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Umwertung – On Nietzsche’s “Trans-valuation of All Values”

PART 1 Life and the World as Wille zur Macht
Exordium The original “motive” of social theoreticians, what “moves” or im-pels them to reflect on the cosmos cannot be found “outside” that cosmos. The “theoretician” is part of the “life” that is the object of theoria. The aim of Western philosophy had always been to achieve the object-ivity allowed by an “Archimedean point” – a point outside the cosmos. Yet in doing so, the growing “objectivity” of its episteme and gnosis led increasingly to the “subordination” of the cosmos by the “observer”, transforming its “theorization” into a praxis that gradually eclipsed its original “human interest” and hypostatized this last into a “dis-interested” search for “the Truth”, for the “essence of things”, for “the nature and being (Wesen) of reality”. Already with Hegel, and then continuing with nearly all postHegelian philosophers, it had dawned on Western thinkers that “science” itself, or “natural philosophy”, could never supply the ultima ratio of existence and being, and that therefore the very “trans-scendence” – the ab-strusion from the cosmos – of the human mind or spirit (Geist) could no longer be “posited” as the “objective ground” or “foundation” of human philosophical speculation. Not only did knowledge (Erkenntnis) need to reflect on its human interests (Inter-esse), but its operari needed also to become conscious of itself as praxis, as an “activity” that trans-forms the cosmos itself. Almost at the same time that Marx wrote the Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach – “philosophers have hitherto interpreted the world; the point now is to change it” -, Nietzsche was inverting the Cartesian “cogito ergo sum” into his “vivo ergo cogito” (“I live, therefore I think”). Existence comes before reflection: experience before theory: civil society before the State: social relations before morality. To a human observer and thinker of the nineteenth century the most obvious “reality”, palpable and ubiquitous, would have been that of industrial capitalism. The commodification and commercialization of every aspect of human life; the rapid industrialization and urbanization of European nation-states; the dramatic specialization of industrial branches and commensurate spread of the division of social labour; the growing concentration of capitalist ownership; last but perhaps most visible, the numeric and political rise of urban working classes and proletarian “masses”: these wellnigh apocalyptic, epochal transformations of civil society and of political institutions would have been evident to all - so evident and massive in fact as to be almost “incomprehensible”, - too per-spicuous to be easily understood, too ubiquitous to be located, too rapid to be digested. In these historical circumstances, the “motivations” that impelled Marx to write the Paris Manuscripts and Nietzsche his Untimely Meditations were almost diametrically opposed. Marx attributed the “alienation” of “species-conscious being-human” to the evident reality

of violent capitalist “separation” (Trennung) of living labour from the “means” or tools necessary for its “activity” (operari) and perceived a “contra-diction” between the “homologation” of human living labour and the “wealth” represented by the exchangevalue of commodities that was then used “to pay” that living labour with dead objectified labour. His theoretical task was to expose the dis-tortion and impediment of a human communion whose practical construction was itself made possible by the antagonism of capitalist social relations of production. Nietzsche, by contrast, eschews all “contra-dictions”: esse est percipi – what you see is what you get. The “inequality” and “conflict” that we witness through our senses is the very foundation of Life intended in its totality as the expression of innate “differences” between living things. The condemnation of this “reality” as “in-justice”, of these “differences” as “in-equalities” is the perverse attempt by the “beautiful souls” to impose their “power-lessness” (Ohn-macht) by means of their “ressentiment” on the “Will to Power” of the strong and dominant: “to judge is to be unjust”. (Freud’s comments regarding “Sozialismus” in Die Unbehagen und die Kultur will follow this line of reasoning. And so will also his introductory “reservations” about Romain Rolland’s “oceanic feeling”, which echo Nietzsche’s own critique of Schopenhauer’s “unegoistische Mit-leid” [sym-pathy, com-passion] or “con-scientia”.) Unlike all previous philosophers, Nietzsche begins his entire “critique” of “modernity” – of the present state of bourgeois society – precisely from this “motivation”, from this “impulse”, this “drive” (Trieb). His starting point is the “mere appearance” that other philosophers dismiss in favour of a “hidden reality”, an “essence” that can explain or decipher the “kingdom of shadows” that they reject and condemn. Nietzsche wishes to explore the real sources of the Kantian ungesellige Geselligkeit (un-sociable society) just as it is – by scrutinizing the very “impulses” that may “motivate” human beings both to behave as they do and to “will the truth” of their practical world so as to master it (vouloirsavoir, vouloir-pouvoir). For him, “the kingdom of shadows” is not the world of “appearances” or “alienation”; it is instead the realm of “reality”, the agon and the object of the philosophia perennis, - the “essentialist”, “transcendental” philosophy that wishes to assign a moral “Value”, a finality, a “purpose” or “telos” to life when it ought to know that to do so is impossible – because “life” is immoral and because philosophy is itself “immersed in life”. Marx denounced abstract bourgeois morality as the “mystification” of a brutal capitalist reality that needed to be “rectified” practically. The “misery” of bourgeois morality was that it left “reality” intact – and therefore “theory” and “practice” needed to be unified. Nietzsche instead condemns moral values precisely for seeking “to rectify” the “reality” of life by calling its manifestations (Geschehen) “appearances”. And he “reconciles” theory and practice by “diagnosing” moral values as physiological symptoms of the decay of those who espouse them! Not only are you wrong to seek to transform reality in accordance with your morality, with your ideals, but your very attempt is a sign and symptom of your “diseased” status and destiny!

At the same time, Nietzsche wishes to demolish the entire foundations of the philosophies of social progress that have sprouted in Europe with the rise of the bourgeoisie: on one side, the doctrine of liberalism sanctions the homologation of the self-regulating market mechanism in the utilitarian theories of Political Economy (whether Classical or Neoclassical), and the free concourse of public opinion that guarantees the Political “neutrality” of the nightwatchman State (Lassalle) in the functioning of the market Economy. On the other side, the numerical and political rise of the working class is manifested in the spread of Socialism whose doctrines envision the inevitable liberation of the proletariat from the exploitative yoke of the bourgeoisie and the ravages of its “anarchical” market. Both theories find confirmation of their progressive faith in the seeming evolution (Entwicklung) of humanity both in a physiological and in a social sense, with the growing “democratization” of liberal regimes, promising the fatidic equiparation of Politics and Economics, of State and civil society, of the Rule of Law and free Public Opinion, of citizen and bourgeois, of public order and cohesion and free individuality. This is the Vergeistigung, the spiritualization that bourgeois society and the liberal economy promise and that now seems within reach through the unstoppable advance of scientific discovery, itself a product of the division of social labour, the Vergesellschaftung or “socialization” induced paradoxically by the very spread of “private enterprise” and of the “free market economy”. Yet, in this apparently seamless chain of industrial and social “progress”, a “disconnection” does exist between ideals and reality, between “price” and “value”, between the “antagonism” of bourgeois society, its “unsociability”, and its hypo-critical (uncritical and dissimulating) lip-service and atavism to “moral values”, to the “utility” of capitalist economy, to the “conciliation” of its self-interests in the State that are glorified as “eternal” but in reality are exposed as both precarious and perishable. These a-spects of social life are “dis-connected” and need to be put together again. On one side we have the Vergeistigung (spiritualization) of Kultur and the nation-state; on the other side, we have the Entseelung (dis-enchantment) of material Zivilisation, of the market economy and its “fever of self-interests” (Hegel), together with coercive “rationalization” and bureaucratization of social life (Weber). But for Nietzsche “natura non facit saltum”, not because “reality” is an unbroken chain of causality but precisely because there is no such causality – and “appearances” are all there is. There is no “Truth”, no “Idea” (Platonic or Hegelian), no “substance” hiding behind or under or beyond real e-vents (Geschehen) – there is no “Sub-ject” or “essence”: hence there can be no contra-diction, no hiatus irrationalis (Fichte) between reality and appearance, between noumenon and phenomenon, between thing in itself and “mere representation”, between Subject and Object.
Pref., 2 - …We have no right to be "disconnected"; we must neither err "disconnectedly" nor strike the truth "disconnectedly." Rather with the necessity with which a tree bears its fruit, so do our thoughts, our values, our Yes's and No's and If's and Whether's, grow connected and interrelated, mutual witnesses of one

one kingdom. that Nietzsche questions and denies from the outset – save as it exists in the very act of Becoming (Werden. Eines Erdreichs. Wechsel). The im-possibility (because it involves a “contra-diction”) of reconciling this “physical” aspect of capital (its “use value” in the means of production and living labour) with its “value” (the “equi-valence” of “use values” as “exchange values”) by means of the “embodiment” of value in “money” – this is the “sub-stance” of the contradiction between “body” and “soul”. — Ob sie euch schmecken. us the philosophers! (GM. whence the notion of “fructiferous capital”.501. It is the very possibility of ever finding such a “nexus”. as Nietzsche’s critique will show. the origin of “crisis”. from gleich. irgend worin einzeln zu sein: wir dürfen weder einzeln irren. of trans-crescence. between the “technical” form of the means of pro-duction and the “inter-action” of social agents. The matrix of the “unity” and “identity” presented and postulated by “science” is precisely a “measurement” which calls into being a “standard of value”. 2]…Wir haben kein Recht darauf. “Value” is to be found in “the alienation of labour”. a “value”. between the world and the deity. diese unsre Früchte? — Aber was geht das die Bäume an! Was geht das uns an. but ultimately it is living labour that constitutes the social synthesis – the “potential foundation” for social harmony. noch einzeln die Wahrheit treffen. This “connection” involves a tie. in Aph. “equal”. to match. Einer Gesundheit. (It is this artificial distinction that paradoxically reconciles Lukacs’s left-Hegelian hypostasis of “totality” in the “individual . Notice the chasm between Marx’s “value” and Nietzsche’s. So what can “equate” or “homo-logate” two disparate things must be a “commonality” (homo-noia. such a “homo-noia”. to my mind. For Marx and Classical Political Economy. of metamorphosis or e-volution (Entwicklung) of Life. uns Philosophen!… The aim of capital is to remove this “dis-connection”. Vielmehr mit der Nothwendigkeit. bloom) as the “organic nexus” between tree and fruit. ‘WM’). We need a unit of “value” or at least a de-fini-tion of it: to connect concepts. by turning the “profit outcome” into something as smooth and natural and “necessary” as “a tree bearing fruit”. Marx’s original intuition of the “inseparability” of these two moments of human evolution was quite correct. one sun—as to whether they are to your taste. We will return to this essential theme in Part Two. unsre Ja's und Nein's und Wenn's und Ob's — verwandt und bezüglich allesamt unter einander und Zeugnisse Eines Willens. of trans-formation (Ver-anderung). a medium that may allow us to compare. between the thing and the idea. these fruits of ours?—But what matters that to the trees? What matters that to us. Nietzsche’s critique of “All Values” (alle Werthe) wishes to restore to this reality the same “physiological” naturalness (Greek “physis” – sprout. between “subject” and “object”. Its elaboration in the Grundrisse constitutes. wachsen aus uns unsre Gedanken.) No distinction is possible in Marx between techne’ and poiesis. we must “isolate” their “commonality” first. because for him they are one and the same thing in human evolution. agreement or harmony). perhaps the pinnacle of human “self-reflection”.will. unsre Werthe. a bond. Yet. to measure and to calculate (Nietzsche uses Ver-gleich-en for “comparing”. (Habermas seeks further to distinguish between labour as “instrumental action” not subject to “self-reflection” and interaction that cannot be subsumed by the scientific principles that govern labour as instrumental action. one health. Einer Sonne. mit der ein Baum seine Früchte trägt. Pref) [Vorrede. between “beings” and “Being”.

is incomprehensible without this “scientistic” quantitative “prejudice” or atavism that Marx “engages with” or even “espouses” with his theorization of “market competition”. even through the “politicized” filter of “commodity fetishism”. demise. Karl Menger. too concerned with defending the indefensible. But the Marxist riposte. Cacciari’s Krisis. A masterful discussion that canvasses many of the politico-economic themes in this study is in M. Bohm-Bawerk. as a distortion of the “inter-esse” implicit in the labour process. In other words. refer to our study of ‘The Austrian School’. (On all this. even assuming that “surplus value” is a “fiction” or a “necessary illusion” (Lukacs) due to the enforced “commodification” of human living labour. Surprisingly. of course. privileging “sensory perception” [“appearances” or “representations”]. will expose the “metaphysics” of the Marxian labour theory of value. early formulations of the whole problematic are in H. “the bourgeois Marx”. The Austrian School will erect its own economic theories on Machian scientific premises. and the consequent “reduction” of living labour to labour-power (Arbeitskraft) as “the source of value”. (See the discussion of Colletti’s attempt. Forgetting its “critical” in-tention (dia-noia.) Nietzsche explodes both the Classical and the Marxian as well as the Neo-classical “syntheses”: he seeks to un-mask the “value” behind “values” so as to operate his “transvaluation [Umwertung] of all values” – save that. of its “reproduction” through the social osmosis represented by the division of labour. the “reality of profit”.) The apory will arise rather in Marx’s hypostatization of “science” or “scientific method” as enabling the “discovery” of “the laws of motion” of the capitalist mode of production. as “inter-action”. Important and appropriate. in Ideologia e Societa’. in his essay on the Weberian Rationalisierung. Habermas uncritically embraces Marx’s notion of surplus value as the capitalist “theft of labour time” [!] – as does Negri in his study of the Grundrisse called Marx Oltre Marx. ‘Karl Marx and CPE’. there is no “value behind . by Bohm-Bawerk’s Viennese teacher. Specifically. to reconcile this “mechanistic” view of the wage relation in our ‘Civil Society’. that run parallel to Nietzsche’s own critique of science which will find its own vindication in Schumpeter’s “theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung” – economic evolution as trans-crescence or “growththrough-crisis”. Grossman. except as a “political exercise of social power”. Marx does not explain how a “fiction” can give rise to a “quantifiable and calculable reality”. from which he derived the concept of “surplus value” (Mehrwert) as the basis of “capitalist exploitation” and therefore of “profit”. the Marxian critique of Political Economy will end up reductively positing “labour” in its “alienated” or “separated” form (Trennung) as the foundation of human society. will neglect to expose the “metaphysics” behind the Neo-classical notion of marginal utility developed. Marx’s notion of “socially necessary labour time”.) It will be on the evident “metaphysical” nature of Marx’s attempted “transformation” of [“real”] “values” into [“apparent”] “market prices” that Bohm-Bawerk will decree the “close” [Abschluss. if not adequate. Entwurf). among others. as a quantifiable entity. end] of Karl Marx’s system”.subject-object” in the guise of the proletariat [in reality a late-romantic longing for the “autonomy” of the skilled worker or “Gelernt”] with the reification of “Technik” in Heidegger and later in Marcuse [itself the subject of an important review by Habermas on the Weberian notion of Rationalisierung].

(Refer to our study. the last illness [Krankheit] announcing itself with its own mincing melancholy: I realised that the morality of sympathy [Mitleid. or pity. welche selbst die Philosophen ergriff und krank machte. der Mitleids-. aber in Einem Eins: in der Geringschätzung des Mitleidens. stability. as a . with Nietzsche. Nein sagte.) . to the “instincts” that Nietzsche returns to trace his Genealogie der Moral: Preface. manifestation or objectification of the Will: except that now. welche gerade Schopenhauer so lange vergoldet. And it is to the “impulses”. strangely enough. das Stehenbleiben. auf Grund deren er zum Leben. Selbstopferungs-Instinkte. 5 -…The issue was. den Willen gegen das Leben sich wendend. bis sie ihm schliesslich als die „Werthe an sich“ übrig blieben. as he accurately styles it . its dira necessitas) through the A-skesis even as it strives to negate and “renounce” it. the instincts of pity [Mitleid]. though paradoxical. die letzte Krankheit sich zärtlich und schwermüthig ankündigend: ich verstand die immer mehr um sich greifende Mitleids-Moral. eine immer tiefer grabende Skepsis! Gerade hier sah ich die grosse Gefahr der Menschheit. high and dry. that eventually they appeared to him. But against these very instincts there voiced itself in my soul a more and more fundamental mistrust. and under which they experienced their evolution [entwickelt haben] and their distortion (morality as a result [Folge]. Spinoza. the value of the " unegoistic " instincts. This is Nietzsche’s “Instinkt der Freiheit”: – it is a new “im-pulsion”. the very interpretation of the indistinct. the value of these values [Werth dieser Werthe] is for the first time to be called into question . this “ascetic ideal”. Aber gerade gegen diese Instinkte redete aus mir ein immer grundsätzlicherer Argwohn. die zurückblickende Müdigkeit.Nihilism? This exaggerated estimation in which modern philosophers have held sympathy. in a guise that “wills Nothingness rather than not will at all!” It follows that the “need-necessity” of the operari returns in the semblance of Schopenhauer’s Nirvana. vergöttlicht und verjenseitigt hatte. Selbstverleugnungs-. a scepticism that dug ever deeper and deeper : and in this very instinct I saw the great danger of mankind.values”. as Nietzsche valiantly shows. is quite a new phenomenon: up to that time philosophers were absolutely unanimous as to the worthlessness of sympathy. is nothing other than the Will to Power in another guise. Let us speak out this new demand: we need a critique of moral values. La Rochefoucauld und Kant. Ich nenne nur Plato. deified and etherealised.Because this A-skesis. the will turning against Life. “unegoistic” or “self-less” Will ends up preserving its operari (its Arbeit. (GM) Es handelte sich in Sonderheit um den Werth des „Unegoistischen“. This is where Schopenhauer went astray for Nietzsche: because in preserving the Kantian “intelligible freedom”. als das unheimlichste Symptom unsrer unheimlich gewordnen europäischen Cultur. its most sublime temptation and seduction—seduction to what ? to nothingness ? — in these very instincts I saw the beginning of the end. or com-passion. — 6…. in Schopenhauer’s foundation of ethics] which spread wider and wider. undifferentiated . as it were.and for this purpose a knowledge is necessary of the conditions and circumstances out of which these values grew. ihre sublimste Lockung und Verführung — wohin doch? in's Nichts? — gerade hier sah ich den Anfang vom Ende. was the most sinister symptom of our modern European civilisation . selfdenial. but only “will to power”: the Umwertung is possible only if this assumption (Voraussetsung) is granted. als ihren Umweg zu einem neuen Buddhismus? zu einem Europäer-Buddhismus? zum — Nihilismus?… Diese moderne PhilosophenBevorzugung und Überschätzung des Mitleidens ist nämlich etwas Neues: gerade über den Unwerth des Mitleidens waren bisher die Philosophen übereingekommen. auch zu sich selbst.Schopenhauerian Will to Life has been trans-formed into the “Will to Power”. and whose grip infected even philosophers with its disease. and self-sacrifice which Schopenhauer had so persistently painted in golden colours. vier Geister so verschieden von einander als möglich." on the strength of which he uttered both to Life and to himself his own negation. his undifferentiated.“unegoistich” (!). as " intrinsic values in themselves. that the Entsagung (Renunciation) of the Will is merely another. the exhaustion that gazes backwards. ‘Umkehrung: Schopenhauer’s Reversal of Kant’s Metaphysics’. the “drives” or Triebe. I realised that it was the route along which that civilization [Cultur] slid on its way to—a new Buddhism ? — a European Buddhism .

morality itself are possible only because life and the world themselves are “value-less”. aber auch in kleinerem Stile. an “error”. eine Verführung. which also means “pity”) as it is terrifying: seen from the moral viewpoint. als jenseits aller In-Frage-Stellung. a “sub-stance” or “purpose” that is simply im-possible to determine or identify. which was beyond all question. to decree the existence of such “values” is equivalent to “renouncing” life and the world such as they are! Life is “that which is” (the Greek expression for Being. als Tartüfferie. der Werth dieser Werthe ist selbst erst einmal in Frage zu stellen — und dazu thut eine Kenntniss der Bedingungen und Umstände noth. Gedeihlichkeit in Hinsicht auf den Menschen überhaupt (die Zukunft des Menschen eingerechnet). that Heidegger reprised) – it is “appearance” and “error” rather than “reality” or “truth”. the world is false! Any moral or scientific “system of values”. as a remedy. wie eine solche Kenntniss weder bis jetzt da war. als Missverständniss. as a stimulant. as a "fetter. it must be these “perspectives” that are “false” to the extent that they seek to impose a “value” on life and the world that these simply cannot have from the necessarily “partial” perspective of the “valuer”! To impose a “value” on life and the world is tantamount to imposing an “ideal” on them. als Krankheit. als thatsächlich. Indeed. als Stimulans. if the maximum potentiality of the power and splendour of the human species were never to be attained? So that really morality would be the danger of dangers ? (GM) Sprechen wir sie aus. als Symptom. to on. ein Narcoticum. up to the present. Wie? wenn das Umgekehrte die Wahrheit wäre? Wie? wenn im „Guten“ auch ein Rückgangssymptom läge. because they are “im-moral”! If values “existed”. als Hemmung. aus denen sie gewachsen. als Maske. a poison. it cannot be life and the world that are false. ein Gift. and as such we must accept it and embrace it – as such we must will it. to encapsulate or encompass the entire world or life. man hat bisher auch nicht im Entferntesten daran gezweifelt und geschwankt. insgleichen eine Gefahr. as a misunderstanding . as a mask. The value of these "values" was taken for granted as an indisputable fact. because it cannot even begin “to comprehend”. Man nahm den Werth dieser „Werthe“ als gegeben. Worse still. values. noch auch nur begehrt worden ist. meaner! So that morality would really be saddled with the guilt. diese neue Forderung: wir haben eine Kritik der moralischen Werthe nöthig. „den Guten“ für höherwerthig als „den Bösen“ anzusetzen höherwerthig im Sinne der Förderung. ungefährlicher."as a drug). as Tartuffism. viewpoints and perspectives. they would not be “possible” as “values” because they would be already . als Heilmittel. but also morality as a cause. not forgetting the future. exhibited the faintest doubt or hesitation in judging the " good man " to be of a higher value than the '' evil man. on the contrary. a temptation. Nützlichkeit." of a higher value with regard specifically to human progress. No one has. aber auch Moral als Ursache. What? Suppose the converse were the truth! What? Suppose there lurked in the "good man" a symptom of retrogression [Ruckgangssymptom]. and prosperity generally. a “hidden reality”. as disease [Krankheit]. durch das etwa die Gegenwart auf Kosten der Zukunft lebte? Vielleicht behaglicher. als Gift). niedriger?… So dass gerade die Moral daran Schuld wäre. but also pettier.symptom. Consequently. utility. a narcotic. such as a danger.more comfortable and less risky perhaps than its opposite. but rather. especially as such knowledge has neither existed up to the present time nor is even now generally desired. wenn eine an sich mögliche höchste Mächtigkeit und Pracht des Typus Mensch niemals erreicht würde? So dass gerade die Moral die Gefahr der Gefahren wäre?… Will to Power as Instinkt der Freiheit Nietzsche’s “critique” is as “pity-less” (a play of words on Schopenhauer’s “Mitleid” or “sympathy”. by means of which the present battened on the future . unter denen sie sich entwickelt und verschoben haben (Moral als Folge. any “per-spective” on life and the world can only be “partial”.

or up. especially in Holzwege. not as a a pre-form of life. Heidegger completely fails to see that for Nietzsche the “sensory world” itself is also not “true”! Pathetic is Heidegger’s rejection of the sheer thought of this [“the phrase sounds monstrous”. that “drive” us – these are the im-pulses. their ineffectuality. assimilation. by “necessity” (Not-wendigkeit).as a kind of instinctive life in which all organic functions are still synthetically intertwined along with self-regulation. can such an inversion of perspective be confined solely to moral values and to “philosophy”. In the end not only is it permitted to make this experiment. serves only to highlight their im-potence. not merely in “nature” but also. of our in-dividuality (indivisibility of self) must be questioned and discarded. . For Nietzsche’s “critique” of morality. as "mere appearance. confrontation and struggle. These are the “affects”. in “civil society”. has delved into a far deeper “foundation” (Grundlegung). their power-lessness (Ohn-macht).1 of Nietzsche] and his attempt “to recuperate” the value of truth” for philosophy – in art! We will discuss in Part Two the significance of this late-romantic escape into art that epitomizes the Ohnmacht of bourgeois thought [especially its neo-Nietzschean component from Jaspers to Badiou] in the face of the capitalist Rationalisierung. and we could not get down. as is only fair. And not only do these “drives” subsist at an elemental organic level. Everywhere we witness behaviour or conduct that is dictated not by “principles” but rather by “need” (Not). nourishment. “realized” in this world – we would have reached our goal. Vol. the conscience of method demands it…(BGE) The reality that we observe around us – the world around us not as we shoud like it to be. his “Wanderung” into the “genealogy of morals”.] Whilst he ably enucleates Nietzsche’s de-struction of the “values” of the philosophia perennis and its “suprasensory world”. His de-structive critique ploughs deep into and undermines our very “perception” and “conception” of life and the world. their “wish-fulness”. (It is utterly incredible that Heidegger should have missed this most fundamental point in Nietzsche’s philosophy! [See our discussion in “Critical Excursus” below. in ch.for thinking is merely a relation of these drives [Triebe] to one another. by “struggles” that reflect the evident “goal” of individual self-preservation that emanates from “a kind of instinctive life…[comprising] all organic functions… as a pre-form of life” a more primitive form of the world of affects in which everything still lies contained in a powerful unity before it undergoes ramifications and developments in the organic process (and. Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of desires and passions. is it not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the question whether this "given" would not be sufficient for also understanding on the basis of this kind of thing the so-called mechanistic (or "material") world? I mean.13. but as it is – is a reality of conflict. also becomes tenderer and weaker) . evidently. but they rise and permeate through even to the level of “thinking”. of our identity. excretion. the “drives”. and metabolism . our millennium by now! The sheer “ideality” of values. far deeper “roots” (Wurzeln) that disclose the “active” origin of all Western values ranging from metaphysics to economics and physics. to any other "reality" besides the reality of our drives . our utopia.) Nor. 36. and perhaps worst of all." [Kant’s “bloss Erscheinung”] an "idea" (in the sense of Berkeley and Schopenhauer) but as holding the same rank of reality as our affect . so that even the “content” of our “self”. the motiv-ations and the e-motions that “move” us. in the “unsociable society”.

“just like a number that leaves no curious remainder” – that there is no “cause and effect”. All our ethical and scientific “explanations” of life and the world. to de-fine and con-fine the cosmos when they are only a “part” of it! (In analogous fashion. or apodictically (Husserl) – not to mention syllogistically (Descartes) or synthetically (Kant) . no Cartesian “methodical doubt” is admissible. an “understanding” (Verstand) and then a “reason” (Vernunft) – because such entities or faculties would seek to do the impossible. The world viewed from inside. if I may say so) . whether we believe in the causality of the will: if we do .will to power. as my proposition has it. The question is in the end whether we really recognize the will as efficient. no “world” outside of this “relation of instincts to one another”! Thus.36…Not to assume several kinds of causality until the experiment of making do with a single one has been pushed to its utmost limit (to the point of nonsense. for example)”. an “ego” to this “Will”! There is no possibility of “intro-spection”. effects of will.and at bottom our faith in this is nothing less than our faith in causality itself . But we cannot from this “experience” (Er-eignis. “Cogito ergo sum” turns into “Vivo ergo cogito”: all we can be aware of is the fact of being aware – that is the Will. therefore.then we have to make the experiment of positing the causality of the will hypothetically as the only one. a “personality”. will force. And “it follows mathematically from the definition” (!) – Nietzsche will say later. Erfahrung) proceed to deduce intuitively. we cannot conclude with Kant and Schopenhauer that this “Will” is “free”! For indeed it makes no sense to attribute or assign an “id-entity” or a “Subject”. as we must. it follows therefore that each and every “causal connection” that we “attribute” to the world as linking together “e-vents” or “happenings” (Geschehen) does not in “actuality” (Thatsachlichkeit) belong to the “world” but rather to “the world viewed from the inside” – to the “given” that we have posited." as a mathematician would say. but that now are presented as hedonistic expressions of deeper “conative” biological – Nietzsche will say “physiological” – needs.and not "matter" (not "nerves. of the will to power. the world defined and determined according to its "intelligible character" .it is one problem .namely.that existence oozed out of its meshes!) Here for perhaps the earliest time we see a dramatic development in philosophy (not seen since Spinoza’s pantheism) from transcendentalism to immanentism: the questioning of “subjectivity” now reaches deeper than ever into the inner recesses of the psyche. we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one basic form of the will . one has to risk the hypothesis whether will does not affect will wherever "effects" are recognized .then one would have gained the right to determine all efficient force univocally as . insofar as a force is active in them. namely.a “unity of apperception”. can affect only "will" . – Because there can be no “agency” or “subject” that performs these “actions”: to say that there is. "Will. In short. A “materiality” is introduced in the study of activities that had always been attributed to the “spirit” or “soul”. finally. that “Will can affect only ‘will’ – and not ‘matter’ (not ‘nerves’. as did Schopenhauer. Kierkegaard reproached Hegel for casting his dialectical net so wide to comprehend the world .it follows "from its definition. must stem (Entstehen) from this “Will”." for example). (BGE) If we admit." of course. because this “Will” is in its turn “merely a relation of these drives to one another”.and whether all mechanical occurrences are not. Suppose.that is a moral of method which one may not shirk today . suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution of the problem of procreation and nourishment .it would be "will to power" and nothing else. Whereas Schopenhauer . no Husserlian epoche’. would be to anticipate the answer to our question! Thus.

dia-noia (plan. of feelings. that is “free” instead of “necessary”? As Cacciari writes (‘DCP’. but from “inside” the Will! Morality and values are organic ex-crescences of the instincts of freedom. and “need” as “suffering” (Leid. The Will to Power. although we have seen that Schopenhauer’s conception of the Will as “Thing-in-itself” is open to just such an objection. from Greek noein. p. a dynamis (Greek. or by the Idea or the Divinity. a homo-noia (agreement and harmony) that becomes a pro-noia (divine providence). . Kant and Schopenhauer and the entire “metafisica occidentale” including Hegel and Marx seek “freedom from the Will”.Turning his own critical weapon against him. It is no objection against Nietzsche to argue that morality also is a “ramification and development” of the “intelligible character” or the instinct of freedom. Neither Schopenhauer’s Will-to-Life nor Nietzsche’s Will to Power are “Subjects” – there is no Fichtean Ich-heit here. Nietzsche instead. to be able). “the Will to Life”.61). Wirk-lichkeit)) as “operari” and work. and therefore “activity” (Tun. as desire and sensuous hedonism. is clearly intended by Nietzsche as a universal condition that mani-fests itself in life and the world in the manner that we will trace presently. Schopenhauer attributed to it at once a “subjectivity” – what Nietzsche derided as “intelligible freedom” – as well as a Platonic idealistic “finality” which was reflected in his theory of ethics. By “id-entifying” the Will as a “thing-in-itself”. of the “Good” – the summum bonum. to mean). yes. Nietzsche sees them instead as legitimate “ex-pressions” of the instincts. a God in disguise. of the Will to Power: Nietzsche will reply that the objection only strengthens his contention: life and the world must be seen “materialistically”. . pathos). a Platonic Ideal. by pressing consistently the “inversion” or Ent-wertung (emptying out) operated by Schopenhauer identifying “the Will” as the active principle [Weltprincip] of Life not “subordinated” to the Ding an sich and to the Kantian Pure Reason (Vernunft) that alone can com-prehend it . “unegoistic”. a liberum arbitrium that needs to be “governed” by a “tyrannical” Reason or Understanding. as a physiological. from arbitrariness and contingency. as “agon-ism”. Nietzsche also asks Schopenhauer the rhetorical question the latter posed to demolish Kant’s ethics (in Die Beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik): “Who tells you?” “Where is it written” that the “negation” of the Will and the sublimation of its “drives” is something that pertains to “intelligible freedom”.sought “to repress” these libidinal impulses. genetic “tendency” or in-tention. a deus absconditus. “physio-logically”. as Arbeit (labour!) -. which would de-fine and con-fine the instincts to the Utilitarian “adaptation” and neo-Darwinian “survival of the fittest”. but as the expression of its intrinsic and irrepressible “destiny” or “stored-up force”. instead. but as a striving for “freedom” – but freedom understood as self-affirmation. as a necessary pre-condition for the attainment of the ultimate “ideal freedom”. “abulic strife” renounceable through the “reflective reason” (Verstand) -. as the search not for “selfpreservation”. of “affirmative life”.only to smuggle back “intelligible freedom” as its perceived indistinct. not as an arbitrary force. but they are simultaneously “symptoms” and “signs” of the “Dis-gregation” (his German word) of these instincts! There is no solipsism here. seeks to uncover and re-affirm the primacy of the “Instinct of Freedom” – the incessant and irrepressible “Wille zur Macht” that attaches to “living things”. as striving and poverty. which represent “necessity” as “need” (Notwendigkeit als Not). Entwurf.

By “motivating” the Will to Power. he will attempt erroneously to give it an animistic aura. nature and spirit.1.). from “Unknowable Object” to its obverse or reverse – the Will to Life. For Nietzsche. its “power” or dynamis is “materialized” as an “energy” (energeia) that finally assumes the “id-entity” (entelechy) of volition and perception (see Vol. but rather. “(external) space” and “(internal) time”. because everything “in life” is in life. What we are “aware of” is the Will-to-life: But this Will-to-life itself is “inscrutable” and run by “instincts” that characterize it. in the chapter “The Interpretative Theory”. That is why Nietzsche describes the Will to Power as “intelligible character” in opposition to Schopenhauer’s “intelligible freedom”. even this Will-to-life cannot be de-scribed or de-fined as “free” – because there is an evident need-necessity to it constituted by the “instincts” or “drives” that “motivate” its self-affirmation. Put differently. which Jaspers almost totally neglects (only a few pages are dedicated to it in Section 5 of what is a monumental tome) and unmistakeably mis-takes philosophisch for a jejune “existentialist” pathos. An important “corrective” to Heidegger’s distorted analysis is supplied by Karl Jaspers. Where Schopenhauer went wrong for Nietzsche. 39 The fable of intelligible freedom. the so-called moral feelings. Heidegger’s “reading” of Nietzsche betrays all the romantic existential features of his concept of Da-sein (being there).Interesting at this juncture to compare the dualism highlighted by Nicholas of Cusa between Platonic ‘chorismos’ and Aristotelian ‘methexis’ – in Cassirer’s Individual and Cosmos. as the title of this section suggests. Nietzsche retains Schopenhauer’s revolutionary “reversal” (Umkehrung) of the Kantian “thing-in-itself”. At first we . was in his “positing” of the “freedom of the Will” as the ultimate “intelligible freedom” that circumscribes the inscrutable. Consequently. from ch. It is not possible. by virtue of which we consider a person responsible. Nietzsche concludes. is divided into the following main phases.that Nietzsche’s “de-struction” of the notions of truth and reason does not “end” (recall Heidegger’s Vollendung) in an irrisory “endless doubt” (see homonymous section in the chapter “The Passion for Willto-Truth”) or sterile circulus vitiosus (on which Jaspers tarries. “opens up” to the entire multi-verse of Nietzschean praxis. to psychologise it along the Aristotelian lines of the De Anima where the formal “ability” of the psyche. the Wille zur Macht as “rationalization of the world”. to de-fine it. between “activity” and “being”.7 The history of those feelings. unknowable “Character” of every “thing” in the World. to draw a line between operari and esse. with his punctilious and accurate review of the philosopher’s “perspectivism”. see especially section on “The Circle”). in Nietzsche. then. object and subject. it is impossible to de-limit life itself. “essent” and “essence”. however. It is this “psychologistic” or “anthropological” turn that will lead to his acrimonious “divorce” with Husserl. as Schopenhauer and Kant and the rest of Western philosophy do – giving rise thereby to the insuperable anti-nomies of “body” and “mind” (or “soul”).5. The limit of Jaspers’s exegesis of Nietzsche is that he fails to perceive what Heidegger instead did! The most essential point: . to draw the “boundary” of life and the world. Heidegger in his Nietzsche will seek to relegate the philosopher of Rocken to the rank of “traditional metaphysics” of which he would represent only the “con-clusion” or “com-pletion” or “per-fection” (Vollendung) precisely by showing the “self-dissolution” of metaphysics in the very “attainment” of its “object” – truth and reason.

4. we forget the origin of these terms and imagine that the quality "good" or "evil" is inherent in the actions themselves. particular acts good or evil without any consideration of their motives. an “absolute Truth” that can reconcile life as experienced by the Will with the world that the Will experiences. and yet everyone prefers to walk back into the shadow and untruth [“the kingdom of shadows”] -.. the motive grows out of him as a plant grows out of the earth. this displeasure is a habit that can be given up. as Schopenhauer does. and from this false deduction Schopenhauer arrives at his fantastic conclusion of so-called intelligible freedom. 65. Thus. we are concluding falsely that we can deduce the justification. And thus we come to understand that the history of moral feelings is the history of an error." which in turn rests on an error called "freedom of the will. a responsibility must exist. Ultimately we discover that his nature cannot be responsible either. In ancient Greece. Furthermore. the rational admissibility of this displeasure. follows from esse (being) the sphere of freedom and responsibility. bk. So we make man responsible in turn for the effects of his actions. Nor can this “per-spect-ive”. we take the effect to be the cause. No one is responsible for his deeds.that is. par. Plato's world of ideas--as a model for the sensual world--was referred to as the "intelligible world:" "Intelligible freedom" is the pure form of freedom. many men do not feel it at all. For there would be no reason for this displeasure if not only all human actions occurred out of necessity (as they actually do. an outgrowth of the elements and influences of past and present things. even after the same actions that cause many other men to feel it. it certainly is not rational. Schopenhauer thinks he can prove that man somehow must have had a freedom. then for his actions. "operari" (doing). the sphere of strict causality.. concluded as follows: because certain actions produce displeasure ("sense of guilt"). nor his actions. 55. but give it rather to the whole nature of a man. and regard the acts themselves as morally ambiguous. Tied to the development of custom and culture. life and the world cannot be com-prehended. without consideration of their consequences. according to this philosopher's insight). the tree itself green-. The tenet is as bright as sunlight. Then we assign the goodness or evil to the motives. Soon. 7. an error called "responsibility. for Nietzsche there can be no “representation” (Vorstellung) of the world to the Will. to be this way or the other. neither for his nature. par. We go even further and cease to give to the particular motive the predicate good or evil. and lack of responsibility. nor the effects of his actions. The displeasure man feels seems to refer to "operari" (to this extent it is erroneous). not to act this way or the other. From the fact of man's displeasure. and present perhaps only within a relatively short period of world history. Metaphysically. Seen from “inside the Will”. in that it is itself an inevitable consequence. his volition precedes his existence. on the other hand.8 In this case. a freedom which did not determine his actions but rather determined his nature: freedom. to judge is to be unjust." Schopenhauer. that is. but simply on the basis of their beneficial or harmful consequences. is to posit the ec-sistence of a “Truth” that is the Scholastic “adaequatio rei et . then for his motives and finally for his nature. this a-spect itself be “pinned down” to a particular “theory”. which is the act of a free will. This is also true when the individual judges himself. 4. Man becomes that which he wants to be. man cannot be made responsible for anything. it is a very changeable thing. this is the same error language makes when calling the stone itself hard. necessity. to the “life” experienced by the Will – because there is no “outside” that corresponds to the “inside” of the Will! To posit a “Vorstellung”.for fear of the consequences. nor his motives. that is. man feels remorse and the pangs of conscience. no Ratio can give them an Ordo. no one for his nature. But displeasure after the deed need not be rational at all: in fact. for it rests on the erroneous assumption that the deed did not have to follow necessarily. See The World as Will and Idea. According to Schopenhauer. however. Ibid. the primary cause of an individual's existence. but if man himself also acquired his entire nature out of the same necessity (which Schopenhauer denies). from the fact that it exists. because he thinks he is free (but not because he is free). bk. but in truth it refers to esse. a “mere appearance” (bloss Erscheinung) arranged by the Understanding (Verstand) that merely re-presents the “world” intelligibly to the Will. the idea of freedom.

. (ToI) 2. they only come into consideration as symptoms. The last of the “thoughts out of season” discuss Schopenhauer’s influence as “educator” but do not invoke his philosophy. diese Weisesten. jener consensus sapientium—das begriff ich immer besser—beweist am wenigsten. the Will (which Husserl will replace with “the transcendental ego”) that “orders rationally” its “representations” (Vorstellungen). Even the Berkeleyan idealism of “esse est percipi” in its Schopenhauerian (and later Machian) adaptation pre-supposes a transcendental Subject. Mir selbst ist diese Unehrerbietigkeit. in their ability “to govern” the physical world via the Understanding (Verstand): his metaphysics show that it is possible to abolish the “objectivity” of the Ding an sich without in the least challenging the “logical-empirical”.—stehn zu muessen. as agencies in Grecian dissolution. as anti-Grecian (&quot.even if this “thing” is a Berkeleyan “idea” along the formula that Schopenhauer adopts. the soul to the body – “life” (experience) is opposed to “the world” (the thing in itself). esse est percipi –. “Lukacs’s reading [in the “Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought”] of Kantian rationalism is unthinkable” [‘K’. Urtheile. of the “purity” of Kant’s Pure Reason (without which. those wisest men. Werthurtheile ueber das Leben. can ultimately never be true: they only possess value as symptoms. 1872). the experience and knowledge of the thing by the mind. the subject to the object. Indeed. That consensus sapientium I understood it better and better proves least of all that they were correct in that on which they were in accordance: it proves rather that they themselves. No such “hiatus”. Schopenhauer still believes in the “truth” of mathematics and logic. dass sie selbst. Judgments. the “cor-respondence” of “mind” with “thing” . 2. the “adaequatio intellectus ad rem”. als Werkzeuge der griechischen Aufloesung. the unstinting quest for this adaequatio is itself the ex-pression of the Will to Power – it is a Will to Truth that still posits an “adaequatio” in the Scholastic and Cartesian tradition. als pseudogriechisch. irgend worin physiologisch uebereinstimmten.57]). dass sie Recht mit dem hatten. and that does not challenge the epistemological validity of natural and physical “laws”. a “mind” is being op-posed to a “thing”. as pseudo-Grecian. that the great wise men are declining types [Niedergangs-Typen]. valuations with regard to life. In both cases. for or against.intellectus”. first suggested itself to my mind with regard to a case where the strongest prejudices of the learned and the unlearned stood opposed to it: I recognised Socrates and Plato as symptoms of decline [Verfalls-Symptome] . zuerst gerade in einem Falle aufgegangen. the very “Will to Truth”. least of all the ethics.The Birth of Tragedy&quot. as Cacciari notes. were somehow in accordance physiologically to take up a position to have to take up a position unanimously negative with regard to life. “Philosophising with a hammer”. or else. in themselves such judgments are follies. als antigriechisch (“Geburt der Tragoedie” 1872). what amounts to the same. Schopenhauer. no such chasm or division of Being. p. wo ihr am staerksten das gelehrte und ungelehrte Vorurtheil entgegensteht: ich erkannte Sokrates und Plato als Verfalls−Symptome. and its consequent “antinomies” is “possible” for Nietzsche. dass die grossen Weisen Niedergangs−Typen sind. Nietzsche takes an irreverent stance toward the “idols” of philosophy – and particularly his own “idol”. therefore “rational ordering” of the world: for Schopenhauer the Ratio-Ordo is the fulfillment (Vollendung) of metaphysics as the correct (truthful) “measurement” of the cosmos. This irreverence. Nietzsche applies here to Schopenhauer his very critique of the “formalism”. . worueber sie uebereinstimmten: er beweist vielmehr.and for good reason. the search and pursuit. um auf gleiche Weise negativ zum Leben zu stehn.

such a doom of a task compels one every moment to run into sunshine . that note of interrogation.—Wie? Und alle diese grossen Weisen—sie waeren nicht nur decadents. because “in themselves… judgements are follies”. ja sogar Streitobjekt ist und nicht Richter. Mit-leid) and pantheism – thereby glorifying contemplation. imposing “universal values” on it. sie waeren nicht einmal weise gewesen?—Aber ich komme auf das Problem des Sokrates zurueck. For a philosopher to see a problem in the worth of life. von einem Todten nicht. Dialectics is a “ragionevole ideologia” that seeks to democratize life. dies Fragezeichen so schwarz. so ungeheuer. koennen zuletzt niemals wahr sein: sie haben nur Werth als Symptome. they were not even wise? But I come back to the problem of Socrates. because such a one is a party yea. about their “symptoms”. and attempt to grasp this surprising finesse. a folly. to shake off a seriousness which has become oppressive.—Eine Umwerthung aller Werthe. it cannot be estimated by a dead person for a different reason.fuer oder wider. (ToI) Man muss durchaus seine Finger darnach ausstrecken und den Versuch machen. and not a judge . der es setzt—ein solches Schicksal von Aufgabe zwingt jeden Augenblick. “the mirror to the world”. Das Zuviel von Kraft erst ist der Beweis der Kraft. dass der Werth des Lebens nicht abgeschaetzt warden kann. that the worth of life cannot be estimated. aus einem andren Grunde. einen schweren. a mark questioning* his wisdom. so huge that it casts a shadow on him who sets it up. THE PROBLEM OF SOCRATES IOQ the very object in the dispute. “to order” it so as “to see a problem in the worth of life”. weil ein solcher Partei. ein Fragezeichen an seiner Weisheit. The “transvaluation of all values” requires the awareness of there being “values” that are “judgements… with regard to life” that are impossible because the “beings” that make them are themselves “within” or “immersed” in life and therefore are unable to assign values “objectively” – telling us in the process only something about themselves. far too oppressive. —Von Seiten eines Philosophen im Werth des Lebens ein Problem sehn bleibt dergestalt sogar ein Einwurf gegen ihn. therefore. so black. eine Unweisheit. A Transvaluation of all Values [Umwertung aller Werthe]. (GD) There can be no “truth”. jeder “Fall” ein Gluecksfall. sie kommen nur als Symptome in Betracht. Von einem Lebenden nicht. (GD) 2…We must by all means stretch out the hand. and therefore their own “physiology” and “psychology”. dass es Schatten auf Den wirft. But to act in life is to potentiate one’s role in it: by trans-valuing values we can play an “active” role in life that leaves behind the “contemplative” one. Kein Ding geraeth. as a “becoming” (Werden) that is the “extrinsication and supersession” (Auf-hebung) of an “Idea” – that of the Platonic “beautiful soul” or that of Hegel. allzuschwer gewordnen Ernst von sich zu schuetteln. Nor is truth “dialectical” in the sense that we may “discover” it as an “intelligible” pattern of the world. To judge is to stand outside of life. that is not a static. . diese erstaunliche finesse zu fassen. The excess of power only is the proof of power. with its “will to life”. Schopenhauer had started with the “actuality” (Wirklichkeit) of the Will. What? and all these great wise men they were not only decadents. in die Sonne zu laufen. It cannot be estimated by a living being. an dem nicht der Uebermuth seinen Theil hat. contemplative and “adequate measure”. Jedes Mittel ist dazu recht. but he ended up with the “renunciation” of the world (Entsagung) and with the “values” of com-passion (or sym-pathy. is really an objection to him.—an sich sind solche Urtheile Dummheiten. Vorwort…Nothing succeeds unless overflowing spirits have a share in it.

was wird ist nicht. es stand weder Sokrates. But it is not just “eudaemonism” that is at issue: before Reason can invade ethics and turn the world into a “telos”. Man muss klug. wird nicht. — Widerlegungen sogar. desperately even.. Nirvana. Sie glauben einer Sache eine Ehre anzuthun. Reason=virtue=happiness. diese Herren Begriffs−Goetzendiener. they kill it and stuff it. noch seinen “Kranken” frei. so muss die Gefahr nicht klein sein. it must shape the world and order it in its own image – the Ratio-Ordo.—es war de rigueur. an's Unbewusste fuehrt hinab. "There must be mere appearance. Vernunft = Tugend = Glueck heisst bloss: man muss es dem Sokrates Das Problem des Sokrates. But since they never grasp it. as well as procreation and growth. they threaten the life of everything they worship.. Sie fragen mich. there was danger. Die Vernuenftigkeit wurde damals errathen als Retterin. suchen sie nach Gruenden. waren Begriffs−Mumien. ihr Aegypticismus. old age.. whatever becomes does not have being. nachmachen und gegen die dunklen Begehrungen ein Tageslicht in Permanenz herstellen—das Tageslicht der Vernunft. deceive us concerning the true world. man hatte nur Eine Wahl: entweder zu Grunde zu gehn oder— absurd−vernuenftig zu sein. contemplation and com-passion seek to order. der Wandel.. Alles. 1. vernuenftig zu sein. When one finds it necessary to turn reason into a tyrant. What really happens then? Above all superior taste is vanquished. wenn sie anbeten. hell um jeden Preis sein: jedes Nachgeben an die Instinkte. that means merely that one must imitate Socrates and counter the dark appetites with a permanent daylight--the daylight of reason. "it is the senses! These senses. truth with the good life – even Schopenhauer describes virtue as “absence of pain”. Zum Beispiel ihr Mangel an historischem Sinn. es war ihr letztes Mittel. sie stopfen aus.. there was but one choice: either to perish or--to be absurdly rational. Der Fanatismus." they cry ecstatically. With Socrates Greek taste veers round in favour of dialectics. are to their minds objections--even refutations. leads downward. 10. Was ist. becalm and defeat the senses in favour of “reason”. wie Sokrates es that. The fanaticism with which all Greek reflection throws itself upon rationality betrays a desperate situation. mit dem sich das ganze griechische Nachdenken auf die Vernuenftigkeit wirft. it was their last resort. Sie toedten. they seek for reasons why it is kept from them.Dialectics triumphs when “all superior taste is vanquished” and “the mob gets the upper hand”. as Socrates did. was Alles Idiosynkrasie bei den Philosophen ist?. dass etwas Andres den Tyrannen macht. clear. Again. sub specie aetemi.—wenn sie aus ihr eine Mumie machen. Nun glauben sie Alle. in what has being. was Philosophen seit Jahrtausenden gehandhabt haben. there must be some deception which prevents us from perceiving that which has being: where is the deceiver?" "We have found him. and pain as the prong to “com-passion” through “reflective reason” –. Da sie aber dessen nicht habhaft werden. a summum bonum that confuses virtue with happiness. bright at any price: any concession to the instincts. the danger cannot be slight that something else will play the tyrant. Der Tod. change.—sie werden Allem lebensgefaehrlich. which are so immoral in other ways too. weshalb man's . to the unconscious.. das Alter ebensogut als Zeugung und Wachsthum sind fuer sie Einwaende. wenn sie dieselbe enthistorisiren. so is their esteem of dialectics. Death. verraeth eine Nothlage: man war in Gefahr. es kam nichts Wirkliches lebendig aus ihren Haenden. 5.. aus der Vernunft einen Tyrannen zu machen. 10. before it can do this it must turn its “measure” into the “adequation of the world”. Wenn man noethig hat. When these honorable idolators of concepts worship something. the mob gets the upper hand along with dialectics. Rationality was then hit upon as the savior. ihr Hass gegen die Vorstellung selbst des Werdens. neither Socrates nor his "patients" had any choice about being rational: it was de rigoeur.. an's Seiende. mit Verzweiflung sogar. Now they all believe. The moralism of the Greek philosophers from Plato on is pathologically conditioned. wenn sie anbeten. Whatever has being does not become. ebenso ihre Schaetzung der Dialektik. Der Moralismus der griechischen Philosophen von Plato ab ist pathologisch bedingt. klar. One must be clever.

that alone introduces lies. mit hoher Ehrerbietung. to] furnish them with appliances. Technik). die Sinnlichkeit ist's! Diese Sinne. weil dieselben Vielheit und Veraenderung zeigten. weil sie die Dinge zeigten. dass das Sein eine leere Fiktion ist. as the fixity of “being”. it is instrumentality clothing itself as “truth”. When the rest of the philosophic folk rejected the testimony of the senses because they showed multiplicity and change [Veranderung. passing away. and so we seek to give it an “order”. It is not just the moral world that defies our “values”. Heraclitus too did the senses an injustice. eine Betruegerei dabei sein. die auch sonst so unmoralisch sind. not because the “thing in itself” cannot be known. das Vergehn. sie betruegen uns ueber die wahre Welt. Insofar as the senses show becoming [Werden]. der Substanz. luegen sie nicht. nor as he believed--they do not lie at all. metaphysics is “fulfilled” and “truth retreats” to the corner of “abortion and not-yet science”. because life is a constant becoming (Werden). a “measure” that is only a “symptom” of our “valuing”. wie die Eleaten es glauben. 2. and follow them mentally to their limits”.. zum Beispiel die Luege der Einheit. they do not lie. But Heraclitus will remain eternally right with his assertion that being is an empty fiction. They lie neither in the way the Eleatics believed. Sofern die Sinne das Werden. den Namen Heraklit's bei Seite. “Being is an empty fiction”. Aber damit wird Heraklit ewig Recht behalten.. becoming]. den Wechsel zeigen. Wenn das andre Philosophen−Volk das Zeugniss der Sinne verwarf. The physical world.. "Reason" is the cause of our falsification of the testimony of the senses. dass wir das Seiende nicht wahrnehmen: wo steckt der Betrueger?”—“Wir haben ihn. I except the name of Heraclitus. as essence. In reality it has nothing to do with it because “truth” itself is only the name we give to this order that we seek! The “rationalization” (Rationalisierung) of life is a specific “practice” that “reduces” life and the world to “measurement” and “predictability”: it is much less scientia than it is technique. of permanence.ihnen vorenthaelt. der Dauer. das legt erst die Luege hinein. Auch Heraklit that den Sinnen Unrecht. Die “scheinbare” Welt ist die einzige: die wahre Welt ist nur hinzugelogen. Was wir aus ihrem Zeugniss machen. Dieselben luegen weder in der Art. the lie of thinghood. .—sie luegen ueberhaupt nicht. “We have learned to sharpen [our senses.. a transformation (Ver-ander-ung). and change [Wechsel]. Every “science” that presumes to describe “the true world” is a “deceitful invention”.. the world of the senses does. The "apparent" world is the only one: the "true" world is merely added by a lie. science is only our practice of domination and control – it is a “rationalization” of life and the world. (ToI) 2. Ich nehme. schreien sie glueckselig. a change (Wechsel). too. Die “Vernunft” ist die Ursache. To the extent that we have “science”. “Es muss ein Schein. the lie of unity. die Luege der Dinglichkeit.. Science is its own practical out-come or re-sult – science is technique (techne’. But science itself is not “truth”: science is “error”. dass wir das Zeugniss der Sinne faelschen. of substance. but the limits remain because they are and will remain “practices” that can never even hope to attain the status of “truth”. als ob sie Dauer und Einheit haetten. verwarf er deren Zeugniss. he rejected their testimony because they showed things as if they had permanence and unity. but bears no resemblance to “the truth”. What we make of their testimony . but because it “posits” such a fiction lying behind our senses and lying to them. noch wie er es glaubte. for example. the ultimate result (Folge) and perfection (Vollendung) of the “desperation” and “decadence” that inspired the original metaphysics. With the highest respect.

To begin from the “free mind”. that in their dilemmatic and conflictual character reveal the complexity of psychic life – something that makes the “simplistic” notion of “in-dividual” extremely deceptive. an offspring.physiological first. and fatigue: all sorts of dregs out of the drained goblet of his own life . in all these cases. then cultural. The soldier wishes that he might fall on the battlefield for his victorious fatherland. in some instances even her health. “the ontogeny of thought”-. . for “competence” and “judgement”: – to do so is tantamount to idealizing human beings. who really cares about his subject. sickness. (On this see “The Religious Life” in ‘HATH’. one must be careful not to read too long in it. It is only ideal man that is distasteful to the philosopher. When the philosopher sees man only in his doings. absurdity. What justifies man is his reality. to use Schopenhauer's phrase. And this “reality” of human beings involves motives that may well be incompatible or contradictory. cowardice. most artful.. by the stretching of his limbs in the imaginary and absurd? The history of his desirabilities has hitherto been the partie honteuse of man.. for the exertion of thought and will in every activity. Are all these really selfless states. is so worthy of reverence. all human ideals. 57 Morality as man's dividing himself. a longing) is present in all the above-mentioned cases." In morality. compared with any merely I CJ2 THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS wished. to yield to it. is in any case not "selfless. for in the victory of his fatherland his greatest desire is also victorious. There is nothing more distasteful to a philosopher than man in as far as he wishes. with all its consequences. led astray even into labyrinthine states of trouble. to the “soul”. how worthy of admiration does man appear to him ! The philosopher even furnishes man with encouragement . the life of the instincts. however? Are these acts of morality miracles because they are. it will for ever justify him. when he sees this bravest. man treats himself not as an "individuum. "impossible and yet real"? Isn't it clear that. to suppressing their real need-necessity. or shamelessly falsified man! compared with any ideal man whatsoever . but also to the “mind”. the best food." but as a "dividuum. because he finds nothingness behind all human ideals. .The need-necessity of the instincts applies not only to the body. But he despises wishing man. how is it that he deserves no respect in so far as he manifests his wishes? Has he to do penance for being so accomplished as a reality? Has he to compensate for his activity. If it were possible. a philosopher would be a nihilist. and most enduring animal. ‘desirable’ man also and in general all desirabilities.) 32 The Immoralist speaks. The girl in love wishes that she might prove the devoted faithfulness of her love through her lover's faithlessness. a drive." (HATH) . a longing. to the psyche. the “constraints” upon the mind and the will that call for “responsibility”. The mother gives the child what she takes from herself: sleep. . Man. more than something else of himself. as a reality. Or not even nothingness. How much more worthy is actual man. dreamt. A good author. wishes that someone would come and destroy him by representing the same subject more clearly and by answering every last question contained in it. man is loving something of himself. “To judge is to be unjust”: to expect that there is “Truth” in the world is to be blind to the fact that the world then must be “error”! It makes possible that “judgemental” stance that mirrors the operari in the Askesis: “renunciation” or “resignation” becomes a “negative operari” that confirms the effectuality of the positive: the devil only exists because we “renounce” it. . but only vileness. that he is thus dividing up his being and sacrificing one part for the other? … The inclination towards something (a wish. her wealth. who. from the “free will” and therefore to ignore the “conditions” of human action . a thought. it is to apply a “Value” to life and the world that simply does not “ec-sist”.

entirely to his phenomenological understanding of being and time. and this is due undoubtedly in large part to his imperfect understanding of the long process of biological evolution leading to homo sapiens. (Gaya Scienza) An interior “conflict” in one’s “inclinations” is not a mark of “selflessness”. Rationalisierung) – because. it is not in the materialistic Marxian sense of human sym-biosis and phylo-genetic development of human organs and faculties but purely in an in-dividualistic. This is the enormous task of the great minds of the next century. It is vital that the “truth” that is applied to the psyche is not the same adaequatio. “the exuberant forms of life”.) A fresh “method” is needed. This is no “neo-Darwinism”: in “Anti-Darwin” (ToI) Nietzsche shows how “the weak”. “science” also is a dimension of human praxis. of the Will-to-Life.) 25…Perhaps a future survey of the needs of mankind will reveal it to be thoroughly undesirable that all men act identically. rather than “the strong” emerge successful from “adaptation”. which precedes Heidegger’s own more “systematic” exposition in Sein und Zeit. a kind of “spontaneous order”. as we shall soon see. There are “institutions”. of “adjusting” the ego to the reality of Angst. Even when “the body” is evoked. His “psychologist” is no “psycho-analyst”: not all sublimation is repressive and Nietzsche would scoff at the “clinical” use of psychoanalysis as a way of “reconciling” Kultur and Zivilisation. that arise from human evolution. as a scientific standard for ecumenical goals. This “new truth” must be able to comprehend “the ontogeny of thought”. perhaps in some circumstances even evil tasks. But Nietzsche seems always to want to see them sub specie individui: . of exuberance. It shows rather that the “self” is not “in-dividual” or a-tomic. but none at all about man.psychology is always “confined” to the individual psyche. a “rational” . then. would have to be set. one that encompasses this new-found “realism” but that goes beyond mere empiricism toward “overcoming” (Uberwindung) the idealized and spiritualised vision of human being (Vergeistigung) as well as its “scientistic” version (Entseelung. onto-genetic though sensuous dimension – only so far as “instincts” are concerned. the measuring “truth” that is a “tool” of homo faber. for whole stretches of human time special tasks. in Part Two. There is never even remotely a mention or simulacrum of “species-conscious being”: for Nietzsche. however much this may be a “dividuum” of conflictual e-motions. not in a broader “biological” sense. rather. (This tendency or deficiency in Nietzsche is due. if mankind is to keep from destroying itself by such a conscious overall government. by inverting the sign of “civilization” and “culture”: . we must discover first a knowledge of the conditions of culture. whereas the latter is rather an ex-pression of libido. (We shall examine later. in the interest of ecumenical goals. but is instead a far more complex maelstrom of forces than the “Sprache-Metaphysik” is able to comprehend. Nietzsche’s unprecedented insights into this intrinsically metaphysical “function” of language. and largely in a “psychic” sense. (HATH) 35…most of all we lack the art of psychological dissection and calculation in all classes of is the former that is the product of sublimation. a knowledge surpassing all previous knowledge. ontogenetically. where one hears a lot of talk about men. but not in relation to other human faculties (recall again Marx’s “ideality” as being central to the “specific con-sciousness” of being-human). as we have seen. In any event. “man” develops endogenously.Nietzsche immediately contradicts Schopenhauer (and later Freud).

greater cultivation and understanding of these psychic forces is warranted for human welfare – such as that initiated in what he calls “the awakening sciences”.. one has even gone too far with this "it thinks" ." and perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves. ‘WM’)." It was pretty much according to the same schema that the older atomism sought. imprescindible aim of “theoria” – this is the terminus a quo of the Cartesian doubt in the “Meditations” – and its universalisation to the status of a “methodical doubt” – again. to put it mildly. Descartes in “Discours sur la Methode” – are supposed to constitute the foundations of philosophy. but that this "it" is precisely the famous old "ego" is. that a thought comes when "it" wishes and not when "I" wish. including the logicians. Nietzsche intimates that a far sharper focus. It is the foundation of theory in the id-entity of the “transcendental subject” that engenders a “dichotomy” between the thinking subject and the “object” of the thinking. .namely. of ontology.even the "it" contains an interpretation of the process.482. which these superstitious minds hate to concede . what allows the identification of “Pure Reason” as a “Subject” – as a “pre-requisite” of Reason itself! . even “creative”. besides the operating "power. questioning reality (ontology). And Nietzsche does not disappoint: far from curtailing his incisive and penetrating intellect on the “ontic”. where the Latin “finis” denotes not necessarily a “limit” but at least a “horizon” (Aph. So much so that. For if indeed the world can be known “a priori”. an assertion.. and does not belong to the process itself. on the things that constitute life and the world. every activity requires an agent. for Kant. Kant had sought to overcome Hume’s systematic skepticism (already presaged in the idealism of Berkeley and the determinism of Leibniz) by re-drawing the boundaries of the knowing subject back to its fundamental “intuition” of space and time. I shall never tire of emphasizing a small terse fact. 0ne infers here according to the grammatical habit: "Thinking is an activity.attitude to that “life” that is far more complex. (BGE) It is at this stage that Nietzsche’s unprecedented re-foundation and critique of metaphysics. and then by “ordering” the cosmos according to the “internal consistency” of Reason. and that can be “applied” epistemologically to perceived “phenomena”. With regard to the superstitions of logicians. Nietzsche engages in the most intriguing and revealing exploration of our intuition of reality.the atom. and assuredly not an "immediate certainty. The “questioning” of the cosmos that is the paramount. of the entire manner in which we envision reality comes to the fore.Because it is clearly insufficient to engage in the task of de-struction of all our conceptions of “Value”. as we shall the very “possibility” of a priori judgements that are “synthetic”. so that it is a falsification of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think. only a supposition. not merely tautological or “analytic” judgements." After all. Ultimately. 17. a “vision”. consequently. and as metaphysica specialis (questioning knowledge and its various “branches”). on “being-in-the-world”. of being and time. There are certainly instructive insights to be gained from such a “negative” endeavour. however. he certainly can claim precedence over Heidegger’s more “systematic” grounding of metaphysics in Sein und Zeit. of the cosmos and the nature of reality." that lump of matter in which it resides and out of which it operates ." It thinks. learned at last to get along without this "earth-residuum. More rigorous minds. open and “vital”. than the closed rational cosmos. to get along without the little "it" (which is all that is left of the honest little old ego). but even the most “negative” critique must start or be founded on some “positive” de-finition of life and the world. the very possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge posits the existence of a causal chain that pre-supposes rationally the existence of an “entity” – Pure Reason – . both as metaphysica generalis.

that gives rise to the “phenomena” (the “appearances” or Erscheinungen) that are “perceived” by the “transcendental Subject” – “transcendental” because the Subject itself is a “thing-in-itself”. Neo-Kantism. It is “pure” Reason. whereas its Machian variant shaped the Walrasian and Paretian general equilibrium analysis. particularly the Marburg School of Cohen and Cassirer. an inscrutable unknowable Ob-ject. This is the substance of what we have called Schopenhauer’s “reversal” (Umkehrung) of Kant’s metaphysics. but at least of the . a “Will to Life”. (On these themes and the inception of this “negatives Denken” [negative thought] we refer to our related study ‘Umkehrung: Schopenhauer’s Reversal of Kant’s Metaphysics’ and to Massimo Cacciari’s pathbreaking early works in this field. but it is a “force”. the existence of Reason as an “intelligible freedom” that stands “outside” and is indeed “posited rationally” by the “necessity” or “heteronomy” of the events determined as cause and effect in the chain of causation. inscrutable and unobservable and yet “required” or “necessitated” dialectically by the “logic” of Pure Reason as applied to the “aesthetic” of human intuition. is the “Thing in itself”. thereby transforming his Metaphysik des Sittens into a kind of philosophical anthropology. As we will see later in this Part. It was the refutation of this excessive “empiricism” that was to form the basis of neo-Kantism and of Husserl’s phenomenology.that stands “outside” that causal chain and that allows its being “known” as such a “causal chain”. Hermann Cohen. this neoKantism. which is not necessarily a “Subject” with a precise “id-entity” and subject to “rules”. Indeed. is not a “thing” at all! Rather. Schreier. This is what leads Kant to postulate the ec-sistence of a “Thing in itself”. a “Will” – to be more precise. that posits in accordance with its own “rule”. Seidler) was to form the philosophical basis of the formalistic. Schopenhauer ends up preserving the “validity” of logic and mathematics in the ability. dis-embodied “pure logic of choice” as the epistemological foundation of neoclassical theory of economics in its Austrian School version (von Mises and Hayek and Robbins). through the filter of the Vienna Circle (Kaufmann. “Where is it written” that the causal chain is anything more than an infinite “instrumental” sequence and that “from it” you can postulate rationally the actual existence of an autonomous “Pure Reason” from which you can derive a “Practical Reason” that “governs” the Will? As far as any “consciousness” is “aware”. save those of intuition and experience. the “seriousness”!) of any “Thing-in-itself”. “Who tells you?” Schopenhauer asks. This “Subject” Kant explores as “Practical Reason” in its “ethical and normative” aspect (Sollen) as an “autonomous will” that must. objective (as in Kant) or subjective (as in Schopenhauer). not of “Reason” (Vernunft).) As we shall see in Part Two. But this ineffable “thing-initself”. Kant did not deem it appropriate to extend the transcendental logic to the Sollen in the same way that he did for the Sein (the thing-in-itself). “the world”. the reality of a “qualitas occulta”. nevertheless. give itself a “rational order”. decreed that the Sollen had its own “rational rules” that permitted the formulation of a “Logic of Pure Knowledge” and an “Ethics of Pure Will” (cf. what we know best. its “purity”. therefore. The possibility of formal “Pure” Reason acquiring the character of “Practical” Reason is precisely what Schopenhauer denies. and this is the starting point (the point de depart) of Nietzsche’s own critique of both Schopenhauer and Kant in that Nietzsche denies the “reality” (indeed. it is our very “inwardness”. System der Logik) whereby the pure will (the expression of Practical Reason) could determine the object of its own pure knowledge independently of human experience or natural science. because this Sollen cannot be said to have an “ob-ject” in the same sense that Pure Reason has “nature” or Sein as ob-ject. just as Pure Reason did in respect of experience and nature. that inevitably assumes the “subjective” guise or free character of the esse.

still it is an expression of the Understanding that ensures the “actuality” (Wirk-lichkeit or “work-like-ness”) of the “World”: therefore. Adorno and Horkheimer. the Body.502 and the whole part on ‘Logic’ starting from Aph.) And this is where Nietzsche begins his “trans-valuation” (Umwertung. not “revaluation”!) of all values. Schopenahuer “under-stands” (Ver-stand. as Heidegger calls it. therefore. as Lukacs remarks in the Preface to the second edition of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. many suggested was written as a reply to his book!).2. Husserl bears the merit of identifying the process of “Krisis” (notably in ‘The Crisis of European Sciences’) that runs along parallel cultural and economic lines and that will “characterize” the development of capitalist economy and society that we seek to understand critically in our series of studies. and because the categories of logic are themselves simply not ‘true’. discussed in detail in our Part Two. perceives as “phenomena” [bloss Erscheinungen] ordered by the Understanding in accordance with the Principle of Sufficient Reason. If anything. Most ‘desperate’ of all is Husserl’s positing of a “transcendental ego” founded on the apparent “permanence” of “memories”. is Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s assertion that “will can only act on will” in the de-ontological sense that “human beings” [whom Deleuze obviously sees as “in-dividual wills”!] can only act on one another [in Nietzsche et la Philosophie]. from Menger and Jevons to Schumpeter and Hayek. but still wildly in-apt. one that can certainly act on the entire reality of life and the world – which includes “nature”. This systematic “destruction of the Subject” that Nietzsche undertakes represents for him the “completion and perfection” (Vollendung. logic and mathematics – precisely where Schopenhauer’s Umkehrung (reversal. and the quotation above). it is Nietzsche who exposes the unfoundedness of the idealist transcendentalist premises from which Lukacs’s “rationalist” criticism moves. Deleuze fails to see that Nietzsche. of course.508. from Wittgenstein and Carnap to Quine and Strawson. The disparate and desperate attempts either “to re-compose” the Subject in line with the philosophia perennis or to re-define it will be the focus of the Western philosophical enterprise from Brentano and Mach to Husserl and Heidegger. in Nietzsche. Both Lukacs and the Frankfurt School moved within epistemological lines that Nietzsche’s critique. even when “reason” is understood in a Marxian historico-materialist sense. Equally wrong is Klossowski when he opines (in Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle) that Nietzsche’s Entwurf is aimed at denouncing “bourgeois culture”. ch. including the values of science. As Nietzsche pre-emptively objected (see Aph. for all. had pitilessly swept away (long before Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit which. (Curious. Vol. sub-stanti-ates) the “World as Will and Representation” (the title of his magnum opus). Lukacs is quite wrong to denounce (in the homonymous Die Zerstorung der Vernunft) Nietzsche’s Entwurf (philosophical pro-ject) as a “destruction of Reason” tout court. is dealing with the Will as an “onto-logical” category. Nevertheless. Nietzsche’s critique of “logico-mathematics” will form the central focus of our Part Two. from Freud and Weber to Schutz and Mannheim. switching) of Kant’s metaphysics is completed. Also fallimentary. neither memory alone nor any kind of ‘logic’ (v. or indicating (Anzeichen – another word for “sign” that will be .Understanding (Verstand) to describe the “representations” that the “objectification of the Will”. Even though for him “logico-mathematics” is not necessarily an intrinsic function of “Reason”. Dialektik der Aufklarung) to define a “substantive reason” in opposition to the “instrumental reason” of the negatives Denken. must be judged the cognate strenuous efforts of the Frankfurt School (see. like Schopenhauer. Husserl’s ‘Logische Untersuchungen’) can form the basis of any meaningful concept of “ego” because the sequence or recurrence of memories is itself not the effect of a conscious effort initiated by a subject. ‘WM’.4) of Western metaphysics. when in fact he is merely pointing to.

unlike what all the over-zealously “romantic” neo-Nietzscheans believe. In his insistence on “constructing a theory” (even a “meta-logic”!) that accounts “logically” for Nietzsche’s “skepticism”.what he calls (“for want of better terms”! [p. bourgeois . Nietzsche was much better at criticizing false views than at constructing theories”!!! (Page11) But it is the height of stupidity (leaving the thorough mis-interpretation of his philosophy to one side) to expect of Nietzsche that he construct a “theory” .that would circum-vent its “either/or”. to espousing sheer “incomplete Nihilism” (refer to our discussion of Heidegger later in this Part). in his own words. too) would reduce Nietzsche’s “tragic” engagement with history into something of a personal tragedy and relegate him to the status of either a “sophist” (as with Fink) or a “logical crank or freak or curiosity”.in other words a “system”. even when he seems to be in-dicting it (as a “symptom and sign” of decay).and above all socialist – morality! Merquior (whose Foucault we shall discuss later) properly observes (at p. perhaps even the equivalent of an anglo-analytical Oxbridge don! Reduced and traduced to a “problem of epistemology”. if you like) the “in-commensurability” of the Wille zur Macht. and therefore for the exact opposite reason to that suggested by their “pre-posterous” interpretation of his Entwurf! Dries’s complaint (in Nietzsche on Time and History) that “Nietzsche was much better at destroying theories than at constructing them” [p. Again.101) that. yet another “staticist position”! – when his entire oeuvre.9]) the “adualistic-dialetheic approach” (even invoking characters like Strawson and Quine) . Nietzsche’s unprecedented insights into and terrifying demolition of the political and philosophical self-understanding of bourgeois society and its ontological. Nietzsche never indicted bourgeois culture for being “repressive” though he certainly at least indicated that it was “decadent”: – in other words. . if Nietzsche declaimed bourgeois morality at all it was for not being “repressive” enough.11] also misses the point.adopted later by the phenomenologists Husserl and Schutz). as it leads to nihilism. Dries puts his well-nigh total incomprehension of Nietzsche’s agon absurdly on display when he summarises the aim of his work as a querulous call for a “third way” of logical analysis . as we saw following Nietzsche’s argument. the astounding realisations to which Nietzsche arrives concerning the onto-logical status of “logic and mathematics” will be examined in Part Two. Dries wholly loses sight of this fundamental Nietzschean perception: truth cannot be theorized – least of all “logically” .because it does not ecsist either as “truth” or indeed as “logic”! But for Nietzsche to stop at this “skeptical doubt” would amount. every ganglion and neuron in his brain has been devoted to the “de-struction” of just such “theories”! Such logico-reductionist approaches to Nietzsche are not just wrong because they assume the validity of “logical reasoning” that Nietzsche’s critique mercilessly demolishes: they are also contemptibly patronising because they seek to tame and emasculate the terrifying realism of the Wille zur Macht and its serious implications for understanding the bases of human society and for informing political action! Dries and the likes of him (Klossowski does this. a “logic”. Herein lies the pointlessness of Dries’s discussion: – that his “staticist” de-finition of Nietzsche’s philosophy is itself the most “staticist” approach imaginable and fails completely to penetrate or “mimetise” (“embody”. epistemological as well as ethical foundations would amount to nothing more than the vapid musings of a freakish professor of philology! We propose in what follows to identify and describe Nietzsche’s ontological pro-ject (Entwurf) as it arises from his understanding of historical experiences and forces. “neither/nor” and “both/and” dichotomies: Staticism is false.

but history understood as res gestae. even if we shrank his bloated “Individualitat” to a mere “it” (the Freudian Id. physiological (Entstehung) and historical (Herkunft). Just as a doctor needs to “heal himself” before he can hope to diagnose a disease. It is important for Nietzsche above all to focus on the “origins”. life and the world as they are. But as Nietzsche has just inconfutably proved. without preconceived ideas. you say? Religions are at their last gasp? Look at the religion of the power of history. “The little old ego”. what Nietzsche calls “the ontogeny of thought”. with their scarred knees! Do not all the virtues follow in the train of the new faith? And shall we not call it unselfishness. Quite clearly. Otherwise described. Untimely Meditations. trusting our senses and highlighting “appearances”. scales] of forces in your hands and observe which one tilts it as the stronger and heavier? And what a school of politeness is such a contemplation of the past! To take . It is obvious that if we cannot com-prehend the cosmos (by definition. then to political institutions. par 8… If each success have come by a "rational necessity. it is a line that takes us physiologically from psychology to consciousness and Culture. conscience and material exchange. either intuitively or scientifically. and finally from science and rationalization back down to the “dis-enchantment” of “civilization”. we need to dispel our myths about “history” before we can hope to interpret it. as a record of events. leads from the body to the soul and then back to nihilism." then—down on your knees quickly. values and moralities aimed at under-standing the world. or in other words still. of these forces that will help us understand our place in the cosmos. that is.Historia Docet – What Life and the World Indicate There is a continuous line of real forces that leads from the instincts to the psyche and from the individual psyche to human groupings and classes of society and then to nation-states. this “line”. . when the historical man lets himself be turned into an "objective" mirror of all that is? Is it not magnanimity to renounce all power in heaven and earth in order to adore the mere fact of power? Is it not justice always to hold the balance [Wagschalen.for they are mere “symptoms” or “signs” of something else. And to do so we must turn to and examine history . But they may tell us what “strategies” human beings have adopted to exert their “instincts of freedom” and how their attempts to make sense of the cosmos. then we may at least try to understand why some humans have attempted to engage in just such a “com-prehension”: . and the priests of the mythology of Ideas. history such as it was. to find out what “motivated” them and why. such simple-minded attribution of either causality or comprehension in human history is easily confuted by the crudest skepticism." and every event show the victory of logic or the "Idea. with our gaze fixed firmly upon the “results” (Folge) and outcomes that we can then contrast with the record of human rationalizations and moralities to see if we can discern a rationale behind these ideas. may reveal the manifestation of this Will to Power. to give it a meaning. a “subject” that initiates action and thereby causes or is “responsible” for human activity or that at the very least “com-prehends” or “reflects upon” life and the world (cf. these rationalizations will not reflect or explain reality. because we are part of it). and let every step in the ladder of “success” have its reverence! There are no more living mythologies. Husserl’s Lebenswelt) intellectually.why and how they have sought to develop ideas. for instance or the Husserlian “transcendental ego”) would still remain an “agency”. at finding a sub-stance and a telos. an essence and a meaning even when these are the proton pseudos – the archetypal lie.

73 this school will show himself openly offended. wie macht das sanft und schmiegsam: und selbst wenn ein in dieser Schule Aufgezogener öffentlich einmal zürnt und sich ärgert. so freut man sich daran. with Hegel. and also “understand” the “telos” or “meaning” of the historical process as a “rational necessity”. one is just as pleased.Enthält jeder Erfolg in sich eine vernünftige Nothwendigkeit. die Religionen wären im Aussterben? Seht euch nur die Religion der historischen Macht an. Not only must the “meaning” or “truth” of history be “rational” to be “intelligible”. to love nothing. of the human “will” – because an entirely “necessary” process would be “meaning-less” in any case. its essential “goal” – be capable of “attainment”. this “form-less” or “shape-less matter” must somehow dis-close a “truth” (the Greek meaning of “a-letheia”. is as it ought to have been”! If we say. auf alle Gewalt im Himmel und auf Erden zu verzichten. a “com-pletion” of the goal pursued by the “free will” that must by definition entail its “abolition”. UBHL. and we may as well prostrate ourselves to its “dialectical necessity”. remembrance) that follows or obeys an “intelligible pattern”. welche als die stärkere und schwerere sich neigt? Und welche Schule der Wohlanständigkeit ist eine solche Betrachtung der Geschichte! Alles objectiv nehmen. alles begreifen. it can only simply “be”. one that can be “de-ciphered” and “com-prehended” and eventually – this is the “telos” of history. unconcealment. that is to say as a “per-fection”. this “a-methodon hyle” (what the early Greek historians called the subject-matter of their istorein or “inquiries”). by its very “necessity” . immer Wagschalen in den Händen zu haben und fein zuzusehen. retorts Nietzsche. wenn der historische Mensch sich zum objectiven Spiegelglas ausblasen lässt? Ist es nicht Grossmuth. for whatever is “necessary” cannot. ist jedes Ereigniss der Sieg des Logischen oder der „Idee“ — dann nur hurtig nieder auf die Kniee und nun die ganze Stufenleiter der „Erfolge“ abgekniet! Was. gebt Acht auf die Priester der IdeenMythologie und ihre zerschundenen Kniee! Sind nicht sogar alle Tugenden im Gefolge dieses neuen Glaubens? Oder ist es nicht Selbstlosigkeit. Even if a man brought up in THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY. es ist nur artistisch gemeint. es ist ira und studium und doch ganz und gar sine ira et studio. be “meaningful”. there is no further need for “action” in history. dadurch dass man in jeder Gewalt die Gewalt an sich anbetet? Ist es nicht Gerechtigkeit. For history to have any “meaning”. the super-session (Aufhebung) of the “freedom” (Freiheit) that the rational theory of history “necessarily postulated” at the beginning of its interpretation! At that precise point. eo ipso. the res gestae. es gäbe keine herrschenden Mythologien mehr? Was. denn man weiss ja. 8…. in which case it must be “necessary” and. then. for the mere record of human deeds. to be worthy of “interpretation”. but it must also be “necessary” – because it would not be “possible” for us fully to com-prehend a process that is not “necessary”! This “rational” approach to history wishes therefore at one and the same time to assert or posit the “freedom” of human actions. knowing it is only meant in the artistic sense of ira et studium though it is really sine ira et studio. “the renunciation of all power” can mean only that “everything that was and is. of “realization”. über nichts zürnen. to understand everything—makes one gentle and pliable. But such “magnanimity” or “selflessness” or even “justice” would be tantamount to conceding that indeed there are no such “values” in history! One of two things: either “justice is “possible”.everything objectively. nichts lieben. to be angry at nothing. that “whatever is real is rational and whatever is rational is real”.

“becomes a compendium of actual immorality” – and history could lay no claim to being regarded as “the judge of this actual immorality”. if they have an independent “reality”. of domination and overpowering. und man soll nur immer lachen. the “happenings” of history indicate (Anzeichen) otherwise: 260. Bei einer Wanderung durch die vielen feineren und gröberen Moralen. The distinctions of moral values have either originated in a ruling caste. innerhalb Einer Seele. like history. life and the world must be false! Because it is obvious enough that if these “values” had any “reality” or “force”. of exploitation: of conquerors and vanquished. There may well be attempts at “mediating” the two moralities. In a tour through the many finer and coarser moralities which have hitherto prevailed or still prevail on the earth. So wird die Geschichte zu einem Compendium der thatsächlichen Unmoral. but one finds still oftener the confusion and mutual misunderstanding of them. however. that in all higher and mixed civilisations. there are also attempts at the mediation [Vermittlung] of the two moralities. But how wrong would one be to regard history as the judge of this actual immorality! Was für veraltete Gedanken habe ich gegen einen solchen Complex von Mythologie und Tugend auf dem Herzen! Aber sie sollen einmal heraus. however one may laugh at them. Ich würde also sagen: die Geschichte prägt immer ein: „es war einmal“. The “case”. indeed sometimes their close juxtaposition--even in the same man. — oder unter den Beherrschten. no “justice” is visible or indeed possible. but no “reconciliation” (Versohnung) is possible at all because they represent . I found certain traits recurring regularly together. I would even say that history always teaches—"it was once. welche bisher auf Erden geherrscht haben oder noch herrschen. welche sich ihres Unterschieds gegen die beherrschte mit Wohlgefühl bewusst wurde. and a radical distinction was brought to light. den Sklaven und Abhängigen jeden Grades. der die Geschichte zugleich als Richterin dieser thatsächlichen Unmoral ansähe! If “values” actually ec-sist.abolish itself. within one soul." So history becomes a compendium of actual immorality. — ich füge sofort hinzu. die Moral: „ihr sollt nicht“ oder „ihr hättet nicht sollen“. pleasantly conscious of being different from the ruled--or among the ruled class. -." and morality—"it ought not to be. noch öfter das Durcheinander derselben und gegenseitige Missverstehen. the slaves and dependents of all sorts. ja bisweilen ihr hartes Nebeneinander — sogar im selben Menschen. Es giebt Herren-Moral und Sklaven-Moral. or else it consists merely of the imposition of a given standard by the strong over the weak. There is mastermorality and slave-morality. the “e-vent”. and in the latter case justice. or have been. until finally two primary types revealed themselves to me. In the former case.I would at once add. dass in allen höheren und gemischteren Culturen auch Versuche der Vermittlung beider Moralen zum Vorschein kommen. und ein Grundunterschied heraussprang. 260. in this time! But that is far from being the “case” (recall Wittgenstein’s definition of truth-value as “that which is the case”). even as “justice”. and connected with one another. What old-fashioned thoughts I have on such a combination of virtue and mythology! But they must out. fand ich gewisse Züge regelmässig mit einander wiederkehrend und aneinander geknüpft: bis sich mir endlich zwei Grundtypen verriethen. Wie schwer würde sich der irren. Moralities then are of two types depending on whether they originate from the rulers or the ruled. Die moralischen Werthunterscheidungen sind entweder unter einer herrschenden Art entstanden. then the “justice” that “balances its contrasting forces” would have become “real” already in our own day and age. All history is the history of violence. then history.

" says an old Scandinavian Saga: it is thus rightly expressed from the soul of a proud Viking. is typical in the morality of the powerful. the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and bestow:--the noble man also helps the unfortunate. A morality of the ruling class. the hero of the Saga therefore adds warningly: "He who has not a hard heart when young. and were only derivatively and at a later period applied to actions. therefore. "Why have sympathetic actions been praised?" The noble type of man regards himself as a determiner of values. that one may act towards beings of a lower rank. precisely in sympathy [Mitleid]. The profound reverence for age and for tradition--all law rests on this double reverence. it is a gross mistake. moreover." and is therefore at present difficult to realise. but rather from an impulse [Drang] generated by the super-abundance of power. he is a creator of values. or in acting for the good of others. is not the morality of "modern ideas. the mendicant flatterers. "We truthful ones"--the nobility in ancient Greece called themselves." and are more and more lacking in respect for old age. quarrelsomeness." belong as definitely to noble morality. just as seems good to one. In the foreground there is the feeling of plenitude. the self-abasing. also. the distrustful. as do a careless scorn and precaution in presence of sympathy and the "warm heart. in order to be a good friend): all these are typical characteristics of the noble morality. Such a type of man is even proud of not being made for sympathy. the happiness of high tension.--the belief and prejudice in favour of ancestors and unfavourable to newcomers. of power.opposing and warring forces that cannot find a lasting meaningful and harmonious “pacification”. is more especially foreign and irritating to present-day taste in the sternness of its principle that one has duties only to one's equals." and in any case "beyond good and evil": it is here that sympathy and similar sentiments can have a place. who takes pleasure in subjecting himself to severity and hardness.--the antithesis "good" and "evil" is of a different origin. towards all that is foreign. which. one that is not the pro-duct of the dominant relationship with the slave. . but not--or scarcely--out of pity [Mitleid]. pride in oneself. "Wotan placed a hard heart in my breast. its “self-glorification”. or "as the heart desires. The noble man honours in himself the powerful one. arrogance--in fact. but rather sees in its very actus dominandi the source and justification of its power. proud disposition displays itself: he despises them. and above all the liars:--it is a fundamental belief of all aristocrats that the common people are untruthful. 260…In the first case. and that which determines the order of rank [Rangordnung. the insignificant. with their constrained glances." The noble and brave who think thus are the furthest removed from the morality which sees. and also to unearth and disclose. he does not require to be approved of. and if." it is the exalted. The cowardly." The morality of the master cannot but be “self-referential”: to the extent that the master reflects on his mastery. the timid.--artfulness in retaliation. as has been pointed out. faith in oneself. will never have one. their domain for invention. the dog-like kind of men who let themselves be abused. The ability and obligation to exercise prolonged gratitude and prolonged revenge both only within the circle of equals. men of "modern ideas" believe almost instinctively in progress and the "future. a radical enmity and irony towards "selflessness. --It is the powerful who know how to honour. hierarchy]. proud disposition which is regarded as its distinguishing feature. It is obvious that everywhere the designations of moral value were at first applied to men. which seeks to overflow. Let it at once be noted that in this first kind of morality the antithesis "good" and "bad" means practically the same as "noble" and "despicable". it is their art. the ignoble origin of these "ideas" has complacently betrayed itself thereby. The noble type of man separates from himself the beings in whom the opposite of this exalted. he passes the judgment: "What is injurious to me is injurious in itself". who knows how to speak and how to keep silence. however. raffinement of the idea in friendship. when historians of morals start with questions like. and those thinking merely of narrow utility are despised. when it is the rulers who determine the concept "good. a certain necessity to have enemies (as outlets for the emotions of envy. he knows that it is he himself only who confers honour on things. or in desinteressement. him also who has power over himself. He honours whatever he recognises in himself: such morality equals self-glorification. it is only to assert his dominance as an “overflowing spirit”. reversely. the characteristic of the moral. and has reverence for all that is severe and hard.

Am meisten ist aber eine Moral der Herrschenden dem gegenwärtigen Geschmacke fremd und peinlich in der Strenge ihres Grundsatzes. die Feinheit in der Wiedervergeltung. wenn Moral-Historiker von Fragen den Ausgang nehmen wie „warum ist die mitleidige Handlung gelobt worden?“ Die vornehme Art Mensch fühlt sich als werthbestimmend. der Macht. den der Überfluss von Macht erzeugt. aber nicht oder fast nicht aus Mitleid. sondern mehr aus einem Drang. das Glück der hohen Spannung. der bettelnde Schmeichler. Verachtet wird der Feige. Whereas the master in his exuberance sees no need-necessity to seek justifications for his dominance except in the assertion of it. was überhaupt erst Ehre den Dingen verleiht. eine Grundfeindschaft und Ironie gegen „Selbstlosigkeit“ gehört eben so bestimmt zur vornehmen Moral wie eine leichte Geringschätzung und Vorsicht vor den Mitgefühlen und dem „warmen Herzen“. der Kleinliche. der Ängstliche. wie angedeutet. die Hunde-Art von Mensch.260… Im ersten Falle. sich gutheissen zu lassen. das Begriffs-Raffinement in der Freundschaft. der an die enge Nützlichkeit Denkende. dass die moralischen Werthbezeichnungen überall zuerst auf Menschen und erst abgeleitet und spät auf Handlungen gelegt worden sind: weshalb es ein arger Fehlgriff ist. dass in dieser ersten Art Moral der Gegensat „gut“ und „schlecht“ so viel bedeutet wie „vornehm“ und „verächtlich“: — der Gegensatz „gut“ und „böse“ ist anderer Herkunft. die überströmen will. Im Vordergrunde steht das Gefühl der Fülle. so verräth sich damit genugsam schon die unvornehme Herkunft dieser „Ideen“. welche zu ehren verstehen. — im Grunde. dass man nur gegen Seinesgleichen Pflichten habe. Eine solche Art Mensch ist eben stolz darauf. der zu redden und zu schweigen versteht. nicht zum Mitleiden gemacht zu sein: weshalb der Held der Saga warnend hinzufügt „wer jung schon kein hartes Herz hat. sie ist wertheschaffend. so far as he is conscious of being dominated. dass das gemeine Volk lügnerisch ist. die den Begriff „gut“ bestimmen. der Glaube an sich selbst. was sie an sich kennt. Die Mächtigen sind es. und wenn umgekehrt die Menschen der „modernen Ideen“ beinahe instinktiv an den „Fortschritt“ und „die Zukunft“ glauben und der Achtung vor dem Alter immer mehr ermangeln. welcher Macht über sich selbst hat. der Glaube und das Vorurtheil zu Gunsten der Vorfahren und zu Ungunsten der Kommenden ist typisch in der Moral der Mächtigen. sie urtheilt „was mir schädlich ist. Die tiefe Ehrfurcht vor dem Alter und vor dem Herkommen — das ganze Recht steht auf dieser doppelten Ehrfurcht —. sie weiss sich als Das. „Wir Wahrhaftigen“ —so nannten sich im alten Griechenland die Adeligen. eine gewisse Nothwendigkeit. dass man gegen die Wesen niedrigeren Ranges. Man bemerke sofort. Der vornehme Mensch ehrt in sich den Mächtigen. der Sich-Erniedrigende. der mit Lust Strenge und Härte gegen sich übt und Ehrerbietung vor allem Strengen und Harten hat. auch schwer auszugraben und aufzudecken ist. gegen alles Fremde nach Gutdünken oder „wie es das Herz will“ handeln dürfe und jedenfalls „jenseits von Gut und Böse“ —: hierhin mag Mitleiden und dergleichen gehören. „Ein hartes Herz legte Wotan mir in die Brust“ heisst es in einer alten skandinavischen Saga: so ist es aus der Seele eines stolzen Wikingers heraus mit Recht gedichtet. es ist ihre Kunst. nicht die Moral der „modernen Ideen“ ist und deshalb heute schwer nachzufühlen. the slave. das ist an sich schädlich“. um gut freund sein zu können): Alles das sind typische Merkmale der vornehmen Moral. welche. Die Fähigkeit und Pflicht zu langer Dankbarkeit und langer Rache — beides nur innerhalb seines Gleichen —. Es liegt auf der Hand. Vornehme und Tapfere. ebenso der Misstrauische mit seinem unfreien Blicke. das Bewusstsein eines Reichthums. will seek to develop a “rationalization” of the reality of exploitation precisely by beginning to doubt and bring into question the “necessity” of this exploitation. der Stolz auf sich selbst. welche sich misshandeln lässt. welche als das Auszeichnende und die Rangordnung Bestimmende empfunden werden. ihr Reich der Erfindung. sie hat nicht nöthig. dem wird es niemals hart“. auch Den. It is otherwise with the slave. wenn die Herrschenden es sind. Der vornehme Mensch trennt die Wesen von sich ab. vor Allem der Lügner: — es ist ein Grundglaube aller Aristokraten. ehrt sie: eine solche Moral ist Selbstverherrlichung. der schenken und abgeben möchte: — auch der vornehme Mensch hilft dem Unglücklichen. welche gerade im Mitleiden oder im Handeln für Andere oder im désintéressement das Abzeichen des Moralischen sieht. an denen das Gegentheil solcher gehobener stolzer Zustände zum Ausdruck kommt: er verachtet sie. Feinde zu haben (gleichsam als Abzugsgräben für die Affekte Neid Streitsucht Übermuth. sind es die erhobenen stolzen Zustände der Seele. by seeking to undermine its legitimacy and to attribute it to causes that are . welche so denken. sind am entferntesten von jener Moral. Alles.

subtlety. and almost the only means of supporting the burden of existence. therefore. denn das sind hier die nützlichsten Eigenschaften und beinahe die einzigen Mittel. dass das Glück selbst dort nicht ächt sei. for here these are the most useful qualities. the warm heart. gemäss der Sklavenmoral-Consequenz. the unemancipated. Feinheit und Stärke." to whom Europe owes so much. Hier ist der Herd für die Entstehung jenes berühmten Gegensatzes „gut“ und „böse“: — in's Böse wird die Macht und Gefährlichkeit hinein empfunden. nach der Herren-Moral ist es gerade der „Gute“. because. der Furcht erregt und erregen will. zuletzt nun auch an den „Guten“ dieser Moral ein Hauch von Geringschätzung hängt — sie mag leicht und wohlwollend sein —. natural or historical. Die Sklaven-Moralist wesentlich Nützlichkeits-Moral. Ihrer-selbst-Ungewissen und Müden moralisiren: was wird das Gleichartige ihrer moralischen Werthschätzungen sein? Wahrscheinlich wird ein pessimistischer Argwohn gegen die ganze Lage des Menschen zum Ausdruck kommen. the instinct for happiness and the refinements of the feeling of liberty belong as necessarily to slave-morals and morality. leicht zu betrügen. humility. the "evil" man arouses fear. which do not admit of being despised. the weary. slave-morality. On the other hand. and those uncertain of themselves should moralise. to “injustices” and usurpations of “rights”. der Sklaven-Moral. zeigt die Sprache eine Neigung. patience. Supposing that the abused. according to the servile mode of thought. while the bad man is regarded as the despicable being. Nach der Sklaven-Moral erregt also der „Böse“ Furcht. Umgekehrt werden die Eigenschaften hervorgezogen und mit Licht übergossen. wenn sich. die Demuth. helping hand. it is here that sympathy. eine gewisse Furchtbarkeit. das warme Herz. --It is otherwise with the second type of morality. those qualities which serve to alleviate the existence of sufferers are brought into prominence and flooded with light. The contrast attains its maximum when. welche die Verachtung nicht aufkommen lässt. together with his situation. ein bischen dumm vielleicht. er hat Feinheit des Misstrauens gegen alles „Gute“. it is precisely the "good" man who arouses fear and seeks to arouse it. a refinement of distrust of everything "good" that is there honoured--he would fain persuade himself that the very happiness there is not genuine. (BGE) 260…— Es steht anders mit dem zweiten Typus der Moral. ingenious men of the "gai saber. According to slave-morality. Unfreien. as is well known. in accordance with the logical consequences of slave. perhaps a little stupid. and almost owes itself. in der . diligence. Leidenden. die Geduld. was dort geehrt wird —. weil der Gute innerhalb der Sklaven-Denkweise jedenfalls der ungefährliche Mensch sein muss: er ist gutmüthig. Everywhere that slave-morality gains the ascendency. its invention is due to the Provencal poet-cavaliers. easily deceived. perhaps a condemnation of man. as artifice and enthusiasm in reverence and devotion are the regular symptoms of an aristocratic mode of thinking and estimating. the good man must in any case be the safe man: he is good-natured. die gefällige hülfbereite Hand. and friendliness attain to honour. als die Kunst und Schwärmerei in der Ehrfurcht. er möchte sich überreden. the kind. Gedrückten. Überall. die Freundlichkeit zu Ehren —. Der Gegensatz kommt auf seine Spitze. un bonhomme. un bonhomme. der Fleiss. a certain dreadfulness. those brilliant. according to master-morality.“remediable” and “avoidable”. language shows a tendency to approximate the significations of the words "good" and "stupid. Here is the seat of the origin of the famous antithesis "good" and "evil": --power and dangerousness are assumed to reside in the evil. Leidenden das Dasein zu erleichtern: hier kommt das Mitleiden. den Druck des Daseins auszuhalten. Slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility. die Worte „gut“ und „dumm“ einander anzunähern. dass die Vergewaltigten. what will be the common element in their moral estimates? Probably a pessimistic suspicion with regard to the entire situation of man will find expression."--A last fundamental difference: the desire for freedom. Der Blick des Sklaven ist abgünstig für die Tugenden des Mächtigen: er hat Skepsis und Misstrauen. wo die Sklaven-Moral zum Übergewicht kommt. welche dazu dienen. der Instinkt für das Glück und die Feinheiten des Freiheits-Gefühls gehört ebenso nothwendig zur Sklaven-Moral und -Moralität. vielleicht eine Verurtheilung des Menschen mitsammt seiner Lage. — Ein letzter Grundunterschied: das Verlangen nach Freiheit. the suffering. he has a scepticism and distrust. a shade of depreciation--it may be slight and well-intentioned--at last attaches itself to the "good" man of this morality. während der „schlechte“ Mensch als der verächtliche empfunden wird.--Hence we can understand without further detail why love as a passion--it is our European specialty--must absolutely be of noble origin. The slave has an unfavourable eye for the virtues of the powerful. Gesetzt.morality. and strength. the oppressed.

what most Nietzsche scholars overlook or misconstrue completely and steadfastly! Jaspers. the slave will seek to separate and distinguish between the “being” of the master and the “actions” that manifest this “mastery”. S. in advocating the voluntaristic generalization of the mastermorality to the status of democratic or existential or “biopolitical” right. have obtained dominance inside and out over the Minority of the strong. the doers. which is the opposite of the Will to Power – the “disintegration” (Disgregation) of the “Instinkte der Freiheit”! How. the post- . But again both authors fall back into the “humanistic” reading of Nietzsche whose “antidote” we hope to provide with this study. warum die Liebe als Passion — es ist unsre europäische Spezialität — schlechterdings vornehmer Abkunft sein muss: bekanntlich gehört ihre Erfindung den provençalischen Ritter-Dichtern zu. Eigenartigen erlangt. Bd. in particular since Christianity. Note for example that. could the “slave-morality” ever impose itself and prevail historically. Simmel captures with remarkable acumen Nietzsche’s entire “problematic”: to explain how in the course of history the Will to Power which is the “universal condition” of life and the world could ever give rise to “the ontogeny of thought”. jenen prachtvollen erfinderischen Menschen des „gai saber“. 202-215). to the “free will” of the master. as does Fink who. hat die Majorität. if certainly not “physiologically”. who could and therefore should act differently to eliminate this contingent historical condition of slavery! The paradoxical result of this rationale may well be. 1896. denen Europa so Vieles und beinahe sich selbst verdankt. “to interpret and utilise correctly” the manifestation of the capitalist Will to Power by re-orienting “strategically” its “spiritual and ideological” velleities (Heidegger and Jaspers refer to the Scholastic velle) toward its effective political and institutional rationalisation of the world (Rationalisierung). in such a way that “being a master” or a “slave” is not a “physiological” attribute of the master and the slave but is rather a “historical accident” due to the “contingent actions”. in Nietzsche’s own words (!).” [“Nietzsche: Eine Moralphilosophische Silhouette”. — Hieraus lässt sich ohne Weiteres verstehn. in other words. Unbedeutenden besteht. Teils als Folge und Ausdruck. deepens its “ontological” importance with a detailed examen of the Zarathustra and the Eternal Return. at least. the exceptional. die äussere und innere Herrschaft über die Minorität der Starken. the Majority. insbesondere seit dem Christentum. as we shall amply discuss later. that naturally is constituted by the weak. over the master-morality? How could the Will to Power succumb to the Entwertung (devaluation) of its incipience and therefore require Nietzsche’s Umwertung (trans-valuation of values)? It may be said that the key aim of this study is. 107. This supreme intellectual and political pro-ject (Entwurf) is. in the chapter dedicated to “The Will to Power” in Section 5 of his Nietzsche. as it has been since the rise of Christendom. die naturgemäss aus den Schwachen. that the slave-morality actually comes to prevail over the master-morality! Georg Simmel agrees that this is “the fundamental thought of Nietzsche” – that “in the course of history. partly as the cause thereof. — (JGB) Because he claims that the reality of mastery and slavery is not ineluctable and physiological. Vornehmen. in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik. the average and the insignificant. Neue Folge. stops merely at noting the “ambiguity” of the notion. Mittelmässigen. alas.und Werthungsweise ist. Heft 2. the original moral values were entirely transfigured”. Partly as the result and effect. (“Der grundlegende Gedanke Nietzsches ist der: im Lauf der Geschichte. teils als Ursache davon sind die ursprünglichen moralischen Werte völlig umgewandelt worden.Hingebung das regelmässige Symptom einer aristokratischen Denk.

as an ineluctable “destiny” requiring a “grosse Politik” that can remedy the “diseased decadence” of bourgeois society which he attributed to precisely the kind of ludicrous “velleities” of a “bio-politics” espoused by these “beautiful souls”! Nietzsche’s Conception of Entwicklung This “abstraction” of actions from their “bearers” necessarily posits a potential and original “equality” between master and slave whose status is no longer due to “necessity” but to historical accident. because it posits a “general harmony of human interests”. who up to the present are the only philosophers who are to be thanked for any endeavour to get as far as a history of the origin [Entstehungsgeschichte. not ‘Genealogie’!] of morality—these men. an advantage over their books — they themselves are interesting! These English psychologists—what do they really mean? We always find them voluntarily or involuntarily at the same task of pushing to the front the partie honteuse of our inner world. 1.from the phenomenological-existentialist “wing” of Heidegger. dass ich es gestehe. or in a blind and fortuitous mechanism and association of ideas. sie haben sogar. wo der intellektuelle Stolz des Menschen es am letzten zu finden wünschte (zum Beispiel in der vis inertiae der Gewohnheit oder in der Vergesslichkeit oder in einer blinden . es zu einer Entstehungsgeschichte der Moral zu bringen. — Diese englischen Psychologen. That is why “slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility”. I say.modernist readings of Nietzsche . — they even have. offer us in their own personalities no paltry problem. für die Entwicklung Entscheidende zu suchen. one of “affirmation” rather than of “ressentiment” – a new Freiheit!). and decisive development [Entwicklung Entscheidende] in that precise quarter where the intellectual self-respect of the race would be the most reluctant to find it (for example. Badiou and then Nancy and Agamben . and looking for the efficient. Deleuze. In interpreting the Will to Power as a potentially “liberating force” (“active” rather than “reactive”. — sie geben uns mit sich selbst kein kleines Räthsel auf. And so it is precisely this very “English” notion of “utility” (from the empiricists in natural philosophy and epistemology to the neo-classicals in economics) that Nietzsche attacks from the outset in the Genealogy of Morals. 1. Those English psychologists. als leibhaftige Räthsel. if I am to be quite frank about it. denen man bisher auch die einzigen Versuche zu danken hat. Leitende. neo-Nietzscheans entirely ob-literate Nietzsche’s terrifying vision of the Will to Power as “Rationalisierung”. eben damit. or in some factor that is purely passive. nämlich die partie honteuse unsrer inneren Welt in den Vordergrund zu drängen und gerade dort das eigentlich Wirksame. or fundamentally stupid)—what is the real motive power which always impels these psychologists in precisely this direction ? 1. or in forgetfulness. a homo-noia achievable through the sanctioning of “universally advantageous” human actions. in their capacity of living riddles. in the vis inertiae of habit. a summum bonum. immer am gleichen Werke. a universal good. molecular.completely misconstrue the blatantly “anti-dialectical” and purely “empirical” character of Nietzsche’s “genealogy” of morality and crucially of the concept of “freedom”. chance and fortune. etwas Wesentliches vor ihren Büchern voraus — sie selbst sind interessant! Diese englischen Psychologen — was wollen sie eigentlich? Man findet sie. governing. reflex. sei es nun freiwillig oder unfreiwillig. Jaspers and Fink to the late or “post-structuralist” current of Lefebvre and Foucault. a work that Nietzsche intended as an elaboration of the “thesis” advanced in Aphorism 260 of Beyond Good and Evil: Ess.

. an “essence”. this system of values must lose its values: is that attained?. and then also to the “subjective” neoclassical version of it that finally privileges the market mechanism as the ultimate arbiter of “value-welfare” through the pricing system – the equilibrium of supply and demand in a process of “pure competitive” exchange. Alle Achtung also vor den guten Geistern. as was always the way of old-fashioned philosophers. But it is certainly a pity that they lack the historical sense itself. Automatischem. but rather in the “goods” that it pro-duces. as pure and empty theoretical “formulations” of a much more “forceful reality”: . simply because. wo es sich darum handelt." "forgetting”. 2." so speaks their decree. on which the higher man has up to the present prided himself as though it were a kind of privilege of man in general. "habit.“ Man sieht sofort: diese erste Ableitung enthält bereits alle typischen Züge der englischen Psychologen-Idiosynkrasie. wie es nun einmal alter Philosophen-Brauch ist. they were praised as good.und zufälligen Ideen-Verhäkelung und -Mechanik oder in irgend etwas Rein-Passivem." The thing is obvious: — this initial derivation contains already all the typical and traits of the English psychologist-idiosyncrasy — we have "utility. da. that it works. “contemplative” nature of “utility” is what Nietzsche declaims and derides in the “English” (Utilitarian) assessment of “value” and the “good” – a critique that extends equally to the “objective” notion of “value” in classical political economy that interprets “labour” as a quantifiable “factor of production”. später hat man diesen Ursprung des Lobes vergessen und die unegoistischen Handlungen einfach. wesentlich unhistorisch. All honour. The whole train of their thought runs. Molekularem und Gründlich-Stupidem) — was treibt diese Psychologen eigentlich immer gerade in diese Richtung? The “passivity”." and finally "error. then. All these “theories of value” invariably posit a “sub-stratum”. a quidditas that lies “behind” or “beyond” or “beneath” or “under” (Latin sub) the “observable economic” behaviour of human beings – whether this “value” is constituted by utility or by labour – because the “value” of labour consists certainly not in its “being” as activity. dass sie gerade von allen guten Geistern der Historie selbst in Stich gelassen worden sind! Sie denken allesammt. came also to be felt as good. that they themselves are quite deserted by all the beneficent spirits of history. those to whom they were useful. subsequently the origin [Ursprung] of this praise was forgotten. dieHerkunft des Begriffs und Urtheils „gut“ zu ermitteln.. dass ihnen der historische Geist selber abgeht. which explains the origins of the labour theory of value in British Utilitarianism (from Hobbes to Smith and Ricardo). denen sie erwiesen wurden. Die Stümperei ihrer Moral-Genealogie kommt gleich am Anfang zu Tage. 2.the reality of power. to the noble spirits who would fain dominate these historians of morality. die in diesen Historikern der Moral walten mögen! Aber gewiss ist leider. on thoroughly unhistorical lines: there is no doubt on this point. that is. as a sheer matter of habit. a “substance”." "Man had originally. of conflicting wills to power or “instincts of freedom”. "praised and called 'good' altruistic acts from the standpoint of those on whom they were conferred. — wir haben . „Man hat ursprünglich — so dekretieren sie — unegoistische Handlungen von Seiten Derer gelobt und gut genannt." the whole assemblage forming the basis of a system of values [Werthschatzung]. daran ist kein Zweifel. Reflexmässigem. This pride must be brought low. auch als gut empfunden — wie als ob sie an sich etwas Gutes wären. weil sie gewohnheitsmässig immer als gut gelobt wurden. The crass ineptitude of their genealogy of morals is immediately apparent when the question arises of ascertaining the origin * [Herkunft] of the idea and judgment of "good. the reflexive and reactive (even “stupid”!). —as though they contained in themselves some intrinsic goodness. and altruistic acts. Nietzsche denounces and derides these theories as sheer “metaphysics”. also denen sie nützlich waren. and the Benthamite notion that turns utility into a socially calculable and measurable entity (Hayek and Foucault will deprecate the “totalitarian” [cf Bentham’s ‘Panopticon’] aspect of this).

and also as unity of perceptio and appetitus (Leibniz. Alles als Unterlage einer Werthschätzung. “the sentimental weakness”. self-interested. makes them “its own”! But the essential. a “commandeering” or “overpowering” that effectively “appropriates” them. above all. most “destructively”. worst of all. But it is utterly unacceptable to him that anywhere in “nature” it is the (passive) “recipients” who positively determine anything as “positive” as human “values”! And most unacceptably absurd to him is the “humanistic illusion” (humanistische Tauschend). which itself follows faithfully Hobbes’s pessimism (see our study on ‘Civil Society’). of the “Subject”. . both as a-tom. Nietzsche’s ruthless critique. homo-noia. even as “exchange” of “goods” that are already in existence… . and then. „die Gewohnheit“ und am Schluss „den Irrthum“. without thereby circumscribing the “active” ability of human beings “to create and seek” their own utilities or values? The notion of “exchange” cannot stand for such “passivity”. much more important point that Nietzsche is attacking is that according to this “idiosyncratic psychology” (or “humanitarian illusion” or “democratic idiosyncrasy”) the “value” of a “good” or an “action” (a service) is first “as-signed” or “evaluated” by the recipients of that good or service! What this “explanation” of the “historical origin” (Herkunft) of “utility” or “good” pre-supposes is that there is some innate human pro-pensity to “reciprocation” and.Now. to “altruistic” (unegoistich) behaviour – and. as merely the absence of “egoism” – a “negative”. and epistemology (the Reine Vernunft). encapsulating the earlier accounts of Spinoza and Hobbes) – from Descartes onwards and especially in Schopenhauer’s “reversal” (Verkehrung) of the Kantian “Thing-in-itself” into the “Will to Life”. as a presupposition underlying these two. p. that this “system of values” applies “to man in general”! .117] – because the “egoistisch”. any idealistic invocations of “common humanity” and “sympathy” or “solidarity” sound pathetic long before they ring hollow. indeed solipsistic character of the human operari is implicit in the very de-finition of the “Ego”. for its “meta-physical” character: for how is it possible to attribute a “value” to something that “merely exists”. Dieser Stolz soll gedemüthigt. which he often designates as “unegoistich”.Because the “appropriation” of these “pre-existing goods” (such as the so-called “endowments” of Walrasian equilibrium) requires an “activity”. passive definition. as id-entity.„die Nützlichkeit“. auf welche der höhere Mensch bisher wie auf eine Art Vorrecht des Menschen überhaupt stolz gewesen ist. for its inertia. the “democratic idiosyncrasy” that these “values” posited by the recipients of the goods and services acquire thereby the status of “universal values” applicable to “man in general” – as if there could be a “general universal harmony” (either as human “agreement”. that is “merely there”. „das Vergessen“. Something “else” will have to found the re-construction of the inter-esse. diese Werthschätzung entwerthet werden: ist das erreicht?… Again we see Nietzsche attack “utility” for its mere “passivity”. which he intended as a corrective for the Hegelian and Fichtean distortions of Kant’s metaphysics! After Schopenhauer’s demolition of Kantian ethics (the Sollen). it is difficult enough for Nietzsche to verbalise the concept of “altruism”. pro-noia) about such “values”! Totally unfounded therefore is Fink’s charge that Nietzsche does not show why “all religion has to be neurotic and all morality vengeful” [Nietzsche’s Philosophy. or as divine or cosmic pro-vidence. of the “self” as in-dividual.

Once more. Jagd. the dance. A distinction must be drawn therefore between a “master morality” that is aware of this reality and asserts it in social life. then it follows that the “dominant” or “hegemonic” values are always and everywhere likely to be those of the “master”. never as “abstractions”: the very fact that they are meant to capture or describe physiological “changing realities”. Abenteuer. Tanz. BGE above). as is notorious. sammt dem. freies. the chase.The knightly-aristocratic " values " are based on a careful cult of the physical . adventure. selbst überschäumende Gesundheit. find ex-pression and embodiment in one “guise” or another. the “active party”. care must be taken not to interpret Nietzsche’s distinction of master and slave moralities as applying “generically” to all human beings at the same time. reiche. within one soul” (see Aph. 7…. Even in their abstract properties. and although he points out that “one finds still oftener the confusion and mutual misunderstanding of them. eine blühende. a shape which is most crafty and most poisonous. in the sense that they have always been with human existence and some even attribute them to “human nature” -. that goes considerably beyond what is necessary for maintaining life. (GM) Die ritterlich-aristokratischen Werthurtheile haben zu ihrer Voraussetzung eine mächtige Leiblichkeit. Ess 1. Their weakness [Ohnmacht] causes their hate to expand into a monstrous and sinister shape. die bösesten Feinde — weshalb doch? Weil sie die ohnmächtigsten sind. was deren Erhaltung bedingt. Die priesterlich-vornehme Werthungs-Weise hat — wir sahen es — andere Voraussetzungen: schlimm genug für sie. in being “egoistic” and surely not “unegoistic”. frohgemuthes Handeln in sich schliesst. was starkes. and joyous action. rich. in's Geistigste und Giftigste. . Aus der Ohnmacht wächst bei ihnen der Hass in's Ungeheure und Unheimliche.If we remove ourselves from the immediacy of “values” that may be held to be universally “good” and concentrate on the possibly far larger sphere of “values” over which there is no “universal” agreement but rather ferocious conflict – for surely conflict and wars are testimony not just to their “per-sistence” but even to their “paramountcy” and. even to their “per-manence”. and. in “dominating” and “overpowering” – more broadly. in opposition. indeed sometimes their close juxtaposition--even in the same man. trans-formations. all of Nietzsche’s analytical categories are never intended “spiritually”. wenn es sich um Krieg handelt! Die Priester sind. to “man in general”. free. on war. and even effervescing healthiness. Nietzsche is steadfastly consistent and insistent on the fact that wherever there is a “master” there must also be a “slave”! The two “conditions” go ineluctably together and are inseparable – because the master morality consists precisely in “appropriation and exploitation”. Although he does not specify a precise “race” or “class” of human beings for whom “the master morality” is a “natural” or “organic” attribute. Kampfspiele und Alles überhaupt. Krieg. that is. the tourney — on everything. some will say. in fact. which is contained in strong. on a flowering. wie bekannt. The priestly-noble mode of valuation is—we have seen— based on other hypotheses : it is bad enough for this class when it is a question of war! Yet the priests are. 260. the worst enemies—why? Because they are the weakest [ohnmachtigsten]. a “slave morality” that seeks instead to disguise its “resentment” and “power-lessness” (Ohnmacht) by denouncing the other morality as “unjust” or “evil”. not the passive recipient. meta-morphoses of “antagonistic values” means that they are not “descriptive qualities” but “active forces” that must at all times be “drawing to their own conclusions”.

it is on the occasion of the decay of aristocratic values. is just as absurd as to require of weakness that it should express itself as strength . falsch. harmony) that lies “behind” human activity and constitutes a common “goal” or “telos”: no such “pro-gress” is envisaged. als „werthvoll an sich“ Geltung behaupten. über schädlich-unzweckmässig aufsummirt und sanktionirt habe. but at any rate the explanation itself is coherent. geht so weit. Even Spencer’s theory is “wrong” because it “reads back” into the notion of “good” an original “purpose”. and so is able to claim to be considered "valuable in the highest degree.To require of strength that it should not express itself as strength . "good" is the attribute of that which has previously shown itself useful. dass das Wort „gut“ sich von vornherein durchaus nicht nothwendig „unegoistische“ Handlungen anknüpft: wie es der Aberglaube jener Moralgenealogen ist. no “uni-versality” is ." This method of explanation is also. a wish to become master. It is both (!) weakness as well as strength that are trying “to express themselves as strength” – except that wherever there is “strength” there must also be weakness. nach dieser Theorie. dass sich dieser ganze Gegensatz „egoistisch“ „unegoistisch“ dem menschlichen Gewissen mehr und mehr aufdrängt. der mit ihm endlich zu Worte (auch zu Worten) kommt. 2…Um wie viel vernünftiger ist jene entgegengesetzte Theorie (sie ist deshalb nicht wahrer — ).purposive." "purposive. Namen zu geben. sie siegeln jegliches Ding und Geschehen mit einem Laute ab und nehmen es dadurch gleichsam in Besitz." so that in the judgments "good" and "bad" mankind is simply summarising and investing with a sanction its unforgotten and unforgettable experiences concerning the "usefulpurposive" and the "mischievous non. the “appropriation” or “affirmation” that Nietzsche invokes is not one that posits a “community of inter-ests” between humans. and thereby at the same time take possession of it." they seal finally every object and every event with a sound. Werthurtheile. By contrast. an inter-esse or even only a “homo-logation” or “homo-noia” (agreement. and that. den Ursprung der Sprache selbst als Machtäusserung der Herrschenden zu fassen: sie sagen „das ist das und das“. the herd instinct [Heerdeninstinkt] which finds in this antithesis an expression in many ways… (Das Herrenrecht. a “substratum” or an “essence”. um mich meiner Sprache zu bedienen. an “adaptation” of human goals and finalities. in accordance with the superstitious belief of these ‘moral philosophers' [Moralgenealogen]. wie gesagt. to use my own language.) It is because of this origin that the word "good" is far from having any necessary connection with altruistic [unegoistische] acts. welche zum Beispiel von Herbert Spencer vertreten wird: der den Begriff „gut“ als wesensgleich mit dem Begriff „nützlich“. so dass in den Urtheilen „gut“ und „schlecht“ die Menschheit gerade ihre unvergessnen und unvergessbaren Erfahrungen über nützlich-zweckmässig. and psychologically tenable.) Es liegt an diesem Ursprunge. aber wenigstens ist die Erklärung selbst in sich vernünftig und psychologisch haltbar. 2…(The masters' right of giving names goes so far that it is permissible to look upon language itself as the expression of the power of the masters : they say " this is that. as I have said. that the antithesis between "egoistic" and "altruistic'' [unegoistich] presses more and more heavily on the human conscience [Gewissen] — it is. a wish to overthrow." “valuable in itself. — es ist." According to this theory. wrong. der Heerdeninstinkt. a telos that is purely fictitious. [On forgetfulness…] How much more logical is that contrary theory (it is not the truer for that) which is represented. for instance. was sich von jeher als nützlich bewiesen hat: damit darf es als „werthvoll im höchsten Grade“. Gut ist. who places the concept "good" as essentially similar to the concept "useful. „zweckmässig“ ansetzt. Auch dieser Weg der Erklärung ist. On the contrary. that it should not be a wish to overpower. dass man sich erlauben sollte. a thirst for enemies and antagonisms and triumphs. no such “harmony” or “con-sensus”. by Herbert Spencer.

No such “dialectic” between human action and “the Object” or even the Schopenhauerian “World” is allowed. emergence. all "happening" [Geschehen – showing. springing] of a thing and its final utility. of dominating [Herrwerden]. neu in Beschlag genommen. . der mit solcher Mühe errungen ist. dass alles Geschehen in der organischen Welt ein Überwältigen. irgendwie Zu-StandeGekommenes immer wieder von einer ihm überlegenen Macht auf neue Ansichten ausgelegt. for it may well be neither vindictive nor a guile or. Every “meaning or sense and end or goal or purpose” is only “transitory” and “fungible”. the “idea” of trans-forming the present and pro-jecting its “ideal” into the future is itself (!) unavoidable – it is itself part of “Life”! Therefore it is irrelevant if not futile to object to “the vindictive guile of impotence [Ohnmacht]”. though facetiously. apparition. ein Zurechtmachen ist. The philosopher of Rocken sees not the “system of needs” that permeates the Arbeit (labour). indeed. “at-hand” (note the ante litteram “Heideggerian” terms in German.The cause[Ursache] of the origin [Entstehung – sprouting. must always be put to new purposes [Ansichten] by a power superior to itself [uberlegenen Macht]. turning and transforming by an over-whelming force”. incessant trans-formation and overturning. its practical application and incorporation in a system of ends [System von Zwecken]. will be commandeered afresh [neu in Beschlag genommen]. not even a sign of “Ohnmacht”. There are no “ultimate or final” causes and effects. or indeed in its very “value” or “worth” whenever it is “exchanged” (the exchange can take place for “bad” reasons). in Aphorism 9 of the First Essay of the Genealogie. which is a “mnemonic” faculty of humans. holding in one’s hand). that must necessarily obscure or entirely extinguish the previous “meaning" [Sinn] and "end. adaptation]. aber auch wirklich errungen sein sollte. The counter-argument to Nietzsche’s reasoning is all too easy to articulate: he himself does it. bei dem der bisherige „Sinn“ und „Zweck“ nothwendig verdunkelt oder ganz ausgelöscht werden muss. par12) 12…. In the very act of “reflection”. one in constant.vielmehr giebt es für alle Art Historie gar keinen wichtigeren Satz als jenen. of . as in the French for “now”. should none the less be mastered in every detail. Vorhanden and ZuStand. difficult though it is to master. Herrwerden und dass wiederum alles Überwältigen und Herrwerden ein Neu-Interpretieren. which.. manifestation] in the organic world consists of overpowering [Uberwaltigen]. not the “ideality” of human purpose and action in “alienated” form that Hegel and Marx theorized.possible. dessen thatsächliche Verwendung und Einordnung in ein System von Zwecken toto coelo auseinander liegen. The fact that something might be “useful” does not mean that it is “good” either in its “origins” (what brought it into existence [Entstehung] may be “bad”) or in its “future effects”. only a “hierarchy of values” can exist. Essay2. are toto caelo opposed to each other— everything. which is “at-hand” [Vorhandenes] and which “comes to pass” [Zu-StandeGekommenes] anywhere. zu einem neuen Nutzen umgebildet und umgerichtet wird. In this constant “becoming and trans-formation” (Veranderung) that is a “commandeering. or our “activity” within it. anything. We are “in” the world and therefore cannot “value” it. 12. to exert its “Will”. a rectification [Zurechtmachen. in any “purposive” or “teleological” sense! The aim of “Life” is to assert itself. main-tenant.. Nietzsche is barking like a wolf at the moon! It is no objection. (GM." [Zweck]. Perhaps there is no more pregnant principle for any kind of history than the following. and again all overpowering and dominating is a new interpretation. will be turned and transformed to new uses. — dass nämlich die Ursache der Entstehung eines Dings und dessen schliessliche Nützlichkeit. dass etwas Vorhandenes.

and Notwendigkeit. Whilst Nietzsche’s uncompromising critique of Western metaphysics and science and morals is extremely useful in its de-structive ability to de-mystify and analyze their “ideo-logical” and “strategic” functions – indeed. For if indeed there is no telos behind human action – if there is no “worker” behind the work. as ineluctable “destiny”. so that no “effective praxis” is indicated by their analyses or critiques. it is far less useful in a constructive. . it needs to make explicit its own physio-logical “pro-ject”. apart from mere survival perhaps. worst of all. is that it fails to identify the “historical forms” of the “power” it deprecates and exposes. to contend (as Nietzsche does elsewhere [Gotzen-Dammerung. in a manner that is “actionable”. by “diffusing” the notion of “power” to the point where it becomes an “ethereal presence”. that he is more Epimenides or Etruscan haruspex than Thucydides and more Thucydides than Polybius. more a “dia-gnosis” rather than a “pro-gnosis”. pro-jectual sense. Nietzsche reduces just about all human action to “self-preservation” and “self-assertion” (which itself is indemonstrable and an evident tautology). in that the slave-morality is a “symptom” of the decadent disease rather than its “cause”. these theoreticians end up stultifying and emasculating the initial “intent” of their work and critiques! We shall pause on this later when we examine thoroughly the practical import of the Rationalisierung in the formation of an imponent capitalist response to the rise of the working class and socialist ideologies in Max Weber’s theorization of the leitender Geist and Pareto’s typology of “azioni e derivazioni” (see his Trattato di Sociologia Generale) both moving within the Grundlinien (groundlines) of the Neoclassical attack on Marxism. for example]) that his philosophy is more an “autopsia” or “divination”. their “rationalization”! -. Does “power” assume definite “forms”? Where may we locate its “source and origin” (fons et origo)? And what is the “content” of this “power”? The vice and ultimate futility of the work of a Foucault. for instance.course.) It would be foolish in the extreme. (Hannah Arendt in her review of “Nietzsche’s Rejection of the Freedom of the Will” has suggested that Nietzsche overcomes this difficulty through what we may designate as “the bad infinity” of the Eternal Return of the Same. In this “circularity”. But the problem remains that if his “diagnosis” is to turn into “autourgeia” (into a “stimulus” or “urge”) or into “praxis”. We will see that this critique of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return is unfounded. its own “ideal”. necessity] in the mani-festation of the Will to Power as “Rationalisierung”. But his “strategy” (for it cannot be “science”) leaves us with the task of identifying the “semeiotics” (the “signs”. Such a rationalization is consistent with Nietzsche’s account of the e-volution (Ent-wicklung. or Guattari and Deleuze. the symbolism and symptomatology) of the exercise of “power”. behind the operari. This is something that Nietzsche’s “onto-geny of thought” simply fails to do. then. a “kingdom of shadows” [Lefebvre]. to abandon Nietzsche’s incomparably incisive and unprecedentedly penetrating and insightful critique – because as we shall see it leads us to the most earth-shattering discoveries in all spheres of human intellectual endeavour and on all fields of human praxis. need. meta-morphosis) of “need-necessity” [the play on Not. and. as we shall see. then we need to explore what lies behind the “activity” of work itself. Nietzsche’s “ambiguity” [Fink and Jaspers] is indefinitely “suspended” – just as the Nazi dictatorship “suspended” the Weimar Constitution and never “abrogated” it.

auch die Resultate gelungener Gegenaktionen. invariably displayed this subjugation. mehr oder minder von einander unabhängigen. dass ein Wille zur Macht über etwas weniger Mächtiges Herr geworden ist und ihm von sich aus den Sinn einer Funktion aufgeprägt hat. nothing survives in the destruction. that is. Darwin would not be possible without Hegel. the evolution [“Entwicklung”] of a “thing". alle Nützlichkeiten sind nur Anzeichen davon. (GM. still less a logical and direct progressus attained with the minimum expenditure of energy and cost : it is rather the succession of processes of overpowering [Uberwaltigungsprozessen] more or less profound. sometimes follow and alternate with each other absolulely haphazard. The new creation is not “linked” or “cognate” to what has been conquered or destroyed. which operate on the thing itself. eines Organs. can on the same principle be regarded as a continuous "signchain" [Zeichen-Kette] of perpetually new interpretations and. vielmehr unter Umständen sich bloss zufällig hinter einander folgen und ablösen. Es2. „Entwicklung“ eines Dings. — sondern die Aufeinanderfolge von mehr oder minder tiefgehenden. an ihm sich abspielenden Überwältigungsprozessen. Nietzsche is very quick and correct to object that “survival” is only the “passive” side of “adaptation” – and that indeed “survivors” may well be said to have actively secured their “fitness to survive”! . it is further the resistance [Widerstand] which in each case . par12) Aber alle Zwecke. further. Implicit in this is a devastating critique of Darwin’s evolutionary hypothesis of natural selection and the survival of the fittest! As Nietzsche will remark later. as Lowith sharply intuits in Vom Hegel zu Nietzsche) that lends a whole new “dimension”. classical and neoclassical. a “multiversity” to the “uni-verse” of political economy. die versuchten Form-Verwandlungen zum Zweck der Vertheidigung und Reaktion. Similarly. mit dem kleinsten Aufwand von Kraft und Kosten erreichter progressus. the Protean wriggles by way of defence and reaction.“Utility” is clearly of “no use” when we look at “adaptation” from this “viewpoint”! We then understand “adaptation” rather as “evolution and development” or “trans-crescence”. and the whole history of a "Thing. und die ganze Geschichte eines „Dings“. adjustments. deren Ursachen selbst unter sich nicht im Zusammenhange zu sein brauchen. is anything but its progressus to an end. hinzugerechnet die dagegen jedes Mal aufgewendeten Widerstände. Ess 2." an organ. a process of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter’s schopferische Zerstorung may safely be said to have originated with Nietzsche. noch weniger ein logischer und kürzester. No “synthesis” emerges from the destruction as the “negation of the negation”: there is only domination and overpowering. has impressed thereon out of its own self the meaning of a function. eines Organs ist demgemäss nichts weniger als sein Progressus auf ein Ziel hin. For Nietzsche. This notion of “evolution” must be kept separate from the Hegelian concept of Auf-hebung which denotes a “dialectical pro-gression” or “extrinsication” of the Idea in the World – the Hegelian “Weisheit” (ruse of Reason). and. a teleology implicit in the very tendentious “hypothesis” that whatever “survives” does so because it is “fit”! Yet as we have seen. a custom. of a custom. 12… But all ends and all utilities are only signs [Anzeichen] that a Will to Power has mastered a less powerful force. “commandeering” for the new needs. eines Brauchs kann dergestalt eine fortgesetzte Zeichen-Kette von immer neuen Interpretationen und Zurechtmachungen sein. or “growth-through-crisis”. more or less mutually independent. whose causes so far from needing to have even a mutual connection. without. eines Brauchs. the results [Resultate] of successful counter-efforts….

das heisst eine Aktivität zweiten Ranges. Damit ist aber das Wesen des Lebens verkannt. übergreifenden. in fact. was herrscht und herrschen will. eine blosse Reaktivität. One remembers Huxley's reproach to Spencer of his "administrative Nihilism": but it is a case of something much more than "administration. neu-richtenden und gestaltenden Kräfte haben. as is obvious. indem er ihr einen Grundbegriff. to the operation*[Wirkung. dass er heute Schritt für Schritt bereits in die strengsten. and encroachment with their new interpretations and tendencies. But this status quo has neither the moral “right” nor indeed and above all the physiological “permanence” or stability that it would need to be enshrined as “adaptation” or as some kind of “ideal”! The fault of “empiricist utilitarians” is therefore to erect not even “what is”. angreifenden. This is what the Nietzschean Umwertung is meant to un-mask: .Ess. neuauslegenden. This definition. that even nowadays it penetrates and has the right to penetrate step by step into the most exact and apparently the most objective sciences : this tendency has. in so far as it has spirited away [eskamotiert habt] a fundamental concept [Grundbegriff]. — seinen „administrativen Nihilismus“: aber es handelt sich noch um mehr als um's „Administriren“… (Incidentally. aggression. ja man hat das Leben selbst als eine immer zweckmässigere innere Anpassung an äussere Umstände definirt (Herbert Spencer). life itself has been defined (by Herbert Spencer) as an increasingly effective internal adaptation to external circumstances.2. fails to realise the real essence of life. Man erinnert sich. anscheinend objektivsten Wissenschaften eindringt. damit ist im Organismus selbst die herrschaftliche Rolle der höchsten Funktionäre abgeleugnet. auf deren Wirkung erst die „Anpassung“ folgt. The tyranny of this idiosyncrasy. It fails to appreciate the paramount superiority enjoyed by those plastic forces of spontaneity. its will to power. der moderne Misarchismus (um ein schlechtes Wort für eine schlechte Sache zu bilden) hat sich allmählich dermaassen in's Geistige Geistigste umgesetzt und verkleidet. its own “hierarchy of values” – its “Will to Power” – and seeks to dis-guise it as a “will to truth” instead. one could not wish for more damning a refutation of the “post-modernist” attempts to reintegrate Nietzsche’s “critique” of Western metaphysics [of its Vollendung] within a “humanist” perspective!) What “the English and French Sociology” perceive as “desirable” is itself nothing more than the “status quo”. however. was Huxley Spencern zum Vorwurf gemacht hat. that of genuine activity [eigentlichen Aktivitat]. Man stellt dagegen unter dem Druck jener Idiosynkrasie die „Anpassung“ in den Vordergrund." (GM) Die demokratische Idiosynkrasie gegen Alles. working] of which “adaptation” is a result [“Anpassung” folgt]: consequently the sovereign role [Roll] of the highest functional organs [Funktionare] in the organism itself (among which the life-will [Lebenswille] appears as active and form-giving) is repudiated. has gradually but so thoroughly transformed itself into the guise of intellectualism. a second-class activity. wie sich von selbst versteht. a mere capacity for "reacting". 12…The democratic idiosyncrasy against everything which rules and wishes to rule. den der eigentlichen Aktivität. zu ihrem Schaden. damit ist der principielle Vorrang übersehn. and to their detriment. exploited . in my view already dominated the whole of physiology and biology. den die spontanen. its pre-judices. however. eindringen darf. ja er scheint mir schon über die ganze Physiologie und Lehre vom Leben Herr geworden zu sein. in denen der Lebenswille aktiv und formgebend erscheint. in fact. sein Wille zur Macht. eskamotirt hat. the modern misarchism (to coin a bad word for a bad thing). results in the theory of "adaptation” being pushed forward into the van of the argument. the most abstract intellectualism. adaptation—that means. but rather a false and “decadent” interpretation of what they imagine to be “reality” to the status of “scientific observation”! What they ignore is that social and biological reality is in a continuous state of incessant “trans-formation” and “becoming” whereby all “values” – far from being “scientifically established or proven” – are constantly “trans-valued”! Nihilism is a “science” that fails to confront its own pre-suppositions.

which recalls the Latin parare. History") to appreciate how politically self-defeating. not an “equi-librium”. that he has to fix the hierarchy of values [Rangordnung der Werthe]. the “responsibility” of “guilt” or of the “bad conscience”. hopelessly distorted by his own “idiosyncratic” (to . a “ranked order” (Rangordnung) or “pecking order” consistent with the “becoming” of relations of power. the good [Wohl] of the majority and the good of the minority are antagonistic value-viewpoints [entgegensetzte Werth-Gesichtspunkte]: we leave it to the naivety of English biologists to regard the former value-viewpoint as intrinsically superior. One simply has to contrast this reading of “genealogy” to that of the charlatan-in-chief’s (Foucault’s in "Nietzsche. as is often the case with him and his types. because it is a “moralistic” or “moralizing”. degenerate and aimless is the entire enterprise of the neo-Nietzscheans! Needless to say. Lowith’s treatment in Max Weber and Karl Marx of the great sociologist’s adoption of this “morality of responsibility” in his personal. a “com-parison” (Nietzsche calls it “Contrastbild”. power-less circulus vitiosus: for Nietzsche’s entire aim here is to trace precisely the “gene-alogy of morals” – the “coming-into-being” (Greek. For the rest. This “assay” is a “test”. but a “hierarchy of values”. a “matching”. that Foucault’s discussion raises some interesting topics such as (right on the point) Nietzsche’s use of different words to denote “origin”. Such a notion of morality could never lead us to the physiological origin (Entstehung) of value. Cf. This is in nuce the import of Max Weber’s “lesson” in Politik als Beruf and indeed the basic Leitmotif in his entire oeuvre. a constant “assay” and “trial”. the instinct of freedom”. Genealogy. to shield. to parry) that “en-ables” human beings to become “calculating”. to measure all things. but a precarious “act of balancing” (Wagschalen. a “con-frontation”. however. This is not to deny. “heir of Machiavelli. The person that promises must be “competent to promise”! This “necessity” is really the highest. contemporary of Nietzsche”]) is the essential focus of this and of our other studies. this task being understood to mean. it is the “awareness of necessity”. a “resultant of forces” vying and wrestling with one another. scales). a constant “confrontation”. of their “being-good”. that he must solve the problem of value. wollen wir der Naivetät englischer Biologe überlassen… Alle Wissenschaften haben nunmehr der Zukunfts-Aufgabe des Philosophen vorzuarbeiten: diese Aufgabe dahin verstanden. Das Wohl der Meisten und das Wohl der Wenigsten sind entgegengesetzte Werth-Gesichtspunkte: an sich schon den ersteren für den höherwerthigen zu halten. Foucault’s discussion of Nietzsche’s interpretation of history. dass er die Rangordnung der Werthe zu bestimmen hat. it is a “measuring-against”. most “responsible” form of “freedom”: it is the “need-necessity.Ess 1. this “problematic” of the intreccio of the historical “origins” of capitalist political and economic ideology with the institutional asset of capitalist social relations of production (clearly personified here in the figure of Max Weber [recall Raymond Aron’s description. But the “responsibility” that comes from “keeping a promise” . genesomai. professional and political conduct. the awareness of having to act in a “competent” manner – in a manner “consonant” and consistent with the “situation” as it presents itself. to “name” and therefore “to keep their word” as a “sign” of their “value”. 17 (fn)… In gauging values. Not a definitive “balance of forces”. to become) from “something other than morals”! Rather. future tense of gi-gnomai.being “a man of his word” – is not for Nietzsche a matter of “morality”. All the sciences have now to pave the way for the future task of the philosopher . dass der Philosoph das Problem vom Werthe zu lösen hat. of the “clash of wills”. (GM) Not a “Value” or “Values” therefore (contra Heidegger). a perpetual “jousting”.

measure and standard of value]. Let us follow Nietzsche’s thought carefully here – because this is one of those pivotal moments in the history of thought on which much of what we think and believe actually hinges. and their co-relation within one organisation). suppression. As soon. (JGB) 259. and a “purpose” or final utility in between! (Nietzsche will soon assail [Essay 2. a state of rest. But it is not a “hierarchy” in any teleological sense. a principle of dissolution and decay [Verfalls-Princip]. a Will to the denial of life. showing. epiphany). it would immediately disclose what it really is--namely. a “happening” (Geschehe. this “chain” of conflict. and especially other humans – through this “ontogeny of thought”. “a general harmony”. a homo-noia.that is a neednecessity dictated by the struggle against. and if possible even as the fundamental principle of society. from violence. severity. also think. and at the least. resoluteness. to turn “becoming” (gi-gnomai) into “knowing” (gi-gnosco. however. exploitation [Ausbeutung]… . an end. as one wished to take this principle more generally. ethical conduct] among individuals when the necessary conditions are given (namely.) The relationship is one of “force”. overpowering [Uberwaltigung] of the strange and weak. and put one's will on a par with that of others: this may result in a certain rough sense in good conduct [guten Sitte. a conciliation. incorporation. to a subject. an intelligible freedom. offers much less enlightenment than his voluble flourishes would induce a superficial reader to believe . injury. the matching against. putting it mildest. the confrontation. an ego and then a consciousness leading to logic and mathematics to causality and science – throughout this process of “self-distancing” and “mirroring” – “re-flecting” . that cannot be “attributed” to anything in particular: it simply “happens” – it is “Life”! By insisting that every “balancing” (with “scales”) of distinct and irreconcilable “forces” must end up in a stable “balance”. the calculation or calculus of pleasure and pain that enters relations with other organisms. and that is all there is to it! To believe that every event has a “cause” (a subject) and an “effect” (an object) – even in physics where “lightning” causes the “flash” – is to attribute to the socalled “subject” a “causal responsibility” that it simply lacks – because we are “recording” an “e-vent”. The relationship of force between wills is also a “hierarchy of values”. From the “identification” of the Will with an esse. in a lasting “conciliation”. scire and finally “scientia”). in the sense that a “subject” deals with an “object” and that this “relationship” can be “theorized” neatly with a beginning. the actual similarity of the individuals in amount of force [Kraftmengen] and degree of worth [Werthmaassen. obtrusion of peculiar forms. resolve. in a binding contractual “harmonious agreement” (homo-noia). whence the Latin gnosis. good morals. apparition. from exploitation. par12] Jhering’s book on Der Zweck im Recht [the purpose in law]. Here one must think profoundly [grundlich] to the very foundations [Grund] and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is essentially appropriation [Aneignung]. the human thinking process seeks to make “familiar” and “in-nocuous” and above all “com-prehensible” what is unfamiliar and senseless. To refrain mutually from injury. human beings develop strategies that make their world “safe and calculable” and that transform the “balancing of forces” in the sense of weighing and testing the strength of conflicting forces into a “balance of forces”. an “equi-librium”. an “equi-librium”. measuring and testing against.avoid the word “idiotic”) approach to epistemology.

259. mildestens. Unterdrückung. ideally so as “to maximize” utility or welfare or use value. later adopted by the Karl Marx who offered to dedicate Das Kapital to Darwin!) It follows that an economic theory founded on “utility” or “labour value” is one oriented to explaining (metaphysically) the “consumption” or the “exchange” of existing goods (!) even if we take them to be. And so is the labour theory of value of Classical Political Economy and of its Marxian-socialist critique that prophesies the socialist utopia of organized labour and of planned production. Ausbeutung. except through the “dis-utility” of labour (which once again is merely a “compensation” for its pre-existing “cost”. Sich gegenseitig der Verletzung. der Ausbeutung enthalten. seinen Willen dem des Andern gleich setzen: dies kann in einem gewissen groben Sinne zwischen Individuen zur guten Sitte werden. By “consuming” the goods. Überwältigung des Fremden und Schwächeren. mere “means of production” -. the consumer “reacts” passively to the “good” (especially if it is considered to be “good in itself”!). (It is interesting to note here. Of course. (In this fundamental respect. but does not seek to account for how “new goods” are pro-duced. Härte. Hier muss man gründlich auf den Grund denken und sich aller empfindsamen Schwächlichkeit erwehren: Leben selbst ist wesentlich Aneignung. neither “utility” nor “labour value” can explain what is “good” or “valuable” about a good that is exchanged. denen von Alters her eine verleumderische Absicht eingeprägt ist? Even from this “negative” side (refraining from harming others. a “value” that the “goods” exchanged simply do not and cannot “possess”! Worst . that the word ‘nihilism’ was first coined by Fichte to refer to this Hegelian dialectical process of labour’s “annihilation of nature”. wenn die Bedingungen dazu gegeben sind (nämlich deren thatsächliche Ähnlichkeit in Kraftmengen und Werthmaassen und ihre Zusammengehörigkeit innerhalb Eines Körpers). The notion of “utility” pre-supposes an “agreement”. — aber wozu sollte man immer gerade solche Worte gebrauchen. Nietzsche exposes already here the “metaphysical” character of all forms of the labour theory of value [including Marx’s] that will form the basis for the Neo-classical assault on it from Bohm-Bawerk onwards. the consumer “destroys” or “nullifies” them – and this includes the Arbeit at the centre of industrial production that “consumes” the means of production. as in the labour theory of value. Verletzung. a “harmony” (homo-noia) about the “value” or “utility” of something that is exchanged – a “good” – that allows this “exchange” to take place. the Schopenhauerian noli ledere. are brought into being (genes-omai). The abstraction from the inert or passive “being” of a “good” to its active “valuation” presumes a “substratum”. as does Lowith in Saggi su Heidegger. the neoclassical “economic” notion of “utility” is abhorrent to Nietzsche – because it can no longer be attributed to a general harmony of self-interests ascertainable through “free and equal exchange”. do no harm). der Gewalt. als Auflösungs. Aufzwängung eigner Formen.und Verfalls-Princip. for the prior “consumption or annihilation of goods” by the labourer) and for the “re-arrangement” of existing “resources”. a “common quality”. The notion of “utility” and the Marxian equivalent “use value” are always “passive” in the sense that they are the “effect” of a “good” (of a “thing”) on the consumer. Sobald man aber dies Princip weiter nehmen wollte und womöglich gar als Grundprincip der Gesellschaft. Einverleibung und mindestens. Nietzsche is also exposing simultaneously the metaphysical basis of Neo-classical theory as well!) Above all. so würde es sich sofort erweisen als Das. was es ist: als Wille zur Verneinung des Lebens.

of all, such a “common utility” or “use value” pre-suppose a universal human faculty and calculus of “utility” or “use-fulness” – indeed, a Hegelian “system of needs” - that simply does not exist and is purely phantomatic! In pointed contrast, Nietzsche reminds us that “value”, both ethico-political and politicoeconomic, stands for “valour”, and “good” (Latin, bonus) stands for “strong” (or “whole”, and thence “hale and healthy”, “integral”, therefore “strong and true”). And this is precisely what he is saying! – That we need to inquire about the precise historical and institutional “forms” of this “valour” and this “strength” – but also of the “resistances” to it, the “defences and reactions” and “counter-actions”.
Ess 1, 5… I believe that I can explain the Latin bonus as the "warrior": my hypothesis is that I am right in deriving bonus from an older duonus (compare bellum = duellum= duen-lum, in which 'the word duonus appears to me to be contained). Bonus accordingly as the man of discord, of variance, " entzweiung " (duo), as the warrior : one sees what in ancient Rome " the good" meant for a man. Must not our actual German word gut mean " the godlike, the man of godlike race " ? and be identical with the national name (originally the nobles' name) of the Goths ? (GM) Das lateinische bonus glaube ich als „den Krieger“ auslegen zu dürfen: vorausgesetzt, dass ich mit Recht bonus auf ein älteres duonus zurückführe (vergleiche bellum = duellum = duen-lum, worin mir jenes duonus erhalten scheint). Bonus somit als Mann des Zwistes, der Entzweiung (duo), als Kriegsmann: man sieht, was im alten Rom an einem Manne seine „Güte“ ausmachte. Unser deutsches „Gut“ selbst: sollte es nicht „den Göttlichen“, den Mann „göttlichen Geschlechts“ bedeuten? Und mit dem Volks- (ursprünglich Adels-) Namen der Gothen identisch sein? Die Gründe zu dieser Vermuthung gehören nicht hierher. —

Not only does Nietzsche demolish the “utilitarian” conception of “value” because “utility” is incapable of supplying the origin both physical (Entstehung – physical source or “spring”) and historical (Herkunft - “basis” or “sub-stance”, pro-venance, the theoretical under-pinnings) of “value” in a theory of pure exchange; but also and above all he explodes the Marxian notion of “exploitation” (Ausbeutung) founded on the labour theory of value. “The fundamental principle of society” is not labour or the division of labour. Even if it were, the reality of the operari, of the Arbeit, would still be subordinate to that of the most primordial, “instinctive” need-necessity of human beings – those “Instinkte der Freiheit” that are “need-necessary” because of their “instinctive” origin (Entstehung), and are also “irrepressible” because of their “necessary instinct” for “freedom”, by which Nietzsche means “appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation”. Far from being an aberration, a distortion, an “alien-ation” of some innate or “essential” aspect of human being, exploitation is the very fons et origo, the very essence of “life”: – it is life “seen from the inside”, from “within the Will” where even the instincts are at war with one another, meaning that no “harmony”, no “community” or “reconciliation” of the “instincts” is possible, no “freedom from the will” is available!
(JGB) 259… Even the organisation within which, as was previously supposed, the individuals treat each other as equal--it takes place in every healthy aristocracy--must itself, if it be a living and not a dying organisation, do all that towards other bodies, which the individuals within it refrain from doing

to each other: it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power, it will endeavour to grow, to gain ground, attract to itself and acquire ascendancy--not owing to any morality or immorality, but because it lives, and because life is precisely Will to Power. On no point, however, is the ordinary consciousness of Europeans more unwilling to be corrected than on this matter; people now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about coming conditions of society in which "the exploiting character" is to be absent: -- that sounds to my ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions. “Exploitation" does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the nature [Wesen, physis] of the living being as an organic [physiological] primary function [Grundfunktion]; it is a result [Folge] of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the Will to Life. — Gesetzt, dies ist als Theorie eine Neuerung, — als Realität ist es das Ur-Faktum aller Geschichte: man sei doch so weit gegen sich ehrlich! — Auch jener Körper, innerhalb dessen, wie vorher angenommen wurde, die Einzelnen sich als gleich behandeln — es geschieht in jeder gesunden Aristokratie —, muss selber, falls er ein lebendiger und nicht ein absterbender Körper ist, alles Das gegen andre Körper thun, wessen sich die Einzelnen in ihm gegen einander enthalten: er wird der leibhafte Wille zur Macht sein müssen, er wird wachsen, um sich greifen, an sich ziehn, Übergewicht gewinnen wollen, — nicht aus irgend einer Moralität oder Immoralität heraus, sondern weil er lebt, und weil Leben eben Wille zur Macht ist. In keinem Punkte ist aber das gemeine Bewusstsein der Europäer widerwilliger gegen Belehrung, als hier; man schwärmt jetzt überall, unter wissenschaftlichen Verkleidungen sogar, von kommenden Zuständen der Gesellschaft, denen „der ausbeuterische Charakter“ abgehn soll: — das klingt in meinen Ohren, als ob man ein Leben zu erfinden verspräche, welches sich aller organischen Funktionen enthielte. Die „Ausbeutung“ gehört nicht einer verderbten oder unvollkommnen und primitiven Gesellschaft an: sie gehört in's Wesen des Lebendigen, als organische Grundfunktion, sie ist eine Folge des eigentlichen Willens zur Macht, der eben der Wille des Lebens ist. — Gesetzt, dies ist als Theorie eine Neuerung, — als Realität ist es das Ur-Faktum aller Geschichte: man sei doch so weit gegen sich ehrlich! —

“Exploitation” is intrinsic to “all organic functions”. Yet “people now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science…” – and above all in “politics”, of course, in “socialism”! – “…about the coming conditions of society in which the ‘exploiting character’ is to be absent”. Nietzsche’s “political” intent, the clear “political motivation” of his entire philosophical critique is utterly evident here, if nowhere else! To wish to eliminate exploitation is equivalent to desiring to eliminate “life” itself! “Because life is precisely Will to Power”, and therefore it is a dominating (Herrwerden) and overpowering (Uberwaltigung). This is perhaps Nietzsche’s most unambiguous, direct and unmistakeable statement and explication of the “Will to Power”: any and every attempt to re-interpret the utter brutality of this “philosophy”, to give it some “emancipatory” twist is contemptible in the extreme. Indeed, one may well argue that such spurious banalisations of Nietzsche’s deontology he himself would deride and deprecate as pathetic examples of the very “slave morality”, the cowardly “herd instinct”, “the humanitarian illusion”, “the sentimental weakness” that he so fastidiously execrates! We are the first to exalt Nietzsche’s acumen and the validity of his insights and critique. But equally we must be first to condemn the wanton bestiality of its “analytical perspective” and of its “exhortations”. It is contemptibly “pathetic” to argue that Nietzsche “resents” the ressentiment of slave-morality for its “duplication” of the master-morality through its “negativism”, for being a “reaction” to it. What Nietzsche “pitilessly” execrates in “slave-morality” instead is its attempt “to accuse” the mastermorality of “guilt”. And of using “guilt” to pursue its own “will to power”! Contrary to the

European metaphysical tradition, Nietzsche’s aim is not “to abolish conflict” or “struggle”, “to pacify existence” (Hegel’s combined notions of Aufhebung and Versohnung): his aim is “to affirm” the ineluctability of “Antagonistic Values” and the manifest “decadence” of “Altruism”. The “eristic” Heraclitean motivation of Nietzsche’s work is its most unquestionable feature: those who deny this show either that they care nothing for intellectual honesty (if acting in bad faith) or that they understand next to nothing of it (if acting in good faith)! In its political aspect, Nietzsche’s “Will to Power” is not an “affirmation” that carries or aims at an inter-esse, a project of human “general harmony” or at least “reconciliation”, as the despicable peddlers of Nietzschean proto-fascist vitalism seek to insinuate, in the name of some absurd “bio-political” vision hidden or latent in his philosophy. If there is one thing – one thing only! – that can be singled out as “the essence” of Nietzsche’s entire philosophy, and that is shared by these epigones, it is his intransigent, emphatic and absolute denial of any “inter-esse”, of any “species-conscious being-human” in the “instinct of freedom” or “will to power” – which remains “irreconcilable” with other “wills to power” in its inexhaustible and implacable self-affirmation! It is important to stress even at this early stage of our study (this is a point that will emerge clearly from our elaboration) that the Will to Power is not an “entity” separate from its “physiological” mani-festations - a “sub-stance” or “essence” that can be abstracted or distilled from its material, physical expressions in life and the world. Rather, Nietzsche clearly intended the Will to Power as a “universal condition” of be-ing, that is, of being-as-becoming. Consequently, Nietzsche’s philosophy is atavistically “ontogenetic” because the exclusive “source” of human action for him are “the instincts” (Instinkte, Triebe, Wille) which are irreducibly “physical” (from Greek physis, nature) and “individual”. He violently and indefatigably opposes and scorns any suggestion of “phylogenetic” factors in human evolution – what Marx called “species-conscious being human”. [Quote from ‘WM’] The only “inter-action” that Nietzsche admits of is the interaction of domination and exploitation, of violence and injury, of commandeering and subordination, in short, of master and slave.
It is evident now why Nietzsche preferred Lamarck’s onto-genetic theory of evolution to Darwin’s phylogenetic one. To summarise, Lamarck’s theory attributed genetic mutation to the vitalistic instinctual efforts of individual members of a species, with the eventual outcome that their progeny would then inherit those traits acquired by the parents. Needless to say, the theory is entirely fallacious in that it hypothesizes a causal link between individual activity and genetic mutation. By contrast, Darwin’s theory accounts rationally for genetic mutation either by the survival of individual species as against other species or by the gradual “selection” of the genetic traits of individuals within a species that “survive” to the exclusion of other less “fit” individuals. The Lamarckian theory has an evident “vitalistic” slant, yet at any rate it is just as evidently fallacious because the link it hypothesizes between individual activity and genetic inheritance is simply fanciful. Darwin’s theory instead, whilst lending itself to Nietzsche’s “teleological” criticism of “adaptation” and “natural selection”, at least has the merit of accounting plausibly for the scientifically-observed transmission of genetic traits. In any case, it need hardly be said that human faculties are far from being “individual” or ontogenetic, but are clearly “phylogenetic”. To give the most

obvious example. das heist trennenden. tearing open clefts. the “e-volution” (Ent-wicklung) that is not a “growth” or a “supersession” (Auf-hebung. a “growth-through-crisis”. then we can see why he could contend that those “English [utilitarian] psychologists [lack] the historical sense”! Because they “flatten” every social reality by transforming its “dia-chrony” into “syn-chrony”. raised by a tribe of gorillas. by reducing “power” to “equi-valence” and “equality”. if one is needed [!] is in Clifford Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures. as in Hegel and Marx). to think and so forth. has been formulated as the ideal in contemporary sociology.the ability to speak. contrarily to the “trans-formation” (Ver-anderung) that Nietzsche “in-tends” (dia-noia). Herbert Spencer is a decadent too: he sees the triumph of altruism as something worthy of being desired [Wunschwerthes]. beginning with cerebral functions. interpreting them “passively”. as-signs a “purpose” retro-spectively and retro-actively to what are active manifestations of life (events. a “stage” toward a “goal” (Ziel). Nietzsche chastises the peddlers of socialist utopianism: It is naive – indeed a “pathetic”. . but Mr. a human baby that (like the mythical Tarzan or “feral child”) by the remotest of chances grew up in the jungle. aber auch Herr Herbert Spencer ist ein décadent. The decline of life. dass sie nur die VerfallsGebilde der Societät aus Erfahrung kennt und vollkommen unschuldig die eigenen Verfalls-Instinkte als Norm des sociologischen Werthurteils nimmt. unter. — er sieht im Sieg des Altruismus etwas Wünschenswerthes!(ToI) Just as with the Utilitarians. And that by virtue of the fact that such a “feral child” would have the same physiological characteristics as any other child. (An entertaining elaboration of this point. “democratic idiosyncrasy” – to insist on the “abolition” (Marx’s Aufhebung) of the “separation” (Marx’s Trennung – on which see our ‘Civil Society’) of the workers from the means of production! This “socialist. “leveling”. another. even more illustrious. Where Marx bemoans the “separation” (Trennung) of living labour from the “means of production” and its “concentration” by the capitalist. subordinate and superordinate”: 37…. Our socialists are decadents. and with perfect innocence accepts its own instincts of decay as the norm of sociological value-judgments. “egalitarian”. is of course in Volume One of Marx’s Das Kapital. they remove “memory” and turn all historical realities into “platitudes” (platus.My objection against the whole of sociology in England and France remains that it knows from experience only the forms of social decay.und überordnenden Kraft formulirt sich in der Sociologie von heute zum Ideal …Unsre Socialisten sind décadents. subordinating and superordinating force [Kraft]. would still retain by virtue of its phylogenetic make-up all of the “human” faculties that every human being shares: . to laugh. Nietzsche brutally dismisses such nostalgic reveries as “socialist decadence” and champions ruthlessly the right of the owners of capital “to organize. (ToI) 37…Mein Einwand gegen die ganze Sociologie in England und Frankreich bleibt. The same goes for the Darwinian and Spencerian “purposive” notion of “adaptation” that “reads back” or a-scribes. that is to say separating [trennenden]. they “democratize” life. flat) giving them an “invariant” status as instances of “human nature” and dressing them up as “stages” in the march of “adaptation” and “pro-gress”. Das niedergehende Leben. the atrophy of all organizing. happenings) – again. but rather a “trans-crescence”.) If we accept that Darwin’s theory does open itself at least in part to the Nietzschean accusation that it is an ex post facto rationalization. die Abnahme aller organisirenden. Klüfte aufreissenden.

hedonistic future – into “adaptation” or a Schopehauerian “genius of the species”! The entirety of modern industry. But why is this reduction impracticable? Because it appears by now that it is almost impossible to reduce the practices to their mere technical foundation. why should this matter? Wherein lies “the great danger of mankind” [Aph5 and 6. when in fact both activities are most evidently “phylo-genetic”? “The unpolitical denounces in small politics the desperate conservation of the regressive idea of a mutual universal recognition of subjects in work as value.” And Cacciari is right also to insist that this “dialectical construction” is the very essence of “economic science” from Smith to the present. The initial. or even as a “mechanistic” one opposed to “artistic and artisanal poiesis”. “negative” objection to Nietzsche’s (and Cacciari’s) evidently “hortatory” philosophy is simple and devastating enough: if this is “life”. the motor of dialectical construction. refers not to the “labour value” or even “utility” of the goods. in fact. But why must “techne’” be understood as an irremediably “ontogenetic” process.99) is perfectly right: “Neither nostalgia for a return. There is not and cannot be a “technological” resolution of human aspirations. our “use” of his critique of science. Pr. historically determined dissolution of this idea that constitutes. The . as in Carlyle. understood as realization of its value. that “work” understood as living labour shapes and is shaped by our “species-conscious being”. constitutes the power of Nietzsche’s critique. “utility” is only “part” of the calculus that enters the exchange: but in truth.. “the atrophy of the employer’s force or power to organize. But with regard to this last Cacciari neglects and omits its most fundamental truth – the central thesis of our work: . much more than the calculable and comfortable “reality” of utility or use value which “translates” life in “humanistic” terms. nor even nostalgia to move forward toward a perfect militarization of work.altruistic and democratic wish” would lead to “the decline of life”. then why trouble even writing about it? Is it merely a question of “honesty toward ourselves” – and why would such “honesty” be better than self-deception (as Nietzsche will ask later in his critique of the Will to Truth)? Or is it a matter of “correcting the ordinary consciousness of unwilling Europeans”? And if the latter. p. into the “progress” toward a benevolent. whilst Nietzsche’s Umwertung is “invaluable” for the reconstitution of our “philosophy of praxis”. from his fundamental categories of de-structive critique. including the “exchange” of living labour or labourpower with dead labour or wages. subordinate and superordinate [or re-structure]” industry! The market “exchange”. which is an osmosis. it is the attack on the very idea of work as value. the whole Vergesellschaftung (“socialization” of production) assumes now a truly revolutionary.namely. to blessed precapitalistic work. including (au fond) the Marxian critique. GM]? Of what are you afraid? Nietzsche and Cacciari are right again: there is not and there cannot be an “objective value” behind the division of social labour. rather. an attack led on the basis of the concrete. a sym-biosis of all our vital faculties that turns us from “human beings” into “being human”. much more is at stake in this trans-action. As we shall see. ethics and political economy requires us “to re-construct” on the fragmented debris of his “philosophizing with a hammer”. but rather to the “matching” of the respective “wills” of the parties to the exchange! Again. even horrifying meaning in Nietzsche’s hands! Cacciari (The Unpolitical.

we will tackle punctiliously the far-reaching political and ethical implications of the figure of “the Wanderer” in Nietzsche’s philosophy. of which he searches the “physio-logical” origins or sources and foundations. That “the state form” is also decaying and “impossible” precisely because its “strategic function” as a “reduction and mediation” of capitalist antagonism is failing.” (p101). it is Cacciari’s impossibly “reductive and mediated” antitheses of “the worker” and “the class”. But impossible in both senses: both because the conditions of its exploitation are a disgrace.the result of too long a time spent reading Heidegger! That Cacciari’s own “vision” is hopelessly caught in this “ontogenetic” trap. but the priest who states that his kingdom is of this world. 102) with an allusion to Wittgensteinian “mysticism” about language and “silence”. then let our language be that of politics without foundation.” (p102). and the “conclusions” that he derives from these critiques.” (p102).102-3) with a lyrical appeal to “the Wanderer” (from the last page of ‘HATH’) and his “ad-venturous existential frisson” worthy of Heidegger (or perhaps of the worst Sartre sipping coffee in St. If our announcement proclaims values. we are the last to deny.doing (doing of techne’ irrevocably severed from poiein) is embodied in subjects that enact their own absence of home as a conflictual relation. and because its own individuality makes impossible the dialectical process of reduction and mediation. of “the state” and “politics” and of “value” and “work” that elicit his “phantasmagoria” of “the impossible class” and “the decaying dialectical state” as well as his epigonal advocacy of Nietzsche’s “Grand Politics”! That the “working class” is “im-possible”. he himself makes crushingly obvious: “The dangerous individual is the worker as impossible class. we are the first to assert! But Cacciari is obstinately and capriciously “postulating” the two horns of a dilemma that exists only in his own mind – only to be impaled by them both! – by insisting on the “individuality” of the “worker”! It is not surprising that his review of Nietzsche’s politics should conclude first (on p. but also – even if we wished to confine ourselves to the most reductive understanding of “pro-duction” – in the human division of social labour! Again. But the prescription is an “active” one in the sense . If our kingdom is nothing but this world. let our kingdom not be of this world. And let this language know how little does one say when one says it politically.) There is certainly a “dif-ference” between Nietzsche’s “critiques” of the Western metaphysical “construction” of reality. Let it recognize its limitations – and how much silence embraces its every word. the “politics” that he prescribes. as a class that is aware of its own condition as impossible. so pellucid not just in the phylogenetic “reflexive” or “species-conscious” faculties of being human. Germain des Pres!). (Later. It is quite astounding how a thinker of Cacciari’s intellectual perspicacity can fail to take into account the indispensable human inter-dependence so manifestly evident. if you like. “Disgraceful is not the priest. and then (pp. But Cacciari is getting caught up in his own hopeless rhetorical logorrhoeia . or in Nietzschean terms “self-dissolving” (selbst-aufgehoben). which is a condition of the power of the state form.

(Again in Wille zur Macht he loosely likens his analysis to “astrology” – “reading” or “interpreting” the star signs. although it is not possible to determine in advance the “purpose” or “utility” of a reality. The “truth” of “life” will be decided… “in the event”. reason and direction) of “amor fati”. A medical condition is “critical” when the patient may either live or die.that the “conclusions” follow inexorably from his most “fundamental premises” (Grundbegriffe). but points out that this word. it is imperative that we will in a certain direction after having “deciphered the signs”! That is the meaning of being caught “between the walls of the past and of the present” (see the following section). together with “cause”. . Nietzsche is saying that if we “refuse to sign” when we “have the pen”. eschew “resentment” and thereby achieve an egalitarian and “noble” society for all! This is not at all the case! Rather. an “indication” (Anzeichen) and a “symptom” of our being “diseased” (Erkranken) – a “symptom of retrogression” (Ruckgangssymptom). whether the disease will grow or disappear. That is the meaning (or “sense” . because “history” does not move with “linearity”. Not a “regression” in a historical sense. and the Will to Power entails the acceptance and “assertion” or “exertion” of this “physiological” reality! For Nietzsche. a “disease” can only be “described” as a “symptom” of “decadence” in a “physiological” or “dia-gnostic” sense precisely because it is impossible to tell for sure. This is Nietzsche’s own unification of theory and practice! There is no “finality” and no “telos” in the deontology indicated by his “critique” of “values”. this “corruption”.in order “to encourage the weak” to act nobly. There is no aetiology of disease. but rather the “symptom or sign” of the latter. Nietzsche is saying that “weakness” (Schwaschlichkeit) is the ubiquitous counterpart to “strength” (Kraft). That is why. Rather. the “result” (Folge)! Only “after” shall we be able to determine. and not even the “effect”. that is in itself a “sign” (Zeichen). in the outcome (Erfolg. An illness (Krankheit) or disease (Erkrankung) is neither the “cause” nor the “effect” of “retro-gression”. of the Eternal Return – of the Wille zur once perception. so that a “willful” search for Power (Macht) is the only way to reverse this decay. literally “success”). as with the medical diagnosis of a diseased organism. it is an “Eternal Return” of “Life”. this explodes the thesis that Nietzsche intends his “physio-logy” in a “hortatory” sense: – pour encourager les faibles (!). the . Nietzsche draws a clear distinction between “weakness” (Schwaschlichheit) and “powerlessness” (Ohnmacht) – the one denoting a “condition” and the other a “decadence” or “decay” (Verfall): the former is not the “cause”. with the benefit of hind-sight. of “decadence and decay” (Verfall) (although in Wille zur Macht Nietzsche uses the word “effect”. he understands as “pure concepts”. whether the patient will live or die. One could describe his “procedure” almost in medical terms: the dia-gnosis leads to pro-gnosis and prophylactic “indications” (Anzeichen) and “counter-indications”. what the true state of affairs (Thatsachlichkeit) was. no scientific “explanation” of its causation. as it were. Once more.) This is the meaning of “Krisis”. There are no Spenglerian fatalistic echoes about the imminent “decline of the West” (Untergang des Abendlandes) or of Heideggerian apocalyptic “obscurcissement du monde” (in Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik) in Nietzsche. of no epistemological relevance).

severity. from violence. if it be a living and not a dying organisation. no “co-existence”.very “ideal” of an “egalitarian and noble society”. of the “will to power”. historically determined dissolution of this idea” – of the inter-esse of species-conscious being human. and because life is precisely Will to Power. To refrain mutually from injury. Only when the amounts of force and the “measures of value or worth” between individuals are “similar” (see below for discussion of “exchange and equivalence of values” in Nietzsche) can there be a “truce” – but only between themselves or within their organization or corporation (Korper – “body”. valour]. obtrusion of peculiar forms. see below on “value and exchange”. the “acceptance” of which. to hide or “mask” this “reality” such as it is – the reality of conflict and antagonism and error – in the name of reconciliation and truth. which the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power. but because it lives. to gain ground. equal] or Vertrag [contract]) whereby the mastermorality assumes an “ideological and strategic” aspect (Vergeistigung) and a politicalinstitutional aspect (Rationalisierung). the individuals treat each other as equal--it takes place in every healthy aristocracy -. as was previously supposed. the actual similarity of the individuals in amount of force and degree[s] of worth [Werthmaassen. will lead infallibly to the atrophy of the “instinct of freedom”. in a first stage. No “reconciliation” of “wills to power” is possible. of the “slaves” in a cataclysmic fury that he himself describes in lucid detail (see below on “origin of the State”). why humanity has not destroyed itself already! What allows the “instinct of freedom” to reach a “limit” of satiety is. Da-sein. Ent-stehung) of the dominated and the subjugated without their “annihilation”! As we quoted above. suppression. conquest of the strange and weak. to assuage. and. no “utopia”. injury. of decadence and decay.but why should one for ever use precisely these words on which for ages a disparaging purpose has been stamped? Even the organisation within which. except insofar as “domination” (Herrwerden) and “overpowering” (Uberwaltigung) require the continued “ec-sistence” (being there. this is precisely what the “herd instinct” and the “slave morality” together with their “ascetic ideals” manage to achieve for Nietzsche: they explain why the human species has not “devoured itself” like his paragon snake biting its tail. and put one's will on a par with that of others: this may result in a certain rough sense in good conduct among individuals when the necessary conditions are given (namely. exploitation [Ausbeutung]. in a second stage. attract to itself and acquire ascendancy . and their co-relation within one organisation). (Again. of a pacified and harmonious world. must end up with the nihilistic denial of life! Any attempt to mollify.must itself. the “acquiescence” in which. 259. . incorporation. putting it mildest. spiritualisation) of this “settlement” (Aus-gleich [Gleich. No “common goal”.not owing to any morality or immorality.) 259…[L]ife itself is essentially appropriation. measures of value. is itself a sign and symptom of incipient Ohnmacht. -. do all that towards other bodies. the “interiorisation” (Verinnerlichung. The question remains then of how Nietzsche envisages the possibility and scope of action of the Will to Power as the rationalization of the world and of whether this constitutes (as Cacciari suggests above) “the concrete. nothing else than the full “submission” of the “herd”. and at the least. from exploitation [Ausbeutung]. No “common humanity” – indeed. note the “physiological” terms). it will endeavour to grow. Indeed. of corruption.

of being “in-appropriate” (un-gemasse) for their “time” (Zeit). a book whose central thesis is so ludicrous that it simply does not deserve the effort of a rebuke or. anything of any use that Deleuze has to say on Nietzsche is said already in the work of these precursors. the “ground” from which nearly all of his philosophy originates both factually (as Ent-stehung) and thematically (as Her-kunft) is evinced not just by his philological formation or by his earliest major study. but above all by the next series of “meditations” in which he provides the first sketch (Entwurf) of what will be his entire philosophy and in which he proclaims so early his “divorce” or “breakaway” from the idols of his youth – Wagner and Schopenhauer. That is the entire meaning of his “Will to Power” as opposed to Schopenhauer’s “Will-to-Life”: . “unitary”. least of all. Indeed. The trap into which most “post-modernist” or “post-structuralist” analyses of Nietzsche’s philosophy fall is exactly this: – that in their absurd attempts “to objectify the subject”. the former is meant to re-affirm without any shadow of doubt the ir-reducible. going even so far as to opine a certain “dis-jointedness” in Nietzsche!). But this “disease” started much earlier with Heidegger’s own “humanistic” reading of Nietzsche as well as that of Henri Lefebvre and Klossowski and later Foucault. If the “un-time-liness” of the Meditations could be con-fined to their being “noncontemporary” or “un-fashionable” (Deleuze and Agamben again – but they represent an almost ecumenical and platitudinous misinterpretation). The Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen are “un-timely” in a sense very far from that of being “ana-chronistic” (or “dys-synchronic”. ir-repressible. of a stroncatura. We shall discuss them later. what is false and deplorable in Nietzsche’s “philosophy” is precisely what we have sought to establish: . his thoroughgoing rooted denial and execration of any and all “common physiological humanity” that human beings may share – something that is made evident from his “revulsion” at Schopenhauer’s clearly inconsistent but “hopeful” notion of “Mit-leid”. as Deleuze and Agamben [‘What Is An Apparatus?’] construe them. “necessary” Ur-Faktum – the “supreme fact” – of the individual will to power! Be-tween the Walls of Past and Future – The Wille zur Macht in History and Time That history is Nietzsche’s main and most forceful source of material. Ultimately. “unegoistic” (Nietzsche) and therefore “universal” character (Schopenhauer’s word for the ultima ratio of human intellectual freedom. “shared pain”! By so doing.that whereas the latter leaves open the “possibility” of a com-unitas in the “striving” of the Will to Life in its very “indistinct”. they swallow whole Nietzsche’s “isolation” of human beings into “in-dividua”. or indeed that they can “comm-unicate” meaningfully! We shall see how Nietzsche abhors and de-values [Ent-wertung] the entire concept of “consciousness” itself – which plays a central role in all “humanistic” deontologies.This ‘hortatory’ intention is the basis of Deleuze’s interpretation in Nietzsche et la Philosophie. literally. then we would truly deliver . the neoNietzscheans defeat the ostensible self-avowed aim of their exegesis! Nietzsche thoroughly and unequivocally denies and despises any and all suggestions that human beings can “share” anything at all. the esse). The Birth of Tragedy.the thoroughgoing denial and execration of any and all inter-esse (not to be confused with the laughable Husserlian phenomenological notion of “intersubjectivity” that led Heidegger “to betray” his master and protector) that we may identify and pursue in our species-conscious “being-human”.

but also “scientific” . the intelligible freedom of the Will. They do not merely confute the Kantian and Schopenhauerian notion of the Freiheit. a “per-spective” from which it will be possible to com-prehend life and the world coherently. The tremendous change of perspective of time that this involves deserves close attention. (Heidegger will adopt this “a-spect” [Bild] ostensibly to re-interpret Kant’s epistemology. Rather. not “system”!) against which intra-temporal and intra-mundane events can be com-prehended. Not that he ever pretended that any theoria could “encompass” or en-capsulate” life and the world. Nietzsche needs an “ontological” standpoint from which to be able “to view” and com-prehend the historical or “ontic” status of life and the world as he inter-prets them. of Being-as-Becoming. Mass. so his Meditations are “extratemporal” in the sense of “un-zeit-gemasse” in that they are not “measurable” (ge-masse. Just as Nietzsche’s critique of morality is “extra-moral” in that it com-prehends the “strategic” ontic status of moral “values”. but in reality to hide the Nietzschean derivation of his phenomenology – only to avow it nearly ten years after the publication of Sein und Zeit and of the Kantbuch with his monumental work on Nietzsche. Hand in hand with the realization of the “eristic” a-spect of all an “extra-moral” and in a “trans-valuational” sense. measure) by the conventional understanding or “metre” or “unit” of “time”. The Untimely Meditations deal not just or merely with the “confutation” or rejection of the enlightened optimism implicit in Hegel’s rationalist trans-figuration of Kant’s “formal logic” (where A equals A.a passage more akin to poetry than to prose . For a detailed discussion of the distinction of intra- .Nietzsche to the rank and file of superficial philosophers (which philosophy is not “untimely”?). “connectedly”. an “a-spect”. He was far too brilliant and coherent a thinker – despite the apparent disjointedness of his aphoristic style – “to think disconnectedly”. a new way of understanding “time”. of how it is “possible” to understand values – not just “moral”. The Meditations go much. Such is the disproportionate importance of this fragment of the Meditations for understanding Nietzsche’s philosophy . to leave theory and practice to their separate destinies. Nietzsche tackles the problem of how it is possible for us to be “conscious” of the “value-lessness” of life and the world. intra-temporal and intramundane interpretation. end up as tautology) into his “concrete dialectical logic” of the Aufhebung (supersession). The Meditations are “un-zeit-gemasse” because they “stand outside” our conventional notion of time: they are “extra-temporal” and “extra-mundane” because they are the Entwurf (pro-ject. “verse by verse”. but Nietzsche needed an ontological foundation upon which to justify coherently their “ontic”. and therefore the two sides of the equation “annihilate” each other. the meditations are “un-timely” in a much more meta-physical sense – because they point to a revolutionary new intuition of time. Nietzsche seeks to e-nucleate it in what is doubtless one of the most beautifully enthralling passages in the entire Nietzschean oeuvre. much further than that! They completely revolutionise and invert our understanding of time itself! Only such an “inversion” (similar to the Verkehrung [reversal] performed by Schopenhauer on Kant’s metaphysics) can allow us to reach a “viewpoint”. which we have described already.that we propose to parse it carefully.

as the Nietzschean word is too often wrongly translated) – the mental state of the Ubermensch. Man cannot see them without regret. at the mercy of the moment.with the world. feeling neither melancholy nor satiety. an “em-bodi-ment” into life and the world such that “time” is intuited as the hic et nunc – the “now” that is separate from the moment that has just elapsed and the moment that is just to come. Such a perception or perspective of time involves a “mimesis” (Italian “im-medesimare” – to be at one. I. De Inventione. yet it is all in vain. answerability) and “conscience” (Gewissen. together with the parallel rise of “responsibility” (Verantwortlichkeit. The dawn of “consciousness” in humans and of “the memory of the will”. the forced abandonment of “forgetfulness” implies the loss for humans of the ability “to id-entify”. the ability to dis-cover a concealed . 2). from day to day.temporal and intra-mundane as against extra-temporal and extra-mundane see our study on ‘Heidegger’s Kantbuch’. the “a-historical sense” of the Greeks made “action” possible and a-voided paralysis or the vis inertiae by making human action “spontaneous”. being) – a history resembling the a-methodon hyle (form-less matter) of Greek historiography. the loss of “happiness” (Gluck) that the development of memory occasions in the human psyche. innocuity rather than ‘innocence’. there is a loss of “innocence” (Unschuldigkeit) that this loss brings about. resolve) and their “negative” correlates. Astounding is the similarity found here between Nietzsche’s opening lines to the “Historie fur das Leben” in the Meditations (“Betrachte die Heerde. In essence.) The reason why it is even “possible” for us to conceive that there are no “values” in history is that we have the ability to con-ceive of a “viewpoint” from which we can per-ceive history as “that which is” (Greek. as it were [Latin ens. as he will do in all his future writings. He may ask the beast — "Why do you look at me and not speak to me of your happiness?" The beast wants to answer — "Because I always forget what I wished to say": but he forgets this answer too. to on. being] . Nietzsche decries. fault or flaw. “guilt” and “bad conscience”. taken up with their little loves and hates. Yet this is not to be read in the sense of a “deterioration” of the type a perfectione ad defectum that often surfaces in ancient historiography. to identify with. Contrarily to Cicero. die an dir voruberweidet. was meant to recuperate this bucolic state of Unschuldigkeit (the absence of blame. to be as one. the Eternal Return. unencumbered and unalloyed by the burden of memory or the “distance” that consciousness and reflection inevitably introduce between thought and action (whence. was Heute ist…”) and Cicero’s depiction (one of the rarest in Antiquity) of the “progress” of humanity from the time when “in agris homines bestiarum more vagabantur” (“men roamed in the fields like beasts”. He wishes simply to live without satiety or pain. Above all. What Nietzsche calls “the historical sense [Geist]” is not the ability to draw “lessons” from history. for he will not change places with it. from morning to night. to be “at one” “the same entity”. they graze and ruminate. like the beast. un-reflective. to em-body). opposed to what Nietzsche believed was the Christian “linear” concept of time. for even in the pride of his humanity he looks enviously on the beast's happiness. sie weiss nicht was Gestern. and is silent. Just like our primordial “forgetfulness”. “the Pathos of distance”). Consider the herds that are feeding yonder : they know not the meaning of yesterday or to-day. and the man is left to wonder. move or rest.

the “boundary” that con-tains all being. into another error of opposite sign: . returns like a spectre to trouble the quiet of a later moment. either an accidental “agreement” or “harmony” (homo-noia) or a divine design or a telos (pro-noia). that attributes its “development” [Entwicklung] to a conscious human “intention” or “pro-ject” (dia-noia). the log-book of res gestae. the Ver-geistigung – which “interiorisation” or “spiritualization” con-cludes ultimately in the Ent-seelung of “consciousness” and “memory”. that he cannot learn to forget. this diseased notion of “freedom of the will”. like the herd. that is here and gone. this faith in “the subject” which is itself “a sign.the reading back into history (understood as the journal of events. He wonders also about himself. sink into night and mist." and envies the beast that forgets at once. we cannot un-learn memory. extinguished for ever. But we still re-tain the “in-tuition” of time – “the moment. . . of a fall from grace. . the finest line of being.“purpose” in it. this memory. the “now” in which “everything [not “every thing”] happens” – the e-vent or happening (Geschehe). It is THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY. in this “intuition”. of a “slavish destiny”. a symbol”. that was no-thing before and no-thing after”. We cannot learn to forget. then “bad conscience” (schlechte Gewissen) and the ascetic ideal – into Nihilism. of “happenings” or Geschehen) of a “sense” or “purpose”. that is here and gone. that chain runs with him. and sees every moment really die. To do this would be to fall from one error . the burying or “sinking” of our be-ing “into night and mist. but hangs on the past: however far or fast he run. Nietzsche is warning against the “voluntarism” that such “sentimental illusions” infuse. is encapsulated the “mimesis” of life and the world. In each moment. that was nothing before and nothing after.the reductionist hypostasis of “utility” operated by the empiricist “English psychologists” -. [where it is] extinguished for ever”. This “conscious-ness” of the passing of time. meta-morphosis) is the “onto-geny of thought” that mani-fests the Will to Power as “the rationalization of the world”. this parallel Entwicklung ( would be to fall into the trap of “Historicismus”. a Disgregation of the “instinct of freedom” – which “instinct” is “tra-duced” and “mortified” (“le mort saisit le vif” seems the theme of the “debt” that communities “owe” to their “ancestors” [see below]) and “weakened” or rendered “power-less” (ohnmachtig) by the “interiorisation” (Verinnerlichung) operated by communal living and the erection of a “State”. of a “Providence” [pro-noia] or “meaning”. matter for wonder : the moment. that situ-ates and loc-ates (Ort [locus]. We discussed already the idea of “decadence” in Nietzsche as a “corruption”. . But again. The memory of the will inhibits forgetfulness and saddles man with the burden of the past even as he would wish to live in the moment. Then he says. Far from pining for a lost paradise. not Raum [space]) our intuition of time also pre-vents our mimesis with nature. A leaf is continually dropping out of the volume of time and fluttering away—and suddenly it flutters back into the man's lap. But this be-ing thus de-fined is a dimension . "I remember . the co-incidence of being and time – time as the “horizon”. Time therefore is not the succession of moments as if they were things: time is “the” moment. a tarnished “innocence”. to a “merit” or “virtue” to which can be opposed an accidental “fortune” as in classical historiography. indeed a “symptom of decadence”.

no meaning in a teleological sense and no direction (Richtung). (Again. can re-cur because there is no “sense”. metabolism over stasis. instead (and in this he entirely anticipates Heidegger’s phenomenology) both time and space dif-fer “categorically” (toto caelo. as active “dynamis” (Greek for “to be able”. As a “meta-physical” entity. “like a number that leaves no curious remainder” . we refer to our study ‘Umkehrung: Schopenhauer’s Reversal of Kant’s Metaphysics’. And it is this “linearity” that allows the “spatial” and “cumulative” intuition of time as “duration”. Latin aevum. is all here: it is what allows him to interpret human history and institutions not “sub specie aeternitatis” but certainly in a “physical” or “physiological” sense. . as quid-ditas. borrowing a Schopenhauerian phrase) from their “scientific” or “physical” re-presentations (Vorstellungen). Schopenhauer and Bergson and even Heidegger. to this being. growth over stagnation and paralysis. for instance. Nietzsche eschews and refutes this “spatial” interpretation of time through which Newtonian science “measures” it in “units”. Schopenhauer’s Will is “the thing in itself” and lies wholly “out-side” the boundary or horizon of the physical world. era) that Nietzsche confronts. Yet it is precisely this “inter-val” that cannot be measured! The “distance” be-tween two “in-stants” in time is impossible to measure because time itself is “im-measurable”. every event and happening. a qualitas occulta. of “nows” – and therefore in this “instantaneous be-ing”. despite their distinction between physical time and the “intuition” of time (or “duree” for Bergson).that cannot be mistaken for a “sequence” or a “succession” of moments. which are “ontic” and sub-ordinate to a con-ception of life and the world that wholly e-lides the notion of be-ing as “coming-into-be-ing”. For “normal science”. it is in a “dimension” or locus (Ort) wholly distinct and dif-ferent from any notion of “measure” or indeed even “duration”. time still ec-sists in a Newtonian and Kantian “physical” or “spatial” dimension so that “the Body”.) For these three.where the Greek physis prevails over nomos. of space and time as perceived by human intuition! (The same is valid for Bergson [Evolution Creatrice] who takes up entirely Schopenhauer’s approach and ignores Nietzsche’s contemporary critique. as chronos rather than aion (Greek for aeon. Being-as-Becoming (Wesen als Werden) over Nothingness. of the amor fati. spontaneity over reflection. as “the objectification of the Will” and its “operari” are sub-jected to physical time like everything else in the “physical world” that is “re-presented” (recall Kant’s phenomena [appearances] and Schopenhauer’s Vorstellungen [representations]) to the Will.) But for Nietzsche. In this re-spect. into an Aristotelian Demi-urgos or a “thing in itself”. action over contemplation. in this ec-sistence everything. It is Christianity that for Nietzsche uses the Parousia (the coming of Christ) to give a linear “sense” and “direction” to historical time – as in Augustine’s denunciation of the revolutio saeculorum [the pagan notion of eternity and the one of the Eternal Return dating from Antiquity] in Book XII of De Civitate Dei. two seconds equal two identical “inter-vals” of time called “seconds”. Nietzsche’s vision of being and time differs significantly and dramatically from the related visions of Kant. as “be-coming”. he would say. in this Da-sein (being there). as “supreme being” or as a “chain of causality” ending in a causa causans. no uni-verse to this “time”. Nietzsche’s conception of the Eternal Return. power) rather than as a “static” essence.

active and reactive.7]. as in the Exordium of “Use and Abuse of History” in ‘UB’: the moment. he travels with a dark invisible burden that he can plausibly disown. their dif-ference must not be perceived as a “space” (Raum) even though Nietzsche refers meta-phorically to “a happy blindness between the walls of the past and the future”. Nietzsche. be-tween memory (a-letheia) and forgetfulness (lethe) that fixes the “horizon” of Being. and is only too glad to disown in converse with his fellows—in order to excite their envy. though Heidegger warns against just such error [v. a thing that lives by denying and destroying and contradicting itself”. But man is always resisting the great and continually increasing weight of the past. “material”. or the “innocence of the children”. it conceals nothing. like the Wanderer between the city walls and the desert wilderness. that is here and gone. the horizon of ec-sistence (Da-sein) that reveals the be-ing of beings. ch. that is. at every moment it seems what it actually is.through the affirmation of the Eternal Return. Be-tween “the first thing” (Genesis. Her-kunft and An-kunft. it presses him down. a locus. the hic et nunc. “historical” carriers (Trager)! (Such is the absurdity into which the “humanistic” and “biopolitical” interpreters of Nietzsche’s Entwurf. from Fink to Deleuze. Yet there is no “distance” be-tween these two “places”. All Too Human’) is the time and place that the Will to Power in-habits in life and the world. For the now is rather a breadthless line. and the Eternal Return. and thus can be nothing that is not honest. ignominiously fall [!]. between the now-past and the now-future. like a number. If one considers Nietzsche’s point that. it can be only a matter of correctly interpreting and then utilizing the signs and symptoms of health and. above all. without leaving any curious remainder. “ The now. even as we are be-aware of the “need-necessity” of what ec-sists! Outside of or in the absence of such knowledge. Here it is the “intuition of time”. his angry tirade against David Strauss [par7 of homonymous Meditation] on this very topic and his rejection of Schopenhauer’s Mit-leid and con-scientia!). for instance. the nunc stans. Knowledge can only be “critical”. that was nothing before and nothing after. that certainly does not mean that a “communion of wills” is possible (cf. of disease. a dimension (Ort). a “horizon”. It cannot dissimulate. independently of their “physiological”. I. death) (the heading of the first section of ‘Human. Nor does it mean that these moralities can be dis-embodied and exist as “forces”.Nietzsche reaches his most lyrical heights as he surveys with nostalgic languor the intransitable mimesis of philosophy and nature: The beast lives unhistorically. and bows his shoulders . for it "goes into" the present. is not a “point” – it is an entirely “dif-ferent” dimension from “the sequence of now-moments” (Heidegger in Kantbuch) – not a space (Raum) but a place (Ort). birth) and “the last thing” (Eschaton. the moment”.) It means rather that no “progress” and therefore no “liberation” is possible in human history from the manifestation of the Will to Power because our “perspective” is necessarily “extratemporal” and therefore “life” can be “com-prehended” only and absolutely from the individual intuition of time – through time as the horizon of being . . all being is “authentic” because it is the “state-of-being” intra-temporally – being-in-the-now. There is no “authenticity” for Nietzsche. the master and slave moralities can “co-exist” in a society and even in the same individual (!). or better “merely a continual ‘has been’.

dor. heart. jenes Losungswort. Augustine in De Civitate Dei. a place) that belongs to memory. History is a locus or a topos (Ort. therefore. learning by heart. will conceive of God’s perception of time from the outside. or. it abolishes life and being together. like other animals. Bk. The child “plays in a happy blindness between the walls of the past and the future”.XIII] much like the way one recites a poem “recorded”. das Kind zu sehen.because in fables “time” is just as much “past” as it is “future” – that is the meaning of “enchantment”.) That is precisely the reason why children understand far better than adults the meaning of “once upon a time”:. and certainly no causal sequence or chain con-necting them. literally. and that therefore can be “re-called” at will in each word or in its entirety. The pre-sent is so fleeting. das noch nichts Vergangenes zu verläugnen hat und zwischen den Zäunen der Vergangenheit und der Zukunft in überseliger Blindheit spielt. so unterschlägt er doch zugleich dabei die Gegenwart und das Dasein und drückt damit das Siegel auf jene Erkenntniss. re. history would not be possible. from cor. life and action would not be possible. an imperfect tense that never becomes a present”.“has nothing yet of the past to disown”. (Similarly. And when death brings at last the desired forgetTHOUGHTS OUT OF SEASON. and plays in a happy blindness between the walls of the past and the future. There is no “space” (Raum) between historical events. was sein Dasein im Grunde ist — ein nie zu vollendendes Imperfectum. [“ante omnia tempora tu est”. ihn zu erinnern. The child is “nearer still” to time because. Deshalb ergreift es ihn. suffering and weariness on mankind. Children understand best the notion of history as an “Eternal Return” because they have no mnemonic historical record (Latin. re-membering) that can in-duce them to con-fuse the past with a causal chain and sequence of events. als ob er eines verlorenen Paradieses gedächte. to see a herd grazing. like the herd. learnt by heart. extra-temporally. mit dem Kampf.And so it hurts him. and only too soon will it be summoned from its little kingdom of oblivion. And yet its play must be disturbed. dass Dasein nur ein ununterbrochenes Gewesensein ist. in vertrauterer Nähe. and reminds them what their existence really is. it is “nearer still” to their mimetic status with life and the world in that the child has very few memories and does not need “to unlearn remembering” . These “walls” are very narrow indeed because “being is merely a continual ‘has been’” because our “existence really is. a child." a thing that lives by denying and destroying and contradicting itself. Without forgetfulness. A million times wrong. nearer still. it will learn to remember – and yet. without the memory of the will. an imperfect tense that never becomes a present. ein Ding. Dann lernt es das Wort „es war“ zu verstehen. like the thought of a lost Paradise. Bringt endlich der Tod das ersehnte Vergessen. and sets the seal on the knowledge that "being" is merely a continual "has been." the "open sesame" that lets in battle.cor. sich selbst zu widersprechen. The real “place” of . die weidende Heerde oder. that has nothing yet of the past to disown. das davon lebt. the instant now so transitory that it cannot be described as “being” but only as “has been”. Und doch muss ihm sein Spiel gestört werden: nur zu zeitig wird es aus der Vergessenheit heraufgerufen. Then it learns to understand the words "once upon a time. like the adult. is the expression “Time is a device to stop everything from happening at once” – because “everything” in time does happen at once! Everything happens now! What stops everything from happening at once are memory and forgetfulness. Leiden und Ueberdruss an den Menschen herankommen. fulness. sich selbst zu verneinen und zu verzehren.

a methodical search. like that of the perfect cynic. carry). are all those “values”. desire. False. feelings – see Heidegger’s discussion in Nietzsche. But in the smallest and greatest happiness there is always one thing that makes it happiness: the power of forgetting. in-quest) of struggle. and privation. and least of all Dilthey’s social-scientific research) to which a “finality” (Ziel) or “sense” (Sinn) or “direction” (Richtung) may be attributed (pro-noia. the capacity of feeling "unhistorically" throughout its duration. without fear or giddiness. is the visible proof of the truth of cynicism. a wild freak. synchronic and diachronic at once. For Nietzsche. a mad interval between ennui.1. and. pro-videntia). Vol. gestum. because the very “contingency” and trans-ience (passing through) of life and the world negates and nullifies them. in more learned phrase. but a istoria (an in-quiry. for his interpretation of “Wille zur Macht”) back to the “physio-logical” instincts whose real origins [Entstehung. if it be only continuous and make one happy. sign) a remedy. a virus is in the historical record but can lie “dormant” and be “inactive”. history is a dia-gnosis. virtue and happiness. in the same way as a disease. or. historia rerum gestarum) run parallel but discrete lines of “development or evolution” (Entwicklung) – not a progressus. From the dia-gnosis of disease. worse still. an examination (Italian dis-anima. sprouting] are as . Better still. all those “eudaemonian” delusions that equate truth. an in-quest into a com-pleted happening or action (Latin. it is possible to locate and identify the disease itself. out-souling) of a “body of e-vidence” that allows us “to recognize” (see our later discussion of the relationship between “becoming” and science as “recognition”. emotions. The historical record cannot be “re-searched” with “scientific tools” – it is not an empeiria. but rather an autopsia. an agreement. no philosophy has perhaps more truth than the cynic's : for the beast's happiness. Once more Nietzsche reminds us of his peculiar notion of “history”. will never do anything to make others happy. And when this “play is disturbed… the little kingdom of oblivion” comes to an end. not to discover its “causes” (aetiology) but rather to venture a “pro-gnosis”. which is not a sequence of conscious and “purposeful” human activity (Vico’s ‘verum ipsum factum’. like a goddess of victory. suffering). a prognostication as to its future course or even to indicate (anzeichen.time is now. If happiness and the chase for new happiness keep alive in any sense the will to live. the moment be-tween the walls of past and present occupied by the oblivious play of children. or in which a “con-ciliation”. The two “histories” (the double meaning of the Greek word istorein as “account” or res gestae and as “narrative”. this “ideal equation” or con-comitance of the three cannot be found in this life and world – because the three simply do not co-incide therein. is incomparably a greater happiness than the more intense pleasure that comes as an episode. then. and therefore “out of time” for very long periods. The smallest pleasure. a cure against its “symptoms”. This “summum bonum”. who cannot stand on a single point. not in an “aetio-logical” sense (as a tracing of a “causal chain” of e-vents). “history” is the process of tracing out the “deep origins” or “derivation” or “provenance” [Herkunft] of human “affects” (Affekte. but rather as a “patho-logy” (pathos. from Greek bastaso. a “harmony” (homo-noia) can be found or reached. the “decadence” of the body. “familiarity”) a human condition or disease. 'One who cannot leave himself behind on the threshold of the moment and forget the past. will never know what happiness is.

but rather an “archaeology of origins”. “stirpe” [cf. Nietzsche aims at a “physio-logy”. There is a certain hypostatization of “instincts” here. Indeed. palingenesis) or in a historical sense (the recurrence of cycles or ana-kyklosis). whose “manifestations” or “happenings” [Geschehen] are “embedded” in and “ex-hibited” by the present conduct and behaviour of human beings. Schopenhauer had made the error of “thinking historically”. the entire aim of Nietzsche’s work was to fulfil this task whereby “theory” and “practice” co-incide in a “history” (Geschichte) that is a “fate and destiny” (Geschick) and yet is simultaneously “decipherable” or interpretable from its “signs” or “indications” (Zeichen and Anzeichen) – its Semeiotik . ex-stirpate. cf. a Schematismus (Entwurf) or “classi-fication”. he . All this is what makes “the Eternal Return” and the Amor Fati both possible and com-prehensible – not in a cosmic sense (the repetition of the exact-same events. of transforming the Will to Life into “a sleepless man” who is incapable of happiness because he cannot for-get. fons et origo). “un-historical” as “life” itself. Just like the Etruscan haruspices who could divine the future from inspecting the entrails of animals. and Entstehung (prefixed to Geschichte) with historical and physical genesis. in short. an “anthropology” (in ‘WM’ he will compare it to “astrology”. remembering the “origin” (Her-kunft) of the word from “gaya” (earth) to “genesis” (birth) to the ancient dynastic and aristocratic “ghens” or “gens” (English “roots”. morality and institutions. The Entstehung/Herkunft distinction is reprised in Schumpeter’s Statik/Dynamik dichotomy in economic theory – the first tracing the “physiology” or “morphology” and the second the “evolution” [Entwicklung] of the economy. a taxonomy (Herkunft. His is above all a “Genealogie” – a “genetic research” into morals. Nietzsche associates Herkunft with “derivation” or provenance. Husserl’s lamenting Heidegger’s deviation from phenomenology to “philosophical anthropology”). but in an extratemporal sense. Latin. a “physis”. of a “nature”. Not a “history” in the scientific sense then – a de-finite subject-matter made up of “facts” (pragmata) that can be “researched” using specific “tools and methods”. up-root] is also faithful to these “genealogical roots”). What Nietzsche means by “history” therefore is the “un-earthing” of these “fossilized” elemental forces. Again. This perspective on history and historical perspective allows Nietzsche to combine “critically” (like Hegel and Marx or Schumpeter) the philosophy of history with the history of philosophy – histoire raisonnee with raisonnement historique. There is also a devastating if implicit critique of Schopenhauer’s Entsagung (ascetic renunciation). because in his denial of life and exclusive concentration on the “aim” of life.and “symptomatology” (Symptomatologie). the nexus with Cicero and his treatise De Divinatione with its examination of signs and auguries. the Italian word for ancestry. of Chaldeian astrologers and Etruscan haruspices is hard to overlook. pro-venance) of its historical origins (Ent-stehung or “coming out” in the sense of “sprout” or “physical source ”. But Nietzsche is aiming “to hammer down” those “idols” he denounced – a task he announced early in the ‘HL’ essay of the “UB” when he sought to expose Cartesian transcendence and replace it with “immanence” (“cogito ergo sum” he turned into “vivo ergo cogito”). down to their Nietzsche’s Entwurf.inscrutable and in-com-prehensible (un-graspable).

from day to day. "I remember . usually if inaccurately translated as “conscience”) and finally degenerate into “bad resolve” (schlechte Gewissen). Happiness is accessible only to those who can forget. . that is here and gone. who therefore can “select” from experience and knowledge only those “bits” that are needed so that “action”. may be possible! Schopenhauer’s Nirvana is in-action. he will hardly dare to raise his finger. who is condemned to see "becoming" everywhere. change) leads invariably to stasis (paralysis. that is. yet it is all in vain. matter for wonder : the moment. We shall turn next to Nietzsche’s “ontogeny of thought”." that injures and finally destroys the living thing. sink into night and mist. and sees every moment really die. he sees everything fly past in an eternal succession. and “responsible action” especially. . be it a man or a people or a system of culture. like the logical disciple of Heraclitus. of "historical sense. from morning to night. It is THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY. He wonders also about himself. stagnation. that he cannot learn to forget. and loses himself in the stream of becoming.bears the entire burden of life and the world – the “sym-pathy”. there is a degree of sleeplessness. . as the beast shows: but life in any true sense is absolutely impossible without forgetfulness. they graze and ruminate.' One who wished to feel everything historically. at the mercy of the moment. 'Forgetfulness is a property of all action. but hangs on the past: however far or fast he run. the “guilt” of living. At last. Then he says. would be like a man forcing himself to refrain from sleep. “the past to disown”. just as not only light but darkness is bound up THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY. Or. and the man is left to wonder. that chain runs with him. it is satis-faction. does not admit of any “historical sense” or “action” or change. Man cannot see them without regret. extinguished for ever. it is in-ertia. or a beast who had to live by chewing a continual cud. taken up with their little loves and hates. to put my conclusion better. to his account and analysis of how consciousness can arise from the instincts and develop into memory. not in the beatific sense but as a ful-filment that paralyses all “activity” because it is “like a dyspeptic man who cannot forget and therefore assimilate experience”. Such a man believes no more in himself or his own existence. whilst allowing for a “cynical” happiness. . the “con-scientia”. The extreme case would be the man without any power to forget. like the beast . returns like a spectre to trouble the quiet of a later moment. feeling neither melancholy nor satiety. A leaf is continually dropping out of the volume of time and fluttering away—and suddenly it flutters back into the man's lap. He may ask the beast — "Why do you look at me and not speak to me of your happiness?" The beast wants to answer — "Because I always forget what I wished to say": but he forgets this answer too. of rumination." and envies the beast that forgets at once. P with the life of every organism. then into “resolve” (Gewissen. Consider the herds that are feeding yonder : they know not the meaning of yesterday or to-day. that was nothing before and nothing after. for even in the pride of his humanity he looks enviously on the beast's happiness. for he will not change places with it. Thus even a happy life is possible without remembrance. the lack of metabole (assimilation. then thinking. move or rest. and is silent. civil war) – to No-thingness. Or else Nirvana is complete forgetfulness that. He wishes simply to live without satiety or pain. And as Hellenic historiography reminds us.

kurz angebunden mit ihrer Lust und Unlust. a wild freak. suffering and weariness on mankind. at every moment it seems what it actually is. Der Mensch fragt wohl einmal das Thier: warum redest du mir nicht von deinem Glücke und siehst mich nur an? Das Their will auch antworten und sagen. The extreme case would be the man without any power to forget. will never know what happiness is. 1. and. Thus even a happy life is possible without remembrance. just as not only light but darkness is bound up THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY. it conceals nothing. It cannot dissimulate. and is only too glad to disown in converse with his fellows—in order to excite their envy. would be like a man forcing himself to refrain from sleep. there is a degree of sleeplessness. P with the life of every organism. for it "goes into" the present. und will es doch vergebens. a mad interval between ennui. he will hardly dare to raise his finger. a child. Er wundert sich aber auch über sich selbst. und so vom Morgen bis zur Nacht und von Tage zu Tage. it abolishes life and being together. worse still. springt umher. like a goddess of victory. or." a thing that lives by denying and destroying and contradicting itself. nämlich an den Pflock des Augenblickes und deshalb weder schwermüthig noch überdrüssig. And when death brings at last the desired forgetTHOUGHTS OUT OF SEASON. and plays in a happy blindness between the walls of the past and the future. Or. 'Forgetfulness is a property of all action. as the beast shows: but life in any true sense is absolutely impossible without forgetfulness." that injures and finally destroys the living thing. of "historical sense. das Vergessen nicht lernen zu können und immerfort am Vergangenen zu hängen: mag er noch so weit. like the logical disciple of Heraclitus.' One who wished to feel everything historically. Dies zu sehen geht dem Menschen hart ein. weil er seines Menschenthums sich vor dem Thiere brüstet und doch nach seinem Glücke eifersüchtig hinblickt — denn das will er allein. without fear or giddiness. and privation. But man is always resisting the great and continually increasing weight of the past.The beast lives unhistorically. or a beast who had to live by chewing a continual cud. noch so schnell laufen. and bows his shoulders . Such a man believes no more in himself or his own existence. is the visible proof of the truth of cynicism. gleich dem Thiere weder überdrüssig noch unter Schmerzen leben. of rumination. who is condemned to see "becoming" everywhere. it presses him down. The smallest pleasure. without leaving any curious remainder. that has nothing yet of the past to disown. die an dir vorüberweidet: sie weiss nicht was Gestern. Then it learns to understand the words "once upon a time." the "open sesame" that lets in battle. and reminds them what their existence really is. like the thought of a lost Paradise. verdaut. to see a herd grazing. die Kette läuft mit. and thus can be nothing that is not honest. was ich sagen wollte — da vergass es aber auch schon diese Antwort und schwieg: so dass der Mensch sich darob verwunderte. if it be only continuous and make one happy. And so it hurts him. or. fulness. like a number. he sees everything fly past in an eternal succession. was Heute ist. das kommt daher dass ich immer gleich vergesse. in more learned phrase. and sets the seal on the knowledge that "being" is merely a continual "has been. an imperfect tense that never becomes a present. he travels with a dark invisible burden that he can plausibly disown. If happiness and the chase for new happiness keep alive in any sense the will to live. like that of the perfect cynic. desire. And yet its play must be disturbed. is incomparably a greater happiness than the more intense pleasure that comes as an episode. the capacity of feeling " unhistorically " throughout its duration. no philosophy has perhaps more truth than the cynic's : for the beast's happiness. frisst. But in the smallest and greatest happiness there is always one thing that makes it happiness: the power of forgetting. Betrachte die Heerde. weil er es nicht will wie das Thier. to put my conclusion better. 'One who cannot leave himself behind on the threshold of the moment and forget the past. will never do anything to make others happy. and only too soon will it be summoned from its little kingdom of oblivion. Es ist ein Wunder: . springt wieder. At last. who cannot stand on a single point. and loses himself in the stream of becoming. be it a man or a people or a system of culture. nearer still. ruht.

sieht alles in bewegte Punkte auseinander fliessen und verliert sich in diesem Strome des Werdens: er wird wie der rechte Schüler Heraklits zuletzt kaum mehr wagen den Finger zu heben. der die Kraft zu vergessen gar nicht besässe. der wird nie wissen. Leiden und Ueberdruss an den Menschen herankommen. das nur vom Wiederkäuen und immer wiederholten Wiederkäuen leben sollte. während seiner Dauer unhistorisch zu empfinden. wer nicht auf einem Punkte wie eine Siegesgöttin ohne Schwindel und Furcht zu stehen vermag. wie eine Zahl. sondern auch Dunkel gehört. gleichsam als Laune. als des vollendeten Cynikers. was den Lebenden im Leben festhält und zum Leben fortdrängt. so unterschlägt er doch zugleich dabei die Gegenwart und das Dasein und drückt damit das Siegel auf jene Erkenntniss. Dann sagt der Mensch „ich erinnere mich“ und beneidet das Thier. welches sofort vergisst und jeden Augenblick wirklich sterben. der sich des Schlafens zu enthalten gezwungen würde. der verurtheilt wäre. um mich noch einfacher über mein Thema zu erklären: es giebt einen Grad von Schlaflosigkeit. alle Vergangenheiten vergessend. Also: es ist möglich. bei dem das Lebendige zu Schaden kommt. die weidende Heerde oder. wäre dem ähnlich. ohne Vergessen überhaupt zu leben. Wenn ein Glück. niederlassen kann. sich selbst zu widersprechen. das davon lebt. was Andere glücklich macht. von Wiederkäuen. das Vermögen.der Augenblick. Wer sich nicht auf der Schwelle des Augenblicks. flattert fort — und flattert plötzlich wieder zurück. das noch nichts Vergangenes zu verläugnen hat und zwischen den Zäunen der Vergangenheit und der Zukunft in überseliger Blindheit spielt. es weiss sich nicht zu verstellen. fast ohne Erinnerung zu leben. oder dem Thiere. dass Dasein nur ein ununterbrochenes Gewesensein ist. zwischen lauter Unlust. ohne dass ein wunderlicher Bruch übrig bleibt. Oder. diese beschwert seinen Gang als eine unsichtbare und dunkle Bürde. von historischem Sinne. sich selbst zu verneinen und zu verzehren. sei es nun ein Mensch oder ein Volk oder eine Cultur. wenn es nur ununterbrochen da ist und glücklich macht. wodurch Glück zum Glücke wird: das Vergessen-können oder. was Glück ist und noch schlimmer: er wird nie etwas thun. verbirgt nichts und erscheint in jedem Momente ganz und gar als das was es ist. vorher ein Nichts. fällt heraus. What both these “antiqui auctores” (Machiavelli’s own expression) do is present or “report” on actual events (reality) without seeking to find a “reason” or a “meaning” or a “telos” behind the events: they “inform” us as . kann also gar nicht anders sein als ehrlich. Denkt euch das äusserste Beispiel. als ob er eines verlorenen Paradieses gedächte. glaubt nicht mehr an sich. Historiographical Excursus We know that Nietzsche placed Thucydides and Machiavelli foremost among “what I owe to the ancients”. nachher ein Nichts. So lebt das Thier unhistorisch: denn es geht auf in der Gegenwart. in Nebel und Nacht zurücksinken und auf immer erlöschen sieht. Bringt endlich der Tod das ersehnte Vergessen. Fortwährend löst sich ein Blatt aus der Rolle der Zeit. einen Menschen. Ein Mensch. kommt doch noch als Gespenst wieder und stört die Ruhe eines späteren Augenblicks. das nur als Episode. Dann lernt es das Wort „es war“ zu verstehen. wie das Thier zeigt. so hat vielleicht kein Philosoph mehr Recht als der Cyniker: denn das Glück des Thieres. ja glücklich zu leben. ihn zu erinnern. Das kleinste Glück. Begierde und Entbehren kommt. ein Ding. ist ohne Vergleich mehr Glück als das grösste. Bei dem kleinsten aber und bei dem grössten Glücke ist es immer Eines. Zu allem Handeln gehört Vergessen: wie zum Leben alles Organischen nicht nur Licht. jenes Losungswort. im Husch vorüber. im Husch da. und welche er im Umgange mit seines Gleichen gar zu gern verläugnet: um ihren Neid zu wecken. welche er zum Scheine einmal verläugnen kann. gelehrter ausgedrückt. es ist aber ganz und gar unmöglich. in vertrauterer Nähe. Und doch muss ihm sein Spiel gestört werden: nur zu zeitig wird es aus der Vergessenheit heraufgerufen. was sein Dasein im Grunde ist — ein nie zu vollendendes Imperfectum. als toller Einfall. überall ein Werden zu sehen: ein Solcher glaubt nicht mehr an sein eigenes Sein. der durch und durch nur historisch empfinden wollte. das Kind zu sehen. mit dem Kampf. dem Menschen in den Schooss. Der Mensch hingegen stemmt sich gegen die grosse und immer grössere Last des Vergangenen: diese drückt ihn nieder oder beugt ihn seitwärts. ist der lebendige Beweis für das Recht des Cynismus. und zuletzt zu Grunde geht. wenn ein Haschen nach neuem Glück in irgend einem Sinne das ist. Deshalb ergreift es ihn.

Historie) so that we “know” (er-kennen. reaches its perfect expression--this inestimable movement amid the moralistic and idealistic swindle set loose on all sides by the Socratic schools. there is no more complete cure than Thucydides. without pre-tending or a-spiring to a “scientific knowledge” (Wissenschaft) or “understanding” (Verstehen) or “interpretation” (exegesis) of these events – without a “moral narrative” or “in-struction”. for its idealism. Greek philosophy: the decadence of the Greek instinct. just as “consciousness” is the false “reconciliation” of conflicting “impulses” or “instincts” (Triebe). One must follow him line by line and read no less clearly between the lines: there are few thinkers who say so much between the lines. my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides. For. From such a standpoint. “are acquainted with”) the occurrences. The greatness of Thucydides for Nietzsche lay in this. the last revelation of that strong. for its “astute theology” (cf the second ‘Untimely Meditation’ – a critique and themes reprised in Weber’s ‘Knies und Roscher’). (ToI) It is of the utmost importance to realize that what Nietzsche opposes is not the “instrumental” approach to society and community: Nietzsche understands that not only is this “instrumentalism” possible. of “events and appearances” and of “becoming” against all “rationalisms” – something that would normally have brought him closer to the Empiricists and even to the Machian Menger and the Austrian School. Nietzsche could chastize the “historical school” of Roscher and Ranke and Niebuhr – Hegel’s history of “reflection” and Dilthey’s “Geisteswissenschaften” – for its post-Hegelian “emanationism”. consequently he flees into the ideal. Thucydides and. moral (good or evil) and ethical (justice) – that the “historicists” and the empiricists and Machians alike seek to ascribe to the “reality” of the istorein. perhaps. hard factuality which was instinctive with the older Hellenes. e-veniences the “nature” or “physis” of the “individuals” involved. it is courage in the face of reality that distinguishes a man like Thucydides from Plato: Plato is a coward before reality. Thucydides: the great sum. history is an amethodon hyle – the “formless matter” of Herodotus and Thucydides – that exemplifies. however eclectic or “hermeneutic”. “physical”.to “what is” (cf. There is no “virtue” (arete’) or even “providence” (Herodotean “pro-noia”) or . Far from being or representing a “value”. Heidegger). 2. severe. consequently he also maintains control of things. so “historicism” is the equally false search for “ideal values” or “knowledge” (Wissen) to be “researched” from these events so as to a-scribe a “meaning” to history (istorein) that is “social” and not “natural”. But what Nietzsche does not admit of is the validity of the “values” – scientific (truth). by which I mean the culture of the realists. What I Owe to the Ancients… My recreation. Machiavelli's Principe are most closely related to myself by the unconditional will not to gull oneself and to see reason in reality--not in "reason. they relate “stories” (istorein. With him the culture of the Sophists. my preference. In the end. to the analysis of “completed” events within their narrow confines (autopsia) and did not pretend to engage in “scientific research” (empeiria) for broader “meanings” or “significance” in a generic “interpretation” of human history. Thucydides has control of himself. which the "classically educated" youth carries into life as a prize for his classroom drill. but it is also valid “as a tool or strategy of power”! This may sound surprising in a philosopher who spared no effort to lampoon British Empiricism in science whilst at the same time constructing his entire philosophical Entwurf on the reality of “happenings”." For the wretched embellishment of the Greeks into an ideal." still less in "morality. that he restricted himself to simple observation.

and perhaps exacerbated. things. Schumpeter completely fails to see the point that Weber was making in adopting the ante litteram Nietzschean conception of Rationalisierung to which he gave the name. still more with the concept with which we comprehend it. yet cognate. The same is true of the postulate that a nation. Schumpeter believes that it is possible to leave “metaphysics” behind and to focus on “both ‘reason’ and ‘facts’”. With some it has become a habit to use the word “rational” in much the same sense as we do “metaphysical”.“spirit” (Geist) in history. but has done so only “imperfectly”. but it has done its work so imperfectly that we must be careful in dealing with the phenomenon itself. “metaphysical”. if not identical. As the reader will see. In true Machian empiricist tradition. by the disjoint prose) with which Schumpeter approaches the question of the “meaning” of history. Nevertheless. another is the “teleological”.” Evident here is the maladroit manner and dis-comfort (not aided. but there is “fate” which is certainly not “Tyche” or “fortuna” (chance!). One is the empiricist rationality of scientific research. Joseph Schumpeter.57) The footnote at “rationalizes” was expanded for the English translation and reads as follows: “This is used in Max Weber’s sense. has made “possible” a scientific “empirical treatment” of “social development (Entwicklung)”. and therefore on the “realm of science”. which Schumpeter adopts from Weber. beyond the realm. “idealist” rationality introduced by Hegel. and most of all with the word by which we designate the concept and whose associations may lead us astray in all manner of directions. but rather nothing more than. is every search for a ‘meaning’ of history. Schumpeter begins Chapter Two of his Theorie with this sweeping and suggestive summation: “The social process which rationalizes our life and thought has led us away from the metaphysical treatment of social development and taught us to see the possibility of an empirical treatment. They are equally different from. The Rationalisierung. as even such a matter-of-fact mind as Roscher assumed…” (p. Hence some warning against misunderstanding may not be out of place. who combined a solid Machian background in the Vienna of Karl Renner with a Nietzschean vision of reality filtered through Max Weber. which implies going beyond the reach of both “reason” and “facts”. How difficult and confusing it may be to separate the three is perfectly illustrated by the most “philosophical” economic theoretician of the neoclassical and Austrian schools. Closely connected with the metaphysical preconception…. or even the whole of mankind must show some kind of uniform unilinear development. the manifestation of the Will to Power as the Rationalisierung of life and the world! Three kinds of “rationalities” are possible. “rational” and “empirical” here mean. not to such a degree that we are able to free ourselves entirely of “metaphysical” concepts – which is why “we must be careful in dealing with the phenomenon [Entwicklung] itself”. therefore. of science. most important for Nietzsche as we shall evince dramatically in Part Two of this work. a civilization. and opposed to. “The social process which rationalizes” is an exquisitely Weberian expression: far from indicating that there is a “rational science” founded on “reason” and “facts” that can epistemologically and uncritically be opposed to a non-scientifc idealistic and “metaphysical rationalism”. and finally we have the Rationalisierung that Nietzsche expounds as the objectification of the Wille zur Macht. Weber is saying what Nietzsche intended by the . that is.

(Cf. the ex-pression and mani-festation of the Wille zur Macht! By contrast.ex-ertion of the Will to Power as an ontological dimension of life and the world that “imposes” the “rationalization” of social processes and development in such a manner that they can be subjected to mathesis. Nietzsche may well have approved of Karl Menger’s attack on “the errors of historicism” for its unwillingness “to theorise” mathematically certain social phenomena. to “scientific control”! What Weber posits as a “practice”. against the Machian “empiricist” approach to “scientific reality and fact and truth” is quite revealing: both Nietzsche and Mach start from the opposition of “experience” and “perception” to any “meta-physical reality” that may lie “beyond” the human perception of life and the world – including. even for Mach. is sufficient to “free” his “rational science” from the pitfalls of “metaphysics”! This contrast between Nietzsche’s approach to the world of experience and perception and appearance as “becoming”. with whose concept of “prophecy” Nietzsche would have disagreed.) Here it will suffice to reiterate that Nietzsche shares wholeheartedly – nay. was certainly not what Nietzsche intended to oppose to his presumed Christian “linearity”. makes it a point of pride of his philosophy dating from Birth of Tragedy . the Newtonian conception of space and time! But. pre-Judaeo-Christian interpretation of historical time. ‘PSC’. economic ones in particular. Vol. . questioning in the process even the Kantian epistemological foundations of logico-mathematics! (We shall pay the closest attention to these matters – which constitute the whole thrust and import of our present work – in Part Two of this study. or even historical-analogical (the repetition of “cycles”. Schumpeter mistakes for an “empirical” and “objective” process that is “rational” and “factual” at once – forgetting thus the very basis of Nietzsche’s critique of Roscher and “historicism”.3. of their “historical truth” or “meaning”! Far from positing a “scientific-rational”. whereas Mach still believes in the epistemological “reality” of Newtonian physics and of the “laws of science” tout court. one that has clear Nietzschean onto-logical (philosophical) and onto-genetic (biological) origins. refs. that is. but certainly against the mediaeval Scholastic “linear” interpretation of Christian millenarism. but rather the “a-historicity” or “realism” of a Thucydides or Machiavelli intent on the study of “completed actions” (autopsia. whether Newtonian or indeed Machian. Nietzsche is attacking the foundations of any “scientific” study of “the social process” or “social development” that does not see it for what it is – Rationalisierung. “rationalization of life and the world”. but most certainly not in pursuit of a . and not even as the “cyclical” and “pagan”. of any “progressus” (as Nietzsche calls it).certainly not (!) because they are founded on “metaphysics” (!). “ob-jective” and “empirical” methodology from which Roscher and the German Historical School have “diverged” with their philo-Hegelian “rationalist teleology”. Mazzarino. anakyklosis) as with Polybius and Vico (“corsi e ricorsi”).) “Cyclicality”. but because they fail to “question critically” the necessarily meta-physical foundations of their “value-systems”. a most crucial distinction. Nietzsche in extreme and radical contrast comes to question the very “scientificity” of this “science” and of this “reality”.the antihistorical notion of “fate” not as “pro-noia” or pro-vidence. dia-gnosis). to Nietzsche. whether in its cosmological version (the exact repetition of events or palingenesis with final apokatastasis) more attributable to Epimenides. Schumpeter believes that the mere abandonment of any “linearity” in the interpretation of history.

for refusing to draw scientific generalizations from history because of their focus on just such individual events! Mazzarino’s perplexity can be overcome if one considers that whilst Nietzsche did not admit of a “linear history” from which a “telos” or a “scientific truth” could be deduced. “organized” economy advanced by the Sozialismus. he would stress the “instrumental” nature of any such “mathesis”: in other words. in ‘Essays in Biography’) – a search joined even by Marx in his “scientistic” mode exist not as “absolutes” or as “explanations”. Mises and Schumpeter. and that of capital (the rise of large cartels and corporations vertically and horizontally integrated) in what has been generally described as “the Second Industrial Revolution” (see Alfred Chandler Jnr’s The Visible Hand). however “heated” their controversy over the “methodology” of the social sciences (the famous “Methodenstreit”) constituted powerful forces in the concerted effort by capitalist bourgeois interests across Europe to counter the emergence of socialist parties and their ideologies in the name of an overall “methodological subjectivism” that displaced the entire focus of Political Economy from “Labour” to “individual Utility” and therefore from the dramatic transformation and concentration of the labour process (Taylorism and Fordism).“scientific empeiria”.362] when confronting Nietzsche’s attack on Roscher for his “historicist” divergence from the Thucydidean focus on individual events and Menger’s equally virulent “anti-historicist” diatribe with this most “pro-Thucydidean” of German historians and his successor. together with the spread of Machism in science that subtended both the Austrian (Menger. as “the rationalization of life and the world”! It is most important to note at this juncture that.that will allow the conceptual fusion by the German ruling elites in the period to World War Two and beyond of the German Historical School’s focus on “individual”. Bohm-Bawerk. must be seen as one co-ordinated and massive intellectual counter-attack by capital against the emergent working class whose political expression will culminate with the overarching intellectual vision of Max Weber. but purely as “descriptions” of a “reality” that changes and is “trans-formed” continuously! This would explain Mazzarino’s “perplexity” [‘PSC’. nevertheless he could have agreed with Menger that “scientific instruments” could be applied in a “practical” or “strategic” sense to the study of a given “historical space” as nothing other than ex-ertions of the Will to Power. In this context. who uses it to describe the latter’s innate “statistical” quest. of the composition of the working class (from the skilled [Gelernt]to the mass worker). p. interventionist specific projects of German industrial domination in Europe. Nietzsche’s own philosophical Entwurf. Vol3. Rather. to a vision of the liberal “free and competitive” market that championed the Planlosigkeit (spontaneous plan-lessness. anarchical freedom) of bourgeois civil society (Ferguson’s and Hegel’s burgerliche Gesellschaft) against the regimentation of the “planned”. see Cacciari’s “Sul Problema dell’Organizzazione” in ‘PNR’. Gustav Schmoller. and of the Austrian School’s elevation of “individual” consumer choices on the other. a factual “research” that could follow “empirical methodological or scientific standards”. he would insist that such “regularities and tendencies” as the neoclassical Menger and Jevons sought (the phrase is Keynes’s. then Hayek) and the Lausanne (Walras and Pareto) Schools. as we argue in our study on the origins of “The Neo-classical Revolution in Economics”. (For an initial outline of these arguments. on one hand. the Austrian and German Schools.) . It is the “abandonment” of all “metaphysical illusions” – the better to conceal the greater illusion of “marginal utility” .

Logic and History.9. he may have agreed on the “instrumental” use of scientific techniques to societies and of economics in particular – what constitutes the Rationalisierung –.) As Mazzarino sharply perceives. is H. just as did Schumpeter.The mathesis. Menger. the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history and thence conclude (what Nietzsche abhorred most) that . which again will be the central theme of Part Two of this study. Later. Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode. But the fact that Nietzsche. which is why he could deride jokingly the philo-Hegelian idealist “emanationism” of “Thukydides-Roscher” (in ch. Menger interprets it as “refusal to be scientific in economic matters” – which Nietzsche would allow! Marx will go even further than Menger by “historicizing” the laws of motion of modes of production in a historical-materialist sense. capably but unconvincingly supported by Cacciari [‘Confronto con Heidegger’ in ‘PNR’]. could attack Roscher’s “historicism” whilst Marx could do the same (although from a “historico-materialist” perspective) by lambasting “ThukydidesRoscher” ought to have warned the philosopher of Rocken about the possible different interpretations of Thucydides. for his part. to repeat. although from a heavily Heideggerian “perspective”. is a politically-charged praxis that Nietzsche brilliantly identified but failed to enucleate sufficiently. the obligatory reference. (We shall have occasion to explain later why Heidegger’s conception of Technik is at once inapplicable and irrelevant to the critique of capitalist social relations despite his most valiant efforts in that direction [in Die Technik und die Kehre and in Brief am Humanismus]. Even the Mengerian assault on Roscher and the German Historical School is evidence of Nietzsche’s mistaken “strictures” on the compass of Thucydides’s historical method. whereas the latter took the “historicist” denial of the “possibility” of economic “science” as “erroneous”. Whilst Nietzsche would agree with Roscher’s “historicism” in exalting historical “uniqueness” (except perhaps for the “analogical cyclicality” of the Eternal Return). Nietzsche’s entire false attribution of “ahistoricity” to the Greeks and of “linearity” to Christian historiography – something that Weber (in ‘Knies und Roscher’) and Schumpeter (quoted above) also thought to glimpse in Roscher’s post-Hegelian “emanationism” and that Lowith later reprised (in The Meaning of History) – finds its real origin in Hegel’s own attempt to reconcile Spirit and Nature. So. which could lend itself to broader “historicist” use in the “reflexive history” tradition (Hegel) of what Dilthey sought to theorise as the hermeneutic “Geisteswissenschaften”. (For a review of the “hermeneutic” current of historical interpretation. no serious attempt has been made to date to “theorize” or “identify” and spell out its nature and import. Despite vague warnings about the dangers of “scientisation” from farsighted critical thinkers such as Gunnar Myrdal (‘The Politics of Economic Theory’) and Hannah Arendt (in ‘The Human Condition’) and Jurgen Habermas (in ‘Theorie und Praxis’).) Thus. starting from a Machian position. Hayek and Schumpeter will assume a position similar to Menger’s. he would also agree with Menger that this “historicism” cannot prevent (except epistemologically) the adoption of certain scientific “techniques” as strategies (ideologies) in the overall Rationalisierung of life and the world. with Marx placing the Greek historian clearly in the “historicist” camp. whereas Nietzsche understands “historicism” as “historical science” and deprecates it. Vol. would argue that these “techniques” are also “scientific”. who championed Thucydides for confining himself to “happenings”.1 of Das Kapital). the “difference” between Nietzsche and Menger is that whilst the former denied the possibility of a “science” of history.

no such notion of historical “linearity” can be found in pre-Hegelian Christian or pagan historiography. in Mazzarino. the importance placed on oratory in the glorification of the polis by Hannah Arendt in Vita Activa. together with Hegel’s idealism. pp. but with the Parousia [the Second Coming of Christ] marking the end of time and the requiem animarum with the entrance of the civitas Dei into the divine Empyrean of crystalline admiration of souls. This we have attributed. I. Even the State is a “balance of forces” or “barter” or “exchange” – subject to corruption and decline and to “stasis” (“paralysis” seen classically as the effect of insurrection or civil war). (For all this. contra Nietzsche. there seems to be no reference by Nietzsche to anything like the “anakyklosis” of Polybius or to Vico’s “corsi e ricorsi” – no mention of palingenesia and apokatastasis. sie weiss nicht was Gestern. So it is always a question of conflicting “needs and instincts”. as we are soon to discuss. Given Nietzsche’s proclivity for the “realism” of Thucydides and the sophists (in the quotation at the start of this excursus). cor-ruptio. die an dir voruberweidet. if anything. p. the concept of “revolution” is virtually absent from Nietzsche’s conception of society and State. another source of Nietzsche’s mistaken notion. Change (metabole) occurs and “decline” or “disease” (malaise. The Ontogeny of Thought – One From Consciousness to Resolve .255ff). referred back to classical antiquity. and whose denunciation of the pagan cyclical notion of time rests still on the “decadence” of the civitas mundi and the coming of the civitas Dei at the end of history – a regressus. of “resolve”. democracy=anomie” (again.) Consistently with his approach. V3. was Heute ist…”) to Cicero’s ascription of “progress” from the time when “in agris homines passim bestiarum more vagabantur” (De Inventione. rather than a progressus. but that of a “regressus a perfectione ad defectum” where the finis is “anomie”. V3. note also Mazzarino’s account of how mediaeval “linearity” (if it ever existed.) Interestingly. Croce) was not that of “progress”.357) – which is perhaps. despite the equations “tradition=nomos. Again.“whatever is real is rational and whatever is rational is real” (in Preface to Grundlinien der Rechtsphilosophie). even in Augustine for whom God is “outside” of time. to his novel intuition of time. the Ent-wertung) seen as a “Disgregation” of original primordial instincts or impulses. 2. p.253. Mazzarino. as with the astounding similarity (remarked upon earlier) of Nietzsche’s opening lines of the “Historie fur das Leben” in ‘UB’ (“Betrachte die Heerde. it is “significant” that the “invention” to which Cicero attributes the “progress” of humanity from its beastly status was rhetoric or oratory as the practical foundation of political decision-making. (Cf. see Mazzarino. despite his emphasis on “the Eternal Return”. which Nietzsche unfailingly places at the origin of “psychological” evolution – the ontogeny of thought with its pathos of distance. The mediaeval notion of “progress”. In reality.

was it not because the idea was so known. as “exact science” with respect to the forum externum which we falsely regard as “external” and strange. something which no longer disquiets us? Is it not possible that it should be the instinct of fear which enjoins upon us to know ? Is it not possible that the rejoicing of the discerner should be just his WE FEARLESS ONES 3OI (Wir. are instead presented as “science”. straight or crooked. . which is in effect the attempt to make the Lebenswelt “free” from the arbitrary Will toward the “categorical imperatives” of Practical Reason (the Sollen). Nietzsche writes: Grillparzer goes so far as to say that "history is nothing but the manner in which the spirit of man apprehends facts that are obscure to him. or questionable.6) The vice of “replacing the unintelligible with the intelligible” is that “ideas of causation… which can perhaps be explained only from within”. only through an examination of the “instincts”. quite apart from all natural influences.The point was made explicit as early as the “History Meditation”: quoting approvingly from a German philosopher. and at their solutions of the riddle of the world in this connection ! When they again find aught in things. Nietzsche is saying that “science” has forgotten its “real” origins and now takes itself too seriously as “perfect”. links things together whose connection heaven only knows. And in this presumed struggle toward “freedom”." (Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen. and so millions of tendencies are running together. replaces the unintelligible by something intelligible. whereas the psychological “awakening sciences” lag behind because they presume that it is “futile” to explore the forum internum – because we already know it! 355. what we are accustomed to so that we no longer marvel at it. any kind of rule to which we are habituated. They have all the appearance of chance.One philosopher imagined the world "known" when he had traced it back to the " idea ": alas. . And we philosophers—have we really understood anything more by knowledge? The known. and make it impossible. this moderation of the discerners! let us but look at their principles. forward or backward. who also foreshadows the “balancing of forces”. that is. p. The Origin of our Conception of Knowledge — I take this explanation from the street. “Science” therefore is conventionally seen as this “history” whereby man gradually attempts to free himself from and jettison what he misinterprets as the primitive “psychological trans-ferences” (or super-stitions) of humans. that is to say. helping or hindering each other. is in reality something where “thousands of small causes may be really at work”. Each man has his own individual needs.52. . ch. die Furchtlosen) rejoicing in the regained feeling of security ? . What seems to be the operari of the Freiheit due to “the existence of chance”. so familiar to him ? because he had so much less fear of the "idea"—Oh. the commonplace. to establish any universal lines on which past events must have run. as objective knowledge of “apprehended facts” that are then falsely attributed to “the external world”. parallel or across. unusual. all and everything in which we know ourselves to be at home:— what? is our need of knowing not just this need of the known? the will to discover in everything strange. where thousands of small causes may be really at work." so I asked myself: What do the people really understand by knowledge? what do they want when they seek "knowledge"? Nothing more than that what is strange is to be traced back to something known. puts his own ideas of causation into the external world. I heard one of the people saying that "he knew me. which can perhaps be explained only from within: and assumes the existence of chance. it is clear that the “obstacles” encountered will have to be given the ontological status of “chance and accident” – so that Tyche or Fortuna play a disproportionate role.

" . . or our logic. tension. (Gaya Scienza) What then is “consciousness”? Even consciousness must not be understood as an “inner world” to be opposed to “what is outside of us”. These matters are examined in Part Two. Mc Taggart) and German idealism (Kant. it is methodically ordered to proceed outward from the "inner world. of science that constitutes the epistemological “value” and foundation of the understanding of science from British empiricism (Hobbes. Fichte. Even the most circumspect among them think that the known is at least more easily understood than the strange. Contrast this Nietzschean position with the “empiricist” acceptance of Newtonian space and time. to an “Ob-ject” that stands over and against our “knowing activity”. the “familiarization” by the consciousness (nous) with the ever-changing world of “coming-into-being” (gi-gnomai. our multiplication table. It is instructive to note here the chasm that separates Nietzsche’s “de-struction” of both the “sub-ject” and the “ob-ject” of scientific inquiry with the Kantian and. . The great certainty of the natural sciences in comparison with psychology and the criticism of the elements ofconsciousness— unnatural sciences. as a “re-cognition of the earth”. Knowledge “be-comes” (gi-gnomai). to perceive as a problem. “Knowledge” in the sense of “truth”. it “grows” and is “born” (ge-nesis) like everything else that is “generated” from life and the world – indeed.among things. much worse. gen) from which all things are “generated” (ge-nesis) and “be-come” (gi-gnomai) so that our “consciousness” (nous) may assign them a “meaning” (noeo) and “recognize” them (gi-gnosco. Hegel) and phenomenalism from Schopenhauer to Mach. of “nature” as the “ob-ject” of “knowledge”. hence “tendency”. as an in-tention (Latin for stretching. from the “earth” (gaya. Schelling. Latin root of “science”) so as to render them “familiar”. and the accustomed is the most difficult of all to "understand. Nietzsche’s “perspectivism or phenomenalism” bears some resemblance to that of the last two. or behind things that is unfortunately very well known to us. . the Neo-Kantian “rational positing” of both! Consciousness itself is a strange and foreign region that needs to be explored with every precaution. But the essential elements of analysis to this “riddle of the world” can be discerned from the world around us (“I take this explanation from the street!”) and from . how happy they immediately are! For "what is known is understood": they are unanimous as to that. This is perhaps the reason why Nietzsche insisted on “Gaya Scienza” as the title for his major critique of orthodox “science” – this intriguing play between the Greek etymology of the words for “earth” (gaya. distant. becoming) so as to make it “re-cognisable” (gignosco. German for object) of the “knowing activity” or “recognition” (gi-gnosco) of that which “comes-into-being” (gi-gnomai) is not possible." because it is the world which is better known to us ! Error of errors! The known is the accustomed. “I know”)." that is to say. Only through this inter-pretation – this “conscious” pathos of distance be-tween consciousness and the life and the world – can a “gaya scienza” be possible. " outside of us. a directing of mind towards) and a pro-ject (both meanings of the Greek pro-noia) in life and the world. “knowledge” is nothing more than “recognition”. quite literally." from " the facts of consciousness. for example. to perceive as strange. Of course. as one might almost be entitled to call them—rests precisely on the fact that they take what is strange as their object: while it is almost like something contradictory and absurd to wish to take generally what is not strange as an object. that for example. in the sense of a complete “penetration” or even of a mere “positing of the ob-ject of knowledge” as an “entity” that stands outside and op-posite (Gegen-Stand. ge’. ge’. Locke. Hume) through to British (Berkeley. . or our willing and desiring. whence “scio. gen). . For Nietzsche. scire.

The “self” is made up of various impulses and drives (Triebe) in conflict with one another. “Each man has his own individual needs. p127ff stresses this Nietzschean reliance on the life of experience rather than on concepts or theory. like justice and the State.72) whereby consciousness. (Fink. Only the illusion (Tauschung – recall Freud’s The Future of An Illusion about religion) of “reconciliation” (the Hegelian “Versohnung”. what else is this intelligere ultimately. so simply and sublimely. straight or crooked. For these “drives” not to annul each other. unstable “settlement” that allows the impulses “to maintain themselves in existence and retain their mutual rights [Recht]”." We have seen that the Individuum is in fact a Dividuum. p. a sort of justice and agreement: for in virtue of the justice and agreement all those impulses can maintain themselves in existence and retain their mutual rights. They have all the appearance of chance. a recognition of rights on all three sides. imperfect and unstable. of the ego . This is Freud’s “Reality Principle” which hides beneath the superficial social presentation of the self. sed intelligere! says Spinoza. something essentially antithetical to the impulses. non lugere. The struggle of these onesided views occurs afterwards. is “the resultant” (not the “equi-librium” or “conciliation”). and so millions of tendencies are running together. whereas in reality “it is only a certain relation of the impulses to one another”: – this is the “reality”. but just the form in which the three other things become perceptible to us all at once? a result of the diverging and opposite impulses of desiring to deride. To quote from Grillparzer again. What does Knowing Mean? Non ridere. helping or hindering each other. think on that account that intelligere is something conciliating. only the outcome. once it becomes stable. One is reminded of Plato’s “charioteer myth” (in the Phaedrus) – with the same insuperable apory of how “anything” can “result” from “selfinterested or blind impulses”. is a precarious. Nevertheless. The “resultant” of this conflict of impulses. and make it impossible.a volcanic miasma of boiling impulses: 333. just and . temporary and precarious. and out of it there occasionally arises a compromise. as Nietzsche does approvingly above.Betrachtungen.the immorality of history (Herkunft and Genealogie) in the sense (the physiological direction [Richtung] and origin [Entstehung] and perception [as in “the senses”]) in which Nietzsche understood it.) Here we meet a recurrent Nietzschean theme of “the balance of forces” (Unzeitg. neque detestari. and is apprehended by our “consciousness” as “something conciliating. as is his wont. lament and execrate? Before knowledge is possible each of these impulses must first have brought forward its one-sided view of the object or event. parallel or across. to establish any universal lines on which past events must have run. to whose consciousness only the closing reconciliation scenes and final settling of accounts of these long processes manifest themselves. forward or backward. no less!) is apparent to us in our “consciousness” as “the settling of accounts of these long processes”. We. and this resulting “truce”. of conflicting “drives” or “forces” or “impulses”. this is what we call “consciousness” or “the ego”. comes to be identified as “a sort of justice [Gerechtigkeit]”. just and good. the “effectuality” of the Spinozan “intellect”. a pacification. quite apart from all natural influences. a “resultant” force that can impose a truce is necessary. as it were.

Das bewusste Denken. wie Spinoza meinte. Ja. Was heißt erkennen. Die längsten Zeiten hindurch hat man bewusstes Denken als das Denken überhaupt betrachtet: jetzt erst dämmert uns die Wahrheit auf. and especially that of the philosopher.the violent. Aye. that the impulses which are here in mutual conflict understand rightly how to make themselves felt by one another. “The great part of our intellectual [conscious] activity [takes place] unconsciously.” Here Nietzsche’s thought reaches an emphatic climax: one can almost empathise with the exhaustion of the thinker striving to articulate and give vent to the most insidious. so schlicht und erhaben. ist die unkräftigste und deshalb auch die verhältnismäßig mildeste und ruhigste Art des Denkens: und so kann gerade der Philosoph am leichtesten über die Natur des Erkennens irre geführt werden. sed intelligere! sagt Spinoza. whereas it is only a certain relation of the impulses [Trieben] to one another. Gutes. as Spinoza supposed. Nietzsche begins by focusing on the practical implications of consciousness on human activity. we become “conscious” of it. “I believe.if it is true that it is the byproduct or outcome of these ebullient impulses at war with one another. sudden exhaustion which overtakes all thinkers. and on that account also the relatively mildest and quietest mode of thinking: and thus it is precisely the philosopher who is most easily misled concerning the nature of knowledge. eine Art Gerechtigkeit und Vertrag: denn. Whenever we pause “to think about thinking”. much earlier. but certainly nothing divine. ein Rechtgeben nach allen drei Seiten. . that is. aber gewiss nichts Göttliches. Most of our lives we engage in activities that we perform almost “mechanically”. etwas wesentlich den Trieben Entgegengesetztes. whenever we stop “to reflect” on what we are doing. sich einander dabei fühlbar zu machen und wehe zu tun —: jene gewaltige plötzliche Erschöpfung. is the weakest. For a very long time conscious thinking was regarded as the only thinking: it is now only that the truth dawns upon us that the greater part of our intellectual activity goes on unconsciously and unfelt by us. and how to cause pain . muss jeder dieser Triebe erst seine einseitige Ansicht über das Ding oder Vorkommnis vorgebracht haben. something essentially antithetical to the impulses. perhaps in our struggling interior there is much concealed heroism. Beklagen-. I believe. in der uns eben jene Drei auf Einmal fühlbar werden? Ein Resultat aus den verschiedenen und sich widerstrebenden Trieben des Verlachen-. von der alle Denker heimgesucht werden. dass der allergrößte Teil unseres geistigen Wirkens uns unbewusst. however. and how to cause pain the violent. mag da ihren Ursprung haben (es ist die Erschöpfung auf dem Schlachtfelde). meinen demnach. intrusive insights into the human psyche – something that cannot have eluded the attention of an undercover Sigmund Freud or. sudden exhaustion which overtakes all thinkers. we then become “aware” of our activity in its “status-as-activity”. that the impulses which are here in mutual conflict understand rightly how to make themselves felt by one another. ich meine aber. hinterher entstand der Kampf dieser Einseitigkeiten und aus ihm bisweilen eine Mitte. werden recht wohl verstehen. Ewig-in-sich-Ruhendes. — Non ridere. without “thinking” or thinking only about the specific task that we are performing – without “reflecting” on what we are doing. may have its origin here (it is the exhaustion of the battlefield). Conscious thinking. vermöge der Gerechtigkeit und des Vertrags können alle diese Triebe sich im Dasein behaupten und mit einander Recht behalten. neque detestari. (Gaya Scientia) 333. wie es seine Art ist. Indessen: was ist dies intelligere im letzten Grunde Anderes. denen nur die letzten Versöhnungsszenen und Schluss-Abrechnungen dieses langen Prozesses zum Bewusstsein kommen. however. may have its origin here (it is the exhaustion of the battlefield). that is. unfelt by us”: the “impulses” (Triebe) are the “stirring Acheronta” that will “bend the superior heights”. And consciousness itself is unconscious! . diese Triebe.good. die hier mit einander kämpfen. Wir. während es nur ein gewisses Verhalten der Triebe zu einander ist. ungefühlt verläuft. intelligere sei etwas Versöhnliches. und namentlich das des Philosophen. non lugere. vielleicht gibt es in unserm kämpfenden Innern manches verborgene Heroentum. Gerechtes. of a Faustian Goethe. eine Beruhigung. or eternally-reposing-in-itself. Verwünschen-wollens? Bevor ein Erkennen möglich ist. als die Form.

We find. Above all. an ecstasis. that is. the purpose of consciousness is to command and obey. this specific manifestation of the instinct of freedom suffers a meta-morphosis. with other “bodies”. of the clash of instincts that occurs between human beings – a dynamic result of their interaction. when it is in the main superfluous? What indeed is the “purpose” of this “reflective consciousness”? It is of the highest importance once again that we do not understand Nietzsche here to say that “consciousness” is an effective “self-consciousness”. It is an expression of the Will to Power. from a “distance” – like an “out-of-body” experience. and nevertheless nothing of it all need necessarily "come into consciousness" (as one says metaphorically). the “distancing” of oneself from the original “mimesis” or identification with nature and with other humans. volitional life as well. a “resultant” of the organic forces. The whole of life would be possible without its seeing itself as it were in a mirror: as in fact even at present the far greater part of our life still goes on without this mirroring. It follows that “consciousness” is a “result”. and recollect. For we could in fact think. 354. consciousness “reflects” in the double sense of . a trans-formation that leads to all those “sign-sequences” or symptomatologies that characterize “the perspective of the herd” – from morality to Kultur and Askesis to Science and Entseelung.—and even our thinking. feel. What then is the purpose of consciousness generally. as if in a “mirror”. But in its “expression”. however painful this statement may sound to an older philosopher. something qualitatively “different” from the unconscious. therefore. from “outside” our own minds and bodies – in other words. it is the “result” (as physiological in nature as the instincts) of our interaction with other human beings. and this “reflection” is what Nietzsche intends by “consciousness”: it is “the pathos of distance”. What we see in a mirror is a “reflection” of ourselves. Such “consciousness” is only a “functional” outgrowth of the unconscious. we could likewise "act" in every sense of the term. the better to be able “to barter” or “to agree” on the conduct of one’s activities. it is “as if” we were looking at our-selves from “outside ourselves”. Far from it! Those who mis-interpret Nietzsche thus understand little of his philosophy. “detachedly”. feeling. will.It follows that for us “to reflect” on our actions and thoughts we must observe them objectively. that just as the intellect is an “agreement” (homo-noia) or “pacification” or “reconciliation” of various “impulses” or “drives” that stir beneath its surface and of whose conflict and interplay it is the “resultant” – so in the “inter-action” of human beings. If I need to reflect on my activity it is certainly for the purpose of being able “to objectify” it – it is here that the “operari” needs its “conscious subject” so that an “individual’s activity” may be “identified” and “attributed” to that individual. “consciousness” is the ability “to communicate” with other “consciousnesses”.The " Genius of the Species^—The problem of consciousness (or more correctly: of becoming conscious of oneself) meets us only when we begin to perceive in what measure we could dispense with it: and it is at the beginning of this perception that we are now placed by physiology and zoology (which have thus required two centuries to overtake the hint thrown out in advance by Leibnitz). a “communication” for which “reflection” (the “distancing” of one’s thought from oneself) is indispensable. Language also is an “ex-pression” of this indispensable function. Consciousness is therefore needed in large part when one deals with “society”. It is as if our minds could “observe” our actions “from a distance”.

to repeat it once least a part of them — is the result of a terrible. and as has been said. In short. Notice that as Nietzsche “traverses” this “immanentistic” chain tracing the evolution (Ent-wicklung) of thought. die Furchtlosen) necessities would at the same time have to be most dependent upon others for his necessities. man. what he calls “the onto-geny of thought”. “physio-logically”. thoughts. — it is only as such that it has had to develop.that from the first it has been necessary and useful only between man and man (especially between those commanding and those obeying) and has only developed in proportion to its utility. and therefore the “pro-ject” or “plan”. in the symbols for communication. this “thinking process” constitutes the “in-tention”. squanderers by their very nature). "late-born" always. Consciousness therefore can in no guise be mis-construed as “the soul” or “the spirit” or “the self”. and to "know" what he thought. the capacity for communication in its turn being in proportion to the necessity for communication : the latter not to be understood as if precisely the individual himself who is master in the art of communicating and making known his WE FEARLESS ONES 297 (Wir. the development of speech and the development of consciousness (not of reason. Let it be further accepted that it is not only speech that serves as a bridge between man and man. he never for one instant “reflects” on the “physical” consequences of this “inter-dependence” . the recluse and wild-beast species of men would not have needed it. and now waited for an heir to squander it prodigally (the so-called artists are these heirs.“mirroring” and “thinking about”. like every living creature. Granted that this observation is correct. and authors: all of them men who come at the end of a long succession. by means of which the origin of consciousness is revealed. our power of being able to fix them. the most superficial part. but does not know it. the “dia-noia” of domination and overcoming that Nietzsche op-poses to the “homo-noia” (the harmonious agreement) of the transcendental subject of the philosophia perennis that was to receive its highest. For. we may say. to "know" how he felt. in the best sense of the word. Now it seems to me. he was obliged to express his distress. the thinking which is becoming conscious of itself is only the smallest part thereof. “bad conscience” and then the A-skesis and finally “grosse Politik”. V his fellows. most “desperate” expression in Husserl’s attempt to lay down a phenomenological “foundation” of scientific knowledge. thinks unceasingly. our becoming conscious of our sense impressions. that is to say. but of reason becoming self-conscious) go hand in hand. The very fact that our actions. he needed 98 THE JOYFUL WISDOM. in like manner the orators. a surplus of the power and art of communication is at last acquired as if it were a fortune which had gradually accumulated. if you will hear my answer and its perhaps extravagant supposition. that the subtlety and strength of consciousness are always in proportion to the capacity for communication of a man (or an animal). however. Consciousness is properly only a connecting network between man and man. to be so in relation to whole races and successions of generations where necessity and need have long compelled men to communicate with their fellows and understand one another rapidly and subtly. prolonged "must" ruling man's destiny: as the most endangered animal he needed help and protection. This “pathos of distance”. It seems to me. the worst part :—for this conscious thinking alone is done in words. instinct) to “Bewusstsein” (consciousness) and on to “Sprache” (language) and communication to “Gewissen” (“conscience”). I may proceed further to the conjecture that consciousness generally has only been developed under the pressure of the necessity for communication . the inevitable “pathos of distance” that inter-venes “need-necessarily”. and as it were to locate them outside of ourselves. the pressure and the gestures . preachers. but also the looks. feelings and motions come within the range of our consciousness . the physiological “tendency”. this physiological suc-cession and e-volution from “Triebe” (drive. he had to know how to make himself understood — and for all this he needed " consciousness " first of all : he had to "know" himself what he lacked. be-tween different “instincts of freedom”. has increased in proportion as the necessity has increased for communicating them to others by means of signs.

its “instinct of freedom”. Remember: this is precisely what Nietzsche condemned bitterly in Schopenhauer – the latter’s “decadent” notion of a “commonality of unegoistich feeling”. from the side of the “Will”. Nietzsche sees “the World” from the “inside”. There is just as little reason to believe that the Will is “free” as there is for the opposite assertion. more correctly." he says in the ‘Goetzendammerung’. Worse still. as Schopenhauer conceives it. of its “striving” – because he understands that to do so is to deny “life itself”! "We must go further in the pessimistic logic than the denial [he means Schopenhauer’s ethical exhortation to suppress the will. “irrepressible” Will to Life is alive and well! Like Schopenhauer. however much he may stress the “non-subjectivity” or the “non-identity” or “non-self” or “dividuality” of their “impulses”. any communion of interests between different organisms except as such interaction serves the organism’s need for self-preservation or. it is an instrumental ability that need not even be “conscious”. his “pessimism” first – which denies the centrality of “the body” -. each and every organism. (Similarly. Most ridiculous of all for Nietzsche is the Schopenhauerian conclusion that we ought “to deny” the Will on account of its “willing”." What Nietzsche execrates are the implications of the Entsagung for Schopenhauer’s “ethics”. Most important. are by definition antagonistic. phylogenetic” penetration of human inter-dependence down to “the very structure of our brain” (!). of the fact that “language” is not just a “utility” (see above) but rather a biological-genetic. the instincts cannot possess any intrinsic quality that they may “share” with other instincts. therefore. each “functionary” (as Nietzsche calls a biological unit or organ) must act for its own self-preservation. however.) For Nietzsche. but rather the “intelligent freedom” of the “esse” on which his ethics are “rooted”. its “drives” are inscrutable: they have to be – because the Will remains a “qualitas occulta” by reason of our inability to com-prehend the World! For that very reason. he denies that the Will is what we know best: for the Will is very “complicated” because its “instincts”. Nietzsche never envisions human beings in a “speciesconscious” role. Nietzsche always and everywhere sees human beings as “separate beings”. What Nietzsche condemns in Schopenhauer is not his “metaphysics”. the “freedom” of the esse. Always and forever. Reason itself is merely “the act of reasoning”. there is not and cannot be any “inter-esse”. In other words.of human beings. which leads back into the circulus vitiosus of Practical Reason. Unlike Schopenhauer. as “in-dividuals”. and we must pause to reflect on it. the Entsagung] of the will. in a way that reveals the reality of the “biological. "we must deny Schopenhauer. Instincts. human beings remain “separate bodies” that cannot in any way be understood as “aspects of being human”. manifestations of a “common humanity”. reintroduces the Kantian problematic of how the Will is “to govern” its freedom. “vitalistic”. however. of “com-passion”. Freud will refuse the notion of “oceanic feeling” advanced by Romain Rolland – on the very first page of Die Unbehagen. In other words. as “species-conscious beings”. Schopenhauer’s “instinctive”. of “sym-pathy”. physiological function of “being human”! This is a point of the highest importance in understanding Nietzsche’s entire philosophy. but one that is “utilized” to ensure self-preservation. and the . one-sided and blind in seeking their self-interest.

meagre. to be sure. as a tool of communication. of the Veil of Maya – Schopenhauer’s “reverence” for the insipid essentialism and subjectivism and moralism of western metaphysics.—that our thought itself is continuously as it were outvoted by the character of consciousness — by the imperious "genius of the species" therein and is translated back into the perspective of the herd. “unaccountable”. a characteristic of the herd”. It is a necessary development. Consciousness arises out of the need-necessity of the unconscious organic functions yet must not be con-fused with them. only when one has regard to the contingent “sociability” of human beings. — a generalisation. and of "knowing himself. my idea is that consciousness does not properly belong to the individual existence of man. . the “elemental” or “natural” or “primordial” properties in human existence are “unconscious” and therefore “natural”. like language! It is impossible not to notice here how foolishly Nietzsche ignores the evident fact that at least language. And because these functions are “unconscious”. relatively stupid. as follows therefrom. a generalised and vulgarised world .—he is doing so still. Fundamentally our actions are in an incomparable manner altogether personal. but rather to the social and gregarious nature in him . physiological in this ontogenetic sense – as confined to separate individual organisms and organs (Funktionare). as a mere dispensable appendage or appurtenance to the individual body. they do not appear so any longer. a characteristic of the herd . and generalisation. and doing so more and more. “bodies” learn how to barter and . and most of all. namely.“sentimental” reversion of the operari into the “moralistic ideality” of Nirvana. — As is obvious. as we will see later! It follows that for Nietzsche the truly “individual”. they are therefore “irresponsible”. in spite of the best intention of understanding himself as individually as possible. consciousness is “nonindividual”. In seeking “safety in numbers”. It develops only and merely for adventitious and “conventional” reasons – purely as a “communal and gregarious utility”." will always just call into consciousness the non-individual in him. but it remains solely and purely a “social” construction “that does not properly belong to the individual existence of man” – indeed. his miraculous rescue of “reflective reason” in extremis as the ethical and eschatological saviour of humanity! The sign-inventing man is at the same time the man who is always more acutely self-conscious.—that everything which becomes conscious becomes just thereby shallow. a “con-vention”. Once again. superficialisation. “organic”. is a phylogenetic property of being human! Faced with the blatant reality of language. it is only as a social animal that man has learned to become conscious of himself. a symbol. the “bodily”. that. but as soon as we translate them into consciousness. This is the proper phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand it : the nature of animal consciousness involves the notion that the world of which we can become conscious is only a superficial and symbolic world. Nietzsche will go through the most insensate intellectual contortions to reduce consciousness to its “logical” and “instrumental” construction. Nietzsche denies that “consciousness” is a phylogenetic faculty of human beings as members of a “species” – as homo sapiens! For him. it is only in relaWE THE FEARLESS ONES 299 tion to communal and gregarious utility that it is finely developed . falsification. radical perversion. if not consciousness. not a genetic endowment. and that consequently each of us. “blame-less”. even a physiological one just as much as the unconscious is. . . his "averageness" . unique and absolutely individual—there is no doubt about it. that with the evolving of consciousness there is always combined a great. And with this development “there is always combined… a symbol.

” Nietzsche takes pains to stress. It is still less the antithesis of "thing in itself" and phenomenon. a “ruse”. . fühlen. Das ganze Leben wäre möglich. inwiefern wir seiner entraten könnten: und an diesen Anfang des Begreifens stellt uns jetzt Physiologie und Tiergeschichte (welche also zwei Jahrhunderte nötig gehabt haben. notes Nietzsche. “formative”. “the Genius of the Species” is a “deception”.compromise. or fancy) just as much as may be of use in the interest of the human herd. the growing consciousness is a danger. the species. No! Rather. 354. is the German for criminal) the covenant. unique and absolutely individual” character of our “actions” but not in absolute “reality” – only in “consciousness”! It follows therefore that it is impossible for there to be any “false (!) consciousness” or indeed any “authenticity” – instead. Indeed. As may be conjectured. irreducibly “individual” actions are trans-figured into “con-science”. signs) and indeed “constituent” of it. to Nietzsche’s endless annoyance. Wir könnten nämlich denken. um den vorausfliegenden Argwohn Leibnitzens einzuholen). Vom "Genius der Gattung".” In fact. wir könnten ebenfalls "handeln" in jedem Sinne des Wortes: und trotzdem brauchte das Alles nicht uns "in's Bewusstsein zu treten" (wie man im Bilde sagt). like wildebeests thronging together so that the individual needs of the body “are translated back into the perspective of the herd” – even to the point that “scapegoats” are immolated to appease irate divinities! The greatest crime an individual can commit is “to break or breach” (Verbrecher. wollen. a fancy. the semeiotics of life and the world! Nietzsche has “no doubt about it”. it is not the antithesis of subject and object with which I am here concerned: I leave that distinction to the epistemologists who have remained entangled in the 300 THE JOYFUL WISDOM. — Das Problem des Bewusstseins (richtiger: des Sich-Bewusst-Werdens) tritt erst dann vor uns hin. consciousness is “bad” only to the extent that it is identical with the expression of morality and resentment and only by its inability “to interpret correctly and to utilize” the signs and symptoms. wenn wir zu begreifen anfangen. a “falsification” and even worse… “This is the proper phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand it: the nature of animal consciousness involves the notion that the world of which we can become conscious is only a superficial and symbolic world. a generalised and vulgarised world…” (above) “The evolution of consciousness” separates us from the real “personal. V toils of grammar (popular metaphysics). did with the “intelligible freedom”. “translated into consciousness”. and whoever lives among the most conscious Europeans knows even that it is a disease. This “collectivism of consciousness” serves “to outvote our thought itself” until it assumes the imperious peremptoriness of a Moral Law. but as soon as we translate them into consciousness. This. then. “Fundamentally. the bond (Schuld. and perhaps precisely the most fatal stupidity by which we shall one day be ruined. they do not appear so any longer. for we do not "know" enough to be entitled even to make such a distinction. . is “the Genius of the Species” – not a “material” development. obligation) that binds him to the community. into “sym-pathy and com-passion” (Mit-leid) – which is what Schopenhauer. we have not any organ at all for knowings or for "truth”: we "know" (or believe. ohne dass es sich gleichsam im Spiegel sähe: wie ja tatsächlich auch jetzt noch bei uns der bei . how to shelter behind “averageness”. language. and even what is here called "usefulness" is ultimately only a belief. uns erinnern. Finally. “our actions are in an incomparable manner altogether personal. independent of our “consciousness” (thought. unique and absolutely individual—there is no doubt about it.

es ist kein Zweifel. die Entwicklung der Sprache und die Entwicklung des Bewusstseins (nicht der Vernunft. und auch nur im Verhältnis zum Grade dieser Nützlichkeit sich entwickelt hat. Wir haben eben gar kein Organ für das Erkennen. Unsre Handlungen sind im Grunde allesamt auf eine unvergleichliche Weise persönlich. Fälschung. auch nur in Bezug auf Gemeinschafts. wenn man meiner Antwort auf diese Frage und ihrer vielleicht ausschweifenden Vermutung Gehör geben will. welcher gerade Meister in der Mitteilung und Verständlichmachung seiner Bedürfnisse ist. wollenden Lebens. als die Nötigung wuchs. — dass es von vornherein nur zwischen Mensch und Mensch (zwischen Befehlenden und Gehorchenden in Sonderheit) nötig war. aber weiß es nicht. die Feinheit und Stärke des Bewusstseins immer im Verhältnis zur Mitteilungs-Fähigkeit eines Menschen (oder Tiers) zu stehen. dass nicht nur die Sprache zur Brücke zwischen Mensch und Mensch dient. relativ-dumm. Wohl aber scheint es mir so in Bezug auf ganze Rassen und GeschlechterKetten zu stehen: wo das Bedürfnis. nützlich war. Es ist erst recht nicht der Gegensatz von "Ding an sich" und Erscheinung: denn wir "erkennen" bei weitem nicht genug. dass die Welt. wie gesagt. — Mein Gedanke ist. Dass uns unsre Handlungen..weitem überwiegende Teil dieses Lebens sich ohne diese Spiegelung abspielt —. so beleidigend dies einem älteren Philosophen klingen mag. sich gegenseitig rasch und fein zu verstehen. sagen wir: der oberflächlichste. Kurz gesagt. sie fixieren zu können und gleichsam außer uns zu stellen. wie jedes lebende Geschöpf. um auch nur so scheiden zu dürfen. Hilfe. Gedanken. sondern allein des Sichbewusst-werdens der Vernunft) gehen Hand in Hand. doch immer nur gerade das Nicht-Individuelle an sich zum Bewusstsein bringen wird. so darf ich zu der Vermutung weitergehen. und dass folglich Jeder von uns. Alles Menschen. sein "Durchschnittliches". diese Beobachtung ist richtig. hat in dem Maße zugenommen. Bewusstsein ist eigentlich nur ein Verbindungsnetz zwischen Mensch und Mensch. zu "wissen". dünn. einzig. erst als soziales Tier lernte der Mensch seiner selbst bewusst werden. wie man sieht: dass das Bewusstsein nicht eigentlich zur Individual-Existenz des Menschen gehört. deren wir bewusst werden können. unbegrenzt-individuell. das bewusst werdende Denken ist nur der kleinste Teil davon. die Mitteilungs-Fähigkeit wiederum im Verhältnis zur Mitteilungs-Bedürftigkeit: letzteres nicht so verstanden. Gefühle. — er tut es noch. Man nehme hinzu. beim besten Willen. und. die Gebärde. was er denkt. Zeichen. sie Andern durch Zeichen zu übermitteln. dass es eine Krankheit ist. er musste seine Not auszudrücken. da ist endlich ein Überschuss dieser Kraft und Kunst der Mitteilung da.die Not die Menschen lange gezwungen hat. gleichsam ein Vermögen. wenn es in der Hauptsache überflüssig ist? — Nun scheint mir. der es verschwenderisch ausgibt ( — die sogenannten Künstler sind diese Erben. — dass unser Gedanke selbst fortwährend durch den Charakter des Bewusstseins — durch den in ihm gebietenden "Genius der Gattung" — gleichsam majorisiert und in die Herden-Perspektive zurück-übersetzt wird. was bewusst wird. das ist die Folge eines furchtbaren langen über dem Menschen waltenden "Muss": er brauchte. was an ihm Gemeinschafts. eine verallgemeinerte. er tut es immer mehr. scheinen sie es nicht mehr . Der Zeichen-erfindende Mensch ist zugleich der immer schärfer seiner selbst bewusste Mensch. nicht der Gegensatz von Subjekt und Objekt. dass mit allem Bewusstwerden eine große gründliche Verderbnis. zu "wissen". sich verständlich zu machen wissen — und zu dem Allen hatte er zuerst "Bewusstsein" nötig. aber sobald wir sie in's Bewusstsein übersetzen. — dass Alles. ihrem Wesen nach Verschwender). womit sich die Herkunft des Bewusstseins selber aufdeckt. sich mitzuteilen. sich selbst so individuell wie möglich zu verstehen. insgleichen die Redner. als ob gerade der einzelne Mensch selbst. der schlechteste Teil: — denn allein dieses bewusste Denken geschieht in Worten. Es ist. Prediger. im besten Verstande des Wortes. "sich selbst zu kennen". wie man errät. eine vergemeinerte Welt.und Herden-Nützlichkeit fein entwickelt ist. er brauchte Seines-Gleichen. "Spätgeborne" jedes Mal. HerdenMerkzeichen wird. Bewegungen selbst in's Bewusstsein kommen — wenigstens ein Teil derselben —. die Kraft. das heißt in Mitteilungszeichen. sondern auch der Blick. und zwar auch unsres denkenden. . Schutz. Schriftsteller. als das gefährdetste Tier. nur eine Oberflächen. der Druck. welche in den Schlingen der Grammatik (der Volks-Metaphysik) hängen geblieben sind. das Bewusstwerden unserer Sinneseindrücke bei uns selbst. dass Bewusstsein überhaupt sich nur unter dem Druck des Mitteilungs-Bedürfnisses entwickelt hat. wie ich ihn verstehe: die Natur des tierischen Bewusstseins bringt es mit sich. dass es.und Zeichenwelt ist. Gesetzt. generell. — nur als solches hat es sich entwickeln müssen: der einsiedlerische und raubtierhafte Mensch hätte seiner nicht bedurft. ebendamit flach. Wozu überhaupt Bewusstsein. Zuletzt ist das wachsende Bewusstsein eine Gefahr. der mich hier angeht: diese Unterscheidung überlasse ich den Erkenntnistheoretikern. zugleich auch mit seinen Bedürfnissen am meisten auf die Andern angewiesen sein müsste. weiß sogar. Denn nochmals gesagt: der Mensch. das sich allmählich aufgehäuft hat und nun eines Erben wartet. Dies ist der eigentliche Phänomenalismus und Perspektivismus. welche immer am Ende einer langen Kette kommen.. wie daraus folgt. und wer unter den bewusstesten Europäern lebt. also selbst zu "wissen" was ihm fehlt. Veroberflächlichung und Generalisation verbunden ist. denkt immerfort. fühlenden. vielmehr zu dem. wie es ihm zu Mute ist.und Herden-Natur ist.

captures well this “tension” [the Latin intentio] in Nietzsche between the “rationality” or “grand reason” of his critique of morals. morality and values and. and the “ir-rationality” of history. But then. and are dictated by it as the instinct of freedom. in his monumental Nietzsche. der Gattung. If indeed there are aspects of life and the world (of the Lebenswelt – Scheler) that are not strictly “organic” or “instinctive” but are mere “ramifications and developments” of the Will to Power that in turn give rise to “strategies” such as “consciousness” and “conscience”. if it the Will to Power or instinct of freedom is “physiologically predestined” or “instinctively conditioned”.für die "Wahrheit": wir "wissen" (oder glauben oder bilden uns ein) gerade so viel als es im Interesse der Menschen-Herde. “co-incides” with the “organic” need-necessity of that Will to Power whose “ontological” validity Nietzsche has posited. he too succumbs. finally the Will to Truth – if these “strategies” are “possible” in the Lebenswelt. ist zuletzt auch nur ein Glaube. then there is no room for “physiological pre-destination” or “instinctive need-necessity” in it! If the Will to Power or the instinct of freedom is “free”. there is a “co-incidence” of the Wille zur Macht and the “morality” in that the “ontic” manifestation of the Will to Power. was hier "Nützlichkeit" genannt wird. totally misconstruing Nietzsche’s radical “resolution” of this “tension”! The most that Jaspers can make of the eristic charge of the Wille zur Macht is to lament romantically its “destruction of reason” – neglecting like Lukacs the momentous thrust of the capitalist Rationalisierung that Nietzsche so incisively theorises! ) In Heideggerian terms. then they are either human “actions” that are “free” or “cultural” or “voluntary”. eine Einbildung und vielleicht gerade jene verhängnisvollste Dummheit. the “strategies” of the Will to Power are either “ontic”. But if these “strategies” are strictly “physiological” (or organic or instinctive). or else they are “ontological” and therefore pre-destined in the sense that they are stages of the “physis” (nature) that transforms “history” (Geschichte) into a “destiny” (Geschick). then they are not “free” because they are “pre-destined” by their “physis”. an der wir einst zu Grunde gehen. whereas the slave- . like everyone else it seems. Critical Excursus We must deal here with a “difficulty” or “ambi-guity” in Nietzsche’s reasoning that must have become evident by now. or else they are still “necessary” within the overall “physio. if the Will to Power is “free”. Nietzsche’s “hortatory” aspect of “Will” would be superfluous in that there is no room left for “Will” in its “voluntary” (or “velleitary”) moment in “physiological” pre-destination! Conversely. then it simply abolishes or dissolves itself. no “Power”. nützlich sein mag: und selbst. because it has no “physiological” or instinctive quality. the master-morality. On the contrary. to the allure of the “artistic creativity” interpretation of the Will to Power. In the latter case.logy” of the Wille zur Macht. fortuitous and voluntary play of “history” or the “nomos”. In the case of the master-morality. then it is not a “Will” or an instinct “ of freedom” at all! (Karl Jaspers. for instance. a “fate” that is an intrinsic part of the “being-as-becoming” (Wesen als Werden) that Nietzsche envisages. and therefore part of the contingent and aleatory. science and art. then “bad conscience” and “resentment” and ultimately the ascetic ideal.

morality can be either part of a “strategy” (ideology). as we have seen. of Politik and Wissenschaft (Nietzsche’s “correct interpretation [Wissenschaft] and utilization [Politik]” of the “Symptomatologie” or “Semeiotik”) that opens up the “need-necessity” of the Rationalisierung! Differently put. “generates”. and in the case of the slave the “slave morality” contradicts its physiological function as “Will to Power”. with the sole and astoundingly brilliant exception of Massimo Cacciari’s. Erkrankung). whereas the slave morality is a Wille zur Ohnmacht which is itself only a manifestation of “disease” (Krankheit. Indeed. But the “ambiguity” is that in the case of the “master” there is no need at all for a “master morality”. pro-duces the “need-necessity” of the “e-volution” (Entwicklung) of “the ontogeny of thought” which. and that was soon to be developed conceptually by Max Weber. In this regard. in turn. have entirely neglected the “materiality” of Nietzsche’s Entwurf – the “need-necessity” of the “instincts of freedom” that engenders. that is. and . slaves). the Rationalisierung of life and the world that is the “mani-festation” of the Will to Power! By failing to see or by neglecting almost entirely this “practical” or “pragmatic” dia-noia or in-tention of Nietzsche’s Entwurf. it “over-comes” only when it be-awares of its “con-dition” through the “sign-symbol-cipher” or the ancient “omen-augury” of whether we are in a state of “strength” (Macht) or “weakness” (Ohn-macht). a “ruse” of the Wille zur Macht. unless it is used “consciously” and knowingly as a “strategy” for the Wille zur Macht. as mere “ideologies” or as “idols” or “phantoms” or “shadows” that are entirely “voluntary” or “velleitary” or “ideological” or “artistically creative”. offers a precise ontologically-grounded critique and trans-valuation of the values of bourgeois society in the era of the society of capital that allows the “critical” use of its historical means and methods to achieve specific political aims. The answer to this “difficulty” is really quite simple within Nietzsche’s critique of occidental metaphysics (Heidegger’s metaphysica generalis) because Nietzsche makes it amply clear and wholly evident that every “happening” is physio-logical in that it mani-fests a “sign”. or else it can be a real Wille zur Ohnmacht to the extent that slaves do not use their morality “consciously”. as we have adumbrated already and will outline painstakingly later. a “symptom” that we can “interpret” or “de-cipher” (cipher – sign!) and pursuant to this “divination” we can then “will” both the past and the future. The master morality is a Wille zur Macht. his philosophical pro-ject. far from atrophying into a paralyzing eclecticism. it is precisely this “co-incidence” of Will to Power and “Kultur” (or ideology). the Will to Power itself is “over-flowing spirit”. accountability) – something that Nietzsche clearly admired in Thucydides and Machiavelli. by positing a universal (ontological) Will to Power that has “differential” (ontic) historical or physiological outcomes (masters. Once again. The point that is absolutely essential to grasp is that nearly all the interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy to date. Nietzsche’s “phenomenalism and perspectivism” becomes a “powerful” tool of political praxis that invites the “scientific” and “value-free” study of the “options” available for political “decision-making” or “responsibility” (Ver-antwort-lichkeit or “answerability”. Indeed. Nietzsche’s “phenomenalism and perspectivism”. Nietzsche is positing a “single” entity with “different” outcomes – hence the “ambi-guity” or “ambi-valence” – some would call it the “a-poria”. occasions both the Vergeistigung and the Ent-wertung (or Ent-seelung). nearly all the interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy end up con-fining it to a mere “hortatory” or ethical or even moralizing “critique” of existing “values” taking these simply as “values”.

if there is one thing that the Will to Power is not.lack therefore a real “material” basis in the physiological evolution of human beings! We hardly need to recall that the first volume of Heidegger’s monumental study on Nietzsche is entitled “The Will to Power As Art”! As we are endeavouring to show unstintingly in this study. at least in tone.end up championing the primacy of “values” and “art” and turning his philosophy into yet another humanistic. the praxis and therefore the politics of life and the world in the most “radical” manner ever seen in the entire history of philosophy. almost on a par with Marx! Nietzsche’s philosophy is more than just a “philosophy”. This is from Volume One of Nietzsche. “The Structure of the ‘Major Work’”: “Corruption” and “physiological decay” and similar things are not the cause of nihilism but constitute rather its consequences. are the exact opposite of what we seek to demonstrate in this study. and above all the “creative” sphere of art! Seen in this “humanistic” light. “intellectualistic interpretation” of life and the world! Much rather and more “fundamentally and radically” for Nietzsche’s Entwurf and its Umwertung. the Will to Power seeks to re-define our entire “con-ception” of life and the world in a manner that is far from “voluntaristic” or “velleitary” or “volitional” or indeed “creative” and “artistic” (!) . his “political intention” – which is not merely “to criticize” or “to hammer” existing “values”. an “intellectualism”! It is a praxis! But a praxis that must be engaged not purely in “hortatory” or “exegetic” or “extra-moral” terms. in terms that (as Heidegger and Jaspers suggest) merely “re-place” one set of values with another. One shudders to think how “artistic” Heidegger’s exegesis of the Wille zur Macht would have been. but rather “to trans-value” them by completely – yes. as we call them “physiological need-necessity”. it is not at all surprising that nearly all these previous readings of Nietzsche – from Heidegger and Jaspers and Fink down to Deleuze and Badiou or Agamben . Nihilism therefore cannot be overcome by eliminating these conditions… [a]lthough it is also a fundamental experience of the history of the positing of values to know that the positing of supreme values does not happen suddenly. Heidegger’s lectures that compose this voluminous tome were delivered from 1936 until 1940. “voluntaristic” interpretations of Nietzsche such as these that privilege “values” over “instincts” or. at the time of its delivery given Heidegger’s complicity in the murderous designs of the Nazi dictatorship!) One example out of a myriad will serve to illustrate conclusively Heidegger’s systematic incomprehension of Nietzsche’s problematic and in-tention (dia-noia) in this respect. that the eternal truth never appears in the space of a night and that no one people [Volk] saw its truth fall from the sky. that merely “re-value” life and the world and therefore con-fine Nietzsche’s Umwertung to the ethicalmoral and ideological. even “systematically”! – “overcoming” and “over-turning” the “humanistic transcendentalism”. both the ethics and ontology and. but not published until 1961. Of course. it is “mere art”! (Indeed. they entirely traduce and wholly misrepresent Nietzsche’s Entwurf – his “plan”. much more a manner that does not idiotically recite the trite homily about how each and every human being can “live affirmatively” and “authentically” by embracing “the master morality” much as one learns the Ten Commandments or takes up painting or a hobby or a sporting activity for leisurely Sunday afternoon indulgence! .

physis) of life and the world as a manifestation of the Will to Power. then Nietzsche’s “tension” between “historical destiny” (Geschichte als Geschick. but much rather one that is the very onto-logical universal condition and foundation of life and the world. The will to power has so to speak a . we will exclude him from this review to avoid repetition. Just how distorted and inaccurate Fink’s interpretation of Nietzsche is can be illustrated wonderfully from Fink’s own summary of what he wrongly interprets Nietzsche as saying: “Nietzsche gains an insight into life as the basis of all value by sublating the selfalienation of the human existence. a cardinal point in life and the world – indeed. The Umwertung extends to “all values” (alle Werthe) including our very “conception” or “inter-pretation” of life and the world in a manner that. which treats the “Being of beings” as a “Supreme Being”. Those who fail to understand this have understood little of Nietzsche’s philosophy and absolutely nothing of his Entwurf and of the Umwertung it pro-poses and operates! The purpose of this section is to illustrate briefly how some of the major interpretations of Nietzsche’s dia-noia have failed miserably in this important regard. a condition of being-as-becoming. immutable. must affect our con-duct. The human creation of values within life is a manifestation of the will to power. If that were so. We would then fall back into the Schopenhauerian dichotomy of free esse and determined operari. not its acumen – to the early work of Cacciari. our praxis in them – but not in the sense of the Freiheit or of the Ich-heit! Always and everywhere. or physis) and “Will” (as individual voluntas and potentia. Nietzsche in-tends the Will to Power as an ineluctable destiny to which human beings are sub-jected independently of “values” and their “interpretations”. or nomos) would simply be untenable – because “willing” would belong to the humanistic Freiheit that cannot co-exist or co-incide with “fate and destiny” fixed by physio-logical “neednecessity”: human beings cannot both be “free” (as “souls”) and “not free” (as “bodies”. Man relates to himself either authentically (adopting the master morality). of “Amor Fati”. alas. (Given that much of our work owes its reasoning and analysis – if.) A. or unauthentically (adopting the slave morality). as a “need-necessity” that is much more than an “ontic” occurrence within life and the world.Nietzsche always and everywhere understands the Will to Power as a “universal condition”. Fink On Nietzsche The reason why Fink finds this “difficulty” or “ambiguity” insuperable and a ground for accusing Nietzsche of “sophistry” is that he believes that Nietzsche is still locked or stuck behind the walls of the old occidental metaphysics. as well as the manifestation of physiological “need-necessity”! This is the meaning of “the Eternal Return”. as a “fate”. as a “fixed. Values exist only because they are posited by life. yes. timeless” essence against which Nietzsche can oppose only an “ambi-guous” Will that is a contradictory mixture of freedom and necessity. and one that constitutes the very “nature” (Wesen als Werden. as an ineluctable “destiny”. Korper).

115). Fink assumes the conventional understanding of “Will” of the philosophia perennis. then they will all become “masters”. then they will live “unauthentically” as “slaves”! Put thus in Fink’s terms. and if they freely choose “to adopt” the slave morality. must be ultimately free to abolish or to supersede their antagonistic values. as Fink does. to underline the “willfulness” of the instincts in their search for the “need-necessity” of “power”. To say. that is. equally partaking of this common “human existence”. is a “distortion” of the aforesaid “human existence” and that can therefore have only an “ontic” or “historical”. so as to emphasise the “physio-logical” need-necessity of the instincts in their organic quest for “freedom”. that . all slave moralities will be abolished and declared illegal and all of us will go to sleep safe in the Heideggerian “authentic” certainty that we all belong to a “master race”! Such is the pathetic nonsense to which Fink would reduce Nietzsche – perhaps the sharpest philosophical mind humanity has produced since Kant! The paradoxical and bathetic outcome of Fink’s misinterpretation of Nietzsche is that we then have a schizophrenic Will to Power. Because Fink (not Nietzsche!) starts erroneously from the notion of Will to Power as the “self-alienation of the human existence”. Both these formulae express Nietzsche’s wish to balance “freedom” with the “necessity” of the instincts. The real origin of Fink’s confusion lies in his failure to understand how Nietzsche effectively overcomes the ontological presuppositions of the philosophia perennis that confine us to an abstract choice between “freedom” of the Will and “necessity” of its “Esse” or “Being”. it would be amazing indeed to find that anyone among us had “freely chosen the slave morality” and therefore to live “unauthentically as a slave”! With the wonderful result that surely.twofold appearance as power and lack of power. there is no notion of “authenticity” or its opposite in Nietzsche because the Will to Power is a “universal condition” that necessarily manifests itself in “appropriation and exploitation” and. as it were. power and its opposite are understood in the ontic sense. once he has thus “equated” or “homologated” the bearers of the master morality and those of the slave morality as sharing equally in “the human existence”. one with a split mentality. therefore. All along. in its “twofold appearance as power and lack of power”! In reality. contingent and accidental status. before this day is out. as we took pains to show earlier. according to which ultimately it is “human beings” in the abstract who are free to choose their destiny and therefore they are either masters or slaves depending on which “morality” they freely “adopt”! If they freely choose to live “authentically”. To say it once more. both the master and the slave. of “free volition” or “liberum arbitrium”. for Fink. but not an overarching “ontological” reality! As a result. and the “need-necessity” of “power” with the “volition” of the “Will”.” (p. It is then inevitable that for him there must be an “ambi-guity (he frankly means a “contra-diction”). and also as “Will to Power”. by definition. then. it is obvious that. in its “ideological or strategic” guise of bad conscience and the ascetic ideal. Wherever this opposition is mentioned in the context of the will to power. it follows therefrom that their “antagonistic values” are the result of a common “ selfalienation” that. this is the reason why Nietzsche describes the “Will” both as “instinct of freedom”.

In the process. If anything. Fink then engages in a strenuous effort to sidestep the obvious “eristic” anti-humanistic consequences of this: . growth or evolution in time we can meaningfully call “history”! (Karl Lowith lays out this critique of Heidegger’s ontology with enviable mastery in his Heidegger. But in fact Nietzsche has “over-come” (that is the meaning [noeo]. to which our notions of “history” and “memory” belong – and. which is what allows him to reach a novel conception of the “Will”. to make) of human beings and therefore ought to be known better than “physical objects”. on the other side (almost literally!).) Perspicuously realizing that Nietzsche places “conflict and strife”. the other dimension of “time”. he investigates them all according to their implicit value judgements. not Raum) for that “physis” whose material de-velop-ment or un-fold-ing. the in-tention [dia-noia] of the Ubermensch. not a purely ontological one.” (p. It may be instructive to note. Also. Nietzsche will similarly stress the retardation of “the awakening sciences” due to the apparent “familiarity” of psychological events. trans-crescence or meta-morphosis. materialistic “ramifications and developments” of the “instinct of freedom”. with regard to Vico. may have been inspired by the title of the great Italian philosopher’s magnum opus. Nietzsche’s ontology is much to be preferred to Heidegger’s to the extent that the Wille zur Macht and the Amor Fati permit a conception of “physis” that is “physiological” in a material. In pointed contrast. interpret and utilize antagonistic moralities. together with the notion of “verum ipsum factum”. indeed war. Denker in durftiger Zeit. Negri in ‘Spinoza essays’. that Nietzsche’s title for one of his most important works. of the Will to Power. La Scienza Nuova. as when Epimenides “prophesied the past”. Heidegger’s ontological Dasein is entirely con-fined to an ontological “intuition of primordial time” (wholly derived from Kant) that resembles Pascal’s “condition humaine” in that it “freezes” the Da-sein in a “sur-face” or “hori-zon of Being” (time) that simply does not allow physical “space” (again. though not avowedly. and that leaves “space” for human “history” as the organic. all notions of “space” and therefore “immanence” is made in our study on ‘Heidegger’s Kantbuch’. it is the Uber-windung!) this “dichotomy” that Fink wrongly attributes to him between “ontological” and “ontic”. all the better to retain the “immanentistic” or “materialist” perspectivism that he proposed from the outset. the notion espoused also by Machiavelli that “facts” are the “makings” (Latin facere. Nietzsche clearly develops his own perspective of time and history which enables him to de-scribe and pre-scribe historical events. La Gaya Scienza.111) is tantamount to implying that Nietzsche remains tied to the “ontic” reality of “values” and is unable “to transcend” them ontologically. or that it would re-cur in cycles (anakyklosis) as with Polybius and Vico.“Nietzsche sees in all traditional philosophy what he does himself: reducing the ontological questions to questions of value. the “extra-temporal” dimension that is the ultimate human intuition of “time” and that enables Nietzsche (be-tween the walls of past and future) to challenge the “linear” notion of “history” (as the sequence of nowmoments) and contrast it to the “circular” one of Antiquity in which it was even surmised that the past would repeat itself e-venientially. Ort. Nietzsche’s entire conception of “time” and “history” allows him to draw a firm “line” – a “hori-zon”! – be-tween the “intra-temporal” sequence of now-moments. where the theory of historical “corsi e ricorsi” (occurrences and recurrencies) was first expounded. Goethian sense. at the origins of language and consciousness. The further charge that Heidegger’s purely transcendental intuition of time excludes implicitly.

47 and p. though there may be in Schopenhauer. primordial will” in Nietzsche. of social rank order. there is no such “unified. overflowing as it is with the most bathetic “humanistic” expressions. How radically this interpretation diverges from ours barely deserves discussion. starting with the complete nonsense of “[Nietzsche’s] superhuman understanding of genius and his function in a unified. The facile manner in which Fink “flies over” in the twinkling of an eye Nietzsche’s most profound insights in the Second Untimely Meditation (at p. p. His superhuman understanding of genius and his function in a unified.“Nietzsche’s cult of the genius assimilates traces of a hero worship. But there can be absolutely no possibility whatsoever that Nietzsche ever overlooked the fundamental and irresoluble conflict between the “master morality of the superior race”. so to speak). determines the theory of culture on the surface. Fink is as wrong as wrong can be to opine that in Nietzsche there is anything even remotely resembling all these “grand notions” that Fink describes.… the herd member” – that he ever contemplated overcoming this “separation” (Trennung) in the name of “alienated self-consciousness” (which Fink mentions earlier and then again discusses on p. He is torn between a purely anthropocentric conception distinguishing the extremes of the creative and the impotent type. correctly. 49) and. indeed. and the slave morality of “the impotent type. that his view of history is both “diagnostic” and “programmatic” (a “divination”. of the genius and the herd member. Although he inquires into the ‘great man’ whenever he wishes to express the essence of humanity. primordial will of the world is almost obscured by the emphasis on a ‘greatness’ which portrays itself as a human achievement. 30) that we have just discussed at length – merely to note. on one side.” (‘NP’. that he aimed at “a more profound conception of humanity that transcends humanism and understands man through his cosmic mission in which he becomes the medium of universal truth”! With this sentence alone. his exposition of human greatness vacillates within the mentioned ambiguity. We have identified here an essential feature of Nietzsche: his concept of the human being is ambiguous. primordial will”. most monstrously ludicrous of all. Yet Fink’s approach is wonderfully illustrative of the “cosmic” stupidity that seems to envelop even the most erudite and perceptive minds when it comes to Nietzsche’s anthropology (his “physiological psychology”. 27). we have called it) – is most regrettable. and a more profound conception of humanity that transcends humanism and understands man through his cosmic mission in which he becomes the medium of universal truth. a clairvoyance.philosophisch” ontology and to his ontogenetic approach. Fink’s “diminution” of Nietzsche’s treatment of Greek philosophy (but how can one argue this when one considers Nietzsche’s profound learning on Heraclitus and Socrates?) has probably much to do with Heidegger’s own willful misinterpretation of Nietzsche in his attempt to . Fink is right to say that there is some “ambiguity” in Nietzsche’s “concept of the human being” – and we have traced its source to his ultimately “transcendental. To a great extent. The pathos of distance. one feels completely defeated. As we have seen. which we still preferred to Heidegger’s. it is precisely such “unity” of the will that Nietzsche attacks as the source of Schopenhauer’s delusions about “intelligible freedom”! Yes. This tension in the concept of the human being remains always alive in the development of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

something we steadfastly denied above: “It is particularly obvious here how Nietzsche transforms (and perhaps must transform) all ontological questions into questions of value. Fink concludes predictably that Nietzsche ignores entirely the question of being in Parmenides: “Nietzsche establishes a contrast to this view of Heraclitus which in its contrast is equally revealing. rigid. as if he were marking an essay submitted by a callow undergraduate! To claim that for Nietzsche “‘Being’ is only an abstract term for a fiction of human imagination” is the closest thing to lunacy imaginable! To proceed and opine with unabashed stupidity that “Being is something fixed. Being is something fixed. essence.claim originality for posing the question of “the being of Being”. 32-3). builds and destroys innocently – and in this. in the empty shells of the most indeterminate concepts. the blood curdles if one touches them. Once more. of the philosophia perennis. what is obvious instead is Fink’s total confusion – again. eternity itself is at play” – what can this be. God) – he mistakes these “fictions of human imagination” for Nietzsche’s very understanding of “being-asbecoming”.Truth is now supposed to live only in the most pale. lifeless and opposed to becoming for him. like life to death. immovable. of time as the horizon of being. lifeless and opposed to becoming for him” is certifiable and patented madness! Truly Fink is clasping at “shadows”! He takes Nietzsche’s veritable assault on the “fixity” of Western metaphysical notions of “Being” (substance. 33). except yet another description of time as our intuitive horizon of Being? Fink then quotes from Nietzsche to illustrate his contention: “ ‘But nobody tackles such terrifying abstractions as 'Being' and 'Non-Being' without punishment. After noting the centrality of “children’s play”. of “creative destruction” in Nietzsche’s engagement with Heraclitus.” (pp.” (pp. most abstract generalities . for an ideal object without corresponding reality for him.. like logical concept to intuition. immovable. this is rank and utter nonsense from a disciple of Heidegger who now applies the most jejune obfuscations propagated by “the master” to discharge what he sees as his “tutorial duty” – betrayed by a pedantic “didactic” tone . substratum. Parmenides relates to Heraclitus like ice to fire.. Once again. the “eternally identical innocence” to which Fink himself has just alluded! What in heaven and on earth is Nietzsche’s “supreme metaphor” of the “eternally living fire [that like children and artists] plays. 31-2). ‘Being’ is only an abstract term for a fiction of human imagination. in acolytic and doctrinal subservience to Heidegger – of how those “questions of value” go right to the very foundations of occidental metaphysics. and the children’s play as the “Unschuldig-keit”. like an abstraction. and trapped in formulas…’ ” (p.. like in a house of cobwebs. And the philosopher sits next to such truth seemingly bloodless.with respect to Nietzsche – truly a “genius” of far superior speculative reach and depth than Fink’s or Heidegger’s -. Nietzsche has made no attempt to overcome the common dichotomy and to think the opposition between being and becoming from within the ontological problem. ens realissimum. . rigid. Nietzsche does not see Parmenides’s originality because he fails to see the speculative death of the ontological problem altogether.

religion and art – indeed “all values”! – crash into and shatter against the hard rock of Nihilism precisely because they have self-dissolved (Selbst-aufgehoben). climbing and rise!] of the “scientific Will to Truth”! Metaphysics. as with Hume. and even of art and its “values”! It is far more than an “unmasking [that] does not use the tools of any particular science”. .and so. 36ff) Only somebody who has either not read Nietzsche’s works or is so intellectually smothered in the thrall of Heidegger’s selfserving and stultified misinterpretation of Nietzsche could ever advance such an outrageously misguided travesty of Nietzsche’s theses in ‘HATH’! It simply beggars belief that Fink could have missed so ignorantly Nietzsche’s devastating confrontation with the Vollendung (the completion. most abstract generalities. (Cf. but rather with the unequivocal aim of re-constructing the practical foundations of ontology and epistemology.… the empty shells of the most indeterminate concepts” – a reduction egregiously exemplified by Heidegger with his monumentally dishonest attempt (in his Nietzsche) to confute Nietzsche’s originality and to“appropriate” his revolutionary “devaluation” (Entwertung) and “completion” (Vollendung) of metaphysics in the “transvaluation of all values” (Umwertung) well before the publication of ‘Sein und Zeit’! As is sadly well known. far from showing that he renounced or ignored or even failed to tackle the ontological demands imposed by his critical quest. per-fection and therefore “shipwreck”) of metaphysics in the new A-skesis [literally. culminating with his culpable complicity with the Nazi regime and his even more despicable attempts to conceal it. Quite the opposite! It is true that Nietzsche applies the principles of “science” to the scientific enterprise: but that is done diabolically to sweep away in a few cataclysmic aphorisms the entire agon of two thousand years of Western metaphysical and scientific enquiry! And that not. by implication for Fink. as even Fink refers to it – to “the most pale. far from being “scientific” and “enlightened”. deals the final and most lethal blow imaginable to the entire edifice of “scientific methodology” and its “values”. metaphysics and art”! (Fink. pp.Yet. Nietzsche here is ironically and quite appropriately voicing his indignant condemnation of the “blood-curdling” manner in which Western “philosophy” has from its earliest days reduced the “eternal fire” of our engagement with “Being” – with “life and the world”. Nietzsche’s critique.) It is hard to imagine how anyone could characterise the earth-shattering unhinging of the foundations of metaphysics that Nietzsche perpetrates in ‘HATH’ and then in the epoch-changing works after ‘Zarathustra’ as “a focus on the human condition” whereby “life is no longer understood metaphysically and mystically… but is understood as a biological concept” and as the application of “enlightenment scientific principles” [sic!] to the de-structive critique of “religion. fastidious and formalistic scepticism. because the very “science” to which the Rationalisierung has led them now finally re-veals their “decadence” and utter “dis-integration” (Dis-gregation) together with that of its own foundations except to the extent that science is the expression of Will to Power! In other words. of psychology and not least of politics – without which no “transvaluation of all values” could be even imaginable! – So much for “Enlightenment” and “scientific positivism”! . Lowith’s accounts on these matters. ful-filment. this was neither the first nor the last time that Heidegger displayed his appalling lack of the “authenticity” he theorised. in the name of a wanton. of morality and its “values”. one that uses generic “scientific tools”. of economics and its “values”.

Far from it! It is the fundamental intuition of “being and time” that animates and motivates all of the Nietzschean oeuvre. as Fink quite falsely or mistakenly asserts (p. man’s “self-alienation” is “overcome”]. Nietzsche’s entire philosophy is aimed at showing that no such .116) Could anybody improve on such bold nonsense? Far from “struggling for human liberation”. 50). This is complete nonsense – a travesty of Nietzsche’s thought that reduces it to the existentialist musings and banality of Sartre’s “iron in the soul” or to Milan Kundera’s equally unbearable “unbearable lightness of being” – “…the expression of a new human thinking which has become conscious of his own freedom” (Fink. 45). 52) – and at the same time to un-mask. “Human freedom”! Could anyone who has read our account of Nietzsche’s clear indictment of the Freiheit countenance for a moment Fink’s interpretation of Nietzsche? Because Fink starts from the proton pseudes that Nietzsche’s critique is intended to elevate us to a “cosmic mission” toward “the universal truth… of man’s own freedom”. But this “from within” clearly stresses Nietzsche’s questioning of the foundations (Heidegger’s Grundlegungen) of metaphysics. his Great War. Nietzsche intends the “genealogy” of values and morals as an illustration of his “physiological” (not “biological”) perspectivism. He intends to struggle for human liberation. Nietzsche wages a war. The fact that life and the world cannot be “com-prehended” does not mean in the least that the intuition of “the being of beings” is abandoned or neglected.interpretation of life and the world always “from within the Will”. against all kinds of self-alienation and enslaved human existence. 38). like Cacciari. Listen to Fink: “Whatever seemed divine. “The Zarathustra is the implied foundation of all subsequent treatises. Man recovers all transcendental attributes. ultimately what Nietzsche intends (or “ought” [!] to intend in Fink’s stultified interpretation) is the superseding of “self-alienation” – delivering Nietzsche safe and sound into the capable hands of Hegel (see p.” (p. on p. One could say in fact that Nietzsche’s entire “philosophy” is an attempt to “instantiate” or “exemplify” the “tragic” figure of the Wanderer (quoted by Fink. not just the presuppositions of “values” (Fink. The physis is intended to give preeminence to the “materialist” or “organic” – as against the “idealistic” and “decadent” . science and morality. He is given thus the utmost freedom of a bold mission. or whatever seemed to transcend man and earth is [for Nietzsche] merely a creation of human existence. 45). 49)! And Comte! Fink goes so far as to classify Nietzsche’s ‘Gaya Scienza’ as “scientific positivism”! We spent the better part of our work underlining Nietzsche’s revulsion at transcendentalism and his radical espousal of immanence: here is how Fink impertinently and impenitently mis-represents him instead: “Man is conceived as a self-transcending being and idealism is inverted [in other words. 43) but above all the ideological and strategic role sustained by the “values” of occidental thought. it is obvious that he finds Nietzsche’s “unmasking” of morality as the strictest “need-necessity” quite naive and unwarranted and that. indeed. including those of “science” first and foremost! Quite evidently. p.Fink unbelievably mistakes Nietzsche’s “genealogy” as a revulsion against “idealisms” – totally forgetting that the “transvaluation” is aimed at “all” (!) values.” (p.” (p. p.

also the sensory and remains within the “sphere” of the “ontic”. Consequently. almost identical to Fink’s first half of his book but vaguer and more “oracular”. as is still the case in Kant. Heidegger. the Wille zur Macht and its “rationalization of the world” as its own self-affirmation! The Wille zur Macht is not the “overcoming” of “self-alienation” and the achieving of “human liberation”: rather. Cacciari absolves Fink from this charge and in fact praises him for the insight (‘PNR’. in speaking about the death of God. If. Heidegger’s related attempt to confine Nietzsche to the sphere of “Values” and “metaphysics” – in “The Meaning of ‘God Is Dead’” in Holzwege (p. and the affirmation of Life and the World – the Amor Fati. Heidegger’s Interpretation Where Fink finally and gratifyingly overcomes his devotion to Heidegger and Husserl is in the final part of his book where his assessment of Nietzsche’s philosophy comes much closer to our own.liberation is possible! – Because the Will to Power will inevitably generate and regenerate (physis) masters and slaves.157). Since Plato. Heidegger simply refuses to relinquish his prejudice that Nietzsche’s Beingas-Becoming is yet another “ontic” characterization of the question of Being and even goes so far as to compare Nietzsche’s notion of Will to Power to Schelling’s conception of the Will! As Cacciari puts it. in Heidegger’s article on ‘Who Is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?” wherein Heidegger first “universalizes” or “ontologises” Nietzsche’s notion of “revenge” or ressentiment to a moment of the human condition and then adduces it as evidence of his still being “chained” to the “ontic completion” of Western metaphysics! Despite seemingly engaging with Nietzsche’s novel conception of time. the changeable and therefore the merely apparent world. winners and losers. or more accurately. this “need-necessity”. we call the sensory world the . but see also chapter 5 of Vol. as against Fink in his long discussion of the Zarathustra. the “realization that God is dead”. as it still was for Schelling and Schopenhauer: at the same time. it surpasses the equally “humanistic” reading. Just consider with what inveterate and consummate charlatanry Heidegger attempts to relegate Nietzsche’s most profound critique and reformulation of the very quest of metaphysics back to the point where Schopenhauer began his critique of Kant! “It is clear from this sentence [“God is dead”] that Nietzsche. fails to notice that the Ubermensch (Zarathustra) is no longer the “Subject” of Western metaphysics. But it is no less certain and no less to be kept in mind beforehand that Nietzsche uses the names "God" and "Christian God" to indicate the supersensory world in general. again fails to grasp the fact that Nietzsche does theorise a new conception of Being-as-Becoming that precedes Heidegger’s own intuition of time as the horizon of Being in Sein und Zeit. by reflex. The this-worldly world is the vale of tears in contrast to the mountain of eternal bliss of the other side.49 – but see below for fuller discussion). B.1 of Nietzsche – on the obvious ground that the “transvaluation” of values does not ipso facto “overcome” Value but merely negates the “supersensory” and therefore. In contrast to it. this realm of the supersensory has been considered the true and actually real world. time and history. the sensory world is only the unreal this-worldly world. the Eternal Return of the Same in the novel Nietzschean intuition of being. means the Christian God. since the late Greek and the Christian interpretations of the Platonic philosophy. it is the “renunciation” (Entsagung) of these (humanistic) “Values”. p. and the “over-coming” of this reality con-sists precisely in the devaluation (Ent-wertung) and transvaluation (Um-wertung) of “all values” that wish to deny and refute this “reality”. God is the name for the realm of ideas and the ideal.

Metaphysics. i.e. as metaphysics.. and beauty: truth. what everything is everywhere dependent upon. It does not bestow life. i. in fact it is embroiled in it to such a degree that it is sealed off from its essence and. "God is dead" means: the supersensory world has no effective power. pp. i. goodness.physical world in the broadest sense.166)." Nietzsche. is unable ever to think its own essence.” (Holzwege. we will leave it an open question whether with this understanding Nietzsche has already caught the essence of nihilism or whether he can catch it. God. it is always only a consequence of nihilism: for it could be that Christianity itself represents a consequence and a form of nihilism…. aphorism no. Since all it does is turn metaphysics upside down. This is the reason that. what one understands by that term is truth. beauty. But it may be interesting to ask what Heidegger himself thinks “supersensory world” means. is at an end. the authority of reason.e. the supersensory world as the world that truly is and that determines everything. it is patently obvious that by “supersensory world” Heidegger intends a class or genus of “ideas and ideals” that in no guise correspond to what Nietzsche had in mind as the ultimate “objective” of his critique and “pro-ject”. which for Nietzsche is Western philosophy understood as Platonism. in the essence of what it is challenging..e. rather. it is above all essential that we reflect. to begin with. Nietzsche poses the question (The Will to Power. Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as the countermovement against metaphysics.” (p. accordingly. ideals and ideas. Unbelief in the sense of apostasy from the Christian doctrine of faith is therefore never the essence or the ground of nihilism. Heidegger attempts to caricature Nietzsche as a brash Sundaymass atheistic brat who has lost.165). That is why we will now ask Nietzsche himself what he understands by nihilism." This answer is emphasized and a supplementary explanation is provided: "The goal is missing. like everything anti-. that which truly is. In a note from 1887. progress. the order and unity of beings in their entirety.” (p. but also and necessarily the very “notion” of a “substance” or “sub-stratum” or “essence” or “quidditas” or Being that sub-tends or sublates and sustains existence and reality.162-3). “In contrast to this.e. it necessarily remains trapped. moral law. then the supersensory world is the metaphysical world. and civilization to forfeit their constructive power and to become void. comprehends nihilism as a historical process. what has “died” with “God” is not simply and only “the guarantee” of all that we believe – all our “highest values” or the “supersensory world” -. culture. He interprets this process as the devaluation of the hitherto highest values.. not just “God”. but his marbles too! To say that Nietzsche was merely “countering Platonism” is a statement of such bestial effrontery as to deserve no further evaluation. ideas. against Platonism. the goals and grounds that determine and support all beings and human life in particular: all these are represented here in the meaning of the "highest values. there remains hidden what actually happens in and as metaphysics itself." According to a view current even now. God. for us to see whether his curtailment of Nietzsche is appropriate or even fair: “Metaphysics is the space of history in which it becomes destiny for the supersensory world. We are calling this essential ruin of supersensory its putrefaction. In one fell swoop. Nietzsche's countermovement against metaphysics remains embroiled in it and has no way out. i. As a mere countermovement. Now. goodness. however. life and the world! What dies with “God” is not just the “supersensory . for him.. Not only! But Heidegger even insinuates that Nietzsche conceived of these “ideas and ideals” purely “as [part of] a historical process” and that therefore he contemplated them from a merely “ontic” philosophical standpoint! Yet it ought to be absolutely blindingly obvious from our careful analysis of what Nietzsche himself intended by “history” and “time” that such “conventional” or “ontic” notions of time and history are as far from Nietzsche’s mind as a black hole is from light! If “God is dead”. for and through metaphysics. 2): "What does nihilism mean?" He gives the answer: "That the highest values devalue themselves. the happiness of the greatest number. the answer to 'why?' is missing.

its forms: we live right in their midst. chapter 5 of Volume One is titled “Nietzsche’s Manner of Thinking As Reversal”. however much he may “magnanimously” concede to him the “completion” (Vollendung) of this same old metaphysics! (Similarly. of that “suprasensory world” that Heidegger had just “emptied” for “replacement” with “altered”. . albeit “revalued”. however. from 1887): "Incomplete nihilism. the supersensory as a of ideas and ideals” – that world had already been “annihilated” by the “incomplete nihilism” that Nietzsche discusses. values! Small wonder that Heidegger saddles Nietzsche with the same old metaphysics of the philosophia perennis. 28. but it always puts them in the old place.168-9). that the entire extent of Nietzsche’s unprecedented “challenge” to our understanding of the foundations of being – being understood as “becoming”. as it were. however “altered and revalued”. must eliminate even the place of value itself. of time and history – was to ex-cogitate yet another “intellectualistic” scale of values. then it follows inevitably that “[c]omplete nihilism … must eliminate even the place of value itself. about which Nietzsche writes (The Will to Power. he has already decreed that. no.1 of his Nietzsche). preserved as the ideal region of the supersensory. the supersensory as a realm.) In no way can this apply to Nietzsche’s Will to Power and the “intuition of time and place” that corresponds to its being a “universal condition” and that Nietzsche calls “the Eternal Return”! It is entirely obvious that what Nietzsche meant by “incomplete nihilism” was not a defective or deficient nihilism that he himself was going somehow to make “complete” (!). we refer to our study ‘Umkehrung: Schopenhauer’s Reversal of Kant’s Metaphysics”. furtively and oafishly as does Heidegger. But again this ‘Umkehrung’ [Reversal] describes rather Schopenhauer’s “substitution” or “replacement” of Kant’s “objective” thing-in-itself with the Will-to-Life! Again. whatever else it may mean." We can grasp Nietzsche's thoughts about incomplete nihilism more clearly and acutely by saying: incomplete nihilism indeed replaces the former values by others. Complete nihilism. but rather a nihilism that was “incomplete” as a critique of those “supreme values” and their “supersensory world” – Schopenhauer’s “metaphysical need”! . that is to say. The attempts to escape nihilism without revaluing the former values: they produce the opposite. is absurd even before it is ridiculous! Nor can Heidegger be accused of excessive subtlety in his “attempt” (a dart at him from the subtitle of Nietzsche’s Will to Power: An ‘Attempt’ at the Transvaluation of All Values”) to preempt the issue by “saddling” Nietzsche with the burden of “traditional metaphysics” (the title of chapter 6 of Vol. and it must accordingly alter and revalue values differently. which is. Breathtaking.” (pp. even before Heidegger examines what Nietzsche means by “transvaluation of all values” (poorly translated here as “revaluation”). as the com-prehension of life and the world. the chicanery with which Heidegger misinterprets Nietzsche! For if indeed Nietzsche’s answer to “incomplete nihilism” is simplistically “to replace” it with a “complete nihilism” (whatever else?). make the problem more acute. “Thus "incomplete nihilism" arises. and it must accordingly alter and revalue values differently”! In other words.precisely because it failed “to com-prehend” the “origins” (ontic and ontological) of the “values” it purported to refute! To opine. “it must… alter and revalue values differently” – and therefore necessarily “remain” in the “realm” of “values”.

there is a ‘better’ world than this one so chained to sensible things. states as follows: this world has no value. political. the supreme principle of morality.” One simply has to brace in horror at the appalling ignorance that Heidegger displays here of Nietzsche’s meaning on what is the most essential point of his entire philosophy! Heidegger would have Nietzsche say that “the world of the senses is ‘the true world’”! Yet the entire thrust of Nietzsche’s philosophy is precisely this: . and wholly unjustifiably . where this extraordinary statement is to be found: “According to Nietzsche’s interpretation. of error. the one that in Platonic terms is the world of appearance and falsehood. Yet we have amply shown that Heidegger’s “interpretation” is baseless.of this Nietzschean vision. The sensible world. another quidditas. It means precisely what properly constitutes the being of beings. . the supersensory one.Nietzsche’s conception of the Will to Power. there is another world superior to it that is the ‘true’ world. In the words of Karl Lowith (‘Interpretation of what remains unsaid in the saying “God is dead”’. referring it interpretatively to “the era of the completion [Vollendung] of subjectivity”. Having thus “defined” – crippled. in Heidegger ): Nietzsche did not then remove the dignity of Being by imposing a “value” on it: on the contrary. as we know. epistemological even more than ontological and ethical . it is Heidegger who subtracts from the central thought of Nietzsche its peculiarity. is an error. is the defect of all “traditional metaphysics” that.1) what he needed to prove: – that the Will to Power is another “Value”. precede his ontology: We said by way of anticipation that Will to Power is a name for the fundamental character of all beings. the supersensory world. of Christian religion and of the philosophy expounded by Plato. to seek “the truth” is – precisely! – tantamount to attempting to give life and the world a “Value” that they simply do not (!) have! Small wonder. for Heidegger. this truth.Just how profoundly Heidegger misconstrues Nietzsche’s entire problematic and Entwurf is illustrated drastically and dramatically in chapter 12 of Vol. . is the true world. Heidegger is then free to argue (again in chapter 6 of Vol. then.1 of Nietzsche. another “whatness” that defines the “fundamental character of all beings” but does not question their “being”! And this. that Heidegger can conclude that Nietzsche is still “stuck” in the “idealist” world of “traditional metaphysics”! More execrably misconceived misinterpretation and usurpation of Nietzsche’s philosophy could not be achieved even by the most clueless of parish priests! Heidegger has simply misunderstood completely the frighteningly farreaching implications – practical. in fact.implications that will form the object of our study in Part Two. the world of the senses is only one of appearances…. Nietzsche says instead: this “true world” of morality is an invention.that there is no (!) truth! There is no truth whether in the “sensory” world or in the (Platonic) “suprasensory” world! For Nietzsche.

However. The dispensation of value is new because it itself makes its principle secure and at the same time holds fast to this securement as a value established on the basis of its principle. Yet it is equally obvious even to the most pedantic critic that this in no way implies that the Will to Power itself (!) is sub-ordinated to the sphere of “values”! As Cacciari himself (a proud exponent. This is why the will to power.e. Heidegger insists on whipping the dead horse of “the Will to Power as positing values”! It is true that for Nietzsche “the manifestation” of the Will to Power in life and the world entails the positing of values – although. the will to power is also (in relation to the former values) the principle of the revaluation of all former values. and undoubtedly the most capable.” (p. only when it becomes true and is accordingly conceived as the reality of all that is real. to establish the new principle of the revaluation of all values is to bring about the reversal of all metaphysics. Nietzsche takes this reversal as the overcoming of metaphysics. in the knowledge of its principle. the Will to Power must be seen as a “condizione universale” and not as a concept “defined” by “values”! Quite astounding and unforgivable is Heidegger’s mulish insistence on exploiting Nietzsche’s human “embodiment” of the Will to Power in the Ubermensch as an obvious in-stance of what he calls the “subjectity” [its being a “subject”] of the Will to Power – something akin perhaps even to the Christian velle (will)! . Yet because the hitherto highest values ruled the sensory from the height of the supersensory. It is not until the will to power comes to light as the fundamental trait of all that is real." With this it becomes clear: values are the conditions. as displayed by the “evolution” or “onto-geny of thought” – which is why we have spoken of “need-necessity”. The principle of dispensing values has now been discerned. no." i.. posited by the will to power itself. of the left-Heideggerian camp) argues quite correctly (at p.Far from “confining” himself to these “deadbeat” concepts or to Heidegger’s stringent sense of “the historical process” – both easier to defenestrate than a Papal Encyclic -. that we see where values originate from and by what means all value-estimation is supported and directed. however.e. in the Rationalisierung as the “destiny” of life and the world! This is something that Heidegger seems to be either too incompetent or too biased to comprehend! “Hence Nietzsche says (“The Will to Power”. as this principle that has been discerned and therefore willed. on the basis of being as the ground of beings. with the Will to Power as “the universal condition” of life and the world (Lowith calls it “universal conception”) that finds its “instinctive”. not in a “logical” or even “onto-logical” sense but rather in a “physio-psychological” or organicist or even “instinctual” sense. “organic” and “physio-logical” manifestation in the “ontogeny of thought”. of the will to power itself.49. ‘PNR’). from 1887): “Values and their alteration stand in relation to the growth in power of the one that sets values. not “necessarily”. The dispensation of values can be accomplished in the future "in principle. because it is now achieved for the first time knowingly. every reversal of this kind will only be a self-blinding entanglement in what is the same though become unrecognizable. and because metaphysics is what structured that rule. is at the same time the principle of a new dispensation of value . as we have taken care to emphasise. Nietzsche actually “positions” his critique of those “idols” and these metaphysical realities from a purely “ontological” perspective that “calls into question” both the “ideas and ideals” as well as the “time and history” within which they ec-sist “ontically”! Nietzsche “hammers” these “idols” not at all (!) for their being “supersensory” or merely “illusory”. As the principle of the new dispensation of value. i.. but much rather for their assuming a “strategic” role within his overall metaphysical re-interpretation of life and the world – of “reality” – “from within the Will”.173) But the only mind succumbing to “a self-blinding [self-deluding] entanglement” here is plainly Heidegger’s own! With insolent obstinacy.

of “a higher history” ."” (p. as the being of beings. the “overcoming” of both the “subject” and of “subjective-ness” (or “subjectity” in this translation of Heidegger) is one of Nietzsche’s most pressing preoccupations – as even a glance at Aphorisms 481 to 492 of ‘Wille zur Macht’ will make overwhelmingly obvious. p. the will to power. demonstrates already Heidegger’s in-comprehension of the Will to Power. as Cacciari notes with a hint of exasperation. To be entirely brutal. Self-consciousness. Lowith shows Heidegger too much deference in this regard: for it is no exaggeration to say that Heidegger’s effort here is so pedestrian.“because in it the principle of all dispensation of value. of “humanity’s essence”. Heidegger “nella sua attenzione per il rapporto tra Nietzsche e la metafisica della soggettivita’. is specifically experienced and undertaken as the reality of what is real. – indeed. the will to power. thereby takes the final step. as the being of beings”. The humanity that wills its own being-human as the will to power and finds this being human to be at home in the reality determined in its entirety by the will to power is determined by a form of human essence that goes beyond erstwhile man. often mistranslated as “re-valuation”] in Zarathustra: he fails to notice the fact that the Ubermensch is no longer Subject) As we shall see in Part Two. Heidegger] can glimpse only the “transvaluation” [of all values.49). Heidegger summarises his own argument in perhaps the most self-defeating manner imaginable: . in which modern humanity has its essence.” (‘PNR’. is specifically experienced and undertaken as the reality of what is to be even beneath our dignity to condemn. Karl Lowith. Heidegger’s references to the Will to Power as falling still within the purview of “self-consciousness”. Denker in durftiger Zeit).187). and nodding approvingly to Fink. man himself moves into another history that is higher because in it the principle of all dispensation of value. After such consciousness. intravvede soltanto l’Umwertung dello Zarathustra: non coglie il fatto che il Super-Uomo non e’ piu’ Soggetto. It wills itself as the enforcer of the absolute will to power. so jejune and invidious. The name for this form of humanity's essence that goes beyond the previous race is "the overman. The decline of normative values is at an end. remarks in terms and for reasons nearly identical to ours on Heidegger’s strained interpretation of precisely these particular Aphorisms to highlight his sophistry and exegetical extremism.“With the consciousness that "God is dead" a consciousness begins to form of a radical revaluation of the hitherto highest values. they exhibit his own Will to Power (!) (an accusation this whose gravity is alleviated by Lowith’s own iteration) to compress Nietzsche’s notion as yetanother “being among beings” that does not “overcome” the very “ontic fixity” of Being that Nietzsche deprecated so unsparingly! Yet again. (in his preoccupation [sit venia verbo!] to establish the nexus between Nietzsche and the metaphysics of subjectivity [“subjectity”. Nihilism . so unworthy of a great thinker – witness the absurdly ridiculous contortions and sophistries to which he descends in the pages just preceding the passage quoted above . in tones far more temperate and cadenced than ours (in Heidegger. Anyone who has read and understood our presentation on Nietzsche’s conception of his “pro-ject” or Entwurf of philosophical reflection will know that there is absolutely no basis on which Heidegger could advance these arguments save as to seek to buttress his unfounded claim to originality in this particular aspect of philosophical reflection! With the attention-seeking insecurity of a childish prankster."that the highest values devalue themselves" is overcome.

Heidegger would still have jumped the gun and drawn a false illation. again. to refer to the controversy with Rudolf Carnap as to the “meaninglessness” of certain Heideggerian propositions). And what if it is only in that nothing that the formerly disguised essence of nihilism announces itself? Would thinking in values then be pure nihilism? But yet Nietzsche grasps the metaphysics of the will to power precisely as the overcoming of nihilism. And indeed. something that can occupy the void left by the devaluation (Entwertung – emptying out) of values. Aph.provided that nihilism is understood only as the devaluation of the highest values and the will to power as the principle of the revaluation of all values on the basis of a new dispensation [value-positing] of values. “ir-reality” of values. our instincts and their impulses for and against”). in its very “overcoming” (Uberwindung) of values. as the dominant translations indicate! And even if we agreed with him to define this “re-placement” as something that follows in the premises of our reasoning just as night follows day (or “as a true bears its fruit”. However. A sophist he may be – but Heidegger is no logician (it may be appropriate here. but he never thereby con-fuses or conflates the two events or indeed the two separate “concepts”. the metaphysics of the will to power is an overcoming of nihilism . But that is very far from saying that by that token. in this overcoming of nihilism. the Will to Power also is a Value! As Nietzsche stresses again and again. as he should but cannot. “the ineffectiveness of values”.physiologically not apodictically “necessary” -. worse still. For what he has failed to demonstrate. If indeed we define the Will to Power as “the overcoming of nihilism” and nihilism itself as “the devaluation [Entwertung] of values”. their “selfdissolution” (Selbst-Aufhebung.or an event with a cause or an effect! (See. “it is our needs that interpret the world. and then “thinking” with “a subject that thinks” . value-thinking is elevated into a principle”(p. is only “need-necessary” .“What is going on with being? With being nothing is going on. to quote Nietzsche) – something that Heidegger himself perceived and showed ably earlier in this piece –. albeit tangentially.477 in ‘WM’: “ both the agent and the agency are fanciful!”) This would be a little like saying that a “law” designed to prevent and punish a crime actually necessarily engenders (“dispenses” or “posits” or “thinks”) crimes and. But Heidegger has mistaken here this “trans-valuation of all values” with “the will to power as the principle of the revaluation of all values on the basis of a new dispensation [better translated as “value-positing”] of values”! This is an illation that he has no right to make. also thereby “to elevate valuethinking into a principle”. by its “valuethinking” (or “value-positing”) or even by its “imposition” (dispensation) of values (which. And that “something” is for Nietzsche “the transvaluation of all values”. as Heidegger does here! . for instance. is necessarily itself a crime – because it is “crime-thinking” or “crime-positing”! (George Orwell himself could not conceive of more absurd “doublespeak”!) Nietzsche himself attacks the “physical laws” of cause and effect. we must not confuse “thoughts” with “thinking”. it follows inexorably therefrom that “the overcoming of nihilism” must be concerned with “the positing of something that can replace values”. in the ontogeny of thought). the shipwreck of the intrinsic “insubstantiality”. although it may be due to his (perhaps “willful”) con-flation and con-fusion of “transvaluation” with “revaluation”.193). is that such “value-thinking” necessarily implies that the Will to Power is itself a Value! True it is that the Will to Power “challenges” ec-sisting values that indeed “de-value” themselves or “self-dissolve” and lead inexorably to nihilism (recall the passage. Nietzsche would say) and that “constrains” the Will to Power.

therefore as an “instrumentality” and ultimately . in just about every respect – not least the ontological. Post. of which “false consciousness” was only a historical product in the course of human interaction with the World (including other human beings). (It may be noted in passing that this tenor of self-serving and self-seeking behaviour represents a sad and deplorable constant in Heidegger’s entire iter intellectualis: – from his treacherous treatment of his mentor and benefactor. to his dishonest attempt to amend the historical record [regarding proNazi enunciations in Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik]. the ‘royaume des ombres’ – in the double sense of ‘idolatrous’ (kingdom) and ‘mystifying’ (shadows) like the Hades of Antiquity. as Part Two of this study will make amply expression of the Will to Power. logic and science . and therefore reviving the notion of that Being “that gives” as the “presenc-ing”. the “rationalization of the world” . in psychoanalysis and in the socio-political and cultural sphere . of Ohn-Macht. to his refusal to accept responsibility for his complicity with the Nazi regime [refer to Jurgen Habermas’s essay on this] and in various other instances too numerous to list here. it is actually Heidegger who is still “looking for God” (see p. phylogenetic human ability for “reflection”.The irony in all this is that. in this regard.199).a dis-tortion and perversion. as we have shown! Hegel and Marx insisted on the innate. at the end of this piece in the Holzwege.of his insights. ec-sistence) in its abysmal state as “being-towarddeath”. rather than “is given” or “is there” (Heidegger’s intentional equivocation of “es gibt”) as a “present-ment” of human Da-sein (being-there. but also in the philosophy of mathematics and of science.Pre. and Pre-Posterous “A fetishism! Consciousness and its cultural creations are fetishistic!” the postmodernists cry out: “Here is Nietzsche’s equivalent of Marx’s and Hegel’s ‘false consciousness’. as a “communal and gregarious utility”. for no other reason than that Nietzsche is prepared to grapple with the “materiality” of being human to a much greater extent than his successor. Sartre’s inability to maintain his promise to define “authenticity” just as Heidegger could describe it in extremis only as “being-before-death” (cf.through language.thus relegating this most intrinsically human. Negri’s critique in Spinoza essays). far exceed anything that Heidegger has to offer. Nietzsche’s and Weber’s concept of Rationalisierung is light years more advanced .) C. precisely because of the “impossibility” of these ontologies to understand human reality as anything other than “condition humaine” (see Lowith’s ‘Heidegger’)! By contrast. the depth and intensity . all too human of faculties in all its manifestations to the status of “the perspective of the herd”. an alienation of the “inter-esse” of being human. Recall. to his public denigration of the eminent German Jewish scholar Ernst Cassirer. as Cacciari notes with superb critical acumen and as we will discuss soon. Nietzsche by contrast reduces “consciousness” to a historically specific human praxis (from religion to metaphysics to “science”). Edmund Husserl. for self-consciousness.Nietzsche’s genius. But not “inauthenticity” (as Heidegger [man. Structuralist Neo-Nietzscheans . to his enthusiastic embrace of Nazi ideology [see Lowith’s testimony].” But they are sorely mistaken. of “power-lessness”. Un-eigentlichkeit] and Sartre [mauvaise foi] will do later). As we have argued repeatedly here. .above all the acuity and concreteness .

between Nietzsche’s own uncompromising “eristic” denial of anything resembling a “common humanity” or of ludicrous notions such as “the irreducible variety of human nature” . there is no “Zerstorung der Vernunft” precisely because .therefore (!) . whilst science remains inevitably a narrow corner of human experience. deserve far greater credit and will be reviewed in our study on Marx’s ‘Grundrisse’. ‘PNeR’. The former pounds Nietzsche with the idealist bludgeon of “Reason”. Negri’s own independent efforts before his exile and. For the philosopher from Rocken. we shall not trouble with Giorgio Agamben’s delirious nonsense either.100-101). and the latter sanctify him with the equally stultified late-romantic “Grand Refusal” of “subjective liberation from (instrumental or technological) Reason” (a “straw man” for Nietzsche if ever he imagined one!) – what Cacciari (‘K’. people like Deleuze. geniali ‘creativita’”.66) rightfully mocks as “tardo-romantiche. (As with Deleuze. the other face of the coin.72). is sharply drawn by JG Merquior in his delightful “stroncatura” [Umberto Eco’s word for critical “truncation”] of Foucault’s inveterate charlatanry in an erudite work titled ‘Foucault’ (at pp. as we are vigourously attempting to do here. as every “idealistic” Vergeistigung like Lukacs’s Hegelian Marxism or. One cannot but laugh at the pathetic manner in which all these “philosophes” seek to depict themselves as opponents of capitalism without having even the slightest clue as to what “capitalism” actually “is”! One can only imagine the loud laughter bellowing out of Westminster and Whitehall or Montecitorio and Palazzo Chigi by the representatives of the European bourgeoisie if indeed the insurgent forces in Europe had only the ideas of people such as these with which to oppose the capitalist Leviathan! By contrast. after his return to Italy.let alone Marx’s species-conscious being! . p.there is no “salvation” from Rationalisierung and Entseelung. his studies on Spinoza. as we shall see in great detail. Antonio Negri’s own peccadillos [with the lamentable Michael Hardt] in this regard need quite deservedly to be excused in light of the vital political support he received from the Parisian neo-Nietzschean and Althusserian academic circles in his terrifyng fight to avoid a lifetime jail sentence in Italy – something to which I was witness in a Paris encounter with Negri in July its “political” application and alertness to the antagonistic reality and needs of capitalist society (Cacciari. Again. post-modernist readings of Nietzsche. Utterly ludicrous is his maladroit and “gauche” [even before it is “gauchiste”!] attempt at the critique of capitalism in his ‘What Is An Apparatus?’’ which takes up Foucault’s original confabulatory notion of “dispositif”. as a “radicalization” of his approach. But Merquior fails to distinguish. it remains a “practice” that can take many forms and directions once we “be-aware” of its possible “uses” and “deep sources” and also of its purely “instrumental” relation with the “tools” of logico-mathematics and remember to keep these separate from all velleities of “mathesis universalis”.) Merquior is right to point out that paradoxically the very post-structuralist “deconstruction” of the Subject (mirroring and extending the earlier structuralist obliteration of it in reified “structures” or “semiology”) ends up re-introducing all the nauseous nonsense about “the liberation of man” and the absurd dilution of . This Marcusean link between Foucault first and then.and the absurd poststructuralist parody of his work in just such an “emancipatory” light. wish to reassure us. p.

Marx’ (surely an allusion to the Master. that is to say. and “symptoms” and “symbols” aplenty that can be “interpreted” pragmatically in history! Nietzsche. Justly poking as much fun as he can at these laughable notions. Henri Lefebvre’s ‘Hegel-Marx-Nietzsche’?) in which. ‘Will To Power’). “Foucault attributes to the trio a position which in fact belongs eminently to Nietzsche. on the contrary. a contribution to the well-known Cahier de Royaumont on Nietzsche) encyclopaedically titled ‘Nietzsche. in the social dispersal and differentiation of man. some hidden essence waiting for us at the end of our interpretive journeys. was also a “pragmatist”). “Needs” inter-pret the world. as Merquior cites Foucault. en-compassed by Nietzsche’s entirely original vision of the Will to Power as the new Weltprincip: “It is our needs that interpret the world. says Foucault. Merquior.74). Yet we know very well from our present study – and again it is a distinction that Merquior fails to draw . quoting Hayden White. works as a full prop of the Foucauldian purpose: the critical grasp of modernity as a mode of existence. as he did! True it is.72). in turn. therefore. the “materiality” of his Entwurf. that for Nietzsche “interpretation has become an infinite task”: – but this must be read in the context of “the Eternal Return” and its precise ontological context in which “interpretations” belong in the “intra-temporal” and “intra-mundane” (or “ontic”) sphere of life and the world which is.” (Aph.that even Nietzsche (let alone Marx. was far too penetrating and serious a thinker not to see that “elephants all the way down” (Lukacs’s derisive reference in ‘GuK’ to “the critical mind” that when told how “the earth rests on the back of an elephant” queries on what the elephant rests and is satisfied with the answer that the elephant stands on the back of another elephant!) is nothing on which to build a philosophy. I once dubbed it.” (p. to say it once more. that is. speaks of “the subjectification of objectification”! “Alienating history. Freud.” (p. Alain Badiou is yet another paragon of this appalling mis-interpretation (see his L’ Anti-philosophie de Nietzsche): . stand between us and the world – certainly not “values” or “interpretations”! This is the vice of all neo-Nietzschean readings of Nietzsche – that they ignore completely the “physiology” of his ontology.8 of his study). and therefore the “pragmatism” of his “Semeiotik” or “Symptomatologie” (remember that CS Peirce. The death of interpretation. is the belief that there are signs of something. one of the founders of “semeiotics”. The position consists in holding that every interpretandum is already an interpretation. let alone a life. writes Merquior. [Hayden] White puts Foucault in a structuralist wing which he labels ‘dispersive’ because it glories in the ‘mystery’ of the ‘irreducible variety of human nature’. to believe that there are only interpretations.481.“power” to a meaningless ubi-quity (“power under the table”. our instincts and their impulses for and against. in whose regard Foucault’s comments are simply laughable) does believe that there are “signs”. ‘dispersive’ structuralists rejoice in cultural heterogeneity. Instead of integrating differences into a common humanitas. It is precisely such a generic (necessarily and paradoxically “humanistic” – whence “the subjectification of objectification”) notion of “man” that Nietzsche would have condemned fiercely! Just how little Foucault understood Nietzsche – and how much he distorted his philosophy – can be discerned from one of his early essays (1964. but see Merquior’s devastating critique of Foucault’s vapid vapourisation of the concept in Ch. ‘the life of interpretation is.

he cunningly cites Max Weber’s allusion to Nietzsche. en tant que ses 2 opérations sont les 2 opérations clé de cette pensée. Nietzsche’s “ontogeny of thought” is a paradigm of incisive sociological acumen that these pathetic epigones can only dimly perceive. but to delineate pragmatically the manifestations and forms of being. devotes nearly his entire study to a serious analysis of Nietzsche’s writings. de la transvaluation et.Il faut donc l’entendre au sens fort: lorsque Nietzsche dit «ce qui a besoin d’être prouvé ne vaut pas grand-chose ». he pretends to show that Nietzsche was not a “counter-revolutionary” by arguing that he chastised past revolutionaries only because “they were failed revolutionaries”! [See the section on “l’interpretation heidegerienne”. Charlatanry of this magnitude never ceases to amaze and stupefy. see also reference above to Foucault’s contribution discussed by Merquior. amount to assertions of power (the infamous Foucauldian “enonce’”). “history enjoys eternal youth”. But it leaves out the most important part – the “positive” . a mere “critique of values”. which Badiou also treats next under the title “Nietzsche par Foucault”]. of life and the world. so that philosophy may suggest a way of life! Contrasted to Badiou’s and Deleuze’s cretinously delirious sophistry. explaining that “it amounts to a permanent creation. he acknowledges that this “being there” is “inevaluable” (ineffable). and particularly the absurd praise he heaps on Deleuze’s utterly insensate concluding remarks [which he quotes at length!] must rank among the most bathetic exercises in sycophancy in the history of philosophy!) Again. hoping perhaps for the next succes de scandale. but aims instead at an ontological yet pragmatic de-finition of life and the world by way of a “transvaluation of all values”! When finally Badiou confronts the question of Da-sein (“il y a”). Badiou’s discussion of the motley collection on Nietzsche that goes under the title of Cahier de Royaumont [under the title “acte et nihilisme”. is precisely not to “value” the “inevaluable” or to name the “ineffable” – just as one should not try to stop the unstoppable force! -. knowing neither causal law nor final goal” (p. this is in perfect harmony with our interpretation. let alone comprehend! (Just to exemplify the bizarre stupidity of Badiou. le valoir. nor should it! The entire “problem” of course. a year when sadly the philosopher of Rocken had already succumbed to mental illness! Faced with such nonsense. then it is as clear as daylight that Nietzsche’s philosophy goes well beyond “values” because “it addresses… essential value” and “it interrogates whatever is” – which is to say that it is far more than “a philosophy of evaluation”. c’est un jugement essentiel. bien entendu. letters and notes dated 1888. Badiou. elle s’adresse à ce qui vaut de manière essentielle ou elle interroge tout ce qui est en tant qu’il vaut.] Mystifyingly. to assign a “value” to being. and that all attempts to name it. parce que.72). one begins to understand why French philosophes cut so miserable a figure vis-a-vis the majesty of their German counterparts. car … la philosophie nietzschéenne est fondamentalement une philosophie de l’évaluation.” (pp4-5). As a “negative” description of Nietzsche’s vision of history and time. But Badiou clearly contradicts himself in mid-sentence! Because if “Nietzsche’s philosophy addresses all that has essential value or it interrogates whatever is to the extent that it has value”. returning to Merquior. l’évaluation est justement l’opération clé chez Nietzsche.

83-4).part (in ontological terms) about the role of the Wille zur Macht and (in terms of social analysis) its “embodiment” (or Entseelung) as Rationalisierung in the “Entwicklung” of life and the world. are easily countered and dismissed as sheer Wille zur Ohnmacht not just “theoretically” by Nietzsche or even by us.74).” (p. “excoriate”!] with the most appalling “structuralist” charlatanry [cf. enonce’) and its “neoNietzschean” per-version of Nietzsche’s valiant and astonishingly insightful description of “the Will to Truth”: “In no time the leader of the growing legion of neo-Nietzscheans would salute in Foucault ‘the conquistador of this terra incognita where a literary form.82. despite their lack of a common measure. such “humanistic” protestations. Yet. rivalry or even comparison are foreign to Nietzsche and to his conception of the will to power . a daily sentence. […] threatening my baby. (One is reminded here of Althusser’s analogous literally extravagant claim that Marx had discovered “a new continent of knowledge” – which he proceeded to substantiate [one should say. and worst of all by present forces. a scientific proposition. one where Merquior again hits the mark. are equally statements. Merquior is entirely right to warn that with Nietzsche “truth is overpowered by wanton will – and history as a former knowledge becomes just a free-for-all for warring perspectives. the flaw in Bachelard is that he still insisted on separating science from poetry. still horrifyingly active and real (those that instill “the worst fear that can ever be hurled. we can do no more than quote him in full: “One cannot overemphasise the extent to which the notions of struggle. (p. As Deleuze explains in the same breath. however “admirable” and “principled”.” [!] (pp. neither a “cosmological” (exact) nor a “historical” (cyclical) recurrence of historical events. Squarely on this point.) We can only characterize as “inqualifiable” Deleuze’s insistence in Nietzsche et la Philosophie that Nietzsche’s philosophy is not about “struggle” – supported (would you believe?) by a solitary allusion to the German philosopher’s saying that he was “much too well-bred to struggle”! To prove that we are not making this up and to illustrate Deleuze’s “temerary” imbecility. etc. Nobody runs such a risk with neo-Nietzscheans. is his derisively contemptuous and sardonic “stroncatura” of the Foucauldian well-nigh meaningless concept of “discourse” (and “statement”. and this may be taken to be the entire rationale of our work. as we expounded earlier. in the Eternal Return which is. Bob Dylan in Masters of War) and for whom Nietzsche’s philosophy is a veritable “operation manual” on how to rule the world! Much more than humanistic shibboleths are needed to counter Nietzsche’s challenge – for in Nietzsche the negatives Denken finds that unity of theory and practice that Marx may be said to have sketched for the party of human emancipation and that Gramsci called “the philosophy of praxis”. his ‘Reading Capital’]. a schizophrenic nonsense. Deleuze’s emphasis!) . but worse still by the very crushing “reality” of the historical record itself (one may wish to recall here James Joyce’s devastating vision of history in Ulysses as “a nightmare from which I am yet to awake”). unborn and unnamed”. war.

and will do so more emphatically and precisely in the pages that follow. its dis-enchantment and de-spiritualisation are an ineluctable “destiny” within the “logic of the Wille zur Macht” (see Part Two) dictated by the “need-necessity” of the “ontology of thought” that we have traced out. conquest of the strange and weak. but because it lives.he never lost sight of the “reality of the Rationalisierung” – of its “effectiveness”! – as the imposition of the Will to Power.In his stultified attempt to shield Nietzsche from the consequences of his eristic philosophy. -. from the “instincts” as a consequence of social interaction – inevitable because of “need-necessity” -. do all that towards other bodies. we will show how Nietzsche identified the frightful “effectiveness” of mathesis as an instrument of the Will to Power. . the individuals treat each other as equal--it takes place in every healthy aristocracy -. it will endeavour to grow. as a “distancing” of thinking from “the body”. respectively.must itself. Deleuze’s “beautiful soul” conveniently forgets (something that Nietzsche would view with contempt) that struggle. and because life is precisely Will to Power. Thus. Nietzsche draws no distinction between “consciousness” as an inevitable aspect of “socialization”. which the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power.Nietzsche’s “distance of Pathos” or “competence to promise”) not as states of “false consciousness” and “authenticity”. Although ideally. intended as domination and overpowering and “overcoming”. As this study is hopefully making clear. for Nietzsche “the rationalization of the world”.but why should one for ever use precisely these words on which for ages a disparaging purpose has been stamped? Even the organisation within which. injury. if it be a living and not a dying organisation. the “out-of-body” experience of consciousness. . as all the romantic idealists from Lukacs to Foucault would have them. But this latter development still leaves room “effectively” for “resolve” (Gewissen) which is the Will exercising its Power in the “distance of Pathos” whereby the “instincts” manifest their affirmation of their “freedom”. consciousness (whence Schopenhauer’s con-scientia and sym-pathy are derived) must be distinguished from resolve (Gewissen . as was previously supposed. for the “mimesis” with “nature” (“naturalism of morality”) where the Will to Power still presides and rules but without the “reflective distancing”. severity. attract to itself and acquire ascendancy . that in Nietzsche’s unforgettable words (already quoted earlier. strife and conflict are the very essence of the negatives Denken (from Schopenhauer onwards) and of Nietzsche’s “ontogeny of thought”. Far from crudely denying the scientific process as an illusory figment or imaginary fabrication or a mere “discourse” or “statement”. putting it mildest. but re-proposed here to dismiss Deleuze’s charlatanry once and for all): 259…[L]ife itself is essentially appropriation. (BGE) We refuse adamantly to fathom the oceanic depths of execrable stupidity that Deleuze’s work has “inspired” in his acolytes and epigones (from Nancy to Agamben to Hardt). to gain ground. exploitation [Ausbeutung]. obtrusion of peculiar forms. the “mirroring”. suppression. and. so to speak. incorporation. the “Cultur” (the mirror-imaging) to which this “socialization” gives rise and that provides the fertile soil on which the “bad conscience” of ressentiment and the nihilistic-rationalistic Entseelung will flourish.not owing to any morality or immorality. at the same time. and at the least. Nietzsche hankered for that “forgetful” and “blame-less” state of the herd in the fields.

56-70 Not only is “consciousness”. Reading. the behaviour of the “ManHerd”. mystified world of “Sprache-Metaphysik” (language metaphysics) and “reverences”. becomes the necessary instrument and vehicle (Trager) of the social and cultural affirmation of the Will to Power by “those who know” and who do not “misunderstand the body” – by the Ubermenschen of the grosse Politik! The greatness of Nietzsche is to have theorised this inextricable double aspect (Doppelcharakter) of “Cultur and Zivilisation”. or the “obscure veil” of “noumena” and “phenomena”. this “everyday self” – this Vermittlung (mediation) of different “instincts of freedom”.is “politically harmful”. as Ver-geistigung (the ascetic-idealistic aspect of “interiorisation” [Verinnerlichung]) and Ent-seelung (the institutional “iron cage” [stahlhartes Gehause] of Weberian fame). Vol 2 p. but it is so for a far greater reason than the “epistemological” or even “metaphysical” rodomontades of idealist philosophy. in its “bureaucratic and technological” phase. of which we cannot even speak (cf. It is this resolve (or conscience) that makes possible the terrifying state of mind of the Wanderer (to be discussed later in Part Two). Wittgenstein).148). alienation). . actually pre-vents or emasculates the grosse Politik. this patina of civility. champion him as the romantic opponent of the latter and the humanist messiah of a “biopolitical” version of the former! The Ontogeny of Thought – Two Nietzsche’s Eristic Genealogy of Law and Political Economy A.In Heidegger’s languorous words (Nietzsche. of “idolatry” and “slave morality” – this “most fatal stupidity by which we shall one day be ruined” . as Vergeistigung (the pro-gress of the Spirit in the world as Hegel’s “ruse of reason” or Weltweisheit) and then. namely. not only is it a “danger”. in its “political manifestations” such as the Demokratisierung. from Lefebvre to Klossowski and Agamben. in the fact that this consciousness and this Cultur with its Rationalisierung disguised first.a behaviour. and Critique of Political Economy Thomas H. of Wills to Power -. a “politics” that even its Rationalisierung and its pragmatic “utility” cannot redeem (an allusion perhaps to Peirce and James) and one that. Will to Power As Resolve and Standard of Value Nietzsche's Knowledge. in its ascendant phase. this velleity of “humanity”. this simulacrum of “sociability”. as Entseelung (Weber’s dis-enchantment. a “disease”. And in this lies the fundamental importance of “tragedy” for Nietzsche. “at the end of Nietzsche’s metaphysics stands the statement: ‘Homo est brutum bestiale’”. “the toils of grammar” (subject. because it induces us to accept and even pro-mote the Demokratisierung. object). Brobjer Journal of Nietzsche Studies No. where his confused neo-Nietzschean hagiographers. pp. 18 (FALL 1999). It is so because this shadowy. the “Species”: .

like a man entering into a promise. full of sound and fury. by analogy with the rest of the animal world. muss Dem um so erstaunlicher erscheinen. he could guarantee himself as a future. circumstances. and above all for the more noble functions and functionaries. namely. room for government and foresight. active and in the strictest sense of the word. action would also not be possible without forgetfulness. But what is the underlying hypothesis of all this? How thoroughly. its act we can easily interpose a world of new strange phenomena. and it is something more than a comparison—he can "get rid of" nothing. the original condition of human beings. it is that there can exist no happiness. in whom. 1. where promises have to be made. in certain instances. not merely the indigestion occasioned by a once pledged word. a memory. so that between the original "I will. to reckon. Ein Thier heranzüchten. dass was nur von uns erlebt. above all. signifying nothing” (Shakespeare’s Macbeth).—so that it is by no means a mere passive inability to get rid of a once indented impression. But this very animal who finds it necessary to be forgetful. and this shows at once why. die der Vergesslichkeit. sie ist vielmehr ein aktives. . So the “paradox” arises of how “memory” is possible. positive — a power responsible for the fact that what we have lived. Ess2. of the active forgetfulness . and what is the means to that end. without forgetfulness. experienced. vollauf zu würdigen weiss. im strengsten Sinne positives Hemmungsvermögen. Yet similarly. der die entgegen wirkende Kraft. in relation to other humans. taken into ourselves. to see the distant as present and to anticipate it. to have power to calculate — how thoroughly must man have first become calculable. that." is carried on. no hope. to think causally. in fact. as I have said. must appear all the more phenomenal to one who can estimate at its full value that force of forgetfulness which works in opposition to it. is to be compared to a dyspeptic. veritable volitions. Forgetfulness is no mere vis not this just that very paradox of a task which nature has set itself in regard to man? Is that not the very problem of man? The fact that this problem has been to a great extent solved. Vergesslichkeit ist keine blosse vis inertiae.which is a very sentinel and nurse of psychic order. rather is it a power of obstruction. the so-called "incorporation. no real present. repose. etiquette.1. wie die Oberflächlichen glauben. in order to be able to regulate the future in this way. has reared for himself an opposition-power. to fix with certainty what is the end. das versprechen darf — ist das nicht gerade jene paradoxe Aufgabe selbst. forgetfulness represents a force and a form of robust health. such dyspepsia of the mind would not allow the “meta-bolism” (Greek for “change and assimilation”) necessary for the “selection” of past moments now “frozen” in historical time. dem es zuzuschreiben ist. no pride. a little tabula rasa of the consciousness so as to make room again for the new. The temporary shutting of the doors and windows of consciousness. with whose help forgetfulness is. a continuing and a wish to continue what has once been willed. The breeding of an animal that can promise . Without “memory” action would be impossible because (as for Benjamin Colton in William Faulkner’s ‘The Sound and the Fury’) without the power “to retain” experiences." “I shall do” and the actual discharge of the will. kept in check —in the cases. the relief from the clamant alarums and excursions. welche sich die Natur in Hinsicht auf den Menschen gestellt hat? ist es nicht das eigentliche Problem vom Menschen?… Dass dies Problem bis zu einem hohen Grad gelöst ist. with which our subconscious world of servant organs works in mutual co-operation and antagonism.To be able to act politically. but an active refusal to get rid of it. no more enters into consciousness during the process of digestion (it might be called psychic absorption) than all the whole manifold process by which our physical nutrition. those that are important and those that are not. man must be able “to digest” experiences – to select from the totality of past moments. disciplined. life would be “a tale told by an idiot. as the superficial believe. The man in whom this preventative apparatus is damaged and discarded. which one cannot dispose of. given that forgetfulness must have been. without the snapping of this long chain of the will. a little quietude. no gladness. predetermination (for our organism is an oligarchic model) – this is the utility. an actual memory of the will. because like a man who cannot digest. must man have first learnt to distinguish between necessitated and accidental phenomena. necessitated even for himself and his own conception of himself.

erfahren, in uns hineingenommen wird, uns im Zustande der Verdauung (man dürfte ihn „Einverseelung“ nennen) ebenso wenig in's Bewusstsein tritt, als der ganze tausendfältige Prozess, mit dem sich unsre leibliche Ernährung, die sogenannte „Einverleibung“ abspielt. Die Thüren und Fenster des Bewusstseins zeitweilig schliessen; von dem Lärm und Kampf, mit dem unsre Unterwelt von dienstbaren Organen für und gegen einander arbeitet, unbehelligt bleiben; ein wenig Stille, ein wenig tabula rasa des Bewusstseins, damit wieder Platz wird für Neues, vor Allem für die vornehmeren Funktionen und Funktionäre, für Regieren, Voraussehn, Vorausbestimmen (denn unser Organismus ist oligarchisch eingerichtet) — das ist der Nutzen der, wie gesagt, aktiven Vergesslichkeit, einer Thürwärterin gleichsam, einer Aufrechterhalterin der seelischen Ordnung, der Ruhe, der Etiquette: womit sofort abzusehn ist, inwiefern es kein Glück, keine Heiterkeit, keine Hoffnung, keinen Stolz, keine Gegenwart geben könnte ohne Vergesslichkeit. Der Mensch, in dem dieser Hemmungsapparat beschädigt wird und aussetzt, ist einem Dyspeptiker zu vergleichen (und nicht nur zu vergleichen — ) er wird mit Nichts „fertig“ … Eben dieses nothwendig vergessliche Thier, an dem das Vergessen eine Kraft, eine Form der starken Gesundheit darstellt, hat sich nun ein Gegenvermögen angezüchtet, ein Gedächtniss, mit Hülfe dessen für gewisse Fälle die Vergesslichkeit ausgehängt wird, — für die Fälle nämlich, dass versprochen werden soll: somit keineswegs bloss ein passivisches Nicht-wieder-loswerden-können des einmal eingeritzten Eindrucks, nicht bloss die Indigestion an einem ein Mal verpfändeten Wort, mit dem man nicht wieder fertig wird, sondern ein aktives Nicht-wieder-los-werden-wollen, ein Fortund Fortwollen des ein Mal Gewollten, ein eigentliches Gedächtniss des Willens: so dass zwischen das ursprüngliche „ich will“ „ich werde thun“ und die eigentliche Entladung des Willens, seinen Akt, unbedenklich eine Welt von neuen fremden Dingen, Umständen, selbst Willensakten dazwischengelegt werden darf, ohne dass diese lange Kette des Willens springt. Was setzt das aber Alles voraus! Wie muss der Mensch, um dermaassen über die Zukunft voraus zu verfügen, erst gelernt haben, das nothwendige vom zufälligen Geschehen scheiden, causal denken, das Ferne wie gegenwärtig sehn und vorwegnehmen, was Zweck ist, was Mittel dazu ist, mit Sicherheit ansetzen, überhaupt rechnen, berechnen können, — wie muss dazu der Mensch selbst vorerst berechenbar, regelmässig, nothwendig geworden sein, auch sich selbst für seine eigne Vorstellung, um endlich dergestalt, wie es ein Versprechender thut, für sich als Zukunft gut sagen zu konnen!

An aphorism this, to ironise Nietzsche’s reasoning here, of “incalculable” importance! To think causally! It is the interaction with other “wills”, then, the exchange of promises, that occasions the development of memory; and it is the measurement and calculability of the surrounding world that allows the pro-jection of future actions and exchanges (literally, in financial parlance, of “futures”). In actual fact, as a matter of pure observation or perception, without “memory” life would be for humans truly “a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury” – and just as lack of memory is the essential characteristic of “idiocy” (as in William Faulkner’s “The Sound and the Fury”), equally it is the presence of memory that makes possible what Nietzsche will occasionally deprecate as the “calculability” and “regimentation” that industrial and commercial society brings (as in Jason Colton, to return to Faulkner, the infamously cynical character in his novel whose mind is “glued” to the Wall Street “ticker”; in BGE Nietzsche will poke fun at this “regimentation” of metropolitan life in the New World). The inability “to draw causal links between events” because of the limited “mnemonic” powers or “forgetfulness” of the “idiot” (the term is used in its psychological acceptation, of course) is counterbalanced by the “memory” that can permit the attribution of calculation and causality – the essential ingredients of “responsibility”. Only through “forgetfulness” is it possible “to act”: a human being that does not forget is like one who is not able to sleep or to digest (“Use and Abuse of History”, ‘UB’, Aph.1, and quotation above). Action requires only so much “historical sense”. Too much of it and “knowledge will overpower life” and make action impossible. Forgetfulness is our most “natural state”;

and “memory” had to be “conquered” by an immense effort of will – a “memory of the will” – that enabled human beings “to make promises”, to become “competent to promise” and therefore “reliable”, “calculating” and “measuring” – and thereby “to think causally”!
2. This is simply the long history of the origin of responsibility. That task of breeding an animal which can make promises, includes, as we have already grasped, as its condition and preliminary, the more immediate task of first making man to a certain extent, necessitated, uniform, like among his like, regular, and consequently calculable…. 2. Eben das ist die lange Geschichte von der Herkunft der Verantwortlichkeit. Jene Aufgabe, ein Thier heranzuzüchten, das versprechen darf, schliesst, wie wir bereits begriffen haben, als Bedingung und Vorbereitung die nähere Aufgabe in sich, den Menschen zuerst bis zu einem gewissen Grade nothwendig, einförmig, gleich unter Gleichen, regelmässig und folglich berechenbar zu machen. (GM) 2…If, however, we place ourselves at the end of this colossal process, at the point where the tree finally matures its fruits, when society and its morality of custom [Sittlichkeit der Sitte] finally bring to light that to which it was only the means [Mittel], then do we find as the ripest fruit on its tree the sovereign individual, that resembles only himself, that has got loose from the morality of custom, the autonomous " super-moral " individual (for "autonomous" and "moral" are mutually exclusive terms),—in short, the man of the personal [eignen, intrinsic], long and independent will, competent to promise [der versprechen darf] and we find in him a proud consciousness (vibrating in every fibre), of what has been at last achieved and become vivified in him, a genuine consciousness of power and freedom [Macht- und Freiheits-Bewusstsein], a feeling of human perfection [Vollendungs-Gefuhl] in general…. Stellen wir uns dagegen an's Ende des ungeheuren Prozesses, dorthin, wo der Baum endlich seine Früchte zeitigt, wo die Societät und ihre Sittlichkeit der Sitte endlich zu Tage bringt, wozu sie nur das Mittel war: so finden wir als reifste Frucht an ihrem Baum das souveraine Individuum, das nur sich selbst gleiche, das von der Sittlichkeit der Sitte wieder losgekommene, das autonome übersittliche Individuum (denn „autonom“ und „sittlich“ schliesst sich aus), kurz den Menschen des eignen unabhängigen langen Willens, der versprechen darf — und in ihm ein stolzes, in allen Muskeln zuckendes Bewusstsein davon, was da endlich errungen und in ihm leibhaft geworden ist, ein eigentliches Macht- und Freiheits-Bewusstsein, ein Vollendungs-Gefühl des Menschen überhaupt. (GM)

And, as already adumbrated above, the whole genealogy of “retaliation” and “obligation” and “conscience”, culminating in the notion of “responsibility” calls for a re-examination of the “freedom of the will” – because the “Will to Power” or “the instinct of freedom” bears little resemblance to the Freiheit of Western metaphysics. The very fact that “responsibility” is a “duty” or a “calling” that represents the culmination, the apex, of an entire sequence of “physio-logical, natural events” (the tree bearing fruit) and institutions whose entire ec-sistence (Entstehung, “origin” as sprouting or “coming-into-being”) was effectively to be a means (Mittel) so that the person who is “competent to promise”, the “sovereign individual” can e-merge or “sprout” from such a “soil”, - this very “primordial fact” (Ur-Faktum) must entail that this sovereign individual musters the pre-existing or “stored-up force” (aufgestauter Kraft) at his disposal that pre-conditions the choices available to him! Again, in the Gaya Scienza Nietzsche lays emphasis on this critical “advance” of his (Fortschritt, forward step; one that will play a central role in Weber’s political theory):
360. Two Kinds of Causes which are Confounded.— It seems to me one of my most essential steps and advances [Fortschritt] that I have learned to distinguish the cause of an action generally from the cause of an

action in a particular manner, say, in this direction [Richtung], with this aim [Ziel]. The first kind of cause is a quantum of stored-up force [aufgestauter Kraft], which waits to be used in some manner, for some purpose; the second kind of cause, on the contrary, is something quite unimportant in comparison with the first, an insignificant hazard for the most part, in conformity with which the quantum of force in question "discharges" itself in some unique and definite manner: the Lucifer-match in relation to the barrel of gunpowder. Among those insignificant hazards and Lucifer-matches I count all the so-called "aims," and similarly the still more so-called "occupations" of people: they are relatively optional, arbitrary, and almost indifferent in relation to the immense quantum of force which presses on, as we have said, to be used up in any way whatever. One generally looks at the matter in a different manner: one is accustomed to see the impelling force [triebende Kraft] precisely in the aim (object, calling, &c.), according to a primeval error,—but it is only the directing force, the steersman and the steam have thereby been confounded. And yet it is not even always a steersman, the directing force [dirigiende Kraft] .... Is the "aim", the "purpose," [“Zweck”] not often enough only an extenuating pretext, an additional self-blinding of conceit, which does not wish it to be said that the ship follows the stream into which it has accidentally run? That it "wills" to go that way, because it must go that way? That it has a direction [Richtung], sure enough, but—not a steersman? We still require a criticism of the conception of "purpose." (GS) 360. Zwei Arten Ursache, die man verwechselt. — Das erscheint mir als einer meiner wesentlichsten Schritte und Fortschritte: ich lernte die Ursache des Handelns unterscheiden von der Ursache des So- und SoHandelns, des In-dieser Richtung-, Auf-dieses Ziel hin-Handelns. Die erste Art Ursache ist ein Quantum von aufgestauter Kraft, welches darauf wartet, irgend wie, irgend wozu verbraucht zu werden; die zweite Art ist dagegen etwas an dieser Kraft gemessen ganz Unbedeutendes, ein kleiner Zufall zumeist, gemäss dem jenes Quantum sich nunmehr auf Eine und bestimmte Weise „auslöst“: das Streichholz im Verhältniss zur Pulvertonne. Unter diese kleinen Zufälle und Streichhölzer rechne ich alle sogenannten „Zwecke“, ebenso die noch viel sogenannteren „Lebensberufe“: sie sind relativ beliebig, willkürlich, fast gleichgültig im Verhältniss zu dem ungeheuren Quantum Kraft, welches darnach drängt, wie gesagt, irgendwie aufgebraucht zu werden. Man sieht es gemeinhin anders an: man ist gewohnt, gerade in dem Ziele (Zwecke, Berufe u.s.w.) die treibende Kraft zu sehn, gemäss einem uralten Irrthume, — aber er ist nur die dirigirende Kraft, man hat dabei den Steuermann und den Dampf verwechselt. Und noch nicht einmal immer den Steuermann, die dirigirende Kraft… Ist das „Ziel“, der „Zweck“ nicht oft genug nur ein beschönigender Vorwand, eine nachträgliche Selbstverblendung der Eitelkeit, die es nicht Wort haben will, dass das Schiff der Strömung folgt, in die es zufällig gerathen ist? Dass es dorthin „will“, weil es dorthin — muss? Dass es wohl eine Richtung hat, aber ganz und gar — keinen Steuermann? — Man bedarf noch einer Kritik des Begriffs „Zweck“.

That is why Nietzsche, when speaking of this “Steuermann”, places “free” in inverted commas – because it is a special “kind” [Art] of “freedom” that he considers. “Freedom” is merely a “store of force”, a “potentiality”, an incalculable energy that can be “exercised” or “ad-opted” responsibly by those who have the necessary “resolve” (Ge-wissen, “certainty”, often but not very accurately translated as “conscience”), who are aware of the “limits” of their “aim” or “purpose”, those who are “competent to promise”. And it is precisely this “resolve”, this mixture of certainty and a-wareness – this “responsibility” or “accountability” –, this “resolute conscience” that determines the ultimate “test” of wills, the “measure” of force against force, - the measure or “standard of value”.
2…The “free man”, the owner of a long unbreakable will, finds this possession his standard of value: looking out from himself upon the others, he honours or he despises, and just as necessarily as he honours his peers, the strong and the reliable (those who can bind themselves by promises),—that is, every one who promises like a sovereign, with difficulty, rarely and slowly, who is sparing with his trusts but confers honour by the very fact of trusting, who gives his word as something that can be relied on, because he knows himself strong enough to keep it even in the teeth of disasters, even in the “ teeth of fate,” [“gegen das Schicksal”] — so with equal necessity will he have the heel of his foot ready for the lean and empty

of the “sym-pathy” or “compassion” (Mit-Leid) that Schopenhauer names and indicates as the ultimate “root” (Wurzel) of ethics and moral behaviour. Price As Punishment Whereas “conscience” preserves the “intelligible freedom” of the Will.jackasses. The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility. hat in diesem Besitz auch sein Werthmaass: von sich aus nach den Andern hinblickend. the “consciousness of the sovereign individual [who has] this power over destiny [that] has sunk right down to his innermost depths. if he needs to have a word for it? But there is no doubt about it—the sovereign man calls it his conscience [Gewissen]… Der „freie“ Mensch. dieser Macht über sich und das Geschick hat sich bei ihm bis in seine unterste Tiefe hinabgesenk und ist zum Instinkt geworden. zum dominirenden Instinkt: — wie wird er ihn heissen. der mit seinem Vertrauen geizt. It is deceptive here to translate Nietzsche’s word “Gewissen” with “conscience”. selten. of one’s conscience or “soul”. der Inhaber eines langen unzerbrechlichen Willens. der wie ein Souverain verspricht. from the “Will to Power”. langsam. ehrt er oder verachtet er. for instance. selbst „gegen das Schicksal“ aufrecht zu halten —: eben so nothwendig wird er seinen Fusstritt für die schmächtigen Windhunde bereit halten. die Starken und Zuverlässigen (die welche versprechen dürfen) ehrt. es selbst gegen Unfälle. this “certainty” represents the opposite of the “moral com-pulsion” denoted by “con-science”. who already breaks his word at the very minute when it is on his lips. diesen dominirenden Instinkt. der sein Wort bricht. Das stolze Wissen um das ausserordentliche Privilegium der Verantwortlichkeit. Clearly. a dominating instinct . the consciousness of this rare freedom. to be “certain” of being able to keep it! B. and has become an instinct. of this power over destiny [Geschick]. — also Jedermann. The word “con-science” (con-scientia. . weil er sich stark genug weiss. der sein Wort giebt als Etwas. common knowledge) is too redolent of that “inter-subjectivity”. from the height of his “competence to promise”. has sunk right down to his innermost depths. wenn er vertraut. Nietzsche wishes to emphasise the “internal im-pulsion”. and has become an instinct. das Bewusstsein dieser seltenen Freiheit.what name will he give to it. a dominating instinct”! This is the meaning of “resolve” (“conscience”. und eben so nothwendig als er die ihm Gleichen. to this dominating instinct. der auszeichnet. und seine Zuchtruthe für den Lügner. and his rod of chastisement ready for the liar. Gewissen). auf das Verlass ist. 4… Have these current genealogists of morals ever allowed themselves to have even the vaguest notion. Nietzsche would never tolerate such a “universal humanistic” notion. firm knowledge. the “ower”... of that universal “oceanic feeling”. On the contrary. that the cardinal moral idea of "ought" originates from the very material idea of "owe"? Or that punishment developed as a retaliation absolutely independently of any preliminary hypothesis of the freedom or un-freedom of the will?. ohne es zu dürfen. who promise when they have no business to do so. gesetzt. welche versprechen. dass er ein Wort dafür bei sich nöthig hat? Aber es ist kein Zweifel: dieser souveraine Mensch heisst ihn sein Gewissen… So this is “the standard of value” – indeed “the measure of value” [Werthmaass]: it is “responsibility”. “Gewissen” stresses the “certainty”. By “Ge-wissen” Nietzsche intends the “literal” meaning of the word – “certainty”. the “drive” or “motive” that “im-pels” the maker of a “promise”. the necessary awareness and “drive” that comes from the “instinct of freedom”. This “Ge-wissen”. wo er es im Munde hat. im Augenblick schon. schwer.

this idea of an equivalency between injury and pain? I have already revealed its origin. total. the “scales” (Wagschalen) that can be likened also to the “scales of justice”! (With remarkable perspicuity. “idiotic” inability of people like Deleuze or Foucault or Derrida so much as to mention [!] this entire “ontogeny” [“paradoxical”. but the active “matching” of one force against the other as judged by the holder of the “balance”. Extraordinary stuff! (Even more extraordinary is the complete. 6]? . Tausch. tiefgewurzelte. punishment was never based on the responsibility of the evil-doer for his action. vielleicht jetzt nicht mehr ausrottbare Idee ihre Macht genommen hat. not only is “retaliation” a purely “mechanical” retributive response – but also Nietzsche makes obvious again and again that he is not talking about “history” in the “historicist sense” (!). punishment was inflicted in those days for the same reason that parents punish their children even nowadays. dass nur der Schuldige zu strafen sei: — vielmehr. Woher diese uralte. Handel und Wandel zurückweist. and was consequently not based on the hypothesis that only the guilty should be punished . he even gives the name of “conscience” (almost a piercing sarcastic dart thrown at Schopenhauer’s “con-scientia”)! The notion that “value” or “price” constitutes a “balance or exchange of utilities” between seller and purchaser is thus exploded! “The price to be paid” refers to the “penalty” that the injurer (ower) must “suffer” so as to “satisfy” the “injured” party (the creditor). das so alt ist als es überhaupt „Rechtssubjekte“ giebt und seinerseits wieder auf die Grundformen von Kauf. and trade. let alone [psycho]-analyse it!) Not only is there no “freedom of will” involved here. die Idee einer Äquivalenz von Schaden und Schmerz? Ich habe es bereits verrathen: in dem Vertragsverhältniss zwischen Gläubiger und Schuldner. with ferocious realism and antithesis. of “innermost depths”. dass jeder Schaden irgend worin sein Äquivalent habe und wirklich abgezahlt werden könne. an anger which vents itself spontaneously [sich auslasst] on the author of the injury — but this anger is kept in bounds and modified through the idea that every injury has somewhere or other its equivalent price. out of anger at an injury that they have suffered. Es ist die längste Zeit der menschlichen Geschichte hindurch durchaus nicht gestraft worden. barter.—on the contrary. so wie jetzt noch Eltern ihre Kinder strafen. sei es selbst durch einen Schmerz des Schädigers. of “destiny and fate”. that is as old as the existence of “legal rights” at all. — dieser Zorn aber in Schranken gehalten und modifizirt durch die Idee. also nicht unter der Voraussetzung. sale. but rather of “the longest time”. dass zum Beispiel jener moralische Hauptbegriff „Schuld“ seine Herkunft aus denn sehr materiellen Begriff „Schulden“ genommen hat? Oder dass die Strafe als eine Vergeltung sich vollkommen abseits von jeder Voraussetzung über Freiheit oder Unfreiheit des Willens entwickelt hat? Throughout the longest period of human history.Haben sich diese bisherigen Genealogen der Moral auch nur von Ferne Etwas davon träumen lassen. Nietzsche calls it]. (Cf. Nietzsche understands by “balance of forces” not their “equi-valence” or “mutual neutralization”. of “instincts” – to which. even though it be by means of pain to the author. aus Zorn über einen erlittenen Schaden. Whence is it that this ancient deeprooted and now perhaps ineradicable idea has drawn its strength.) Nor does “price” constitute a “balance of forces or of values” – for no such “equi-librium” or “Aquivalenz” is possible with Nietzsche! Once again. which stands for “pain” and “punishment” to compensate for “injury”. in the contractual relationship between creditor and ower. Merquior detects this subtle and rare interpretation of Nietzsche’s expression “the balance of forces” in the Meditations: “Has he not taught that truth is not objectivity but a will to ‘justice’ [Thoughts Out of Season. and can really be paid off. here the Italian “pena”. weil man den Übelanstifter für seine That verantwortlich machte. Verkauf. and in its turn points back to the primary forms of purchase. der sich am Schädiger auslässt. II.

his life or his wife. no “authenticity”. in this society. there is a “resultant of forces” that “vye with one another”. lie dormant like Camus’s plague. cruelty. Rather. the “ower” or “Schuldner”. Nietzsche’s conception of “genealogical history” – and here one is reminded of his preoccupation with the origins of the Greek “ghens” or nobility. to be sure. In this praxis. the solemn duty. no “liberation” because there is no “interesse” over which different “wills” may hope “to reconcile” themselves or to be reconciled! The “Will to Power”.) “Price” and “debt” always and everywhere must be approached from the “active” side – just as “law” and “justice” must: and the active side is that of the strong who impose the price on the weak without the prior intervention or “mediation” of a “free will”: “punishment” is a “pain” that is inflicted by the “injured” party (creditor) as an “anger that vents itself mechanically on the author (of the “debt”. but rather through its “self-assertion”. its irrepressible violence. its “instinctive-ness”. in order to drill into his own conscience the duty.Justice.74]. so may we suspect. that joust incessantly for domination and overpowering that has no “common” object or stake or prize or “utility” or goal or purpose. or his freedom or his body… . Krankenheit) are as “ahistorical” as buried memories. except in its “opposition” to others. or negation of the negation. or phenomenologically (in Heidegger) or “bio-politically” (Foucault) is allowed in the act of “consciousness” – there is no “Aufhebung”. in order to give a guarantee of the earnestness and sanctity of his promise. The same goes for the “history of the instincts”: this is a “force” that is not “com-mensurable” with any other. a force that contains in its “material” traits the “genealogy” of its “destiny” – a “drive” that can be “traced back historically”. “disease/malaise” or “illness” (Erkrankung. no “reconciliation”. no equality of “values”. and pain: the "ower. whence “gene” and “genealogy” – is comparable to psycho-analytic anamnesis (recollection) or analepsis (flash-back). Similarly. they have a “source” and “mutations” but no “history” because they are not human constructs. like a virus neither dead nor living. they can be “frozen in time” and hibernate. however dialectically “mediated” (as in Hegel). they cannot be “reconciled”. the “instinct of freedom” is a “stored-up force” that is “physiological” in nature. . like a “fossil” that is still extant. in this society the object is to provide the promiser with a memory. . in the hands of hanging judges. pledge something that he still possesses. overturn and dominate another force. of course (as would be already expected from our previous observations). in its constant struggle to overwhelm. there will be full scope for hardness. the party at fault)! No equi-valence. no negation. no equi-librium is possible in contractual transactions – for the simple and overwhelming reason that there is no “sub-stratum of value” that can make such “equi-valence” possible! There is no “balance-of-forces” because the “forces” do not respond to a “common” metre or measure. The realisation of these contractual relations excites. In this society promises will be made . In this regard. another Will! 5." in order to induce credit in his promise of repayment. of repayment. except in its “conflict”. something that he still has in his power. for instance. will.not through its passive “function” or as-signed “utility”. a great deal of suspicion and opposition towards the primitive society which made or sanctioned them. strong personalities whose very vitality puts them high above the mass of mankind” [p. by virtue of a contract with his creditor to meet the contingency of his not paying. or even hypnosis used in the reconstruction and the interpretation of dreams.just like a virus or a gene.

for “bond”. instead of an equalisation in money.… 6. — das Wohlgefühl. Peinliches sein. brutal imposition”. the creditor is granted by way of repayment and compensation a certain sensation of satisfaction—the satisfaction of being able to vent. long before our notions of “justice” and “compensation” and “fairness” became “pacified” with the “quantitative exchange” of commercial “values” (money. „Pflicht“. the German word for “criminal”). In dieser Sphäre. Verpflichtung seinem Gewissen einzuschärfen. his power on one who is powerless. wird eine Fundstätte für Hartes. or some kind of chattel).… Machen wir uns die Logik dieser ganzen Ausgleichungsform klar: sie ist fremdartig genug. Der Schuldner. Contract is “war pursued by other means” (to invert VonClausewitz)." " conscience. is thoroughly and continuously saturated with blood… 6. die sie schuf oder gestattete. um Vertrauen für sein Versprechen der Zurückbezahlung einzuflössen. hier gerade. dass an Stelle eines gegen den Schaden direct aufkommenden Vortheils (also an Stelle eines Ausgleichs in Geld. — ihr Anfang ist. like the commencement of all great things in the world. Grausames. seine Macht an einem Machtlosen unbedenklich auslassen zu dürfen. das er sonst noch „besitzt“. verpfändet Kraft eines Vertrags dem Gläubiger für den Fall. „Gewissen“. land). der verspricht. um eine Bürgschaft für den Ernst und die Heiligkeit seines Versprechens zu geben. a suspension of civil war: – except that where Hobbes still admitted of a “forum internum” of reason and utility that founded the individual decision “to alienate” his “natural rights” so as to put a “contractual” end to civil war. hier gerade handelt es sich darum. it is strange enough. for a “meeting of minds” (the legal periphrasis for “contract” is itself most “revealing”). “breaker”. The “logic” of Nietzsche’s “contract” is the ability “to vent power [and punishment] on the powerless…” The world of morality. It resembles in its realism Hobbes’s notion of the status civilis as a “contractual cessation of hostilities”. Hier gerade wird versprochen. Besitz irgend welcher Art) dem Gläubiger eine Art Wohlgefühl als Rückzahlung und Ausgleich zugestanden wird. über das er sonst noch Gewalt hat. “like all great things in the world…is thoroughly and continuously saturated with blood…”! Far from being the “consensual fruits” of “utility . the primordial “equivalence” was the infliction of “violence”. Again. Dem.5. Nietzsche cannot admit of such a “state by institution” but only of a “state by acquisition”. “contract” here does not even remotely stand for “agreement”. The equivalence consists in this : instead of an advantage directly compensatory of his injury (that is. Land. Die Äquivalenz ist damit gegeben." the "sacredness of duty. wie es nach dem Voraus-Bemerkten von vornherein zu erwarten steht. wie der Anfang alles Grossen auf Erden. the exertion of one’s “power” over a power-less “breaker of the promise” (Ver-brecher. so darf man argwöhnen. for “promises” founded on mutual fear and aggression. um bei sich selbst die Zurückbezahlung als Pflicht. ein Gedächtniss zu machen. or rather “a state by violent. lands. Die Vergegenwärtigung dieser Vertragsverhältnisse weckt allerdings. im Obligationen-Rechte also. dass er nicht zahlt. zum Beispiel seinen Leib oder sein Weib oder seine Freiheit oder auch sein Leben… Let us make the logic of the whole of this equalisation process clear." — their commencement. for “conciliation or reconciliation”! It stands for its opposite – for “obligation”." "duty. without any trouble. Etwas. It is then in this sphere of the law of contract [Obligationen-Rechte] that we find the cradle [Entstehungsheerd – spring or source] of the whole moral world of the ideas of " guilt. hat die moralische Begriffswelt „Schuld“. gründlich und lange mit Blut begossen worden… In other words. gegen die ältere Menschheit. mancherlei Verdacht und Widerstand. „Heiligkeit der Pflicht“ ihren Entstehungsheerd.

" of personal obligation [Verpflichtung. Every exchange. hier möchte ebenfalls der erste Ansatz des menschlichen Stolzes. assessing values. this “conflict”. Making prices. From this “clash”. no matter how “mutually beneficial” or “consensual”. Every “sale and purchase”. impellent duty] (to take up again the train of our inquiry). involves a constant “confrontation of individual against individual” (“Person . Gläubiger und Schuldner: hier trat zuerst Person gegen Person. Man hat keinen noch so niedren Grad von Civilisation aufgefunden. so as to abide by one’s “resolve” (Gewissen). tauschen — das hat in einem solchen Maasse das allereste Denken des Menschen präoccupirt. the e-mergence of a “memory of the will” is connected with the “antagonism” that comes from a “clash of wills”. Preise machen. das es giebt. are not a simple matter of “do ut des” (I give so that you may give). it was here in this sphere that we can perhaps trace the first commencement of man's pride. Werthe abmessen. thinking out equivalents. seines Vorrangs-Gefühls in Hinsicht auf anderes Gethier zu vermuthen sein. The historical origin of this “competence to promise”. as we saw. seinen Ursprung in dem ältesten und ursprünglichsten Personen-Verhältniss. we have “confrontation” and “combat” (“matching against”)! 8. trade and commerce and “the market” itself. its origin in the oldest and most original personal relationship that there is. hat. wie wir sahen. der persönlichen Verpflichtung.and adaptation”. There has not yet been found a grade of civilization [Civilisation] so low. and that individual matched himself against individual. “person matched himself against person”! Far from an “agreement” or “co-operation” or “con-sensus”. in dem nicht schon Etwas von diesem Verhältnisse bemerkbar würde. The feeling of "ought. Äquivalente ausdenken. hier mass sich zuerst Person an Person. as not to manifest some trace of this relationship. 8. can be found in “the relationship between buyer and seller. “all the great things in the world” originate from violence and struggle (recall Marx’s description of the rise of the bourgeoisie. Memory or the fight against forgetfulness plays a vital role in the institutional “outgrowth” or “result” (Folge) of these promises. in dem Verhältniss zwischen Käufer und Verkäufer. um den Gang unsrer Untersuchung wieder aufzunehmen. has had. of “resolve” and “responsibility”. from the exertion of the “instinct of freedom”. creditor and ower”. And part of the selfpreservation of humans consists in their ability to enter into agreements and therefore “to bind themselves” by means of “personal obligations” or contracts (Obligationen-Rechte). of this “conscience-as-certainty”. a mutually beneficial “utilitarian” exchange: there is much more “antagonism of values” than that! “Exchange” is the “clash” of opposing wills. So here is what marks the difference between Civilisation (Zivilisation) and Culture (Kultur)! The ability “to fight back” forgetfulness so as to become “competent to promise”. It is in this “contractual” and exquisitely “economic” sphere that “person confronted person”. creditor and ower: here it was that individual confronted individual. exchanging— that is what preoccupied the primal thinking [Denken] of man in such measure [in einem solche Maasse]. the “out-come” or “result” of this process is “Civilisation”. the relationship between buyer and seller. let alone “conciliation”. of his feeling of superiority over other animals. And the “out-growth”. that this in a certain sense is thinking itself: it was here that was trained the oldest form of sagacity. dass es in einem gewissen Sinne das Denken ist: hier ist die älteste Art Scharfsinn herangezüchtet worden. of this conscience-as-certainty. human beings are forced to stake out their “need-necessity” against those of other human beings. gehabt. Das Gefühl der Schuld. “oozing blood from head to toe”!).

to this day! And despite the consequent loss of “happiness” (Gluck) that memory begets. langte man alsbald bei der grossen Verallgemeinerung an „jedes Ding hat ein Preis. the very ability “to think”. all can be paid for. though set in motion with difficulty. [better translation: zugleich mit der Gewohnheit. measuring and calculating force with force. "everything has its price.…Vielleicht drückt noch unser Wort „Mensch“ (manas) gerade etwas von diesem Selbstgefühl aus: der Mensch bezeichnete sich als das Wesen. together with the habit of comparing. commerce. as the "assessing" animal par excellence [das „abschätzende Thier an sich“]. obligation. compensation was first transferred to the rudest and most elementary of the social complexes (in their relation to similar complexes). debt. Kauf und Verkauf. of “instincts of freedom”. Sale and purchase. this complex “evolution” of thought and memory gave humans their sense of superiority over animals: 8… Perhaps our word "Mensch" (manas) still expresses just something of this self-pride: man denoted himself as the being who measures values. Ausgleich erst auf die gröbsten und anfänglichsten Gemeinschafts-Complexe (in deren Verhältniss zu ähnlichen Complexen) übertragen. together with their psychological concomitants. Das Auge war nun einmal für diese Perspektive eingestellt: und mit jener plumpen Consequenz." the oldest and most naive moral canon of justice. also for the ability “to promise”. the beginning of all "kindness. aber dann unerbittlich in gleicher Richtung weitergehenden Denken der älteren Menschheit eigenthümlich ist." of all " objectivity " in the world. Alles kann abgezahlt werden“ — dem ältesten und naivsten Moral-Kanon der . Recht. to enter binding commitments or “bonds” or “obligations”! Nietzsche insists on the point so much that he stresses that not only did this occur in the remotest past. zugleich mit der Gewohnheit. werthet und misst. die dem schwerbeweglichen. 8. zu messen. sammt ihrem psychologischen Zubehör. welches Werthe misst. als das „abschätzende Thier an sich“. His eye was now focussed to this perspective . Verpflichtung. to come to an “understanding” [“Verstandigen”] again by means of a settlement [Ausgleich]. zu berechnen ]. right. which. as we have seen. Justice in this initial phase is the goodwill among people of about equal power to come to terms with one another [sich mit einander abzufinden]. and with that ponderous consistency characteristic of ancient thought. feeling] of exchange." of all "equity. sind älter als selbst die Anfänge irgend welcher gesellschaftlichen Organisationsformen und Verbände: aus der rudimentärsten Form des Personen-Rechts hat sich vielmehr das keimende Gefühl von Tausch. which involves that “struggle against forgetfulness”. Macht an Macht zu vergleichen. Schuld. to compel them to agree among themselves to a settlement. man soon arrived at the great generalisation. and with regard to the less powerful." of all "goodwill. Macht an Macht zu vergleichen. result) – like a tree that bears fruit! Not only! But this constant “measuring and matching” of wills. are older than the origins of any form of social organisation and union : it is rather from the most rudimentary form of individual right that the budding consciousness [Gefuhl. Vertrag.gegen Person”): “hier mach sich zuerst…” – here for the first time individual “measured” or “matched” himself against individual! Society and its institutions are nothing more than a physio-logical means (Mittel) to this “outcome” (Folge. that “will to remember” whereby “memory” introduces “history” to humanity and to that extent re-duces its ability for “happiness” – that “memory” that enables causal links to be made from the “measurement and matching” of “Person against Person” – that (!) is the very origin (Ursprung) of the human capacity for “thought”! And. it “preoccupies the primal thoughts of man to such an extent that in a certain sense it is thinking itself”! In other words. who values and measures. zu berechnen. zu messen. becomes so intense. yet proceeds inflexibly along the line on which it has started. but also (much more important) it persists to the present: “dass es in einem gewissen Sinne das Denken ist [!]”) – “that is what in a certain sense ‘thinking’ is…” .

the Will to Power is the only real “need-necessity” of choice. that enables the “translation” and equi-paration of every element of the cosmos into every other element – a Leibnizian mathesis universalis. an “equi-librium” . Gerechtigkeit auf dieser ersten Stufe ist der gute Wille unter ungefähr Gleichmächtigen.Gerechtigkeit. not the different “rights” of the opposing parties. Nietzsche and the Sphere of Exchange As we saw earlier. both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche devalue and discount even the possibility of “labour” forming . this “homo-noia” – this Nirvana! – that is nothing other than the absurd “preference” for a metaphysical “Value” that he himself had agreed could not be found in life and the world (“Where is it written?” he asked Kant). yet another tactic or stratagem in the overall “strategies” of the warring factions. pursued in the name of an Objective Truth. even “ir-reconcilable”. the responsibility to decide – it is a “need-necessity” in an “affirmative” sense – a “resolve” (Gewissen). harmonious and lasting equi-librium” – but in the sense that “justice” is the “balance” (or “scales”. of an “ascetic Ideal”! In reality. the resoluteness of decision! Contemporaneously with the rise of the neoclassical theory of marginal utility. aller „Billigkeit“. aller „Objektivität“ auf Erden. “weight (Wichtigkeit) and strength (Kraft)”! Justice is therefore only a temporary truce. sich mit einander abzufinden. the Instinct of Freedom. Wagschalen!) with which the “op-posing and conflicting forces” are “weighed”! Justice is likened to the “scales” that “weigh up”. Such is their Wille zur Ohn-macht. (GM) C. this supreme attempt to find in life and the world a “homo-noia”. a Will-toTruth. sich durch einen Ausgleich wieder zu „verständigen“— und. a manifestation of the Will to Power in its “nihilistic” interiorisation (Verinnerlichung) that chooses and wills to renounce life and the world for the sake of a different world. not at all in the sense that these “forces” have found a “natural. locate in “Utility” and that the Socialists measure in “Labour”. had preferred in the end the renunciation (Entsagung) of the endless irrepressible strife of the Will-to-Life in the name of this “harmony”. the competence to promise. the prophet of Heraclitean struggle and conflict. the philosopher of Eris. Even Schopenhauer (!). but that he nevertheless chooses and wills as the ultimate goal of Life! Nietzsche sees in this Schopenhauerian Wille zur Ohn-macht (Will to Powerlessness) the very same “metaphysical need” that the “English and French psychologists”. At the core of all the “metaphysical needs” that Nietzsche denounces even in Schopenhauer’s “reversal” of the Kantian “thing-in-itself” with his own “Will-to-Life” is this ultimate goal. of Strife. a search for “Value” that is nothing more that a Will-to-Death. dem Anfange aller „Gutmüthigkeit“. an “agreement” and “harmony”. justice is a “balance of forces”. alles „guten Willens“.a “commutative justice”! – that “homologates”. but their different. imposed by the dominant and overpowering party to secure the subservience of the dominated and overpowered. a “pre-established harmony” that is the apex of the Ratio-Ordo. diese unter sich zu einem Ausgleich zu zwingen. from Darwin to Spencer and Comte. in Bezug auf weniger Mächtige.

of Nirvana – “the complete satisfaction of all requirements”! Whence. became itself an active operari. p. in his attempt to define the “subject-matter” of Economics. the “de-valuation” (Entwertung) of the Arbeit. Robbins will observe that “Nirvana is not necessarily single bliss. to make). food – the classical and neoclassical “wage fund”). full). to say it again. from its “pain” (Leid). fn. then. from its “reification” into brute “labour power” (Kraft. Nirvana is “freedom from want”.13). the a-scent to and the reward of Nirvana! In similar vein. “destitute” living labour separated (Marx’s Trennung or “alienation”) from its “means of pro-duction or object-ification”. to stress his point further. Only those capable of “renouncing” this need. It follows that Nirvana is also the “freedom from the hard choices” to which “scarcity” forces us. And then. From this entirely Nietzschean “perspective” (one that belongs properly to the negatives Denken).the basis of the inter-esse. Far from being a “Value” or “the source and measure of value”. a “climbing” toward the Freiheit of the esse. of “already-objectified labour” as “capital”.16). for the negatives Denken living labour is only a means to satisfy a “need-necessity” intended in a passive. he prefers Irving Fisher’s “analytical” definition of capital as “an aspect of wealth” to Adam Smith’s “classificatory” one as “a kind of wealth” (ibid. an active “quest” or “a-scension” (Askesis). of the social synthesis. satis. the founder of marginal utility. p. its dis-utility in contrast with the “utility” of capital.1). economics is the science of choice between the alternative uses of scarce resources (see ibid. The “renunciation” of the Will (Ent-sagung). as a mere appendage or “aspect of wealth”. will employ the phrase “Arbeits-leid” interchangeably with “Arbeits-kraft”) by means of their “endowments” or “wealth” to which they can lay rightful claim of “ownership” due to their earlier “abstinence” or “sacrifice” or “abnegation”: – in this consists the A-skesis.. of post-poning it.13. Nirvana is freedom from the compulsion of Economics. its “means of production” and its “means of subsistence” (Lebensmittel. the operari. Heinrich Gossen. enough. It is merely the complete satisfaction of all requirements. Robbins cites Karl Menger’s pathbreaking work introducing the concept of marginal utility right on this point (p.. “negative” sense – not as a “utility” but rather as a “dis-utility” – as the instant gratification of this “need-necessity”! Labour understood as “bare”.15). life-means. and facere.” (in Essay. living labour must be dis-placed from its role as the sole source of “value” in Classical Political Economy to the ancillary role of “factor of production” in Neoclassical Theory! Already with Schopenhauer. of the com-unitas. In other words. It is obvious that for this Economics the “Political” of Classical Political Economy has been totally eclipsed by the abstract quantitative analysis of the adequation of . in its ful-filment. the “striving” for happiness and satisfaction by the Will-to-Life was “de-valued” (hence the Entwertung) as a self-defeating exercise because the “pleasure” induced by the achievement of the Will’s aims was inevitably nullified in the very act of its satis-faction (Latin. the very opposite of the Arbeit with its “need-necessity”! Nirvana is “not having to choose”! But this is the contrary of the agon of the Economics: for Robbins. p. of “denying” the Will-to-Life – its agon or conatus or appetitus – can absolve themselves from the “need-necessity” of the Arbeit. can only work and thus consume its “object”. in its com-pletion (plenus.

In effect. (Recall that for Schumpeter. to secure one’s Freiheit. its active operari.” (p. as “dis-utility”: it is Will to Power over living labour! Except that all the “priests”.) As Nietzsche notes with customary sagacity.) Robbins (at p. the “entrepreneurial spirit” as the source of the capitalist Innovationsprozess. is placed thus at the centre of limitless capitalist accumulation. an “axiology” or “praxeology” that ineluctably involves “human action” – importantly. individual action! – considered abstractly.axiomatically defined means and ends. and so the “advantage” to be derived from “society” is reduced only to what can be derived from the ability “to exchange” these endowed resources so as to maximize one’s “requirements”. omniscient socialist “planner”. like a totalitarian. But the active “pro-duction” of those “requirements” is the result of a “science of choice”. Walras was “the greatest of economists”. neoclassical theory eliminates “social labour” and its “division” from all analysis of the Economics. far from being a purely “negative” state of pure “contemplation”. (In the case of Walrasian equilibrium. the “freedom from want” that Nirvana represents is freedom from the Arbeit understood as “toil”. (On all this. to a “science”. Robbins objects: “But it is one thing to generalise the notion of exchange as a construction. such an Economics rapidly loses its “practical” character – what allows it to be a “choice” (this will be von Mises’s bitter recrimination against Hayek) – and therefore turns itself into a formal mathematical or engineering exercise. as the ascetic Ideal – Nirvana. Nirvana is the A-skesis.) This “science of choice” leaves to one side all considerations of “ownership” and “entitlement” to what it calls “scarce” – decidedly not “social”! – resources by calling them (individual) “endowments”! At the same time. by “reducing” itself to a “pure logic of choice” (Hayek’s phrase). we refer to our study on ‘The Pure Logic of Choice’. to ensure their “complete satisfaction”. the a-void-ance of the Will-to-Life. its renunciation (Entsagung). It is another to use it in this sense as a criterion [of Economics]. the reward for the deferral of consumption – its abnegation! The opposite of “hedonism” (Greek hede. he himself was to abandon the Walrasian ‘Statik’ analysis in favour of the much more Nietzschean notion of Entwicklung with its ‘Dynamik’ approach centred on the Unternehmergeist. “the complete satisfaction of all requirements” (Robbins).20). Consequently. all the peddlers of the “ascetic ideal” wish to disguise “ideologically” its clear “choice” or . axiomatically.19) is quite explicit in this regard: “it is clear that the phenomena of the exchange economy itself can only be explained by going behind such [exchange] relationships and invoking the operation of those laws of choice which are best seen when contemplating the behaviour of the isolated individual”! In this analytical framework. for instance. however. (as Robbins implies in this quotation) Walrasian equilibrium will form only the extension or “generalization” to “the market” of what are strictly “individual choices and actions” (which explains the expression “general equilibrium analysis”)! In reply to Schumpeter’s “Walrasian” formulation of “economics” (in Hauptinhalt). a study devoted to the Austrian economist. now). Hayek will show conclusively that its equations can apply “practically” only to a single individual who can be taken to process the information they contain simultaneously. We discuss this in our ‘Entwicklung: Capitalism as Transcrescence’. Nevertheless. all the “pessimists”.

as “abnegation”. These themes are canvassed in our Catallaxia study. secure from certain injuries and enmities. is exposed. that is. to which the man outside the community. of “civil society” – the “expanded reproduction of needs” by means of the division of social labour! Beyond “civil society”. The wrath of the injured creditor. of the community. puts him back in the wild and outlawed status from which he was previously protected : the community repudiates him — and now every kind of enmity can vent itself on him. man enjoys the advantages of a community (and what advantages! we occasionally underestimate them nowadays). will get itself paid. deprived of all these advantages and amenities — he is in addition reminded of the importance of those advantages. In this case the question of the direct damage done by the offender is quite subsidiary: quite apart from this the criminal* [Verbrecher] is above all a breaker. the infinite superiority. the "peaceless" man. but even sets out to attack his creditor: consequently he is in the future not only. poverty] (elend) — secure because he has entered into pledges and obligations to the community in respect of these very injuries and enmities. —a German understands the original meaning of "Elend" [misery. the community stands to its members in that important and radical relationship of creditor to his "owers. in complexity and sophistication and philosophical depth and insight. he completely side-steps the corpus of the relationship creditor-debtor when he considers the relationship between individual and community – so much so that he even mis-construes “poverty” (Elend) in the quotation below as the mere “exclusion” by outlawing or ostracism of the individual from the community! Completely elided or sublated is what surely must be the most essential “advantage” of human society. As we shall soon see. the failure to distinguish the two. 9.“resolve” to accumulate social resources as “pious renunciation”. this dis-guised Will to Power beneath the veil of the religious Askesis whereby the positive urge to accumulate capital. Nietzsche ultimately ignores the fact that it is impossible to conceive of a human being without its “phylogenetic” attributes that turn it into a “being human”. in peace and trust. moreover. is one of the most disappointing denouements of many recent “left-wing” studies. Punishment is in . Publick Benefits”. the “socialist” glorification of “labour” in its alienated form under capitalism becomes the cruel parody of “communist” aspirations for human emancipation. in Vol. is camouflaged as the Protestant Ethic! This is a Will to Power that de Mandeville had exposed scabrously in The Fable of the Bees as “Private Vices. as well as it can. a breaker of word and covenant to the whole. the Spirit of Capitalism. The “con-fusion” of all “labour” with “toil” or “alienated labour”. Even Weber overlooks. is present or again possible at all periods). Arendt fails to detect. however. Weber’s Protestantische Ethik. of the Nietzschean formulation of the antagonistic bases of capitalist social relations of production. the defrauded creditor. The criminal [Verbrecher] is an "ower" [Brecher] who not only fails to repay the advances and advantages that have been given to him. as regards all the advantages and amenities of the communal life in which up to that time he had participated." Man lives in a community. Yet rather than tackle this ideology. spared. as is fair. What happens when this is not the case? The community. Cf. Nietzsche understood perfectly this “apory” of neoclassical and classical economic analysis – their “ideological” Eskamotage to remove all conflict and antagonism from economic categories. Measured always by the standard of antiquity (this antiquity. one can reckon on that.I of The Origins of Totalitarianism. man lives protected. as “entrepreneurship”. Conversely. except perhaps at the very end of his monograph when he alludes to the new thrust of entrepreneurial capitalism. and whose “Hobbesian” origins were lately rediscovered by Hannah Arendt.

and conquered enemy. (For all this section. and is “again possible at all periods”. 9. see our fundamental study. in fact turns out to be much more complex than what it sounds in the sense that “equal” denotes “commutative justice” which. (HATH) . niedergeworfnen Feind. nicht nur aller dieser Güter und Vortheile verlustig. vor dem er bisher behütet war: es stösst ihn von sich. in Bezug auf alle Güter und Annehmlichkeiten des Gemeinlebens. a result that is a success and a succession (a play on Folge. ist der Verbrecher vor allem ein „Brecher“. and Erfolg. was „Elend“. an denen er bis dahin Antheil gehabt hat. — und nun darf sich jede Art Feindseligkeit an ihm auslassen. ein Vertrags. wird sich bezahlt machen. im Frieden und Vertrauen. der „Friedlose“. — er wird vielmehr jetzt daran erinnert. wehrlos gemachten. there is no extinction of antagonism – there is only a dynamic “vying and wrestling with and against one another” to produce a “resultant force”. as Thucydides (in the horrifying conversation between the Athenian and Melian envoys) 30 rightly understood. der getäuschte Gläubiger. but first and foremost between individual and community – from antiquity to the present. dass der Krieg selbst (eingerechnet der kriegerische Opferkult) alle die Formen hergegeben hat. Die „Strafe“ ist auf dieser Stufe der Gesittung einfach das Abbild. This applies not merely between individual and individual. When there is no clearly recognizable supreme power and a battle would lead to fruitless and mutual injury. Es handelt sich hier am wengisten um den unmittelbaren Schaden. Immer mit dem Maasse der Vorzeit gemessen (welche Vorzeit übrigens zu allen Zeiten da ist oder wieder möglich ist): so steht auch das Gemeinwesen zu seinen Gliedern in jenem wichtigen Grundverhältnisse. was es mit diesen Gütern auf sich hat. êlend ursprünglich besagen will —. of the normal treatment of the hated. that is. success. des Gemeinwesens giebt ihn dem wilden und vogelfreien Zustande wieder zurück. geschont. denen der Mensch ausserhalb. der die ihm erwiesenen Vortheile und Vorschüsse nicht nur nicht zurückzahlt. dem des Gläubigers zu seinen Schuldnern. Der Zorn des geschädigten Gläubigers. man geniesst die Vortheile eines Gemeinwesens (oh was für Vortheile! wir unterschätzen es heute mitunter).und Wortbrüchiger gegen das Ganze. sondern sich sogar an seinem Gläubiger vergreift: daher geht er von nun an. sondern auch jeder Gnade verlustig gegangen ist. result. ausgesetzt ist — ein Deutscher versteht. Der Verbrecher ist ein Schuldner. disdained. der Mimus des normalen Verhaltens gegen den gehassten. as Nietzsche demonstrates. who is not only deprived of every right and protection but of every mercy. sorglos in Hinsicht auf gewisse Schädigungen und Feindseligkeiten. the mimic. so we have the martial law and triumphant festival of the vae victis! in all its mercilessness and cruelty. is a far from straightforward concept: 92… Justice (fairness) originates among approximately equal powers [Gleichmachtigen]. a “putting to new use”. and Aufeinanderfolge. This shows why war itself (counting the sacrificial cult of war) has produced all the forms under which punishment has manifested itself in history. wie man sich gerate in Hinsicht auf diese Schädigungen und Feindseligkeiten der Gemeinde verpfändet und verpflichtet hat. There is no “satisfaction” of the opposing forces in this “balancing act”. den der Schädiger angestiftet hat: von ihm noch abgesehn. der nicht nur jedes Rechtes und Schutzes. Was wird im andren Fall geschehn? Die Gemeinschaft. ‘Catallaxia: Philosophical Antecedents of the Sphere of Exchange’.) The notion of “equal and free exchange” or “barter”. Man lebt in einem Gemeinwesen. man wohnt geschützt. darauf darf man rechnen. so gut er kann. one begins to think of reaching an understanding and negotiating the claims on both sides: the initial character of justice is barter. a fresh outcome) – an overpowering (Uberwaltigung) that is a “commandeering”. wie billig. succession. also das Kriegsrecht und Siegesfest des vae victis! in aller Schonungslosigkeit und Grausamkeit: — woraus es sich erklärt. unter denen die Strafe in der Geschichte auftritt.this stage of civilisation simply the copy.

Therefore he fails to see that the “inter-dependence” of the “exchange” need not be “destructive”. This element comes out weightily in the “inter-esse” that is required to ensure that a “market” is “competitive”. Now. But this can be the case only if we define “self-interest” further. this “value”. is simply not possible if the “individuals” involved in the exchange are presumed to act on the basis of their “selfinterest” alone! Because otherwise these “unmediated” self-interests would quite simply annihilate one another or not be capable of any “exchange” at all! Even the antagonism of com-petition must have an agreed foundation on which it can proceed without mutual annihilation. Even the entire basis of knowledge. Whether or not “the market” remains “competitive” depends entirely on the kind of “relations” that obtain between the parties. Yet this social relation. he can see only the “exchange” but not its “basis” (even “biological”!). first we would need to specify what “the aim” or “goal” of competition is. It is meaningless therefore to insist on “free and fair competition”. Because Nietzsche always sees the world sub specie individui. then it is obvious that because they are “self-interested” they will seek to hide market information or engage in other conduct that will give them a “competitive advantage” over other self-interested individuals. But then. is for Nietzsche the “valor”. it can only be “one-sided” [einseitig] and therefore “irreconcilable”! “Competition” is the one “activity” that is supposed to lead to “growth” through greater specialization. of “value”. Nietzsche’s concept of “barter” or “agreement” makes absolutely clear that the “market exchange” of classical political economy (its “utilitarian” version) which assumes the “equality” and “freedom” of commutative justice. either no-one obtains any “advantage” out of this “competitive activity”. as in a knightly mediaeval joust.Barter or exchange involve a notion of “equal powers”. communication and consciousness is not immune to these eristic forces (the same “Gesichtspunkt” or “gene-alogy” characterizes Schopenhauer’s “social” philosophy and Freud’s psychoanalysis). which is the antithesis of . not its “inter-esse”. gather so as to exchange their “endowments” or “values”. the antagonistic “strength” of the “relating” or competing parties. Even assuming that it is “utility maximization” until equilibrium is reached. on “free and equal exchange” because these terms “pre-suppose” an agreement on the “rules” of the “com-petition” that is not “natural” or “automatic” or “objective”. the insurmountable problem remains that if “self-interested individuals” seek to exchange their goods to maximize their private “utilities”. but in that case their “competitive activities” will eventually lead to the establishment of a “monopoly”. whether this be use value or exchange value: exchange is a “relation” between people. or else some individuals do succeed in obtaining an advantage. not the division of social labour. but one that is eminently “social” – because “exchange” involves “equal powers” which involve a “social relation”. just like competing “impulses” or “drives”. The market is the “place” where “competing parties”. “ontogenetically” and not “phylogenetically”. in which case competition cannot lead to “growth” or trans-crescence. because “self interest” on its own cannot be “enlightened”: by definition. depending on how this “exchange” takes place. Quite perceptively.

by the way. (HATH) 25. naive idea. according to innate laws of melioration. namely. is discussed by Nietzsche in ‘HATH’. als ob ein Jeder ohne Weiteres wüsste. dass die allgemeine Harmonie sich nach eingeborenen Gesetzen des Besserwerdens von selbst ergeben müsse . also welche Handlungen überhaupt wünschenswert seien. es ist eine Theorie wie die vom Freihandel. verlangt vom Einzelnen Handlungen. Vielleicht lässt es ein zukünftiger Überblick über die Bedürfnisse der Menschheit durchaus nicht wünschenswert erscheinen. Privat. as if everyone without further ado would know which manner of action would benefit the whole of mankind.25 demands from the individual those actions that one desires from all men--a nice. — Seitdem der Glaube aufgehört hat. no “self-regulating market” is possible. — Jedenfalls muss. See Giulio Palermo’s excellent review of Alchian-Demsetz called ‘Misconceptions of Power’. that is. namely Kant's . even when the inter-esse remains antagonistic at any given historical stage.“competition” and leads us therefore to an insoluble “antinomy”! (Note. which actions were desirable at all.) . dass alle Menschen gleich handeln. inspired by Douglass North. In the absence of an “inter-esse” that allows us to agree on the “rules of competition” in the “market”. voraussetzend. the “agreement” and therefore the “inter-esse” of the “self-interested individuals”! This “impossible” aspect of “competition”. A meaningful notion of “com-petition” must therefore set out “the inter-esse”. free trade or “market” theory. It is a theory like that of free trade. gefunden sein.und Welt-Moral. Die ältere Moral. to identify a historical and theoretical “legal foundation” for capitalism. Hierin liegt die ungeheure Aufgabe der großen Geister des nächsten Jahrhunderts. where he draws the analogy with Kant’s Categorical Imperative: 25 Private. the agreement or “the goal” (Zweck) of the competitive game.and World-Morality…The older morality. bei welcher Handlungsweise das Ganze der Menschheit wohlfahre. dass ein Gott die Schicksale der Welt im Großen leite und. because the “spelling out” of these rules would presuppose a real political foundation of “interests” between the market participants that precedes market exchange and competition and that fundamentally distorts and vitiates the putative “equality” of “self-interested individuals” that underpins bourgeois economic theory! This is what Cacciari would call “politics without foundation”. which assumes that a general harmony would have to result of itself. welche man von allen Menschen wünscht: das war eine schöne naive Sache. namentlich die Kant's. wenn die Menschheit sich nicht durch eine solche bewusste Gesamtregierung zu Grunde richten soll. vielmehr dürften im Interesse ökumenischer Ziele für ganze Strecken der Menschheit specielle. This means that the concepts of “market” and “competition” in economic theory live or die together!) “Enlightenment” or “intelligible freedom” when applied to “self-interest” pre-supposes what remains to be established. (The entire project of the Freiburg School of “regulating” capitalism in accordance with a “scientifically-constituted liberal order” must founder on the rock of this reality! The same fate is met by the attempts of the “New Institutional Economics”. die ganze Erde umspannende Ziele stellen. vorher eine alle bisherigen Grade übersteigende Kenntnis der Bedingungen der Kultur. vielleicht unter Umständen sogar böse Aufgaben zu stellen sein. trotz aller anscheinenden Krümmungen im Pfade der Menschheit. sie doch herrlich hinausführe. both Classical and Neoclassical. But this runs counter to economic theory. als wissenschaftlicher Maßstab für ökumenische Ziele. müssen die Menschen selber sich ökumenische. that the term “monopoly” itself presumes the existence of a “market” that has been “monopolized”.

or else we say that the goal of competition is… “to destroy the competition” (!). it does not at all follow that art in itself is without an end. meaningless . he treats the division of labour as the product of “individual actions”.. on the other hand. The “freedom of the will” is brought into question ipso facto – by the very deed! Remember that Adam Smith attributed the division of labour to the “act” or “propensity” of human beings to exchange. Like Smith. aim or purpose (Zweck) – Nietzsche incorrectly speaks of “meaning” in this quotation. even though unlike Smith he does not believe that these “individual actions” are “free”. „Lieber gar keinen Zweck als einen moralischen Zweck!” — so redet die blosse Leidenschaft. and “promising” (through contracts or obligations or bonds) – that fact itself (!) shows that there is a “neednecessity” in the “exchange relationship” itself – because there would be no “exchange or barter” without a “need-necessity” behind it as a “motive”. der sich in den Schwanz beisst — ist. one that cannot sub-sist practically as “self-regulationg”! Here is Nietzsche’s identical conclusion by analogy with the pursuit of “art for art’s sake”: 24. what does all art do? does it not praise? does it not glorify? does it not select? does it not bring into prominence? In each of these cases it strengthens or weakens certain valuations [Werthschatzungen] . ‘No end at all.from this primordial “exchange and barter”.. ziellos. kurz l'art pour l'art — ein Wurm.thus speaks pure passion. truck and barter. sinnlos. which are therefore unmasked as specific antagonistic historical institutions. as an “impulse”. of the entire “onto-geny of thought”! .. An activity that does not make explicit its “goal” (Ziel) and therefore its “premises” will inexorably be without an “end” – without “target”. A psychologist [Nietzsche means himself as the analyst examining art as an activity]. Ein Psycholog fragt dagegen: was thut alle Kunst? lobt sie nicht? verherrlicht sie nicht? wählt sie nicht aus? zieht sie nicht hervor? Mit dem Allen stärkt oder schwächt sie gewisse Werthschätzungen . the very fact that human beings “engage” in the “activity” of exchange and barter. Nietzsche begins his entire analysis of “Value” – indeed. Both Nietzsche’s as well as Smith’s analyses of “exchange and barter” are founded entirely on an “ontogenetic” conception of human being – one that excludes ab initio and absolutely the “phylogenetic” notion of “species-conscious being-human”! For Adam Smith. . (ToI) Wenn man den Zweck des Moralpredigens und Menschen-Verbesserns von der Kunst ausgeschlossen hat. they are “autophagous”. without a goal. Similarly. a “drive” – an “instinct”! It cannot be said therefore that “exchange and barter” can ever be “free”. these concepts are analogous to “a snake that bites its own tail” – in our own words. L’ art pour L’ art is a serpent which bites its own tail. barter and exchange that induces “specialization” and the division of labour (see the famous Ch. so folgt daraus noch lange nicht.2 of The Wealth of Nations). in the absence of such an “inter-esse”.Ultimately. in short. rather than a moral end!’ .. In Nietzsche’s words. it is the natural human tendency to truck. sale and purchase. asks. dass die Kunst überhaupt zwecklos. Indeed. the economic notion of “competition” cannot form the basis of the “self-regulating market” and its “free and equal exchange”. in which case it is an “aporetic” notion. in which case they cease to be “com-petitive” (Latin for “seeking the same things”). they “eat themselves” – because either we say that they are “purposeless” (abulic) in that they have “no aim or goal” outside themselves (!). L’Art pour l’art…When the end of the ethical preacher and improver of mankind has been excluded from art.

of “will” (a-bulia) – indeed. Empty and blind . market participants would need to have all the information available at equilibrium for them to fix their prices accordingly. his greatest service even to us. It is their form rather than their substance which is significant. as Nietzsche correctly perceives.” (Essay. “decisionist” or “arbitrary”. this loss of “sense” as direction [Richtung] and purpose [Ziel.not in a “voluntaristic”. their “subject-matter”: “For it is not the materiality of even material means of gratification which gives them their status as economic goods. not to a “market” case with separate individuals in competition with one another! Because the “selfinterests” of these theoretically separate individuals co-incide by definition. which defeats the purpose of the whole analysis – namely. the bourgeois “hypostatization” of economic relations ends up “devouring” their “materiality”. on this. their corpus.The classic circulus vitiosus. but above all this lack of “freedom and equality” in human interaction arises from the “phylogenetic inter-dependence of human beings” – from our existence as “species-conscious being-human”! Little wonder then that equilibrium analysis with its notion of “pure competition” excludes any and all activities that come under the definition of “competition” (Hayek in Individualism & Economic Order. like Kant’s thoughts without human intuitive senses. it is their relation to valuations. it remains an “empty category”. undermines the very “(interested!) motive” or “impulse” of the quest! What Nietzsche does here. their “practical object and substance”. of “materiality”. the “search for objectivity”.) Expressed in terms of “equilibrium analysis”. is the ultimate meaning of scientific “Nihilism”! The very “pursuit of truth”.) This is so because there are no “rules” to agree on the “valuation” of these endowments. which can be valued only if their “prices” are already known! . the “value” of the exchange is! As with Robbins. is to un- . as Nietzsche also explains. and therefore their “hypostatization” .21) For Nietzsche. this “circularity” of “science”. and therefore they are axiomatically already at equilibrium (!).in fact purposeless. for “value-neutrality”. discussed by Demsetz in “Competition”) so that. it is impossible for them to know how to price their endowments for exchange. because given that self-interested individuals are not at equilibrium.. not only is it not “equal”. p. Little wonder also that equilibrium analysis cannot admit of “time” – because “everything” must happen “at once”! (See Hayek. pace Myrdal. and exchange” is possible without a pre-existing “specialization”. this “auto-phagy” or “anti-nomy”. This fundamental insight is enucleated in our Pure Logic of Choice and in our Catallaxia. to determine the “content” of prices not as simple exchange-ratios or relative prices but rather in terms of “what makes the goods commensurable” and therefore what the basis and purpose. literally. and contra Adam Smith. – Which is why Hayek correctly points out that Walrasian equilibrium can really apply only to one individual. that is to say. without the “division of social labour”! In other words. not only is the activity of “exchange and barter” not “free”.But Smith misses the obvious objection that no “truck. (Purposeless but not meaningless. because the very “mathesis” of reality that equilibrium analysis carries out is itself a “strategy” that allows its practitioners “to act effectively” on that reality. Zweck]. but in a “physiological” sense as Will to Power . barter. ‘I&EO’.

the clash of impulses or instincts is what we need to study! Frank Hahn. “sale and purchase” or “barter” as the “settlement” of “equal powers”. to the needy .never as a “final extinguishment of the “need-necessity” in the act of “exchange”. no more. namely. but only insofar as we find our own highest advantage [Vorteil. that is to say. Nietzsche genially re-defines “exchange”. this ongoing. the outcome of general equilibrium analysis is “inexorable”! (For a full discussion of these themes. the “temporary”. the “game” is “rigged” from the outset. no less. personal hindsight] the common good [Nutzen fur die Allgemeine] is also greatest. Might not a significant transformation of these views be at hand.107). we discuss how Wittgenstein likened the “impossibility” of this concept to that of “moving” a vector (a car. so that now it is precisely the strictly personal action [streng personliche Handeln] which corresponds to the current concept of morality (as a common profit [allgemeinen Nutzlichkeit])? To make a whole person of oneself and keep in mind that person's greatest good [hochstes Wohl] in everything one does--this takes us further than any pitying impulses [mitleidigen Regungen] and actions for the sake of others. quoted in T. constitutes the very “meaning and purpose” of “competition”: the “friction”. Now too we wish to work for our fellow men. Until now man has taken the true sign of a moral act to be its impersonal nature. now when we see with ever greater clarity that precisely in the most personal respect [personliche Rucksicht. or simply walking) on a perfectly smooth surface: it cannot be done without “friction” (in Philosophical Investigations. And the “friction”. only this “friction”. drives] can maintain themselves in existence and retain their mutual rights. It . But the essential point. see also our Catallaxia study. a “clash of impulses. Lawson. as if it were something bad which had to be sacrificed. this continuous “ordering of rank” (Rangordnung) of values! Once again. a wheel. “critical” result (Folge) is a sort of justice and agreement: for in virtue of the justice and agreement all those impulses [Triebe. we all still suffer from too slight a regard for our own personal need. sale and purchase. share] in this work [Arbeit]. far from being “exogenous” or “accidental” or “adventitious” to the analysis. the antagonism of values. for “overpowering” and “domination”. as we quoted above. of commutative justice in the “self-regulating market”. where we examine these matters systematically. incessant “conflict” can give “meaning” (we would say “purpose”) to the act of exchange. “precarious”. or barter . instincts or wills’ to which only a “temporary truce” is applicable in an unending struggle for supremacy. the conflict of interests. as an unresolved and irresoluble “antagonism of values”. Let us admit that our mind has instead been forcibly diverted from it and offered in sacrifice to the state. For him. utility]. but only as a “trans-formation” (Veranderung) of these “Antagonistic Values” or “impulses”. just as much as the labour theory of value that it was supposed to replace! In a study we are preparing (The Pure Logic of Choice). it has been poorly developed. the fact that marginal utility theory is itself pure metaphysics. and it has been shown that in the beginning all impersonal acts were praised and distinguished in respect to the common good [allgemeinen Nutzen. par. concedes that equilibrium analysis involves the setting of conditions that can yield a given outcome. the existence of equilibrium: in other words. the one that Lawson fails completely to appreciate despite his honest efforts. To be sure. ‘The (Confused) State of Equilibrium Analysis’. to science. is that.) Because “self-interest” can never be the foundation of “equal exchange”. 95 Morality of the mature individual.mask the “metaphysics of utility”. as we shall soon see in Part Two extrapolating Nietzsche’s reflections on logic to Wittgenstein’s on language.

no “Automatik”. rohe Individuum wird ihn auch am rohesten verstehen. such “spontaneous order” or even “settlement” (Ausgleich) could never be more than a chimaera. As we have emphasised. The immature. “ana-logically”. Sollte nicht eine bedeutende Umwandelung dieser Ansichten bevorstehen. so long as this is not understood “most crudely” as it is bound to be by “the immature. but rather a system of “strictly personal action which corresponds to the current concept of morality (as a common profit)”. Nietzsche has to posit history.depends only on what one understands by his advantage. gerade das unreife. (We are reversing here. Again. to science. Wir Alle leiden freilich noch immer an der allzugeringen Beachtung des Persönlichen an uns. “in the world”. an evolving “inter-esse”. Es kommt nur darauf an. dass gerade in der möglichst persönlichen Rücksicht auch der Nutzen für das Allgemeine am größten ist: so dass gerade das streng persönliche Handeln dem jetzigen Begriff der Moralität (als einer allgemeinen Nützlichkeit) entspricht? Aus sich eine ganze Person machen und in Allem. und es ist nachgewiesen. crude individual will also understand it most crudely. der Wissenschaft. Auch jetzt wollen wir für unsere Mitmenschen arbeiten. als wir unsern eigenen höchsten Vorteil in dieser Arbeit finden. (HATH) 95. — gestehen wir es uns ein: man hat vielmehr unsern Sinn gewaltsam von ihm abgezogen und dem Staate. no “general harmony”. intra-mundane. nicht mehr. derentwegen man alle unpersönlichen Handlungen lobte und auszeichnete. for humans to be aware of this need-necessity of physis and to accept and affirm the need-necessity of this awareness. das geopfert werden müsste. And yet. the Durkheimian terminology of “solidarity” in the division of social labour. in the historical “e-venience” or “de-velop-ment” or “e-volution” of material forms of inter-dependence through “social labour” – be it “mechanical” (“soul-less”. to the needy”. es ist schlecht ausgebildet. Even in a purely “pragmatical” sense. als jene mitleidigen Regungen und Handlungen zu Gunsten Anderer. It is not a utilitarian summum bonum that he seeks. — Man hat bisher als das eigentliche Kennzeichen der moralischen Handlung das Unpersönliche angesehen. aber nur so weit. undeveloped. but rather as a “physis” as manifest “nature” (Wesen als Werden) in-comprehensible to human beings who are “within life”. it is evident that history must either remain “meaningless” or else “repeat itself indefinitely”. dass zu Anfang die Rücksicht auf den allgemeinen Nutzen es war. crude individual”. and therefore incapable of “valuing” life and the world. unentwickelte. deren höchstes Wohl in's Auge fassen — das bringt weiter. Moral des reifen Individuums. then. Yet he is advocating the supremacy or paramountcy of “the person’s greatest good… [which has been] forcibly diverted… and offered in sacrifice to the state. was man tut. undeveloped.) . no “co-incidence” of “personal action” or “self-interest” and “common profit” is possible for Nietzsche. There is the seed here of the “ideal” that Nietzsche will seek to articulate later: .the yearning for an “unanswerable state of blamelessness” or “irresponsible state of innocence”. Nietzsche here as in the discussion of “justice and equality” seems to believe that self-assertion and self-interest may still lead to each person’s “own highest advantage in this work”. “dis-enchanted” Rationalisierung) or “organic” (communal solidarity or sym-biosis). jetzt wo immer besser eingesehen wird. of course. was man als seinen Vorteil versteht. Nowhere does he discuss or explain how “the person’s greatest good” can simultaneously lead to “a common profit”. nicht weniger. dem Hilfebedürftigen zum Opfer angeboten. not as a “pro-gress”. In order to go “beyond good and evil”. wie als ob es das Schlechte wäre. it can be argued that Nietzsche is wrong “in the e-vent” (!).

" Such a judgment always remains very dangerous. Es fehlt am Besten. essentially determine. — Eine „altruistische” Moral. bei der die Selbstsucht verkümmert —. „Nicht seinen Nutzen suchen” — das ist bloss das moralische Feigenblatt für eine ganz andere. and yet not want to be uttered: whether one is capable of consciously remaining in untruth. as motives." Disintegration [Disgregation] of the instincts! Man is finished when he becomes altruistic. The best is lacking when self-interest begins to be lacking. -. moral as well as material? What Zivilisation do we choose to have? For after all. that is virtually the formula of decadence. life is not worth anything. every bit as much as religion. or. Morality to the extent that it was an "ought" has been destroyed by our way of reflection. "Not to seek one's own advantage"--that is merely the moral fig leaf for quite a different. The time fast approaches when we must ask what this “actual man” is: what can be the object of the “gaya scienza”? For does not the obliteration of “trans-valuation of values” leave a vacuum. as we have said. Ein solches Urtheil bleibt zuletzt eine grosse Gefahr. the individual cannot pull it out of this well without growing profoundly annoyed with his entire past." the moral lie in the mouth of the decadent says. wenn der Mensch altruistisch wird. eine Moral. auf Jahrtausende hin das Leben . Knowledge can allow only pleasure and unpleasure. indication] under all circumstances.. and their very unfair measurements. it is particularly true of nations. bald als Philosophie (Schopenhauerei). it is contagious: throughout the morbid soil of society it soon proliferates into a tropical vegetation of concepts--now as a religion (Christianity). "Nothing is worth anything. living is “necessarily” evaluating! Or is it that we do not have a “choice”? Nietzsche seems to fall back on a curious mixture of “naturalism” and “spontaneity” (spontaneous order?) in the concluding aphorism of “First and Last Thing”: 34 Some reassurance.. Kritik der Décadence-Moral. But does not our philosophy then turn into tragedy? Does not truth become an enemy of life. 35. nämlich physiologische Thatsächlichkeit: „ich weiss meinen Nutzen nicht mehr zu finden” . our pleasure and unpleasure). All human life is sunk deep in untruth. Unter Umständen vergiftet eine solche aus Fäulniss gewachsene Giftbaum-Vegetation mit ihrem Dunste weithin. His historical remarks refer almost exclusively to a stage of human evolution that belongs clearly to homo sapiens and even then are restricted to the documented phase of our history (especially from pre-Socratic times). benefit and harm. state of affairs: "I no longer know how to find my own advantage. too. Disgregation der Instinkte! — Es ist zu Ende mit ihm..” sagt die Moral Lüge im Munde des décadent: „Nichts ist etwas werth. "I am no longer worth anything. whether death would not be preferable? For there is no "ought" anymore.. This is true of individuals. Instinctively to choose what is harmful for oneself. es wirkt ansteckend. — das Leben ist nichts werth” . bleibt unter allen Umständen ein schlechtes Anzeichen. and without opposing scorn and disdain to the passions that urge one on to the future and to . bald als Religion (Christenthum). Gelockt-werden durch „uninteressirte” Motive giebt beinahe die Formel ab für décadence. Sometimes the poisonous vegetation which has grown out of such decomposition poisons life itself for millennia with its fumes. „ich bin nichts mehr werth. 35.. now as a philosophy (Schopenhauerism). have to do with errors (to the extent that inclination and disinclination. Dies gilt vom Einzelnen.An "altruistic" morality--a morality in which self-interest wilts away--remains a bad sign [Anzeichen. namely. a physiological. he is never quite equal to the task of focusing on their “phylogenesis” as opposed to “ontogenesis”. if one had to do so. Instead of saying naively.. Critique of the morality of decadence. an enemy of what is better? A question seems to weigh down our tongues. — auf dem ganzen morbiden Boden der Gesellschaft wuchert es bald zu tropischer Begriffs-Vegetation empor. to feel attracted by "disinterested" motives.And although he is able to show the “historicity” of human traits and connotations both physical and mental. without finding his present motives (like honor) senseless. wenn es an der Selbstsucht zu fehlen beginnt. But how will these motives come to terms with the feeling for truth? These motives. Instinktiv das Sich-Schädliche wählen. — Statt naiv zu sagen. dies gilt namentlich von Völkern.

the happiness in it. If this is true, is there only one way of thought left, with despair as a personal end and a philosophy of destruction as a theoretical end? I believe that a man's temperament determines the aftereffect of knowledge; although the aftereffect described above is possible in some natures, I could just as well imagine a different one, which would give rise to a life much more simple, more free of affects than the present one. The old motives of intense desire would still be strong at first, due to old, inherited habit, but they would gradually grow weaker under the influence of cleansing knowledge. Finally one would live among men and with oneself as in nature, without praise, reproaches, overzealousness, delighting in many things as in a spectacle that one formerly had only to fear. One would be free of appearance 32 and would no longer feel the goading thought that one was not simply nature, or that one was more than nature . (HATH)

“A spectacle that one formerly had to fear”: Nietzsche seems to distinguish between institutions that allow the affirmation of life and those that seek to repress it. He even seems to be tempted by “enlightened self-interest” at times, for providing the “spontaneity” he seeks: “to be free of appearance”, “no longer [to] feel the goading thought that one was not simply nature, or that one was more than nature”. Nietzsche is almost “physiologically” impelled to read “physis” or “nature” as a “destiny” of conflict and strife, as “Will to Power” - not over life itself, but “at one” with life, in mimetic unison and harmony with it. Yet it is his “perspectivism” and “naturalism” that become problematic – engender a nostalgic paralysis, even nihilism – because it is impossible to evaluate “life” out of “need-necessity” or “fate”, and then “to be conscious or aware” of such neednecessity – and then again believe in the necessity of such evaluation or even will it! Whilst Nietzsche may well refrain from evaluating “life” in the past, as it has transpired historically, he must then decide whether to accept the present as it is – and therefore “preserve” it as “substance”, as permanence, against the “becoming” he exalts -, or else to trans-form it by pro-jecting (dia-noia) its “ad-vantageous” elements into the future. There are times when he clearly wishes he did not have to make a “choice” – and is tempted, cosmically, to affirm the “cyclical” returning of the Dyonisian mysteries to which all life is bound and, socially, to accept the “automaticity”, the “self-regulation” of the “market mechanism”.
3… This tremendous inward tension then discharged itself in terrible and ruthless hostility to the outside world: the city-states tore each other to pieces so that the citizens of each might find peace from themselves. One needed to be strong: danger was near, it lurked everywhere. The magnificent physical suppleness, the audacious realism and immoralism which distinguished the Hellene constituted a need, not "nature." It only resulted, it was not there from the start. And with festivals and the arts they also aimed at nothing other than to feel on top, to show themselves on top. These are means of glorifying oneself, and in certain cases, of inspiring fear of oneself… For it is only in the Dionysian mysteries, in the psychology of the Dionysian state, that the basic fact of the Hellenic instinct finds expression - its "will to life." What was it that the Hellene guaranteed himself by means of these mysteries? Eternal life, the eternal return of life, the future promised and hallowed in the past; the triumphant Yes to life beyond all death and change; true life as the overall continuation of life through procreation, through the mysteries of sexuality. (ToI)

Morality as ‘Strategy’ – Nietzsche’s Unity of Theory and Practice By insisting that every “balancing” of distinct and irreconcilable “forces” must end up in a “net weight”, a stable “equi-librium”, in a lasting “conciliation”, in a binding contractual “agreement”, the human thinking process seeks to make “familiar” and “innocuous” and above all “com-prehensible” what is unfamiliar and senseless. From the “identification” of the Will with an “esse”, an intelligible freedom, to a subject, an ego and then a consciousness leading to logic and mathematics to causality and science – throughout this process of “self-distancing” and “mirroring” that is a need-necessity dictated by the struggle against, the matching against, the confrontation, measuring and testing against, the calculation or calculus of pleasure and pain that enters relations with other organisms, and especially other humans – through this “chain” of conflict human beings develop strategies that make their world “safe and calculable” and that transform the “balancing of forces” in the sense of weighing and testing the strength of conflicting forces into a “balance of forces”, an “equi-librium”, a state of rest, a conciliation, “a general harmony”. The “end” or “goal” of a possible economic system needs to be “con-vened”, to be agreed: it is political and institutional – “con-ventional”. Either it is an “extrinsic” goal in that it falls outside any human inter-est; or else it is “intrinsic” in that it “per-fects” human interesse. Perhaps Nietzsche’s greatest insight was to unmask the very “search for scientific truth” - for “objectivity” that is not a temporary “settlement of antagonistic values”, the “measurement and mathematisation of every human reality” in search of a “truth” that will bring about “a general harmony” - as being itself a potentially pernicious form of Nihilism: a “Rationalisierung”, an “objectivism” or “scientism” that may be exploited “ideologically” to further other antagonistic interests – a “Will to Power” that has “turned inwards” to become a “Will to Death”. On one side, we have the ressentiment of the slaves who wish to blame their condition on the “unfairness” or the “injustice” of a social reality that they do not see as “necessary” or as “destiny” – this is the source of “bad conscience” (bad resolve). On the other side, we have the temptation of the masters to wish “to justify” social reality and to preserve society and the State by emphasizing – precisely! – the “fairness” and “mutual advantage” of the market Economy, and the “progress” and “equality” of each individual in the Empyrean of the liberal State, of the Political! Here, at the summit of bourgeois society, this “interiorisation” of its conflict and antagonism is “rationalized” in the Vergeistigung (the “spiritualisation”) of Political Economy, that is to say, the “homologation” of market mechanism and civil society, of bourgeois and citizen, of self-interest and its “representation”, mediation and “reconciliation” in the liberal State. It is this combined process of Demokratisierung that Nietzsche wishes to attack. But to do so, he has first to expose how these “idealistic” aims, this “spiritualization” or “internalization”

(Verinnerlichung) are tied up with the “denial” of this Life and its substitution with the other-worldly quest for “Truth” – the ascetic ideal, the A-skesis. The dira necessitas imposed by the Wille zur Macht, and of which it is itself an expression, applies to the Arbeit not as the inter-esse of a “Subject”, of alienated humanity, but rather as a “need-necessity” to which the Arbeiter themselves are subjected! The worker is no longer, as in Hegel or Marx, a “consciousness” that “mediates” between the Herr and the “Object” by exempting him from the compulsion of work to satisfy “common” though “alienated” needs upon which “values” can be assigned to the pro-ducts of human labour. Instead, there is an irreducible “antagonism” between “master” and “servant” (Herr und Knecht) over who is to dominate (Herrwerden) and therefore assign “values”. (In all the babble about “consumerism”, we tend to forget that it is the capitalist who decides what gets produced and how and when – a fact brilliantly emphasized by Schumpeter in his account of the capitalist Innovationsprozess [in the Theorie; see our study on Schumpeter, ‘Entwicklung: Capitalism as Trans-crescence’ ].) Therefore it cannot be the Arbeiter and his operari that creates or assigns “Value”. To believe that “the doer” or “the worker” can subtract itself to its “destiny”, not on an individual basis – because that would be to deny the very “instinct of freedom” that Nietzsche is theorizing in his “genealogy” -, but rather through the very “necessity” of “mastery” and “domination” by ascribing or as-signing it to “merit” or “virtue” – in short, to a “subjective element” that is therefore “historical” and subject to the vagaries and accidents of “chance” (Zufall) and of “fortune” (Gluck): to do all this would itself be a “sign and symptom” of the very “decadent disease”, of the “slave morality”, of the “ressentiment” that Nietzsche is indicting! This perspective on the social relationship of force in the wage relation is commented upon in Aph.40 of “Gaya Scienza”:
(GS) 40. The Lack of a noble Presence.—Soldiers and their leaders have always a much higher mode of comportment toward one another than workmen and their employers. At present at least, all militarily established civilisation still stands high above all so-called industrial civilisation; the latter, in its present form, is in general the meanest mode of existence that has ever been. It is simply the law of necessity that operates here: people want to live, and have to sell themselves; but they despise him who exploits their necessity and purchases the workman. It is curious that the subjection to powerful, fearinspiring, and even dreadful individuals, to tyrants and leaders of armies, is not at all felt so painfully as the subjection to such undistinguished and uninteresting persons as the captains of industry; in the employer the workman usually sees merely a crafty, blood-sucking dog of a man, speculating on every necessity, whose name, form, character, and reputation are altogether indifferent to him. It is probable that the manufacturers and great magnates of commerce have hitherto lacked too much all those forms and attributes of a superior race, which alone make persons interesting; if they had had the nobility of the nobly-born in their looks and bearing, there would perhaps have been no socialism in the masses of the people. For these are really ready for slavery of every kind, provided that the superior class above them constantly shows itself legitimately superior, and born to command—by its noble presence! The commonest man feels that nobility is not to be improvised, and that it is his part to honour it as the fruit of protracted race-culture - but the absence of superior presence, and the notorious vulgarity of manufacturers with red, fat hands, brings up the thought to him that it is only chance [Zufall] and fortune [Gluck] that has here elevated the one above the other; well then - so he reasons with himself - let us in our turn tempt chance and fortune! Let us in our turn throw the dice! and socialism commences. 40. Vom Mangel der vornehmen Form. — Soldaten und Führer haben immer noch ein viel höheres Verhalten zu einander, als Arbeiter und Arbeitgeber. Einstweilen wenigstens steht alle militärisch begründete Cultur noch hoch über aller sogenannten industriellen Cultur: letztere in ihrer jetzigen Gestalt ist überhaupt die

from the master. als zum Befehlen geboren legitimirt — durch die vornehme Form! Der gemeinste Mann fühlt. dass die Unterwerfung unter mächtige. auf alle Noth speculirenden Hund von Menschen. dass nur Zufall und Glück hier den Einen über den Andern erhoben habe: wohlan. of a repressed “instinct of freedom” – the “need-necessity”. a dispensable “bureau” that is the pro-duct of chance and historical accident. Denn diese sind im Grunde bereit zur Sclaverei jeder Art. to a conscious pro-duct and arte-fact of his “free” will! The organic functions of the capitalist master then become an “office”. its “carrier”. vorausgesetzt. dass der Höhere über ihnen sich beständig als höher. Sitte und Ruf ihm ganz gleichgültig sind. but not right-fully or cor-rect-ly) through dis-simulation. the fruit of “his labour”. der diese Noth ausnützt und sich den Arbeiter kauft. – As if “socialism” could ever (!) become reality! – Because for Nietzsche this wish denotes a will to subvert “life” itself. feisten Händen. aussaugenden. Hier wirkt einfach das Gesetz der Noth: man will leben und muss sich verkaufen. a mere accoutrement or emolument. of eternal values attributable to “actions” and therefore “separable” from the very “being” of their “agents”. also constitute the effective expression of a Will to Power. the fact that the entire “object” or “sub-stance” of the capitalist-worker relationship is the pro-duct itself (the goods and services). bei Weitem nicht so peinlich empfunden wird. als diese Unterwerfung unter unbekannte und uninteressante Personen. it is by ignoring “wilfully” – because even “slave morality” is an ex-pression. unter Tyrannen und Heerführer. to . welche erst die Personen interessant werden lassen. mechanical operari. wie es alle Grössen der Industrie sind: in dem Arbeitgeber sieht der Arbeiter gewöhnlich nur einen listigen. Den Fabricanten und Gross-Unternehmern des Handels fehlten bisher wahrscheinlich allzusehr alle jene Formen und Abzeichen der höheren Rasse. his “domination”. so gäbe es vielleicht keinen Socialismus der Massen. versuchen wir einmal den Zufall und das Glück! Werfen wir einmal die Würfel! — und der Socialismus beginnt. the affirmation of the Will to Power of the “master”! By isolating the “need-necessity” of the will to power. an empty and adventitious. And that this inclination “to honour nobility” is obstructed if not defeated by the “lack of presence [Form]” on the part of the bourgeoisie! Nevertheless. that workers conjure up velleities of “substituting” their industrial masters in the ideology of “socialism”. its “spread”. to defeat the “will to power”! But although such “in-tention”.gemeinste Daseinsform. ja schreckliche Personen. die es bisher gegeben hat. then. — aber die Abwesenheit der höheren Form und die berüchtigte Fabricanten-Vulgarität mit rothen. through the “invention” of morality. the slave is seeking to reduce the ineluctable reality of the master (its “happening”. At the same time. dessen Name. manifestation). Es ist seltsam. such “historicist” reading of human reality. aber man verachtet Den. and forced thereby upon the “worker” seen this time as the “object-victim” of the employment relationship. and thereby “to equate” or “homologate” what is a neednecessity into an accident “caused” by the “agency”. so schliesst er bei sich. hätten sie die Vornehmheit des Geburts-Adels im Blick und in der Gebärde. the “fatality” (not to be mistaken with an “accident”!) of domination and exploitation as irrefragable elements of “life” – it is thus that the “slave morality” in-tends to over-turn (ap-propriately. Note (however revolting and pathetic he may sound here) that Nietzsche always insinuates a certain “inclination” on the part of “slaves”… to slavery (!) in the form of a fatalistic “pre-disposition”. bringen ihn auf den Gedanken. in-duces the “worker” wrongly to view this as “his product”. Socialism itself. furchterregende. to a mere contingent “accident of history”. Small wonder. of the “stored-up force” of the “instinct of freedom”. a “sign”. merit or demerit of the capitalist. dass die Vornehmheit nicht zu improvisiren ist und dass er in ihr die Frucht langer Zeiten zu ehren hat. Gestalt.

these forces are no longer seen in their “physio-logical” dimension. to be entirely true to his philosophy. of " we aristocrats. to shield)! It is thus that both bourgeois liberalism and working-class socialism come to share a common Kultur of decadence: all “differences” evaporate to leave space for the clamour for “equality”! This is the “inevitable gravitation to the objective instead of back to the subject [which] is typical of ‘resentment’”! 10… The revolt of the slaves in morals begins in the very principle of resentment [ressentiment] becoming creative. of the “decadence” of a “superior race” and indeed of a culture or of a nation. its Political Economy with its utilitarian values and the ideal of free markets and trade – that all these could be a substitute for the Will to Power! Indeed. die der That versagt ist. deprived as they are of the proper outlet of action. Der Sklavenaufstand in der Moral beginnt damit. The Ohnmacht of the operari is articulated defensively as “resentment” that by reflex “negates” and refutes “life” by erecting “counter-values” aiming at fortifying the will of the “weak” against the ravages of the “strong” and by assigning “moral responsibility” as “culpability” or “guilt” to their acts of domination. to employ physiological terminology. Nietzsche would argue that this “decadence” of the bourgeoisie is not itself the “cause” but the “symptom” of its own “decline and decay”. denen die eigentliche Reaktion. it requires objective stimuli to be capable of action at all— its action is fundamentally a reaction. zu einem „Anders“. as the expression of organic vital functions but rather as being – precisely! – “equi-parable”. we beautiful ones. “homo-logated”. Nietzsche uses the word “Contrast-bild” (contrast position) to denote “com-parison” (Latin parare.” 10. it merely seeks its antithesis in order to pronounce a more grateful and exultant “yes” to its own self. Diese Umkehrung . Während alle vornehme Moral aus eine triumphirenden Ja-sagen zu sich selber herauswächst. to the “commensurability” of physiological functions that are absolutely sui generis and incommensurable." is merely a pale late-born foil in comparison [Contrastbild] with its positive and fundamental conception (saturated as it is with life and passion). Not on the workers is Sozialismus to be blamed. While every aristocratic morality springs from a triumphant affirmation of its own demands. sagt die Sklaven-Moral von vornherein Nein zu einem „Ausserhalb“. we good ones.the degree that they ignore or conceal their “need-necessity” they are the “signs and symptoms” of disease (Freud’s malaise). This volte-face of the valuing standpoint—this inevitable gravitation to the objective instead of back to the subject is typical of "resentment": the "slavemorality” requires as the condition of its existence an external and objective world. giving birth to values — a resentment experienced by creatures who. the slave morality says "no" from the very outset to what is "outside itself. But the assigning of “moral responsibility” and “culpability” requires the erection or foundation or establishment of an “objective standard” by means of which in effect. of their Ohnmacht! Rather. it is the bourgeoisie itself that lacks the “noble characteristics” of a “superior race” because it has fooled itself into thinking that its “industrial enterprise”. die sich nur durch eine imaginäre Rache schadlos halten. we happy ones. dass das Ressentiment selbst schöpferisch wird und Werthe gebiert: das Ressentiment solcher Wesen. by mere virtue of the “equiparation of forces”. "low.—its negative conception. for they are “ready or predisposed for every kind of slavery”: and their very “ressentiment” is an unmistakeable “symptom” of their decadence and decay. are forced to find their compensation in an imaginary revenge. “measurable” by a (“common”) standard! This process of “equating” gives rise to the ob-literation of “differences” and the “equation” of values. zu einem „Nicht-selbst“: und dies Nein ist ihre schöpferische That. in-comparable: indeed." " different from itself and "not itself": and this "no" is its creative deed. The contrary is the case when we come to the aristocrat's system of values : it acts and grows spontaneously." "vulgar " "bad.

of the Arbeit. all working as conditioned by a worker. and interpret the latter as a thing done." And just exactly as the people separate the lightning from its flash. willing.des werthesetzenden Blicks — diese nothwendige Richtung nach Aussen statt zurück auf sich selber gehört eben zum Ressentiment: die Sklaven-Moral bedarf. wir Glücklichen!” Belief in the tenets of morality is Ohn-Macht. these good lambs. But let us come back to it. the problem of another origin of the good—of the good. yet.un Aussenwelt. " We bear no grudge against them. from “life”. äusserer Reize. immer zuerst einer Gegen. This “morality” or “genealogy of morals” extends to the “laws” of science that are meant thereby “to anthropo-morphise” life itself. into a “causal” sequence linking culpable subject to innocent object-victim. physiologisch gesprochen. which understands. it is a sign and symptom of decadence and decay. Unschuldig-keit). “to democratize” the world by finding “equations” and therefore “equi-valence” in every “e-vent” or “happening” seen as “phenomena”. their effective Ohnmacht. and understands wrongly. will. as the resentful man has thought it out—demands its solution. durch und durch mit Leben und Leidenschaft durchtränkten Grundbegriff „wir Vornehmen. the real import or effect of its “manifestation” or “activity” is still the Wille zur Macht. It is not surprising that the lambs should bear a grudge against the great birds of prey. for no “force” or “will” other than the Will to Power can exist! The reflex defense of the weak is to deflect their inferior Will to Power. to assign “values” to life. um zu sich selber noch dankbarer. therefore turning “passivity” into “in-nocence” (also. — is he not good ? " then there is nothing to cavil at in the setting up of this ideal. "These birds of prey are evil. a lamb. a thirst for enemies and antagonisms and triumphs. so also does . “that-which-is” (Heidegger). sie bedarf. Das Umgekehrte ist bei der vornehmen Werthungsweise der Fall: sie agirt und wächst spontan. that attributes “agency” to the former and therefore turns “responsibility” (Verantwortlichkeit) into “culpability”. By breaking the “necessary link” arising from the exertion of the Will to Power. sie sucht ihren Gegensatz nur auf. as “appearances” that need to be “linked” to an under-lying “reality” made up of “meaningful laws of nature” connecting “causes” or “agents” or “subjects” and “effects” or “objects”. onto “reactive envy” or “ressentiment” into deontologies and ideologies – “strategies” that seek to exalt and glorify Ohnmacht itself. um zu entstehn. wir Schönen. A quantum of force is just such a quantum of movement. and “flaw-lessness” (Unschuldigkeit) into “guilt”. but that is no reason for blaming the great birds of prey for taking the little lambs. as the working of a subject which is called lightning. wir Guten. a wish to become master. that it should not be a wish to overpower. — ihre Aktion ist von Grund aus Reaktion. who is rather its opposite. And when the lambs say among themselves. by a “subject. though it may also be that the birds of prey will regard it a little sneeringly. noch frohlockender Ja zu sagen. Yet even as “reactions”. we even like them : nothing is tastier than a tender lamb. and can only appear otherwise in the misleading errors of language (and the fundamental fallacies of reason which have become petrified therein). morality and the ascetic ideal are “strategies” or ideologies (“viewpoints”. and he who is as far removed from being a bird of prey." To require of strength that it should not express itself as strength. um überhaupt zu agiren. and perchance say to themselves. action—rather it is nothing else than just those very phenomena of moving. acting. 13. the weak seek to re-order “reality”. a wish to overthrow. is just as absurd as to require of weakness that it should express itself as strength. “perspectives”) that seek to impose the Will to Power of their holders onto others! It is the aim of the weak to give vent to their own will to power in dis-guise not as “instinct of freedom” but rather as the idealistic “freedom of the will” in the attempt to subtract themselves from the necessity of the operari. — ihr negativer Begriff „niedrig“ „gemein“ „schlecht“ ist nur ein nachgebornes blasses Contrastbild im Verhältniss zu ihrem positiven.

the “soul”) has perhaps proved itself the best dogma in the world simply because it rendered possible to the horde of mortal. just as the Kantian "Thing-in-itself"). es ist gar nichts anderes als eben dieses Treiben. What wonder. nicht losgeworden (das Atom ist zum Beispiel ein solcher Wechselbalg. wenn sie sagen „die Kraft bewegt. durch ein „Subjekt“ versteht und missversteht. insgleichen das Kantische „Ding an sich“): was Wunder. es stehe dem Starken frei. wie das Volk den Blitz von seinem Leuchten trennt und letzteres als Thun. The action is everything. to give another instance. and the bird of prey of Being a lamb. dass sie nicht ein Überwältigen-Wollen. als Wirkung eines Subjekts nimmt. of self-assertion. wenn es den Blitz leuchten lässt. dass sie sich als Stärke äussere. — Doch kommen wir zurück: das Problem vom andren Ursprung des „Guten“. es den grossen Raubvögeln zu verargen. versteckt glimmenden Affekte Rache und Hass diese Glauben für sich ausnützen und im Grunde sogar keinen Glauben inbrünstiger aufrecht erhalten als den. Werden. But there is no such substratum. Stärke zu äussern oder auch nicht. Wollen. diesen guten Lämmern. dem Raubvogel es zuzurechnen. die „Subjekte. a dupe of the tricks of language. — unsre ganze Wissenschaft steht noch. becoming. Die Naturforscher machen es nicht besser. The scientists fail to improve matters when they say. in which every lie is fain to sanctify itself. Niedergetretenen Vergewaltigten aus der rachsüchtigen List der Ohnmacht heraus sich zureden… . Ebenso nämlich. ist gerade so widersinnig als von der Schwäche verlangen. vom Guten. that is a "doingdoing": they make the same phenomenon first a cause. „der Thäter“ ist zum Thu bloss hinzugedichtet. und wer so wenig als möglich ein Raubvogel ist. Wirken selbst. es giebt kein „Sein“ hinter dem Thun. down-trodden. kann es anders erscheinen.… This kind of man finds the belief in a neutral. the people duplicate the doing. — das Thun ist Alles. — sollte der nicht gut sein?“ so ist an dieser Aufrichtung eines Ideals Nichts auszusetzen. weak. sei es auch. ein Durst nach Feinden und Widerständen und Triumphen sei. wie als ob es hinter dem Starken ein indifferentes Substrat gäbe. ein Herrwerden-Wollen. working. and overpowered say to themselves with the vindictive guile of weakness [Ohnmacht]. das Blitz heisst. the interpretation of weakness as freedom.the popular morality separate strength from the expression of strength as though behind the strong man there existed some indifferent neutral substratum. of being this or being that. the effect of that cause. is such a changeling. The subject (or. das ist ein Thun-Thun: es setzt dasselbe Geschehen einmal als Ursache und dann noch einmal als deren Wirkung. und dem Raubvogel. and oppressed individuals of every kind. that most sublime specimen of self-deception. "the doer" is a mere appannage to the action. Das Volk verdoppelt im Grunde das Thun. Wirken — vielmehr. vielmehr deren Gegenstück. dem es freistünde. secondly. and has never succeeded" in getting rid of that superstitious changeling “the subject” (the atom. 13. welche alles Wirken als bedingt durch ein Wirkendes. dass sie sich kleine Lämmer holen. force causes. "Force moves. there is no "being" behind doing. wenn die zurückgetretenen. schwach. ein Lamm. ei Niederwerfen-Wollen. ihrer Freiheit vom Affekt. which enjoyed a caprice and option as to whether or not it should express strength. dass sie sich nicht als Stärke äussere. Und wenn die Lämmer unter sich sagen „diese Raubvögel sind böse. so trennt die Volks-Moral auch die Stärke von den Äusserungen der Stärke ab.“ — Von der Stärke verlangen. Ein Quantum Kraft ist ein eben solches Quantum Trieb. Wirken. and then. wie ihn der Mensch des Ressentiment sich ausgedacht hat. when they make the lightning lighten. das befremdet nicht: nur liegt darin kein Grund. Lamm zu sein: — damit gewinnen sie ja bei sich das Recht. Raubvogel zu sein… Wenn die Unterdrückten. if the suppressed and stealthily simmering passions of revenge and hatred exploit for their own advantage this belief and indeed hold no belief with a more steadfast enthusiasm than this—"that the strong has the option of being weak. free-choosing "subject" necessary from an instinct of self-preservation." Thereby do they win for themselves the right of attributing to the birds of prey the responsibility for being birds of prey : when the oppressed. Aber es giebt kein solches Substrat." and so on. Our whole science is still in spite of all its coldness. die Kraft verursacht“ und dergleichen. dass die Raubvögel dazu ein wenig spöttisch blacken werden und vielleicht sich sagen: „wir sind ihnen gar nicht gram. verlangt nach seinem Abschluss. to use popular language. Wille. In point of fact. wir lieben sie sogar: nichts ist schmackhafter als ein zartes Lamm. as merit. und nur unter der Verführung der Sprache (und der in ihr versteinerten Grundirrthümer der Vernunft). unter der Verführung der Sprache und ist die untergeschobenen Wechselbälge. of all its freedom from passion. trotz aller ihrer Kühle. — Dass die Lämmer den grossen Raubvögeln gram sind.

let our kingdom not be of this world.” (p102). the “worker” attributes (awards) the pro-duct of the labour process to “his labour”. this “Verstellungskunst” (mystique of the “appearance”) that is the real “Wille zur Wahrheit” turning into “Wille zum Tode”! As Cacciari puts it. a voluntary and arbitrary “merit” or “demerit” – in any case. “[d]isgraceful is not the priest. If our announcement proclaims values. its ineluctable Eris – all in the very act of “overpowering and domination” that “dis-enchants” and “alienates” both master and slave from the world. and then turns around and attributes (blames) the capitalist employer for his condition as “worker”. the “doing” or “working”. a “responsibility” for “causing” the “ef-fect”.This is yet another pivotal moment in Nietzsche’s philosophy that must be understood thoroughly.) By conjuring a con-nection. for Nietzsche. If our kingdom is nothing but this world. Nietzsche is not making “moral judgements” here: he is not saying that the “bad conscience” or the “ascetic ideal” are “bad” or (most absurd for him) “evil”! If anything. the slave-morality that is “judging” the cause and thereby “being unjust”! As a result. a link and nexus between separate “happenings’ or “e-vents” (Geschehen) in the guise of “cause” and “effect”. it is the “bad conscience”. into “life”. then let our language be that of politics without foundation. its physiological “strife”. It would be pointless and absurd – indeed “power-less” (ohnmachtig) – for Nietzsche to pontificate vainly about how “wrong” these “perspectives” truly are! Because he knows all along – that is what he is saying! – that they are “perspectives”. but the priest who states that his kingdom is of this world. we are performing two “intellectual” or “spiritual” (psycho-logical. and the second is to attribute to the “cause” an “agency”. a commonality or “medium” by means of which they can be “con-nected” and “equi-parated”. into “the world”. Make no mistake! It is not the “instrumental” use of these “perspectives” or “viewpoints” or “judgements” or “rationalizations” (we would call them “ideologies” or “strategies”) such as “science” or “knowledge” or “the intellect” or “Socialism” or “Christianity” that runs counter to the “Will to Life” and the “Wille zur Macht” and so also against “the Body” (Korper). Not at all! It is the “deception” that comes from attributing or “concealing” this “instrumental logic” into “things”. “self- . that it could not possibly have outside of our own arbitrary. (But remember that this is no philoHegelian “self-alienation” that can be “super-seded” in a dialectic of “reconciliation”! Such dialectical notions of “mediation” or “synthesis” of “thesis and antithesis” are anathema to Nietzsche’s perspectivism. by means of which a “nexus” and a “common measure” between them can ec-sist. removing its “differences”. they are “one-sided”. Nietzsche’s “teaching” is that even the “bad conscience” of the slave or the ascetic ideal or the “Will to Truth” are manifestations. The Rationalisierung is a process of “homologation” and “interiorisation” of the world – a process that is meant “to master” the world but simultaneously “to familiarize” or “interiorize” it. “actualities” or expressions of the Will to Power. fictitious “attribution” of such agency or causality! This is the origin of the “bad conscience” and of its “resentment”. rather than physiological) and therefore “arbitrary”. un-necessary “operations”: the first is “to homologate” the two separate events by attributing to them a “sub-stratum”. and trans-substantiating or hypostatizing that into the “Logos” – this “Tauschung” (illusion).

and correct utilization – theory and practice! The counter-revolutionary reply to Lenin will not wait long: Weber is well on the way! Verstehen of “values”. with the problem of how it is possible for Nietzsche to maintain this “meta-perspective” that is his “true phenomenalism and perspectivism” as the practical fusion of freedom and necessity in the new intuition of time and space. pp. And again. And it is this “meta-perspective”. they are always merely absurd. On Pareto. at least for those who can interpret them. (GM) “For those who can interpret them”! There are clear unmistakeable echoes here of Machiavelli: “Quelli che sanno!” (Those who know! – The expression is Gramsci’s in Note sul Machiavelli [‘La Scienza della Politica’. Yet this does not obviate or remove the “need” for us “to un-mask” them for what they are! – Symptoms. Mario Tronti’s Operai e Stato. and “responsibility” of the leitender Geist: here is Max Weber’s monumental enterprise in a nutshell! The “calling” of the scientist who studies and “under-stands” the available options (politics as the art of the possible). if you like. see Norberto Bobbio’s studies in Saggi sulla Scienza Politica in Italia. Morality is only a language of signs [Zeichenrede]. a symptomatology [Symptomatologie]: one must know how to interpret them correctly to utilize them [um von ihr Nutzen zu ziehen]. then: . and that of the political leader who is competent to make the “responsible” choice! Again the obligatory reference is to Weber’s fundamental distinction between “politics of conviction” and “politics of responsibility” in Politik als Beruf. decay and decadence” to the extent that they deny what is their very essence and prime mover – the Will to Power! Nietzsche even advocates “studying” their “semeiotics”. We have dealt above. that enables Nietzsche to take a practical “Position” or “viewpoint” with regard to other “values” or “strategies”. also Pareto’s parallel theorization and classification of “ideologies” into “azioni e derivazioni”.interested viewpoints” and therefore “need-necessary” from the “viewpoint” of their proponents. see Lowith’s Max Weber and Karl Marx for a discussion of how Weber sought to abide by this “calling of responsibility”in his own life. that repropose faithfully the eristic instinctual matrix of the negatives Denken in the context of a political theory of elites [in Vol. Granted that his “perspectivism” does in fact “rationalize” the existence of a life and world that are “contrary” to human “species-conscious being” because he sees all attempts at “rectifying” or “ameliorating” this “state of affairs” or “actuality” (Thatsachlichkeit) as being “futile”. their “sign-language” (Zeichenrede) or “sign-series” (Zeichen-Kette) – their “ideological genealogy”. however. they remain invaluable: they reveal. to assess their “strategic” role in the exertion of the Will to Power. therefore.correct interpretation. as being “against fate or destiny” – nevertheless Nietzsche’s ex-hortation “to read the . with Walras.10ff] and we discuss its significance below. 1…Moral judgments are therefore never to be taken literally: so understood. “affects” of “disease. Cf. This is a point over which Nietzsche has been much misunderstood. supplemented by Cacciari in PNeR.) “One must know how to interpret [the signs] correctly [so as] to draw their usefulness”! Two things are necessary. the most valuable realities of cultures and psychologies that did not know how to "understand" [verstehen] themselves. is the original source for this linking of Nietzsche and Weber. actions and derivations.I of his Trattato di Sociologia Generale] – and his adherence to Machian scientific methodology in the shadow of the Lausanne School. Our own study on Weber and these political themes is in preparation. signs. Semiotically. in connection with “Consciousness”.

as “resolve”. The same applies to “industrial government”. that is. It is this Doppelcharakter that explains the apparent “ambi-guity” in Nietzsche’s Entwurf between. truly “Darwinian”. Nietzsche never thought of his “critique” as “political” because its entire meaning and thrust. the spirit of leadership of the charismatic Ubermensch that is “competent” to lead and implement the grosse Politik. in the “institutional” Rationalisierung that results in the Entwertung (the “disintegration” [Dis-gregation] or “devaluation” of the instincts) and the Ent-seelung. “for the few” who have the necessary “resolve” and can bear the “responsibility” for “die grosse Politik”! This is a point that is absolutely essential to understand how and why Nietzsche’s entire philosophy could be so radically founded upon and saturated with politics – indeed be so “Machiavellian” . politically as “competence to promise”. . in a “place” (Ort) so narrow that our “room for manoeuvre” is strictly limited. the apparent historical. the ontological reality of the Will to Power as “universal condition” in life and the world and.because. much as the Etruscan “haruspices” read the “entrails” of animals to prophesy the future or as Epimenides “divined the past”: .physiological symptoms and signs of disease” and then “to will” their reversal. Realpolitik. wrote “per chi non sa” (for those who do not know) to open their eyes to the ultimate practices of domination such as la ragion di stato. that is. on one hand. its very “self-understanding” was as a “divination”. we are stuck “between the walls of the past and the future”. lies the Weberian leitender Geist. la raison d’etat. as an “astrological horoscope” or “semeiotic study” or even as a “pathology” – as a “reading” of signs and symptoms. and second. as “responsibility” over and against the “illusions” and “sentimental weakness” and even the “nihilism” of the Vergeistigung. with its Technik (Heidegger). remember. as Will to Truth and there-fore as ascetic ideal (A-skesis) and nihilistic Will to Death. of the “spiritualization” and “internalization” (Verinnerlichung) of the “instinct of freedom” – first. – Contrarily to Machiavelli who. the Rationalisierung.and yet he could steadfastly deny having any concern with “politics” as such – in Cacciari’s phrase. of life and the world. is intended for the few! The “overturning”. in the “ideological” manifestation of the Will to Power as Freiheit (freedom of the will). die Staatsrason. At the height of the need-necessity. of the Will to Power as the rationalization of the world. the “trans-valuation” and “overcoming” (Uberwindung) in favour of what he interprets as signs of “health” and “affirmation of life” and of “Will to Power” are intended for “those who can interpret [the signs] correctly to utilize them” – that is. “institutional” triumph in the “onto-logy of thought” of the Vergeistigung. the “dis-enchantment” of Culture and above all Zivilisation with its Demokratisierung. must then confront the reality that the Will to Power can now ec-sist practically and historically. on the other hand. to capitalist enterprise. “bureaucratization” and Parlamentarisierung (Weber) that lead finally to the idolatry of the State! Nietzsche’s entire colossal critical effort to effect a “tran-valuation” of those “values” that represent an ontogenetic Entwertung (degradation or devaluation) and Disgregation (disintegration) of the “Instinkte der Freiheit” paradoxically brought about by the “inception” or mani-festation of the “logic of the Will to Power”. as Gramsci reminds us. he was “Unpolitical”.

} . an intention (dia-noia) – the Will to Power. but what is an extra-temporal and extra-mundane pro-ject. the Will to Power is not “free” because there is no Subject. for those who like us hold dear the fate of this Demokratisierung. – neither an ana-kyklosis nor a palingenesis.or Marx . but not on his “extratemporal” vision of time which reduces historical time to mere “memory” – but a “memory” that “reads the leaves of time” in a physio-logical and dia-gnostic and therefore dia-noiac manner. as we have seen.without Hegel! The next Part of our study must then consider how the Will to Power as the Rationalisierung of the world is possible and what this entails politically for Nietzsche and “for those who do not know” (!). is history presented as a dialectical progressus – and. Hence. but not what is “past” (history as a tale or as pro-vidence) but what is “eternally recurrent”. and therefore every decision is “a miracle”. yet it is not “un-free” because time is not “determined”. it is an “Eternal Return of the Same” whereby “decisions” are “necessarily made” according to neednecessity. not Subject. This is why for Nietzsche both the Demokratisierung and the Parlamentarisierung are so “im-possible” – because they are based on either “pro-noia” or “homo-noia”. not according to any causality ascertainable “scientifically”! A “necessary decision” is the equivalent of a “con-ditioned Will” – a Will to Power as “universal condition”. Only with Hegel. “an exception”. Zarathustra “speaks” and therefore “legislates” (Greek legein) or “teaches”. as Heidegger notes. then. no “intelligible freedom”.the Dezisionismus that is already made evident by Nietzsche and then by Max Weber for whom there are no “laws of nature”. Incidentally. for Nietzsche there is no Darwin . Which brings us to Carl Schmitt and “the exception”. Donoso Cortes with dictatorship as “miracle” or “suspension” of “the laws of nature” .This is Nietzsche’s answer to Hegel and Marx: for his own belief that the “linearity” of history as against Greek “cyclicality” dated back to the inception of Christendom (a belief we have shown to be entirely mistaken) was in fact due to his “re-action” to Hegel’s idealist cosmology and rationalism. a resolve. for the first time in historiography.