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Management Science and Research

December 2012, Volume 1, Issue 1, PP.8-17

Empirical Research on Effect of Managerial


Power on CEO Pay
Monitoring Intensity as Moderator Variable
Changzheng Zhang #Shuo Wang
School of Economics and Management, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710054, China
#Email: zcz7901@163.com

Abstract
The paper focuses on the special manipulation effect of managerial power on CEO pay considering the moderating role of monitoring
intensity in China. The paper empirically indicates that the manipulation effect of managerial power on CEO pay does exist, and
quantitatively describes the degree of the manipulation effect, which shows that the manipulation effect of managerial power on CEO
pay significantly decreases. The results prove that monitoring intensity can restrain the manipulation effect of managerial power on
CEO pay. Only under a certain monitoring intensity, will CEO pay not exceed the reasonable level too heavily.
Keywords: Managerial Power; CEO Pay; Monitoring Intensity; Listed Firms; Empirical Research

710054

[2]

[1,2][3-5]
*

NO.09YJC630186NO.107-210803
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Tosi (2007)
5%
[6]Jensen & Murphy
[7]

(Managerial Discretion)[8]

1
1.1

Mehran (1995)[9]David et. al (1998)[10] CEO


Cordeiro & Veliyath(2003) [11]
Crystal (1991)[12]
CEO CEO Berle & Means (1932) [13]

Harvey & Shrieves (2001)[14]Mehran (1995)David


et. al (1998) CEO
Raihan Khan, Ravi Dharwadkar, Pamela
Brandes (2004) [15] CEO
CEO CEO
CEO CEO
CEO
Schmidt & Fowler (1990)[16]Tor Eriksson (2003)[17]
Finkelstein & Hambrick (1989) [18]
U Barkema & Pennings (1998) [19]

Finkelstein & Boyd (1998) [20]

Stephen P. Ferris (2007) [21] 1997-2001 466


Zhang Changzheng & Li Huaizu(2007)[22]
CEO
Joseph Gerakos (2007)
Konstantinos(2008)

[23]

Phillip Leslie Paul Oyer(2008)

[24]

Thomas

[25]

Henlen. M. Roberts (2005) [26] CEO


CEO
Donghui Li (2006) [27]
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CEO

1.2

Aghion & Triole (1997) [28]

2002-2004 14.79 23.67


60% 2002 3.84% 3.7%1

H1

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[29]

H2
H2

H2

3
3.1

3.2
2004
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) STPT
(6)

932 SPSS13.0

2
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LNMP

LNMPt-1

ZSPP

ZEPP

ZROP

ZMD

(ZSPP+ZEPP+ZROP)/3

ROA

ZSMI

ZBMI

ZMI

(ZSMI + ZBMI)/2

LNINDUSMP

INDUSROA

LNASSET

ECONOMIC

15

SHARE

10

FIRMAGE

20041231

PUBLIC

20041231
2

LNMP

932

9.870

14.620

12.089

.746

ZMD

932

.126

.727

.385

.101

LNINDUSMP

932

11.709

12.654

12.071

.213

ZMI

932

0.040

.660

.206

.090

ROA

932

-42.080

31.390

3.843

6.272

INDUSROA

932

-.353

11.077

3.843

1.891

LNASSET

932

18.770

26.850

21.268

.918

LNSALES

932

16.430

27.100

20.637

1.202

ECONOMIC

932

3.090

1.252

SHARE

932

.350

.478

FIRMAGE

932

42

9.184

3.944

PUBLIC

932

15

6.229

3.332

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3.3

H1 H2 1

ln MP = + ZMD + ln ASSET + ECONMIC + ln INDUSMP + INDUSROA


+ ROA + SHARE + FIRMAGE + PUBLIC + ZMI +
i

10

(1)

H1(1) 3 2
(1.379, T=6.740)
H2 932
1 466 466
3 3 4 3 4
(1.700)(1.000)
H2

(0.024)(0.015)

H2

-1.059(-.832)

-.206-.107

-1.828(-1.091)

ZMD

1.379***(6.740)

1.000***3.258

1.700***(6.231)

LNASSET

.194***(8.364)

.179***(5.091)

.191***(6.238)

INDUSROA

-.028**(-2.446)

-.026(-1.540)

-.029*(-1.861)

ROA

.019***(5.341)

.024***(4.162)

.015***(3.315)

ECONOMIC

.148***(8.624)

.158***(6.008)

.128***(5.659)

LNINDUSMP

.677***(6.855)

.625***(4.227)

.740***(5.610)

SHARE

.121***(2.826)

.145** (2.246)

.080(1.367)

FIRMAGE

.014**(2.088)

.011(1.140)

.012(1.395)

PUBLIC

-.017**(-2.088)

-.018(-1.476)

-.013(-1.250)

ZMI

-.584**(-2.528)

41.772

15.627

23.006

.312

.256

.335

.304

.239

.321

931

465

465

(1) t (2)****** 0.10.05 0.01

3.4

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3.4.1

932
12345

1-HP11-LP1

2-HP2-LP3-HP3-LP4-HP4-LP5-HP5-LP
3-2( )
=
ME
1

(2)

ME1(Manipulation Effect) H , L
4
4 (ME1)

MI

3.4.2

0.045

0.040

0.032

0.029

0.021

-0.012

-0.007

0.002

0.006

0.009

ME1

0.057

0.047

0.03

0.023

0.012

1-HM11-LM1
2-HM2-LM3-HM3-LM4-HM4-LM5-HM5-LM3-2
( )
=
ME
2

(3)
L

ME2(Manipulation Effect) H , L
5
5 (ME2)

MI

1.801

1.586

1.399

1.268

1.102

1.214

1.118

1.054

0.945

0.824

ME2

0.587

0.468

0.345

0.323

0.278

45

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ME1
0.06

0.05

0.04

0.03
0.02

0.01
0
1

MI

1 (ME1)

ME2
0.6

0.5
0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1
0
1

MI

2 ME2

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1#

1978-

1988-

Email: 453825972@qq.com

Email: zcz7901@163.com.

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