This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
[G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996]
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents. DECISION
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both of the parties to the contract. The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute. Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,i in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: "(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations; "(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with. "Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes. "The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the other. "(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages."ii (Italics ours) Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner. In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
"II "Articles 50. considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union. work or industry. plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. the trial court said: "Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio. regardless of the cause thereof. are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares. their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. "IV "It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay. pursuant to Art. of the Family Code."v The trial court correctly applied the law. "The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property. in the absence of proof to the contrary. the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148. such as the case may be. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases. a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. petitioner submits that Articles 50. 147. the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply. . 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held controlling. the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio." iii (Italics supplied) In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling. live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995. he argues that: "I "Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated. properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts. "In the absence of proof to the contrary. and shall be owned by them in equal shares."Consequently. In a void marriage. including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. In his recourse to this Court. For purposes of this Article. "In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant.vi it provides: "ART. 147. "III "Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse."iv Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another. should aptly prevail. Under this property regime. property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitationix or declaration of nullity of the marriage. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains. each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. i. any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"vii of the Code. any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children. if so existing under a valid marriage." viii Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains. his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. without the consent of the other.xi In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property. property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.x When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife ). In all cases.only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money. 51 and 52. in relation to Articles 102 and 129. or still in default thereof.. In the absence of descendants. during the period of cohabitation. until after the termination of their cohabitation. The first paragraph of . The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. in substance and to the above extent. the law now expressly provides that — (a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in coownership property. not Articles 50. the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled ). as well as in concluding that. has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code. and (b) In the case of a void marriage. in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them. "When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares. in addition. to the innocent party.xii of the Family Code. as the case may be. the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation."Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common." This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman. Such contributions and corresponding shares. so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately. are prima facie presumed to be equal.e. each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. such share shall belong to the innocent party. the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership. however. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code. without the consent of the other. in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants. Article 147 of the Family Code. a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household. suffering no legal impediment to marry each other. the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children.
Jr.e. to void marriages under Article 40xiv of the Code. Padilla.Article 50 of the Family Code.xiii relates only.Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning. et al. Art. presiding. whether legitimate or illegitimate. Kapunan. leaving to ordain. 42. 1055. the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. applying paragraphs (2 ). pp. vs. i. in the latter case. 38-39. See Margaret Maxey vs.. Court of Appeals. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law. 129 SCRA 187. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood relatives. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43..xvi of the Family Code. Art. Bellosillo. 22.(4) and (5) of Article 43. Rollo. 24-25. 5. JJ. p. Perlita Tria Tirona. Garcia. dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995. between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages. Rollo. exceptionally. whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree. the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter. remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses." i. nevertheless. and Hermosisima. (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child. up to the fourth civil degree.Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38. of the Family Code. the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage. Rollo. 102 Phil. on leave. Rollo. on the one hand.e. i Hon. et al. Chapter 2. on the other.. concur. of the trial court are AFFIRMED. (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child. Aznar. 38. WHEREFORE. between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and. that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home.. the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. the provisions found in Title V. No costs. It must be stressed. (2) Between step-parents and stepchildren.. may contract marriage. in relation to Articles 41 xv and 42. ii iii iv v vi vii Art. and (2) Between brothers and sisters.(3 ). even as it may merely state the obvious. whether of the full or half-blood. p. 37. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage. by its explicit terms. J. on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. . pp. In all other cases.. it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations. the questioned orders. to voidable marriages and. SO ORDERED.
102. property or sound securities. or the trustee of their property. An inventory shall be prepared. 50 and 51. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2 ). The final judgment in such case shall provide for the liquidation. which shall be divided equally between husband and wife. in the partition of the properties. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage. shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Art. Family Code. (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother.(3 ). 51. Family Code. may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.(4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. Art. Art. In the partition. unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements. (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter. the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime. or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share as provided in this Code. the following procedure shall apply. No. in accordance with Article 51. the same shall not affect third persons. the custody and support of the common children. ix x xi xii Art. In case of insufficiency of said assets. Article 148. unless the court has decided otherwise. 50. had already provided for such matters. listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive . unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. and (9) Between parties where one. (5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition. killed that other person's spouse or his or her own spouse. the court shall decide. the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. No. (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. Art. Article 147. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents. computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court. (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43. shall be delivered in cash. by mutual agreement judicially approved.(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter. unless the parties. Family Code. (1) Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime. partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses. listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. otherwise. and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property. Family Code. the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses. the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94. taking into consideration the best interests of said children. the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated. (2) and 63. 129. viii Article 147. (2 ). In said partition. In case there is no such majority. the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared. with the intention to marry the other. The children or their guardian. Articles 43. and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes. but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(3) Donations by reason or marriage shall remain valid. but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith. the court shall decide. (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. which shall be divided equally between husband and wife. even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. taking into consideration the best interests of said children. 40. shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds. such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law. (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property. the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership. as the case may be. (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. if any. the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family. unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties. even due to fortuitous event. xiv Art. the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage. xv Art. unless the court has decided otherwise. the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the . In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code. unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. and their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided by the court in a proper proceeding. 42. in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121. (9) In the partition of the properties. the innocent spouse. the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy. (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition in accordance with Article 51.properties of each spouse. the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or. In case of insufficiency of said assets. (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership. shall be dissolved and liquidated. In case there is no such majority. 43. without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall. (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits. in default of children. belonging to either spouse. his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or. xiii Art. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse. (6) Unless the owner has been indemnified from whatever source. (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate. except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void. an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. if there are none. xvi Art. unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. 41. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother.
On October 30. No. the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay. Pangasinan (Civil Case No. 1975.R.xvi Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DECISION ROMERO. 1973. respondents. Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. on February 15. 1950. SECOND DIVISION [G. allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. petitioner. Miguel and Carlina’s only child. 1975. Transfer Certificate of Title No. July 28. 1981. as evidenced by the Deed of Sale. 143120 covering said property was later issued in her name. he left to work in Hawaii. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957. 1977. not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. vs. xvi The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child. was born on May 12. TCT No. 1997] ERLINDA A. Miguel died. CV No.: Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Pangasinan with an area of 10. A few months after the wedding. born on December 6. 1981. Consequently. 1949 when he took private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. 101736 covering said rice land was issued in their names. J. Palang. but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio. Herminia Palang. 116668. Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23. In 1979. 1973. in October 1949. an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta. 1994 involving the ownership of two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and private respondent’s legitimate spouse. Pangasinan.residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person. 24199 entitled “Erlinda Agapay v. Dela Cruz” dated June 22.xvi Two months earlier. instituted the case at bar. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Herminia Palang. Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. AGAPAY. DELA CRUZ. herein petitioner. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother. On July 11. on May 17. Binalonan. . Miguel and Erlinda.xvi When he returned for good in 1972.R. A house and lot in Binalonan.080 square meters. with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. herein private respondents. On July 15. Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. Kristopher A. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz. Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. he refused to live with private respondents. jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe. Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16. xvi Two years later.
respondent court reversed the trial court’s decision. having bought the same with her own money. SO ORDERED. consisting of 10. as defendant below. 3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural land situated at Balisa. 4) Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his deceased father. Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan. Miguel’s illegitimate son. 2. particularly of Kristopher Palang. as evidenced by TCT No. Lot 290-B including the old house standing therein. 143120. Pangasinan. Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang. 1989 dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. 143120 is her sole property. Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay. Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot. 3. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to herein plaintiffs-appellants. the estate of deceased Miguel Palang will have to be settled in another separate action. otherwise. Pangasinan. premises considered. After trial on the merits. this petition. 2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot located at Poblacion. The lower court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: “WHEREFORE. with costs against plaintiffs. PREMISES CONSIDERED. Miguel Palang. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia. 101736 in the name of Miguel Palang. No pronouncement as to costs.080 square meters and as evidenced by TCT No. the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and another one entered: 1. San Felipe. judgment is hereby rendered1) Dismissing the complaint.U-4265).”xvi Hence. She added that the house and lot covered by TCT No. the lower court rendered its decision on June 30. she had already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. Binalonan. provided that the former (Kristopher) executes. dated October 30. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July 22. San Felipe. 143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs-appellants. under TCT No. Petitioner. Pangasinan. a quit-claim forever renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal properties of her parents. 1994 with the following dispositive portion: “WHEREFORE. the one-half (1/2) of the agricultural land situated at Balisa. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in question. 101736 is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda). within 15 days after this decision becomes final and executory. the first in favor of Miguel Palang and . 5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney’s fees. contended that while the riceland covered by TCT No. 101736. 1975. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. Binalonan. Binalonan.”xvi On appeal. Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. Palang should be considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. Palang as Miguel Palang’s illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel’s estate. the Court denies the petition and affirms the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner assails the validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of land. The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this action. petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred in not declaring Kristopher A. in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance. Consequently. Third. “in not finding that there is sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristoffer A. respondent court erred. we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.S. it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3. 1973. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan. even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15. U-4625 before the trial court and in CA-G. There is no dispute that the transfers of ownership from the original owners of the riceland and the house and lot. respectively. Furthermore. said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved. according to petitioner. as well as the pertinent provisions of law and jurisprudence. 1973. are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.xvi After studying the merits of the instant case. were valid. Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari storexvi but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. In the nature of an afterthought. in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone. said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. In any case. The sale of the riceland on May 17.Erlinda Agapay and the second. Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. the riceland should. No.R.xvi In the case at bar. Corazon Ilomin and the spouses Cespedes. petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U. 24199. Palang or Christopher A. Considering her youthfulness. Government. Second. 1973. there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.750. was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property. xvi there being no proof of the same. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their compromise agreement “in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the . May 17. Pangasinan. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. Under Article 148. the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Jr.. With respect to the house and lot. Petitioner adds that there is no need for Kristopher to file another action to prove that he is the illegitimate son of Miguel. His mother. JJ. and Mendoza. 1975 when she was only 22 years old. Erlinda. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee. Costs against petitioner.xvi The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel’s estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court’s correct assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher’s heirship and filiation “inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent. Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.. Kristopher. therefore.00 on September 23. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Regalado. the instant petition is hereby DENIED.. proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession. under Article 739 of the Civil Code. not having been impleaded.” xvi Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. Puno.separation of property between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership. WHEREFORE. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Moreover. not a party to the case at bar.xvi The trial court erred gravely. xvi The judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred. Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20. J. in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. Atty.xvi Petitioner’s grave error has been discussed in the preceeding paragraph where the need for probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguel’s estate and Kristopher’s successional rights has been pointed out. the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. concur.”xvi As regards the third issue. . petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should be considered as party-defendant in the case at bar following the trial court’s decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as party defendant but theorized that he had submitted to the court’s jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad litem. (Chairman).xvi for otherwise.000. on leave. SO ORDERED. was. cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar.xvi The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda. Torres.
In 1988. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO. PCCUI. Cariño. No. namely. During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. in Civil Case No.000. petitioner failed to file her answer. whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. February 2. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased. he contracted two marriages. Cariño.00 from “GSIS Life. SPO4 Santiago S. She. 1969. respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. Commutation. the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. CV No. where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.”xvi while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21. and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of. Commutation. who spent for his medical and burial expenses.R. that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146.FIRST DIVISION [G. He passed away on November 23. the first was on June 20. with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee). To bolster her action for collection of sum of money. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146. [and] Pag-ibig. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. and the second was on November 10.R. inter alia. respondent.”xvi On December 14. prompting the trial court to declare her in default. In support . vs. 51263.” Despite service of summons.00) collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI. J.000. Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of. 1992. with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. Branch 87.00 from “MBAI. Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decisionxvi of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao). PCCUI.000. [and] Pag-ibig. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO. 132529. however. NAPOLCOM. 2001] SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO. which affirmed in toto the decisionxvi of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Q-93-18632. respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying. petitioner. NAPOLCOM. 1993. 1992. under the care of Susan Yee.: The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Sahlee and Sandee Cariño. with whom he had two offsprings.
dissolution of property regime.xvi and 2) a certification dated March 9. This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. for purposes other than remarriage. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. DE CONSUEGRA VS. Susan Yee. IT IS SO ORDERED. such as but not limited to the determination of heirship. Meaning.xvi renders the marriage void ab initio.000.xvi In such instances. the instant petition. holding as follows: WHEREFORE. half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño. legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. which reads – This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 1969. 1994.000.xvi Under Article 40 of the Family Code. II. subject to certain exceptions. was indispensable to the . Hence. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED. For other purposes.xvi However. or a criminal case for that matter.xvi It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case. testimonial or documentary. as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the deceased. we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.00. which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5.thereof. the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73.xvi On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals.00. therefore. is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. contending that: I. Under the Civil Code. the sole basis acceptable in law. where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE. and costs of suit. respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number. the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto. settlement of estate. Hence. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal purpose it may serve. xvi and the absence thereof. there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement.xvi In the case at bar. and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage. Metro Manila. so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. xvi On August 28. to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. evidence must be adduced. no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. the trial court ruled in favor of respondent. AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. A marriage license. from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. who are married in this municipality on June 20. for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity. 1995. the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage.
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan. under Article 40 of the Family Code. It is beyond cavil. the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand. the second marriage would also be void. before a party can enter into a second marriage. Hence. but rather. the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and. as in the present case. Court of Appeals. for purposes of remarriage. void ab initio. is undoubtedly void ab initio. and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement. that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio. the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property.000. are clearly renumerations. Accordingly. Commutation. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage. there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage. however... having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased). the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Inc. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the . petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court.. therefore. the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. In Republic v. or spiritual or moral inspiration. NAPOLCOM.xvi Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage. the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is. relationships in a state of concubine. The disputed P146. This notwithstanding. he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased. Although she was declared in default before the trial court. It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition. adulterous relationships. the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. multiple alliances of the same married man.xvi “. the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. Pag-ibig. the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. are excluded in this regime. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void.validity of their marriage.” Under Article 148 of the Family Code.xvi the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license.xvi Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio. Such being the case. or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions . having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license. Hence. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. children and household. and PCCUI. To reiterate.]. relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons. Metro Manila. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. contributions in the form of care of the home. the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value. which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages..00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association. Then too. their office has no record of such marriage license.” In this property regime. incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money. Absent any circumstance of suspicion. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. property. likewise. though void. otherwise.
to his legal heirs. respondent. this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting. the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts. and shall be owned by them in equal shares.. As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased. such share shall belong to the innocent party. In the absence of descendants. de Consuegra v. In affirming the decision of the trial court. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage.” And with respect to the right of the second wife. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. intestate succession. to the second wife. his children with Susan Nicdao..contrary. property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Government Service Insurance System. namely. entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage.”xvi It should be stressed. work or industry. and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by. Article 147 of the Family Code governs. one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime. under the foregoing article. even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee. Thus. xxx xxx xxx When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith. wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them. both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. it could not be said that she contributed money.. Article 147 creates a co ownership in respect thereto. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case. the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants. they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased.. In all cases. Hence. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other. live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. For purposes of this Article. By intestate succession. And. In the absence of proof to the contrary. 147. the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. however. [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased.xvi where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half. but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons.. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity. and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. holding that: “. their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Consequently. In contrast to Article 148. a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. This is the reason why in the said case. the Court . whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in dispute. xvi Conformably. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code. the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. like the absence of a marriage license. “[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband.
if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage. if material to the determination of the issues before it.R. and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73. Q-93-18632.000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5. All that a party has to do is to present evidence. the court.J. In Domingo v. CV No.determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime. and Pardo.. for purposes other than to remarry. When such need arises. clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is. Puno J. otherwise the second marriage would be void. on official leave. that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Court of Appeals. JJ. like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid. is hereby DISMISSED. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. WHEREFORE. Thus. the petition is GRANTED.00. However. Jr. testimonial or documentary. (Chairman). the Court. he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void.xvi however. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. in Niñal v. will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence.. SO ORDERED. Davide. before he or she could contract said second marriage. No pronouncement as to costs.. C. a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.000. The complaint in Civil Case No. . is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. construing Article 40 of the Family Code. no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. Bayadog. Kapunan. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.xvi the Court explained: [T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Thereupon. concur.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.