GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs. RTC OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G.

HERNANDO

December 18, 1992 (216 SCRA 692)

FACTS: October 25, 2012 § Leave a Comment The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.

FACTS: Guerrero and Pedro are brothers in law , their respective wives being sisters. Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.

ISSUE: WON brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.

HELD: Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word “No”, the requirement is mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that “*i+f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.” No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon 6 that the enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as members of the same family does not comprehend “sisters-inlaw” ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.

HELD: The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living together “because that was our agreement.” It held that a agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse.

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO v. CA and HO HANG a.k.a. JOSE JO, CONSING

September 26, 2012 § Leave a Comment The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who declared under oath that she left

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO v. CA and HO HANG a.k.a. JOSE JO, CONSING

even if she said spouse does not leave the other spouse. Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business reversals. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family. . September 26. 5 There must be absolute cessation of marital relations. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. 128 of Family Code. sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita.” It held that a agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. through its president. MAR TIERRA CORP. providing as follows: Art. MAR TIERRA CORP Under the Art. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause. Lacson and Ricardo A.000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company.Dumaguete City. the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. hence. Martinez. and RICARDO LOPA November 29. Martinez. WILFRIDO MARTINEZ. coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner. 2006 (508 SCRA 419) Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return. the spouse have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. followed by prolonged absence without just cause. duties and rights. and 2. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez. FACTS: Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation. The physical separation of the parties. and without in the meantime providing in the least for one’s family although able to do so. Miguel J. eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. MIGUEL LACSON. Wilfrido C. Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code. applied for a P12. 135. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent corp and individual respondents. with the intention of perpetual separation. The private respondent had already rejected the petitioner. SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. (6) That at the time of the petition. 2012 § Leave a Comment SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v.000. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. where she and Jo were living together “because that was our agreement. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause.

there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation. the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. marred the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18. v. 9478. FACTS: Benigno Toda. COURT OF APPEALS March 26. In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. 1981. the parties in order to avoid further “disagreeable proceedings. HELD: . JR. It failed to discharge that burden. TODA. 2012 § Leave a Comment TODA. 35566. No.. 1981. we ruled that. ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. de Garcia that. 56121 of this Court. 1981 a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code.” In other words. the principal contract. Court of Appeals. COURT OF APPEALS HELD: No. 11123-SP of the Court of Appeals and G. This petition which was signed by the parties on March 30. It affirmed RTC decision..e. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under After hearings were held. the transaction falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. 1979 in the former Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1951 and were blessed with two children. The said petition and the compromise agreement therein were approved by the trial court in its order of June 9. a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno.” September 26. however. in acting as a guarantor or surety for another. the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were married on June 9. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract.” filed on April 1. was solely for the benefit of the latter. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno. which was consolidated with the aforesaid civil case. 35566.Petitioner appealed to CA. No. embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the said Civil Case No. On the other hand. as Civil Case No.R. JR. In the case at bar. SC upheld the CA. 1990 (183 SCRA 713) The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co. if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor. V. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. docketed as Special Proceeding No. the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession. i. V. Inc. CA-G. Jr. Petitioned to SC. where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business.R. the conjugal partnership is liable for “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. It. 14 “(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957. In 1979. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved. the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. but by the decree of the court approving the same. AGAPAY vs. 15 Furthermore. he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan. Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property. was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties. and not on March 30. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15. are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. PALANG and HERMINIA P. they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. When he returned for good in 1972. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. herein petitioner. there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. Erlinda failed to prove that she actually contributed money for the said property. 2 months earlier.We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the compromise agreement became effective only on June 9. the date when it was approved by the trial court. The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay. October 25. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code. only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. the court found no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the . said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation. they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. 2012 § Leave a Comment FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949.” Hence. therefore. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. ERLINDA A. Under Article 148. so. Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia. DELA CRUZ Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. without which it is void. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision. becomes effective on y upon judicial approval. 1973. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner.1981 when it was signed by the parties. Miguel died. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. ISSUE: WON the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay. On the other hand. 2 years later. HELD: The sale of the riceland on May 17. in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. 1973. 1981.

In any . she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez. Consequently. and that they acquired the property in question as their “love nest. Moreover. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her. Art. It is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. both as rental. 2012 § Leave a Comment HELD: No. FACTS: Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumlos. under Article 739 of the Civil Code. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage. Upon appeal to the RTC. but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. As correctly held by the CA. petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship.600. the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of any rent. 148 needs actual contributions. Toto Tumlos. Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. the riceland should. her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. They have demanded several times that the defendants vacate the premises. Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property October 25. and Gina Tumlos. GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs.00 a month. the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code. Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1. that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated Likewise. In their complaint. revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. Indeed.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1. as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. that it was agreed upon that after a few months. and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments.” It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years. With respect with the house and lot. which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants.same. for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife.000. the transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda. Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. but Article 148 of the Family Code. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint.

vs. properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money. BOAC. but separated from their respective spouses. this fact by itself does not justify her claim. in addition to providing that a coownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. which applies to bigamous marriages. even assuming that they lived together as husband and wife ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties HELD: it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Rey was married. 1453 of the Civil Code. relationships in a state of concubinage. 1452 and Art. then are no longer material since a trust relation already inheres in a co-ownership which is governed under Title III. In 1992. representing her contribution to the construction of their house. the couple separated. During their union. when she met and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996. and multiple alliances of the same HELD: Family Code. Clearly. Book II of the Civil Code. 2012 § Leave a Comment FACTS: Seventeen-year old Gina S. considering the present status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each other. ISSUE: Can the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties. 2012 § Leave a Comment JACINTO SAGUID vs. be reimbursed to her. MA. relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons. is presumed to be equal. due to irreconcilable differences. the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry each other. ELVIRA CASTILLO The provisions of Art. if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other. October 25.event. CA. but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN. there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of coownership. in the absence of proof to the contrary. likewise provides that. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70. they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. but separated de facto from her husband. RTC.000. JR. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which. REY FACTS: Petitioner and respondent. cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted.00. MARINDUQUE and GINA S. with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors. BRANCH 94. private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner. . October 25. adulterous relationships. under the law. both married and with children. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent’s name. and respondent as vice-president and treasurer.

Under this regime. the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code HELD: The court erred. Even if cohabitation commenced before family code. Petitioner . Quezon City that in a void marriage. the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties.00 for the completion of their house. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife. alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70. article 148 applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful. or their marriage is void October 25. regardless of its cause.000. On May 2001. 2. no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. However.married man. The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio. and had abandoned her responsibility to the family. MA. nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. and 3. DIÑO v. property. in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions …” Proof of actual contribution is required. ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation. the following elements must be present: 1. Branch 102. ALAIN M. however. such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36. choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. but whose marriage is nonetheless void. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials. partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code” In the case at bar. CARIDAD L. The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property. their share shall be presumed to be equal. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code. Their union is without the benefit of marriage. While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit. partition. RTC. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other. It later altered it to” A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation. The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage. 2012 § Leave a Comment FACTS: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. “…only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. DIÑO For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply. there is. and would at times become violent and hurt him.

Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code. petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership. partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. The rules on coownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. In short. In Valdes. there is a need to liquidate. In this case. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. “*p+artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains. which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. Thus.All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent. x x x. .