An Unsung Soldier

The Life of Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster

Robert S. Jordan

naval ins titute press annapolis, maryland

Naval Institute Press 291 Wood Road Annapolis, MD 21402 © 2013 by Robert S. Jordan All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jordan, Robert S., An unsung soldier : the life of Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster / Robert S. Jordan. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-61251-278-5 (hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-61251-279-2 (ebook) 1. Goodpaster, Andrew Jackson, 1915–2005. 2. Generals—United States— Biography. 3. Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890–1969—Friends and associates. 4. National security—United States—Decision making—History— 20th century. 5. United States. Army—Biography. 6. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Biography. 7. United States—History, Military—20th century. 8. United States Military Academy—Biography. 9. Cold War. I. Title. II. Title: Life of Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. E745.G66J67 2013 355.0092—dc23 [B] 2013018691 Photos courtesy of the George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Virginia. Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). Printed in the United States of America. 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 First printing 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

This book is dedicated to the memories of Dr. Norman H. Gibbs Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University and Dr. Edgar S. Furniss Jr. Professor of Politics, Princeton University; Director, The Mershon Program, The Ohio State University Mentors to many students and scholars—especially to a young student who found himself in awesomely unfamiliar academic environments


  Foreword  Preface  Acknowledgments   Terms and Abbreviations Part I: A Career in Preparation and Execution Chapter One: The Professional Foundation Chapter Two: Professional Planning Chapter Three: Goodpaster and the Creation of NATO/SHAPE Chapter Four: Solarium: The Articulation of a National Posture Chapter Five: The “New Look” Part II: Goodpaster with Eisenhower Chapter Six: Presidential Staff Secretary and Counselor Chapter Seven: A Functional National Security System Chapter Eight: National Defense Writ Large Chapter Nine: Eisenhower’s Health Crises Chapter Ten: The U-2 and Overflights Part III: Arrival at the Top Chapter Eleven: Deputy Commander and Commander-Designate

ix xi xiii xv

3 13 23 33 43

55 72 83 94 103

  in Vietnam
Chapter Twelve: As NATO Supreme Allied Commander Chapter Thirteen: Returning to West Point as Superintendent Conclusions: The Soldier-Scholar in the National Security

117 124 134 141

  Policy Process

 Afterword 147  Appendix: Contributions to Public and Voluntary Service 149  Notes 159   Source Material 187  Index 205

v ii 


I am happy to have this opportunity to say a word about my dear friend and sometime colleague, Gen. Andrew Goodpaster. I do this having in mind that I was honored with the Goodpaster Award of the George C. Marshall Foundation. In addition, I was invited to dedicate “Goodpaster Hall” on the campus of St. Mary’s College, in nearby Maryland. I first met General Goodpaster when he became commandant of the National War College—the military’s highest institution of professional military education—and I became a student there shortly thereafter. General Goodpaster took me “under his wing” and provided me with invaluable perspectives on leadership, policy and strategy development, and war prevention. While I confess to receiving somewhat special treatment, General Goodpaster so endeared himself to my entire class that they elected him an honorary member of the class at the end of the year. That was an initiation of an increasingly close association, which grew until his unfortunate passing in 2005. There never is a poor time for a career military person to bring up the subject of leadership. In 1981, when General Goodpaster was superintendent at West Point, he described his concept of leadership: “I thought that the framework [for the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership] had to be leadership, but a deep and broad understanding of leadership. I think that has been the case. And the related disciplines—psychology, for example, and some elements of sociology—would fall within the framework of a sense of how you should give leadership. How does an officer give leadership at the various echelons of responsibility?”1 This observation had been earlier reframed thus: “If we wish to know the meaning of behavior, we must know the meanings of the behaver [sic]; to remain outside his frame of experience is simply to remain in the dark.”2 With warfare today relying more and more on high technology, it is noteworthy that General Goodpaster’s Princeton doctoral dissertation, written in 1950, anticipated this significant trend before it had become such a dominant aspect of both strategy and tactics. For him, knowledge of engineering (he was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers from West Point) had to be linked to, or partnered with, knowledge of the social and behavioral sciences. He also was convinced that, as the United States had entered
i x 



for ewor d

the world political-military arena to stay after the great victory of World War II, military officers should obtain a thorough grounding in history and international affairs. I watched him put his ideas into practice when we were both at the National War College. General Goodpaster’s leadership style was understated and quietly focused—he led by persuasion, by rational discourse, and by unfailing courtesy and consideration for others. These traits made him both a successful Supreme Allied Commander in NATO and an essential White House assistant and confidante to President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In a completely different vein, General Goodpaster joined the board of St. Mary’s College of Maryland in 1987. He devoted twelve years to a substantial overhaul of the college’s overall progress, curriculum procedures, and faculty compensation to lift St. Mary’s to the first tier of liberal arts colleges in the nation. Policy was as much a part of him as command and combat; in the Army an officer who was outstanding in both was a marked man. This is why Goodpaster rose quickly through the ranks, always being called back into a policy role even as he desired command assignments. He invariably wanted to know why, as well as what and how, when confronted with a policy dilemma. Also, he shared President Eisenhower’s insistence on considering the various alternatives when arriving at a decision. Not only was he not a “yes-man,” he did not want to be associated with them as he advanced up the career ladder. Professor Jordan has written a painstakingly researched, yet eminently readable, account of the career and accomplishments of General Goodpaster, for which I, for one, am very grateful. Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.) National Security Advisor to President Gerald Ford and President G. H. W. Bush


“It is absurd to make out that the means ever became more important than the end.” —Graham Greene, The Lost Childhood and Other Essays Few military men of his generation have been both “warriors” and “thinkers,” yet Gen. Andrew Jackson Goodpaster Jr. qualifies to be among that select company. To write about so-called action generals who more often than not possessed vivid personalities, although still a challenge, pales against the challenge of writing about a contemplative general who also could be an operational commander in combat or near-combat situations. General Goodpaster was a dedicated cold warrior throughout his active-duty military career of nearly forty years. He was also a sophisticated observer and commentator on the foreign policy and national security scene for nearly a quarter-century thereafter. In fact, it was said that during the course of his professional and post-military career, “he continued to receive calls from agencies involved with national security affairs for a variety of assignments at the highest and, in the Cold War, most important level of policy—the three-way intersection of presidential politics, military planning, and international relations.”1 It is difficult to speak of a nonconformist when discussing a very senior military man, but the more Goodpaster’s personality is examined, the more difficult it is to simply consider him the consummate “insider.” Although he was notably successful at playing by the rules at each level of his career, nonetheless he managed to retain his distinct character and personality. This was true for many of the general officers who came to the peak of their careers either near the end of World War II or during the early Cold War years—Lyman Lemnitzer, Lauris Norstad, and Matthew Ridgway come to mind. Yet none of them in their earlier years came to the attention of the “movers and shakers” who controlled their professional futures in quite the same manner as Goodpaster. Two persons stand out as his mentors: George “Abe” Lincoln, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. George C. Marshall was his model of the “complete officer.” As his career unfolded, Goodpaster could retain the aspect of a detached observer even as—by extension—he was able to relate successfully to those
x i 

x ii  


pr eface

around him within a largely closed yet supportive hierarchical professional environment. From his relatively humble origins, he achieved the highest international military command assignment possible—as the supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thereafter, he earned the gratitude of the Army as a whole when he returned to West Point as its superintendent from 1977 to 1981 to help restore integrity to its reputation, which had been sullied by a widespread cadet cheating scandal involving engineering examinations. Along the way, he became one of the first serving Army officers to obtain a doctoral degree in an Ivy League university. He also, of course, became an essential part of the Eisenhower White House entourage relatively early in his military career, often performing essentially civilian responsibilities informally, as well as becoming through his presence not only a trusted aide but also a counselor and friend to the president. Not resting on his laurels, upon his final retirement and for over a quarter-century thereafter, he was actively involved in both the formal and informal worlds of Washington policy-making, making his mark repeatedly as a respected participant. He identified himself with organizations as diverse at St. Mary’s College of Maryland and the Atlantic Council, serving as an officer in both, along with contributing his time and presence to many other worthwhile activities. Robert S. Jordan Woodbridge, Virginia December 2012