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POLICY November 2008


The U.S. Military’s Expanding Role
in Foreign Assistance
The Congress and new Administration should ensure civilian agencies have the
The military’s necessary mandates, funding and personnel to lead U.S. diplomatic, humanitarian
growing and development efforts. The military should not take on development work to
involvement in
compensate for resource gaps in USAID and the Department of State. The currently
and development expanding assistance programs of the Department of Defense should be thoroughly
assistance is a evaluated to ensure effectiveness in meeting its security objectives. U.S. military
serious concern to should, as a rule, be used in disaster relief as a last resort, in situations requiring an
nongovernmental extraordinarily quick response or large lift capacity. The military response should be
organizations limited in geographic and programmatic scope, and should always be in support of
(NGOs). Its
civilian agencies.
operations often
blur the line
between NGOs Actions
acting in accord
with humanitarian • Rebuild civilian personnel and resource capacities at the Department of State and
principles, and the a newly constituted, elevated independent development agency (see separate
military’s pursuit briefing paper) by providing robust support in the international affairs budget;
of political and • Rewrite and reauthorize the Foreign Assistance Act to promote and protect hu-
security objectives.
manitarian and development priorities, including reinvigorating related expertise
In the development
arena differences and resources; and
in mandate and • Conduct a full review of Department of Defense programs and regional combat-
training make the ant command activities relating to foreign assistance. Determine the appropriate-
military a poor ness and effectiveness of the Department’s security, humanitarian and develop-
substitute for ment aid programs and the extent to which they are redundant.
civilian experts.

These steps will help address the imbalance among the three pillars of national se-
curity: defense, diplomacy and development. In combination, they will improve U.S.
Government capacity to address poverty through effective development assistance
1400 16th Street, NW and eliminate duplicative Department of Defense programs, thus freeing up scarce
Suite 210 military resources for tasks critical to its core mission.
Washington, DC 20036
Since 1998, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) derstanding of local societies, employ largely local staff, and
share of U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) in- design projects with community participation and cultural
creased from 3.5% to 22%. The DoD has dramatically sensitivity to ensure sustainability. NGOs operate in a mul-
expanded its relief, development and reconstruction as- tilateral context with the host government taking the lead,
sistance through programs such as Section 1207, the Com- and, when local institutions are  not functioning, with the
manders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the UN. As a result, instead of using weapons or armed guards
Combatant Commanders’ Initiative Fund, and through the for their security, NGOs rely on an “acceptance” model that
activities of the regional combatant commands, particularly rests upon perceived impartiality and the trust of the com-
AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM, and the Provincial Reconstruc- munities in which they work. In conflict situations, NGO
tion Teams (PRTs). staff generally keep their distance from the military unless
Like the military, humanitarian non-governmental orga- deemed necessary to address civilian needs. This is not an
nizations (NGOs) adhere to a strict set of principles and stan- expression of hostility to the military, but instead a neces-
dards of behavior. For NGOs these are based on the  Code sary and vital measure for their security – security that de-
of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent pends on community belief in their neutrality and indepen-
Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster dence from political and military actors.
Relief. This code of conduct binds signatories to the follow- The military, therefore, should not consider NGOs as “force
ing key principles: extenders” or assume their cooperation, and should leave
• The Humanitarian Imperative: Every human being has development and humanitarian response to civilian agen-
the right to humanitarian assistance when affected by a cies and NGOs as much as possible. NGOs recognize that
natural or man-made disaster; communication with military actors is mutually beneficial
• Independence: NGO staff must not knowingly allow when conducted in a neutral space, and guidelines exist to
themselves to be used by governments or other groups help improve NGO-military relations when they operate in
for non-humanitarian purposes; and a common space. Although the InterAction- Department of
• Impartiality: Assistance is provided according to need, Defense Guidelines apply in hostile and potentially hostile
without regard to race, religion, nationality or political af- environments, they are useful in any environment where
filiation. the military is present.
The military should focus on its mandate and its strengths
Militaries have frequently been involved in natural disas- including security sector reform, maritime security, and mili-
ter response where their logistical resources, air and marine tary-to-military trainings in civilian protection and HIV/AIDS.
transport capabilities, and engineering services can be of However, when the military does engage in humanitarian and
significant help in specific contexts. Such efforts are most development activities, its involvement should be approved,
effective when coordinated with civilian expertise, which led and coordinated by civilian agencies. It is important that
can be found in USAID, the United Nations and NGOs. the “do no harm” principle is respected. The military should
In other disaster contexts, however, the military’s involve- develop clearly specified security and developmental objec-
ment can be deeply problematic. The U.S. military’s chief tives before implementing any assistance project and should
focus is security. Its relief and development activities em- regularly monitor progress towards achieving these goals.
phasize winning the “hearts and minds” of a population. Relations between the military and NGOs should adhere to
Moreover, the military generally lacks specialized humani- the Guidelines (attached) and military uniforms should be
tarian and development expertise. Quick-impact projects worn at all times, without exception.
and other force protection activities motivated by security
objectives may undermine sustainable development proj-
ects and relationships built by NGO workers. Well-intended
projects may have negative consequences and are often
unsustainable due to the military’s short-term goals and
high turnover. Relief activities by the military can also com-
promise the security of NGO staff in or near conflict areas
by blurring the lines between humanitarian and military
NGOs take a different approach: they generally make a
long-term commitment to a situation, acquire a deep un-
POLICY November 2008


Recognizing the contribution of UN peacekeeping to the achievement of our
In recent years strategic objectives, the U.S. should seek to strengthen the UN’s ability to deploy
United Nations the large, multidimensional peacekeeping operations needed to resolve the world’s
members (including
complex conflicts situations. The U.S. should show positive leadership through
the U.S.) have
charged UN consistent financial and material support, the promulgation of necessary UN institu-
peacekeeping tional reforms, and the development of stronger institutional linkages between the
operations have U.S. Department of State and the UN peacekeeping system. Furthermore, the U.S.
been charged should actively use its leadership position on the UN Security Council to ensure that
with increasingly peacekeeping is not weakened and discredited through irresponsible deployments.
complex and
tasks. However, Actions
expectations and • Demonstrate the renewed U.S. commitment to UN peacekeeping through the
responsibilities have prompt and complete payment of the U.S. share of current UN peacekeeping
not been matched costs, and the payment of U.S. peacekeeping arrears;
with the increases • Remove the legislative cap on U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping opera-
in financial, tions, allowing us to fully meet our obligations to the UN and to pay off all arrears
material, and
incurred under the cap;
political support
necessary to fulfill • Use U.S. leadership to ensure that UN peacekeeping missions are provided with
these mandates the resources necessary to fulfill their mandates, including equipment, troops,
and meet related and political backing to resolve the crises in areas in which peacekeepers deploy;
expectations. • Use U.S. leadership on the UN Security Council to ensure that UN peacekeeping is
used responsibly and judiciously; and
• Take a leading role in the reform of UN institutions needed to reinforce the UN’s
ability to mount credible, sustained peacekeeping operations, during which
peacekeepers guilty of human rights violations are held to account.

1400 16th Street, NW Re-investment in UN peacekeeping will strengthen and expand the capacity of the
Suite 210 UN to effectively and consistently protect civilians, and stabilize weak and failing
Washington, DC 20036
states. It will also send a strong signal of the Administration’s intention to reclaim
202-667-8227 the U.S. role as a respected leader in the international community.
There are over 100,000 UN peacekeepers deployed in prove the security situation for Somali people or the delivery
20 missions on four continents around the world. These op- of humanitarian assistance.
erations all originate with the UN Security Council, which au- And yet, regardless of the enormous challenges faced by
thorizes the missions through Security Council Resolutions modern peacekeeping, the multilateral UN approach has
and regularly reviews their mandates. proved to be a successful and cost efficient way to promote
Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping no lon- international peace and security. A 2005 RAND study found
ger resembles the “classical” observation missions of lightly that multinational UN forces are far better suited than uni-
armed troops monitoring ceasefire agreements. Today’s lateral U.S. forces to perform peacekeeping responsibilities.
peacekeeping missions are complex operations deployed Furthermore, the Office of Management and Budget gave
into active conflict zones. Modern peacekeepers are asked the U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping (CIPA account) its
to create stability, protect civilians, demobilize ex-combat- highest rating under the OMB Program Assessment Rating
ants, and guide the development of democratic institutions Tool. As part of this assessment, UN peacekeeping efforts
that respect human rights and uphold the rule of law. Peace- were judged to be consistent with State Department objec-
keeping today often represents a comprehensive effort to tives, consistently achieving stated the goals.
stabilize and reconstruct failed and failing states. As a permanent member of the Security Council with the
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations man- power to veto any Security Council Resolution, the U.S. ef-
ages UN civilian and military peacekeepers working to pro- fectively has the right to withhold approval for any mission
mote values and institutions that coincide directly with U.S. or mandate it considers ill conceived. Yet the U.S. routinely
political and strategic interests. Throughout the world, UN continues to underfund the U.S. share of the costs of these
peacekeeping efforts strive to prevent conflict, protect civil- operations – this despite the fact that we have approved
ians affected by armed conflict, to uphold the human rights, the missions. This, in turn, encourages other UN member
and to promote stability and good governance. For example, states to do the same, with the result that UN peacekeep-
in southern Sudan UN peacekeepers have been deployed to ing operations routinely fall behind in payments for troops
support and promote the U.S.-backed Comprehensive Peace and equipment, jeopardizing the ability of peacekeepers to
Agreement that brought over two decades of brutal civil war do their jobs, and thereby putting vulnerable people even
to an end. further at risk.
Reports of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers threaten The U.S. has a projected debt of over $1.3 billion based on
to overshadow their positive contributions to prevent and the administration’s FY09 CIPA request due to a legislative
secure peace. While the UN has implemented significant re- cap on U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.
forms to prevent and address sexual exploitation and abuse Congress retroactively lifted the 25% cap on payments to
by peacekeepers, including mandatory pre-deployment UN peacekeeping for 2005 – 2008 and provided $190 million
trainings and the establishment of a conduct and discipline to pay off some of its debts through the FY08 supplemental.
unit at headquarters and in the field, more needs to be done. The FY09 appropriations bill contains language to prevent
The U.S. should press troop contributing countries to hold further arrears and Congress and the Administration should
accused nationals legally accountable and to incorporate continue to work together to permanently remove the leg-
the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse into stan- islative cap to demonstrate our commitment and support to
dard military training. these critical peacekeeping missions.
In spite of the complexity, sensitivity and danger involved In short, despite the amazing strides and accomplish-
in conducting modern UN peacekeeping, UN missions are ments of UN peacekeeping over the last two decades, the
routinely deployed with mandates that far exceed the equip- system under tremendous financial and political strain – this
ment, staff, troop numbers and political support they re- at a time when the need for and demands on it are greater
ceive to get the job done. Also problematic is the increasing than ever. The new Administration has the opportunity to
inclination of UN member states to deploy UN peacekeepers use leadership on this matter to re-assert the U.S. as a global
into situations where there is no peace to keep, creating un- leader in the defense of human rights, the prevention of
reasonable expectations and damaging the credibility of the mass atrocities, and a leader of states by making a renewed
UN peacekeeping system as a whole. For example, current commitment to the development and responsible use of UN
US pressure to deploy a large-scale peacekeeping operation peacekeeping.
in Somalia ignores the reality that military intervention in an
environment where there is no peace to keep will actually
result in a further escalation of violence, and will not im-
POLICY November 2008


Guidelines for Relations
Between U.S. Armed Forces
and Non-Governmental
Humanitarian Organizations
in Hostile or Potentially
Hostile Environments

Previously published by n March 8, 2005, the heads of major U.S. humanitarian organizations and U.S. civilian
United States Institute and military leaders met at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) to launch a discussion on
of Peace, InterAction,
the challenges posed by operations in combat and other nonpermissive environments.
and the Department of
Defense, July 2007. The Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Nonpermissive Environments, facilitated by
USIP, was created as a result of this meeting.
InterAction, the umbrella organization for many U.S. NGOs, has coordinated the non-gov-
ernmental delegation.1 Repre­sentatives from the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for Inter­national Development have partici-
pated on behalf of the U.S. Government.

1. Recommended Guidelines
Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian
Agencies in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments
The following guidelines should facilitate interaction between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-
Governmental Organizations (see Key Terms) belonging to InterAc­tion that are engaged in hu-
manitarian relief efforts in hos­tile or potentially hostile environments. (For the purpos­es of these
guidelines, such organizations will henceforth be referred to as Non-Governmental Humanitar-
ian Or­ganizations, or NGHOs.) While the guidelines were devel­oped between the Department
of Defense (DOD) and Inter-Action, DOD intends to observe these guidelines in its deal­ings with
the broader humanitarian assistance com­munity. These guidelines are not intended to consti­
tute advance endorsement or approval by either par­ty of particular missions of the other but are
premised on a defacto recognition that U.S. Armed Forces and NGHOs have often occupied the
same operational space in the past and will undoubtedly do so in the future. When this does oc­
1400 16th Street, NW
cur, both sides will make best efforts to observe these guidelines, recognizing that operational
Suite 210
Washington, DC 20036
necessity may require deviation from them. When breaks with the guidelines occur, every effort
should be made to explain what prompted the deviation in order to promote transparency and avoid dis­traction from the critical task of providing essential relief to a population in need.

1 The InterAction delegation includes CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the International Medical Corps, the Interna- tional Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Refugees International, Save the Children, and World Vision.
A. For the U.S. Armed Forces, the following guidelines that follow, NGHOs should minimize their activities at mili-
should be observed consistent with military force protec- tary bases and with U.S. Armed Forces personnel of a nature
tion, mission ac­complishment, and operational require- that might compromise their inde­pendence.
ments: 7. NGHOs may, as a last resort, request military pro­tection
1. When conducting relief activities, military personnel for convoys delivering humanitarian assis­tance, take advan-
should wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid tage of essential logistics support available only from the
being mistaken for NGHO representatives. U.S. Armed Forces military, or accept evacuation assistance for medical treat-
personnel and units should not display NGHO logos on any ment or to evacuate from a hostile environment. Provision
military clothing, vehicles, or equipment. This does not pre- of such military support to NGHOs rests solely within the
clude the appropriate use of symbols recognized under the discretion of the military forces and will not be undertaken
law of war, such as a red cross, when appropriate. U.S. Armed if it interferes with higher priority military activities. Sup­port
Forces may use such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, generally will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accor-
and equipment in appropriate situations. dance with applicable U.S. law.
2. Visits by U.S. Armed Forces personnel to NGHO sites
should be by prior arrangement. C. Recommendations on forms of coordination, to the
3. U.S. Armed Forces should respect NGHO views on the extent fea­sible, that will minimize the risk of confusion be-
bearing of arms within NGHO sites. tween military and NGHO roles in hostile or potentially hos-
4. U.S. Armed Forces should give NGHOs the option of tile environments, subject to military force protection, mis-
meeting with U.S. Armed Forces personnel outside military sion accomplishment, and operational requirements are:
installations for information exchanges. 1. NGHO liaison officer participation in unclassified secu-
5. U.S. Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as “force rity briefings conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces.
multipliers” or “partners” of the military, or in any other fash- 2. Unclassified information sharing with the NGHO liaison
ion that could compromise their independence and their officer on security conditions, operational sites, location of
goal to be perceived by the population as independent. mines and unexploded ordnance, hu­manitarian activities,
6. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should avoid and population movements, insofar as such unclassified in-
interfering with NGHO relief efforts directed toward seg- formation sharing is forthe purpose of facilitating humani-
ments of the civilian population that the military may re- tarian operations and the security of staff and local person-
gard as unfriendly. nel engaged in these operations.
7. U.S. Armed Forces personnel and units should respect 3. Liaison arrangements with military commands prior
the desire of NGHOs not to serve as implementing partners to and during military operations to deconflict military and
for the military in conducting relief activities. However, in- relief activities, including for the purpose of protection of
dividual NGOs may seek to cooperate with the military, in humanitarian installations and personnel and to inform mili-
which case such cooperation will be carried out with due tary personnel of humanitarian relief objectives, mo­dalities
regard to avoiding compromise of the security, safety, and of operation, and the extent of prospective or on­going civil-
independence of the NGHO community at large, NGHO rep- ian humanitarian relief efforts.
resentatives, or public perceptions of their independence. 4. Military provision of assistance to NGHOs for hu­
manitarian relief activities in extremis when civil­ian provid-
B. For NGHOs, the following guidelines should be ob- ers are unavailable or unable to do so. Such assistance will
served: not be provided if it interferes with higher priority military
1. NGHO personnel should not wear military-style cloth- activities.
ing. This is not meant to preclude NGHO per­sonnel from
wearing protective gear, such as hel­mets and protective 2. Recommended Processes
vests, provided that such items are distinguishable in color/ A. Procedures for NGHO/military dialogue during con-
appearance from U.S. Armed Forces issue items. tingency planning for DOD relief operations in a hostile or
2. NGHO travel in U.S. Armed Forces vehicles should be potentially hostile environment:
lim­ited to liaison personnel to the extent practical. 1. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief send a small
3. NGHOs should not have facilities co-located with facili- num­ber of liaison officers to the relevant combatant com-
ties inhabited by U.S. Armed Forces personnel. mand for discussions with the contingency planners respon-
4. NGHOs should use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, sible for designing relief operations.
and buildings when security conditions permit. 2. NGHOs engaged in humanitarian relief assign a small
5. NGHO personnel’s visits to military facilities/sites should number of liaison officers to the relevant combat­ant com-
be by prior arrangement. mand (e.g., one liaison was stationed at U.S. CENTCOM for 6
6. Except for liaison arrangements detailed in the sec­tions of the first 12 months of the war in Afghanistan, and one was
in Kuwait City before U.S. forces entered Iraq in 2003). D. Possible organizations that could serve as a bridge be-
3. The relevant military planners, including but not lim­ited tween NGHOs and U.S. Armed Forces in the field2, e.g., U.S.
to the Civil Affairs representatives of the rele­vant command- Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of
er, meet with humanitarian relief NGHO liaison officers at a Military Affairs, State Department’s Office of the Coordina-
mutually agreed location. tor for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the
UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator:
B. Procedures for NGHOs and the military to access as- If the U.S. Agency for International Development or the
sessments of humanitarian needs. U.S. military and NGHO State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruc-
representatives should explore the following: tion and Stabilization agree to serve a liaison function, they
1. Access to NGHO and military assessments directly from should be prepared to work with the broader NGHO commu-
a DOD or other U.S. Government Web site. nity in addition to U.S. Government implementing partners.
2. Access to NGHO and military assessments through an The UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator or his/her rep­
NGO serving in a coordination role and identifying a com- resentative could be a strong candidate to serve as liaison
mon Web site. because he/she normally would be responsible for working
3. Access to NGHO and military assessments through a U.S. with all NGHOs and maintaining contact with the host gov-
Government or United Nations (UN) Web site. ernment or a successor regime.

C. Procedures for NGHO liaison relationships with com- Key Terms
batant commands that are engaged in planning for mili- Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): In wider us-
tary operations in hostile or potentially hostile environ- age, the term NGO can be applied to any nonprofit organiza-
ments. (NGHO liaison personnel are provided by the NGHO tion that is independent from government. However, for the
community): pur­poses of these guidelines, the term NGO refers to a pri-
1. The NGHO liaison officer should not be physically locat- vate, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated
ed within the military headquarters, but if feasible, should be to alle­viating human suffering; and/or promoting education,
close to it in order to allow for daily contact. health care, economic development, environmental protec-
2. The NGHO liaison officer should have appropriate ac- tion, hu­man rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encour-
cess to senior-level officers within the combatant com­ aging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil
mands and be permitted to meet with them as necessary society. (JP 3-08/JP 1-02)
and feasible. Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations (NG­
3. There should be a two-way information flow. The NGHO HOs): For the purposes of these guidelines, NGHOs are or­
liaison officer should provide details on NGHO capabilities, ganizations belonging to InterAction that are engaged in
infrastructure if any, plans, concerns, etc. The military should humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hos­tile
provide appropriate details regarding minefields, unexplod- environments. NGHOs are a subset of the broader NGO
ed ordnance, other haz­ards to NGHOs, access to medical fa- community.
cilities, evacuation plans, etc. Independence for NGHOs: Independence is defined in the
4. The NGHO liaison officer should have the opportunity same way as it is in the Code of Conduct of the International
to brief military commanders on NGHO objectives, the Code Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
of Conductof the International Federation of Red Cross and and NGOs Engaged in Disaster Relief: Independence is de-
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and NGOs Engaged in Disas­ter fined as not acting as an instrument of government foreign
Relief, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Com­mittee policy. NGHOs are agencies that act independently from
(IASC) Guidelines, country-specific guidelines based on the governments. NGHOs therefore, formulate their own poli-
IASC Guidelines, and, if desired, The Sphere Project Humani- cies and implementation strategies and do not seek to im-
tarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. plement the policy of any government, except insofar as it
U.S. Armed Forces personnel should have the opportunity to coincides with their own independent policies. To maintain
brief NGHOs, to the extent appropriate, on U.S. Government independence, NGHOs will never knowingly—or through
and coalition goals and policies, mon­itoring principles, ap- negligence— allow themselves, or their employees, to be
plicable laws and rules of engage­ment, etc. used to gath­er information of a political, military, or econom-
5. The NGHO liaison officer could continue as a liaison at ically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that
higher headquarters even after a Civil-Military Operations may serve purposes other than those that are strictly humani­
Center (CMOC) or similar mechanism is established in-coun-
try. Once this occurs, liaison officers of individual NGHOs
2 In situations in which there is no actor to serve as a bridge, a US military
could begin coordination in-country through the CMOC for Civil Affairs cell could serve as a temporary point-of-contact between NG-
civil–military liaison. HOs and other elements of the US Armed Forces.
tarian, nor will they act as instruments of foreign policy of
donor governments.
InterAction: InterAction is the largest coalition of U.S.-
based international development and humanitarian non­
governmental organizations. With over 165 members op-
erating in every developing country, InterAction works to
overcome poverty, exclusion, and suffering by advancing
ba­sic dignity for all.
POLICY November 2008


Contributors to NGO and Military Relations Policy Brief

Organization URL
American Jewish World Service
American Red Cross
American Refugee Committee
Catholic Relief Services
CHF International
Christian Children’s Fund
Church World Service
Habitat for Humanity International
International Medical Corps
International Rescue Committee
Jesuit Refugee Service
Mercy Corps
Oxfam America
Refugee Council USA
Refugees International
Relief International
Save the Children
US Fund for UNICEF
Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children
World Vision

InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Working Group

Organization URL
Action Against Hunger (USA)
Adventist Development and Relief Agency International
African Medical & Research Foundation, Inc.
Air Serv International
Alliance to End Hunger
American Friends Service Committee
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
1400 16th Street, NW
Suite 210 American Jewish World Service
Washington, DC 20036 American Near East Refugee Aid
202-667-8227 American Red Cross International Services American Refugee Committee
America's Development Foundation Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team
InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Working Group (cont)

Organization URL

Baptist World Alliance/Baptist World Aid
Brother's Brother Foundation, The
Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC)
Catholic Medical Mission Board
Catholic Relief Services
CHF International
Christian Children's Fund
Christian Reformed World Relief Committee
Church World Service
CONCERN Worldwide US Inc.
Congressional Hunger Center
Counterpart International, Inc.
Direct Relief International
Doctors of the World, Inc.
Episcopal Relief and Development
Ethiopian Community Development Council
Food for the Hungry
Friends of Liberia
Handicap International
Heart to Heart International
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society
Help the Afghan Children
Immigration and Refugee Services of America
International Aid
International Catholic Migration Commission
International Medical Corps
International Orthodox Christian Charities
International Relief and Development
International Relief Teams
International Rescue Committee
Islamic Relief
Jesuit Refugee Service/USA
Korean American Sharing Movement
Latter-day Saint Charities
Lutheran World Relief
MAP International
Mercy Corps
Mercy-USA for Aid and Development, Inc.
National Peace Corps Association
Northwest Medical Teams
Operation USA
Oxfam America
Partners for Development
Physicians for Human Rights
Presbyterian Disaster Assistance and Hunger Program
InterAction Humanitarian Policy and Practice Working Group (cont)

Organization URL

Project HOPE, The People-to-People Health
Foundation, Inc.
Refugees International
RELIEF International
Salvation Army World Service Office, The
Save the Children
Trickle Up Program, The
U.S. Association for the UN High Commissioner for
U.S. Fund for UNICEF
United Jewish Communities
United Methodist Committee on Relief
World Concern
World Education
World Emergency Relief
World Relief Corporation
World Vision