Villanueva vs.

IAC 192 SCRA 21

Facts: Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz. After they died, their surviving children, Modesto and Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition.

Ruling: Even if it be assumed that the husband’s acquisition by succession of the lot in question took place during his marriage, the lot would nonetheless be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him “during the marriage by lucrative title”.

Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited from his parents, Graciano and Nicolasa, is his exclusive and private property. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law. FIRST DIVISION

Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz Registry of Property. Modesto was married to Victoria Comorro but they had no children. After the death of Modesto, his two surviving illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18,000 from Jesus Bernas. As a security they mortgaged to Bernas their father’s property. In the loan agreement executed between the parties, a relative Raymundo Aranas, signed the agreement as a witness.

[G.R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997]

ALFONSO TAN and ETERIA TEVES TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CELESTINO U. TAN and ROSARIO DY KUSHIN and SPOUSES MAXIMO U. TAN and TERESITA SY TAN, respondents.

Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. About a month later, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernas praying that the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land. They ground their cause of action upon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas and his wife Victoria. Victoria’s will stated that her interests, rights and properties, real and personal as her share from the conjugal partnership be bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and also to Dorothea and Teodoro in equal shares. Modesto’s will, on the other hand, bequeathed to his two illegitimate children all his interest in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37224 dated June 20, 1994 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, the decretal portion of which reads:

Issue: Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses Modesto and Victoria.

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants-spouses Celestino U. Tan and Rosario Dy, and Maximo U. Tan and Teresita Sy to partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. 46249, deliver to plaintiff Eteria Teves Tan the one-third share of plaintiffs-spouses Alfonso U. Tan and Eteria Teves Tan; to pay Eteria Teves Tan P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[1]

although it was her husband and mother-inlaw who drew the loan. On January 16.The antecedents are as follows: On April 17. as well as the interests and participation of each member. 46249[7] and that the funds used in the construction of the house standing thereon were drawn from a loan she and her husband secured. so that. and as a consequence thereof. It was alleged in the complaint that the parties are co-owners of a 906square meter residential lot with improvements thereon situated at Banaue. the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan. incurred advances and indebtedness from the partnership in the amount of P130. sought partition of the same. private respondents asserted that Alfonso’s one-third (1/3) share of the subject property was mortgaged by him to his sister. denied Alfonso’s motion but recognized his reluctance to prosecute.[4] The trial court. 1977. (e) that Alfonso failed to pay said loan. is proper in the premises. the former could not be deprived of her share of the one-third . a Decision[10] dated July 12.[2] against his brothers insofar as the family business is concerned. (c) that the subject property was inherited by them from their mother. They alleged that they are entitled to the fruits. Celestino and Maximo. Tan but they were now living separately by virtue of a decree of legal separation rendered by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on August 31. and that he had no claim whatsoever As above-stated. (b) that Alfonso had no more claim against the family business because he borrowed heavily on his equity in the family business and from his brothers and sisters. proceeds and profits of the said family business. Lolita. and their respective wives. they bought a residential lot consisting of 906 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.[3] Celestino and Maximo Tan and their spouses. however was submitted during the trial with respect to the allegation that the property was inherited from their mother. private respondents filed their answer alleging that an accounting is not feasible because the company had long been dissolved by the partners on September 30. 1991 was rendered after trial finding that the 906-square meter lot with improvements was acquired by the three (3) brothers by sale through installments and so it should be partitioned equally among them and their respective wives. 1963. Lolita Tan-Go. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 494 of the New Civil Code. Alfonso U. 1989. was dissolved on September 25. the spouses claimed that on August 15. 1990. 1990. Trinidad Uy. a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein private respondents who are the Alfonso’s brothers. on their part.[6] that during their marriage. 1989. mortgaged his share of the disputed property to her.[8] On October 16. an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the partnership. 1982 on account of mismanagement brought about by Alfonso’s incompetence. Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Eteria. being co-owners to the extent of one-third (1/3) portion of the aforesaid lot. Consequently. the brothers together with other siblings put up a business which they registered as Bel Air Auto Supply Company and was engaged in the sale and distribution of auto spare parts. Finally. in its Order dated July 4. Tan filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss contending that the case was filed only at the instance of his estranged wife. Bel Air Auto Supply Company.000. in order to secure a loan he obtained from her. Rosario and Teresita. and (f) that the house on the lot in question was constructed using funds from a loan contracted by their mother from the Social Security System (SSS).[9] No documentary evidence. tried to establish the following: (a) that the family business.[5] Eteria Teves Tan testified that she is married to Alfonso U.00. as a consequence thereof. Anent the action for accounting. It was further alleged that Alfonso mismanaged the business during his incumbency as manager and. 1982 on account of financial losses and that whatever was due to each partner was already given him. since the lot was acquired during the marriage of petitioner and Alfonso. He prayed that the case be dismissed. (d) that Alfonso borrowed money from their sister.

May 22. R. There is documentary proof to support the testimony of Maximo Tan that indeed the property in dispute was inherited by Alfonso. Filipino. Celestino and Maximo from their late mother. of legal age. Hill No. in turn. 1969. with respect to the business dealing in auto spare parts. TAN. the spouses Celestino and Rosario Tan and the spouses Maximo and Teresita Tan. the same had been dissolved due to losses. Dec. married to Rosario Dy Kushin of Banawa. Hill No. Cebu City. against the estate of the deceased Trinidad Uy'. the Supreme Court observed: (H)ad the property been acquired by them (spouses) during coverture. was actually inherited by the Tan brothers and their sisters from their mother who died intestate on December 15. In other words. together with other properties. 2. NCC). the herein appellants. meters and described on Transfer Certificate of Title No. of Cebu City. We note that the 906-square meter lot is registered in the name of: ALFONSO U. reversed and set aside the said judgment.portion which is the conjugal property of the spouses.C. We quote the pertinent portion of the decision: The title further states that the property is subject to the 'liabilities imposed by Section 4. thru Maximo Tan. The property is registered in the names of the three brothers as married to their respective spouses. It is true that under the New Civil Code. of legal age. Pardo. 1991. hence. Filipino. This condition supports the . private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] of the decision contending that the 906-square meter lot. 'A') [underlines Ours]. (Exh. it can be deduced that 1/3 portion of the property solely belongs to Alfonso Tan. 21. In this regard. 160. TSN. 17-17-a. xerox copy of which was attached to the motion. from January 9.00. Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Filipino. it would have been registered in the name not of Francisco Soriano.[13] Aggrieved by the ruling. with equal shares. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs which was the basis of private respondents' claim that they inherited the lot in question from their mother was not presented as part of their evidence during the trial. The provision of law on presumption of the conjugal nature of the property requires the party who invoked it to prove first that the property in controversy was acquired during marriage. insist that the property in dispute was acquired by inheritance from their late mother Trinidad Uy Tan.[12] The lot was described in the document as: x x x. On September 19. all properties of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains to the husband or to the wife (Art. CELESTINO U. 2. 1960. 23 SCRA 637-644). 312). From the very wording of the title. Tax declaration No. Trinidad Uy Tan. single. of Banawa. 1970. Respondent court ruled that although the subject property was acquired during the marriage of the spouses Eteria and Alfonso. 36 SCRA 289. proof of acquisition during coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership (Cobb-Perez vs. 1968 but said lot was adjudicated to the three (3) brothers in a notarized "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Adjudication of Properties" executed by the heirs on September 8. However. married to Tomasa Rodriguez' but the spouses 'Francisco Soriano and Tomasa Rodriguez' (Ponce de Leon vs. Assessed at P2. A parcel of land (lot 6448-C-5 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-21849 being a portion of Lot 6448-C with an area of 906 sq.F. TAN. for a period of two (2) years.800. private respondents. TAN. 022318. married to Eteria Teves of Bulacao.. On the other hand. Lantin. and MAXIMO U. their exclusive property. it was established by the Tan brothers that the same was inherited from their mother. who died on 15 November 1968 (pp. interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which. of legal age. 38759. 1990). Philippines. L-22300.

38759 presupposes the existence of summary settlement of an estate from where the property was derived. to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Trinidad Uy.[16] It is not necessary. CELESTINO U.[15] The petition is not impressed with merit. when the latter covered the 906-square meter lot which was one of the properties left by the late Trinidad Uy to her children when she died intestate and which property was adjudicated to her three sons as appearing in the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs and Adjudication of Properties. 38759. The property is registered in the name of Alfonso U. TAN’ is against well-settled jurisprudence in our jurisdiction."[21] Such imposition on property is for the benefit of the heirs who may have been deprived of their lawful participation of the estate of the decedent. TAN xxx married to Rosario Dy Kushin xxx and MAXIMO U. 46249. TAN. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited from his mother.[20] From this ruling. rebuttable with strong clear. that although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to Eteria. from January 9. conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria Teves Tan. It shows that the 1/3 portion of the property belongs exclusively to Alfonso U. unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. married to Eteria Teves. the presumption applies and it will be considered conjugal property. The ruling of respondent Court of Appeals that the 1/3 portion of the lot in question exclusively belongs to Alfonso Tan simply because the Certificate of Title states that the lot is registered in the name of ‘ALFONSO U. categorical. the source of the property can be reasonably and materially inferred from TCT No. 2. even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. Tan. 46249 which contains a provision that the property is subject to the "liabilities imposed by Section 4. that of private respondents' deceased mother. under TCT No.contention of the herein appellants that the lot was inherited by Alfonso. which was carried over from its predecessor TCT No. 46249. Tan. and convincing evidence that the Article 148: The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: . While this document was not admitted as evidence because it was submitted only as an annex to private respondents' motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. 1970 and a transfer from TCT No. the presumption of conjugality remains and it is not petitioner but private respondents who have the burden of proof to prove otherwise.[17] So that when an immovable was acquired by purchase during the marriage. however. 1979 against the estate of the deceased Trinidad Uy.[19] In the case at bar. xxx married to Eteria Teves xxx. the original owner of the property. Celestino and Maximo from their late mother. Tan.[14] property belongs exclusively to one of the spouses and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. and that it is not part of the conjugal partnership of gains. There can be no doubt then.[18] In fact. as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148 of the Civil Code which provides that: Said presumption is. married to Rosario Dy Kuchin and Maximo U. the one-third portion of the property should be regarded as Alfonso's own exclusively. single. The presence of the imposition in TCT No. Tan. to wit: 1. That since respondent Court of Appeals had already ruled that 1/3 portion of the lot in litigation was acquired by Alfonso Tan while said Alfonso Tan and his wife Eteria were still living together. It is clear from TCT No. it is considered as conjugal property. Eteria Teves Tan seeks a second assessment of the case in the present petition for review raising the following errors. Rule 74 of the Rules of Court for a period of two (2) years. 46249 that the title was entered on January 9. Celestino U.

1972 – Emilio died intestate.3. Emilio soldhis share to Agustina. He says hisson possesses such qualities too. excluding Moises. Emilio acknowledged receipt too. JJ. In Villanueva v.deceit. and Hermosisima. Neither was her allegation that the house was constructed with the loan she and her husband obtained duly substantiated. Agustina is married to Ernesto Vasquez. The foregoing disquisitions adequately answer the second issue raised by petitioner. on leave. 1968. during the marriage. From whom the loan was obtained was not even revealed.00.#1 is null & void because his father’s consent was obtained by fraud. COURT OF APPEALS.Deed of Sale executed July 27.Deed of Extrajudicial Partition & Adjudication w/Sale executed March 9. undue . Padilla.x x x.. 1994 is AFFIRMED. Moises allegations:1. Jr. All documents were executed before a notary public. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo. Spouses Emilio Jocson & Alejandra Poblete had 2 children: Moises Jocson & Agustina Jocson-Vasquez.000. 1973: Moises filed complaint.Deed of Sale executed July 27. Nos. June 20. assailing validity of 3 documentsexecuted by Emilio during his lifetime. ACCORDINGLY. On the other hand. April 1. OISES JOCSON.00. 1 & 2 were registeredw/the Register of Deeds. helpful & thoughtful daughter who bought the property. AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ. the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 20.000. selling 2 rice mills & a camalig inNaic.2. ERNESTO VASQUEZ. concur. He prays that the following be declarednull & void and that the properties involved be partitioned bet him & his sister:1. Deed included Emilio’smanifestation that the lands was sold at a low price because it was hisloving..1969 wherein Emilio & Agustina. Heacknowledged receipt of payment. petitioner vs. Cavite to Agustina for P5. Intermediate Appellate Court. by lucrative title. 1989] Facts: (2) That which each acquires. Cavite for P10.[22] we ruled that the husband's acquisition by succession of a parcel of land during his marriage to his wife simply means that the lot is his exclusively property because it was acquired by him during the marriage by lucrative title pursuant to the provisions of Article 148 of the Civil Code. Vitug. Alejandradied intestate. He further claims that the sale did notviolate any law & that he did not touch his wife’s properties. x x x. extrajudiciallypartitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing such into 3. petitioner had adduced no evidence at all that the lot was acquired by her and her husband with their funds. respondents Petition for Certiorari to review CA decision [February 16. (Chairman). J. Old certificates were cancelled & new certificatesissued in the name of Agustina.. 1968 wherein Emilio sold to Agustina 6parcels of land in Naic.

NO. he claims that thecontract is fictitious. 3.especially since documents show that his dad (vendor) acknowledged receipt of price & they are notarized. NO. 5. 1471 & 1409[3]) and action for declarationof its nullity does not prescribe (CC Art. Thus. Moises has to present proof that properties inquestion were indeed obtained during the RTC: decided in favor of petitioner. Partition w/sale in #3 is valid since it was done in accordance w/New CCArt.6.” Orderedregistration of prop to 2 children. 2) prices weregrossly inadequate tantamount to lack of consideration at all.No real sale between dad & daughter living under same roof.P24. De Guzman). Even he himself said that he didn’t know if his sister had other businesses.Dad didn’t need money since sold properties were all income-producitng. 1410). it is incumbent upon him to prove his allegations. w/Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. No proof of inadequacy of price. Discovery means the time when contractwas registered . Declared #1 & #2 properties as conjugal by virtue of registration papers w/cdeclared: “Emilio Jocson.00.A sale w/simulated price is void (CC Art.Agustina testified that she was into buy & sell even prior to her marriage. CC Art. and #3 P8k vs.If this was the only consideration. 3) improbabilityof sale considering circumstances. 1470). Gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect the contract except perhaps an indication of defect inconsent (CC Art. No proof of defective consent. 996 on intestate succession & Moises’ 1/3 has not been prejudiced.4.4). Proof of such: issuance of newtitles. ISSUES & RATIO:1.pressure.500. P3. He failed to do so and thus he was not able to overcomethe presumption that a contract is with consideration (CC Art.2.Contracts w/o cause or consideration produce no effect whatsoever (CC Art. #2 P5k vs. Also. influence & other illegal machinations. 1354). Even his ownwitness contradicted his claim that his sister & her husband had no source of income. He alsoalleges that property was sold for a simulated price considering that hissister had no work or livelihood of her own.00). 1 & 2 barred by prescription because annulment of contractbased on fraud must be filed 4 yrs from discovery of such w/c begins on thedate of the registration w/the Register of Deeds. simulated & fabricated. Designed to exclude Moises. 1352). WON sale is improbable. 160 provides that all property of marriage is presumed to belong to CPunless proven otherwise. 4. purchase price was higher thanassessed value (#1: P10k vs.Same allegations re #2 & #3 with additional allegation that he wasdeliberately excluded & they intended to defraud him of his legitimateshare.3. In fact. 1391 par.840. Lantin). Nos.5. WON sales were w/o consideration. object & cause. WON suit is solely based on fraud and as such is barred by prescription NO.#3: he only questions sale of dad’s share to sister but not extrajudicialpartition. then it is barred by prescription. CA: reversed. P8920. But he furtherassailed that sale was w/o consideration since amount paid were merely simulated. Since Moises alleges such. Improbability of sale is purely speculative. married to Alejandra Poblete. He also claims that defendants were employed in their parents’ business & they must have used business earnings or simulatedconsideration in order to purchase the properties. Not relevant considering that allessential requirements for contract are clearly present: consent. 1330) & action for annulment must be filed w/in 4 yrs from timeof discovery of fraud (CC Art. NO. 2. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as when consent’s obtained by fraudis voidable (CC Art. WON prices were simulated NO. Besides difference bet market value & purchase price isunderstandable considering father’s filial love for his daughter. All documents actually & intended to be binding & effective against Emilio. WON properties in #1 & #2 were conjugal properties of Emilio & wife.#1 & #2 are unliquidated conjugal properties that Emilio can’t validly sell. Witness Bagnas said that Agustina & Ernesto were into buy & sell of palay & rice. Documents were simulated & fictitiousbecause: 1) no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties. Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for partywho invokes this to prove that properties were indeed acquired during the marriage(Cobb-Perez vs.

CA affirmed It cannot be seriously contended that. Consistent w/principlethat registration of property in name of only one spouse doesn’t negate possibility of it being conjugal (Bucoy vs. 2012 § Leave a Comment BELCODERO v. However. FACTS: The prpoerty was acquired by Alayo then transferred title to the name of the second wife. COURT OF APPEALS September 25. we have to likewise take note of the new Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988. Due to lack of proof. Now. Alayo Bosing died Lucia Embrado. The property unquestionably was acquired by Alayo it was just transferred to Josefa. clear & convincing and left the property to his paramour turned second wife (first marriage still subsisting). Paulino). Doesn’t say when propertieswere obtained. proof to rebut the presumption. 1993 (227 SCRA 303) June 27. COURT OF APPEALS October 20. HELD: The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana.marriage of their parents before he caninvoke the presumption. of Zamboanga del .properties are considered exclusive to Emilio. Torregianis instituted in the Court of First Instance. 1994 (233 SCRA 335) FACTS: This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while living with a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. of course. It should be interpreted as Emilo is the owner. presumption does not exist. has ensued during the latter Code’s regime. Embrado.property registered in his name alone & that he is married. bought LOT NO. simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayo’s request. Acquisition of title (actual owning of land) is different fromregistration. as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law spouse. she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. Moises should have presented sufficient proof toshow that properties were acquired during the marriage so that he may enjoy thepresumption under Art. the effects of the document would retroact to the 15th day of April 1941. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407). titles used by RTC in declaring properties as CP(see RTC decision in bold letters) are insufficient proof. Possible that Emilio acquired properties when he was still a bachelor & only registered such after marriage. now Regional Trial Court. unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Embrado sold the lot described as her own paraphernal property tp her adopted daughter. “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. COURT OF APPEALS EMBRADO and TORREGIANI v. HOLDING: Petition dismissed.” This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted. who was already married to petitioner Oreste Torregiani. EMBRADO and TORREGIANI v. thus. “Married to” phrase is a mere description of Emilio’s civil status at the time of registration (Litam v Rivera). Eda sold the lot to tohers. The document provided that even though the deed was prepared and signed on 2 July 1946. Eda Jimenez. 564 in her name alone. The property had been bought by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950 but the final deed. First wife petitioned. 160. the date the lot and its improvements were actually sold to Lucia C. Both require sufficient.

“(w)hen the sale is made through a public instrument. Under Art. “ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501.” The second paragraph of Art. the same became conjugal upon the construction of the residential/commercial building in 1958.” Under this article. which was duly supported by the testimony of Matias Carpitanos. (b) the ownership of the land by one of the spouses. correction is called for and will hereby be effected. Both acts being proscribed by law. at the expense of the partnership. for obligations incurred by the latter while engaged in a business that had admittedly redounded to the benefit of the family. ISSUE: WON the property is exclusive of Embrado or conjugal property. Although there is no The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in the Court of First . the land becomes conjugal upon the construction of the building without awaiting reimbursement before or at the liquidation of the partnership upon the concurrence of two conditions. COURT OF APPEALS In the case at bar. The conditions have been fully met in the case at bench. 1496 of the Civil Code. 1498. reconveyance and damages alleging that he did not consent to the sale. Although ownership was acquired during the marriage and hence presumed conjugal. 2012 § Leave a Comment MARIANO v. the Venta Definitiva over Lot 564 in favor of Lucia Embrado was executed by the Carpitanoses on 2 July 1946 when her marriage to petitioner Oreste Torregiani was already subsisting. MARIANO v. the presumption of conjugality was successfully overcome by the terms of the Venta Definitiva which contains a positive assertion of exclusive ownership. we cannot adopt its conclusion that because Lucia and the original owners agreed in 1941 for its purchase and sale. evidence on the source of funds used. one of the original sellers of the lot. COURT OF APPEALS September 26. to wit: (a) the construction of the building at the expense of the partnership. or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. also pertain to the partnership. if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Thus. it is a fact that there is a construction in 1958 of a residential/commercial building on said lot a part of which was leased to third persons and another part serving as the conjugal dwelling. However. the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract. even if Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia as evident from the “Venta Definitiva”. but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. ownership was already acquired by Lucia at that moment. annulment of sales.” and under Art. and. 1989 (174 SCRA 335) FACTS: The proceedings at bar concern (1) an attempt by a married man to prevent execution against conjugal property of a judgment rendered against his wife. during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses. HELD: The court agrees with respondent court that Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia.Norte an action for declaration of nullity of contract. 158 of the Civil Code provides that “*b+uildings constructed. it is presumed to be conjugal funds. and (2) the interference by a court with the proceedings on execution of a co-equal or coordinate court. which consent was necessary because Lot 564 was conjugal property.\ June 7.

but of the conjugal partnership of the Sanchez Spouses and Development Corporation (AIDC). being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982. He filed a complaint for annulment of the execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in his capacity as administrator of the conjugal partnership. appointed deputy sheriff. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services. or by separate action. for recovery of the value of ladies’ ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter. Respondent Alfredo Ching. 1998 (286 SCRA 272) FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. if in the end. CA and SPOUSES CHING February 12. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. Esther’s husband. were exempt from execution. ISSUE: WON the claim that property levied on in execution of a judgment is not property of the judgment debtor. Simply stated. no actual benefit may be proved. and the income derived therefrom had been expended. that Esther had engaged in business with her husband’s consent.. whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ. and rightly so. He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife. moreover. the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wife’s obligations in the premises cannot be disputed ISSUE: What debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership? AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVT CORP. In any case.000. . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.300. that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership . It is immaterial. some of the personal property levied on.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract. Magsajo. he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession. Daniel. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. as aforestated. For it being established. RTC issued writ of execution. to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. that contract falls within the term . EVP of PBM. And ABELARDO MAGSAJO v. Daniel Sanchez. in part at least. .Instance at Caloocan City.e. i.” Here. for the support of her family. . Thereafter. where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business. now made his move. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC. his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Daniel Sanchez’s wife. caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. and that. the law presumes. the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. HELD: In the case at bar. such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal dwelling. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband. Pending the appeal of the judgment.

Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz and while she was in Manila seeking employment (with the consent of her husband). *We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms “redounded to the benefit of” or “benefited from” on the one hand. The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching’s acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. the terms are used interchangeably. null and void. 2012 § Leave a Comment GUIANG v. Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. They mean one and the same thing. COURT OF APPEALS June 26. However. consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood. In the second assignment of error. as a surety for his own employer. Later.” As can be seen.Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision? On the other hand. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale. his shares would appreciate. this should not be taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession . Petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing. which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband. and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor. and “for the benefit of” on the other. alone be categorized as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void.” Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. Article 122 of the Family Code provides that “The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang one half of their conjugal peoperty. when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement. Upon her return to Cotabato. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. GUIANG v. that contract cannot.” The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded. i. respondent gathered her children and went back to the subject property. both use the term “for the benefit of. there was an amicable settlement between the parties. Feeling that she had the shorter end of the bargain. if the money or services are given to another person or entity.. The court are likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive acted or was persuaded to act. and it would enhance his career. 1998 (291 SCRA 372) FACTS: The petitioners claim that the benefits were: employment of Ching would be prolonged. while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.e.” On the other hand. COURT OF APPEALS September 26. . The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. it is “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. No presumption can be inferred that. these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect. the petitioner advances the view that acting as surety is part of the business or profession of the respondent-husband. by itself. respondent filed an Amended Complaint against her husband and petitioners.

the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause. Art 124 of the FC rules that In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. The settlement. To constitute a valid contract. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale. By no stretch of the imagination. after which the barangay authorities secured an “amicable settlement” and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. A void contract cannot be ratified. (2) object. and (3) consent. the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. following the last sentence of Article 124.ISSUE: WON contract without the consent of wife is void HELD: Yes. the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. Respondent’s consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. however. Neither can the “amicable settlement” be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties. the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar. can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124. petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent. . does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. In the absence of such authority or consent. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent’s consent.

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