You are on page 1of 8

ASPEC A Tribute to Scotty P

7 Week Juniors

Aspec
Aspec.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Interpretation: Divided Into 3 Branches........................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Specification key to Policy............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Specification Key to Policy ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 4 Implementation Key to Policy.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Agent CPs Good............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6 Agents = Zero-Sum......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Specification key to Activism........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8

-1-

ASPEC A Tribute to Scotty P

7 Week Juniors

Interpretation: Divided Into 3 Branches


Power in the federal government is divided in 3 branches Rotunda 01 (18 Const. Commentary 319, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE POLITCAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, AND MORRISON, lexis)
The Framers of our Constitution anticipated that a self-interested "federal majority" would consistently seek to impose more federal control over the people and the states. n10 Hence, they created a federal structure designed to protect freedom by dispersing and limiting federal power. They instituted federalism [*321] chiefly to protect individuals, that is, the people, not the "states qua states." n11 The Framers sought to protect liberty by creating a central government of enumerated powers. They divided power between the state and federal governments, and they further divided power within the federal government by splitting it among the three branches of government, and they further divided the legislative power (the power that the Framers most feared) by splitting it between two Houses of Congress. n12

Authority is not centralized in a monolithic federal government but divided among 3 branches. Alabama Law Review, 2002 (l/n)
The Framers sought to protect liberty by creating a central government of enumerated powers. They divided power between the state and federal governments, and they further divided power within the federal government by splitting it among the three branches of government, and they further divided the legislative power (the power that the Framers most feared) by splitting it between two Houses of Congress.

The USFG isnt an actor Phillip Corboy et al, lawyer, 30 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 183, Winter, lexis, 19 99,
Each branch of government, be it the legislative, executive, or judicial, has its own realm of authority, and one branch shall not exercise the powers that properly belong to a different branch. 190 The authority to determine when the separation of powers doctrine has been violated rests with the judiciary . 191

The United States federal government is the basis for our interpretation and specific agency action is a valid interpretation. Words And Phrases Dictionary v.16 1998
Action against the Postal service, although an independent establishment of the executive branch of the federal government is an action against the Federal government for purposes of rule that plaintiff action against government has the right to jury trial only where the right is one of terms of governments consent to be sued.

The word the in the resolution serves as a function word to distinguish the United States Federal Government from other federal governments The United States Federal Government is made up of 3 branches and numerous agencies acting independently. Merriam Webster, 2002
used as a function word with a noun modified by an adjective or by an attributive noun to limit the application of the modified noun to that specified by the adjective or by the attributive noun.

USFG is not an actor Brovero 94 (Adrienne, Immigration Policies Expert, Immigration Regulation : Borderline Policies Wake Forest Debate Site www.wfu.edu/Studentorganizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Brovero1994Immigration.htm) The problem is not that there is not a plan; this time there is one. The problem is that there is no agent specified. The federal government does not enact policies, agents or agencies within the federal government enact policies. The agent enacting a policy is a very important aspect of the policy. For some of the same reasons the affirmative team should specify a plan of action, the affirmative team should specify an agent of action

-2-

ASPEC A Tribute to Scotty P

7 Week Juniors

Specification key to Policy


Its impossible to determine whether plan is valuable without looking to the branch of government implementing it Komesar 94 (Neil, John and Rylla Boshard Profesor @ U of Wisconsin, PhD in economics from U Chicago, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in
Law, Economics, and Public Policy, p. 4-5) My belief is that the importance of institutional choice and comparative institutional analysis is not universally shared, however. There are, in fact, dramatic anomalies in the study of law and public policy when it comes to the subject of deciding who decides. For example, one would assume that the central issue of constitutional law is the choice of who decides- the choice between alternative social decision-makers such as the executive, the legislature, and the judiciaryand that, therefore, constitutional scholarship would be replete with sophisticated analyses of these alternatives. In turn, one would assume that, when economic analysts of law-usually non-constitutional law-consider the issue of who decides these high priests of trade-offs and opportunity costs would know that one cannot decide who decides by examining only one alternative. Yet most constitutional scholars ignore the issue of who decides or at most treat it with superficial maxims. And when economic analysts of law address the subject of who decides, they often focus their attention on the attributes of only one alternative. Constitutional law and the economic approach to law are important enough aspects of legal study that such anomalies standing alone would justify searching inquiry. But, in fact, these anomalies are only dramatic examples of pervasive problem in the analysis of law and, more generally, of public policy. Although important and controversial decisions about who decides are buried in every law and public policy issue, they often go unexamined, are treated superficially, or, at best, are analyzed in terms of the characteristics of one alternative. Most existing theories of law and public policy focus attention on social goals and values. The economic approach to legal analysis is cast in terms of a single social goal- resource allocation efficiency. Its critics attack that goal as insufficient both normatively and descriptively, while its proponents defend its validity. Constitutional law analysis is largely a debate about social goals and values such as resource allocation efficiency, Rawlsian justice, or Lockean protection of property. Although the choice among social goals or values is an important ingredient in understanding and evaluating law and public policy outcomes, analysis of goal and value choice, standing alone, tells us virtually nothing about these outcomes- what they are or what they should be. Upon close inspection, each social goal bandied about in analyses of law and public policy is generally consistent with virtually any law or public policy outcome. In other words, a given goal can be seen as consistent with liability or no liability, regulation or no regulation, constitutional right or no constitutional right. Goal choice may be necessary to the determination of law and public policy, but it is far from sufficient. A link is missing - an assumption overlooked- in analyses that suppose a given law or public policy result follows from a given social goal. That missing link is institutional choice. Embedded in every law and public policy analysis that ostensibly depends solely on goal choice is the judgment, often unarticulated, that the goal in question is best carried out by a particular institution. Given the goal of protecting property, for example, the case for recognizing a constitutional right involves the implicit judgment that the adjudicative process protects property better than the political process. In turn, given the goal of promoting safety, the case for removing tort liability involves the implicit judgment that the market for government regulation promote safety better than the adjudicative process. Goal choice and institutional choice are both essential for law and public policy. They are inextricably related. On the one hand, institutional performance and, therefore, institutional choice can not be assessed except against the bench mark of some social goal or set of goals. On the other, because in the abstract any goal can be consistent with a wide range of public policy, it is institutional choice that connects goals with their legal or public policy results.

The crux of policymaking education is found in agent and implementation issues focus should be applied on resolving those issues Schuck 99 (Peter H., Professor, Yale Law School, and Visiting Professor, New York Law School, Spring 1999 ("Delegation and Democracy" Cardozo Law
Review) http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/schuck.htm God and the devil are in the details of policymaking, as they are in most other important thingsand the details are to be found at the agency level. This would remain true, moreover, even if the nondelegation doctrine were revived and statutes were written with somewhat greater specificity, for many of the most significant impacts on members of the public would still be indeterminate until the agency grappled with and defined them. Finally, the agency is often the site in which public participation is most effective. This is not only because the details of the regulatory impacts are hammered out there. It is also because the agency is where the public can best educate the government about the true nature of the problem that Congress has tried to address. Only the interested parties, reacting to specific agency proposals for rules or other actions, possess (or have the incentives to ac-quire) the information necessary to identify, explicate, quantify, and evaluate the real-world consequences of these and alternative proposals. Even when Congress can identify the first-order effects of the laws that it enacts, these direct impacts seldom exhaust the laws' policy consequences. Indeed, first-order effects of policies usually are less significant than the aggregate of more remote effects that ripple through a complex, interrelated, opaque society. When policies fail, it is usually not because the congressional purpose was misunderstood. More commonly, they fail because Congress did not fully appreciate how the details of policy implementation would confound its purpose. Often, however, this knowledge can only be gained through active public participation in the policymaking process at the agency level where these implementation issues are most clearly focused and the stakes in their correct resolution are highest.

-3-

ASPEC A Tribute to Scotty P

7 Week Juniors

Specification Key to Policy


The agent that implements that plan heavily affects policy Epstein and OHalloran 99 (David, Fellow Dept PoliSci/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis @ Columbia and
Sharyn, Fellow Dept PoliSci/School of International and Public Affairs/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis @ Columbia, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers, Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999, [pg. 7]) It is clear from these examples that where policy is made in Congress or through delegation to the executive has a significant impact on policy outcomes. The central puzzle to be explained, then, is why does Congress delegate broad authority to the executive in some policy areas but not in others? Does this delegation reflect the particularities of an issue area, such as who are its benefactors, who are adversely affected, and what are its complexities? Does it reflect deeper structural factors, such as legislative organization, committee composition, or congressional-executive conflict (divided government)? Is executive branch decision making different form the internal workings of Congress, and how does this affect the decision to delegate? Can congress perfectly control delegated authority through administrative procedures, oversight, and administrative law? Does it want to? In the end, what are the implications of delegating discretionary Can the virtues of separate powers intended by the Founders be maintained alongside significant delegation to the executive?

The agent affects the quality and end-result of policies Epstein and OHalloran 99 (David, Fellow Dept PoliSci/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis @ Columbia and
Sharyn, Fellow Dept PoliSci/School of International and Public Affairs/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis @ Columbia, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers, Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999, [pg. 162]) These findings lend greater credibility to our approach to the policy-making process, but they also have important implications for the divided-government debate. First, we are able to systematically test theories of strategic institutional design, which have been proposed in the literature but only subject to verification by case studies. Second, we found that, contrary to the findings of Mayhew (1991) and others, divided government does have significant impacts upon policy. These effects are not felt in the quantity of legislation passed, but they are reflected in the quality of these laws. More-constrained executive branch agencies under divided government have less leeway to set policy, are less able to incorporate their expertise into regulations, are subject to more oversight by interest groups, the courts, and congressional committees; and are therefore in greater danger of falling prey to procedural gridlock. In other words, our system of separate powers influences not only policy made through the normal legislative channels but delegated policy making as well. We know that bicameralism, strong committees, super-majority requirements, and the possibility of a presidential veto make difficult the passage of new legislation, forcing a series of compromises at each stage and making rapid or radical policy change difficult if authority for our separation of powers system and the incremental mode of policy making that it was meant to encourage? not impossible. This chapter shows that the same logic also holds with policy made via authority delegated to executive agencies; When the concordance of preferences between the branches is high, agencies will be given a relatively free hand in the fashioning of regulations, but interbranch conflict over policy will lead to agencies being burdened with restrictive administrative procedures, again requiring the assent of numerous actors both within the government and without to effectuate policy movement.

Specification and implementation are key aspects of policy and decision-making Lindsay 93 (James M., associate professor of political science at the University of Iowa. Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 4. (Winter, 1992-1993), pp. 616. JSTOR) Political scientists have been slow to recognize how process shapes policy. Recently, however, the "new institutionalism," which seeks to uncover how different institutional forms affect policy outcomes, has begun to explore the topic.38 New institutionalists begin by noting that electoral incentives limit the enthusiasm legislators have for proactive, systematic reviews of agency behavior. in the executive branch in ways that will promote executive compliance with legislative intent or, failing that, will make it easier for affected groups to seek Such "police patrol" oversight has limited electoral appeal either because the agency usually complies with the intent of Congress or because the agency does not harm a legislator's supporters. Either way, legislators often cannot gain credit for their legislative work. Moreover, police patrols entail opportunity costs; legislators could be devoting time to more electorally valuable activities. This incentive structure encourages legislators to fashion the decision-making process remedies from the agency, the courts, or Congress itself.

-4-

ASPEC A Tribute to Scotty P

7 Week Juniors

Implementation Key to Policy


Implementation questions are vital to determining how well the affirmative solves Thompson 00 (Anne, FAO, Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches at the Policy Level
Paper prepared for FAO e-conference, March, http://www.livelihoods.org/pip/pip/tho2-fao.doc) (emphasis in original) Policy itself can be analysed conceptually at a number of different levels. In its broadest sense, the term policy can be used to include projects, programmes, strategies, plans and their implementation, in fact every element of public or collective decision-making. Although it is a rather artificial simplification, policy can be divided into content and the process of policy formulation, in other words the way in which that content is arrived at. The way in which policy is implemented can change the effective content of policy, either because policy interactions have not been fully understood, or because the policy is subverted by those responsible for implementing it.

90% of the plan is the procedure of implementation. We cant learn about most of the Affirmative Elmore 80, Professor of Public Affairs at University of Michigan, Polysci Quarterly Pages 79-80
Analysis of Policy choices matters very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood. In the Normal Case, it was about 10%, leaving 90% in the realm of Implementation.

-5-

ASPEC A Tribute to Scotty P

7 Week Juniors

Agent CPs Good


Turn- Agent Counterplans are crucial in gaining topic specific education and effective solvency debates over the agent of action are equally important as the mandates of the plan. Stoddard 97 (Thomas, professor of law at New York University, 72 New York University Law Review 967, "BLEEDING HEART: REFLECTIONS ON USING
THE LAW TO MAKE SOCIAL CHANGE", lexis) Typically, the absence of any one of these factors will forestall the possibility of "culture-shifting," although, as the story of DOMA indicates, there are exceptions. I have already expressed my view that in most circumstances, change through the legislature is more likely to engender "culture-shifting" than change through a court or an administrative agency, and that legislative change is therefore - in general - preferable to other forms of change. It is deeper and lasts longer. Conversely, it is also harder to attain, since legislatures are rambunctious places that operate slowly, untidily, and often illogically. Legislative change certainly does not assure "culture-shifting," but it does make it more feasible. Many of my colleagues seeking social justice have deliberately avoided legislatures in recent decades, both because of the difficulty of making change there and because of the perception that politicians will not be receptive to their claims. They have turned by and large to the courts. While applauding the changes these lawyer-activists have helped to bring about, and while acknowledging the shortcomings and frustrations of legislative change, I submit that those of us in the business of "culture-shifting" should upend our traditional preference for judicial activity and embrace the special advantages of legislative change. E.M. Forster appended to the title page of his novel Howard's End the enigmatic aphorism: "Only connect ..." n46 It is an apt injunction to lawyers like me. If we lawyer-activists truly seek deep, lasting change, we have to "connect" with the public. We have to accord as much attention to public attitudes as we do to the formal rules that purport to guide or mold those attitudes. That means thinking as concertedly about process as we do about substance. Process matters. How a new rule comes about may, in the end, be as important as what it says.

Turn: The logic that informs their theory arguments against the counterplan is the same logic that encourages gradual erosion of democracy delegation proves we sometimes need to look beyond the policy itself and focus on process Schoenbrod 99 (David, Professor of Law, New York Law School, Adjunct Scholar, Cato Institute, Former Staff Attorney and Co-director, Project on Urban
Transportation, Natural Resources Defense Council, Former Director of Program Development, Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, Former Staff Attorney, Association of the Bar, City of New York Committee on Electric Power and the Environment, Former Professor, Yale Law School, and Member, American Tree Farmers' Association, 1999 ("Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics" Cardozo Law Review) http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/schoenbrod.htm Mashaw's allocation of responsibility is wrong-headed on many levels. It is not as if voters get to choose between candidates who delegate and those who do not. When the Republicans in Congress think environmental regulation is too aggressive, they do not replace the Clean Air Act with a regulatory regime in which Congress takes responsibility or even use the Congressional Review Act to challenge regulations such as the new ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter. Instead, they introduce legislation that would delegate in ways that would make it harder to regulate strictly. Indeed, the Washington Post took exception to a recent Republican environmental bill on the basis that the way for Congress to change the EPA's priorities is to stop delegating and start taking some responsibility. That will not happen readily, however, because delegation gives the electoral advantage to those who duck the hard choices. As I said before, delegation is not so much an issue of left versus right as insiders versus outsiders. With insiders having such a significant stake in delegation, outsiders opposed to delegation face a tremendous organizational challenge. Moreover, it is hard to get ordinary voters to focus on the issue. It is human nature to care more about what a particular piece of legislation does to one directly rather than whether the process by which the legislation is passed will do indirect harm by undermining democracy in the long run. Even law students have to be hit on the head by us professors to get them to look beyond the direct consequences in cases about the structure of government and see the long-term stakes. Ordinary voters are apt to care more whether a particular bill seems to help them than whether it delegates. For example, even in 1970 when there was a public outcry against Congress because it had dropped the ball on air pollution by delegating broadly to agencies and Congress promised explicitly that it would make the "hard choices," Congress easily got away with delegating again. The 1970 statute camouflaged its delegation with the kind of spurious detail that even an expert such as Jerry Mashaw confuses with nondelegation.

Debating about the division of authority between the three branches is key to education, understanding our government, and protection of civil liberties. Ron Lewis, Congressman, Prepared Testimony of Congresssman Ron Lewis Before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federal News Service, January 29th, 1998.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, first let me thank you for allowing me to participate in this important debate. As I understand it, the debate before us today is one about power. Not power in the raw, political sense, but in terms of the allocation of government authority between each branch of the government or more specifically, between Congress and the Judiciary. In a federal system that relies on checks and balances between the three branches to protect our liberty, having this debate is fundamental to understanding what kind of government we have, or more important, aspire to. Indeed, it is a debate and conversation that has been taking place since our founding.

-6-

ASPEC A Tribute to Scotty P

7 Week Juniors

Agents = Zero-Sum
Agents are zero-sum, using one excludes the other Epstein and OHalloran 99 (David, Fellow Dept PoliSci/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis @ Columbia and
Sharyn, Fellow Dept PoliSci/School of International and Public Affairs/Director Center on Political Economy and Comparative Institutional Analysis @ Columbia, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers, Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999, [pg. 7]) Our approach to this question begins with the observation that policy can be made in Congress, through delegation of authority to executive agencies, or by some mixture of these two. Furthermore, the amount of discretionary authority delegated is a decision made by Congress, which can write either detailed legislation that leaves the executive with little latitude in implementation or vague laws that leave executive actors with broad discretionary powers. And when deciding where policy will be made, Congress trades off the internal policy production costs of the committee system against the external costs of delegation. Thus, Congresss decision to delegate is similar to a firms make-or-buy decision; hence our usage of the term transaction cost politics.

-7-

ASPEC A Tribute to Scotty P

7 Week Juniors

Specification key to Activism


Comparative Institutional analysis is vital to participatory activism for social justice Komesar 94 (Neil, John and Rylla Boshard Profesor @ U of Wisconsin, PhD in economics from U Chicago, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in
Law, Economics, and Public Policy, p. 4-5) Ambiguity and discretion move institutional choice to center stage. Suppose, for example, that the legislature (or any other branch of government) assigned the task of implementing this standard is dominated by the rich or even the non poor. One might expect a relatively stingy guaranteed minimum, this stinginess might stem from an intentional distortion of justice or it might reflect the honest but still biased view of officials and constituents that, if the guaranteed income were any higher, the pie would shrink so much that the poor would be worse off in the long run. Recognizing the possibility of a biased legislature, a constitution maker might consider a wide range of design choices including a legislature structured to better represent the poor, another branch of government to review the determination of the first (presumably that reviewer branch would be structured differently than the reviewed branch), or a detailed schedule of guaranteed income specified in the constitution itself. The important point here is that even the most straightforward version of Rawls difference principle depends for its real substance on the decisions of the institutions that Rawls neglects to examine. Even the constitutions of totalitarian states have contained high sounding announcements of right. The welfare of the populace depends on the presence of institutions capable of translating high sounding principles into substance. Issues of institutional representation and participation seem especially important for the least advantaged, who almost by definition have had difficulties with representation and participation are important for resolving the simpler version of the difference principle, they would seem even more important in fronting the more complicated standard that Michelman derives from Rawls. They would seem more important yet when society faces the immense task of fulfilling a measure of justice that seeks to integrate this difference principle with the concepts of equal opportunity and liberty. Determining the character of the legislature or agency given the task of this integration seems central here. The real content of Rawlsian justice depends on such determination. Any theory of justice capable of even minimally capturing our basic sensibilities has many loosely defined components. Because such loosely defined elements and complicated standards are inherent in goal choice and articulation, the character of the institutions that will define and apply these goals becomes an essential-perhaps the essential-component in the realization of the just society. The more complex and vaguely defined the conception of the good, the more central becomes the issue of who decides-the issue of institutional choice. The discussion of boomer showed that these questions of institutional choice dominate issues of resource allocation efficiency-a definition of the social good more confined and better defined than broader conceptions of the good such as Rawls theory of justice. The lessons about the important and complexity of institutional choice derived from Boomer are even more appropriate with more-complex definitions of the good. Rawls purposely and expressly abstracts from concerns about institutions and institutional choice. Under such circumstances, perhaps it was unfair for me to raise the subject in criticism of his theory-however limited that criticism. I did so for two reasons. First I wanted to show that implicit assumptions about institutional choice exist within even the most carefully constructed abstractions and that, if left unexamined, these hidden assumptions can have adverse effects on the internal structure of the theory. Second, I wanted to show that such abstraction from institutional choice severely constrains the robustness of the resulting theory. Any attempt to employ Rawls to explore the character of the just society, as opposed to justice in the abstract, requires abandonment of the vow of non-institutionalism.

-8-