Galina M. Susova Aviation Register of Interstate Aviation Committee 0 Moscow Andrei N. Petrov M.Gromov Flight Research Institute Zhukovsky
Key Words: Arcraft, Reliability, Flight safety, Latent failure, Scheduled maintenance, Markov model, Maintenance system, Maintenance effectiveness, Optimization.
SUMh.t4RY AND CONCLUSION
Redundant aircraft systems are intended for operation under established flight missions and maintenance programs. Systems may have latent failures and their reliability may vary, depending on previously made scheduled checks and repairs. System failure modes are a basis for assessing failure effect on flight safety, and are determined by the components' failure modes and their sequence of occurrence. Using a model of Markov homogeneous process it is s h o w that probabilities of the aircraft system states can be presented as a product of two multipliers. The first of them depends on a components failure rate and flight duration under condition of serviceability of all the components at takcoff. It may be determined by known methods using the Markov processes and Boolean logic. The other one depends on the check and repair intervals for the components and system states, as well as the flight phase limits. The practical calculation formulae are presented. The proposed method presents a new practical approach for aircraft systems analysis and may be used for a wide range of complex systems with latent failures. The analytical model may be used for solving a number of practical tasks: redundancy optimization, determining check intervals, optimizing aircraft Minimum Equipment List, etc.  in order to minimize operation cost and ensure flight safety. Practical application of this technology to modern aircraft has shown good results.
1. INTRODUCTION
Aviation development over the last 15 years has shown a growing interest in aircraft technical operating capabilities (flight safety, reliability, testability, and maintainability). The aviation industry became involved in the development at all stages of the lifecycle besides high aircraft performance to achieve an economical efficiency of operations, a high level of safety, and complete system reliability. This can be confirmed by a classical optimization interconnections chain. Indeed, a growth of requirements to the composition and quality of the tasks performed by an aircraftandeconomic efficiency of its operations complicates the aircraft and its systems' design,
and influences the failures rates and effects. To maintain the required reliability and safety levels measures should be taken to enhance the system components reliability, redundancy, warning means, and special safety systems (both, forewarning the critical flight modes, and predicting the hazardous conditions). These measures directly affect the aircraft lifecycle cost (through the systems costs, aircraft weight, etc.), and on the other hand, they stipulate new requirements to an aircraft maintenance system, ground support and test equipment. New requirements cause challenges within aircraft maintainability and testability that have to be solved. Some of these challenges are: new or improved ground support equipment; onboard and ground test equipment; nondestructive inspection techmques; and the elaboration of more effective maintenance programs to reveal hidden failures of redundant components and prevent aircraft system failures evident to the crew. This helps to ensure the required reliability and safety of the aircraft, though it considerably affects the dispatch reliability and operating cost due to increase in labor spent for troubleshooting complex redundant systems, probable human errors, and "Retest OK" events,  and finally results in lifecycle cost increases leading to new advanced requirements for the aircraft characteristics. One of the key tools for optimizing operating cost, safety, and reliability is an analytical "reliability maintenance policy" model whch allows the calculation of systems reliability taking into account different kinds of maintenance checks and their intervals. There have been a number of different models proposed in the past two decades, but most of them are not really suitable for practical aerospace applications ([I]...I 41). Some of them are too simple to adeqwtely represent complex aerospace systems. Others are too sophisticated to be correctly used in everyday engineering. The proposed Markovbased reliability and safety evaluatim method is based on mathematically correct, but simplified, quantitative relations between aircraft safety, reliability, and maintenance parameters and provides promising results. The following notation appears in this paper: H system state (depends on components states),


0780337832/97/$5.00 0 1997 IEEE 1997 PROCEEDINGS A n n u a l RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium
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I The failed components of the aircraft systems may not be restored inflight.ti) .cVI. . Each flight includes a number of phases with specific limits for each phase.po ( H .i (K..   "'"   2.. Oj. VI cv2 c. r system state index equal to the number of failures which moved the system from a serviceable condition to the given state HZor H.pa (til .state to which the system transits after occurrence of a. in any sequence. It is shown in Figure 1. . ..l.ti> . i..designations for a specified sequence of failures and a random combination of failures respectively. .T 1 TZ  Fig.. Maintenance intervals and tasks are related by following rules: T i < TI < .flight duration.systcm state with fully serviceable components.the overall aircraft specific maintenance cost. Maintenance System and Mission Parameters An aircraft operation can be realized by a series of typical flights. ..pa.2. z ).pa (til . tn. The process of the system transition from a without restoration serviceable state Ho to a state In general terms. 3. o failures in the specified sequence. Hereafter any "component" means replaceable aircraft unit and mathematically will be referred as an "element" of the system model. of a series of a... ti)... v 3 0 3 v 1 v 2 0 1 T . QZ(til til probability of the state l%p.. and unscheduled tasks on repair of the failed system components according to the maintenance schedule established for an aircraft type..P.. < Tj.i.. Aircraft System 30 1997 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium ..K ap.jth scheduled maintenance check and repair interval.... ) occurrence on the ith flight phase. (til.. H G (FIT state to which the system transits after occurrence. . Qoup..pa . sequence failure modes (i=1..7J. BASICS OF THE MATH MODEL 2. Maintenance scheme for case of J=3 is shown in Figure 2. > .e. where TI = tn is a maintenance check of minimum volume.. c #2 a 1 T1 0 1 0 1 0 2 01 T l a 1 T 1 1 I 1 T1 T2 4 T 1 T 1 T2 1 3 T 1 _ _. .Ho.. the ith element is having (Ii+l) Ho+Ha+Hafl+ . M = Tj/T1 is a number of flights between full system restoration at the Jth maintenance check..p.coefficients of the system maintenance policy effect on the system failures probabilities Qoap. . is charactenzed by the transition of a number of I elements with the ith element having 1.. ) . 2 .. As a rule. K. T y p i c a l A i r c r a f t M a t n f e n a n c e S y s t e m w i t h T h r e e S c h e d u l e d C h o c k s . Qap. p p failures.individual maintenance task interval that is equal Tj interval at which state H.. upper index.2. " A ti tit1 (z L l t.i . Has. .. h.. ( H . Qup..po (Hz) occurrence on the ith flight phase. It should be mentioned that separate components failure modes monitoring and repair at different times is typical for most aircraft systems. Q..ith phase of flight limits.. a system may be regarded as consisting of the failed elements.po.p. each form (maintenance check) has its own tasks scope V. possible states. (ti. the maintenance schedule involves performing j = 1.+Hap ..pa. (1) 2. is checked and restored.ti). m = TJ/IJl are positive integers....I).. jth form of maintenance actions.pa . and several forms of maintenance actions 0.. Tj ...p+ Hap.. The maintenance system provides for scheduled tasks on the system condition monitoring. rate of the pth mode of the element failure.i on the ith flight phase. C.p.probability of the state H. denotes a probability of a system state under condition of serviceability of all system components before next flight. T.. and interval T. over the entire aircraft service life. I(ap..2.
..tn/r! (10) M K... + Hpa. (5) t % W Q43P where Ir(t) = 1 ...po Ho + Ho +Hop +... the process of the system transition from the serviceable state Ho to a state H... and Aot =C k..=Mtn.t < 1 (4) P * System elements fail in flight only.qQ. and then estimating errors..... Coefficients K .....tn) = Q o z (0.. The trajectory (1) may be used as a base for particulare cases.. The second factor (I 1) does not depend on the element reliability h. can be termed as the coefficient of the adopted maintenance system effect on the aircraft reliability.. The engineering formula for this case can be easily determined using proposed assumptions. random time of the p t h failure origination... ....t) using (3).+ + Ha p.../ttr. and shows how many times the probability Q2is increased with actual values of the check intervals for the corresponding system states.3.....=T..t) = Q ~ P .. (12) Table 1 formulae are based on universal math model and may be used for reliability and maintainability analysis of a  1997 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium 31 ... 3) Determine the recursive probability of transit (1) integrating Q(AT) within limits (t. These assumptions are usually used for analysis of aviation system reliability.. element failure rates from one hand..4..f r o m the other hand.pa (0.t)= 3.. restoration policy should be taken into account for calculating a math model.. state restoration (depends on TI)..hph.that occurs under a condition of restoring the serviceability of all the failed elements before the takeoff. the higher system state index is... Math Model If in equation (6) all variables 9. 2) Determine the probability Q(AT) of trajectory realization using Markov process formulae.. To determine the formula for Qap...... defined by combination of failures of not more than four elements.. and process transit rates .. their probabilities. The probability of system failure in any flight during this period can be determined from the formula M QAO... TheMarkov model (differential mode) leads to analitycal formulae (regarding inequalities ( 4 ) ) . The value K. However. 4) Simplify the formula for Qap........ t ! / d (7) Qap.. = (tit'. but the method does not lead to analytical formulae. tn) = hahp..pa Otherwise...P.. state probabilities....These transitions occur at random instants of time due to the element failures.. Reliability Assumptions Basic system reliability assumptions are as follows: * Element failure rates are constant A . for any unserviceable state can be theoretically formulated. dtp .... the larger are the calculation tasks.. 1 dt...  The first factor (10) in the obtained expression (9) defines the probability of the inflight system failure state H .. Besides.t>= .pa(O... (6)  O b $ tp 2... for example.Ir((j1) tn)} (11) Usually recursive model is employed in complex maintanability scenarios.Apha Ir(t).. * The inspections are perfect and essentially hundred percent of the failures are detected and fixed.. GENERAL CALCULATION FORMULAE The probability Q2(tl. On the basis of the abovementioned assumptions the Markov homogeneous process may be used as a math model for the aircraft system reliability if the coqelation can be established between: aircraft system states..... + Hop. The proposed approach suggests both methods to get the analytical formulae for the complex scenarios by using Markov model (process trajectories mode).. . occurrence varies from flight to flight since beginning of operations till the full restoration of the system after the appropriate check TJ.t2) of the system state H. 2.. * Element failures are detected in flight and on the ground but are corrected only during ground maintenance.. No new failures are introduced as a result of the maintenance..hph. (2) whcrc t.F (t) the calculation process will be as follows: 1) Compose the process trajectory AT for transit (1). ~ hAp.. (o.. .dt. dt. Thus..p + Hpa .... = const (3) * For highly reliable aircraft systems the following inequalities are true: Apt << 1. and Markov process states.po (none restored Boolean model ) features a combination of possible transition sequences: Ho + H a + Hap +. j t d Qdo70'l) GI)) j=l  (8) The expression derived with due regard to ( 5 ) can be presented in the form Q2(0. tn) Kz (9) if the designations are introduced Qo. = (r!/ tn)(l/M) jl C {Ira tn) ...p + Hop...(O. but it is employed in simple cases only. (0.. .. check and repair intervals have to be taken into consideration. But the experience of practical aircraft reliability analysis shows thai possible systems failure modes are usually.. The transformation results are given in Table 1.. tfl) = ( 1 W C { Q..>/ .... In many practical cases the system failure effects depend on a flight phase where the failure occurred. (4). = t (no restoration is performed) the equation (5) agrees with a wellknown formula for the Markov process theory u p.. cpz minimum time for H. + Hap.. Resulting formula is Qz(O.... * System failures are detected in flight only and corrected before the next flight.pcr Ho +HP + HJ3a +. In the given equations n.
and Q.)=QO.l. the design formula is For particular z and failures combinations. {H. mode in the ith flight phase is determined from the formulae using the n...}2.1.(15) QRJ (til. the system unserviceable states {H..i). maintenance check and repair intervals. In case when the state of the system output characteristics (and the system failure mode) depends on the failed element compositim.. Methods of calculating the measures provide for sets which define each system failure mode.> 3) Coefficients K.}!.. Table I Formulae for probabilities Q. upon the system serviceability as ii whole.i or K. Process failure modes based on the engineering analysis the set of (H. i+ Q pa. To generate a list of possible system 4.po(O. are found from 1)Dimensionless parameters 0i and n system output characteristics set. Approach 32 1997 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium . Transition to any subset of formula (12).i In practice.. + QOap .i+ (13) .. {H. {H. . formula: 4. 4) data on the system unserviceable states (system failures) and.p o .. 4....t.tn)I(.t.2..}J in such a way that the system transition from the serviceable state to any unserviceable one system failure modes estimation includes the following steps: belongs to the same subset result in equal variations in the .3.p u .po. hph. i+ &a .. means the system 2) Probabilities Q... (14) K =.po.} is divided to compose a group of J disjoint subsets The calculation procedure for the probabilities of the {H. RELU BILITYAND SAFETYASSESSMENT APPLICATIONS Initial data to calculate the probabilities of the system failure modes for the established maintenance policy are as follows: 1) list of the system element failure modes and failure The basis for a design evaluation of flight safety and effectiveness measures are aircraft system failure modes and Occurrence rates.broad range of aviation systems considering their specific scope and design.}.. Initial Data   4. ..... are determined from equations failure of R* mode.pa(ti..i+ . 2) list of the system failure modes..p.ti ) is the probability of the unserviceable state H .p . hence. the probabilities of the failure modes are found from equations (9) and (13) using Table 1 formulae.po(07tdKpa.p a h p ... + Kop.9. As a result of the analysis a set of the unserviceable system states rates. and the system state probabilities of failure occurrences in Werent phases of flight.ti)= Qap .} is determined.i(O.i are calculated from the Table 1 of R .. but not of their sequence..po(til.po.i(07hW up.pa .. The probability of this system failure mode will be QG (til. failures and does not depend on their occurrence sequence as shown in transits (2)..pa. i 7 where Qoap.i= (1/r!)&. ~ of the system failure occurrence The proiability Q R (ti.ti) + Qpa. and time limits for the phases which the engineering analysis of the element failure mode and failure combination effects upon the system output characteristics flight is divided into...ti)= C IHzlj Qz(tll)ti) (16) where Q& . 3) flight duration.td/r! . it often appears that the system unserviceable ..0 + Qop .... K. and coefficients K..ti) +*.on the ith phase of flight....tn) = (r!) LAp..pu.@.o element state is defined only by the modes of a. i = Qo up. (10) and (14).pa.. values..pu(til.
Rcliclbili(v nnd Sclfit?.i) (1s) {Hz}j .ti .1.ti)= Qd(%Tj.bj. 4.iQRj(fil. Qc(~. The alternative for the accurate quantitative approach to solving the problem is the rational combination of the qualitative engineering analysis. Approach Fig. til.5. 5) Using formulae (16). Suppose Qreqland Qreqz are the quantitative requirements . 4. 3 . (19) leads us to inequalities: 1 0 2 Q&.4)ProbtAties Q z. filrfi .tn .bj. 5: bj. ti) of the system failure modes on the ith phase of an arbitrary selected flight are respectively calculated.. to select the PMF's and maintenance tasks.tn .Tj. and their intervals is one of the rational ways to reduce the aircraft operating cost. .2 and 4. (17) the occurrence probabilities QRj (ti.fi 9aj.tl . 9  S.ti1.i ) (19) ~ H z ~ J an aircraft system failure during typical flight let us evaluate where aJs1 and bJ. (21) for safety and dispatch (or effectiveness of operations) while minimizing the aircraft maintenance specific cost C. 3) in accordance with procedure recommended in par. accurate analytical models of the PMPs and the maintenance tasks influence on the safety and eflectiveness criteria.(2 1) which allow to estimate (using Table 1 formulae) the @I dependence of the system failures probabilities on its element 2 failure rates and associated check and repair intervals to be found for the arbitrary (up to the 4th order) system states. the main difficulty is a quantitative validation of meeting the requirements at the aircraft development stages because of the deficiency in simple but.i4.bj. an accident or departure failure due to a system failure RJ.ti .MINTENANCE OPTIMIZATION APPLJCATIONS 5. Transformation of the relations (lS).i < Qeq2 . are obtained by formula (9) or ( 13). For esample. where Tu unknown individual maintenance interval.ssess~~ient Tasks The effect of each ~YYtem failure mode on flight Safety and effectiveness is ~vahated b Y the engineeringanalysis.ti)=Qc(LTj.@3 placed to flight safety and dispatch reliability.fi .i ) < Qreq2 .tfl <a e q l Qd(h. fil. the problem of quantitative substantiation of the effective maintenance schedule consists of ensuring the required probability levels (20).: Cs3 MIN. and the qualitative methods to develop the 9 1997 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium 33 . Exanrple i TO illustrate the method for calculating the probability of Q F r _ Z .tfl .aj. But there is a need for a good solid based math model to describe the system reliability and safety under certain maintenance modes.l or Q.Tu. with all the necessary initial information available. S a m p l e System The last two decades of severe competition at the air transportation and military aircraft market have shown that the development of the maintenance program which provides for optimization of the aircraft components primary maintenance processes (PMPs). ti1. With this approach.lare the coefficients for the probability of a simple system with scheduled maintenance (Fig.Tu.til.i ) < Qmql (20) I Qd(J. 4. The experience of the aircraft operations shows that maintenance costs can be reduced (while maintaining the necessary level of flight safety) through wide implementation of the oncondition maintenance. the probability of a catastrophic effect Qcand departure failure Qdshould be given in the form of Qc= C C aj. scope of maintenance and repair tasks.Tj.3. maintaining at the same time its airworthiness and competitiveness.4. Generally.iQRj(kl. respectively.
34 1997 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium .1 I25.75 IL96300 1230. The only problem in this step is to how implement Table based on the abovementioned methodology starting from the 1 formulae in case of unknown maintenance intervals (means early stages of the airplane design.) maintenance task intervals by to comply with the world level of parameters under integration of tasks with 'optimum values into appropriate consideration. The first experience of main stages. intervals using rank values. 5. (21) a new reliability model application was acquired on the IL86 and cost function C. system safety assessment. and engineers together with M. and sum of 800 types of maintenance objects (assemblies. A Final substantiation to be checked during this task.7[*] Notes: 1. so if % then Tu < Tu+.5115 11.0 10. 2. .3 134. typical flight and its phases analysis for the IL86 maintenance program development but duration. tasks cost (manhours or money values).3. A method is proposed for ranking the Tuvalues using the is prescribed by the wellknown ATA MSG3 [SI were criteria % . in terms of system failure modes with airplane which was thoroughly analyzed by "IL" reliability associated safety and mission completion effect. safety. The methodology which was used to develop some aircraft maintenance programs combines the task . Then T.maintenance tasks. About maintenance task is a function of the task cost C. This assumption allows to documents set exceeds 3. Table 2 Basic Parameters of the IL96300 Airplane Maintenance Program and the airplane analogies  I 12.2. Also there consideration uS%g the following data: component failure was an attempt to realize ATA MSG2 document logic modes and their probabilities. Example o f Practical Implementation o f the Method The Ilyushin Company of Russian experience shows a Maintenance intervals optimization process includes three good example of practical implementation of the proposed math model and associated techniques. parts. 1. values are determined. 3. and the qualitative methods to develop the maintenance intervals for those tasks which are covered by the proposed mathematical model of scheduled check tasks frequency influence on functional system reliability.0 10. scheduled maintenance checks with the known base T. < %( than others. which are based on the factor analysis of a number of foreign airplanes. The values Lf overhaul maintenance manhours per flight hour (MMH/FH) are calculated for the Russian and foreign airplanes with the same technique using the data of airlines (except for the 1186. Estimation of rationa. and aircraft effectiveness. All the system components without division into "significant" and 'honsiflcant" as it unknown sequence of failures restoration). Optimization of the individual maintenance tasks and development of a maintenance program for the next intervals Tu using Lagrange's method for convex functions generation IL96300 airplanes were carried out completely case.2 Estimaited 1230. that is reflected in Table 2 [ 5 ] . = Lg (C/QU). Failure mode and effect analysis.0[*]/12 I1.75 17. The analysis results permitted to reduce the IL96300 establish which maintenance task should be performed earlier maintenance volume by 30% compared to that of the IL86 . It allows formal analyzing of the influence of possible systems and components failure modes on aircraft s a f ~ t y ~ dispatch reliability. unknown parameters of maintenance tasks intervals without a close relation to the results of failure mode and to be optimised. Maintenance Intervals Optimization Process mainteiiance tasks selection (known as RCM principles [7]) with quantitative methods of rational scheduled tasks interval evaluation using the proposed math model. and the possible components failures probabilities Qu which have components) were considered. Sign [*I shows the estimated values.Gromov Flight Research Institute requirements Q values for each system failure under specialists to assess systems reliability and safety.000 pages.oriented qualitative engineering analysis for PMPs and 5. The line before the 1196300 shows the estimated parameters for its project analogue. scheduled and unscheduled maintenance effect analysis based on the proposed reliability model. where rank SUfor the Uth analyzed in accordance with the special Manual [6]. for which the estimated value for the outofservice plant overhaul is shown) 2. Determination of the unreliability functions (20). and economical efficiency.
=: so visible. 5 ) .9 6 . 0. 1997 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium 35 .11 iicarly 90% of the total number of the components) can be this reduction is n.09 . 77. 5 .02 0.6 2 IL .Ol 0 22 38 23.8 6 IL . 110. As a result of the analysis performed  N.04 0. predecessors (Fig. Distribution o f the P e r i o d i c Maintenance Specific L a b o r f o r the IL. 4).05 0.9 63 0 0 Fig..17 011 0. which is mostly due to low inaintaincd oncondition and operated without any lifc tinie components reliability and necessity of frcqucnt checks of limitations.3 0 0 C o m p a r c d to IL86 S y s t e m s . IL . 114 28 32 27 76 21 26 24 29 35 30 ATA 1 0 0 Number Systems Fig.% ~~ ~ ~~~ ~ 1 0 0 9 0 8 0 ( O N O . The S h a r e o f the O n . 31.63 16 0.9 6 . these systems. but due to the earlier rectification and specific labor rates for all basic systems wcrc sul’ficieiitly cliiiiiiintioii of iiiaintaiiiability rind testability deficiencies.3 0 0 S y s t e m s C o m p a r e d to o t h e r “IL“ A i r p l a n e s (IL62 and IL86). reduced (Fig.This has bccii achieved not only by the riiaintcriaiicc arid the iniplcmentation of tlic oncondition niaintcnancc tlic program optimization.c o n d i t i o n Maintained C o m p o n e n t s f o r the I L . 113. The iiiost airplane coniponents (about 100% of Q ~ e s and But tlic share of avionics and fire supprcssion systems i. MMHlFH x 1000 0.06 0.07 0. 4 . of c o m p ~ n e n t s ’ t y p e T ~ m ~ o f . Numerous “false alarm” signals (‘Retest OK’ I n this way the airplane compares favorably ibitli its events) are also typical for this class of systems.c o m p o n e n t s I 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n 1 .08 0.03 0. 34.
) with a cyclic operation. reliability. JM. Sharma.C.. allowing a include reliability. IL96300. S.POTENTIAL OUTLOOK BIOGRAPHIES Galina M. Susova accrued for two decades at the M. MIS. Reliability & Maintainability Symp. Proc. Gromov (Russian abbreviation . T. of Flight T Andrei N. Ann. Pahitknr. Sharmn. 2. He adso participated M n working group m m b r or *e projoct manager in the development of many tochnicd and regulatory documents (specifications. The methodology can easily be used Mrs. On the subject she participated in turning out more than 25 papers and several Industry standnrds. She is a member of SAE. Gromov Flight Research operations certification procedures. Moscow. C. 140160 RUSSIA F a : (095) 5565334 Email: poatmaste@flyim.msksu optimization technique and ETOPS (twin engine airplanes Galina M. Ann.M. etc.mclktu REFERENCES 1 . Garbelhi. Aviation Register.pp 676481.Zilbermnn.) with the m a i n activity in maintenance progradmaintainability OptimiLation and certification. Intentate Aviation Committee. S. Dr. aircraft reliability growth m e n t .C. M in AircrafWSystmu T e s t i n g and evnuation f r o m the Flight Research Institute in 1989. Revision 2. Somd. testing and operating data. 3. F. of the ALcraft Flight Safety Intl. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors express their deep gratitude to all specialists of M. safety and maintainability methods for complex systems.6 . 1993. 7. 1993. pp 303308. pp 195 200. Nowlnn. She took part i military aircratl. T. M. "Manual for the Designers and Operators on the Civil Aviation Aircraft Maintenance Program Development and C d i c a t i o n (RDKE)". formal description of system potential failures and associated based on Markov models. Cod. Yak42. Susova received her MS in Mechanics f r o m the Moscow State over ocean with a probable one engine failure allowed) r .  36 1997 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium . IL114. 1990. L . "Availability Technique8 and Approach fora Manned Reentry Vehicle". There is also a University and D n 1974. nnd replntions) on nn aircraft technical opentiag capabilities (flight safety.Proc. Moscow Region. Susova.. 5.. 1993.Gromov Flight Rwearch Institute in other industries also.. 1993. Gromov LII. Sc. B. expnt systems design.Nguyen.M. DR. natiod/indu&y stmd. It can be applied to reliability and of Russia. Gromov Flight Research Institute and Ilyushin Design Bureau who gave us a helping hand in refining and implementation of the proposed method into engineering Andrei N. SC. Gromov LII/Flight Research Institute Zhukowky2. He is a member of Society e s t Engineers. He was closely Maintenance . bldg 1. reliability and maintainability reliability for students at the Moscow Aviation Institute. A K.. in Engineering f r o m the M. mnintninnbility. A N. "Reliability Analysis of Redundant Aircrali Systems with Possible Latent Fdlures" Proc. Jan. Another model Fax: (095)1255195 enhancement is the development of Minimum Equipment List Email: root@makniias. Krjijanovsky St. 1978. Prior to this assignment ensuring and evaluation. "Experience of Development and Certification of the IL96300 Maintenance Program". implementation of the digital system reliability assumptions 7. and risks to be made. GosNII GA. The future activities of niodel inwrovement are focused on Chief Specialist.rb. Petrov is an author of a number of publications (standards.Petrov received his Dr. She delivers lectures on systematic approach to safety. V. Since 1993 he is a Chief of the Safety.handbooks. DR. H. Tu204. Unfortunately he Moscow Avidon Institute with a MS degree in &eraft Mechanical passed away in 1993 and we will always keep him in our memories. Petrov. and T involved in development. 8. Fenante. Proc. r .Petrov entered Rursia State Flight Research Institute nnmed after practice.Qromov LII) upon grnduation &om the shall be regarded as one of the authors.. Engineering. degree teatability) evaludon and ccrtifcntion. testing and certifcation of a number of both civil and military aircraft (SU27. Sc.. Reliability & Maintainability Symp. Reliability. "RehbilityCentercd Maintenance". locomotives. A Karpmko. 1994. SC. Since 1991 Mrs. Ann Relinbility P Maintaihbility Symp. S h q Ph. Susovn's research interests ships. "Reliability Computation of Systems with Latent Failures and Monitoring". were he worked since 1980 to present time on engineering and managerial positions. printed pnpcrs). "Reliability Modeling of Systems with Latent Failures U s i n g Markov Chains ". Petrov. 1994. AM. . T . A K Somnni. Tomich also did much and indeed M. M. working her way h m M Engineer up to the Chief of the Relinbility n reliability nnnlyair of a number of both civil end safety assessment of most complicated systems (power units. He has some educational experience teaching the m e t h o d s of maintenance program development and cdication. Mr. Chief of Division 4. data bases. pp 222229. Reliability & Maintainability Symp. Laboratory. Susova is a Chief spcialist at the Aviation Institute i technological problem of method automation realizing a Register of the Interstate Aviation Committee. pp 120125. 6. A Altavilla. etc. Valery K. Sept. e s t Research Division in the Institute. 117875 RUSSIA and possible inflight repair opportunity. Proc. 4. "AirIineManufactum Maintmsnce Program Development Document" (ATA MSG3). JM. JM.