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British Military and German Military Systems,Some Reflections on India Pakistan Armies Failures thanks to British Legacy
Hmmm. It is also interesting to observe some of the traditions of the British Army than the armies of India and Pakistan have chose to perpetuate. The author is right to try to separate the British Army generally from the Army in India -- they generally had different purposes. The British regimental system was more of a 'modular' army with a weak general staff/logistical system, but not so weak as many think. Marlborough and Wellington both had highly efficient logistic systems supporting them and sometimes moved with a speed that argued a very efficient staff system supported them. Arguably in the bulk of the 19th Century, where most of their British experience was 'expedition/imperial' fixated, the history of this experience received less stress. The same process seems to have been at work in the Royal Navy. In that same century, the Army in the Raj was not usually called on (aside from China and Ethiopia) to provide expeditions much beyond the Sub-Continent. Perhaps both because of the complexities of logistics in meeting Muslim and Hindu ration scales, the logistics of using these troops mitigated against the opportunities for more experience in expedition warfare. Also, arguments against a weakness for combined arms in the British Army don't generally ring true. But, in the Raj, where garrison units might end up being used against each other (remember the experience of the Mutiny), the British were perhaps more likely to de-stress inter-regimental cooperation and keep combinedarms planning as a purely British speciality. By John Thompson
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COMMENTS ON ABOVE CRITICISM The army of the English East India Company was used outside India well before the class system of regimental quotas was introduced.So the assertion that food affected expeditions is incorrect.Religious quotas for recruitment were introduced only after 1857 and there were no cook houses before 1857.Each man cooked with provisions purchased as he wished .Even Hindus and Muslims cooked together out of friendship and the system was discouraged by the British policy only after 1857. Also your assertions that Indian Army was used only in Ethiopia and China is fallacious. The Indian Army was used in the expeditions below. 1-The Anglo Nepalese War 1814-1816. 2-The First Burma War 1824-1826
3-The First Afghan War 1839-1842. 4- The Second Burma War 1852 5- Expedition to Malaca (Malaysia) 1791 6-First Egyptian Expedition 1801 7- Expedition to Macao 1808 8-Capture of Mauritins 1810 9- Expedition to Java 1811-13 Why Indian Army was not used in South Africa in Boer War ? Nothing to do with Indian Army but use of Indian Army against White races went against the entire British policy of perpetuating white mans superiority. It was only when as per British historian Edmonds that the British were desperate that the Indians were used in France against Germans .At this time Britian had no choice. The same racist considerations dictated that Indian Army be used against the hated Germans and Italians but not in France ?
Agha Sheryar Oil and Gas and Mineral Exploration Support Expert The combined arms failure is a consensus conclusion of various British historians including Liddell Hart , J.F.C Fuller , Correlli Barnett etc. http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/oct/handling.htm POOR GENERAL STAFF PROCEDURES AND PLANNING ABILITY AT HIGHER LEVELS This factor played a serious role in the Pakistani armoured division’s failure at Khem Karan in 1965. At the GHQ level the failure to appreciate that the armoured division must get out of the bottleneck between Rohi and Nikasu Nala was not appreciated. Nothing in the orders given to the 1st Armoured Division indicates that the planners understood this problem. Nikasu Nala was a pre-1947 landmark while Rohi Nala was no common pin to have missed the eyes of the planners. Poor general staff procedures at brigade and division level led to failure to concentrate all three armoured brigades across the Rohi Nala and thus was the principal reason for failure of the armoured division’s effort. The GHQ vacillation and indecision on 6th, 7th and 8th September when it issued contradictory orders to the 1st Armoured Division, sometimes to send one of its brigades to Lahore and sometimes
to Sialkot117 also played a major role in adding to the imperial confusion in the armoured division.
Correlli Barnett’s observations on the British Staffs of WW II fit well on the Pakistani Staff officers role in failure to handle armour. Barnett thus noted “The pace (referring to that of armoured operations) was too fast for the slow working staffs of lower formations (referringto corps/divisional/brigade staffs) ......(German staff work, because of greater experience and better training, was always faster and more lucid than British).....and detailed organisation for the offensive was poor and confused”.118 This observation fits well with the Military Operations Directorate of both sides and all staff officers down to armoured brigade level responsible for planning/executing the operations of both the Pakistani and the Indian 1st Armoured Divisions. The British perhaps were unlucky that their opponents were Germans and the Indians and Pakistanis were perhaps very lucky that their opponents were Pakistanis and Indians! o o o Delete Edit Comment You have 10 minutes
Agha Sheryar Oil and Gas and Mineral Exploration Support Expert http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/oct/handling.htm TRADITION OF LEADING FROM THE REAR AT BRIGADE AND BEYOND One of the main reasons of slowness of British armour operations was the fact that brigade commanders with few exception like the great Jock Campbell, VC who was an artillery man, there was a tradition of leading from the rear and this certainly contributed to many failures in Grand Slam and in Khem Karan. Decision making was thus done at a snail’s pace. All sorts of false and exaggerated reports were accepted as the Gospel truth etc. The British tradition of leading from the rear had a deep connection with the level of esteem in which their staff officers were held by their field commanders. The layman reader may note that unlike the German General Staff the British never had a permanent cadre of general staff officers. In their army as in both the Indo-Pak armies attending the staff course was just a hole punching business and general staff was not a highly specialised corps in the British Army unlike the German Army where the staff officer with a crimson stripe on his uniform was a highly qualified man belonging to a corps d elite. Thus while German commanders of the rank of brigade, divisional and corps level could lead from the front staying close to the leading tank regiment, the British commanders could not do so, since they looked down on their staff officers as men who were incapable of manning their main headquarters. Thus the profound truth in Mellenthin’s observation that “the officers of the German General Staff were not mere clerks or mouthpieces of their higher commanders (Mellenthin hints without saying so that the British ones were!!!!), but were trained to accept responsibility to give grave decisions and were respected accordingly. In contrast the British fighting commanders tended to look down on the staff, and the British show a curious reluctance to appoint capable staff officers to operational commands”.115 o o o Delete Edit Comment You have 11 minutes
Agha Sheryar Oil and Gas and Mineral Exploration Support Expert http://www.defencejournal.com/oct99/barapind.htm
FRONTAL ATTACK IN MILITARY HISTORY VERSUS IMAGINATIVE USE OF TANKS IN DEFENCE A frontal attack against an enemy who has not been neutralised by artillery fire or surprised by following a stratagem has rarely succeed. In 1815 at New Orleans when the British Army was one of the finest armies of the world; a similar frontal attack had led to one of the most disastrous repulses in British military annals! Thus the British suffered 2037 casualties including their commanding general killed while the US defenders suffered just 61 casualties47! It is interesting that to note that tank is such a versatile weapon system; that the worst possible tank in defence can play havoc with the best tank when it comes to firing at an advancing tank from a stationery defensive position. The Italians in North Africa had the technically speaking most pathetic tanks of WW Two. During the battle of 'Crusader' in November 1941 the British 22nd Armoured Brigade equipped with the technically overwhemingly superior 'Crusader' Tanks with 2 Pounder gun and 49mm frontal armour lost 40 out of 160 tanks when it gallantly but frontally charged the far inferior Italian Ariete Division equipped with M-13 tanks! Most of the tanks were destroyed by anti-tank guns which were closely integrated with Italian tanks! In July 1944 SS Obersturmfuehrer Michael Wittman was able to stop the British 7th Armoured Division with just four Tiger Tanks, annihilating their complete advance guard, knocking out 25 tanks, 14 carriers and 14 half tracks! Wittman did so without charging, but by conducting a highly imaginative defensive battle!48 n o o o Delete Edit Comment You have 13 minutes
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Agha Sheryar commented in the group onBritish Military and German Military Systems,Some Reflections on India Pakistan
Armies Failures thanks to British Legacy: [http://www.defencejournal.com/oct99/barapind.htm|leo://plh/http%3A*3*3www%2Edefencejournal%2Ecom*3oct99*3barapind %2Ehtm/43yq?_t=tracking_di... 1 minute ago
John Thompson commented in the group on British Military and German Military Systems,Some Reflections on India Pakistan
Armies Failures thanks to British Legacy: Hmmm. It is also interesting to observe some of the traditions of the British Army than the armies of India and Pakistan have chose to... 11 hours ago
John Thompson commented in the group on Saudi Arabia, Syria, Chemical Weapons & Paid Salafi Mullahs: Seriously, these
guys are worse than Marxist dialectians for working out logical contradictions when it suits them. 11 hours ago See all activity
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