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[G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006.] LEONILO ANTONIO vs. MARIE IVONNE F.

REYES
TINGA, J

Facts: Barely a year after Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes first met, they got married. Subsequently, on 8 March 1993, Antonio filed a petition to have his marriage to Reyes declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that she was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He claimed that she persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, to wit: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead introduced the boy to him as the adopted child of her family. She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her. She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts.

In support of his petition, he presented a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist. They observed that Reyes' persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. Before the trial court rendered its decision, Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties (such decision was affirmed by National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal and later by Roman Rota of the Vatican). According to the trial court, her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of makebelieve. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. However, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment holding that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's psychological incapacity. Hence, this petition for Review on Certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the requirement in Molina that the psychological incapacity of Reyes was shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Held: Yes. Petitioners expert witnesses remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable. The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before the

Molina case was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

[G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992.] PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG (WITH ALIASES JOSE JO AND CONSING)
CRUZ, J

Facts: Prima Partosa-Jo was legally married to Jose Jo. Upon their agreement, Prima left Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living together. However, when she returned from Zamboanguita on 1942, she was rejected by Jo. Apart from refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. Moreover, beginning 1988, he refused to give financial support to the petitioner. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted her to file the actions against him for support and later for separation of the conjugal property. Issue: Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property sought should be allowed. Held: Yes. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart from refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children by them. The private respondent has not established any just cause for his refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as a dutiful husband.

G.R. No. L-18753, Mar 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO vs. ANA DEL VAL CHAN BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Facts: Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will. Subsequently, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will. But, one Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix opposed the probate of the will. Issue: Whether or not Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding. Held: No. The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. "The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between, the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either." (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652)