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PROVISIONAL REMEDIES |1

ONATE vs. ABROGAR FACTS: The petitioner filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division (previous case), holding that although the levy on attachment of petitioners' properties had been made before the trial court acquired jurisdiction over them, the subsequent service of summons on them cured the invalidity of the attachment. Petitioners maintain that, in accordance with prior decisions of this Court, the attachment of their properties was void because the trial court had not at that time acquired jurisdiction over them and that the subsequent service of summons on them did not cure the invalidity of the levy. On the other hand private respondent Sun Life stresses the fact that the trial court eventually acquired jurisdiction over petitioners and contends that this cured the invalidity of the attachment of petitioners' properties. It invoked the ruling in Davao Light & Power Co . v. Court of Appeals in support of its contention that the subsequent acquisition of jurisdiction by the court cured the defect in the proceedings for attachment. It is also contended that the Deputy Sheriff had tried to serve the summons with a copy of the complaint on petitioners on January 3, 1992 but that there was no one in the offices of petitioners on whom he could make a service. • Respondent Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (Sun Life, for brevity) filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a writ of attachment against petitioners, and Noel L. Diño On January 3, 1992, upon Sun Life's ex-parte motion, the trial court amended the writ of attachment to reflect the alleged amount of the indebtedness. Attempts to serve summons and copy of the amended writ of attachment upon petitioners were done but it failed since no responsible officer to receive the same o Nonetheless, the sheriff proceeded with the levy and notices of garnishments. Summons was served eventually Petitioners filed an "Urgent Motion to Discharge/Dissolve Writ of Attachment." o Sun life filed an ex-parte motion to examine the books of accounts and ledgers of petitioner Brunner Development Corporation (Brunner, for brevity) at the Urban Bank, Legaspi Village Branch, and to obtain copies thereof, which motion was granted by respondent Judge. o Also, Sun Life filed another motion for examination of bank accounts, this time seeking the examination of Account No. 0041-0277-03 with the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI) — which, incidentally, petitioners claim not to be owned by them — and the records of Philippine National Bank (PNB) with regard to checks payable to Brunner. Respondent judge denied the urgent motion of petitioners Hence, this petition o Petitioners argued that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing ex parte the original and amended writs of preliminary attachment and the corresponding notices of garnishment and levy on attachment since the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over them It is clear from the above excerpt, however, that while the petition for a writ of preliminary attachment may be granted and the writ itself issued before the defendant is summoned, the writ of attachment cannot be implemented until jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained. As this Court explained, "levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the plaintiff's attachment bond." Indeed, as this Court through its First Division has ruled on facts similar to those in these cases, the attachment of properties before the service of summons on the defendant is invalid, even though the court later acquires jurisdiction over the defendant. 14 At the very least, then, the writ of attachment must be served simultaneously with the service of summons before the writ may be enforced . As the properties of the petitioners were attached by the sheriff before he had served the summons on them, the levies made must be considered void. The Rules of Court do not require that issuance of the writ be kept a secret until it can be enforced. Otherwise in no case may the service of summons on the defendant precede the levy on attachment. To the contrary, Rule 57, §13 allows the defendant to move to discharge the attachment even before any attachment is actually levied upon, thus negating any inference that before its enforcement, the issuance of the writ must be kept secret. On the other hand, to authorize the attachment of property even before jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through the service of summons or his voluntary appearance could lead to abuse. It is entirely possible that the defendant may not know of the filing of a case against him and consequently may not be able to take steps to protect his interests. Nor may sheriff's failure to abide by the law be excused on the pretext that after all the court later acquired jurisdiction over petitioners. More important than the need for insuring success in the enforcement of the writ is the need for affirming a principle by insisting on that "most fundamental of all requisites — the jurisdiction of the court issuing attachment over the person of the defendant." 18 It may be that the same result would follow from requiring that a new writ be served all over again. The symbolic significance of such an act, however, is that it would affirm our commitment to the rule of law. 19 Davao Light and Power v. CA FACTS: • Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Queensland Hotel, etc. and Teodorico Adarna. o It contained an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment • The judge granted the ex parte application • An attachment bond was submitted by petitioner, the writ of attachment was issued. • Defendants filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction over the cause and their person when the said writ of attachment was promulgated • TC denied the motion to discharge • CA ruled in favor of the defendants and declared the orders of TC as null and void • Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT MAY ISSUE EX PARTE AGAINST DEFENDANT BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE LATTER. HELD: The Court rules that the question must be answered in the affirmative and that consequently, the petition for review will have to be granted. The events that follow the filing of the complaint as a matter of routine are well known. After the complaint is filed, summons issues to the defendant, the summons is then transmitted to the sheriff, and finally, service of the

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HELD: We find petitioners' contention respecting the validity of the attachment of their properties to be well taken. We hold that the ATTACHMENT of petitioners' properties PRIOR TO THE ACQUISITION OF JURISDICTION by the respondent court is VOID and that the subsequent service of summons on petitioners did not cure the invalidity of such attachment. The records show that before the summons and the complaint were served on petitioners Oñate and Econ Holdings Corporation (Econ) on January 9, 1992, Deputy Sheriff Arturo C. Flores had already served on January 3, 1992 notices of garnishment on the PNB Head office 2 and on all its Metro Manila branches and an A.B capital. In a portion of the decision in Davao Light, the SC said that , when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicant's affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem, if any, as also explicitly directed by Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

the Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition that writs of attachment may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant. 1. authorization by the Court of service of summons by publication. either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court's authority. The service of a petition for preliminary attachment without the prior or simultaneous service of summons and a copy of the complaint in the main case — and that is what happened in this case — does not of course confer jurisdiction upon the issuing court over the person of the defendant. as above indicated — issuance of summons. They may be validly and properly applied for and granted even before the defendant is summoned or is heard from. petitioner. — Action is commenced by filing of the complaint. as explicity required by Section 5 of Rule 57. prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. petitioner's counsel went before the trial court and entered a special appearance for the limited purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court." Thus. or grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant. if any). receivership or replevin. COURT OF APPEALS. Rule 57. Withal no principle. DOCTRINE:  Attachment is an ancillary remedy. preliminary injunction. when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment. • Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the defendant may be bound by a writ of preliminary attachment even before summons together with a copy of the complaint in the main case has been validly served upon him. and the plaintiff's attachment bond. Petitioner had not previously received any summons and any copy of a complaint against him in Civil Case No.PROVISIONAL REMEDIES |2 summons is effected on the defendant in any of the ways authorized by the Rules of Court. by service on the defendant of summons. the order of attachment. or dissolving it by causing dismissal of the complaint itself on any of the grounds set forth in Rule 16. or contemporaneously accompanied. • On the day set for hearing of the Petition for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment. • Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. therefore. or demonstrating the insufficiency of the applicant's affidavit or bond in accordance with Section 13. such petition must be served either simultaneously with service of summons and a copy of the main complaint or after jurisdiction over the defendant has already been acquired by such service of summons." o “COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION. if any. in its discretion. too. Hence. different acts may be done by the plaintiff or by the Court. but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless preceded. these do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court.  However. is true with regard to the provisional remedies of preliminary attachment. petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. for example. order of attachment and writ of attachment (and/or appointments of guardian ad litem. ALBERTO SIEVERT. paraphrasing the Rules of Court. Among these. 88-44346. statutory or jurisprudential. A court which has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant. Service of all such documents is INDISPENSABLE not only for the acquisition of JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON of the defendant. HON. Rule 57. The resolution of this issue depends. but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem. even though summons is not issued until a later date. and of the order of attachment. Notice of the separate attachment petition is not notice of the main action. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. or amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court 30 — and however valid and proper they might otherwise be. the grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant. the application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted separately from the complaint). have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. Rule 57. respondents. require prior hearing on the application with notice to the defendant. a copy of the complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem. cannot bind that defendant whether in the main case or in any ancillary proceeding such as attachment proceedings. of the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor and thus accord him the opportunity to prevent attachment of his property by the posting of a counterbond in an amount equal to the plaintiff's claim in the complaint pursuant to Section 5 (or Section 12). received by mail a Petition for Issuance of a Preliminary Attachment filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 32. • Under Sec. it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicant's affidavit and attachment bond. This. JUDGE ARTEMON D. at the commencement of the action. ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge may issue a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner before summons is served on the latter RULING: We rule for respondent Judge. vs. which are unquestionable validity and propriety. on what is meant by "Commencement of the action. but also upon CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. (No jurisdiction over the person-lack of notice) • The trial court denied the petitioner's objection. the dismissal of the action by the plaintiff on mere notice. • Thereupon. . There is ordinarily some appreciable interval of time between the day of the filing of the complaint and the day of service of summons of the defendant. It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant. a citizen and resident of the Philippines. During this period. It is a remedy which is purely statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions granting it. where the petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied in a discrete pleading. For the guidance of all concerned. a writ of preliminary attachment may issue upon filing of the complaint even before issuance of the summons . are the appointment of a guardian ad litem. o He simultaneously filed a written objection to the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear or act upon the Petition for Issuance of a Preliminary Writ of Attachment. as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may. on the same day. LUNA and AURELIO CAMPOSANO. it is clear that. although it may. at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter. to apprise the defendant of the complaint against him. the amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court. a party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security. as also explicity directed by Section 3. A PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT may be defined. FACTS: • Alberto Sievert. • There is no question that a writ of preliminary attachment may be applied for a plaintiff "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter" in the cases enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.

or after jurisdiction over the defendant has already been acquired by such service of summons. respondents filed a Motion to Lift the WPA. • However. No. the case may be re-raffled for assignment for study and report only after there is a resolution that the case is deemed submitted for decision. Teofilo developed a scheme to save the elder Carlos’s estate from inheritance taxes. Carlos elevated the said Decision to this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari. The judgment of CA in this case settled the issue of damages because of the improper issuance of the WPA in the first place. Carlos discovered that Sandoval and his brother were never validly married (no marriage license). • Carlos sought to nullify the agreements with Sandoval for want of consideration. as there were still pending incidents. Thus. No. had attained finality. is not necessarily fixed and Identical regardless of the specific purpose for which the determination is to be made. arguing that under the Revised Internal Rules of the CA (RIRCA). a Notice of Garnishment was served upon the PNB over the deposit accounts maintained by respondents.00. Subsequently. Carlos prayed of the RTC to declare the alleged marriage between Teofilo and Sandoval void ab initio. the prayer in a petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied or incorporated in the main complaint itself as one of the forms of relief sought in such complaint. o Carlos filed a MR. Before the RTC case could be heard. CV No. but rendered against the attachment bond. They pointed out that re-raffle could not yet be effected. CV No. the issue posed in this case is not to be resolved by determining when an action may be regarded as having been commenced. o CA ordered the discharge and dissolution of the Writ of Attachment and Notice of Garnishment. respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari.” [COMMENTO: To simplify what happened. as affirmed by the SC. • G. the want of jurisdiction of the trial court to proceed in the main case against the defendant is quite clear. provided that Teofilo died without issue.R. these should encompass only such damages incurred during the pendency of the appeal.800. the trial court proceeded to hear the petition for issuance of the writ. • Rather. • In the case at bar. CA granted respondent’s Motion for Immediate Execution. The respondents filed a Motion against the Attachment Bond and the immediate execution of it. No. that the CA erred in resolving the motion without conducting any hearing. it simply has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendant or his property. • Meanwhile. Thus. valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint will in such case vest jurisdiction in the court over the defendant both for purposes of the main case and for purposes of the ancillary remedy of attachment. Accordingly. Respondents duly filed their Answer and thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. • G. The RTC rendered a summary judgment in favor of Carlos. Carlos moved before the RTC for execution pending appeal. 53229. They noted that the CA had already ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by the RTC was improperly granted and that its Decision. as well as the Motion for Judgment on Attachment Bond. This is reversible error and must be corrected on certiorari.R. SIDDCOR points out that no hearing was conducted on the Motion for Immediate Execution despite the requirement in Section 2. order that new titles covering the subject properties be issued in the name of Carlos and require Sandoval to restitute Carlos in the amount of P18. but it was approved by the CA and was affirmed by the SC.R. Upon promulgation of the Summary Judgment. granting that damages may be awarded. 136035: CA erred in ruling on the motion for damages without awaiting judgment in the main case. CA did not award moral and exemplary damages. • CA promulgated two resolutions: o FIRST: Denied Carlos’s Motion to Dismiss the Appeal and Motion for Suspension.R. which was granted upon the filing of a bond. in any case. Yet. which governed claims for damages on account of unlawful attachment. Rule 39 that “discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. • Resolution (3/2301998): The Court of Appeals deemed that the case may be already be referred to the Raffle Committee for assignment to a ponente for study and report. The CA found that there was no sufficient cause of action to warrant the preliminary attachment. • If a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant in the principal action. • Carlos claimed that prior to their father’s death in 1963. He claimed that he was the sole compulsory heir of his parents and he has survived his brother Teofilo who died intestate in 1992. notice of the main case is at the same time notice of the auxiliary proceeding in attachment. the critical time which must be identified is when the trial court acquires authority under law to act coercively against the defendant or his property in a proceeding in attachment . • Carlos likewise prayed for the issuance of the provisional relief of PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT which the RTC granted. The RTC denied the motion. 53229 o In CA-G. Felix assented to the plan and Carlos entered into certain agreements with Sandoval in connection with the subject properties. docketed as CA-G. the Petition for Review on certiorari is GRANTED due course and the Order of the trial court dated 20 May 1988 and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 July 1988 are hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. It is not disputed that neither service of summons with a copy of the complaint nor voluntary appearance of petitioner Sievert was had in this case. It was initially denied by the RTC. Carlos filed a case in the RTC and one of the reliefs prayed for is the issuance of WPA (which was granted and was followed by a Notice of Garnishment). o Sandoval also filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. . • G. but explained the reasons for such denial. such petition must be served either simultaneously with service of summons and a copy of the main complaint. • Respondents filed an URGENT MOTION TO DISCHARGE THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT. and that a hearing was necessary to prove the claim for damages and the appellate court erred in granting the award for damages despite lack of hearing. Rule 57 of the then Rules of Civil Procedure. In such case. Subsequently. o SECOND (THE assailed Resolution): CA resolved the Motion for Judgment on Attachment Bond and ruled that it was not necessary for the determination of damages on the injunction bond to await the decision on appeal.924. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL FACTS: • Carlos filed a Complaint in the RTC against Sandoval. No pronouncement as to costs. • Respondents –– o Filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Judgment – Denied o Appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. denied without elaboration Carlos’ MTD. JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. ordered SIDDCOR and Carlos to pay Sandoval. the judgment became final. particularly the motions for reconsideration of Carlos and themselves. • Ordinarily. 135830: Carlos argues that the CA could not have resolved the Motion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond since the case had not yet been re-raffled under the two-raffle system for study and report. We believe and so hold that critical time is the time of the vesting of jurisdiction in the court over the person of the defendant in the main case.R. • WHEREFORE.PROVISIONAL REMEDIES |3 • However. Shortly thereafter. that the CA had no jurisdiction over the motion as the docketing fees had not yet been filed. but the Court denied Carlos’s Petition and thus the CA Decision ordering the dissolution of the Writ of Attachment and Notice of Garnishment became final. respondents filed a Motion for Judgment On the Attachment Bond. the hearing on Carlos’s Complaint ensued before the RTC. 137743: Assails the allowance by the CA of the immediate execution of the award of damages. a point in time which. Notice of the separate attachment petition is not notice of the main action. they were entitled to damages under Section 20. where the petition for a writ of PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT is embodied in a DISCRETE PLEADING. Carlos posted a bond for P20M issued by SIDDCOR Insurance Corporation (SIDDCOR).

prior to the adjudication of the main case. Rule 57. there is no express requirement under the rule that the hearing be done in open court. said checks were returned dishonored and stamped "ACCOUNT CLOSED". there is no requirement under the rule that a full-blown hearing on the merits should be had. Nos. Said ruling attained finality when it was affirmed by this Court. It should be noted that this case poses a situation different from what is normally contemplated under Section 20. as it was. They may be treated separately from the petition in G.” or on 27 June 1996. The premature award of damages DOES NOT NEGATE the fact that the parties were accorded due process. The only matter left for adjudication is the proper amount of damages. petitioners. The necessary elements to be established in an application for damages are essentially factual: the fact of damage or injury and the quantifiable amount of damages sustained . No. 39267 became final. even by the court called upon to resolve the application for damages on the attachment bond.R. “…And Shall be Included in the Judgment on the Main Case” Section 20. The award of damages was made after a proper hearing had occurred wherein all the concerned parties had been given the opportunity to present their arguments and evidence in support and in rebuttal of the application for damages. Scope of Damages Properly Awardable The rule is thus well-settled that the bond issued upon an application for preliminary attachment answers for all damages.] ISSUES: Whether or not – (1) The assailed judgment on the attachment bond could have been rendered. 135830 and 136035 are concerned with the award of damages on the attachment bond. Even SIDDCOR acknowledges that there are recognized instances where the award of damages or judgment on the attachment bond may not be included in the decision on the main case. Thus. since it is on that basis that the right to damages comes to existence. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. which are sustained by reason of the attachment.PROVISIONAL REMEDIES |4 The RTC case was heard. [G. and issued to the latter three postdated checks as payment of the purchase price. (2) The CA properly complied with the hearing requirement under Section 20. This conclusion is no longer subject to review. Carlos and SIDDCOR filed their respective comments in opposition to private respondents’ motion. 137743. Carlos contends that the award of damages should have been included in this case and it was wrongfully included/prematurely awarded in the Motion against the Attachment Bond. 2007. and indeed availed of their right to be heard.] SPOUSES GREGORIO and JOSEFA YU. or that the parties be allowed to confront adverse witnesses to the claim of damages on the bond . (3) The CA properly ascertained the amount of damages it awarded in the judgment on the attachment bond. the action of the Court of Appeals in resolving the application for damages even before the main judgment was issued does not conform to Section 20. In this case. 53229. Carlos obtained a favorable judgment to which the respondents filed an appeal. deeming as it does the allowance by the RTC of preliminary attachment as improper. Rule 57— wherein the very wrongfulness of the attachment remains one of the issues in contention in the main case.R. but also to present evidence in support of their claims. All the relevant parties had been afforded the bare right to be heard on the matter. the special particular circumstances of this case lead us to rule that such error is not mortal to the award of damages.R. However. In this case. The “PROPER HEARING” contemplated would not merely encompass the right of the parties to submit their respective positions. the petitions are DISMISSED. It was rendered by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction in the original action reviewing the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the private respondents. interest should start to accrue only from the moment it had been finally determined that the attachment was unlawful. No. Nahilo ako…sorry! The main issue related to our topic is concerned with the propriety of the judgment on the ATTACHMENT BOND and the MOTION FOR ITS IMMEDIATE EXECUTION which was granted. by reason of its affirmation by this Court. there were no open court hearings conducted by the CA and it is precisely this absence that the petitioners assert as fatal. HOWEVER. The core questions though lie in the proper interpretation of the condition under Section 20. When Te presented the checks at maturity for encashment. legal interest commences from the date the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G. RULING: Scope and Import of Section 20. G.R. ESSENTIAL MANUFACTURING. J p: FACTS: Spouses Yu purchased from Ngo Yet Te (Te) bars of detergent soap. which relates to the immediate execution of the said award. there would be a greater demand for a more extensive hearing on the application of damages . NGO YET TE. However.” Petitioners assert that there was no proper hearing on the application for damages and that the CA had wrongfully acted on the application in that it resolved it prior to the rendition of the main judgment. The Motion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond filed by respondents was properly filed since it was filed with the CA during the pendency of the appeal in the main case and also as an incident thereto. It must be noted that the judicial finding on the wrongfulness of the attachment was then already CONCLUSIVE AND BEYOND REVIEW and that the amount of actual damages sustained was likewise indubitable as it could be found in the official case record in CA-G. the claimant loses his right to damages. However. The courts are bound to respect the conclusiveness of this final judgment. such as if the main case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and no claim for damages could have been presented in the main case. Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Section 20 allows the application to be filed at any time before the judgment becomes executory . 155868.R. we disagree that the rate of legal interest be counted from the date of the “unlawful garnishment. doing business under the name and style. the determination that the attachment was wrongful did not come from the trial court or any court having jurisdiction over the main action. The only matter of controversy that could be litigable through the traditional hearing would be the matter of moral and exemplary damages. incurred at whatever stage. In such a case. but should instead be resolved and included in the judgment on the main case. WHEREFORE. Respondents are generally correct on the point that a case can only be deemed submitted for decision only after all pending incidents are resolved. CV No. Rule 57 does state that the award of damages shall be included in the judgment on the main case. It should be filed with the court having jurisdiction over the case at the time of the application. respondent. Rule 57 prior to its judgment on the attachment bond. and seemingly indicates that it should not be rendered prior to the adjudication of the main case. HOWEVER. February 6. Properly. “Such Damages May Be Awarded Only After Proper Hearing” Both Carlos and SIDDCOR were duly notified of the Motion for Judgment on the Attachment Bond and were required to file their respective comments. vs. The remedy provided by law is exclusive and by failing to file a motion for the determination of the damages on time and while the judgment is still under the control of the court. SP No. Te demanded payment from Spouses Yu but the latter did not heed her . The award of actual damages by the Court of Appeals is thus proper in amount. It should be filed in the same case that is the main action and cannot be instituted separately . but the CA appropriately chose not to award such damages. Rule 57 that reads: “Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case. It is clear that the award for damages need not be resolved before the case is submitted for decision. and to rebut the submissions and evidence of the adverse party. or the decision on the Appeal by Certiorari filed by the respondents.

Thus. Spouses Yu filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it. To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment. dami finile like Notices of Appeal. a Toyota Ford Fierra. Te filed with SC a Petition for Review in on Certiorari but denied the same in a Resolution for having been filed late and for failure to show that a reversible error was committed by the CA. They also sought payment of attorney's fees and litigation expenses. 2. findings of fact may be passed upon and reviewed by the Supreme Court in the following instances: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations.) CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision declaring that the latter had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of their entitlement to damages. the same had been previously attached by the Sheriff of Mandaue City in connection with another case and that it was placed in the Cebu Bonded Warehousing Corporation. Thus. discharging from attachment the Toyota Ford Fierra. RTC issued an Order of Attachment/Levy on the basis of which Sheriff Alimurung of RTC Cebu City levied and attached Spouses Yu's properties in Cebu City consisting of one parcel of land and four units of motor vehicle. (7) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting. On the counterclaim. Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that the writ of attachment was procured in bad faith. (10) when the findings of fact of the lower court are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. apparently not informed of the SC Decision. representing the damages they allegedly sustained as a consequence of the wrongful attachment of their properties. the attachment defendant must prove. Charry Sy (Sy). (6) when the factual findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court. actual damages. As to its amount. Hence the present petition. after it was established by final judgment that there was no true ground therefor – NO Whether or not the appellate court erred in refusing to award actual. 1994. moral and exemplary damages after it was established by final judgment that the writ of attachment was procured with no true ground for its issuance – Sps. and a passenger bus. specifically. based on reliable information. it would appear that long before the passenger bus was placed under preliminary attachment in. It also appears that the order of attachment was upheld because of the admitted financial reverses the petitioner is undergoing. Te filed with the Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. merely declared the previous issuance of the writ of attachment by this Court thru its former presiding judge to be improvidently issued. No. moral damages. (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken. rendered a Decision. Indeed. Entry of Judgment of Resolution was made on July 22. (having exhausted all their remedy in RTC they went to CA again questioning the disposition of their counterclaim. No reports regarding the average actual profits and other evidence of profitability necessary to prove the amount of actual damages were presented. the CA stated that despite her submission of the used and unused ticket stubs. In ruling that Spouses Yu failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support their counterclaim for actual damages based on unrealized income. They contend that they are entitled to their counterclaim for damages as a matter of right in view of the finality of SC Resolution in which affirmed the finding of the CA that respondent Te had wrongfully caused the attachment of their properties. (5) when the lower court. the present case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Spouses Yu filed an Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Attachment. they were about to move or dispose of their properties to defraud their creditors. . and Canter delivery van on humanitarian grounds. especially when it concurs with the factual findings of the RTC. there was no evidence on the daily net income. neither is there a statement of the particular acts committed to show that the petitioners are in fact disposing of their properties to defraud creditors. but it did not award any damages of any kind to the defendants. if the claim for actual damages covers unrealized profits. 11 and the passenger bus. with the best evidence obtainable. The submitted basis is too speculative and conjectural . or conjectures. considering that the question of the attachment which allegedly gave rise to the damages incurred by the defendants is being determined by the Supreme Court. etc. a Canter delivery van. They also filed a Claim Against Surety Bond in which they demanded payment from Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety). From said CA Decision. a jeep. jeep. specifically. In a Petition for Certiorari CA lifted the RTC Order of Attachment on their remaining properties ruling that neither pleading states in particular how the fraud was committed or the badges of fraud purportedly committed by the petitioners to establish that the latter never had an intention to pay the obligation. and exemplary damages. and not on guesswork or speculation . Te filed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail. this RTC declines to rule on this. Nor can they also attribute to the wrongful attachment their failure to earn income or profit from the operation of the passenger bus. and that. Upon Te's posting of an attachment bond. but maintaining custody of Lot No. absurd. Only entitled to temperate damages and attorney's fees HELD: CA finding that the attachment of the properties of Spouses Yu was wrongful DID NOT RELIEVE SPOUSES YU OF THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THEIR COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES. While the RTC did not resolve the Claim Against Surety Bond. the RTC. the routes plied by the bus and the average fares for each route . The RTC issued an Order which reiterates in toto its Decision reasoning that both the High Court and the CA. Acting through her son and attorney-in-fact. We are in full accord with the CA that Spouses Yu failed to prove their counterclaim.R. They also filed a Manifestation informing the RTC of the SC Resolution in G. surmises. and therefore ordered Defendants to pay the plaintiff with interest and denies the grant of damages. went beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. Cebu City. or impossible. 66 However. it issued an Order. In particular. SC usually defer to the expertise of the CA. This is reversible error. In support of her prayer for preliminary attachment. (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions made without a citation of specific evidence on which they are based. Te attached to her Complaint an Affidavit executed by Sy that Spouses Yu were guilty of fraud in entering into the purchase agreement for they never intended to pay the contract price. ISSUE: 1. Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Insolvency is not a ground for attachment especially when defendant has not been shown to have committed any act intended to defraud its creditors . Spouses Yu cannot complain that they were unreasonably deprived of the use of the passenger bus by reason of the subsequent wrongful attachment issued. the amount of unrealized profits must be established and supported by independent evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure. On the same date. Spouses Yu filed an Answer with counterclaim for damages arising from the wrongful attachment of their properties . the same must be measurable based on specific facts. finding that the plaintiff has established a valid civil cause of action against the defendants.dami nangyari eh. (4) when judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.. . the surety which issued the attachment bond. 114700. the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount thereof. However.. . Spouses Yu filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied. which was claimed by the defendants in their counter claim. based on the Manifestation filed by Sheriff Alimurung. in making its findings.PROVISIONAL REMEDIES |5 demands. the Court a quo did not err in not awarding damages in favor of defendants-appellants. (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents. Spouses Yu filed with the RTC a MR questioning the disposition of their counterclaim. Besides. hence RTC could not grant any damages by virtue of the improvident attachment made by this Court thru its former presiding judge. .

• Petitioner filed its Position Paper dated April 15. process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. The trial court issued a restraining order but the same was put in issue: Whether the Order was a TRO or a preliminary injunction. Gregorio Yu and Josefa Yu are awarded P50. SYNOPSIS: Respondent City filed a case for Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner who announced the implementation of its water rates adjustment. ELUCIDATED. No. petitioner. WHEREFORE. respondent City filed a Motion to Set [for] Hearing its application for a temporary restraining order or preliminary mandatory injunction. Hence. to merit an award thereof. 2004. FACTS • Petitioner Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) is a water district established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. • Respondent City opposed. SC cannot attribute malice nor bad faith to Te in applying for the attachment writ. moral. 2000. Nonetheless. We cannot hold her liable for moral and exemplary damages. On the other hand. Spouses Yu waged a protracted legal battle to fight off the illegal attachment of their properties and pursue their claims for damages. Hence. December 10. causing irreparable injury to the public. and should not be confused with. such as by appending a false affidavit to his application . attorney's fees cannot be awarded when moral and exemplary damages are not granted. — INJUNCTION is a judicial writ. may issue.00. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. Thus. 1999. we recognize that Spouses Yu suffered some form of pecuniary loss when their properties were wrongfully seized. the exception however is when a party incurred expenses to lift a wrongfully issued writ of attachment. 1999. 1999. It is only just and equitable that they be awarded reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of P30. As a matter of course.00 temperate damages and P30. respondent City filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order And[/]Or Writ of Preliminary Injunction praying that the case be set for hearing on February 24. The failure of respondent court to fix a period for the ordered restraint did not lend the temporary restraining order a breath of semi-permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary injunction. 198 as a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. • On June 17. Hence. 2000. 1999. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. we grant them temperate damages and attorney's fees. BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICT. it is not difficult to understand why Te concluded that Spouses Yu never intended to pay their obligation for they had available funds in their bank but chose to transfer said funds instead of cover the checks they issued. LABAYEN. 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioners' counterclaim is PARTLY GRANTED. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days. The increase was aborted after petitioner unilaterally suspended the January 22. in an action for injunction.000. the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from. CIVIL PROCEDURE. a RESTRAINING ORDER is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte . it alleged that the proposed water rates would violate due process as they were to be imposed without the public hearing required under Letter of Instructions No. 2000. 46 and the City of Bacolod. the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated.PROVISIONAL REMEDIES |6 Moreover. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction . THE HON. • March 15. The 20-day period should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do so. 326. • After a hiatus of nearly seven (7) months. vs. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. As a rule.R.000. That the Order failed to state the period for the restraint does not convert it from a TRO to a preliminary injunction. It attached documents evidencing the conduct of extensive and lengthy public hearings in fifty-eight (58) of the sixty-one (61) barangays of Bacolod City. • On July 22. However. DISTINGUISHED FROM PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. Presiding Judge. the petition is partly GRANTED.000. 2000. Under the law. 70 As to moral and exemplary damages . respondent court heard respondent's application for temporary restraining order and issued an Order commanding petitioner to stop. petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order. respondents. 2000 an Order 19 directing respondent City to file an Opposition to the Urgent Motion. The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. 1999 scheduled implementation. EMMA C. hence. In its Opposition. In sum. The twenty (20)-day period provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do so. SC affirm the dismissal of the counterclaim of petitioners Spouses Yu for actual. The petition stated that on January 15. however. Without a doubt. respondent trial court issued an Order stating that there was no more need to hear the case on the merits as both parties have already submitted their position papers and documents to prove their respective allegations.] SYLLABUS: REMEDIAL LAW. 11. The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court. it prayed that before the hearing of the main case. the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. an award of temperate or moderate damages in the amount of P50. [G. it must be shown that the wrongful attachment was obtained by the attachment plaintiff with malice or bad faith. It is in the business of providing safe and potable water to Bacolod City. 2000 and 2001 . the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard . • Public respondent City of Bacolod is a municipal corporation created by Commonwealth Act No. The March 21.000. petitioners did not present evidence as to the damages they suffered by reason of the wrongful attachment of Lot No. 1999. 1479. whether prohibitory or mandatory.00 is in order. On the same date requested. Br. petitioner announced that the rate hike will be implemented on April 1. or on February 18. No costs. • On March 7. a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. BACIWA published a Schedule of Automatic Water Rates Adjustments for the years 1999. a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction be issued. ACTION FOR INJUNCTION. And the 20-day limited period of effectivity of the TRO is absolute. respondent .00 attorney's fees. The Court ruled that the attendant facts and circumstances of the case clearly showed that the trial court issued a TRO. although the amount thereof cannot be definitively ascertained. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied. the testimony of petitioner Josefa Yu herself negates their claim for moral and exemplary damages since she admitted that there is really a transfer of fund from their previous bank to another bank. It opined that original jurisdiction over cases on rate review is vested in the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). The rates were supposed to take effect seven (7) days after its posting in the local papers or on January 22. RTC of Bacolod City. the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law. 157494. respondent City filed a case for Injunction with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner . desist and refrain from implementing the proposed water rates for the year 2000 which were then supposed to take effect on March 1. It alleged that the parties had already submitted their respective memoranda. However. 1999. 700 and Presidential Decree No. the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction. 1999. and exemplary damages. It also alleged that petitioner had already effected the water rates increase and collection. Respondent court a quo issued on March 10. • On March 26. 1999. otherwise known as the Charter of Bacolod. no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.

• On appeal. The grant of a preliminary mandatory injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court. 2000. the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case. . It must be further noted that the temporary restraining order has been elevated to the same level as the preliminary injunction in the procedure. among others. respondents cannot now consider it as a preliminary injunction to justify the validity of the assailed Decision. Thus. that the case was not yet ripe for decision when the court granted the final injunction. Respondent court denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit in an Order dated January 24. Hence this petition. Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals. however. and the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court should not be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. It alleged that public respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave and patent abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she issued the final injunction in disregard of petitioner's basic right to due process. the present practice is to categorically refer to it as a temporary restraining order. 2001. therefore. On April 6. the omission by the public respondent in referring to the 24 February 2000 order as a temporary restraining order could not have been a mere oversight but deliberate. PLCC filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure o Now. Also. for failure to pay their obligation despite repeated demands. avail of the mandatory pre-trial conference and have the case tried on the merits. The attendant facts and circumstances clearly show that the respondent trial court issued a temporary restraining order. Estares (Estares spouses for brevity) filed a complaint for "Damages and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction" against private respondent Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) o They alleged that the obtained a loan from PLCC which is secured by a real estate mortgage and that the promissory note and the real estate mortgage were falsified because they affixed their signatures on two blank documents. • Spouses Castro and Nogoy filed before RTC Pampanga a complaint for injunction. is in fact a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review on certiorari. restoration of road lot/right of way and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. By its wordings. A perimeter wall was constructed on Co’s lot. It is likewise settled that a court should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which would effectively dispose of the main case without trial. respondent court issued an Order finding petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order moot and academic considering petitioner's compliance of said temporary restraining order. Estares and Rosenda P. Accordingly. ESTARES v. Benedict Subdivision to the Spouses Castro and Spouses Nogoy . the CA dismissed the petition and denied their MR. ENGR. An annotation of the TCT is the best evidence to prove that said lot is a road lot. the issuance of injunctive relief is improper. though termed by BACIWA as a temporary restraining order. grasses and bushes. Respondents. ratiocinating thus: • The Spouses Castro and Nogoy demanded from the Co’s to stop the construction of the said perimeter wall because it closed the only means of ingress and egress and impeded ventilation. These lots have a common boundary on their southeastern side by a lot owned by respondent Co and his siblings. the [O]rder of public respondent dated 24 February 2000. Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act. the petitioner having had no opportunity to file its answer. To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: • Petitioner Spouses Eliseo F. This note of semipermanence simply cannot issue from a mere temporary restraining order. As found by the trial court during its ocular inspection. On December 21. the petitioner sought to declare as null and void the promissory note and the real estate mortgage for not reflecting their true agreement. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.PROVISIONAL REMEDIES |7 City contended that the temporary restraining order issued was not infirmed with procedural and substantive defects. SPOUSES JOEY & MARY JEANNIE CASTRO and SPOUSES RICHARD & EDITHA NOGOY. Given the previous undeviating references to it as a temporary restraining order.BENJAMIN CO. petitioner raises the following issues: ISSUE: WON the order issued is a TRO or a PI? TRO HELD: The sequence of events and the proceedings that transpired in the trial court make a clear conclusion that the Order issued was a temporary restraining order and not a preliminary injunction. to set [a] distinction. 2001 asserting. • The RTC denied the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. it can be safely inferred that the increased water rates must not be effected until final disposition of the main case. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed. Injunction is a judicial writ. It further issued Orders dated March 17. versus . 2000 21 and March 20. free from doubt or dispute. 2000. the petitioners must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial. Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Decision on January 11. respondent court issued the assailed Decision granting the final injunction which allegedly confirmed the previous preliminary injunction. • Co entered into a joint venture with Three Kings Construction and Realty Corp for the development of their lot. grounds and requirements of its obtention by S[ection] 4. it was only when petitioner expressed its vehement objection on the ruling that the final injunction confirmed the preliminary injunction previously issued.5% and 3% penalty on each delayed monthly interest are different from the 18% interest per annum to which they agreed to. • The complaint was subsequently amended modifying the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the road because the wall was almost finished. DALE OLEA and THREE KINGS CONSTRUCTION & REALTY CORPORATION. when the respondent City and the respondent trial court started to insist that the questioned Order was a preliminary injunction. it does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. • FACTS: China Banking sold lots situated at St. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION. Resorting to this Court. 2000. the certificate of title in the name of Co covering the subject lot does not have an annotation to the effect that said lot is a road lot. In which case. (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable. Also. Petitioners. In the interim. Respondent court continued with the proceedings by receiving the evidence of petitioner in support of its Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order. Said lot is covered by wild plants. Rule 58. they prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin PLCC from taking possession of the • • • • • • In the case at bar. there is an existing secondary road within the subdivision that serves as the main access road to the highway. The period of the restraint was not limited. process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. Again. he does not have a clear legal right and. Issue: Whether or not the circumstances would warrant the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction? Held: NO because the petitioners have not shown a clear and unmistakable right for the court to issue the writ. There is no visible pathway either beaten or paved on the lot. the monthly interest of 3. and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Co’s lot is not a road lot which could have been used by petitioners as ingress and egress.

that the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation. held that the February 14.00. clearly gives too much weight to one factor. discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction. o This is to enjoin the Buycos from closing off a private road within their property which he has been using to go to and from the public highway to access his poultry farm. efficacious and obligatory. considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors. Upon the nonpayment of the loan. the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. rendering petitioner’s act of closing the road on March 1. fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination. o The trial court. The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. In one case. is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. the petitioner must show. Rosenda P. The application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason for such an order before the case can be regularly heard. Generally. the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale.PROVISIONAL REMEDIES |8 mortgaged property and proceeding with the extrajudicial sale TC Issued a TRO in favor of the petitioners At the hearing on the Estares spouses’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction. It thus declared petitioner and his brother in contempt of court • Upon MR of petitioner. 38 As such. 2007 decision had not yet become final and executory. injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests. noting that respondent received on March 5. HELD: In any event. 8 It is merely a provisional remedy. alleging that they had closed off the subject road. and the essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides. we find that this petition must still be dismissed as the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition. hence. the writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted. the writ of preliminary injunction remained to be valid. inter alia. this petition • • • Nelson Baraquia (respondent) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a complaint 1 against Dominico Buyco and Clemente Buyco (Buycos). hence the general . when they received PLCC’s demand letter. a court abuses its discretion when it lacks jurisdiction. in view of all the circumstances. 10 Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy. its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served. an adjunct to a main suit. HELD: A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. 2007. injunction and damages with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. • RTC granted the application of preliminary injunction On February 14. BARAQUIA FACTS: ISSUE: WHETHER THE LIFTING OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNTION DUE TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition. received on January 12. The trial court denied the Estares spouses’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction. the appeal does not suspend the judgment. the appeal therefrom notwithstanding. The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the following requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive relief: (a) the existence of their right to be protected. they went to the former’s office not to question the loan’s terms and conditions but merely to request for extension of three months to pay their obligation. it appears. requiring a party or a court.9 It is not a cause of action in itself. which was secured by the mortgage. the TC granted it and ruled that the petitioners cannot be held in contempt by mere motion and not by verified petition • • • • • • ISSUE: WON THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MUST BE ISSUED TO THE SPOUSES. 33] To be entitled to an injunctive writ. whether prohibitory or mandatory. adjunct to the main case subject to the latter’s outcome. and for purposes of the ultimate effects. for the establishment of a permanent right of way. thus violating the writ of preliminary injunction.00. EVEN IF THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IS PENDING APPEAL. and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of such right. 11 It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction. or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions BUYCO v. the trial court dismissed respondent’s complaint for failure to establish the concurrence of the essential requisites for the establishment of an easement of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. 2007 his copy of its decision while petitioner received his on February 21.000. They do not deny that they are indebted to PLCC but only question the amount thereof. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits. hence. It must be stressed that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination. 2007 an indirect contempt of court. In granting or denying injunctive relief.000. relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity. the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief. they did not question the figures appearing therein. In the present case. they did not question PLCC in writing why they only received P637. Estares (Rosenda for brevity) testified that: the loan proceeds of P637. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy. 12 The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed." regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. 2007. was used in the improvement and renovation of their boarding house. holding that the latter failed to establish the facts necessary for an injunction to issue CA dismissed the petition of the spouses holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Estares spouses’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction since the latter failed to prove the requisites for the issuance thereof MR was denied. when they received the Statement of Account. a trial court’s decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief will not be set aside on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. Their property is by their own choice encumbered by a real estate mortgage. 3 It accordingly lifted the writ of preliminary injunction Respondent filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s decision Respondent filed with the trial court a motion to cite petitioner and his brother Gonzalo in contempt. relies on clearly erroneous factual findings. of a final judgment in the case. 1998. the SC ruled that: “a dismissal.

1998. good customs. On the contrary. September 29. 1 member did not sign.: • Justice Jose Benedicto Luna Reyes (aka Justice JBL. J. the writ of preliminary injunction issued on December 1. PROCEDURAL: It was worse that the CA immediately enforced its decision pending appeal restoring respondent in possession of the leased premises and worst. According to jurisprudence. • • • • • • • April 14. morals. On the other hand. much less served on the parties. 1997. Inc. motion to cite in contempt and motion to stop demolition. public policy or public order they shall have the force of law between them. petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a motion requesting for an extension of time to file explanation on the motion to declare petitioners and counsel in contempt. As long as such agreements are not contrary to law. 1998. Once final and executory. May 16. March 20. MMB prayed for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction against the execution of the ejectment decision. the judgment must be remanded to the lower court. upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. Respondent filed with the CA a manifestation alleging that it filed with the RTC an action for annulment of the unilateral termination of lease contract and damages. 1976. Inc. Respondent filed with the CA another case seeking to set aside the order of the RTC dismissing the action and praying that a TRO be issued against the MTC enjoining the writ of execution etc. Respondent never raised the issue of jurisdiction. 1999 by the trial court was automatically dissolved upon the dismissal of Civil Case No. Petitioners elevated the decision of the CA to the SC by petition for review." There being no indication that the appellate court issued an injunction in respondent’s favor. despite the pending petition with the SC. CA and Metro Manila Builders. Incidentally. • • • • • • • • • • ISSUE: Was there was a need for judicial rescission of the contract of lease before respondent may be compelled to move out of the leased premises? NONE. 26015. the trial court issued the corresponding writ of execution. where a motion for its execution may be filed only after its entry. finding petitioners guilty of indirect contempt of court. HELD: SUBSTANTIVE: There is no need for a judicial rescission of the lease contract. private respondent also filed a petition for annulment of the ejectment decision before the RTC on the ground that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case . 1996. the resolution was void .PROVISIONAL REMEDIES |9 rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. March 23. did not deny the violations imputed to it but questioned the absence of a judicial rescission of the contract of lease. A judgment of the CA cannot be executed pending appeal . The good reasons given by the CA to support the discretionary execution of its decision are (1) that respondent would be deprived of income from its business endeavors. CA consolidated the 2nd and 3rd CA cases. September 14. Petitioners found out that respondent MMB had not properly maintained the premises or covered the same with an adequate insurance policy. FACTS: PARDO. Before the appellate court could rule on the injunctive relief. before its finality. The good reasons allowing execution pending appeal must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injuries or damages to the adverse party if the decision is reversed. Petitioners. denied. 1997. Respondents. But. <unanimous vote of three members of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision. 1998. the same must be founded upon good reasons. However. In other words. respondent filed with the CA a series of petitions and motions to issue injunctive relief. the judgment cannot be executed . November 30. Failing to do so. 1998. On August 31. In discretionary executions. DOCTRINE: CA has no authority to issue immediate execution pending appeal of its own decision. With the imminent expiration of the TRO. respondent appealed the decision to the RTC. respondent filed with the CA another motion exparte for execution pending appeal. 1998. was effectively abandoned . This rule applies to interlocutory resolutions>. petitioners filed with the RTC their memorandum opposing the injunctive relief sought by respondent. L. MTC ruled in favor of petitioners. v. and restored possession in favor of private respondent. when withdrawn. petitioners filed with the MTC a motion for execution of the judgment of eviction. Respondent MMB. or final resolution which shall be reached in consultation before the writing of the opinion by any member of the division. the CA promulgated its decision setting aside the decision of the MTC and ruled in favor of the respondent. respondent's precarious financial condition is not a compelling circumstance warranting immediate execution . respondent had sub-leased the property to 3rd parties and was earning about P500K a month. petitioners filed with the SC a petition for review of the decision of the CA. they entered into a 25year lease contract (15-30K) with Metro Manila Builders. 1998. respondent filed another petition with CA for certiorari and mandamus complaining about what it termed as the sub-silencio denial by the lower court of their application for injunctive relief. None of the cited reasons is "good" enough . appointed a special sheriff to carry out the writ of execution. Simultaneously with the withdrawal of the first CA case. upon motion of petitioners. REYES represented by Adoracion D. and (3) that petitioners acted with bad faith and malice. There can be no discretionary execution of a decision of the Court of Appeals. respondents failed to file their appeal memorandum on time and so the court dismissed their appeal. Edmundo A. MTC granted the motion for execution that petitioners filed. petitioners filed with the MTC-Pasay a complaint for unlawful detainer based on breach of the contract of lease. 1998. August 21. petitioners filed with the SC a petition for certiorari to nullify the resolution of the CA allowing execution pending appeal and the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto and more.. 1998. The clerk of court should not have received for filing. promulgated its resolution adjudging petitioner and their counsel guilty of indirect contempt CA enforced the writ. Worse. August 25. Respondents filed with the RTC a petition seeking a TRO to enjoin MTC and the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution. Bad faith and malice are not indicated simply because petitioners insisted on their rights and exhausted judicial remedies. 1998. the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that respondent's remedy is appeal in due time which. respondent withdrew its appeal. On the ground that such case was still pending. Reyes. the CA issued a TRO against the execution of the ejectment judgment. Reyes) and his brother Dr. which the CA allowed. By the mere fact of the filing of the petition. Heirs of the Late Justice JOSE B. 1998. Reyes were co-owners of a parcel of land located at Taft Avenue. Inc. (MMB). The court must state in a special order the "good reasons" justifying the issuance of the writ. restrained them from enforcing the writ of execution. this resolution was signed by only 2 members of the CA. Consequently. evicted petitioners. Discretionary execution under Rule 39. March 5. CA. petitioners filed with the same court a MTD. Hence. March 23. November 5. respondent filed an appeal to the CA. petitioners served on respondent a notice terminating the lease contract and demanding that they vacate and surrender the premises. Urgency resulting from years of delay in the disposal of a case is not a good reason for premature execution of the decision. May 9. 1997. the CA issued a resolution giving petitioners (10) days from notice to file their comment on the petition and in the meantime. Section 2 (a) is allowed pending appeal of a judgment or final order of the trial court. et al. (2) that "it is of public knowledge" that the CA and the SC are clogged with cases and it may take some time before the decision in the case may attain its finality. good faith is always presumed. respondents prayed for a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the execution of the judgment. the finality of the CA's decision • • • • • • . December 2.

P R O V I S I O N A L R E M E D I E S | 10 was stayed. It appointed an employee of the mailing section.] LINO BROCKA vs. Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka. — A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is . 7 or 9 ’85. Petitioners are acquitted of the charge of contempt of court. The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. Brocka. RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered Brocka. et al for alleged inciting to sedition • 3:15PM counsel inquired from Records Custodian when the charges against Brocka. However.8 ’85 • Petitioners. considering the circumstances then prevailing: 1. It thereby encroached on the hallowed grounds of the SC.1-7 ’85 a On Feb. Brocka. have been undertaken by state officials in bad faith: 1. JUAN PONCE ENRILE FACTS: • Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) a demonstration held in sympathy of this strike. et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim cases. et al. 2004. [G. et al: • In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.).R. 28 ‘85 • Neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka. hasty and spurious filing of this second offense as follows: • 10:30 AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka. et al arrived at office of Asst. et al filed respective bail bonds BUT… • Despite service of release order. • Feb 11 ’85 – Brocka. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. 1990. et al on Jan. [G. recommended bail at P6. panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka.0000 each a Brocka. vs.000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka. and. et al should have filed a motion to quash the information instead of a petition for Habeas Corpus The Court agreed with the contention of the SolGen. WHEREFORE. criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution. If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as in this case where petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed) and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined. 69863-65 : December 10. Worst of all. and there could be no entry of judgment therein. • Hence. et al. et al will be brought before the QC Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons a another phone call subsequently received informing counsel that appearance of Brocka. No.14 ’85 on orders of then Pres. respondents said all accused had already been released a four on Feb15 ’85 and one on Feb.R. et al. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka. the Court declares VOID the resolution of the CA and the writ of execution. Such display of keen interest in the immediate execution of its decision coupled with the exercise of excessive authority by illegally appointing a "special sheriff' makes the concerned members of the CA liable to disciplinary action and the imposition of appropriate penalty. et al released provisionally on Feb. et al sign a waiver of their rights under RPC125 as a condition for the grant of the counsel’s request that they be given 7 days within which counsel may conferwith their clients a no such requirement required under the rules • Brocka. forcibly and violently dispersed a petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers – Jan 28 ‘85 • Petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par. — Section 3. Manila Despite subpoenas for PDA’s production. this petition. et al. still argue that the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition. and the duplicate original. only issue here is… ISSUE: Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined – YES RULING: We rule in favor of Brocka. the same utterances which are the subject of the crim cases for Illegal Assembly for which Brocka. November 19. 140228. ordinance or regulation • When double jeopardy is clearly apparent • When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense • Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution • Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance • When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground had been denied • Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners In the case at bar. No. 3.3 in 3 crim cases filed before RTC QC • All petitioners released on bail – P3. no premature execution could be had. et al was to be at 2:00PM • 2:00PM Brocka. at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile) 2. SolGen’s manifestation: Brocka. et al remained in detention a respondents-police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against Brocka. et al in detention until the second offense could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew "Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution.] Fancisco Medina. WHEN PROPER. Greenfield Development DOCTRINE: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. hence. preliminary or final EXCEPTIONS: To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused • When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions • When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice • When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority • Where the prosecution is under an invalid law. it noted that such course of action would have been a futile move. prosecution merely presented a purported xeerox copy of it a violates Court pronouncement that “individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original. No costs. and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA. The petition is hereby GRANTED. Ben Cervantes. et al’s release from detention BUT this PDA was issued on Jan. GEN. et al contend: • bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution • second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal – premised on one and the same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike a matter of defense in sedition charge so. to wit: SEC. et al had been officially received a informed that said charges were never coursed through the Records Office • ALSO. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended • Urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC a daily hearings held between Feb. utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition under RPC142 are. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second offense of inciting to sedition. et al of the right to bail • AND. the CA has no authority to appoint a special sheriff. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds justifying the issuance of a preliminary injunction.9 ’85 upon receipt of TC’s order of release a violates guideline that PDA shall be invoked within 24 hrs in Metro.28 ’85 and invoked only on Feb. Spurious and inoperational PDA 2. et al’s provisional release. Manila or 48 hours outside Metro. Sham and hasty Preliminary Investigation Clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka. nevertheless. Marcos a release narrated in Court’s resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka. et al are entitled to be relased on bail as a matter of Constitutional right a appears that respondents have conspired to deprive Brocka. City Fiscal a complainants’ affidavits had not yet been received • 3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of complainants against Brocka. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction. who was not even bonded as required by law. The CA adopted its resolution granting execution pending appeal after the petition for review was already filed in the SC. almost verbatim.

BENJAMIN AQUINO. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Thus.. (Basic Agricultural Traders Jointly Administered Kasamahan) is a Filipino-American corporation. As of that year. as vendors. Its financial condition deteriorated to the point of bankruptcy. By virtue of these sales. Hence. • However. upon its expiration. continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant. reconveyance. or is procuring or suffering to be done. Davao City. and this time signed by Pedro.00. Batjak applied to PNB for additional financial assistance. . (b) That the commission. damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order. court. the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent and its agents and representatives from preventing petitioners to exercise their rights over the properties. injunction is not proper. • Three (3) years thereafter. Under said Agreement. Batjak mortgaged its three (3) coco-processing oil mills in Sasa. NIDC (whollyowned subsidiary of PNB) would. respondents. among others. Thus. The trial court granted the prayer for injunctive relief but the same was nullified by the Court of Appeals. respondent constructed a fence on the property and posted security personnel. There would. to the detriment of the doctrine of presumption of validity in favor of these documents. One year thereafter. or (c) That a party. HON. vs. which the latter duly accepted. Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed. PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the oil mills of Batjak located in Tanauan. injunction is not proper. was yet to be established. to be entitled to an injunctive writ. GARCIA and MARCELINO CALINAWAN JR.000. Jimenez. Petitioners alleged that they were co-owners of the lands in issue and the deeds of sale on the properties were simulated and fictitious. Leyte to Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Bank). (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. to liquidate Batjak's obligations to Republic Bank (RB). all surnamed Medina. et al. • As security for the payment of its obligations and advances against shipments. BATJAK INC. After discovering the annotation.. and Nazaria Cruz. preparatory to their turn-over and transfer to the stockholders of Batjak. this time asking for a complete accounting of the assets. primarily engaged in the manufacture of coconut oil and copra cake for export. Subsequently. would dispose of the main case without trial.915. the petitioner has the burden to establish the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected. Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company (MBTC) and Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB). and the balance of the investment was to be applied to Batjak's past due account of P 5 million with the PNB. Such basis would be virtually recognizing petitioners' claim that the deeds of conveyances and the titles are a nullity without further proof. Petitioners caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the titles. forced by the insolvency of Batjak. which in effect. Where the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed. GRACIANO A. respondent was able to register in its name the title to the two parcels of land. petitioners. be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively duty bound to prove. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. pay or otherwise liquidate pending financial obligations with the different private banks. 1988 FACTS: • Batjak. Respondent denied the allegations. threatening or is attempting to do. This agreement was for a period of five (5) years and. FACTS: Pedro. PNB transferred the ownership of the two (2) oil mills to NIDC. petitioners sought.. management and operation of Batjak. • In need for additional operating capital to place the three (3) cocoprocessing mills at their optimum capacity and maximum efficiency and to settle. respectively. petitioners' entitlement to the injunctive writ hinges on their prima facie legal right to the properties subject of the present dispute. Misamis Occidental and Tanauan. Petitioners' entitlement to the injunctive writ hinges on their prima facie legal right to the subject properties. and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. after Batjak failed to exercise its right to redeem the foreclosed properties within the allowable one year period of redemption. in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. invest in Batjak in the form of preferred shares of stock convertible within five (5) years at par into common stock. BENEDICTO. Petitioners. L-34192 June 30. against respondent and the Register of Deeds. (NO) HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB). was to be subject to negotiation between the parties. A notarized Deed of Sale covering said property was subsequently entered into in favor of respondent. The properties were sold to PNB as the highest bidder. Batjak wrote a letter to NIDC inquiring if the latter was still interested in negotiating the renewal of the Voting Trust Agreement.R. as it actually did. EUSEBIO VILLATUYA MARIO Y. Equally pertinent is the rule that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. stating that petitioners have no valid claim on the properties and insisted on the fact that the properties were already in the name of respondent by virtue of public documents executed by petitioners' predecessors. final Certificates of Sale were issued by the provincial sheriffs of Leyte and Misamis Occidental for the two (2) oil mills in Tanauan and Jimenez in favor of PNB. however. • Batjak sent another letter to NIDC. • A Voting Trust Agreement was also executed in favor of NIDC by the stockholders representing 60% of the outstanding paid-up and subscribed shares of Batjak. agency or a person is doing. his brother and his niece executed a notarized Contract to Sell in favor of respondent Greenfield Development Corporation over a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City. Petitioners' clear and unmistakable right. CONSING and ROBERTO S. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for injunction. grandchildren of Pedro Medina from two marriages instituted an action for annulment of titles and deeds. NATIONAL INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. The ground relied upon by the trial court in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in this case is its doubt over the acquisition of the properties by respondent.P R O V I S I O N A L R E M E D I E S | 11 established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded. properties. • A Financial Agreement was submitted by PNB to Batjak for acceptance. (2) a violation of that right. barring their ingress and egress. Misamis Occidental. Republic Bank (RB). No. G. and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of. Leyte and Jimenez. that they remained in possession of the property through their caretaker who resides thereon. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper. in effect. Batjak's indebtedness to some private banks and to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) amounted to P11. either for a limited period or perpetually. or in requiring the performance of an act or acts. some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding.

it is necessary in granting the relief of receivership that the property or fired be in danger of loss. hence. • Respondent spouses amended their complaint and excluded Yaphockun as party-defendant. management and operations of Batjak. Certificates of title were issued to PNB and NIDC after the lapse of the one (1) year redemption period. The prevention of imminent danger to property is the guiding principle that governs courts in the matter of appointing receivers. which is the subject of the action. it was correctly reversed by the Court of Appeals. but also title to the three (3) oil mills formerly owned by Batjak. vs. TRB rendered its final accounting of funds under receivership wherein it retained P219.R. to wit: Sec. The Spouses Tayengco assailed the RTC order before the CA. 8. Receivership proceedings were duly terminated. • Respondent judge issued the now assailed order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and appointing a set of three (3) receivers. o The spouses further alleged that they were deprived of the possession of the said vehicles and despite repeated demands. of its own motion or on that of either party. More so. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. and management. The CA ruled that it was improper for TRB to deduct its fee from the funds under receivership. to be taxed as costs against the defeated party. HELD: . who was the Treasurer of the Morante spouses’ business of buying and selling corn. VALDEZ FACTS: • Respondent spouses Morante brought an action in the RTC against petitioner Yang and Yaphockun to recover possession of two cargo trucks. Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. therefore. it shall. that NIDC not only has possession of. his compensation is to be charged against the defeated party. the SC ruled that the Spouses Tayengco are the lawful owners of properties under receivership and in another case the SC affirmed the validity of the appointment of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) as receiver pendent lite. FACTS: In an earlier case. The right. Batjak premises its right to the possession of the three (3) off mills on the Voting Trust Agreement. removal or material injury. and HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE C. • Batjak filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction against herein petitioners.00.016. petitioner Yang refused to release the trucks to the respondents. NIDC was constituted as trustee of the assets. failed to present any evidence. where Batjak does not impugn the validity of the foreclosure proceedings. shall determine that the necessity for a receiver no longer exists. or claim in property. There can be no doubt. The interest of Batjak over the three (3) oil mills ceased upon the issuance of the certificates of title to PNB and NIDC confirming their ownership over the said properties. as justice requires. or apportioned. It is. • Petitioner Yang also put up a counter bond which was rejected for having filed out of time • Petitioner went to the SC o It was contended that the replevin bond was merely an undertaking of one of the respondents and their counsel and that no tangible security (cash. Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. or the prevailing litigant may be made to share the expense. YANG v. he had no standing to demand the return of the cargo trucks. The court shall allow the receiver such reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant. Subsequently. compensation of receiver. NIDC was constituted as trustee only of the voting rights of 60% of the paid-up and outstanding shares of stock in Batjak. therefore. NIDC acquired ownership of the third oil mill also under a mortgage foreclosure sale. confirming the fact that it had no intention whatsoever to comply with the demands of Batjak. Nowhere in the said provisions or in any other part of the Voting Trust Agreement is mention made of any transfer or assignment to NIDC of Batjak's assets. ISSUE: Who should shoulder the payment of the receiver’s fee? HELD: Section 8. that due to the expiration of the Voting Trust Agreement. 111357 June 17. operations. as justice requires. • Respondent judge disapproved the counter bond.— Whenever the court. claiming that under said agreement. direct the delivery of the funds and other property in his hands to the persons adjudged entitled to receive them. to entitle one to a receiver over it. RTC approved the final accounting including the deduction of fee. contending that since Yaphockun was merely a nominal defendant =. Under Sec. ISSUE: WON receivership was proper in the case at bar? NO HELD: A receiver of real or personal property. 1997 TRADERS ROYAL BANK. Hence this petition. explicitly provides for the manner in which the receiver’s fee shall be paid for its services. o It was alleged that they had actual use and possession of the trucks.P R O V I S I O N A L R E M E D I E S | 12 • NIDC replied.24 as its receiver’s fee. G. Neither Batjak nor its stockholders have instituted any legal proceedings to annul the mortgage foreclosure aforementioned. must be present and existing.000. PNB acquired ownership of two (2) of the three (3) oil mills by virtue of mortgage foreclosure sales. ISSUE: WON the replevin bond of the respondents is defective. NIDC should tum over the assets of the three (3) oil mills to Batjak. CA decision is AFFIRMED. the trucks were registered in the name of petitioner Thomas Yang. or in its amended petition therefor. o Then. clear that when the services of a receiver who has been properly appointed terminates. No. respondents. petitioner. As borne out by the records of the case. o Judge issued an order of seizure to take immediate possession of the vehicles • Yaphockun filed a motion seeking repossession of the trucks and posted a counter bond of the same amount. the respondents applied for a writ of replevin and put up a replevin bond of P560. In the case at bar. the respondent submitted an opposition on the counter bond. to establish the requisite condition that the property is in danger of being lost. the trial court's order approving TRB's compensation to be charged solely against the funds under its receivership is without legal justification. It also filed on a petition for receivership as alternative to writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. and order the discharge of the receiver from further duty as such. removed or materially injured unless a receiver is appointed to guard and preserve it. settle the accounts of the receiver. PNB transferred the ownership of the two (2) oil mills to NIDC. the replevin bond was defective since it had been filed by only one of the respondents and that the bondsmen had failed by its terms to undertake to return the cargo trucks to petitioner if the latter will be adjudged lawful owner of those vehicles. 1 (b). o However. Termination of receivership. may be appointed by the court when it appears from the pleadings that the party applying for the appointment of receiver has an interest in said property. however. property or surety) was placed at the custody of the court o Also. Consequently. Batjak in its petition for receivership. after due notice to all interested parties and hearing. • To obtain immediate possession of the trucks. on 26 October 1970. interest. TAYENGCO.

arose from the execution of a writ of replevin in Adoma v. Moreover. Respondents. in the words of Section 2. The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks immediate possession of the property involved need not be holder of the legal title to the property. It recommended that respondent sheriff be fined in the amount of P5. filed his counterbond. Finally.000. It is his contention that his redelivery bond was not filed out of time. Disposition of property by sheriff. SEC.000. the latter was forced to release the vehicle to complainant. of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Santiago City.00. she found that respondent sheriff did not actually demand money for the implementation of the writ because it was complainant who promised to give money in exchange for the implementation of the writ of replevin. Spouses Edmundo Andres and Luzviminda Andres . Valdez respectively. Ricardo Morante. Sheriff III. It suffices. 2004. not a party to the replevin suit.00 for conduct unbecoming a court employee and that respondent Taguba be reprimanded for Yang v. which may be adjudged to the said defendants and all damages which said defendants may sustain by reason of the order of replevin. petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff" require the return of the property. Petitioner received summons on the amended complaint on 25 January 1985 and on the same day. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and conduct unbecoming a court employee . Rule 60. did not act as surety on the same bond as his wife did. In its Memorandum dated June 4. 2003. Santiago City. in Section 6. however. subject to liquidation. the property shall be delivered to the applicant. although not written in the bond in printer's ink. With the vehicle still undelivered on the 7th day. acts in excess of its jurisdiction. the OCA affirmed the investigating Judge’s report . It would appear to the benefit of petitioner that Atty. 6. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant. Calonzo signed up as the other or second surety or bondsman on that bond. A defendant in a replevin suit may demand return of possession of the property replevied by filing a redelivery bond within the periods specified in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 . the failure of the replevin bond to state expressly that it was "conditioned for the return of the property to the defendant. Rule 60. or of the surety or sureties thereon. does not affect the validity or the sufficiency of that bond. hence complainant filed the instant administrative case.—If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff. Further. Rule 60. complainant threatened to file an administrative case against respondent sheriff. The replevin bond put up by Milagros Morante and Bayani L. since he was served with summons only on 25 January 1985. In the case at bar. he is. She concluded that respondent sheriff is guilty of misconduct considering that he accepted partial payment and insisted on its full payment. before whom it was presented and who was in a better position than this Court to appreciate the financial standing of the sureties. or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicant’s bond or approves a new bond. he may do so. Under Section 5. On the same day. a lower court which approves a counterbond filed beyond the statutory periods. Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court under which the replevin bond was given may be regarded as having become part of the bond as having been imported thereunto. that the obligation of the bond be secured or supported by cash or personal property or real property or the obligation of a surety other than the person giving the bond. continued to demand P6. of Branches 1 and 2. the replevin bond given by the respondent Morante spouses was properly secured by the sureties themselves who declared their solvency and capacity to answer for the undertaking assumed. The other objections to the replevin bond are equally lacking in merit. presided by Judge Ruben Plata. In the instant case. the sheriff must return it to the adverse party.  FACTS: • The instant administrative complaint filed against respondents for violation of Republic Act No. on August 29." Both these periods are mandatory in character.P R O V I S I O N A L R E M E D I E S | 13 A bond that is required to be given by law is commonly understood to refer to an obligation or undertaking in writing that is sufficiently secured. The sufficiency of a bond is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which must approve the bond. vs. if the return thereof be adjudged. Petitioner Yang never put in issue the financial capability of these two (2) sureties. The prevailing party will then deposit the said amount to the Clerk of Court who will disburse the amount to the sheriff. and EUGENIO TAGUBA. We agree with the conclusion of respondent judge that petitioner's right to file a counterbond had already prescribed. allegedly promised by complainant but the latter was able to give only P1. PETITION IS DENIED ALIBSAR ADOMA." Petitioner would finally challenge the order of respondent judge dated 28 February 1985 rejecting his counter-replevin bond for having been filed out of time. a "bond" is an obligation reduced to writing binding the obligor to pay a sum of money to the obligee under specified conditions. the cargo trucks were taken into custody by the Sheriff on 7 January 1985. She refused to believe the claim of respondent sheriff that he did not release the vehicle to complainant after 5 days from the implementation of the writ on August 16. complainant. to be more credible. or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond. who volunteered to assist respondent sheriff. will be read into the bond in determining the scope and content of the liability of the sureties or bondsmen under that bond. however. through an Affidavit of Justification. It follows that the approval of the replevin bond by respondent judge. 2 It is not indispensably necessary.000. because he was awaiting instructions from Judge Plata. a process server of Branch 2 of MTCC. Process Server. DOCTRINE:  The Rules require the sheriff to estimate his expenses in the execution of the decision. However." 5 is not fatal to the validity of the replevin bond. The writ of replevin stated that the vehicle will be delivered to complainant after 5 days from the implementation thereof.00 and another P1. "entitled to the possession thereof." 6 We believe that the condition of the bond given in this case substantially complied with the requirement of Section 2. Any unspent amount will have to be returned to the prevailing party.00. respondent sheriff Romeo Gatcheco implemented the writ. the provisions of Rule 60. "within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the officer.00 the following day. 2003. • • • . for recovery of possession of motor vehicle with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin before Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City. Petitioner Yang's counter-replevin bond was filed on 25 January 1985. 2003 a writ of replevin for the recovery of an L-300 van was issued in his favor. Bayani L. if the court shall finally adjudge that the plaintiffs were not entitled thereto. All the particular conditions prescribed in Section 2. Calonzo stated that it was given "under the condition that [they] will pay all the costs. Most generally understood. can scarely be questioned as a grave abuse of discretion. respondents. since petitioner thereby acquired a right of recourse not only against the respondent spouses but also against a third person.000. Complainant Alibsar Adoma claimed that on August 16. After the two respondents seized the vehicle. 9 Thus. if at the time he applies for a writ of replevin.000. The fact that the other respondent. they demanded payment of P8. the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond. Judge Madrid found the testimony of complainant which was corroborated by two witnesses. He was accompanied by respondent Eugenio Taguba. ROMEO GATCHECO.

and o fifth. the procedure for the execution of writs and other processes are: o first. A defendant in a replevin suit may demand return of possession of the property replevied by filing a redelivery bond within the periods specified in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 . before whom it was presented and who was in a better position than this Court to appreciate the financial standing of the sureties.00 and that they demanded the payment of an additional P6. the executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ. contending that since Yaphockun was merely a nominal defendant =. since petitioner thereby acquired a right of recourse not only against the respondent spouses but also against a third person. the respondents applied for a writ of replevin and put up a replevin bond of P560. did not act as surety on the same bond as his wife did. the replevin bond given by the respondent Morante spouses was properly secured by the sureties themselves who declared their solvency and capacity to answer for the undertaking assumed.000. In the case at bar. the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him. Hence. can scarely be questioned as a grave abuse of discretion. The sufficiency of a bond is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which must approve the bond. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of the administrative charges against them? RULING: • The Court agrees with the findings of the investigating Judge and the OCA that respondents received the amount of P2. o It was alleged that they had actual use and possession of the trucks. petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff" require the return of the property. Further. he is. he may do so. • On July 5. All the particular conditions prescribed in Section 2." Both these periods are mandatory in character. through an Affidavit of Justification. the provisions of Rule 60. Most generally understood. does not affect the validity or the sufficiency of that bond. o second. which may be adjudged to the said defendants and all damages which said defendants may sustain by reason of the order of replevin. in Section 6. The other objections to the replevin bond are equally lacking in merit. to date. he had no standing to demand the return of the cargo trucks. Moreover.00.P R O V I S I O N A L R E M E D I E S | 14 FACTS: • Respondent spouses Morante brought an action in the RTC against petitioner Yang and Yaphockun to recover possession of two cargo trucks. the Court required the parties to manifest whether they are willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. since he was served with summons only on 25 January 1985. o Judge issued an order of seizure to take immediate possession of the vehicles Yaphockun filed a motion seeking repossession of the trucks and posted a counter bond of the same amount. To obtain immediate possession of the trucks. Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. not a party to the replevin suit. Respondent judge disapproved the counter bond. Calonzo stated that it was given "under the condition that [they] will pay all the costs.00 from complainant. Under Section 5. the parties have yet to file their manifestation. It follows that the approval of the replevin bond by respondent judge. he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses. Petitioner Yang never put in issue the financial capability of these two (2) sureties. Rule 60.000. In the instant case. It would appear to the benefit of petitioner that Atty. Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court under which the replevin bond was given may be regarded as having become part of the bond as having been imported thereunto. the cargo trucks were taken into custody by the Sheriff on 7 January 1985. The fact that the other respondent. PETITION IS DENIED • Trying to abet the misconduct of a fellow employee of another court. Petitioner received summons on the amended complaint on 25 January 1985 and on the same day. the respondent submitted an opposition on the counter bond. The replevin bond put up by Milagros Morante and Bayani L. the trucks were registered in the name of petitioner Thomas Yang. The testimony of complainant before the investigating Judge is worthy of belief because the same was not only candid and direct but also corroborated by two witnesses who attested to the veracity of complainant’s accusations." 6 We believe that the condition of the bond given in this case substantially complied with the requirement of Section 2. the failure of the replevin bond to state expressly that it was "conditioned for the return of the property to the defendant." Petitioner would finally challenge the order of respondent judge dated 28 February 1985 rejecting his counter-replevin bond for having been filed out of time. the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court and ex-oficio sheriff. if the court shall finally adjudge that the plaintiffs were not entitled thereto. property or surety) was placed at the custody of the court o Also. Bayani L. o fourth. filed his counterbond. acts in excess of its jurisdiction. o The spouses further alleged that they were deprived of the possession of the said vehicles and despite repeated demands. o third. if the return thereof be adjudged. o Then. "entitled to the possession thereof. It is his contention that his redelivery bond was not filed out of time. It suffices. Rule 60. the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff. a "bond" is an obligation reduced to writing binding the obligor to pay a sum of money to the obligee under specified conditions." 5 is not fatal to the validity of the replevin bond. 9 Thus. although not written in the bond in printer's ink. "within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the officer. the replevin bond was defective since it had been filed by only one of the respondents and that the bondsmen had failed by its terms to undertake to return the cargo trucks to petitioner if the latter will be adjudged lawful owner of those vehicles. Ricardo Morante. we are constrained to dispense the filing of such manifestation. Petitioner Yang's counter-replevin bond was filed on 25 January 1985. We agree with the conclusion of respondent judge that petitioner's right to file a counterbond had already prescribed. in the words of Section 2. who was the Treasurer of the Morante spouses’ business of buying and selling corn. that the obligation of the bond be secured or supported by cash or personal property or real property or the obligation of a surety other than the person giving the bond. Rule 60. 2 It is not indispensably necessary. HELD: A bond that is required to be given by law is commonly understood to refer to an obligation or undertaking in writing that is sufficiently secured. Petitioner Yang also put up a counter bond which was rejected for having filed out of time Petitioner went to the SC o It was contended that the replevin bond was merely an undertaking of one of the respondents and their counsel and that no tangible security (cash. if at the time he applies for a writ of replevin. However. The writ of replevin has been implemented and the vehicle is now in complainant’s possession. Respondent spouses amended their complaint and excluded Yaphockun as party-defendant. petitioner Yang refused to release the trucks to the respondents.000. . Any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction which renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty. 2004. a lower court which approves a counterbond filed beyond the statutory periods. • Under Section 9. will be read into the bond in determining the scope and content of the liability of the sureties or bondsmen under that bond. o However. The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks immediate possession of the property involved need not be holder of the legal title to the property. Calonzo signed up as the other or second surety or bondsman on that bond. however. • • • • • • ISSUE: WON the replevin bond of the respondents is defective.

• In this case. Hence. • Furthermore. (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question. Hence. The premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. • Clearly. COURT OF APPEALS. No. Process Server. No. by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision. CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. if it is so seized. respondent sheriff deliberately failed to place complainant in possession of the vehicle after five days from the implementation of the writ because the latter failed to give the whole amount he promised. [G. The trial court denied their motion. 19. Private respondents failed to submit required explanation. but under no obligation to purchase it. and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. Santiago City is found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct. G. — All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review. that is to say. It reads: SEC. 1997. Petitioner Jovito Layugan. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND DOUGLAS F. Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN FACTS The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Lastly. RTC granted the same. respondent Romeo Gatcheco. • As correctly found by the OCA. • WHEREFORE. in view of all the foregoing. that it is exempt from such seizure. Branch 1. the Court held that the absence of an affidavit of merit is not fatal where the petition itself. petitioner. but not under compulsion to sell. Hence. (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable. Rule 141. Actual value (or actual market value) means "the price which an article would command in the ordinary course of business. inter alia. Dishonesty and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and is SUSPENDED for one (1) year. it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him. AFFIDAVIT COMPLIANCE THEREOF. respondents. (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim.A. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. And similarly. Respondent failed to demonstrate that he followed the procedure laid down by Rule 141. the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P. 705. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. Santiago City is found GUILTY of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and is SUSPENDED for six (6) months without pay. ANAMA. motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby. The facts that must be set forth in the affidavit of merit are (1) that plaintiff owns the property particularly describing the same. a clear violation of Section 6. no estimate of sheriff’s expenses was submitted to the court by respondent. when offered for sale by one willing to sell. Facts: .500. Series of 1966. the money which respondent deputy sheriff had demanded and received from complainant was not among those prescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court. 111107. (10) when the rule does not provide a plain. N. recites the circumstances or facts constitutive of the grounds for the petition. He failed to make and submit estimate of the sheriff’s expenses.00 from the complainant for the lunch and merienda of the policemen who will accompany him in executing the decision of the Court is a clear violation of section 9. • However. Municipal Trial Court in Cities. In fact. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending. This Court has ruled that any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.P R O V I S I O N A L R E M E D I E S | 15 • In the instant case. 61508. (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter.R. Respondent Eugenio Taguba. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings. (3) that the property is not taken by virtue of a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law or seized under execution or attachment or. Sheriff III. in this case. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. respondent not only utterly failed to live up to the high ethical standards required of a sheriff. 8. (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned. required to be stated in the affidavit because such actual value will be the basis of the replevin bond required to be posted by the plaintiff. (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings. His acts of accepting and soliciting said monetary considerations make him liable not only for conduct unbecoming a court employee but also for grave misconduct and dishonesty. respondent sheriff totally disregarded the aforecited procedure. — OF MERIT. PAAT vs. without pay. REVIEW .D. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Formerly First National City Bank). this petition for review on certiorari. DOCTRINE: REPLEVIN. 1999. respondent’s act of demanding money and receiving P1. Municipal Trial Court in Cities. speedy and adequate remedy.R.] CITIBANK. HELD: The Court held in the negative. March 17. and (4) the actual value of the property. The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. or that he is entitled to its possession. he totally ignored Section 9. pertinent rules require that the affidavit of merit should state the actual value of the property subject of a replevin suit and not just its probable value. which is under oath. SUBSTANTIAL There is substantial compliance with the rule requiring that an affidavit of merit to support the complaint for replevin if the complaint itself contains a statement of every fact required to be stated in the affidavit of merit and the complaint is verified like an affidavit. Moreover. Pending appeal. if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. but also. ISSUE: Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine." It bears stressing that the actual value of the properties subject of a replevin is. it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process. it took respondent sheriff 13 days before he released the vehicle to complainant. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. (2) wrongful detention by defendant of said property. The amounts received and demanded by him are therefore unauthorized fees. • Respondents are warned that a repetition of the same or any other act of infraction in the future shall be dealt with most severely. in the case of an attachment which likewise requires an affidavit of merit. Branch 2. January 10. (5) when there is irreparable injury. vs. and purchased by another who is willing to buy.] LEONARDO A. Rule 60 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. as amended. unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No.

"the main issues to be resolved are whether there was lack or excess of jurisdiction. Anama executed a promissory note to pay the same and constituted a Chattel Mortgage in favor of the Bank. and there is no appeal nor any plain. Costs against the private respondents. Therefore.00. or that for some other reason the alleged default is nonexistent. Later. in that (1) there was no Affidavit of Merit accompanying the Complaint for Replevin. In the case under consideration. the court approved the bond in the amount of P400. and ordered the seizure of the properties — recourse to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing such order is proper under the circumstances. But. There was no finding yet of the fact of default. "The reason why the law does not allow the creditor to possess himself of the mortgaged property with violence and against the will of the debtor is to be found in the fact that the creditor's right of possession is conditioned upon the fact of default. inadequate should there be a finding that the actual value is actually far greater than P200. Hence. The Rules of Court requires the plaintiff to "give a bond. The questioned resolutions issued by the respondent judge together with the writs and processes emanating or deriving therefrom. which was based merely on the probable value of the properties. . instead of requiring the plaintiff to post a new bond. Procedurally therefore. the bond should be double the actual value of the properties involved. It should be noted that a replevin bond is intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may suffer by reason of its being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property pending trial of the action. 2. It was thus an error for the said court to approve the bond. . What was posted was merely an amount which was double the probable value as declared by the Bank and. Although the complaint alleges that petitioner is entitled to the possession of subject properties by virtue of the chattel mortgage executed by the private respondent. technical or dilatory objections.00. Under the Revised Rules of Court. But when the same failed. therefore. for instance. Finding that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions. Other matters The Bank also questioned the finding of the Court of Appeals that the bond posted was insufficient. WON the CA erred in ruling that the provisions of the Rules of Court on Replevin have not been complied with (NO) HELD: 1. When such objection was not given due course in the court below — when. such defense was no longer available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule. inadequate should there be a finding that the actual value is actually greater. the Court of Appeals aptly held that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in dealing with the situation. and rightly or wrongly. This is because a possessor has every right to be respected in its possession and may not be deprived of it without due process. N.000. The Bank filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Seizure.." Hence. WON CA erred in practically and in effect rendering judgment on the merits against the herein petitioner by ordering the return of the machineries and equipment and its accessories to their original and respective places and positions. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore in effect is hereby made permanent. or grave abuse of discretion. are hereby declared null and void ab initio. As enunciated by this Court in the case of Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. The said respondents are further ordered to cause the repair of the concrete foundations destroyed by them including the repair of the electrical wiring and facilities affected during the seizure. Court of Appeals. what was posted was merely an amount which was double the probable value as declared by the plaintiff and. A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties on the basis of the disclosed facts. NO Petitioner is correct insofar as it contends that substantial compliance with the affidavit requirement may be permissible. ISSUE: 1. the Bank filed a complaint for the collection of the unpaid balance. in the issuance of the orders in question. may claim in good faith. that the debt is paid. assuming for the sake of argument that its replevin bond was grossly inadequate or insufficient. dismantling and hauling. Thereafter. At any rate. Hence. irrespective of formal. therefore. and the defendant's alleged "wrongful detention" of the same. Since the valuation made by the petitioner has been disputed by the respondent. The debtor. the requirement that the bond be double the actual value of the properties litigated upon. the lower court proceeded to try the case on the merits. For erroneously issuing the alias writ of seizure without inquiring into the sufficiency of the replevin bond and for allowing petitioner to assume receivership without the requisite oath. upon the latter's default on its obligation.P R O V I S I O N A L R E M E D I E S | 16 In consideration of a loan obtained from Citibank. the defense of lack of affidavit of merit was interposed only in the Reply to the Comment of the Bank on the Petition for Certiorari which Anama filed with the Court of Appeals. the private respondent did not opt to cause redelivery of the properties to him by filing a counter-bond precisely because he objected to the sufficiency of the bond posted by plaintiff. The same may also be answerable for damages if any when judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant or the party against whom a writ of replevin was issued and such judgment includes the return of the property to him. Anama then went to the Court of Appeals. and the same was granted despite opposition by Anama. Such is the case because the bond will answer for the actual loss to the plaintiff. before they were dismantled. Thus. which corresponds to the value of the properties sought to be recovered and for damages.A. as correctly taken note of by the Court of Appeals. and it is not necessary that there should have been a trial. the lower court should have determined first the actual value of the properties. and in the language of Article 446 of the Civil Code. he must be respected therein. The decision only ruled on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of seizure by the trial court. An Order of Replevin over the properties covered by the Chattel Mortgage was issued but the same was not immediately implemented in view of an amicable settlement then being worked out. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals did not make any adjudication on the rights and liabilities between Citibank and Douglas Anama. . and the existence of this fact may naturally be the subject of controversy. petitioner's complaint does not allege all the facts that should be set forth in Petitioner also maintains that. . executed to the defendant in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit . In this case. To allow the an affidavit of merit. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. the Court of Appeals granted the petition. if they were so seized. (2) the bond posted by Citibank was insufficient. for the delivery and possession of the chattels preparatory to the foreclosure thereof. the Bank took possession of the mortgaged chattels and they were advertised for public auction. the recourse of the respondent should be to post a counterbond or a redelivery bond as provided under Section 5 of Rule 60. claimed by respondent to be insufficient. the respondent ex-officio sheriff of Quezon City and the respondent First National City Bank are ordered to return all the machineries and equipment with their accessories seized. seized and hauled at their own expense.000. on his various machineries and equipment. he need not file a counter-bond or redelivery bond. holding that the provisions of the Rules of Court on Replevin and Receivership have not been complied with. and (3) there was non-compliance with the requirement of a receiver's bond and oath of office. As worded by the respondent court itself. His possession in this situation is as fully entitled to protection as that of any other person. dismantled and hauled. for failure of Anama to pay the promissory note despite demand. speedy." 2. to their original and respective places and positions in the shop flooring of the petitioner's premises where these articles were. the said complaint does not state that subject properties were not taken by virtue of a tax assessment or fine imposed pursuant to law or seized under execution or attachment or. the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. that they are exempt from such seizure. There is substantial compliance with the rule requiring that an affidavit of merit to support the complaint for replevin if the complaint itself contains a statement of every fact required to be stated in the affidavit of merit and the complaint is verified like an affidavit. this petition for certiorari. if any. NO.

The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be awarded. as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated February 28. The amount of support. Quezon City. In the said petition. or to and from place of work. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the award of support to his son arguing that they already had a compromise agreement approved by the RTC Makati court whereby they agreed to contribute to a common fund for the support of the child. WON support can be administered during the pendency of an action. the being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficiently to enable it to justly resolve the application. 131286 March 18. 194. and with the means of the giver. In determining the amount.000 monthly support? HELD: 1. in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Whether or not the compromise agreement approved by RTC Makati is a bar to any further award of support in favor of the child? 2. During the hearing. Adriana filed a Motion to Re-Open the case on the ground of newly discovered evidence. depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support. according to the reduction or increase G. pursuant to Articles 194. for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support. The Marriage Contracts were presented. his or her alimony may be modified or altered. Husband filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. Issue: WON adultery of the wife was a defense in an action for support. However. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional. The RTC declared the marriage between Adriana and Jose null and void for being bigamous. the petition is hereby DISMISSED.P R O V I S I O N A L R E M E D I E S | 17 creditor to seize the property against the will of the debtor would make the former to a certain extent both judge and executioner in his own cause — a thing which is inadmissible in the absence of unequivocal agreement in the contract itself or express provision to the effect in the statute. HON. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. No pronouncement as to costs. In 1994. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul. 202. vs." WHEREFORE. 1978 ordered the alimony to beP1000/month from the period of June to February 1979. there was no prayer for the support of their common child.R. clothing. Adriana found out that Jose had been married twice before he married Adriana. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. respondents. 2. A complaint was filed on June 3. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance. There is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him and Adriana. ISSUES: 1. Hence this petition. The judge reduced the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. On appeal. in the cases referred to in Articles 195 21 and 196. the amount awarded was excessive. . Facts: Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. to wit: Art. SO ORDERED. vs. Art. it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted findings of the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence and because it wasn’t excessive. 1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt. The husband filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive such support during the pendency of the case. Subsequently. it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to modification. SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE. Support can be administered during the pendency of such cases. Mere allegations will not bar her right to receive support pendente lite. as embodied in the compromise agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC. FACTS: Adriana and Jose were married in 1984. No. They begot one son. respondent. Art. 201 and 202 of the Family Code. 201. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination. ADULTERY AS A DEFENSE IN ACTION FOR SUPPORT MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. CA dismissed the petition which made the husband appeal to the SC. No. — Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support.000 to his son. REYES. is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John Paul. medical attendance. ADRIANA CHUA. Held/Ratio: Yes – provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. petitioner.22 shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Judgment for support does not become final . SYLLABUS: HUSBAND AND WIFE. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO. dwelling. The SC on July. No. after the trial. was stopped only because of her driver’s intervention. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. C. The husband opposed the application for support on the ground that the wife committed adultery with her physician. for lack of merit. petitioner. education and transportation. even beyond the age of majority. COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES. as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession. in accordance with his increased or decreased needs. the CA affirmed the RTC decision. More affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. no evidence was presented regarding the support of the child or the capacity of Jose to give support. wherein she was already living separately from her husband. Jose was ordered to give monthly support of P20. trade or vocation. Whether or not the trial court is correct in awarding 20. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support pendente lite for herself and her three children. one way or the other. 2004 JOSE LAM. Adriana filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of Jose. The Motion was Denied. MANUEL J. it is not a bar. Jose’s MR was denied. 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school. such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. and that even if she is entitled to it.

education and transportation of the child. the only evidence presented by respondent Adriana regarding her claim for support of the child is her testimony. clothing. medical attendance. In this case. and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance. It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it.P R O V I S I O N A L R E M E D I E S | 18 of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same. . Such testimony does not establish the amount needed by the child nor the amount that the parents are reasonably able to give. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code. dwelling. Case remanded to RTC Pasay City to conduct hearings for further reception of evidence for the proper determination of the proper amount of support to be awarded to the child.