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Morris, Inc., are similarly not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction. As registered owners "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK" per certificates of registration issued by the Philippine Patent Office on April 26, 1973, May 28, 1964, and March 25, 1964, plaintiffs-petitioners asserted that defendant Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in contravention of Section 22 of the Trademark Law, and should, therefore, be precluded during the pendency of the case from performing the acts complained of via a preliminary injunction (p. 75, Court of Appeals Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No. 13132). For its part, Fortune Tobacco Corporation admitted petitioners' certificates of registration with the Philippine Patent Office subject to the affirmative and special defense on misjoinder of party plaintiffs. Private respondent alleged further that it has been authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK", and that "MARK" is a common word which cannot be exclusively appropriated (p.158, Court of Appeals Rollo in A.C.-G.R. SP No. 13132). On March 28, 1983, petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction was denied by the Presiding Judge of Branch 166 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed at Pasig, premised upon the following propositions: Plaintiffs admit in paragraph 2 of the complaint that ". . . they are not doing business in the Philippines and are suing on an isolated transaction . . .". This simply means that they are not engaged in the sale, manufacture, importation, expor[t]ation and advertisement of their cigarette products in the Philippines. With this admission, defendant asks: ". . . how could defendant's "MARK" cigarettes cause the former "irreparable damage" within the territorial limits of the Philippines?" Plaintiffs maintain that since their trademarks are entitled to protection by treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris Convention of which the Philippines is a member and ratified by Resolution No. 69 of the Senate of the Philippines and as such, have the force and effect of law under Section 12, Article XVII of our Constitution and since this is an action for a violation or infringement of a trademark or trade name by defendant, such mere allegation is sufficient even in the absence of proof to support it. To the mind of the Court, precisely, this is the issue in the main case to determine whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs' right of property to such trademark or trade name. This claim of plaintiffs is disputed by defendant in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Answer; hence, this cannot be made a basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. There is no dispute that the First Plaintiff is the registered owner of trademar[k] "MARK VII" with Certificate of Registration No. 18723, dated April 26,1973 while the Second Plaintiff is likewise the registered owner of trademark "MARK TEN" under Certificate of Registration No. 11147, dated May 28, 1963 and the Third Plaintiff is a registrant of trademark "LARK" as shown by Certificate of Registration No. 10953 dated March 23, 1964, in addition to a pending application for registration of trademark "MARK VII" filed on November 21, 1980 under Application Serial No. 43243, all in
G.R. No. 91332 July 16, 1993 PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., AND FABRIQUES OF TABAC REUNIES, S.A.,petitioners vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents. Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco Law Office for petitioners. Teresita Gandionco-Oledan for private respondent.
MELO, J.: In the petition before us, petitioners Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques of Tabac Reunies, S.A., are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, herein private respondent, from manufacturing and selling "MARK" cigarettes in the local market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners' respective symbols "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK", also for cigarettes, must be protected against unauthorized appropriation, petitioners twice solicited the ancillary writ in the course the main suit for infringement but the court of origin was unpersuaded. Before we proceed to the generative facts of the case at bar, it must be emphasized that resolution of the issue on the propriety of lifting the writ of preliminary injunction should not be construed as a prejudgment of the suit below. Aware of the fact that the discussion we are about to enter into involves a mere interlocutory order, a discourse on the aspect infringement must thus be avoided. With these caveat, we shall now shift our attention to the events which spawned the controversy. As averred in the initial pleading, Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Virginia, United States of America, and does business at 100 Park Avenue, New York, New York, United States of America. The two other plaintiff foreign corporations, which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Philip
the Philippine Patent Office. In same the manner, defendant has a pending application for registration of the trademark "LARK" cigarettes with the Philippine Patent Office under Application Serial No. 44008. Defendant contends that since plaintiffs are "not doing business in the Philippines" coupled the fact that the Director of Patents has not denied their pending application for registration of its trademark "MARK", the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is premature. Plaintiffs contend that this act(s) of defendant is but a subterfuge to give semblance of good faith intended to deceive the public and patronizers into buying the products and create the impression that defendant's goods are identical with or come from the same source as plaintiffs' products or that the defendant is a licensee of plaintiffs when in truth and in fact the former is not. But the fact remains that with its pending application, defendant has embarked in the manufacturing, selling, distributing and advertising of "MARK" cigarettes. The question of good faith or bad faith on the part of defendant are matters which are evidentiary in character which have to be proven during the hearing on the merits; hence, until and unless the Director of Patents has denied defendant's application, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that issuance a writ of preliminary injunction would not lie. There is no question that defendant has been authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to manufacture cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK" (Letter of Ruben B. Ancheta, Acting Commissioner addressed to Fortune Tobacco Corporation dated April 3, 1981, marked as Annex "A", defendant's "OPPOSITION, etc." dated September 24, 1982). However, this authority is qualified . . . that the said brands have been accepted and registered by the Patent Office not later than six (6) months after you have been manufacturing the cigarettes and placed the same in the market." However, this grant ". . . does not give you protection against any person or entity whose rights may be prejudiced by infringement or unfair competition in relation to your indicated trademarks/brands". As aforestated, the registration of defendant's application is still pending in the Philippine Patent Office. It has been repeatedly held in this jurisdiction as well as in the United States that the right or title of the applicant for injunction remedy must be clear and free from doubt. Because of the disastrous and painful effects of an injunction, Courts should be extremely careful, cautious and conscionable in the exercise of its discretion consistent with justice, equity and fair play. There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or (which is) more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuing of an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity that never ought to be extended unless to
cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction. (Bonaparte v. Camden, etc. N. Co., 3 F. Cas. No. 1, 617, Baldw. 205, 217.) Courts of equity constantly decline to lay down any rule which injunction shall be granted or withheld. There is wisdom in this course, for it is impossible to foresee all exigencies of society which may require their aid to protect rights and restrain wrongs. (Merced M. Go v. Freemont, 7 Gal. 317, 321; 68 Am. Dec. 262.) It is the strong arm of the court; and to render its operation begin and useful, it must be exercised with great discretion, and when necessary requires it. (Attorney-General v. Utica Inc. Co., P. John Ch. (N.Y.) 371.) Having taken a panoramic view of the position[s] of both parties as viewed from their pleadings, the picture reduced to its minimum size would be this: At the crossroads are the two (2) contending parties, plaintiffs vigorously asserting the rights granted by law, treaty and jurisprudence to restrain defendant in its activities of manufacturing, selling, distributing and advertising its "MARK" cigarettes and now comes defendant who countered and refused to be restrained claiming that it has been authorized temporarily by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under certain conditions to do so as aforestated coupled by its pending application for registration of trademark "MARK" in the Philippine Patent Office. This circumstance in itself has created a dispute between the parties which to the mind of the Court does not warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. It is well-settled principle that courts of equity will refuse an application for the injunctive remedy where the principle of law on which the right to preliminary injunction rests is disputed and will admit of doubt, without a decision of the court of law establishing such principle although satisfied as to what is a correct conclusion of law upon the facts. The fact, however, that there is no such dispute or conflict does not in itself constitute a justifiable ground for the court to refuse an application for the injunctive relief. (Hackensack Impr. Commn. v. New Jersey Midland P. Co., 22 N.J. Eg. 94.)
Hence, the status quo existing between the parties prior to the filing of this case should be maintained. For after all, an injunction, without reference to the parties, should be violent, vicious nor even vindictive. (pp. 338-341, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.) In the process of denying petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration of the order denying issuance of the requested writ, the court of origin took cognizance of the certification executed on January 30, 1984 by the Philippine Patent Office attesting to the fact that private respondent's application for registration is still pending appropriate action. Apart from this communication, what prompted the trial court judge to entertain the idea of prematurity and untimeliness of petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction was the letter from the Bureau of Internal Revenue date February 2, 1984 which reads: MRS. TERESITA GANDIONGCO OLEDAN Legal Counsel Fortune Tobacco Corporation Madam: In connection with your letter dated January 25, 1984, reiterating your query as to whether your label approval automatically expires or becomes null and void after six (6) months if the brand is not accepted and by the patent office, please be informed that no provision in the Tax Code or revenue regulation that requires an applicant to comply with the aforementioned condition order that his label approved will remain valid and existing. Based on the document you presented, it shows that registration of this particular label still pending resolution by the Patent Office. These being so , you may therefore continue with the production said brand of cigarette until this Office is officially notified that the question of ownership of "MARK" brand is finally resolved. V e r y t r u l y y o u r
the abandonment of an application is of no moment. but the trial court nonetheless denied the second motion for issuance of the injunctive writ on April 22.) It appears from the testimony of Atty. For another.) Confronted with this rebuff. He said there is no specific provision in the rules prohibiting such refiling (TSN. Rollo. when the trial court first declined issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. and that said 3 application has 1 been deemed abandoned and forfeited.with the Philippine x Patents Office. Granting that 0 the alleged changes in the material facts are sufficient grounds for a -motion seeking a favorable grant of what has already been denied. . A this motion just the same cannot prosper. 1983. Secondly as shown by plaintiffs' own evidence furnished by no less than the chief of Trademarks Division of the Philippine Patent Office. For one. is in actual use and available for commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines. But defendant has . 350-351. nay. and thereafter matter was injunction. D 2 Plaintiffs' arguments in support of the present motion appear to be 8 of their stand in the first above-mentioned petition a mere rehash 3 which has already been ruled upon adversely against them. pp. according to Madarang. Raviera). they concentrated their fire on the alleged abandonmentD and forfeiture by defendant of said application for registration. from manufacturing. The Court of Appeals initially issued a resolution which set aside the court of origin's order dated April 22. that could alter the results of the case in that Fortune's application had been rejected. thus: For all the prolixity of their pleadings and testimonial evidence. Petitioners thereafter cited supervening events which supposedly transpired since March 28. In fact. petitioners filed a previous petition for certiorari before the Court. 60 & 64. 91332. No. (pp. they did not even bother to establish by competent evidence that the products supposedly affected adversely by defendant's trademark now subject of an application for registration products which they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the trademark applied for by defendant. are in actual use in the Philippines. and the A to rest. and granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Fortune.. 78141. its agents. R. docketed as G. Enrique Madarang. on the P strength of supposed changes in the material facts of this case. 1984. 311. and that the application had been forfeited by abandonment. 1987. November 21. 6 there is no proof whatsoever that any of plaintiffs' In the first place (p. matter was made N However. 1986. 348. 1987. Hence. i v i The Court cannot help but take note of the fact that in their s complaint plaintiffs included a prayer for issuance preliminary i petition was duly heard. employees. plaintiffs came up with the present motion citing therein 6 the said changes which are: that defendant's application had been 5 rejected and barred by the Philippine Patents Office. the refiled application of defendant is now pending before the Patents Office. it appears that the motion has no leg to stand on. the plaintiffs-movants have fallen far short of the legal requisites that would justify the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. 1983. and representatives. The o assiduously discussed lengthily and resolved against plaintiffs in a n issued by the undersigned's predecessor on March 15-page Order 28. for the same can always be refiled.refiled the same. but the petition was referred to the Court of Appeals. Atty. No.R. Rollo). Rollo in G. Chief of the Trademark Division of the then Philippine Patent Office that Fortune's application for its trademark is still pending before said office (p. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was denied in T another well-argued 8 page Order issued on April 5. barred by the Philippine Patent Office. Enrique Madarang.
and thus make ineffectual the final judgment rendered afterwards granting the relief sought by the plaintiff (Calo vs. Sandico. Generally." (p. CA rollo) of Conrado P. 1984.) After private respondent Fortune's motion for reconsideration was rejected. 107. the trademark application of private respondent for the "MARK" under Serial No. the appellate court may grant the same. to wit: The private respondent seeks to dissolve the preliminary injunction previously granted by this Court with an offer to file a counterbond. 1986 of any reference to the pendency of the instant action filed on August 18. 137. CA rollo) issued upon the written request of private respondents' counsel dated September 17. does not give protection as against any person or entity whose right may be prejudiced by infringement or unfair competition in relation to the aforesaid trademark nor the right to register if contrary to the provisions of the Trademark Law. If it is not issued. 166 as amended and the Revised Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases. Quintillan. "MARK TEN". Pitted against the petitioners' documentary evidence. and (2) the certification dated September 26.(Annexes B. 165-167.selling. is now deemed forfeited. In a third official communication dated April 8. Diaz. Inc. Sheriff of Manila. 1982. 148 SCRA 326). The penultimate paragraph of Commissioner Diaz' letter of authority reads: Please be informed further that the authority herein granted does not give you protection against any person or entity whose rights may be prejudiced by infringement or unfair competition in relation to your above-named brands/trademark. vs. are not also questioned by respondents. 91332.R. No. Cuneta. We believe and hold that petitioners have shown a prima facie case for the issuance of the writ of prohibitory injunction for the purposes stated in their complaint and subsequent motions for the issuance of the prohibitory writ. there being no revival made pursuant to Rule 98 of the Revised Rules of Practitioners in Trademark Cases. Ruiz. 139. 125 SCRA 276) The requisites for the granting of preliminary injunction are the existence of the right protected and the facts against which the injunction is to be directed as violative of said right. (Buayan Cattle Co. The foregoing documents or communications mentioned by petitioners as "the changes in material facts which occurred after March 28. 47374 of the respondent Court. 1986. (pp. temporarily granting the request of private respondent for a permit to manufacture two (2) new brands of cigarettes one of which is brand "MARK" filter-type blend. the defendant may. (Service Specialists. It is a writ framed according to the circumstances of the case commanding an act which the Court regards as essential to justice and restraining an act it deems contrary to equity and good conscience (Rosauro vs. Rollo in G. 13132. Quintillan. however. the Court has not missed to note the absence of a mention in the Sandico letter of September 26. The late Justice Cacdac. 1986. Thus. vs. 1986. Rep. Ortigas & Co. As found and reiterated by the Philippine Patent Office in two (2) official communications dated April 6. a motion to dissolve the disputed writ of preliminary injunction with offer to post a counterbond was submitted which was favorably acted upon by the Court of Appeals. vs. 151 SCRA 636). the trademark "MARK" is "confusingly similar" to the trademarks of petitioners.R. Director of Patents (p. CA rollo). No. Petitioners' right of exclusivity to their registered trademarks being clear and beyond question. SP No. as amended (pp. and advertising "MARK" cigarettes. its grant or denial rests upon the sound discretion of the Court except on a clear case of abuse (Belish Investment & Finance Co. 1986 of Cesar G. petition). 106. If the lower court does not grant preliminary injunction. respondents pointed to (1) the letter dated January 30. 1983 and January 24. Roldan. 138. remarked: There is no dispute that petitioners are the registered owners of the trademarks for cigarettes "MARK VII". vs. 445). C and D. Act No. 76 Phil. supra. 44008 filed on February 13. do or continue the doing of the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain. SCA rollo). speaking for the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. before final judgment. and "LARK". Private respondent's documentary evidence provides the reasons neutralizing or weakening their probative values. while Director Sandico's certification contained similar conditions as follows: This Certification. 4 (d) of Rep. 166. 145 SCRA 139). hence registration was barred under Sec. vs. 1981 which was declared abandoned as of February 16. 1979 (p. 1983". 1986 attesting that the records of his office would show that the "trademark MARK" for cigarettes is now the subject of a pending application under Serial No. premised on the filing of a sufficient counterbond to answer for whatever perjuicio petitioners may suffer as a result thereof. State House. The temporary permit to manufacture under the trademark "MARK" for cigarettes and the acceptance of the second application filed by private respondent in the height of their dispute in the main case were evidently made subject to the outcome of the said main case or Civil Case No. then Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 59872 filed on September 16. (Buayan Cattle Co. . 151 SCRA 570). Act. the respondent court's denial of the prohibitive writ constituted excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse discretion.
25-26. the conclusion reached by petitioners is certainly correct for the proposition in support thereof is embedded in the Philippine legal jurisprudence. That the country of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which it is domiciled. While the rule is that an offer of a counterbond does not operate to dissolve an injunction previously granted. II. the judicial admission of private respondent that it will have no more right to use the trademark "MARK" after the Director of Patents shall have rejected the application to register it. the international commitments of the Philippines.) to drive home the point that they are not precluded from initiating a cause of action in the Philippines on account of the principal perception that another entity is pirating their symbol without any lawful authority to do so. petitioners. whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine. The petitioners argued in their comment that the damages caused by the infringement of their trademark as well as the goodwill it generates are incapable of pecuniary estimation and monetary evaluation and not even the counterbond could adequately compensate for the damages it will incur as a result of the dissolution of the bond. No. The specific taxes being paid is the sum total of P120. The petitioner will not be prejudiced nor stand to suffer irreparably as a consequence of the lifting of the preliminary injunction considering that they are not actually engaged in the manufacture of the cigarettes with the trademark in question and the filing of the counterbond will amply answer for such damages. As WE have maintained the view that there are sound and good reasons to lift the preliminary injunction. it required. petitioners should be using actually their registered trademarks in commerce in the Philippines.R. 21-A. or false designation of origin and false description. After a thorough re-examination of the issues involved and the arguments advanced by both parties in the offer to file a counterbond and the opposition thereto. as amended. grants a similar privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines. that in order that petitioners may suffer irreparable injury due to the lifting of the injunction. the petitioner further argued that doing business in the Philippines is not relevant as the injunction pertains to an infringement of a trademark right. at the time it brings complaint: Provided.) To sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement. (pp. thereby ignoring not only the mandates of the Trademark Law. it lifted the injunction in violation of section 6 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Judging from a perusal of the aforequoted Section 21-A. contrary to law and jurisprudence. .It was pointed out in its supplemental motion that lots of workers employed will be laid off as a consequence of the injunction and that the government will stand to lose the amount of specific taxes being paid by the private respondent.) Petitioners. 7 of Republic Act No. it is equally true that an injunction could be dissolved only upon good and valid grounds subject to the sound discretion of the court. filed their own motion for re-examination geared towards reimposition of the writ of preliminary injunction but to no avail (p. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or trade-name has been registered or assigned under this act may bring an action hereunder for infringement. . . Indeed. Rollo. . in turn. as foreign corporations not engaged in local commerce. .98 from January to July 1989. . rely on section 21-A of the Trademark Law reading as follows: Sec.R. convention or law. Rollo in G. 24-25. (As inserted by Sec. No. Rollo in G. . for unfair competition. 53-54. 55. 91332). pp. nevertheless. the motion to file a counterbond is granted. it made a complete about face for legally insufficient grounds and authorized the private respondent to continue performing the very same acts that it had considered contrary to equity and good conscience. 638. In addition. Hence. and the admonitions of the Supreme Court. WE believe that there are sound and cogent reasons for US to grant the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the offer of the private respondent to put up a counterbond to answer for whatever damages the petitioner may suffer as a consequence of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction. otherwise known as the Corporation Law. by treaty. . and III. after having found that the trial court had committed grave abuse of discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction for having refused to issue the writ of injunction to restrain private respondent's acts that are contrary to equity and good conscience. .120. 295. 91332. it was stressed in General Garments Corporation vs. the instant petition casting three aspersions that respondent court gravely abused its discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction when: I. Director of Patents (41 SCRA 50 ) by then Justice (later Chief Justice) Makalintal that: . (pp. Petition.
Philippine Commercial Laws. What are registrable. — Trademarks. further. which allows a foreign corporation or juristic person to bring an action in Philippine courts for infringement of a mark or tradename.R. (p..) Following universal acquiescence and comity. was qualified by this Court in La Chemise Lacoste S. corporations. . 75. Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the cases involving trademarks. or service marks are actually in use in commerce and services not less than two months in the Philippines before the time the applications for registration are filed. (at p. on May. since it requires. (As amended by R. 1 Regalado. Rev. In assailing the justification arrived at by respondent court when it recalled the writ of preliminary injunction. corporations." Petitioner argues that Section 21-A militates against respondent's capacity to maintain a suit for cancellation. inserting Section 21-A in the Trademark Law. That said trademarks.A. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. 2. it may be stated that the ruling in the Mentholatum case was subsequently derogated when Congress. 638. p.and in the service rendered. shall be recognized and protected in the same manner and to the same extent as are other property rights known to the law. no condition as to the possession of a domicile or establishment in the country where protection is claimed may be required of persons entitled to the benefits of the Union for the enjoyment of any industrial property of any industrial property rights.A. Co. with a certified true copy of the foreign law translated into the English language. heretofore or hereafter appropriated. — Anyone who lawfully produces or deals in merchandise of any kind or who engages in any lawful business. it may be observed that petitioners were not remiss in averring their personality to lodge a complaint for infringement (p. about necessity of actual commercial use of the trademark in the local forum: Sec. The argument misses the essential point in the said provision. 381).R. 589-590. 203 SCRA 583 . 75. insofar as this discourse is concerned. tradenames. No. to distinguish his merchandise. it is not sufficient for a foreign corporation suing under Section 21-A to simply allege its alien origin. petitioners are of the impression that actual use of their trademarks in Philippine commercial dealings is not an indispensable element under Article 2 of the Paris Convention in that: (2) . 1986. Section 21-A. No. and such fact is officially certified. at the time it brings complaint. 1988. the provision under consideration.. 865). that its trademark or tradename has been registered under the Trademark Law. Petition. which is that the foreign corporation is allowed thereunder to sue "whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines" pursuant to the Corporation Law (precisely to counteract the effects of the decision in the Mentholatum case). Indeed. And provided. That the country of which the applicant for registration is a citizen grants by law substantially similar privileges to citizens of the Philippines. Ed.. Remedial Law Compendium. there is no necessity to treat the matter with an extensive response because adherence of the Philippines to the 1965 international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had been acknowledged in La Chemise (supra at page 390). partnerships or associations domiciled in the Philippines and by persons. 13132) especially so when they asserted that the main action for infringement is anchored on an isolated transaction (p. otherwise known as the Corporation Law. by actual use thereof in manufacture or trade. 638). 28. Rather.. . Another point which petitioners considered to be of significant interest. by the government of the foreign country to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 1991 Ed. p. in business. partnerships or associations domiciled in any foreign country may be registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act. tradenames and service marks owned by persons. 29. may appropriate to his exclusive use a trademark. (Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. at pp. Rollo in G. service mark. as amended. 57. SP No. tradename.Parenthetically. tradenames and service marks. The ownership or possession of a trademark. p.A. or false designation of origin and false description. 598. 2-A. vs. Rollo in AC-G. or a service mark not so appropriated by another. Sec. and which they desire to impress upon us is the protection they enjoy under the Paris Convention of 1965 to which the Philippines is a signatory. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Yet.Rollo in AC-G. Ed. which petitioners have done in the case at hand. how acquired. a tradename. p. it must additionally allege its personality to sue. for unfair competition. business or service from the merchandise. No. 4 Martin.R. Fernandez (129 SCRA 373 ). business or service of others. . Fifth Rev. SP No. Relative to this condition precedent. Provided. as in this section provided. 17 SCRA 1037 (1966). 21.) However. to the effect that a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may have the right to sue before Philippine Courts. purposely to "counteract the effects" of said case. but existing adjective axioms require that qualifying circumstances necessary for the assertion of such right should first be affirmatively pleaded (2 Agbayani Commercial Laws of the Philippines. Ownership of trademarks. 103). there can be no disagreement to the guiding principle in commercial law that foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines may maintain a cause of action for infringement primarily because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when the legal standing to sue is alleged. (As amended by R. 91332. emphasis supplied. "whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine. our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a . 13132. Intermediate Appellate Court. before a foreign corporation may bring an action.. vs. 1984. enacted Republic Act No.) Yet petitioners' perception along this line is nonetheless resolved by Sections 2 and 2-A of the Trademark Law which speak loudly. or who renders any lawful service in commerce.
It requires actual commercial use of the mark prior to its registration. It has never paid a single centavo of tax to the Philippine government. (Sy Ching v. of considerable sales since its first use. Farbenfabriken Bayer Actiengesellschaft (27 SCRA 1214 ) in this way: A rule widely accepted and firmly entrenched because it has come down through the years is that actual use in commerce or business is a prerequisite to the acquisition of the right of ownership over a trademark. Fourth ed. The aforequoted basic provisions of our Trademark Law. Respondent did not expect income from such "samples". rules of international law are given a standing equal. 20). petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. and no proof were presented to show that they were subsequently sold in the Philippines. It has never promoted its tradename or trademark in the Philippines. but these alone would not give exclusive right of use.municipal tribunal (Mortensen vs. it did not present proof to invest it with exclusive.. Great Britain. 7-a. 589591. 1906. give out price lists on certain goods. p. The Trademark law is very clear. p. . It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a complaint for infringement. (at pp. 1974. Inc.) In other words. Intermediate Appellate Court (203 SCRA 583 ). Emphasis Supplied) The records show that the petitioner has never conducted any business in the Philippines. it has no right to the remedy it seeks. yet it failed to fully substantiate its claim that it used in trade or business in the Philippines the subject mark. Going back to the first assigned error. In fact. The invoices (Exhibits 7. definite and free from inconsistencies. to national legislative enactments (Salonga and Yap. Such right grows out of their actual use. 44 SCRA 148149) "Samples" are not for sale and therefore. have been construed in this manner: A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a tradename. Flowing from this is the trader's right to protection in the trade he has built up and the goodwill he has accumulated from use of the trademark. There is no dispute that respondent corporation was the first registrant. 118 SCRA 526 . v. a prior registrant cannot claim exclusive use of the trademark unless it uses it in commerce. in Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. issue circulars. Adoption is not use. It is unknown to Filipino except the very few who may have noticed it while travelling abroad. together with the corollary allegation of irreparable injury. Adoption alone of a trademark would not give exclusive right thereto. the fact of exporting them to the Philippines cannot be considered to be equivalent to the "use" contemplated by the law. The evidence for respondent must be clear. The underlying reason for all these is that purchasers have come to understand the mark as indicating the origin of the wares. We rule[d] in Pagasa Industrial Corporation v.. Public International Law. For trademark is a creation of use. Paras. Gaw Lui. . One may make advertisements. 16). 1971 Ed. has yet to be established by petitioners by the requisite quantum of evidence in civil cases. . continuous adoption of the trademark which should consist among others. xxx xxx xxx These provisions have been interpreted in Sterling Products International. involved as . not superior. . (Pagasa Industrial Corp. High Court of Judiciary of Scotland. and 8-b) submitted by respondent which were dated way back in 1957 show that the zippers sent to the Philippines were to be used as "samples" and "of no commercial value". Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market. Jr. . Court of Appeals (118 SCRA 526 ): 3. Court of Appeals. according to Justice Gutierrez. Peters. Withal. we can not help but notice the manner the ascription was framed which carries with it the implied but unwarranted assumption of the existence of petitioners' right to relief. 8 Sessions 93. It cannot be denied that our reluctance to issue a writ of preliminary injunction is due to judicial deference to the lower courts. Under the law. the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. xxx xxx xxx .. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries. v. International Law and World Organization. the entity need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. It must be emphasized that this aspect of exclusive dominion to the trademarks. There were no receipts to establish sale.
207 SCRA 622 ). 82). for its part. vs. What we are simply conveying is another basic tenet in remedial law that before injunctive relief may properly issue.. the supposed right of petitioners to the symbol have thereby been controverted. Indeed. 3 Martin. the issuance or continuance thereof would cause great damage to the defendant. Rules of Court. Refusal or dissolution may be granted in this case with or without notice to the adverse party. that the manner the complaint was traversed by the answer is sufficient to tilt the scales of justice in favor of private respondent. Rules of Court.. 6. and the defendant files a bond in an amount fixed by the judge conditioned that he will pay all damages which the plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court: Sec.there is mere interlocutory order (Villarosa vs. It may be added in this connection that albeit petitioners are holders of certificate of registration in the Philippines of their symbols as admitted by private respondent.R. Teodoro. the petition has its roots on a remedial measure which is but ancillary to the main action for infringement still pending factual determination before the court of origin. would cause great damage to the defendant while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer. 100 Phil. the fact of exclusive ownership cannot be made to rest solely on these documents since dominion over trademarks is not acquired by the mere fact of registration alone and does not perfect a trademark right (Unno Commercial Enterprises.. if the status quo is maintained. to be entitled to an injunctive writ. 91332) as well as in the very petition filed with this Court (p. 25 ). Section 4. The defendant. while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer. still. suggest the fact of infringement. Revised Rules of Court). 91332. or. 1986 ed. may be dissolved. No. if it appears after hearing that although the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction. 319.R. it must be modified. Section 3.R. with or without notice to the adverse party. not to mention the diminution of tax revenues represented to be close to a quarter million pesos annually. however. on the following instances: (1) If there is insufficiency of the complaint as shown by the allegations therein. must file a bond in an amount fixed by the judge conditioned that he will pay all damages which plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. No. — The injunction may be refused or. what appears to be the insurmountable barrier to petitioners' portrayal of whimsical exercise of discretion by the Court of Appeals is the well-taken remark of said court that: The petitioner[s] will not be prejudiced nor stand to suffer irreparably as a consequence of the lifting of the preliminary injunction considering that they are not actually engaged in the manufacture of the cigarettes with the trademark in question and the filing of the counterbond will amply answer for such damages." Petitioners therefore. as the case may be. Francisco. inasmuch as the possibility of irreparable damage. if granted ex parte. may not be permitted to presume a given state of facts on their so called right to the trademarks which could be subjected to irreparable injury and in the process. Court of Appeals. It may also be refused or dissolved on other grounds upon affidavits on the part of the defendants which may be opposed by the plaintiff also by affidavits. without prior proof of transgression of an actual existing right. Rollo in G. New Civil Code. complainant's right or title must be undisputed and demonstrated on the strength of one's own title to such a degree as to unquestionably exclude dark clouds of doubt. On the other hand. may be dissolved. With reference to the second and third issues raised by petitioners on the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction.. there will be no damage that would be suffered by petitioners inasmuch as they are not doing business in the Philippines. If it appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction granted is too great. Such a ploy would practically place the cart ahead of the horse. upon the insufficiency of the complaint as shown by the complaint itself. Rule 58. vs. Rollo G. 120 SCRA 804 ). it cannot be gainsaid that respondent court acted well within its prerogatives under Section 6. This is not to say. during the pendency of the case before the trial court. "submitted the actual labels or packaging materials used in selling its "Mark" cigarettes. Inc. It is virtually needless to stress the obvious reality that critical facts in an infringement case are not before us more so when even Justice Feliciano's opinion observes that "the evidence is scanty" and that petitioners "have yet to submit copies or photographs of their registered marks as used in cigarettes" while private respondent has not. rather than on the weakness of the adversary's evidence. Even if we disregard the candid statements of petitioners anent the absence of business activity here and rely on the remaining statements of the complaint below. p. if granted. 225. if granted. or for motion of dissolution of injunction. p. Far from it. 2. may be dissolved. we are extremely bothered by the thought of having to participate in throwing into the streets Filipino workers engaged in the manufacture and sale of private respondent's "MARK" cigarettes who might be retrenched and forced to join the ranks of the many unemployed and unproductive as a result of the issuance of a simple writ of preliminary injunction and this. (2) If it appears after hearing that although the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction. . (p. On the economic repercussion of this case. Under the foregoing rule. in this case. Rollo in G. for these frank representations are inconsistent and incongruent with any pretense of a right which can breached (Article 1431. Grounds for objection to. is no ground for injunction being mere damnum absque injuria (Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc.) More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint (p. Second ed. 91332) indicating that they are not doing business in the Philippines. No. Sr. It may further be refused or. 54. 1985. petitioner must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the facts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right (Searth Commodities Corporation vs. In point of adjective law. injunction may be refused. when these averments are juxtaposed with the denials and propositions of the answer submitted by private respondent. Rule 129. To our mind. General Milling Corporation. the issuance or continuance thereof. CFI of Negros Occidental. 42 SCRA 577 .
1989 and November 29. WHEREFORE. more so when extinction of the previously issued writ can even be made without previous notice to the adverse party and without a hearing (Caluya vs. petitioners' criticism must fall flat on the ground.(3) On the other grounds upon affidavits on the part of the defendant which may be opposed by the plaintiff also affidavits. 460 ).. 1986 ed. Francisco. p. 640 . 81). Modification of the injunction may also be ordered by the court if it appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction granted is too great. Rules of Court. so to speak. 1989 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Ramos.. 79 Phil. 1970 ed. Rules of Court. 99. at p. and mindful of the rule that a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order which is always under the control of the court before final judgment. . the same may be cured by appeal and not in the form of a petition for certiorari (Clark vs.supra. At any rate. 88 Phil.) In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the Philippines. Philippine Ready Mix Concrete Co. (3 Martin. the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 14. Verily. it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their "right" to be protected. 268.. and assuming in gratia argumenti that respondent court erroneously lifted the writ it previously issued. 3 Moran. p.
a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be 9 extradited. or. . to set aside the order of deportation. and HON. Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the Government 6 of the Philippines in the suppression of crime.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION and subsequent enforcement of penal laws can be effectively accomplished only by agreement between States through treaties of extradition. Extradition proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. arguing that the evidence adduced in the court below failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country. BRANCH 139. Pursuant to these principles. Mallari for petitioner. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. all the principal issues raised by the petitioner G. the Treaty states that: (a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States place the offense within the same category or denominate the offense by the same terminology." For the purpose of the definition. Petitioner. 113213 August 15. the Treaty includes all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least 10 one (1) year.: A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not surrender any individual for any offense not included in a treaty of extradition." A request for extradition requires. Since punishment of fugitive criminals is dependent mainly on the willingness of host State to apprehend them and revert them 5 to the State where their offenses were committed. petitioner. In defining the extraditable offenses. the furnishing by the requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person. which rendered a decision ordering the deportation of petitioner. and for the purpose of enforcing their respective municipal laws. jurisdiction over such fugitives . each contracting State agrees to extradite. . actual or constructive. where appropriate. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA. Capsulized. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the host State and a 1 delimitation of the sovereign power of the State within its own territory. was sought by Australian authorities for indictable crimes in his country. Additionally. Rodrigo E. the two countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. HON. an Australian Citizen. M. The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that 4 arising from treaty. "persons . under conventions recognizing the right of nations to mutually agree to surrender individuals within their jurisdiction and control. to another State within whose territorial jurisdiction.R. wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the 8 Requesting State for an extraditable offense. the Treaty allows extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity. (b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested shall be taken into account in 11 determining the constituent elements of the offense. Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals. Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10. States enter into treaties of extradition principally for the purpose of bringing fugitives of justice within the ambit of their laws. HON. provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their commission. Aurora Salva Bautista collaborating for petitioner. Under the Treaty. an act of extradition. . RTC. respondents. in accordance with the requested State's own interests. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21. The act of extraditing amounts to a "delivery by the State of a person accused or convicted of a crime. MAKATI. . No. double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the two countries and (which) embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least one (1) year. it 2 was committed and which asks for his surrender with a view to execute justice. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his extradition. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. vs. J. 1994 PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT. The Treaty adopts a "non-list. if the person is accused of an offense. FRANK DRILON. hence.M. even with a treaty rendered executory upon ratification by appropriate authorities. or by a more severe penalty. petitioner came to this Court by way of review on certiorari. COURT OF APPEALS. does not imposed an obligation to extradite on the requested State until the latter has made its own determination of the validity of the requesting State's demand. This principle arises from the reality of extradition as a derogation of sovereignty." As it is an act of "surrender" of an individual found in a sovereign State to another State 3 which demands his surrender . KAPUNAN. 1990 and became effective thirty (30) days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective 7 requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with.
before this Court strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the government against him. 080/93 dated February 19. Craker's signing and swearing before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Practice Act (1958). 12 are undisputed: On March 17. of which respondent is an insurance agent.2 in commission (including $367. and again were told the policies were free for 2 years as long as an unused bank account was applied. secured by a mortgage on the property in Bangholme. (ii) some policy-holders were offered cash inducements ($50 or $100) to sign and had to supply a bank account no longer used (at which a direct debit request for payment of premiums would apply). The one count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958. (iii) some policy-holders were introduced through the "Daily Personnel Agency". Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. Wright/Orr Matter — one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958. 1993. Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty. in one or more of the following ways: ( i ) some policy-holders signed up only because they were told the policies were free (usually for 2 years) and no payments were required. the policy-holder of which does not exist with the end in view of paying the premiums thereon to insure acceptance of the policy and commission payments. Wright's and Mr.68 commission to a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and .. out of which life proposals none are in existence and approximately 200 of which are alleged to have been false. by falsely representing that all the relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell. Wright's and Mr. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the following indictable crimes: 1. and 2. dishonesty in obtaining $315. and paying premiums thereon (to the acceptance of the policies and payment of commissions) to the Australian Mutual Provident (AMP) Society through the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance. The one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. depending on the volume of business written. Ltd. Mendelson and Round Solicitors (MM7R). a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and containing three (3) false statements. Craker's attempting to cause the payment of $2. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. by submitting one proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP Society.044 in bonus commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Wright's and co-offender Mr. The thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr.250 from Mulcahy.870. Ltd. These policy-holders were also told no payments by them were required. Assistant Secretary Sime D. 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. by submitting two hundred fifteen (215) life insurance proposals. The facts. 1069. as found by the Court of Appeals.. a company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell. Wright/Cracker Matter — Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958. Wright's and co-offender. (iv) some policy-holders were found not to exist. Herbert Lance Orr's. John Carson Craker's receiving a total of approximately 11. which crimes were allegedly committed in the following manner: The one (1) count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81 (1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. one count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958. Ltd.
In its Order dated April 13. again left for Australia on May 29. AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION. The trial court. has neither produced any certification thereof. 1993 and 14 denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on December 16. THAT THE HON. with whom he begot a child. From its examination of the charges against the petitioner. which are relevant to our determination of the validity of the extradition order. Section 2 of the said Treaty." Clearly. Conformably with Article 2. extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense — in relation to the extradition — was committed. 1993 by the State Counsels of the Department of Justice before the respondent court. the Australian government should show that he "has a criminal case pending before a competent court" in that country "which can legally pass judgement or acquittal or conviction upon him. the respondent Judge ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of the petitioner. held that under the provisions of the same Article. the respondent court directed the petitioner to appear before it on April 30. 1990. married to a Filipina. and that his tourist visa has been extended but he could not produce the same in court as it was misplaced. 1990 for Australia and returned to the Philippines on May 24. 1993 at Taguig. 1990. The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that the petitioner was arrested on April 26. THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA. has not left the Philippines. V. Judith David. concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION. In the course of the trial. He avers that for the extradition order to be valid. 1993. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS TO AN "EX POST FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES SECTION 21. 1990. the petitioner filed his answer. in its decision dated 14 June 1993. 1990. II. that he arrived in the Philippines on February 25. reveals that the trial court committed no error in ordering the petitioner's extradition. IV. Thereafter. IN MISINTERPRETING THE EXTENDED STAY OF PETITIONER AS EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S DESIGN TO HIDE AND EVADE PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA. In the same order. the trial court correctly determined that the corresponding offenses under our penal laws are . continue to be held. left the Philippines again on April 24.Australia on September 10. granting the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australia. extradition proceedings were initiated on April 6. 1990 and from that time on. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on September 14. to date. nor any temporary working visa. provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the 13 time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed. 1990 passing by Singapore and then returned to the Philippines on June 25. Reiterating substantially the same assignments of error which he interposed in the Court of Appeals. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT SPECIFYING IN HIS ORDER OR DECISION THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS TO STAND TRIAL IN AUSTRALIA. THAT THE HON. a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited. 1990 returned to Australia on March 1. 1993. the crimes for which the petitioner was charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were undeniably offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have been committed. that he is not a fugitive from justice and is not aware of the offenses charged against him. moreover. Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell where petitioner. then back to the Philippines on April 11. Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors: I. III. petitioner challenges in this petition the validity of the extradition order issued by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals under the Treaty. THAT THE HON. The trial court. 1993 and to file his answer within ten days. ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. Petitioner vigorously argues that the trial court order violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. the petitioner testified that he was jobless. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DO NOT SHOW THAT PETITIONER IS WANTED FOR PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA. that he has no case in Australia.
" This being so. They were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were committed. All of these documentary requirements were dully submitted to the trial court in its proceedings a quo. (a) public seal of the Requesting State or of a Minister of State. prohibits retroactive enforcement of the Treaty..e. Article 2 paragraph 4. much less. a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed. or of a Department or officer of the 18 Government of the Requesting State. 24 state constitutions in Calder vs. Absolutely nothing in the said provision relates to. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes. if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested State at the time of the making of the request for extradition. Does the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws? Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to 23 include all laws of retrospective application. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when appropriate. there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the ." The last requirement was accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra." and "certified by a diplomatic or consular 19 officer of the Requesting State accredited to the Requested State. a statement of each and every offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which were alleged against the person in respect of each offense are sufficient to show that a person is wanted for prosecution under the said article. whether civil or criminal. or. Chase.Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false 15 testimony/perjury. May the extradition of the petitioner who is wanted for prosecution by the government of Australia be granted in spite of the fact that the offenses for which the petitioner is sought in his country were allegedly committed prior to the date of effectivity of the Treaty. and (b) the acts or omissions alleged would. 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed. absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. they fall under the panoply of the Extradition Treaty's provisions. while not creating new offenses. Thus. limiting the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to person charged with an information or a criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the purpose 22 of evading arrest and prosecution. the second paragraph pertains to its termination. The warrant for the arrest of an individual or a copy thereof. specifically. i. the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which 26 affects the substantial rights of the accused. citing Blackstone. Chief Justice Salmon P. 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it 25 substantially easier to convict a defendant. This brings us to another point raised by the petitioner both in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals. The Federalist and other early U. The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity. aggravate the seriousness of a crime. Article 18 states: ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting States have notified each other in writing that their respective requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with. in fact. Petitioner takes the position that under Article 18 of the Treaty its enforcement cannot be given retroactive effect. and. We fail to see how the petitioner can infer a prohibition against retroactive enforcement from this provision. the offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly extraditable under Article 2 of the Treaty. However. .S. including the statement itself. Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it shall cease to be in force on the one hundred and eightieth day after the day on which notice is given. in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State. . Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that: 4. respectively. the appropriate documents and annexes were 17 signed by "an officer in or of the Requesting State" "sealed with . 2) laws which. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted. For purposes of the compliance with the provisions of the Treaty." Furthermore. The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents required for extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. As conceived under our Constitution. quoted above. the 'Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that petitioner is not only wanted for prosecution but has. The petitioner's contention that a person sought to be extradited should have a "criminal case pending before a competent court in the Requesting State which can 20 legally pass judgement of acquittal or conviction" stretches the meaning of the phrase "wanted for prosecution" beyond the intended by the treaty provisions because the relevant provisions merely require "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of 21 the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be extradited. ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was committed. irrespective of the time they were committed. In conformity with the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty. provided that: (a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the offense. "Applying the constitutional principle. have constituted an offense against the laws in force in that state. the signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement 16 of the Acts and Omissions. On the other hand. Australia.
the Treaty took effect thirty days after the requirements for entry into force were complied with by both governments. finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals. violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. 1990. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was 27 ratified." In signing the Treaty. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded. SO ORDERED. Having been ratified in accordance with the provision of the 1987 Constitution. WHEREFORE. The said Treaty was concurred and ratified by the Senate in a Resolution dated September 10. we hereby AFFIRM the same and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit. the government of the Philippines has determined that it is within its interests to enter into agreement with the government of Australia regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in either country. .Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect.
and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody. 2000 Resolution. 5 Ralph C. vs. 1069. also known as the Extradition Law. filed with the RTC on May 18. DECISION PANGANIBAN.k.a. the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows: ." GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Sandoval-Gutierrez. this Court issued its 9 October 17. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO. Panganiban.000. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents. Mendoza. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. the answer to these two novel questions is "No.epublic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action. the United States Government. Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure 4 List.000. however. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuan ce of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. 1999. directed the issuance of a warrant. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v.it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez.: In extradition proceedings. The second challenged Order.. in the light of the foregoing. represented by the Philippine DOJ. YnaresSantiago. Carpio.after three justices changed their votes -. Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice. but at the same time granted bail to Jimenez. Bellosillo. 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondent’s temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1. Branch 7 25. Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. GUILLERMO PURGANAN. Finding no more legal obstacle. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ. petitioner. Branch 42. the same to be paid in cash. respondent Davide Jr. Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and MARC JIMENEZ a. the Government of the United States of America. Quisumbing. 6 The Case Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process." The explanation of and the reasons for. on the other hand. By an identical vote of 9-6 -. This Resolution has become final and executory. 0597. are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important. Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. through diplomatic channels. Initially. assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. Austria-Martinez. 139465. 1 seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23.by a vote of 9-6 -. Sr. Corona. Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila. this rule are laid out in this Decision. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting 8 evidence. as well as the exceptions to. the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order. supplemented by Note Nos. the cancellation of the bond. The validity of the TRO was. the Court -. 2 3 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. J. HON. pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general. The Facts This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. Vitug.00). Morales and Callejo. Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9. 2002 WHEREFORE. Jimenez. 2001.dismissed the Petition. No.R. Upon learning of the request for his extradition. Essentially. sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. Jimenez. 2001 and July 3. 148571 September 24. 0522 dated June 16. CJ. Puno. Lantion.
vs. bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances. Respondent Jimenez filed before it 10 an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion. (2) tax evasion.01192061. 2001. We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues. (4) false statements. In that hearing. had been 14 recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders. he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100. in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b. in the absence of any law that provides for such power. the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. The Hon. RTC. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. instead of 15 in this Court. II. relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail. (3) wire fraud. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371. Before the RTC could act on the Petition. In his Memorandum. 64589. the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The Petition alleged. and (5) illegal campaign contributions. the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued. Branch 17. 2001 Order. the court below issued its questioned July 3. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. 1069.R. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10. ‘3. which [were] relied upon. 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4. Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue. in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2. Presiding Judge. inter alia." which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. ‘6. Issues Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court: I. Manila. Preliminarily. SP No. 2001 in the case entitled ‘Eduardo T. After the hearing. the public respondent received no evidence of ‘special circumstances’ which may justify release on bail. ‘4. Rodriguez et al. . Thereafter. and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order 12 dated July 4. 1069. 2001. cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings. the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition. ‘2. that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15. as amended. In its assailed May 23. Section 13. 1999. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15. 13 The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because: ‘1. 2001 Order. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high.’ CA-G.000. Hence. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail. ‘8. 2001. petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one 11 million pesos in cash. and no special circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee. we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA). Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings. Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court. ‘5. this Petition. in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2.’" In sum. in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201. ‘7. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
and. In 22 Fortich v. Court of Appeals: ‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case. Corona we stated: [T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling reasons. (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity. (2) when public interest is involved. absent factual and legal basis therefor. the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow. Hence. no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts. as correctly observed by petitioners. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor. et. warrant. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is. as yet. a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given.The Court’s Ruling The Petition is meritorious. al. we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to 21 issue writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor. Moreover. A cardinal rule in the 25 interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. Since . which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Time and again. Legaspi. or the nature and importance of the issues raised. As we have further stated in Cuaresma: ‘x x x. Contreras. the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non. would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus. Arranz. prohibition. a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case. Bercero vs." For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA. et. This is established policy. Torres vs. has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Five Postulates of Extradition The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been 20 squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. Likewise. x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money. al. cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to 18 comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties. the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which.’ In a number of other exceptional cases. as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition. and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals. namely: Uy vs. petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them. quo warranto and habeas corpus. 16 and (4) the issues raised are purely of law. Their strict and rigid application. though. mandamus. has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law. and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same. the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose. x x x.’ Pursuant to said judicial policy. 24 we held as follows: This Court has original jurisdiction. In the instant petition. over petitions for certiorari. this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. This rule. a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with. Aside from being of this nature. and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent. Advincula vs. As a fourth exception. must always be avoided." As a general rule." In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings. We reiterate what we said in Piczon 23 vs. Preliminary Matters Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus.. (2) 17 the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal. clearly and specifically set out in the petition. De Guzman. concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. through a motion for reconsideration. or (3) in 19 case of urgency. which.
or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State. an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined. upon extradition to the requesting state. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes." It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent 31 to try them in accordance with municipal and international law.in a class by itself -. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied. especially transnational crimes. To begin with. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. our duly authorized representative’s signa ture on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the 35 other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. in extradition which is sui generis -. From an absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the 32 commission of crime itself. 3. That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given. crimes are becoming the concern of one world. and that both accept and trust. as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. easier and faster international travel. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Indeed. governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries. More pointedly. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding. each other’s legal system and judicial 34 process. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country. a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited ‘upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis.PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which 26 the Philippines is a signatory. all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein. in an extradition proceeding. "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of international co30 operation in the suppression of crime. constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x. extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of 27 28 suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a 29 fugitive from one state to the other.’ Finally. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the 36 we explained: The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent. An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. Today. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime. extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. Hence. the treaty would not have been signed. the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. More and more. understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here. Lantion 33 Second. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime. the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In criminal proceedings. Accordingly. unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final. Lantion. 2. in this era of globalization. x x x. 1. the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore. our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.they are not." . The Proceedings Are Sui Generis Third. as a rule." In Secretary v. we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. otherwise. and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused First. xxxxxxxxx There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding.
extradition hearings would not even begin. Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith. failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. "[t]he demanding government. if issued. when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do. 1. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. On the other hand. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight Fifth.. if only the accused were willing to 45 submit to trial in the requesting country. what is there to stop him. These circumstances point to an everpresent. and our legislative branch ratified it. we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our 42 obligations under the Treaty. and 39 whether the person sought is extraditable. should it be found proper.gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition. it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to 37 ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited.demands of the nation’s foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite. is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant. a fugitive from justice. On the other hand. our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. as soon as practicable. 5. 6. given sufficient opportunity. summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. It states: SEC. and the other government is under obligation to 43 make the surrender. Temporary Arrest. Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due process. are satisfied." Given the foregoing. Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting 40 state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state. Issuance of Summons. petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent. persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. the presiding judge of the court shall. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Moreover. as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. Service of Notices. mass murderers and war criminals -. as set forth in the Treaty. or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed.(1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there. the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge. Fourth. that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him. (2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest. This prima facie 44 presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that 38 jurisdiction.(1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition. Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state. Upon receipt of the answer.including terrorists. In other words. ergo. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty." (Emphasis ours) Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of im mediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative. the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof. shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case. Indeed. particularly an extradition 41 treaty that hinges on reciprocity. Hence. Having fled once. and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -.may invoke it in future extradition cases. Verily. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us. The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. in that those sought to be extradited -. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. On the Basis of the Extradition Law . Prior acts of herein respondent -. after the petition for extradition has been filed in court." Accordingly. the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused. 4. from fleeing a second time? First Substantive Issue: Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest? Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition. Hearing. underlying high risk of flight.
a prima facie finding -sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused." Verily. had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended. with a Certificate of Authentication among others. as argued by petitioner.of . In connection with the matter of immediate arrest. as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Hence.under oath or affirmation -. the Constitution itself requires only the examination -. on the whole. the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state." To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants. however. he stated: In the instant petition. Michael E. a priori." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. nor with previous treaty obligations towards third States. after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist. papers. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. the Affidavit executed on May 26." the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. If. Savage -. (3) Annex BB. the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the 50 hearing against the extraditee. the law could have easily so provided. the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed Statements in 49 two volumes. and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. immediately upon the filing of the petition. does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. houses. Evidently. Hence. sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the ends of justice. the more 53 reasonable to the less reasonable x x x . the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment. From the knowledge and the material then available to it. On the Basis of the Constitution Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution. the word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision. (2) Annexes H to G. were the following: (1) Annex H. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation. and (5) Annex MM. Moreover. uses the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the accused. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. Hearing 46 entails sending notices to the opposing parties." We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and. 2. 1999 by Mr. the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. (4) Annex GG. therefore. our Extradition Law. 2. receiving facts and 47 48 arguments from them. It also bears 52 emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that consequence. Attached to the Petition for Extradition.It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069." The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but. the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132. with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment). for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed Statements in two volumes. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. In the second questioned Order. which is invoked by Jimenez. the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous. he actually concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. By using the phrase "if it appears. respondent judge gravely abused his 51 discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -. In point of fact.trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice. It provides: Sec.
the judge must study them and make.if he so desires -. or at the very least. Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings We agree with petitioner. judges merely 57 further examine complainants and their witnesses. what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -. or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition. He also alleges the relevance to 59 the present case of Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which. III. judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. a more restrictive one -." the constitutional provision on bail quoted above. It does not apply to extradition proceedings. before conviction. because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. All persons. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions." At most. In the present case. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. Second Substantive Issue: Is Respondent Entitled to Bail? Article III. insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings. shall. Prior to the issuance of the warrant. judges merely determine personally the probability. In our opinion. never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. Section 13 of the Constitution. If. On the other hand. the judge may 56 54 require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases. On the other hand. a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance. lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In doing so. not the certainty of guilt of an accused. All we required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment." Respondent Mark B.complainants and the witnesses they may produce. Since this is a matter of first impression. 13. Excessive bail shall not be required. That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. Supposedly.in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. and (c) the person sought is extraditable. If a different procedure were called for at all. who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. as soon as possible. the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest: Again. no 58 prima facie finding is possible. in spite of this study and examination. De Leon. as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.not the opposite -. applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. Sec. including those sought to be extradited. we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest." In Webb v.would be justified in view of respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee. if the presence of a prima facie case is determined. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction. In Ho v. the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua. is worded as follows: Art. then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee. we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure: Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents. (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law. in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record. People and in all the cases cited therein. upon which to verify the findings of the 55 prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant. . The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. be bailable by sufficient sureties. At his discretion. when evidence of guilt is strong.
constitutionally. humanitarian and 71 compelling circumstances including. proceedings had already been conducted in that country. Exceptions to the No Bail Rule The rule. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state. to apply for bail as an exception to the no -initial-bail rule. we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives. it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. we repeat. those cited by the . only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that. it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. To stress. liberty or property" of every person. their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition. Indeed. cowards and weaklings who. after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law. However. we find no arbitrariness. Likewise. the right to due process extends to the "life. the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community. In the absence of any provision -. adaptable to every situation calling for its application. Hence. Where the circumstances -. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty. yet. Indeed. the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal.1âwphi1. persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed.expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings. bail may be applied for and granted as an exception. (2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest." Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice. adopting the practice of not granting them bail. No Violation of Due Process Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti in arguing that. and (2) that there exist special. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him. as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and 69 enforce constitutional rights. would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors. there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness. not before the extradition court. as a matter of reciprocity. instead of facing the consequences of their actions. as a general rule. In the present case. the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and 66 palpable government interests. extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. once granted bail. and (3) his opportunity. is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. Contrary to the contention of Jimenez. since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here." Contrary to his contention. we believe and so hold that. the law or the treaty -. In this light.such as those present in 65 an extradition case -. That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough." Too. the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of 68 discretion and tyranny. Hence.Moreover." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition. the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum. we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. "[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law. either. point out that the doctrine does not always call for a 64 prior opportunity to be heard. instead of taking it.in the Constitution. unless his guilt be proved 60 beyond reasonable doubt. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or 61 offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.call for it. respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently. would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the government’s interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of crime. It is "dynamic 70 and resilient. in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. he ran away. once he is under the court’s custody. 62 It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent. Furthermore.nêt The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with 67 and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty. through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment. his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be 63 heard but. at the same time. choose to run and hide." Hence.
The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. including his detention pending the final resolution of the case. We are not persuaded. We. he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600. To give a more drastic illustration. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty. responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness. On that basis. the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed. his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Anticipated Delay Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy. the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of 73 the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness. Hence. the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus: When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress. A police officer must maintain peace and order. not a judicial. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’ are multifarious. not to determine guilt or innocence.] wittingly or otherwise. In its barest concept. he may no longer serve his full term in office. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. while this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play. Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law? The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature. it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of Representatives. they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive. precision and emphatic forcefulness." it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations. not to mention the 24 members of the Senate. the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity. charged with the duties of legislation. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos. In 72 People v. 2. which is not normally a judicial prerogative. A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.’ This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. they do so knowing that at any time.highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person.000 residents. therefore. we are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail. it would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. 1. . The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. Jalosjos. Again we are not convinced. In the ultimate analysis. Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. In short. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. Hence. insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution." It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila. Alleged Disenfranchisement While his extradition was pending. Along this line. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed.
Jimenez’s plea for bail. after the Memos had been submitted. he stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999. Respondent Jimenez . upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition. he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Summation As we draw to a close.as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring. in bad faith. it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points: 1. Then. which our Extradition Law requires to be summary in character.back to its territory. even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Jimenez.entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and "Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -. if at all. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters. we believe. in its length and breath. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed. a remand will not serve any useful purpose. The trial court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Consequently." We believe that this charge is not only baseless. Rather. even after bail has been previously denied.in which the main topic was Mr. this Court -. the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr.in particular. a procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. both of which were separately filed by the parties. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning. As already stated. A remand would mean that this long. that is. not a circuitous cop-out. but also unfair. this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion. This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition. as a rule. complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the petition. it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment. By entering into an extradition treaty. the Comment. Evidently. 2. there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition. in fact. Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest. he has not fled the country. However. 3. This we cannot allow. an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -. tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. Thus. We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may. it lies in his legal arguments. Brief Refutation of Dissents The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court. to a court’s request to . In any event. the Reply. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. the RTC set for hearing not only petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant.particularly the potential extraditee -. so that the criminal process may proceed therein. supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition. as he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. that. Moreover. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -. if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent. In short. the parties -. then position papers on the application for bail. which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits. It is more akin. Suffice it to say that.has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Indeed. True. but also private respondent’s prayer for temporary liberty. it is a cop-out. is totally unnecessary. any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and academic. Not a Flight Risk? Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondent’s claim to bail. in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions. 3. To support this claim. however. private respondent has not asked for a remand. Thus. This is quite another matter that is not at issue here. unduly delay the proceedings. as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein. it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments.or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -. with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be justified. yet. the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner. not unnecessary and convoluted delay. Additionally. and whether the person sought is extraditable. extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined. In the present case. The parties -. Yet.Neither is it. it will only further delay these 74 already very delayed proceedings. the lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties. Be it noted.have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -. By nature then. the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail. intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself.
At bottom. Thus. the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity. it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. 9. and. a bulwark of democracy and the conscience of society. and whether the person sought is extraditable. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it. the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive.police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. If convinced that a prima facie case exists. Indeed. not a judicial. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Worse. delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose. WHEREFORE. available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition. 7. 5. or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. 6. while the challenged Order dated July 3. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state. checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation. while safeguarding basic individual rights. SO ORDERED. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights. After being taken into custody. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further documentation. 8. 10. potential extraditees may apply for bail. No costs. mock. In extradition cases. the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation. the Petition is GRANTED. they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community. the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition. and (b) there exist special. to avoid the legalistic contortions. a bastion of liberty. Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. On the other hand. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents. . 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. bail is not a matter of right. humanitarian or compelling circumstances. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way. Since the applicants have a history of absconding. with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law. They should not allow contortions. our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay. whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law. mummify. 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23. under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. frustrate. responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. 4. lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner’s simple request to return a fugitive.
FELIXBERTO T.000. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. OLALIA. private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo. 1997 and October 25. thus: In conclusion.: For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. 1999. On August 23. J. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION. JR. Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. 1999. 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail. 1999. seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). That same day. 1997. For his part. Jr. the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. Branch 8. the NBI agents arrested and detained him. the RTC. 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz. issued an Order denying the petition for bail. 2001.a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. 1997. penalized by the common law of Hong Kong.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court. to post bail. No. The facts are: On January 30." It took effect on June 20. 99-95773. in turn. petitioner. No. Jr. docketed as G. the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons. 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. private respondent filed. The DOJ then .R. the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government. 1999. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ. praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. private respondent. the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void. vs. this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. filed with the RTC of Manila. Judge Bernardo. 2001. Jr. If accused fails in this undertaking. Meanwhile. On October 30. 1999. or on October 8. as early as November 22. 2001. Branch 19. Petitioner. Judge Bernardo. 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent. On November 9. 1999. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud. Bail is set at Php750. petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. 2007 forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which. as amended.R. warrants of arrest were issued against him. On September 23. 153675 April 19.) issued in Civil Case No. in the same case. 1999. Respondents." in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. Cap." On October 22. If convicted. Olalia. docketed as Civil Case No. 201 of Hong Kong. will further appear for judgment. private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. raffled off to Branch 10. HON. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. On December 18. After hearing. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20. On July 1. On November 12. represented by the Philippine Department of Justice. 2000. and (2) the Order dated April 10. prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. 2001. 99-95733. Jr. On September 13. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20. On October 14.. 140520. The Decision became final and executory on April 10. represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ). 1995. holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk. he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions: 1. 99-95733.
Jimenez. 41 SCRA 1. both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. September 17. 1948. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition. this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding. Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. On December 21. where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law. said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. as well as Section 4. All persons. thus: Sec. later Chief Justice. VIII. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10. At first glance. in the 20th century. (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere. SO ORDERED. and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law. Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations. that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail. Hence. In Government of United States of America v. be bailable by sufficient sureties. RTC of Manila. In his comment on the petition. the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. and if they further desire. the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal. on the other. J.2. this Court. applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. the instant petition." the constitutional provision on bail quoted above. liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. has gradually attained global recognition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail. Slowly. Purganan. with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office. Constitution). However. Hence. Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired. held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Branch 42. real and personal. crimes against peace. Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. on one hand. The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal." thus: x x x. Moreover. the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. on December 10. Nonetheless. 2001. be filed with this Court soonest. Thus. the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. Section 13. 3. 6. For one. and Mark B. Recently. speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. under the Nuremberg principle. On a more positive note. the principles contained in the . the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war. per Fernando. this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who. 2002. While not a treaty. It is "available only in criminal proceedings. and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s libe rty. Hon. later CJ). Mario Batacan 1 Crespo. and 4. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. shall. at any time and day of the week. before conviction. Art. the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. Excessive bail shall not be required. manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused. also after World War II. 1971. private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee. except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. Presiding Judge. 13.. Enage. and the law on extradition. Guillermo G. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court. a.a. petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order. Panganiban. the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. 18. and crimes against humanity.k.
" This is shown by Section 6 of P. 3 in granting bail to a prospective deportee. this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases. Likewise." Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power. It 12 is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. After all. the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail. This commitment is enshrined in Section II.said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members 2 of the international community. to a prolonged restraint of liberty." and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding. and due process. the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law. a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. such as deportation and quarantine. it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law. liberty. committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. held that under the Constitution. As 6 7 5 previously stated. Thus. a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.D. Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Director of Prisons. while ostensibly administrative. the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime. the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings. the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice. along with the other members of the family of nations. for it is not punishment 10 for a crime. the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. Under these treaties. First. have likewise been detained. to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest. Second. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled. In fact. particularly the right to life and liberty. Clearly. some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law.) No. In 1966." Obviously. In other words. an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal. Thus. If bail can be granted in deportation cases. The Philippines. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life. and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the 8 9 demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights. The 1909 case of US v. Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P. therefore. taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights. tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. and forced to transfer to the demanding state . While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings. has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process. the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal. to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. in Mejoff v. created by treaty. In this case. but one that is merely administrative in character." Thus. even though such punishment may follow extradition. we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings. Go-Sioco is illustrative. for the purpose of trial or 14 punishment. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding. Commission of Immigration. bears all earmarks of a criminal process." and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently. this Court. It is sui 11 generis.D. there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases." The Philippines. No. Respondents 4 in administrative proceedings. In Mejoff v." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the " provisional arrest of the accused. pending receipt of the request for extradition. ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court. however. to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. an extradition proceeding. Nor 13 is it a full-blown civil action.
and due process." If not. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a 15 fugitive from justice. 1999. it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. We should not. liberty. conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch. In this case. 2001. such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. when the trial court ordered his admission to bail." WHEREFORE. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan. and thereafter. In the latter. provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee. the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. Given the foregoing. to which the Philippines is a party. More so. a right to due process under the Constitution. this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence. the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. not only by our Constitution. the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. In other words. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition. however. As Purganancorrectly points out. the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. In fact. it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations. Consequently. but also by international conventions. we DISMISS the petition. SO ORDERED. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. . then Associate Justice. therefore. Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23. the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention. he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. and remained incarcerated until December 20. but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. where these rights are guaranteed. this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life. deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. however. However. According to him. the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail. By any standard. The applicable standard of due process. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence. An extradition proceeding being sui generis. While administrative in character. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings. proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.following the proceedings.
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