdens and responsibilities of an employer. the petition is DENIED. petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict. We upheld this finding and affirmed the declaration of joint and several liability of the corporation with its driver. WHEREFORE. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. that the driver was not its employee but of the lessee. the corporation raised the defense that at the time of the collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it was leased to another. logically. this provision of Art.owner was not in the motor vehicle. the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused injuries to several persons and damage to property. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 31 January 1995 sustaining the dismissal of petitioner's complaint by the trial court is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Costs against petitioner. the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. Intending to exculpate itself from liability. Clearly. cdasia 99 . Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that case. its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper." Obviously.

100 .

SO ORDERED. (b)P150. 5 and turned over the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt to Jalipa. judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff declaring Atty. Atty. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to Abraham Abubakar on June 20. Medardo Ag.J p: For review on certiorari are the Decision 1 dated September 16. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally liable for damages to the plaintiff for their own negligence as stated above. which affirmed the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. the instant appeal is DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case No.] MEDARDO AG.000.85 as reimbursement of medical expenses. the orthopedic surgeon who attended to the respondent.R.723-95.[G. 1994. Branch 10. Cimafranca rushed the respondent to the Davao Medical Center. aETDIc The facts are undisputed. Petitioner Cadiente raises the following as issues: 101 . Jalipa claimed that he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera at the time of the accident. 23723-95 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Branch 10. 4 Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared. as well as open bone fractures in both thighs and other parts of his legs. 2002 and the Resolution 2 dated December 18. the surgeon had to amputate both legs up to the groins. CADIENTE. November 14. the court ruled: WHEREFORE. (c)P18. 8 He thus filed a fourth-party complaint 9 against Abubakar. it decreed as follows: WHEREFORE. respondent. Cadiente. 161946.m..00 as compensatory damages for the permanent and almost total disability being suffered by him. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to Engr. Thus. in Civil Case No. In order to save his life. was standing on the shoulder of the road. at about 4:00 p. Dr.982. Cadiente claimed that when the accident happened. 2008. 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. However. The victim's father. Acting C. vs. filed a complaint 6 for torts and damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente before the RTC of Davao City. driven by Chona C. (d)P30. Eyewitness Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19.00 for attorney's fees. 10 On appeal. Hilario Diaz. Medardo Ag. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in the name of herein petitioner. 11 From the aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals and the subsequent denial of the motion for reconsideration. and ordering them to indemnify the plaintiff jointly and severally as follows: TcDIaA (a)P300. 1994. She was about two and a half meters away from the respondent when he was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera.000. the Court of Appeals held that the findings of the trial court were in accordance with the established facts and was supported by the evidence on record. Samuel Macas. and (e)costs of suit. In answer. CV No. DECISION QUISUMBING. BITHUEL MACAS. No. premises considered. Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint 7 against Jalipa. 15-year old high school student Bithuel Macas. 64103. Cimafranca. only Cadiente appealed to this Court.R. with the understanding that the latter would be the one to cause the transfer of the registration. The instant petition alleges that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in affirming the decision of the trial court. herein respondent. 23. testified that the respondent suffered severe muscular and major vessel injuries. Rogelio Jalipa on March 28.000. Cadiente and Engr.00 for moral damages. petitioner. he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. at the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in Davao City. 1994. Rosalinda and another unidentified person immediately came to the respondent's rescue and told Cimafranca to take the victim to the hospital. After trial.

13 DHAcET The petitioner further argues that having filed a third-party complaint against Jalipa. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE INJURED PARTY? II. for his part.. took off from the cemented part of the highway. such as those loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. As noted by the trial court. 18 that the registered owner of any vehicle. The respondent cannot be expected to have foreseen that the Ford Fiera. the shoulder was intended for pedestrian use alone. which indicated collusion between the petitioner and Jalipa. 14 The respondent. We explained. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. by collusion with others or otherwise. the victim was standing on the shoulder. Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is. to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person. The defendant is thus held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. He insists that when he was hit by the vehicle. to whom he had sold the Ford Fiera. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full. 16 After a careful consideration of the parties' submissions. damage or injury caused by the vehicle. it would be easy for him. which was the uncemented portion of the highway. counters that the immediate and proximate cause of the injuries he suffered was the recklessly driven Ford Fiera. Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. this Court has recently reiterated in PCI Leasing and Finance. He maintains that the alleged sale of the vehicle to Jalipa was tainted with irregularity. . without so much as slowing down. we find the petition without merit. instead of ordering him solidarily liable for damages. . . cAHIaE Cimafranca. 21 102 . The petitioner contends that the victim's negligence contributed to his own mishap. the Court of Appeals should have ordered the latter to reimburse him for any amount he would be made to pay the victim. UCPB General Insurance Co. Only stationary vehicles. The victim was just where he should be when the unfortunate event transpired. records show that when the accident happened. Domingo. had no rightful business driving as recklessly as she did. the Ford Fiera in this case. on the other hand. Thus. The petitioner theorizes that if witness Rosalinda Palero. the issues to be resolved are: (1) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim. then the victim must have been so negligent as to be bumped and run over by the said vehicle. but must proportionately bear the consequences of his own negligence. was not hit by the Ford Fiera. the plaintiff may recover damages. he was standing on the uncemented portion of the highway. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] COMMIT[T]ED GRAVE LEGAL ERROR IN ORDERING DEFENDANT CADIENTE AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT JALIPA JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE. However. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. v. inexplicably swerved to the shoulder. 12 Essentially. is primarily responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause. WAS THERE . but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Coming now to the second and third issues.I. we are unable to accept the petitioner's contention that the respondent was negligent. . ARE BOTH DEFENDANT CADIENTE AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE TO THE INJURED PARTY? III. which was registered in the petitioner's name. But if his negligence was only contributory. and recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim. he cannot recover damages. the petitioner is primarily liable for the injury caused by the said vehicle. and (2) whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally liable to the victim. . 19 In the case of Villanueva v. Running vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said uncemented portion of the highway. 17 In this case. erstwhile speeding along the cemented part of the highway would suddenly swerve to the shoulder. 15 The respondent stresses that as the registered owner of the Ford Fiera which figured in the accident. Inc. This is so as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity cannot be secured. then bump and run him over. Inc. 20 we said that the policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be held responsible in case of accident. which was exactly where pedestrians were supposed to be. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. who was only two and a half meters away from the victim.. or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. even if he had already sold it to someone else.

WHEREFORE. the petitioner cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the respondent.R. who had since stopped schooling and is now forced to face life with nary but two remaining limbs. 64103 are hereby AFFIRMED. since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the misfortune took place. Costs against the petitioner. ADCTac SO ORDERED. 2002 and Resolution dated December 18. The assailed Decision dated September 16. the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.Therefore. 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. CV No. 103 .

104 .

. Luis Contreras for respondents. to invade and occupy the land of respondent Ortiz. and. No. By order of June 11. through the Irrigation Service Unit. 1962. Solicitor General for petitioner. 203). In the absence of proof that the tortious inducement was authorized.] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.ID.. HON. an office or agency under the Department of Public Works and Communications. SYLLABUS 1. therein defendant Irrigation Service Unit was declared in default.. 1960. operate merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiff's claim but they cannot be enforced by processes of law. with damages. is engaged in a private business of purchase and sale of irrigation pumps and systems. L-5122. ID. No appeal appears to have been taken. neither the State nor its funds are liable therefor. Inc. — The initial complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it induced the Handong Irrigation Associations. Inc. PALACIO.L. 1960. Hence. of 958-square meter-lot located in Handong. as Ex-officio Sheriff of Manila and ILDEFONSO ORTIZ. Libmanan. a corporation with principal place of business in Libmanan. May 29. 1960. where it has consented to be sued. Upon denial of this motion. 1962. PERFECTO R. as well as of the motion for reconsideration of said denial. For failure to appear and answer the complaint. to recover possession. to cover the sum of P14. Camarines Sur. Manila. 1962. Teodoro et al. according to the Court of Appeals and following the ruling in the case of National Airports Corporation vs. and presently under the Department of Public Works and Communications to which it was transferred". against the Handong Irrigation Association. 1960. Camarines Sur. at the instance of its co-defendant. had actually consented to the suit. This liability thus arose from tort and not from contract and it is a well-entrenched rule embodied in art. 30915). The Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on July 19. STATE LIABLE ONLY FOR TORTS CAUSED BY SPECIAL AGENTS. Consequently. for the reason that the funds subject matter thereof are public funds and exempt from attachment or execution.. the Government. the Republic of the Philippines. J. 105 .B. this motion was denied. San Juan. petitioner. 1952 (91 Phil. "formerly an office under the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources created by virtue of a 'Memorandum of Agreement on the Irrigation Pump Program of the Philippines' signed by the Chairman of the PHILCUSA (now NEC). on the basis of the finding by the trial court that the Irrigation Service Unit. the present petition for review filed by the Republic of the Philippines. DECISION REYES. MACARIO M. J p: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G. is engaged in the private business of selling irrigation pumps and construction materials on installment plan. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT: WAIVER OF IMMUNITY DOES NOT NECESSARILY SUBJECT ITS PROPERTY AND FUNDS TO SEIZURE. claiming that defendant Irrigation Service Unit has no juridical personality to sue and be sued. On June 3. as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 4886) on the trust fund in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank. 1 On March 8. Judgments against a State. it is up to the legislature to provide for their payment in such manner as it sees fit. and the Irrigation Service Unit. through the Solicitor General. the Solicitor General commenced the present certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the Court of Appeals. by thus engaging in private business. There is no controversy as to the following facts: On April 2. the Solicitor General was served with copy of the writ of execution issued by the court against the defendants in the above-mentioned civil case.[G.. on February 16. L-20322.R. on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. — The mere waiver of the State of its immunity does not render its property and funds liable to seizure under legal process. 2.. ID. 1968. respondents. the appellate court sustained the propriety of the disputed garnishment-order. moved for the dismissal of the complaint. an order of garnishment was served by the Sheriff of Manila against the deposits and/or pump irrigation trust fund in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit at the Philippine National Bank. and dismissed the Government's petition. to restrain the enforcement of a writ of execution (issued by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No. April 30. On January 29. vs. filed with the lower court an urgent motion to lift the order of garnishment. Chief of the MSA Mission (now AID) and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. dismissing the original action for certiorari and prohibition filed with said Court by herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines. on the ground that the said defendant although a mere agency of the Republic of the Philippines. 1962. OFILADA. the Solicitor General. which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered and occupied.R.874. 2180 of the Civil Code that the State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents specifically commissioned to carry out acts complained of outside of such agent's regular duties. Ildefonso Ortiz instituted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur Civil Case No.40. In its decision of August 21. 4886.. No. STATE.POLITICAL LAW.

1952. (b) and (c) of the Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America. Counterpart Project No." The budgetary requirements to carry out the objectives of the project were to be financed by withdrawals from the Counterpart Fund-Special Account (Memorandum Agreement of June. This issue in turn calls for a determination of the nature of said trust fund.Whenever the total value of all deposits made to the Trust Fund from contract principal and interest payments exceeds the value of total releases made to the Trust Fund from the Counterpart Fund. This is the fund on which the disputed writ of execution for money judgment rendered against the ISU. and (e) the compensating use tax to the Philippine Government. on the ground that the ISU. consented to the suit. the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. and the operating expenses of ISU for which appropriated funds are not available. of the ISU annual budget. as claimed by the respondents. 2 including the settlement of the obligations of said administration. function and operation of the Irrigation Service Unit (ISU) which is necessary for the proper resolution of the issue herein involved. has waived its governmental immunity and. if any. deposited with the Philippine National Bank in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit. i. the state is at liberty to 106 . pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of April 27. "to prosecute to completion the rehabilitation of pump systems transferred from the former Irrigation Pump Administration of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.The issue presented by this case is whether or not the pump irrigation trust fund. 311). Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained.Under the Guiding Principles of the Irrigation Pump Project. Interest is also payable under each contract at the rate of six percent per annum on any unpaid balance of the total amount of the contract. (d) ten per cent of the total of (a) and (b) to cover the costs of administration. (c) the cost of fuel and oil financed for the first crop season. The total payment required under the contract is stated in the contract and is equal to the sum of (a) the landed cost of equipment at the installation site.e.[b]. Such transfers shall be considered as 'proceeds of sale' and 'advance deposits' as provided in Annex Section 1. "1. 2. may be garnished to satisfy a money-judgment against the latter. entitled 'Irrigation Pump Sales Proceeds Account' is hereby abolished and any deposits therein will be immediately transferred to the Trust Fund. and of any advance deposits which the Philippine government may make in the Special Account (Sec. Periodic payments to ISU by each association are required.S. by engaging in the private business of purchasing and selling irrigation pumps on installment basis. "Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed. to finance the peso-cost of the Irrigation Pump Project. the installation and construction of pump units. This emphatically is not the law (Merritt vs. It is clear from the foregoing that the ISU is not only an office in the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. dated August 13. For a better understanding of the nature. "3. The separate account established by the project agreement for Counterpart Project 409. 409 — Pump Irrigation). inspection and collection. The mere fact that interests are being collected on the balance of the unpaid cost of the purchased pumps does not convert this economic project of the government into a corporate activity. the installment payments and interests receivable from the farmers are to be used to replenish the counterpart funds utilized in furtherance of the operation of the project. whether it is a fund belonging to the national Government (which was not a party to Civil Case No. its property and funds become liable to seizure under legal process. It is apparent that this decision of the Court of Appeals suffers from the erroneous assumption that because the State has waived its immunity.All principal and interest payments received by the ISU from farmers' associations shall be deposited immediately in the Trust Fund. It was later transferred to the Department of Public Works and Communications as an office directly under the Office of the Secretary. by implication. 1951). will be considered in the preparation. 1. the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund was established in the Philippine National Bank. on the basis of a supplemental agreement (No. 1951. were transferred. Agreement of April 27. 1954. the Court of Appeals nevertheless sustained the garnishment order. to which all authorized releases to the ISU 3 from the Counterpart Fund — Special Account. which will finance the costs of supply and equipment purchases.) This Counterpart Fund-Special Account referred to above was established in the Central Bank by the Government of the Philippines and made up of deposits in pesos commensurate with the indicated dollar cost to the Government of the United States of economic and technical assistance made available to the Philippines. 2 to Counterpart Project No.. governments) hereunder copied in full: "C Disposition of Proceeds from Payments under Contracts of Sale. but also that its activity (of selling irrigation pumps to farmers on installment basis) is not intended to earn profit or financial gain to its operator. (Par. of deposits accruing to it (Philippine government) from the sale of commodities or services supplied under the Agreement or otherwise accruing to it as a result of the import of such commodities or service. these excess deposits shall be transferred from the Trust Fund to the Counter fund-Special Account. Although evidently acknowledging the nature of the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund as a public fund. or purely the proceeds of a private venture by the government. paragraphs 2[a].and [c]. pumps are sold to farmers' associations under conditional sales contracts. 4886)." It was also provided therein that the payments by the farmers' associations on conditional sales agreements specified in paragraph C. 409 (signed by representatives of the Philippine and U. is being enforced. 34 Phil.Special Account. as maintained by herein petitioner. Later. "2. (b) the cost of installation and construction including survey and design.2 above. technical assistance furnished by the ISU. As previously pointed out. Annex to Memo. and shall form part. Insular Government. created to promote a specific economic policy of said government. A reading of the records and documents submitted to the Court of Appeals will readily show that the sales of irrigation pumps to farmers by ISU are governed by the terms of the Supplemental Agreement No. B — 1). it is worthwhile to recall that this office was originally created under the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources by virtue of a Memorandum Agreement between the governments of the Philippines and the United States.

p. 1343.S. 331. otherwise they can not be enforced by processes of law." (49 Am.. sec. A second infirmity of the decision under appeal originates from its ignoring the fact that the initial complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it had induced the Handong Irrigation Association. sec. supra. and it is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction. and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. 232. J. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent.J. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered. is hereby declared null and void.determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not.) "Judgment against a state. Auditor General. embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 81 Phil.S. 107 . Makalintal. and it is for the legislature to provide for their payment in such manner as it sees fit.I. and would amount to a disbursement without any proper appropriation as required by law. Insular Government." (59 C. 81 C. Inc. Fernando. pp. — U... No costs. that the State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents. neither the State nor its funds can be made liable therefor. the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is reversed and set aside. Concepcion. generally operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's claim in the absence of express provision. Castro and Angeles. WHEREFORE. sec. concur. Bilateral Agreement. 104. There being no proof that the making of the tortious inducement was authorized. Dizon.) It needs no stressing that to allow the levying under execution of the ISU funds would amount to diverting them from the purposes originally contemplated by the P. and execution can not issue on a judgment against the state. in cases where it has consented to be sued.. is on official leave. Jur.. Sanchez. JJ.. The ISU liability thus arose from tort and not from contract. Zaldivar. p.J. to invade and occupy the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. 501. with the Philippine National Bank. C. specifically commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's regular duties (Merritt vs. Rosete vs. 453). 312-320.J. and the order of garnishment issued by the Sheriff of Manila on the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit.

108 .

Saleeby notice that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. vs. 4. his pulse was so weak and so irregular that.000 as claimed in the complaint. instead of turning toward the south. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the wound would be expose to infection. The patient apparently was slightly deaf. who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post placed there. ID. Crossfield & O'Brien for plaintiff. agents. 5." The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur. — An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability not previously existing unless it is clearly expressed in the act. MERRITT. ID. AND EMPLOYEES. so that it would be on the left side of said avenue. upon reaching said avenue. upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets. 3. and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14. in his opinion. together with the costs of the cause. ( b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. plaintiff-appellant. SYLLABUS 1.. ID. "By reason of the resulting collision. Saleeby. ID. by which movement it struck the plaintiff. without having sounded any whistle or horn.000.FIRST DIVISION [G. CONSENT OF THE STATE TO BE SUED. while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. March 21. for which reason it was of the most serious nature. LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS.. At ten o'clock of the night in question. had a slight weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a special agent. and employees when they are acting as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil code. riding on a motorcycle. "At another examination six days before the day of the trial. The trial court's findings of fact. he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region. instead of P6. No. after passing the center thereof.R. was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura. "The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain mass had suffered material injury. instead of P25.666. an act abrogating that immunity will be strictly construed. Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5. passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles and hour. there was little hope that he would live. DECISION TRENT.741. a wound in the same place and in beck part of his head.DAMAGES. J p: This is an appeal by both partied from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14. — The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the federal and state governments of the United States' the decisions of the high courts of that country may be used in determining the scope and purpose of a special statute. the General Hospital ambulance. 1916. 11154.ID. This latter 109 . Dr. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. — The state not being liable to suit except by its express consent.] E. — Where the evidence shows that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for six months it is an error to restrict the damages to a shorter period during which he was confined in the hospital. CONSTRUCTION.GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. which are fully supported by the record. even if it be true that collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur. according to Dr.." and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2. AGENTS. MEASURE OF.SPECIAL STATUTES. are as follows: "It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff. defendant-appellant. which was the time set for performing the operation. as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act.000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint. Examination of his head revealed a notable re-adjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. — The Government of the Philippine Islands in only liable for the negligent acts of its officers.741. who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital.ID. turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street.. the plaintiff was so severely injured that. into the right side of Taft Avenue. 2.

because he was incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties.075. 1915. to which Mr." Did the defendant. for he had lost the agility. simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former.This Act shall take effect on its passage. "Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. he could no longer." These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination. The court. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government. Kirkpatrick.. and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home.) 110 . citing U. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff. E. energy. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. 2457. "Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of damages." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. and the trial court so found. We. and to determine the amount of the damages. It is also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. . therefore.000. 20 How. 199. and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed. in order that said questions may be decided: Now. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part. 103 Minn. We fund nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Act No. As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government." We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. E. "As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor. especially when he attempted to use his memory for mathematical calculations. . State. The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages. "SEC. "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs.666. if any. February 3. 2457. that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. The two items which constitute a part of the P14. the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. of Manila. except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. 2. E. without any fault on his part. "Enacted. the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally liable for the damages resulting therefrom. 527. who was at the time an employee of the defendant. 15 L. for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth.. as to the second. nineteen hundred and thirteen. be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided.S. the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent. is P18. then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized. is well settled. and Beers vs.Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital." (Claussen vs. to which Mr. would not prevent recovery for the whole time. because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of sex months. Ed." says Justice Story. he had to dissolve the partnership he had formed with the engineer. difficulties and losses.. effective February 3. if it exists. if any. and (b) the P2. we must look elsewhere for such authority. "The Government. to defend said Government at the same." we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No. The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and state Governments in the United States. it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent. "According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses. his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation. if any . however. as he had before done. and the attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands. Ed. 1915. therefore. "By authority of the United States. climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building. and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building. E. the record shows. Wilson. in enacting the above quoted act. Merritt. that: "SECTION 1. In this we think there was error. 991. to which the claimant is entitled. which would be subversive of the public interest.000 per month. which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. limited the time to two months and twenty-one days. 9 Wheat. E. 720. reads: "An act authorizing E. . City of Luverne.weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor.. 491. In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs. As a contractor.741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are ( a) P5. and render judgment accordingly. the amount awarded for permanent injuries. since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments. 6 L. . vs. and "Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommend that an act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr.

and to advance to educate and benefit the industrial classes. 284). 690..) As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either tort or contract.. arising under different facts.. State.. Clodfelter vs. Partida 7. State (152 N. sec. 203." In determining the scope of this act. (Chapman vs. 316). 28. it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference but would have done so in express terms. Rep. 24 N." The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said: "That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes another by his fault or negligence is based. the court said: "No claim arises against any government in favor of an individual. except as herein otherwise provided. 158.. Commonwealth. "It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants. by his own fault or negligence. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. 144. 86 N. vs. Chapman vs. "Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers. the rule is stated in 36 Cyc. 41 Am. 152 Mass.C. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. State. or was intended to do. U. It follows therefrom that the state by virtue of such provision of law." In Apfelbacher vs. more than remove the state's immunity from suit. Bourn vs... relied upon and considered. St. or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. vs. 53. laces.. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law. State. 440. and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake. State. 27 Am. the court said." (Citing Gibbons vs. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state. but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have existed if the statute had not been enacted.. Y. whether at law or in equity.. and to advance by such means the material interests of the state. but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. W. but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities can be adjudicated. 690. to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes. by the terms of the statute of New York. said: "The statute we are discussing discloses no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities. St. the fish hatchery of the State Wisconsin on the Bark River. or create any cause of action in his favor. Rep. and in both it was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before. 158. 93 Cal." In Sipple vs. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized. Waukesha County.Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher. 104 Cal. R. jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained.. (Murdoc Grate Co.. subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. by reason of the misfeasance. It simply gives authority commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the state. State (99 N.. to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of Wisconsin. takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. State ( 121 Cal. 8 L. 121 Cal. 319. Commonwealth (152 Mass. or its duly authorizes officers and agents. E. Story on Agency. 399)" In Denning vs. as is evidenced by the same Law 3. 43 Am. to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent jurisdiction.A. 915. of the town of Summit. Title 15. 73 Cal. agents. and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. State. thus: "By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. decided April 16. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff. Chief Justice Ruger remarks. and prosecute the same to final judgment. and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake. on the terms and conditions herein contained. Rep.. relative to the mill property of said George Apfelbacher.. we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers.. 28). state (123 Cal.. 16). 1915. is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their 111 . the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for personal injuries received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil Code reads: "The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent.." And the court said: "This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases." It being quite clear that Act No. advanced sheets).)" A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth. In construing this statute the court. Green vs.. the provisions of the Act of 1893.S. 854. 29. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits. or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents. in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. 269. or shall hereafter have claims on contract or for negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of examiners. Melvin vs. which authorized the bringing of this suit. Rep. 51. It is difficult to see how the act does. but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability. 8 Wall. 16. read: "SECTION 1.In the case of Melvin vs. Wisconsin." with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. the Act of 1913. where the board of the canal claims had.. and employees. or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. 321. Hart. being objects similar to those sought by the public school system. in Murdock Grate Co. In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents. Wisconsin.. 43 Am. are as follows: "All persons who have. on that the person obligated. all in the county of Waukesha. It did not pass upon the question of liability. St. a state institution created by the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries. are hereby authorized. 104 Cal.

1904. guardians and owners or director of an establishment or enterprise. by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor. and among these persons. duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim." (Supreme Court of Spain. of the 18th of May. 146) It is. is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission. the state. this concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who in his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. and whereas in the first articles thereof. January 7. Civ. 390.. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts." (Supreme Court of Spain. 83 Jur. officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903. on the contrary. 112 . Arellano. 1898. for the acts of its agents. Civ.office. title 16. book 4. 24. therefore. we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its operation. but not always.. in the sense in which these words are employed. 1904. caused by an official of the second class referred to.. the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages. July 30. the following article refers to third persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage. Between these latter and the state therefore. because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents. among others. which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees. foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof he executed the trust confided to him. 389. Johnson and Moreland.J. Consequently. are found. must be presumed to lie with the state. JJ. "That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers.. For the foregoing reasons. no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. supra." (Supreme Court of Spain. as held in the last paragraph of article 1903. called up[on to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner. according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth. Torres. 1902. in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease. has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. acting in the exercise of his powers. 122 Jur. in a damage case. yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official. No. This legal presumption gives way to proof. "That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent. because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. concur. evident that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable. regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence. because. and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charge with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. which is the original basis of this kind of objections. reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage. and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.) "That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision. Civ. however. without costs in this instance.. 1911. in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case. the fault or negligence.) "That the Civil Code in chapter 2. except when it acts through the agency of a special agent. where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence. May 18. the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent. we are not called upon to determine. the judgment appealed from must be reversed. C. 98 Jur. doubtless because and only in this case.

R. The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable. plaintiff contends. 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. as a consequence. Spanish Civil Code). plaintiff-appellant. nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade.FIRST DIVISION [G. Alvero Law Offices & Edon B. the civil liability of the father is evident. DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO. From the school Dante.] SABINA EXCONDE. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March 31.The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher. which provides: "ART.ID. Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña. 2. LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR DIRECTOR. and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed. he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. 15001). boarded a jeep and when the same started to run. From this decision. xxx xxx xxx Finally. jointly and severally with his son Dante. It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31." Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers. plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law. After trial. Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and. Spanish Civil Code). paragraph 1 and 5. No. it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. During the trial. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO. teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. he was a minor and was then living with his father. And so. Brion and Vencedor A. reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. — The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father. the mother. In line with her reservation. This defense was sustained by the lower court and. INSTITUTIONS AFFECTED. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime. The father. he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident. in case of his death or incapacity. 1903. on appeal.959. keeping them in their company. only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. Magno T. for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno. and. Alimario for appellees. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of such liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155. are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. 1957. June 29. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. SYLLABUS 1. The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code. as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña. with other students. in case of his death or incapacity. father of Dante.CIVIL LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN. on the other hand. and.. RELIEF FROM LIABILITY.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. Sabina Exconde. educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means". last paragraph. 113 . the mother. vs. died as a consequence. son of Delfin Capuno. the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability. defendants-appellees. Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2. Bueser for appellant. It further appears that Delfin Capuno. 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. L-10134. while. supervision and custody of the latter. J p: Dante Capuno. the former was not under the control. — The civil liability imposed by Article 1903 of the old Civil Code on teachers or directors of arts and trades for damages caused by pupils or apprentices under their custody. was not with his son at the time of the accident.

. the sum of P2. there is no question that the pupil. Wherefore. and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them. in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. dissenting: After mature consideration I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of liability. I can see no sound reason for limiting Art.We find merit in this claim. in defiance of the school authorities. On the other hand. is obvious. p.. 557).. "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody". and the costs of action.. A. Spanish Civil Code). the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. If. there can be no responsibility. p.. on the other hand. for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction.00 as damages. If a teacher or scout master was present. 114 . Civil Law. so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. Spanish Civil Code). could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155. the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments". This defendants failed to prove. IV. etc. I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent. At any rate. Ed. last paragraph. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. as conceded by all commentators. JJ. Here Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extracurricular activity. and not the parent.L.B. concur. It is true that under the law above quoted. it is clear that neither the head of that school. Vol. was instructed by the City School Supervisor to attend the Rizal parade. and. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them.. See 12 Manresa. it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher. and not the father. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him. but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla. In the circumstances. nor the city school's supervisor. In the case before us. the latter. And if there is no authority.959. he attended the parade in honor of Dr. J. C. if no teacher or master was at hand to watch over the pupils. In my opinion. should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. teachers. JJ. concur. in case of his death or incapacity. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable. while. keeping them in their company.J. Labrador and Endencia. the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. Padilla and Reyes. 4th Ed. jointly and severally. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it. 841.. Separate Opinions REYES. concurs in the result. the school authorities would provide adequate supervision over them. the accident occurred. the mother. The father had every reason to assume that in ordering a minor to attend a parade with other children. Montemayor. educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means". 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents. then he should be the one responsible for allowing the minor to drive the jeep without being qualified to do so. 1953. The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil Codes. His father could not properly refuse to allow the child to attend. Paras. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903.. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. J. 1903 of the old Civil Code. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority. Bengzon. The civil liability which the law impose upon the father. the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff. Dante Capuno. the school authorities are the ones answerable for that negligence.

There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. 4. 5... likewise. the latter. the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter. P12. Leovollo C .00 to P12. and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied. L-29025. must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. and the Court has not been shown in this appeal any compelling reason to disturb such finding. had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm.. ID.EN BANC [G. PANTOJA.. ID.R. so long as they remain in their custody. J. of a school of arts and trades. as to their pupils and students.. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M.00 as indemnity for the death of their son should be increased to P12. Civil Code. concurring: CIVIL LAW. the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live an board in the school. owner and President. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR DEATH CAUSED BY CRIME OR QUASI DELICT.CIVIL LAW. defendants-appellees.T.] Spouses MOISES P..000.000.I. The school itself. DAMAGES.000.B. and Amares for appellee Daffon.)." The Court thereby adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206. — The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180.. including injuries that some students themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. as erroneously held by the lower court. 1903 (now 2180)is some culpa in vigilando that the parents. QUASI-DELICT. CUSTODIAL SUPERVISION OF SCHOOLS OVER PUPILS. and hence. 1971. and observed in all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. Navarra.ID." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.ID. RATIONALE." As stated above. by "( proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage... PHRASE "SO LONG AS STUDENTS REMAIN IN THEIR CUSTODY.L. VALENTON. AUTHORITY EXISTS REGARDLESS OF STUDENT'S AGE. In the law of torts. which is the basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for his torts. QUIBULUE. in Pantoja. — While in the case of parents and guardians. as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated. known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute" (M. et al. Almacen. 3. is that they stand. — Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6. that "In quasi-delicts. committed while under such authority. Civil Code.. ID. should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. which amount is to be awarded "even though there may have been mitigating circumstances" pursuant to the express provisions of said codal article. etc. REYES. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority and where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher.000. J.000. only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school. Pantoja (25 SCRA 468). BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. after noting the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso. and not the parent. places himself under the custodial supervision and disciplinary authority of the school authorities. QUASI-DELICT. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants. ID. ID. LIABILITY OF SCHOOL HEADS AND TEACHERS FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF STUDENTS.. Honorato S. A student over twenty-one. had expressed its "considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12. their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age. plaintiffs-appellants. Civil Code. BASIS. October 4. — The basis of the presumption of negligence of Art.. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE. VIRGILIO L.00. The Court.00 as set by the Court in People vs. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. PALISOC. At any rate. it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school. to a certain extent. ID.. including recess time. — Decisive here is the touchstone provision of Article 2231. as well as of interest and increased attorney's fees. by enrolling and attending a school.. ANTONIO C. for the reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction.ID. No. 350 and 352 of the Civil Code." No gross negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to warrant the imposition of exemplary damages. has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.00.00 AS SET BY PEOPLE VS. the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability.000. in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child" This is expressly provided for in Articles 349. Villareal. Reyes for appellee Brillantes." CONSTRUED. including recess time. NOT GRANTED IN ABSENCE OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. vs. from the old stated minimum of P3. the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents. Civil Code. the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its head and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. respectively. 6. OBSERVANCE OF DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY. — The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided.. 2. ID. teachers.ID. SYLLABUS 1. VALID DEFENSE.ID. — The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students. Of 115 .. in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180.

the teachers' control is not a plenary as when the student is a minor. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows. It is only a factor to be appreciated in determining whether or not the defendant has exercised due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. as prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 2180. TORTIOUS ACTS OF CHILDREN.. to a certain extent. a classmate of the protagonists. it was duly incorporated. 108 Phil. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police Department who performed the autopsy re "Cause of death: shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs (6th and 7th. Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son. gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face. the action below for damages arising from the death on March 10. instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged. absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute. Dominador Palisoc. "so long as they remain in their custody" used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code was construed as referring to a " situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Manila. therefore. as that of a disinterested witness who "has no motive or reason to testify one way or another in favor of any party" and rejected the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased. Defendants.CIVIL LAW. 1966. and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors.ID. 1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student. ." then it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to parents. 3 It held that "(T)he act. With the postmortem findings of Dr. together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. . as stated also in the opinion of the majority. as testified to by the lone eyewitness. to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them. finally he died. however. Daffon. defendant Virgilio L. a fellow student of the deceased. so he was immediately taken to a hospital. in retaliation." The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by the trial court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. dissenting: 1. academic and non-academic. so long as they remain in their custody." 2 the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Court of Appeals." The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident. and on the afternoon of March 10. so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category.. between two and three o'clock. I find no justification. had filed on May 19. left. they. — I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado vs. Quibulue. to make a substitute parent liable where the real parent would be free from liability. is that they stand. as to their pupils and students. Desiderio Cruz. The foregoing is the substance of the testimony of Desiderio Cruz. Palisoc became pale and fainted. 2. TEACHERS ARE LIABLE FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF STUDENTS LIVING AND BOARDING WITH THEM. 1 the defendant Teodosio Valenton. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. at the laboratory room of the said Institute. 1966. at the time when the incident which gave rise to his action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute. . and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute. but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. attitudes and often destructive activism of the students. Daffon were classmates. either in the law itself or in justice and equity. PARENTS LIABLE THEREFOR ONLY AS TO MINORS LIVING IN THEIR COMPANY. the lone witness to the incident. Daffon. 414. per the trial court's decisions are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C. but lately on August 2. Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which reads: 'Art. MAKALINTAL. At that time the classes were in recess." I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results. 2180. as well as the temper. direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. and the defendant Virgilio L. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived. considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions." and his testimony that these internal injuries of the deceased were caused "probably by strong fist blows. ID. the defendant Santiago M. where the clause. If. contusion of the pancreas and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain. He never regained consciousness.. in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. . of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this article of the Code. J. but that circumstance can only affect the degree of the responsibility but cannot negate the existence thereof. . — For parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company. 1962. such that the (latter's) control." 4 The trial court. 116 . J p: An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Quezon Boulevard. "the rationale of (the) liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students. QUASI-DELICT. in this wise: ".course. Brillantes. the president thereof. Daffon. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship. DECISION TEEHANKEE.

for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the school premises. (Ciriaco L.00 adjudged against him for the physical injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar.375. its former single proprietor. May 30. Jr. direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED: — The clause 'so long as they remain in their custody' contained in Article 2180 of the new civil code contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher. the lower court found that it had been incorporated since August 2. 'CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180.. Mercado. the dictum in such earlier case that "It is true that under the law above-quoted. "3. since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant. No. and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher. such that the control. Here. In those circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil as well as the responsibilities for their sort would pass from the father and mother to the teachers. 9 the Manila Technical Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. The Court holds that under the cited codal article." Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual findings of the trial court. liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices. defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue. . Civil Code.000. 7 that " (I) t would seem that the clause 'so long as they remain in their custody.R. that the school involved is a non-academic school. since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents. either. Civil Code. and in good health when he died. The Court finds the appeal. to be meritorious. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices. so long as they remain in their custody. such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.Absolving the other defendants. but this provision only all applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado. since the wound left no scar.] The moral damages award was after all set aside by the Court on the ground that none of the specific cases provided in Article 2219.The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180. . plus the costs of this action. the trial court erred in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of holding them jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P6. (b) P3. since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon. with defendant Daffon. the parents of the student at fault. are not involved. Plaintiffs failed to do so.00 by way of medical expenses to treat and cure.000. 2. Petitioner. this article of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar.' contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher." The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. and (e) P2. 8 where the only issue involved as expressly stated in the decision." This dictum had been made in rejecting therein petitioner-father's contention that his minor son's school. in the main. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable. Capuno. Court of Appeals. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors.Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. et al. 1960). 'teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. by impleading improperly defendant Brillantes. [A cut on the right cheek with a piece of razor which cost only P50. for the moral damages of P2. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it. (c) P5. rather than him as father. Manuel Quisumbing." Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows: "1. for the damages awarded them as a result of their son's death. the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. as thus incorporated. for awarding moral damages had been established.00 for loss of earning power.000. notwithstanding that Brillantes and his co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' 117 . 1. respondents. the Court of Appeals. "2. and therefore the school itself.The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground that the provisions of Article 2180. (which issue was resolved adversely against the father).Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. There is no question. L-14862. so long as they remain in their custody. The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs.00 for actual and compensatory expenses.000.'Lastly. which are now beyond review. since "there is no evidence that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal fistblows] 6 lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the school." are not applicable to the case at bar. (d) P10..000. should have been brought in as party defendant. respectively) are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-parents for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. Quezon City [which was not a party to the case] should be held responsible. petitioner's son being only nine years old and not having been shown to have "acted with discernment" in inflicting the injuries on his classmate. defendant Daffon.' "In the opinion of the Court. vs. G. 1962. which expressly hold "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades .00 for attorney's fee. Nevertheless. Civil Code. Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon.00 for moral damages. was whether the therein defendant-father could be held civilly liable for damages resulting from a death caused in a motor vehicle accident driven unauthorizedly and negligently by his minor son. considering that the deceased was only between sixteen and seventeen years.' 5 "There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school.

. 12 In the law of torts. should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents." 10 3. Teodosio V. JJ . 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6. Brillantes from the complaint. Daffon.Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court should have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal interest on the total damages awarded. had expressed its "considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc. is that they stand. as erroneously held by the lower court. including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. plus the costs of this action in both instances. after noting the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso. as well as of interest and increased attorney's fees. teachers. for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction " The school itself. to a certain extent.00 as indemnity for the death of their son should be increased to P12. and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied." No gross negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to warrant the imposition of exemplary damages. that "In quasi-delicts. took no part. etc.00 for actual and compensatory expenses. dismissing defendants' counterclaims. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents. has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same cited article.Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the death of his classmate. Civil Code. in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school. 7. from the old stated minimum of P3. At any rate. 6. Justice J. as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated. 8.000. as to their pupils and students. (b) P3. the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. so long as they remain in their custody.J . and the Court has not been shown in this appeal any compelling reason to disturb such finding. besides increasing the award of attorney's fees all concern matters that are left by law to the discretion of the trial court and the Court has not been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of such discretion on the part of the trial court 16 Decisive here is the touchstone provision of Article 2231. J . in Pantoja.00. (d) P10. Civil Code. "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: 1. Brillantes is not the registered owner/head of the 'Manila Technical Institute' which is now a corporation and is not owned by any individual person. Valenton and Santiago M.As tersely summarized by Mr..The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180. Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12. 118 . and hence.L." 11 This is expressly provided for in Articles 349.00 as set by the Court in People vs. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority" 13 and "where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher. the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability.000. said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.00. likewise.Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L.375. (c) P5. including recess time.000.000 00 for attorney's fee. 2. 4. had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. which amount is to be awarded "even though there may have been mitigating circumstances" pursuant to the express provisions of said codal article. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided. it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school.000. 14 5. Concepcion. the latter.00 to P12. must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.00 for moral damages.000. Civil Code." The Court thereby adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206.000." As stated above. The Court. Dizon. the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school. Pantoja. ACCORDINGLY. the deceased Dominador Palisoc. absolvingdefendant Antonio C.. in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180.000. and not the parent. Civil Code.request for admission had expressly manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C. 15 and observed in all death indemnity cases thereafter is well taken. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde.000. concur. whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties.The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students. by "( proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. C .00 for less of earning power and (e) P2. including recess time. Villamor and Makasiar." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision.B. and 3.

principal. ANIANO. ID. MR. ROSALINDA A.. QUASI-DELICT. ID. PERFECTO A. AMADORA JR.] JOSE S... respondents.. The philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in loco parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents 119 . petitioners. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A.ID. PANTALEON A. JOSE A.. ID. Padilla Law Office for respondents.EN BANC [G.. VICTOR LLUCH. ID. SYLLABUS 1. LUCY A. NORMA A. teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature. but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. JR. — If at all. L-47745. AMADORA..CIVIL LAW. TEACHER-IN-CHARGE. thru his parents and natural guardians. — The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises.. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision. APPLIES TO ALL SCHOOLS. AMADORA III. LIABILITY OF TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS." 3.ID.. AMADORA. following the first part of the provision.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION. vs.CIVIL LAW. WHETHER ACADEMIC OR NOT. AMADORA. SERGIO P." This would limit liability to occasions where there are classes under the immediate charge of a teacher." Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis. ID. ID. which does not seem to be the intendment of the law. NICANOR GUMBAN. LIABILITY OF TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS CO-EXTENSIVE WITH THE PERIOD THE STUDENT IS IN SCHOOL PREMISES IN PURSUANCE OF LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVE. — Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: "Lastly. J. 1988. CELESTINO DICON. FRANCISCO ALONSO. ID. SERREC A. — The provision in Article 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all schools. whatever its nature. PROPER DEFENSE. ID.. EMBRACES ONE THAT STANDS IN LOCO PARENTIS. TERM NOT LIMITED TO TEACHER-IN-CHARGE.CIVIL LAW. In other words.. or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. AMADORA. AMADORA. There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. Amadora & Associates for petitioners. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.ID. thru his guardian. JOSE A. REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS. academic as well as non-academic. ID. LORETA A. AMADORA.. AMADORA. QUASI-DELICT. ID. and MRS. LIABILITY OF TEACHERS AND HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS. and ROLANDO VALENCIA. ID.. and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege. — The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean. April 15. — It should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective. "teachers should apply to the words "pupils and student's and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices. he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180. Unlike the parent. and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right. the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. This is the general rule. ID. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody. 8. RATIONALE.R. AMADORA. APPLIED IN ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE. the school. 6. 2..... QUASI-DELICT. ID. LIABILITY ATTACHES REGARDLESS OF AGE OF STUDENT. ATTY. — It should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. MELENCIO-HERRERA. — I concur. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS. BASIS OF LIABILITY OF SCHOOL FOR NEGLIGENCE OF TEACHERS AND HEADS. DEFINED. LIABILITY FALLS DIRECTLY ON THE TEACHER OR HEAD OF SCHOOL. who will be liable only if his child is still a minor. responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. ABELLANA. PABLITO DAFFON. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS.. ID. ID... OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS.ID.ID.. whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. Jose S. concurring and dissenting: 1. 4. VICENTE A.. DAMASO. may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior. the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age. YLAYA. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS. except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term "teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge. in the exercise of a legitimate student right. 7. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature. in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR. — Such defense of bonus pater familias is also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY.. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of. 5. whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. No.

. through their respective parents. the dean of boys. On April 13. as the victim's parents. 7 Mercado v. the responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. LIABILITY OF SCHOOLS. 3 On appeal to the respondent court. ID. 201). There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the private respondents. including recess time. the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. As it turned out. moral damages. and the physics teacher. a classmate. exemplary damages. and hence. 1978 ed. he was then under the custody of the private respondents. though. as it happens. the school may exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family. — And while a school is. and while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon.. DEFENSE AVAILABLE. 120 . RATIONALE OF LIABILITY. EXPLAINED. ID. It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7. The complaint against the students was later dropped. 2 Additionally. hence.. as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated.. Brillantes. loss of earning capacity. 41 SCRA 548) 3.. the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. meaning their protective and supervisory custody. ID.. the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. costs of litigation. which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 4. ID. Sergio Damaso. Again.. ending all his expectations and his life as well. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody. ID. the high school principal. the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. J p: Like any prospective graduate. including injuries that some students themselves may inflict wilfully or through negligence on their fellow students. the dean of boys.. ID.ID. 8 and Palisoc v. however.. The victim was only seventeen years old. DECISION CRUZ.ID. by virtue of the same provision. may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents (Sangco. prLL The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation. The respondents say.. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar. that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo. 5 The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13. is invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting positions. yet. to wit: Exconde v. — As provided for in the same Article 2180. 4 In its decision. After trial. the herein petitioners. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16... it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school.whenever in such a standing. that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun. Capuno. funeral expenses.. admittedly.. fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo. Pablito Daffon. Court of Appeals.984. while they were in the auditorium of their school. 1972. not directly liable since Article 2180 speaks only of teachers and schools heads. (Palisoc vs.ID. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended. a classmate. Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180 which. the school. — "The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents. 2. 6 As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo. Philippine Law on Torts & Damages. 1972. and that in any event the defendants had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury. and attorney's fees. Brillantes. Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious acts of pupils and students so long as the latter remain in their custody. filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. 1972. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended. however. ID. p. Jr. its rector. fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On the implications and consequences of these facts.00. 1972. confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or taking any further action. DEFENSE AGAINST LIABILITY. the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294. together with Daffon and two other students. ID. as their employer. ID. representing death compensation. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows: "Lastly. 1 Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence." Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-quoted provision. the parties sharply disagree.

it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher. Brillantes. was imposed on (1) teachers in general. decided on October 4. 1971. teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature. which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29. Liability under this role. This decision. the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. Unlike in Exconde and Mercado. Dante Capuno. the boy boarded a jeep. In the separate civil action filed against them. Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school involved at bar is a non-academic school. following the first part of the provision. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis. Through Justice Labrador. the custody requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher. and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied. 1960. cdrep "If. he said. cdrep In Palisoc vs. there can be no responsibility. What substantial difference is there between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons. Justice J. and unlike in Palisoc. and the parents of the victim sued the culprit's parents for damages. with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred. the words 'arts and trades' does not qualify 'teachers' but only 'heads of establishments." This is the case. 10 including Justice J. etc. The parties herein have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades. the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180. and only he." After an exhaustive examination of the problem. a 16-year old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. 11 Justice Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the rule should apply only to torts committed by students not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco parentis. that even students already of age were covered by the provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and subject to its discipline. took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle. Although the wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not boarding in the school. In other words.' 121 . if so. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach. must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.B. as conceded by all commentators. should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. In the case of establishments of arts and trades. dissented. including recess time. responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. as erroneously held by the lower court." Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case. Dante was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. In a footnote." Justice J. in the phrase 'teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades' used in Art. Reyes. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City. resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature. Dissenting with three others. teachers. his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.B.L. who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. the question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised. and not the parent. Moreover. "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices. the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools. when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody. so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. Reyes did not take part but the other members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30. the Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued) that the school was not liable because it was not an establishment of arts and trades. for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents.L. arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held liable. it is the head thereof. This is the general rule.L." The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J. such that the control. the head thereof and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. And if there is no authority. Reyes.B. and. attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor. the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school.L. 1957. who stressed." This decision was concurred in by five other members. exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades. the latter.' The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms `preceptores y artesanos' used in the Italian and French Civil Codes. 1903 of the old Civil Code. direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents. and with an elaboration.B. In my opinion. The Court declared through Justice Teehankee: "The phrase used in the cited article — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody' — means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. After the parade. a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout.In the Exconde Case. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part: "I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers. in answer to the dissenting opinion. academic as well as non-academic.

It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves? From a reading of the provision under examination. such as submission of reports. or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. LLpr The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. If at all. even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school. Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. on the other hand. This does not necessarily mean that such. sees fit to enact the necessary amendment. remains unchanged. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. to repeat Palisoc v. the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him. and in the case of graduating students. for the injuries caused by the student. taking into account the changes in the situation subject to be regulated. the consequent increase in their enrollment. but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180. it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students' torts. it is clear that while the custody requirement. and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right. By contrast. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school. whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises. custody be co-terminous with the semester. it does signify that the student should be within the control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. Thus. who usually even boarded with him and so came under his constant control. the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students. in practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. supervision and influence. the school. the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades. may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior. whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. principal. could be so blamed. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-academic. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision. 122 . in the exercise of a legitimate student right. the head of the school of arts and trades. The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contact of their heads with the students. Consequently. the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. whatever its nature. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school term. the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic. while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students. may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his students. These questions. term papers. the period before the commencement exercises. no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of its rules. Notably. why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or non-technical school. and excluding the time before or after such period. because of his closer ties with them. All other circumstances being the same. however. beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof. does not mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities. and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege. clearances and the like. it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. Brillantes. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury. though. During all these occasions. In any event. the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature. In its present state. Indeed. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective. such as the period of registration. In the view of the Court.There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. Article 2180. During such periods. the teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the nonacademic school would be held liable. why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher? The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students. and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean. The injury contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is registered.

the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor — then there should all the more be justification to require from the school authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury. also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed. it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. as previously observed. it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that the confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son. for which he deserves sanctions from the school. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. On the contrary." In this connection. llcd 4. who will be liable only if his child is still a minor. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. Unlike the parent. As previously observed. It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's influence. through the enforcement of the school regulations. Nevertheless. in maintaining that discipline. The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. besides being co-terminous with the period of custody. is usually enforced only because of the students' desire to pass the course. these measures are effected through the assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those rules upon the students. of course. in the Palisoc Case. the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its employ. 2. Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.The rector. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher. 5. And if it is also considered that under the article in question. A fortiori. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180. Obviously. Moreover.Such defense is. it should be repeated that. the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. the parent can expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. 123 . Thus. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody. 3. In this sense. the Court has arrived at the following conclusions: 1.In the absence of a teacher-in-charge. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. which also states that: "The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. Applying the foregoing considerations. there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. liability attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge. if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he has reached majority age and so is no longer under the former's control. especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of the student. in fact.Finally. The parent can instill more lasting discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher for the tort committed by the child.At any rate.At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot. it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence. While this was clearly negligence on his part. In this respect. the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities. respondent Celestino Dicon. cdll The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases now. it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable. the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises and presumably under his influence. the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. That is a valid fear. the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer. under the present ruling. he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age. After all. it is not the school that will be held directly liable. to be sure. This should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.

Fernan andPadilla. took no part. formerly counsel for Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. C. the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Daffon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13. did not participate in deliberations. JJ. While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here related. Narvasa. the petition is DENIED. Gancayco.. 124 . Sarmiento.In sum... concur. It is so ordered. Paras. Teehankee. 1972. JJ. we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek. under the law they have invoked.J. as a balm to their grief. Yap. Cortes and Griño-Aquino. WHEREFORE. Feliciano. Bidin. without any pronouncement as to costs.

are: ". the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody" of the school. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant.SECOND DIVISION [G. SYLLABUS 1. CASTRO.. Abon for damages resulting from his acts. as contemplated in the law. ID. had instructed Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior. Besides. Cocjin. in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]. 30. 2180 . so long as they remain in their custody. Not being an employee of the BCF. in so far as it affirmed the decision 2 of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court). J p: In this petition for review on certiorari. he also received his salary from the AFP. CASTRO and RODOLFO B. VIRGINIA B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer.m. 6 The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. CV 69876. . — We hold that Jimmy B. Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. to a certain extent. CASE AT BAR. [However]. Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF. . AFP. petitioners cannot under Art. the ROTC Commandant. . at around 8:00 p. therefore.R. ID. October 5. 70458. AFP. ." as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school.CIVIL LAW. — Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. Likewise. a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat.. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. Abon was under the custody of the school when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be held liable. 10 On 3 March 1977. "the phrase used in [Art. . 2) shows that BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department offering Communication. — In line with the case of Palisoc.." contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises. ET AL.] BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION. or the area within which the school activity is conducted. the record shows that before the shooting incident.. under Art. Leonardo L. It has so advertised itself. BRILLANTES. including recess time. which held. respondents. 2180 of the Civil Code. Tenefrancia for petitioners. Broadcast and Telytype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses . hereafter) is an academic institution. Edilberto B. No. petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. 11 As a result. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. pursuant to Department Order No. Its brochure (Exh. No." 3 Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. TORTS AND DAMAGES.R. . in the parking space of BCF. among others. A "recess. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. CASTRO. 4 The ROTC Unit. petitioners. SEE PALISOC V. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily liable with Jimmy B." or in the custody of BCF. and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 7 As armorer of the ROTC Unit.ID. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher. Abon. Logically. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. LibLex The relevant facts. as found by the Trial Court and adopted by reference by the respondent Court. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. 1988. in AC-G. 2. DECISION PADILLA.. EDUARDO B. this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. for respondents. as its own evidence shows. dated 7 December 1984. Jimmy B. Jimmy B. 2180 of the Civil Code. DIOMEDES B. these courses divest BCF of the nature or character of being purely or exclusively an academic institution.. Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded." Likewise. ID. . 3. it is also an institution of arts and trade. 14. vs. Series of 1975 of the Department of Education and Culture. Abon was prosecuted for. Roberto B. petitioners seek the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.'so long as (the students) remain in their custody' means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. 5 is provided by the BCF an office and an armory located at the basement of its main building. the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit.ID. the latter "stands. LIABILITY OF TEACHERS OR HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS. TERM "RECESS" CONSTRUED. when he shot Napoleon Castro. SCHOOL HEAD NOT SOLIDARILY LIABLE. (41 SCRA 548). when he shot Napoleon Castro. 12 125 . which is under the full control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Jr. by way of accommodation to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). CASTRO.

JJ. the record shows that before the shooting incident. 18 Likewise.00 to P30. Abon. (c) P5. Abon for his tortious act in the killing of Napoleon Castro. Inc. as contemplated in the law. AFP. had instructed Jimmy B. Abon. to a certain extent.. when he shot Napoleon Castro. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. considering that Jimmy B. the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages. but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit. Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF).00 by way of temperate damages." or in the custody of BCF. A "recess.00. (2) absolving the other defendants.00 as actual damages. 15 In the case at bar. "the phrase used in [Art. Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded. the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody" of the school. Paras. including recess time. Hence. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Petitioners also raise the issue that. the respondent Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial Court. the latter "stands. 2180 of the Civil Code. SO ORDERED. the respondent Court ruled that: "it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident. No costs. however. supra. and (e) P5.000. concur. Ungos (ROTC Commandant). (b) P316. Abon was still in the protective and supervisory custody of the Baguio Colleges Foundation when he shot Napoleon Castro. which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation.00 as moral damages. so long as they remain in their custody. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro. and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. to pay private respondents. 126 . the Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon such other issue.000.000." contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises. the Trial Court rendered a decision.000. a school which offers both academic and technical vocational courses cannot be held liable for a tort committed by a student enrolled only in its academic program. in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]. impleading Jimmy B. he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. Abon was under the custody of the school when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be held liable." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher. 2180 of the Civil Code. we hold that Jimmy B.000. therefore. (d) P6. 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. Sarmiento and Regalado.00 as attorney's fees.00 to P30. Logically. 19 Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. under Art. Abon. or the area within which the school activity is conducted. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices." 14 Likewise. After hearing. the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. 13 On appeal by petitioners. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant.00 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school. this petition. 20 WHEREFORE. Roberto C. plus costs." as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school. Inc. Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation. Libertad D. prcd Upon the foregoing considerations. the ROTC Commandant. as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B.. (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Melencio-Herrera. this circumstance shows that Jimmy B.000. jointly and severally. as party defendants. The modification consisted in reducing the award for loss of earning capacity of the deceased from P316.000. The time interval is safely within the 'recess time' that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case." 16 (Emphasis supplied) In line with the case of Palisoc. Besides. in holding that Jimmy B. when he shot Napoleon Castro.Subsequently.000.000. 2180] — 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody' means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. petitioners cannot under Art. Roberto B. as heirs of Napoleon Castro: a) P12. Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF). Abon for damages resulting from his acts. Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. The central issue in this case is whether or not petitioners can be held solidarily liable with Jimmy B. and increasing the indemnity for the death of Napoleon Castro from P12.00 for the death of Napoleon Castro.

there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual. the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision.. It was Ched Villanueva. For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident. Moreover. instruction or custody: (1) the school. PRINCIPAL AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY.ID. 127 . Thus.000. REGISTERED OWNER OF VEHICLE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED TO THE PUBLIC OR TO THIRD PERSONS WHILE VEHICLE WAS BEING DRIVEN ON THE HIGHWAYS OR STREETS. — Under Article 218 of the Family Code... Respondent Villanueva was absolved from any liability. DAMAGES. but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. ID. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S.. — However. 143363. ID. and declared respondents Daniel subsidiarily liable.. those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision. excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. son of respondents Carpitanos. ID. The trial court ruled in favor of Sherwin's parents ordering petitioner to pay civil indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin. Consequently. CARPITANOS. entity or institution.ID. there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep and that the proximate cause of the accident was a mechanical defect in the vehicle. SYNOPSIS Sherwin Carpitanos. whether inside or outside the premises of the school. Sherwin's parents filed an action for damages against petitioner and the other respondents. Though incapable of pecuniary computation. SR. — Under Article 219 of the Family Code. In this case. vs. who had possession and control of the jeep. Hence. Under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code. and attorney's fees under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code. JAMES DANIEL II. to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities. MARY'S ACADEMY. the grant of attorney's fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted. Villanueva was held primarily liable for the death of Sherwin. the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. ID.. with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. — In this case. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. JAMES DANIEL..00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. for petitioner to be liable. instruction. actual and moral damages. legal and equitable justification.. Further. thus. a minor. Peter Y.] ST. Co for respondents Daniel and Villanueva.ID. if the person under custody is a minor. there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva.. or custody.. respondents. ID. 2. its administrators and teachers. petitioner. Maraon for respondent Carpitanos.ID. or (2) the individual. 2002. Feliciano M. ID. 4. the grant of attorney's fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule. The incident occurred during an enrollment drive conducted by petitioner academy where Sherwin was a student. and which was the proximate cause of the accident. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II... a minor.FIRST DIVISION [G. would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. the latter's negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. ID. The vehicle was then driven by James Daniel II. we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of P500. SYLLABUS 1. moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.. petitioner may not be held liable for the death of Sherwin. aESICD 5. petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. entity or institution engaged in child care. SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER A MINOR CHILD. Mary's Academy had no control. and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA. even if not used for public service. the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. In this case. FAMILY CODE.. — We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle. 3. but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. ID. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. However. February 6. REQUISITE. it is not the school. Thus. died in an accident caused by the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva. as the registered owner of the vehicle. CASE AT BAR.CIVIL LAW. Padilla Law Office for petitioner. such authority and responsibility applies to field trips. the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner. No. GUADA DANIEL.R. grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. ID. for the school to be principally and solidarily liable for the acts of its students.

00) actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses. Mary's Academy. 205-206). the Court of Appeals denied the motion.FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40. Sherwin Carpitanos. The Facts The facts. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City." 2 In due time. 2000. Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: "'WHEREFORE. this appeal. on the fateful day. the vehicle owner. Mary's Academy. and to pay costs. Mary's Academy. as found by the Court of Appeals. petitioner St.00) indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S. 5 Hence."' (Decision. 2. c. and Guada Daniel are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Carpitanos. 32-33. 4 On February 29. Larayan. on May 22.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo.000. holding petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.000. Sr. in toto. Dapitan City. Records. against his parents. IT IS SO ORDERED. James Daniel Sr.FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50. defendant-appellant St. and subsidiarily. the following sums of money: a. judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner: 1. However. 2000.000. PREMISES CONSIDERED. Mary's Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City. Mary's Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. are as follows: "Claiming damages for the death of their only son. Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.Defendant St. Sherwin.00) for attorney's fees. 4. pp. same being adjudged against defendants St. the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages to P25. petitioner St.000. and Guada Daniel. 3 On February 29.TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10.FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500.Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. As a student of St. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. 2000. is hereby DISMISSED. 3. pp.00) for moral damages. b. His counterclaim not being in order as earlier discussed in this decision.DECISION PARDO. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. 6 128 . "Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.Defendant James Daniel II. Mary's Academy appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City. defendants James Daniel. Allegedly. being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and who was under special parental authority of defendant St." "From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995. spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9. d. is ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated damages. J p: The Case The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution denying reconsideration. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos. 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents.000. "On 20 February 1997. Accordingly. Vivencio Villanueva and St.Their liability being only subsidiary. the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School.

such authority and responsibility applies to field trips. produces the injury. 2)Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the petitioner. 9 Under Article 219 of the Family Code. respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities. however. pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. entity or institution engaged in child care. and without which the result would not have occurred. for petitioner to be liable. which. a minor. cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision. Hence. Significantly. to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits. The Court's Ruling We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Hence. excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.‟ In other words. its administrators and teachers. or custody. Further. must be pinned on the minor's parents primarily. produces the injury. Between the remote cause and the injury. there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence. and which was the proximate cause of the accident. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities. 10 However. "The proximate cause of an injury is that cause. It was Ched Villanueva. petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle. 129 . In their comment to the petition. including the spouses Carpitanos. must have a causal connection to the accident. in natural and continuous sequence. and without which the result would not have occurred. or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. „negligence. establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.The Issues 1)Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II. 11 “In order that there may be a recovery for an injury. unbroken by intervening efficient causes. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. Under Article 218 of the Family Code. entity or institution." 13 Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Respondents. the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events. who had possession and control of the jeep. parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos. Mary's Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. instruction or custody: (1) the school. the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Consequently. no matter in what it consists. Mary's Academy had no control. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. instruction. Thus.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.”‟ 12 In this case. liability for the accident. the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. it must be shown that the „injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision. in natural and continuous sequence. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary's Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 7 and 219 8 of the Family Code. if the person under custody is a minor. or (2) the individual. whether inside or outside the premises of the school. Hence.‟ And „the proximate cause of an injury is that cause. which. we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of P500.000. there intervened the negligence of the minor's parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. the respondents‟ reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that “those given the authority and responsibility under the p receding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor” was unfounded. but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. For.

.. 16 Thus. legal and equitable justification. in the result.. even if not used for public service. 19 The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants. the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner. excluding petitioner St. the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals 18 and that of the trial court. Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago. but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. 15 The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual. it is not the school. SO ORDERED.Though incapable of pecuniary computation. C. the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. JJ.J. The Fallo WHEREFORE. concur. For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident. 14 In this case." 17 Hence. the grant of attorney's fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted. moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. Puno. Moreover. there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle. DaTHAc No costs. the grant of attorney's fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule. Incidentally. Mary's Academy. J. 130 .. would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. Jr. Dipolog City. with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Davide.

Upon his discharge from the hospital. reversing the decision ** of the Court of First Instance of Manila." (p. 013887-CV Bernardino Jimenez v. Branch XXII in Civil Case No. 96390 between the same parties.000. 65) while respondent filed its memorandum on October 24. 96390. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at the time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. 71049. 1985 (Rollo.00 as moral damages due to pains. together with his neighbors. 47). SO ORDERED. CITY OF MANILA and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT.00 as attorney's fees. 34) while petitioner filed its Reply on August 21. Petitioner filed his memorandum on October 1. respondents. sufferings and sleepless nights and P10.SECOND DIVISION [G. Civil Case No. 1985 (Rollo. 42). judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. p.00). p. pp. on appeal. CV No. 1985 (Rollo. P20. the Intermediate Appellate Court held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable for damages but absolved respondent City of Manila. this case was transferred to the Second Division of this Court. the dispositive portion of the decision reading: "WHEREFORE. p. LexLib Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Hence this petition. vs. Rollo. 1974 he. 62) gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit simultaneous memoranda. p. 01387. Ana Public Market had been placed by virtue of a Management and Operating Contract (Rollo. causing a dirty and rusty four inch nail. petitioner. but only insofar as holding Asiatic Integrated Corporation solely liable for damages and attorney's fees instead of making the City of Manila jointly and solidarily liable with it as prayed for by the petitioner and (2) the resolution of the same Appellate Court denying his Partial Motion for Reconsideration (Rollo. 1986. 29) respondent City of Manila filed its comment on August 13. The lone assignment of error raised in this petition is on whether or not the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in not ruling that respondent City of Manila should be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner suffered. P900. AC-G. He felt ill and developed fever and he had to be carried to Dr. Despite the medicine administered to him by the latter.90 actual medical expenses. DECISION PARAS. Rollo. Asiatic Integrated Corporation and City of Manila." (Decision. went to Sta. No. 131 . 82). A new one is hereby entered ordering the defendant Asiatic Integrated Corporation to pay the plaintiff P221. 20. After purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to return home but he stepped on an uncovered opening which could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater. p.R. 51). Thereafter. he had to walk around with crutches for fifteen (15) days. p. As a result. the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED. As above stated. 1985 (Rollo. His injury prevented him from attending to the school buses he is operating. No. Juanita Mascardo.R. 1987. Rollo) The findings of respondent Appellate Court are as follows: The evidence of the plaintiff (petitioner herein) shows that in the morning of August 15. 2). he had to engage the services of one Bienvenido Valdez to supervise his business for an aggregate compensation of nine hundred pesos (P900.R. The lower court decided in favor of respondents. After administering first aid treatment at a nearby drugstore. May 29. For lack of sufficient evidence. He was then rushed to the Veterans Memorial Hospital where he had to be confined for twenty (20) days due to high fever and severe pain. p. stuck inside the uncovered opening. his left leg swelled with great pain. p.00 for the amount paid for the operation and management of a school bus. J p: This is a petition for review on certiorari of : (1) the decision * of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G. the same having been assigned to a member of said Division (Rollo. 92). In the resolution of October 13.000. 1985 of the First Division of this Court (Rollo. 13-20). his companions helped him hobble home. p. the Court in the resolution of September 11. p. (Decision. to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-petitioner penetrating to a depth of about one and a half inches. In compliance with the resolution of July 1. the counterclaims of the defendants are likewise dismissed. 1985 (Rollo. The dispositive portion of the Intermediate Appellate Court's decision is as follows: "WHEREFORE.] BERNARDINO JIMENEZ.

" In other words. city or municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public building in question. 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers" to enforce the provisions of said Act. p. 4. 6). (Rollo. or his duly authorized representative or representatives. to report on the activities and operation of the City public markets and talipapas and the facilities and conveniences installed therein. CV No.) The fact of supervision and control of the City over subject public market was admitted by Mayor Ramon Bagatsing in his letter to Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata which reads: "These cases arose from the controversy over the Management and Operating Contract entered into on December 28. R. or any other City Officer. For one thing. or any other law or ordinance. 409 as amended (Revised Charter of Manila) which provides: "The City shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor. that the defective public works belong to the province. public buildings and other public works under their control or supervision. p. liable for damages for the death of. Provided. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. 44) xxx xxx xxx "VI That all present personnel of the City public markets and talipapas shall be retained by the SECOND PARTY as long as their services remain satisfactory and they shall be extended the same rights and privileges as heretofore enjoyed by them. there is no doubt that the plaintiff suffered injuries when he fell into a drainage opening without any cover in the Sta." Upon the other hand. Ana Public Market. claiming that it was only a small puncture and that as a war veteran. Art. or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads. Teotico (22 SCRA 269-272 [1968]) where the Supreme Court squarely ruled that Republic Act No. to enforce the provisions of this chapter. 409 refers to liability arising from negligence. there is no question that the Sta. public buildings. streets.R. subject to prior approval of the FIRST PARTY to discharge any of the present employees for cause. and other public works under their control or supervision. or any other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. In the same suit. Asiatic Integrated Corporation assumed all responsibility for damages which may be suffered by third persons for any cause attributable to it. p. As correctly found by the Intermediate Appellate Court. . (Decision. cities and municipalities . operation and maintenance in connection with the stipulations contained in this Contract. regardless of the object. when it provides: "II That immediately after the execution of this contract. the SECOND PARTY shall start the painting. in general.A. AC-G. public buildings and other public works" in particular and is therefore decisive on this specific case. cdphil In the case at bar.The petition is impressed with merit." ( Ibid. Defendants do not deny that plaintiff was in fact injured although the Asiatic Integrated Corporation tries to minimize the extent of the injuries. Section 4 of Republic Act No." constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces. plaintiff's hospitalization at the War Veteran's Hospital was free. 01387. "or any other law or ordinance or from negligence" of the City "Mayor. the SECOND PARTY shall submit a program of improvement. or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. bridges. cleaning. Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that: "Provinces. Municipal Board. despite the Management and Operating Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the control of the former. the Municipal Board. Ana Public Market. 1. "VII That the SECOND PARTY may from time to time be required by the FIRST PARTY. 45). streets. sec. said contract is explicit in this regard. particularly as to their cost of construction. or from negligence of said Mayor. thereof. Cdpr Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be held liable for the injuries sustained by the petitioner because under the Management and Operating Contract. 1972 by and between the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation. city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. It has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot be held liable under Article 1. sanitizing and repair of the public markets and talipapas and within ninety (90) days thereof. it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach. whereby in consideration of a 132 . (Rollo. rehabilitation and reconstruction of the city public markets and talipapas subject to prior approval of the FIRST PARTY. that the SECOND PARTY shall have the right. No. bridges. ." This issue has been laid to rest in the case of City of Manila v. What said article requires is that the province. the Supreme Court clarified further that under Article 2189 of the Civil Code. while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective streets. Municipal Board. Rollo. however. or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective conditions of roads. development.

there is no showing that such practice has ever been prohibited. pp." (Decision. it was already uncovered. Your Honor. 01387. . p. More specifically stated. 41-42. rehabilitation and development of the City's public markets and 'Talipapas' subject to the control and supervision of the City. Neither was it shown that any sign had been placed thereabouts to warn passers-by of the impending danger. it must however. 1173 of the Civil Code).) (Emphasis supplied. 75). it is an error for the trial court to attribute the negligence to herein petitioner.. Chief of the Market Division and Deputy Market Administrator of the City of Manila testified as follows: "CourtThis market master is an employee of the City of Manila? Mr." (Exhibit 7-A.fixed service fee. Thus the Asst. the check or verifying whether the place is safe for public safety is vested in the market master. that the Sta. If he ventures to the store on the basis of such assumption and is injured because the owner and not comply with his duty. As observed by respondent Court of Appeals. p. Ana Public Market during a stormy weather is indeed untenable. AC-G. 76) The contention of respondent City of Manila that petitioner should not have ventured to go to Sta. . 1977. 59). As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasi-delict.) (Rollo.) (Emphasis supplied. the opening was still uncovered. Sadly. A customer in a store has the right to assume that the owner will comply with his duty to keep the premises safe for customers. to check the safety of the place for the public. Finally.R. the drainage hole could have been placed under the stalls instead of on the passage ways. 76)." (T. as I stated. Ana has its own market master. Your Honor. YmsonActually. p. that the City should have seen to it that the openings were covered. Moreover.) (Rollo.) (Rollo. Hearing of July 27. 57.) xxx xxx xxx "CourtAs far as you know there is or is there any specific employee assigned with the task of seeing to it that the Sta. while there are findings that during floods the vendors remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water (Decision. QWhat are his functions? ADirect supervision and control over the market area assigned to him. and five (5) months after the incident happened. the evidence indicates that long before petitioner fell into the opening. 1977. inasmuch as the City retains the power of supervision and control over its public markets and talipapas under the terms of the contract. 17). pp. Rollo. pp. administration and control over public markets and the personnel thereof..s. including those whose duties concern the maintenance and upkeep of the market and ordinances and other pertinent rules and regulations. provides: "The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate supervision. 24-25. 133 . AC-G. more specifically. maintenance. respondent City having retained control and supervision over the Sta. Even more important is the fact.n. xxx xxx xxx "It is believed that there is nothing incongruous in the exercise of these powers vis-a-vis the existence of the contract. 01387." (T. the City of Manila employed a market master for the Sta. p. Rollo. 19).s. one must have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family.R. In fact. p." (Emphasis supplied. There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of Manila to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. The trial court even chastised the plaintiff for going to market on a rainy day just to buy bagoong. the City hired the services of the said corporation to undertake the physical management. Ana Market is safe for the public? "Mr. Section 30 (g) of the Local Tax Code as amended. (Art.n. Ana Public Market whose primary duty is to take direct supervision and control of that particular market. To recapitulate. CV No. it appears evident that the City of Manila is likewise liable for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code. no negligence can be imputed to the customer. the findings of appellate court are as follows: ". CV No. Ana Public Market and as tort-feasor under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.Ymson Yes. (Rollo. Hearing of May 20. LLjur For instance. much less penalized by the City of Manila. The primary duty of that market master is to make the direct supervision and control of that particular market. be admitted that ordinary precautions could have been taken during good weather to minimize the dangers to life and limb under those difficult circumstances. While it may be conceded that the fulfillment of such duties is extremely difficult during storms and floods.

PREMISES CONSIDERED. making the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation solidarily liable to pay the plaintiff P221. Jr. Gutierrez. concur.000. Thus the negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered. P20.Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no openings in the middle of the passageways and if any..00 as attorney's fees.000. Respondent City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation being joint tort-feasors. Padilla.90 actual medical expenses. JJ. petitioner could not have fallen into it. SO ORDERED. 134 . sufferings and sleepless nights and P10. Fernan (Chairman). are solidarily liable under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. Bidin and Cortes.00 for the amount paid for the operation and management of the school bus..00 as moral damages due to pain. the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED. P900. the City is therefore liable for the injury suffered by the petitioner. Had the opening been covered. that they were adequately covered.

city treasurer and chief of police.. within a "loading and unloading" zone. the former establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers to enforce the provisions of said Act. Genaro N. city health officer. the defense presented evidence. waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. He was also associated with several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club. received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of 135 . be raised for the first time on appeal much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court. to prove that the Storm Drain Section. plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2. During the period of his treatment. at about 8:00 p. Daza & Associates for respondents.00 during his incapacity to work. the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines.m.. sec. — The assertion that P.PLEADINGS. Reyes for petitioner. Burgos Avenue is a national highway for which the City of Manila is not liable. he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends. city engineer. plaintiff was a practicing public accountant. a businessman and a professor at the University of the East. cities and municipalities liable for damages for the death or injury suffered by any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. Valencia and Co. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital. 3.EN BANC [G. vs. On January 27. while article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making provinces. his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. Due to the filing of this case. 1968. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid. respondents. Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh. As a result of the incident. Burgos Avenue. Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knight's of Rizal. Burgos Avenue. ANSWER. the A. As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence. January 29. Sevilla. Act 409 and Article 2189 of the Civil Code. City Fiscal Manuel T. with the Court of First Instance of Manila. whereas Article 2189 of the Civil Code. — Insofar as its territorial application is concerned. Teotico filed. Such assertion raised a question of fact which had not been put in issue in the trial court and cannot. the left upper arm. Republic Act 409 is a special law and the Civil Code is a general legislation. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P1.J p: Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.. DECISION CONCEPCION. petitioner. and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals. the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.ID. was made for the first time in the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. amended — for damages against the City of Manila.R. "At the time of the incident. the right leg and the upper lip. Due to the fall. It was not alleged in the answer. C. L-23052. apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. CANNOT BE RAISED FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. but as regards the subject-matter of the provisions of sec. Because of the incident.00. U. Office of the City Engineer of Manila. where his injuries were treated. 4 of Rep.00. These injuries and the allergic eruptions caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital. oral and documentary. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence in connection with the maintenance of said road is a question of fact — a question already decided by the Court of Appeals and the factual findings of said Court are not subject to a review by the Supreme Court. After waiting for about five minutes. "On the other hand. THOUGH A GENERAL LAW. SYLLABUS 1. As blood flowed therefrom. he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. 4. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF CIVIL CODE.. governs liability due to defective streets in particular. plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days.400. 2. PREVAIL OVER MANILA CHARTER. subsequently. He held responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co. No. Rep. a complaint — which was. and took a few steps. TEOTICO and THE COURT OF APPEALS . impairing his vision. — The determination of whether or not P.] CITY OF MANILA.000. its mayor. therefore. ALLEGATIONS NOT SET FORTH IN ANSWER. FINDINGS OF FACT OF COURT OF APPEALS. As stated in the decision of the trial court. In other words. plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he was their only support. Act 409 refers to liability arising from negligence in general regardless of the object thereof. after which he was taken home. SPECIAL LAW. Manila. streets and other public works under the control or supervision of said municipal governments. 1958. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney. CONCLUSIVE. The Civil Code is decisive herein because the present action is based on the alleged defective condition of a road. GENERO M.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole.

bridges. correctly. Republic Act No. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. a question of fact. or any other law or ordinance. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation. the assertion to the effect that said avenue is a national highway was made. that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing. or injuries suffered by. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading: "The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road." After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint. that whenever a report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover. What said article requires is that the province. On appeal taken by plaintiff. intended exclusively for the City of Manila. said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. under Republic Act 409. admitted that P. Even if P. or from negligence" of the city "Mayor. streets. and can not be set up. much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court. that in order to prevent such thefts. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers: 136 . we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. that the Office of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in question was not covered between January 25 and 29. 18." Upon the other hand. in a motion for the reconsideration thereof. and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time whenever funds were available. or injury suffered by. and. Teotico alleged in his complaint. 1958. it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belongto the province. on appeal." Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter. Such assertion raised. therefore. bridges.750. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides: "SEC. or any other city officer. The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. whereas the Civil Code is a general law. by the defendant City and its officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law. regardless of the object thereof. this appeal by the City of Manila. 1 Hence. as well as in his amended complaint. therefore. Manila. except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned. without costs. . Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. streets. city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. however. Moreover. Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces. which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6. As regards the first issue. in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. to enforce the provisions of this chapter. public buildings. At any rate. the matter is immediately attended to. this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. and other public works under their control or supervision . which had not been put in issue in the trial court. Municipal Board. under Article 2189 of the Civil Code.00. alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered. and other public works under their control or supervision.P. because Republic Act 409 is a special law. the City had.matter of the provisions above quoted. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets. in general. city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. but. which is charged with the duty of installation. on January 24. that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance." In other words. but the same was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4). that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers. It is true that. said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence. the city government has changed the position and layout of catch basins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalk with concrete cement covers and openings on the sides of the gutter. which provides: "Provinces. The Court of Appeals. In its answer to the amended complaint. whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets. for the first time. either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with steel matting. or from negligence of said Mayor. repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila. 1958. as regards the subject. . liable for damages for the death of. public buildings. the City. Moreover. Burgos avenue were. that again the iron cover of the same catchbasin was reported missing on January 30. but the said cover was replaced the next day (Exhibit 5). this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila. for the first time. any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads. that it has always been a policy of the said office." or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. a national highway. and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith. in effect. stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant. applicable to the entire Philippines. the Municipal Board. applied the Civil Code. "in particular. cities and municipalities . 1958. Municipal Board. we think. in turn. or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.Legislative powers." Thus. insofar as its territorial application is concerned. It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him took place in a national highway.

to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places. dated May 2." Then. Ruiz Castro. WHEREFORE. cemeteries. piers. to provide for the construction and maintenance. . and gutters therein. thereon are not subject to our review.B. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. .. Makalintal. water. Angeles and Fernando. maintenance and improvement of national primary. so that the natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed. JJ.L. motor and other vehicles. is one of fact. and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes. concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. it provides that "the construction. and culvertsalong and under their tracts. 113. Bengzon. alleys. grade. to provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof. drains. J. and drains. to provide suitable protection against injury to persons or property . to provide for lighting. 917. cleaning. to provide for the inspection of. in connection with the maintenance of said road. of bridges. or any part thereof. and crossing of railroads. and culverts. the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed. sewer and other pipes." This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No.xxx xxx xxx "(x)Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out. the building and repair of tunnels. to provide for and change the location. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces. again. .. and locomotives. sewers. which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative. and other amusements which may annoy persons using the streets and public places. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence.P. or frighten horses or other animals. viaducts. and other public places. avenues. to regulate the speed of horses and other animals. Moreover. upon which the City relies. and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein. cars. . Sanchez. kiteflying. . curbs. with costs against the City of Manila. and Executive Order No. fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas. chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries. and to require railroad companies to fence their property. 137 . and to construct and repair ditches. sewers. to prohibit and regulate ball playing. the determination of whether or not P.. cars. Reyes. construction and improvement. parks. wharves. . and locomotives within the limits of the city. 917 and Executive Order No. and the findings of said Court. national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts. hoop rolling. J. to regulate the lights used on all such vehicles. and to regulate the use of streets. . sidewalks. concur. 1955. to provide for and regulate cross-walks. and sprinkling of streets and public places. Dizon. Zaldivar. and regulate the use. . It is so ordered. .

138 .

NATURE. — The award of moral damages at P150. the award of actual damages becomes erroneous. APPLIES IN PARTICULAR TO LIABILITY ARISING FROM "DEFECTIVE STREETS. P150. The Court has time and again called attention to the reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis. CHARTER ONLY LAYS DOWN GENERAL RULES REGULATING LIABILITY OF CITY. ACTUAL DAMAGES.ID. NOT NECESSARY FOR DEFECTIVE ROAD OR STREET TO BELONG TO PROVINCE.053. inasmuch as the determination of the amount is discretionary on the court. medical and other expenses [Exhs. CITED. the following judgment was rendered against the respondent City of Dagupan: xxx xxx xxx (1)Ordering defendant City of Dagupan to pay plaintiff. the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code.000. there must be compensatory or actual damages as satisfactory proof of the factual basis for damages. — The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. DECISION SARMIENTO. and P3. Though evidence of moral loss and anguish existed to warrant the award of damages. MAY BE AWARDED EVEN WITHOUT PROOF OF PECUNIARY LOSS AS DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT IS DISCRETIONARY ON COURT.. ID. GUILATCO. AWARD OF DAMAGES WITHOUT BASIS RESULTING IN EXHORBITANT AMOUNTS. respondents.000. ARTICLE 2189 OF NEW CIVIL CODE..00 as lost income for one (1) year [Exh. the court can not rely on "speculation. Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the discretion of the trial court.] FLORENTINA A. and 139 ... ID. AMOUNT MAY NOT BE BASED ON "SPECULATION. PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND OTHER PUBLIC WORKS". P50.ID. ARTICLE ONLY REQUIRES THAT EITHER CONTROL OR SUPERVISION IS EXERCISED OVER DEFECTIVE ROAD OR STREET. Tangco. petitioner. Without the actual proof of loss. the moderating hand of the law is called for. 5.00 as attorney's fees. Nolan R. (3) Third..00 as exemplary damages.00 as bonus).054..R. Her handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year.000. ID.000. The City Legal Officer for respondents. F] and P450. CITY OF DAGUPAN.420.000. resulting in exhorbitant amounts.ID.00 as hospital. 1989.CIVIL LAW. Alfredo G. EXPLAINED. cdasia 2. J p: In a civil action 1 for recovery of damages filed by the petitioner Florentina A.. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective streets. P7. ID. public buildings and other public works.. MORAL DAMAGES. SYLLABUS 1.. the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's acts. (2)Dismissing plaintiff's complaint as against defendant City Engr. ID. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P20. H to H-60]. EXCESSIVE DAMAGES. ID. WITHOUT ACTUAL PROOF OF LOSS. REPREHENSIBLE.ID. city or municipality for liability to attach. REDUCED..ID. March 21. moral damages are in the nature of an award to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered but which for some reason can not be proven. No. In determining actual damages... QUASI-DELICTS. the following should be taken into consideration: (1) First.00 as moral damages.000. Guilatco.00 should be reduced to the proven expenses of P8. under preceding jurisprudence. vs. conjecture or guess works as to the amount. cda 6. DAMAGES.00. — The actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the amount of P10. REQUISITES THEREOF. — It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province. 4. 61516.924 (namely P8.65 only. — Moral damages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss. — In awarding moral damages. and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.00 is excessive. ID. (2) Second. Though incapable of pecuniary estimation. Evangelista for petitioner. plus costs and to appropriate through its Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) said amounts for said purpose. and litigation expenses. AWARD BECOMES ERRONEOUS." 3. CONJECTURE OR GUESS WORK". CITY OR MUNICIPALITY FOR LIABILITY TO ATTACH. actual damages in the amount of P15.SECOND DIVISION [G. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.

long by 150 cms. City Engineer of the Public Works and Building Official for Dagupan City. A. In his answer defendant Tangco expressly admitted in par. 1978 which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving gaping hole about 2 ft. Dr. She has lost several pounds as a result of the accident and she is no longer her former jovial self. we grant the petition. at the time of the incident on July 25. I. Ernesto Solermo. De Asis and Cerezo corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff regarding the mishap and they have confirmed the existence of the manhole (Exhs. 2 The facts found by the trial court are as follows: 3 It would appear from the evidences that on July 25. streets. social. Alfredo G. city or municipality for liability to attach. she has been unable to perform her religious. that in his capacity as ex-officio Highway Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and control over National roads. admittedly a National Road in front of the Luzon Colleges. Dominado Manzano of the Provincial Hospital. (a National Road. She also incurred hospitalization. 6 In the case at bar.000. 1978. plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain not only on her right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body.65 (Exh. It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province. plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter. He also admitted that said manhole (there are at least 11 in all in Perez Blvd. G. at first at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital. Hence. is held concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.053.00 in all. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the Highway Engineer which. Defendant Alfredo Tangco. where the fatal drainage hole is located. or injuries suffered by. medication and other expenses to the tune of P8. the pain has persisted even after her discharge from the Medical City General Hospital on October 9. G-1 to G-19) have confirmed beyond shadow of any doubt the extent of the fracture and injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the mishap. the appellate court 4 reversed the lower court findings on the ground that no evidence was presented by the plaintiff-appellee to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard. admitted the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd. 1978 up to the present. see also Exhs. long by 1 1/2 feet wide or 42 cms.. She earns at least P720. and the job is specifically done by his subordinates. from July 25 to August 3. On the other hand. for lack of merit. is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. Hence. deep (see Exhs. CFIDagupan City. H to H-60) or a total of P10. and other public works under their control or supervision. As a result thereof. as well as the arguments presented by the parties. no liability should attach to the city. Despite her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches and the Court has actually observed that she has difficulty in locomotion. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. Mr. while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. C and sub-exhibits) on the sidewalk along Perez Blvd. herein plaintiff. 1978 up to the present she has been deprived of said income as she has already consumed her accrued leaves in the government service. Antonio Sison of the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong Rizal (Exh. thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. we have simplified the errors assigned by the petitioner to a single issue: whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists..(3)Dismissing the counterclaims of defendant City of Dagupan and defendant City Engr. as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office. 7-1 thereof. City Engineer of Dagupan City and admittedly ex-officio Highway Engineer.Provinces. In this review on certiorari. we agree with those of the trial court and of the petitioner. to the present. are also owned by the National Government. 1978 (or for a period of 16 days). under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk. 5 The city contends that Perez Boulevard. but since July 25. From the time of the mishap on July 25. this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer who has the following duties: 140 . D and D-1). 1978. Tangco. After examination of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and those of the appellate court. during the period of her confinement in said two hospitals. also a maintenance Engineer. in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code. But as City Engineer of Dagupan City. wide by 75 cms. F. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. Cdpr On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan. where the incident happened. as other receipts were either lost or misplaced. as well as Dr. Patrolman Claveria.) is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. he supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they are properly covered. and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident. Norberto Felix and Dr. public buildings. confined. located near the city hall in Dagupan City. including the Perez Blvd. Santiago de Vera (Maintenance Foreman) and Engr. bridges.00 a month consisting of her monthly salary and other means of income. she had to be hospitalized. B. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. a Court Interpreter of Branch III. operated on. by mere coincidence.

D. 19 resulting in exhorbitant amounts. and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Witnesses from the petitioner's place of work testified to the degeneration in her disposition — from being jovial to depessed. as Ex-Officio Highway Engineer. duties and compensation — There shall be a city engineer. and all private sewers. as in the case at bar. they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer. She refrained from attending social and civic activities.00 should be reduced to the proven expenses of P8. Though evidence of moral loss and anguish existed to warrant the award of damages. Hence. 21 under preceding jurisprudence. the actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the amount of P10. inasmuch as the determination of the amount is discretionary on the court. 22. the physical suffering and mental anguish suffered by the petitioner were proven. The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter. LLphil There is. as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works. Without the actual proof of loss.00 from the Bureau of Public Works and P500. in accordance with the ordinance relating thereto.053. as Building Official for Dagupan City.65 only. last but not the least. 1096. the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P20.00.66 from Dagupan City. cdasia As for the award of exemplary damages. P200. He shall have the following duties: cdrep xxx xxx xxx (j)He shall have the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers. 12 On the other hand. This is because while he is entitled to an honorarium from the Ministry of Public Highways. 18 the moderating hand of the law is called for. his salary from the city government substantially exceeds the honorarium. But the city can not be excused from liability by the argument that the duty of the City Engineer to supervise or control the said provincial road belongs more to his functions as an ex-officio Highway Engineer of the Ministry of Public Highway than as a city officer. may be legislated by the Municipal Board. conjecture or guess works as to the amount. However. the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear. Her handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. 17 Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P150. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. the trial court correctly pointed out the basis: 141 . the court can not rely on "speculation. maintain and regulate the use of the same. the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's acts. The Court has time and again called attention to the reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis. shall inspect and regulate the use of all private systems for supplying water to the city and its inhabitants. therefore.000. admits that he exercises control or supervision over the said road. 15 (3)Third. Mr.00 by virtue of P. the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code.000. construction and improvement of streets. 8 The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. xxx xxx xxx The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out. Alfredo G. and regulation of the use thereof. the award of actual damages becomes erroneous. and.00 from the Ministry of Public Highways. receives the following monthly compensation: P1. Be all that as it may. 1 6 In the case at bar.The City Engineer — His powers. can not be used to exempt the city. 13 Though incapable of pecuniary estimation. 11 Although these last two officials are employees of the National Government. the following should be taken into consideration: (1)First. Tangco.Sec. public buildings and other public works. who shall be in charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works.000. 20 Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the discretion of the trial court. and shall control. avenues and alleys and sidewalks. In determining actual damages. in awarding moral damages. 9 The City Engineer. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective streets. Alfredo G.810. respectively. moral damages are in the nature of an award to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered but which for some reason can not be proven. and their connection with the public sewer system. public buildings. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan. 7 Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located. We do not agree. there must be compensatory or actual damages as satisfactory proof of the factual basis for damages. moral damages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss." 10 This function of supervision over streets. P100. He shall receive a salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in question. 14 (2)Second. and all sources of water supply.00 is excessive.

924 (namely P8.00 as hospital. should serve warning to the city or cities concerned to be more conscious of their duty and responsibility to their constituents. Melencio-Herrera.00 as lost income for one (1) year and P450. 142 . to immediately cover the same. 1979. the end is more important than the manner in which the work is carried out. the petition is GRANTED. Magat. JJ .000. We do not find any good reason to justify the issuance of an order of execution even before the expiration of the time to appeal. Padilla and Regalado.00 as bonus). in order to minimize or prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians. Because of this obsession for showing off. This order for garnishment was revoked subsequently by the succeeding presiding judge. from the then presiding judge. The assailed decision and resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court. 1979 and amended on March 13.00 as exemplary damages. 23 We rule that the execution of the judgment of the trial court pending appeal was premature.420.00 remain the same. Hon. Willelmo Fortun. Hon. Romeo D. medical and other expenses. 22 Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact" projects such as beautification drives. and became the basis for the petitioner's motion for reconsideration which was also denied. P20. through this case. the petitioner was able to secure an order for garnishment of the funds of the City deposited with the Philippine National Bank.054. dated March 12. SO ORDERED.00 as moral damages and P10. causing public inconvenience and inviting accidents. The attorney's fees of P3.000. Pending appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan from the trial court to the appellate court. is hereby REINSTATED with the indicated modifications as regards the amounts awarded: cdphil (1)Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P15. Paras.. such trivial details as misplaced flower pots betray the careless execution of the projects.To serve as an example for the public good.000. P7. 24 WHEREFORE. it is high time that the Court. especially when they are engaged in construction work or when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which are uncovered. concur.

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