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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 1 of 4

Yoel Tobin

From: Yoel Tobin [ytobin@9-11commission.gov]
Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 1:34 PM
To: 'DByman@9-11commission.gov'
Subject: Levitt MFR

I have made a few additional changes. I have shown deletions by using strikeout, and additions by using
bold. Let me know if you are ok with these changes. Thanks!

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of Matthew Levitt

Date: October 28, 2003

Classification: Unclassified

Prepared by: Yoel Tobin & Dan Byrnan

Team numbers: 1 and 3

Location: K Street, Conference Room

Participant: Matthew Levitt, Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Participants - Commission: Dan Byman & Yoel Tobin

Background

Mr. Levitt is currently a Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies at the Washington Institute for Near
Policy. Before that, he served as a counterterrorism analyst at the FBI from November 1998 through
November 2001. At the FBI, he focused primarily on Palestinian
terrorist groups, but also worked on issues relating to Osama bin Laden and Al
Qaeda.

Combating Terrorist Financing

Mr. Levitt commented on the efforts by the United States Government (USG) to combat terrorist
financing. He said that the USG has "a far way to go," although the situation has improved somewhat
since 9/11.

Mr. Levitt said that there should be no distinction between material supporters of terrorism and those
who pull the trigger or activate the bomb, i.e., there they are all equally culpable.

Mr. Levitt emphasized the permeable borders between terrorist groups and the need to crack down on
terrorist financing across the board, rather than restricting our efforts to Al Qaeda. He believes that
support networks for Al Qaeda frequently support other Islamic terrorist groups, as well, and gave

11/7/2003
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 2 of 4

examples of overlapping assistance to both Hamas and Al Qaeda. He also believes that it is a moral
imperative to have a consistent, across-the-board counterterrorism policy against groups that target
civilians.

The FBI

Levitt was critical of the FBI in several respects. He said disapprovingly that before 9/11 DOJ and FBI
management would only prosecute persons who gave money to terrorist groups if there was proof that
the donor knowingly intended to finance a terrorist attack. He also stated that the FBI is poorly
organized and that for bureaucratic reasons it insists on pigeonholing cases into discreet categories by
terrorist group, when in fact the boundaries between groups are often fluid. He noted that the
information sharing problems of the FBI missed the point: the FBI often did not share information with
itself, let alone with the rest of the government. In addition, he asserted that the FBI sometimes
withheld relevant information from its analysts, and that there was a dearth of strategic analysis because
good analysts were often pulled into operational units. During crisis periods, senior analysts were
sometimes assigned secretarial duties because managers were reluctant to ask secretaries to work late at
night. He believes that many of these problems persist today.

With regard to the Government's post-9/11 efforts against terrorist financing, Mr. Levitt praised the
efforts of Treasury's outgoing General Counsel David Aufhauser. At the same time, he criticized the
USG's structure as cumbersome (e.g., persistence of different terrorist lists) and said that the USG
needs a senior official who focuses on terrorist financing and chairs the PCC dealing with that issue.
Also, the USG needs a culture change so that everyone is working to contribute to the overall
interagency effort.

Mr. Levitt also thought that there were additional entities that should have been shut down, even
allowing for the fact that in some cases nonaction was justified because of ongoing intelligence
investigations. In addition, many of the terrorism lists are not complimentary, with radicals on one list
but not another.

Saudi Arabia

Mr. Levitt also addressed the role of Saudi Arabia in financing terrorist groups. He stated that the
Kingdom is not doing everything it can and should be doing to choke off terrorist financing. Much of
the Kingdom's clerical elite is sympathetic to Bin Ladin. He singled out Prince Nayef, the Saudi
Interior Minister, as a major problem. He charged that Prince Nayef does not cooperate with the USG,
that he is aware of some extremist financing, and that he consciously shields himself from information
that he does not agree with or want to hear. Mr. Levitt also asserted that much of Saudi Arabia's
religious establishment was sympathetic to parts of Bin Laden's agenda, and that Saudi diplomats have
been linked to charities that operate as fronts for terrorist groups.

Mr. Levitt gave examples of inadequate Saudi action against terrorist financing. Although the Saudis
shut down two branches of the Al-Haramain charity, those branches later reopened, and in any case the
Saudis should have taken action against the entire organization. He also expressed concern about the
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Muslim World League (MWL), the World
Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and Saudi businessman Wael Jalaidan. (Jalaidan was apparently
the subject of a joint U.S.-Saudi terrorist designation, which Prince Nayef then disavowed).

Mr. Levitt also criticized other Saudi actions, including alleged Saudi funding of mosques used by
terrorists, Saudi efforts to spread Wahabi ideology, and what he said were proactive efforts by Saudi
officials to undermine counterterrorism investigations in other countries through, e.g., the issuance of

11/7/2003
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 3 of 4

T^^^^c^rs^^^^^^^^^^^njCc^^^^^^T^rcCTrvTi^^^^^^^^TrTikJT^cn^TTiri'cirTvTtrkjTTiTC^TiT
[deleted last sentence as redundant]
There was not a major change in Saudi cooperation after September 11. The Kingdom launched a
public relations campaign and denied charges but did not fulfill provinces promises related to a
financial intelligence unit or giving FBI and IRS people on the ground direct access to the data the
Saudis receive. As a result, we don't know what we are not getting. It focused on its image, not the
problem. Mr. Levitt has not seen a marked improvement in Saudi actions since the May 12, 2003
bombings in Riyadh.

The FBI needs to be empowered and tasks tasked to run a strategic analytic review of Saudi links to
international terrorism cases in the United States. The Bureau needs to know the scope of the problem
and the details of groups and institutions with links to the Kingdom.

Mr. Levitt suggested that we speak with USG officials Cofer Black, David Aufhauser, and Stephen
Hadley to learn more about the lack of Saudi cooperation on terrorist financing. He added that there
were no simple answers to the problems with Saudi Arabia since the Saudi government is essentially
dysfunctional.

HAMAS, PIJ, and the Muslim Brotherhood

HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad are not part of the al-Qa'ida "family," but it is impossible to
disentangle their logistics networks. Doth organizations have tremendous legitimacy, and Our Arab
partners refuse to delegitimate their use of terrorism by HAMAS and PIJ, focusing instead on the
cause itself which is legitimate if peacefully articulated. More broadly, the international community
needs to delegitimate terrorist tactics and should help fill the gaps in Palestinian society that HAMAS
and PIJ fill meet the social and economic needs in Palestinian society so that Palestinians will not
need to rely on HAMAS and PIJ to meet those needs.

Levitt believes the Muslim Brotherhood should be designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Brotherhood members call for jihad and otherwise aid violence.
Hizballah and Iran

Hizballah is an extremely capable terrorist group that gets tremendous support from Iranian intelligence
and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as from Syria (which is less involved in
Hizballah's global network). Some al-Qa'ida members trained with Hizballah and learned about
spectacular attacks and how to do prcoccupational preoperational surveillance. There were also
meetings - but they did not progress e» to operational cooperation. Hizballah has close ties to the
Popular Resistance Committee in Gaza and is otherwise aiding various anti-Israel groups. Today
Hizballah is building up its international capacity. This is now latent, but it could be turned on if the
group wants to use it. Iran shelters al-Qa'ida leaders, but the relationship is tactical, not intimate.

Iraq and Syria

Al-Qa'ida and Iraq were always involved, and the current "open door" works well for the organization.
For months jihadis have crossed from Syria, and it is documented that money and supplies are coming
in. The Syrians are allowing entry into Iraq and perhaps facilitating it. Even before the war, Syria
allowed Al Qa'ida operatives to transit Syrian territory on their way to Ansar al-Islam camps in
Iraq. Saddam Husayn probably had a liaison with al-Qa'ida but not necessarily sponsorship. The war
with Iraq may not have been the best use of resources.

11/7/2003
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 4 of 4

Recommendations

U.S. diplomacy in the war on terrorism is poor. The United States cannot do everything on its own -
cutting off funding or otherwise isolating groups requires worldwide help. The Bush administration is
unnecessarily unilateral. The Arab states also are necessary to give cover on the peace process. Public
diplomacy is abysmal. The MEPI is a good first step, but small.

Domestic intelligence should be made separate from the FBI. DHS' role in intelligence is not clear.

11/7/2003
lYoel Tobin
From: dlb32@georgetown.edu
Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 11:11 AM
To: ytobin@9-11commission.gov
Cc: dlb32@georgetown.edu
Subject: Re: first part of draft MFR for Levitt

Levitt MFR.doc (35
KB)
Here is the version with my inputs. Let me know when you approve, and
I'll have it added to the system.
Dan

Original Message
From: "" <ytobin@9-llcommission.gov>
Date: Thursday, October 30, 2003 2:42 pm
Subject: first part of draft MFR for Levitt

> Dan: Below is a partial draft of the MFR for Matt Levitt. Please
> review what
> I have done and complete it at your convenience. Also, if you
> don't mind, I
> would like to review your portion before we finalize it.

> By the way, have you seen Matt's Sept. 10, 03 testimony? It
> fleshes out some
> of his contentions during the interview, (see
> http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/levitt/levitt091003.htm)
> Regards,

> Yoel

> MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

> Event: Interview of Matthew Levitt

> Date: October 28, 2003

> Classification: Unclassified

> Prepared by: Yoel Tobin & Dan Byman

> Team numbers: 1 and 3

> Location: K Street, Conference Room

> Participant: Matthew Levitt, Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies at
> the
> Washington Institute for Near East Policy

> Participants - Commission: Dan Byman & Yoel Tobin

> Background

> Mr. Levitt is currently at the Washington Institute for Near

1
Policy. Before
that, he served as a counterterrorism analyst at the FBI from
November 1998
> through November 2001. At the FBI, he focused primarily on
> Palestinian
> terrorist groups, but also worked on issues relating to Osama bin
> Laden and Al
> Qaeda.

> Combating Terrorist Financing
>
> Mr. Levitt commented on the efforts by the United States
> Government (USG) to
> combat terrorist financing. He said that the USG has "a far way
> to go, "
> although the situation has improved somewhat since 9/11.
>
> Mr. Levitt said that there should be no distinction between
> material supporters
> of terrorism and those who pull the trigger or activate the bomb,
> i.e., there
> are all equally culpable.
>
> Mr. Levitt was critical of the FBI in several respects. He said
> disapprovingly
> that before 9/11 DOJ and FBI management would only prosecute
> persons who gave
> money to terrorist groups if there was proof that the donor
> knowingly intended
> to finance a terrorist attack. He also stated that the FBI is
> poorly organized
> and that for bureaucratic reasons it insists on pigeonholing cases
> into
> discreet categories by terrorist group, when in fact the
> boundaries between
> groups are often fluid. In addition, he asserted that the FBI
> sometimes
> withheld relevant information from its analysts, and that there
> was a dearth of
> strategic analysis because good analysts were often pulled into
> operational
> units. During crisis periods, senior analysts were sometimes
> assigned
> secretarial duties because managers were reluctant to ask
> secretaries to work
> late at night. He believes that many of these problems persist
today.
>
> With regard to the Government's post-9/11 efforts against
> terrorist financing,
> Mr. Levitt praised the efforts of Treasury's outgoing General
> Counsel David
> Aufhauser. At the same time, he criticized the USG's structure as
> cumbersome
> (e.g., persistence of different terrorist lists) and said that the
> USG needs a
> senior official who focuses on terrorist financing and chairs the
> PCC dealing
> with that issue. Also, the USG needs a culture change so that
> everyone is
> working to contribute to the overall interagency effort.
>
> Mr. Levitt also thought that there were additional entities that
> should have
> been shut down, even allowing for the fact that in some cases
> nonaction was
justified because of ongoing intelligence investigations.
>
> Mr. Levitt also addressed the role of Saudi Arabia in financing
> terrorist
> groups. He stated that the Kingdom is not doing everything it can
> and should
> be doing to choke off terrorist financing. He singled out Prince
> Nayef, the
> Saudi Interior Minister, as a major problem. He charged that
> Prince Nayef does
> not cooperate with the USG, that he is aware of some extremist
> financing, and
> that he consciously shields himself from information that he does
> not agree
> with or want to hear. Mr. Levitt also asserted that much of Saudi
> Arabia's
> religious establishment was sympathetic to parts of Bin Laden's
> agenda, and
> that Saudi diplomats have been linked to charities that operate as
> fronts for
> terrorist groups.
>
> Mr. Levitt gave examples of inadequate Saudi action against
> terrorist
> financing. Although the Saudis shut down two branches of the Al-
> Haramain
> charity, those branches later reopened, and in any case the Saudis
> should have
> taken action against the entire organization. He also expressed
> concern about
> the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Muslim
> World League
> (MWL), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and Saudi
> businessman Wael
> Jalaidan. (Jalaidan was apparently the subject of a joint U.S.-
> Saudi terrorist
> designation, which Prince Nayef then disavowed).
>
> Mr. Levitt also criticized other Saudi actions, including alleged
> Saudi funding
> of mosques used by terrorists, Saudi efforts to spread Wahabi
> ideology, and
> what he said were proactive efforts by Saudi officials to
> undermine
> counterterrorism investigations in other countries through, e.g.,
> the issuance
> of visas.
>
> Mr. Levitt has not seen a marked improvement in Saudi actions
> since the May 12,
> 2003 bombings in Riyadh.
>
> Mr. Levitt suggested that we speak with USG officials Gofer Black,
> David
> Aufhauser, and Stephen Hadley to learn more about the lack of
> Saudi cooperation
> on terrorist financing. He added that there were no simple
> answers to the
> problems with Saudi Arabia since the Saudi government is
> essentially
> dysfunctional.
>
> Mr. Levitt emphasized the permeable borders between terrorist
> groups and the
> need to crack down on terrorist financing across the board, rather
> than
> restricting our efforts to Al Qaeda. He believes that support
3
networks for Al
' Qaeda frequently support other Islamic terrorist groups, as well,
'> and gave
> examples of overlapping assistance to both Hamas and Al Qaeda. He
> also
> believes that it is a moral imperative to have a consistent,
> across-the-board
> counterterrorism policy against groups that target civilians.
>
> [rest for Dan]
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Page 1 of 1

Yoel Tobin

From: Daniel Byman [dlb32@georgetown.edu]
Sent: Monday, November 03, 2003 10:39 AM
To: team6@9-11commission.gov
Cc: ytobin@9-11commission.gov
Subject: Levitt info

We interviewed Matt Levitt, largely about terrorist logistics, last week. He just sent us this bit of
information that he had passed on to the 9/11 Joint Inquiry.

I thought it would be of interest to your team.

Dan

Original Message
Subjectralso FYI
DaterMon, 03 Nov2003 10:23:43 -0500
From:"MATT LEVITT" <MATTL@washingtoninstirute.org>
To:<ytobin@9-l 1 commission.gQv>, <dlb32@georgetown.edu>

Thanks for having me in last week to give you the world according to
Matt. I apologize for having to run back to the o f f i c e .

Thought y o u ' d find the attached interesting and perhaps useful, I
submitted it to the Congressional joint inquiry at their request as
follow up to the interview I gave them. It still stands true.

Matt

Matthew A. Levitt
Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
1828 L Street, NW Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20036
Tel. 202-452-0650
Fax 202-223-5364
mat11@washingtpninsti tute.org
www. washingtoninstitute -_

11/3/2003
Yoel Tobin
From: MATT LEVITT [MATTL@washingtoninstitute.org]
Sent: Monday, November 03, 2003 10:24 AM
To: ytobin@9-11commission.gov; dlb32@georgetown.edu
Subject: also FYI

Joint 9-11 inquiry
letter.doc...

Thanks for having me in last week to give you the world according to Matt. I apologize
for having to run back to the office.

Thought you'd find the attached interesting and perhaps useful, I submitted it to the
Congressional joint inquiry at their request as follow up to the interview I gave them.
Tt~ C? 1~ 1 "I 1 e^ i- -a T-I ^ C!« f- -v~^ t s~\t still stands true.

Matt

Matthew A. Levitt
Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
1828 L Street, NW Suite 1050
Washington, DC 20036
Tel. 202-452-0650
Fax 202-223-5364
mattl@washingtoninstitute.org
www.washingtoninstitute.org
July 23, 2002

Ms. Eleanor Hill, Director of the Joint Inquiry Staff
Ford House Office Building, Room H2-167
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Ms. Hill,

In response to your staffs request, I submit to you this statement for the record offering
my assessment of the how FBI analysts are trained, used, and regarded. As someone who
served as an FBI counterterrorism intelligence analyst (an Intelligence Research
Specialist, or IRS) from November 1998 through November 2001, it is my pleasure to
provide this first-hand account of some of the central problems hindering the intelligence
function and the analytical process at the FBI. I should note that there are a number of
positions at the FBI that can be described as "analysts." My statement uses the term to
describe the IRS position, which most closely resembles the pure intelligence analyst
position common in other US government agencies.

How analysts are trained: They are not. Unlike Special Agents, who undergo specialized
training prior to assuming their posts, FBI analysts are given no training whatsoever upon
entry into the FBI. Training opportunities arise over the course of one's career, including
administrative training on the use of FBI and other computer systems, courses on specific
area studies, substantive courses on particular fields such as counterterrorism analysis
course, but nothing is offered - let alone required - upon entry on duty (EOD) and before
assuming responsibility for specific programs. The FBI's database is cumbersome and
not user-friendly, but analysts learn to use it on the job. The vast majority of analysts
join the bureau with general degrees in International Affairs, but with little substantive
knowledge or expertise in international terrorism in general or the specific regions, states,
or groups they are assigned to cover. That too is learned on the job. There is no
language training offered for analysts, nor is there any travel requirement for area
familiarization as there is for analysts in practically every other U.S. intelligence agency.
In one instance, analysts who requested such area familiarization were rebuked by FBI
management for trying to get the FBI to "pay for their vacation." In another, analysts
covering Middle Eastern terrorist groups requested Arabic language training and were
similarly rebuked for trying to get the FBI to "pay for their education." Analysts were
told - by managers with no understanding or appreciation of analysis - that they had no
need for language training to provide analysis, and that any translations they needed
could be accomplished by an FBI language specialist (LS). The training that analysts do
receive over the course of their careers is provided in nearly every instance by outside
agencies such as the CIA, DIA, and others. As such, it is relevant and important, but
does not necessarily address FBI-specific issues and circumstances.

Analysts should be trained, upon entry into the bureau and throughout their careers, in the
art of analytical thinking and writing. They should be provided guidance in the process
of absorbing tremendous quantities of information, sifting through it all, picking out the
significant information, and packaging that information in a way that best suits the needs
of the recipient audience/s. Analysts should receive language training and incentives to
engage in such training, as well as be required to travel to the regions they cover for area
familiarization and briefing tours every 1-2 years. And they should receive training in
areas studies, issues in intelligence and law enforcement, and substantive training in
international terrorism, counterterrorism, specific terrorist groups, fronts and sponsors.
Counterintelligence analysts should receive similar training particular to their field.

How analysts are used: There is no uniform procedure for using analysts or incorporating
their function into the overall operational function of the FBI. The flow of information is
controlled by the substantive operational unit, which determines if, and how, to use their
analytical counterparts. There is no mandated requirement to include analysts in the team
tasked with a specific area of responsibility, and as such some analysts are brought to
meetings and given access to information such as asset reporting and FISA wiretaps and
others are not. Often there is tension between the purely analytical IRS and the
Intelligence Operations Specialist (IOS) sitting in the operational unit. The use of
analysts is driven primarily by the individual relationships analysts establish with
operational counterparts at FBI headquarters and in FBI field offices. The few attempts
to standardize and mandate the terms, responsibilities and requirements of analytical
support to operational units, including one effort which I was tasked to help write after
the Millennial threat in December 1999 and January 2000, failed miserably after
operational units summarily disregarded them.

How analysts are regarded: Analysts are considered "support staff," no different than
secretaries or other non-specialized personnel. Analysts' professional experience and
advanced degrees are resented more than respected among many Special Agents and
lOSs, and they are regularly sidelined. Agents frequently choose not to seek the
analytical input of the their respective professional analysts, and have been known to
reject analysis out of hand when it didn't suit their needs. Asset validations, which are
not employed as frequently as required and are often ignored when critical of an Agent's
asset, are a critical example of this phenomenon. The FBI in general, and management
and operational units in particular, are Agent-driven societies. Individuals with little or
no experience in intelligence, terrorism, analysis or the particularly region of world in
question are the ones making decisions about the relevance, quality, significance and
application of intelligence analysis provided by analytical units. Being an analyst at the
FBI is a frequently demeaning and frustrating experience, especially difficult for young
professionals with advanced degrees who chose employment in the public sector over
more lucrative private sector employment in the hopes of making a difference.

Picture of career progression: While the IRS position at FBI headquarters goes up to the
GS-14 level (it is lower in the field offices), little distinction is made - if any - between
the responsibilities and expectations at different GS levels. In my own experience, I
started as a GS-11 and left as a GS-13 and served the same functions, with the same
responsibilities and no additional expectations or opportunities throughout. At age 31,1
faced the prospect of earning my GS-14 and plateauing at my own glass ceiling. There
are very few management positions for analysts, since the Bureau is so Agent-centric. In
most cases, those management positions available to career analysts are purely
administrative, while management positions available to career Agents are substantive.

In short, there is no structure, no management, whose sole purpose is to see to the
integrity of the intelligence function and the analytical process. There is no mechanism
that ensures, or even facilitates, analysts' access to information and their timely analysis
of that information. Analysts who ingratiate themselves with their operational
counterparts, often by playing by whatever rules the operational unit delineates, may be
able to position themselves to analyze source information, highlight intelligence gaps,
connect seemingly unrelated pieces of information and give form to the overall picture of
a specific case or provide an overall assessment of a terrorist group. Others will not.

Analysis needs to be recognized as a critical commodity, not an optional and
parenthetical product that can alternatively be recognized or ignored. Intelligence and
analysis should not be subservient to operations, nor should they be run or managed by
individuals with no or little expertise and exposure to intelligence, analysis and the
substantive subject area (counterterrorism, counter-intelligence, etc).

I hope you find these comments useful.

Please feel free to contact me with any additional questions.

Yours,

Matthew A. Levitt
Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies
The Washington Institute for Near East Studies
1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050
Washington, B.C. 20036
202-452-0650
mattl@washingtoninstirute.org
Mail "Sent Items: first part of draft MFR for Levitt Page 1 of 2

I 93.14MB /476.84MB (19.53%)
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2003 14:42:41 -0500
From: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>4|F
To: "" <dbyman@9-11 commission.gov>41
Subject: first part of draft MFR for Levitt

Dan: Below is a partial draft of the MFR for Matt Levitt. Please review what
I have done and complete it at your convenience. Also, if you don't mind, I
would like to review your portion before we finalize it.
By the way, haye you seen Matt's Sept. 10, 03 testimony? it fleshes out some
of his contentipns during the interview, (see
http://www.washi ngtoni nsti tute.org/medi a/1evi tt/1evi tt091003.htm)
Regards,
Yoel
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event: interview of Matthew Levitt
Date: October 28, 2003
Classification: unclassified
Prepared by: Yoel Tobin & Dan Byman
Team numbers: 1 and 3
Location: K Street, Conference Room

Participant: Matthew Levitt, senior Fellow in Terrorism studies at the
Washington institute for Near East Policy
Participants - commission: Dan Byman & Yoel Tobin

Background
Mr. Levitt is currently at the Washington Institute for Near Policy. Before
that, he served as a counterterrorism analyst at the FBI from November 1998
through November 2001. At the FBI, he focused primarily on Palestinian
terrorist groups, but also worked on issues relating to Osama bin Laden and Al
Qaeda.

Combating Terrorist Financing
Mr. Levitt commented on the efforts by the united States Government (USG) to
combat terrorist financing. He said that the USG has "a far way to go,"
although the situation has improved somewhat since 9/11.
Mr. Levitt said that there should be no distinction between material supporters
of terrorism and those who pull the trigger or activate the bomb, i.e., there
are all equally culpable.
Mr. Levitt was critical of the FBI in several respects. He said disapprovingly
that before 9/11 DOJ and FBI management would only prosecute persons who gave
money to terrorist groups if there was proof that the donor knowingly intended
to finance a terrorist attack. He also stated that the FBI is poorly organized
and that for bureaucratic reasons it insists on pigeonholing cases into
discreet categories by terrorist group, when in fact the boundaries between
groups are often fluid, in addition, he asserted that the FBI sometimes

http://kinesis.swishmail.conVwebmail/imp/rnessage.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX.Sent+Items&bo... 10/30/03
it Items:firstpart of draft MFR for Levitt Page 2 of 2

,iheld relevant information from its analysts, and that there was a dearth of
Vategic analysis because good analysts were often pulled into operational
nits. During crisis periods, senior analysts were sometimes assigned
secretarial duties because managers were reluctant to ask secretaries to work
late at night. He believes that many of these problems persist today.
with regard to the Government's post-9/11 efforts against terrorist financing,
Mr. Levitt praised the efforts of Treasury's outgoing General Counsel David
Aufhauser. At the same time, he criticized the use's structure as cumbersome
(e.g., persistence of different terrorist lists) and said that the use needs a
senior official who focuses on terrorist financing and chairs the PCC dealing
with that issue. Also, the USG needs a culture change so that everyone is
working to contribute to the overall interagency effort.
Mr. Levitt also thought that there were additional entities that should have
been shut down, even allowing for the fact that in some cases nonaction was
justified because of ongoing intelligence investigations.
Mr. Levitt also addressed the role of Saudi Arabia in financing terrorist
groups. He stated that the Kingdom is not doing everything it can and should
be doing to choke off terrorist financing. He singled out Prince Nayef, the
Saudi interior Minister, as a major problem. He charged that Prince Nayef does
not cooperate with the USG, that he is aware of some extremist financing, and
that he consciously shields himself from information that he does not agree
with or want to hear. Mr. Levitt also asserted that much of Saudi Arabia's
religious establishment was sympathetic to parts of Bin Laden's agenda, and
that Saudi diplomats have been linked to charities that operate as fronts for
terrorist groups.
Mr. Levitt gave examples of inadequate Saudi action against terrorist
financing. Although the Saudis shut down two branches of the Al-Haramain
charity, those branches later reopened, and in any case the Saudis should have
taken action against the entire organization. He also expressed concern about
the international Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Muslim world League
(MWL), the world Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and Saudi businessman wael
Dalaidan. Oalaidan was apparently the subject of a joint U.S.-Saudi terrorist
designation, which Prince Nayef then disavowed).
Mr. Levitt also criticized other Saudi actions, including alleged Saudi funding
of mosques used by terrorists, Saudi efforts to spread wahabi ideology, and
what he said were proactive efforts by Saudi officials to undermine
counterterrorism investigations in other countries through, e.g., the issuance
of visas.
Mr. Levitt has not seen a marked improvement in Saudi actions since the May 12,
2003 bombings in Riyadh.
Mr. Levitt suggested that we speak with USG officials Cofer Black, David
Aufhauser, and Stephen Hadley to learn more about the lack of Saudi cooperation
on terrorist financing. He added that there were no simple answers to the
problems with Saudi Arabia since the Saudi government is essentially
dysfunctional.
Mr. Levitt emphasized the permeable borders between terrorist groups and the
need to crack down on terrorist financing across the board, rather than
restricting our efforts to Al Qaeda. He believes that support networks for Al
qaeda frequently support other Islamic terrorist groups, as well, and gave
examples of overlapping assistance to both Hamas and Al Qaeda. He also
believes that it is a moral imperative to have a consistent, across-the-board
counterterrorism policy against groups that target civilians.
[rest for Dan]

http://kinesis.swishmail.conVwebmaiyimp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX.Sent+Items&bo... 10/30/03
QUESTIONS FOR MATT LEVITT

You've called Al Qaeda a "network of networks" in one of your articles.
Can you elaborate? How do you understand the nature of Al Qaeda pre-
9/11? Post-9/11?

The recent policywatch you authored suggests that Islamic terrorists
and their networks cross group lines and that it is a mistake to focus
on, say, Al Qaeda, to the exclusion of Hamas or Hezbollah. Can you
elaborate?

o How do we set priorities under this approach? What would
you say to those who assert that Al Qaeda represents the
real threat to the US and that we should focus our resources
on it?

What were the links, if any, between Al Qaeda and Hezbollah prior to
9/11? How have they changed post 9/11?

o You wrote in February 2003 that "although Hezbollah and AQ do
not appear to share operational support, they have engaged in
logistical cooperation on an ad hoc and tactical basis, as well as
cooperative training."

o How significant was this cooperation? Did Hezbollah contribute
significantly to Al Qaeda's capabilities? Did AQ contribute
significantly to Hezbollah's capabilities?

o How did AQ and Hezbollah bridge the Sunni/Shia divide? Will that
divide limit future cooperation?

o What can the US do to prevent these groups from cooperating?

What about links between Iran and AQ?

o Would Iran necessarily have been aware of any AQ-Hezbollah
cooperation?

o In your May 29, 2003 article on Iran, you cite U.S. intelligence reports
that Bin Laden operatives approached Iranian agents in 95 and again in
96, "offering to join forces against the United States." Can you
elaborate on this? How did the Iranians respond?

o Post 9/11: In your May 29, 2003 article, you accuse Iran of
"sheltering" AQ leadership figures. Can you elaborate? Press
reporting has been somewhat inconsistent and uncertain on whether
Iran has arrested these men, or whether it is allowing them to operate.
Is it possible that these men are in fact sitting in Iranian jails?

o If Iran is harboring AQ, is it possible that rogue elements are
responsible for this? Or can we assume that such actions would not be
taken without the approval of Khameini?

o Same question re: past Iranian support.

o As with Hezbollah, does Shia/Sunni divide limit cooperation?

o What can the US do to pressure/entice Iran to hand over Al Qaeda
men within its borders and to end any cooperation with AQ?

In your judgment, do US troops in Iraq face a serious threat from groups
like Ansar al Islam, Hezbollah, and/or AQ? Or is the primary threat
from ex-Baathists? What should the US do to minimize the threat to our
troops from Islamic terrorists?

Who do you suspect killed the 3 American guards in Gaza recently? AQ?
Hizballah? A Palestinian group? Members of a hard-to-categorize
informal network? Does this presage a shift in tactics by Islamic
extremists in Israel and the territories toward U.S. targets?

o Do you see signs that AQ is focusing more on Israeli and/or Jewish targets
than it has in the past?

If you were serving on the Commission, what policy recommendations
would you make?
Questions for Matt Levitt

1. You have been critical of the USG effort to combat terrorist financing. If you were in
charge, what concrete steps would you take, and how would those steps improve our
efforts.

2. In particular, you have been critical of Saudi Arabia and the USG effort to persuade
Saudi Arabia to crack down on terrorist financing.

• Describe your various criticisms?

• Post-9/11 change?

• To the extent you have been able to follow the changes in the Saudi's approach to
terrorism following the May 12, 03 Riyadh bombings, how do you evaluate those
changes?

3. What concrete metrics would you propose for evaluating (1) the success of the efforts
to combat terrorist financing; and (2) Saudi Cooperation in those efforts?

4. You have written, "since there is significant overlap between terrorist groups in the
area of financing, failure to deal with the financing of groups like Hamas undermines
efforts to stem the flow of funds to al-Qaeda." Jerusalem Post, August 03.

Although that is certainly true of entities shown to finance both groups, why is that true
with respect to entities only funding Hamas? In other words, if we have evidence a
person is a Hamas financier but no evidence that person funds al-Qaeda, how does
cracking down on that person help combat al-Qaeda [setting aside the independent value
in addressing Hamas fundraising]?

5. How do you respond to an argument that addressing Hamas fund-raising actually hurts
the effort to maintain a unified international front against al-Qaeda fund-raising because
of the support Hamas enjoys in much of Islamic world, and parts of Europe?

6. As a former FBI analyst, you have been critical of the FBI's analytical program. Have
you followed the FBI's efforts to improve analytical capability in the terrorist financing
area? If so, are they on the right track?

7. How do you target terrorist logistics cells more effectively? Why did the United
States not do so pre-911?
[Classification] Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Background briefing on Afghanistan and the Taliban

Type of event: Briefing

Date: August 1,2003

Special Access Issues: None—Unclassified

Prepared by: A. Albion

Team Number: 3

Location: K Street, Conference Room

Participants - Dr. Larry Goodson, US Army War College

Participants - Commission: Alexis Albion, Scott Allan, Tom Dowling, Nicole
Grandrimo, Mike Hurley, Yoel Tobin

Dr. Goodson addressed the following areas:
1. The Rise of the Taliban and al Qaeda

• Goodson dates the foundations of the Taliban to the culture wars (Islamism vs. modernization) of
the mid-late 1960s at Kabul University, which themselves grew out of two critical points in
Afghanistan's history:

1. The struggles of the 1920s between modernizing forces and resistance to modernization; and

2. The period of post-British withdrawal from the region in the early 1950s, and what Goodson
characterized as the U.S. decision not to step in but rather to leave Afghanistan to the Soviets.

• 1960s sees the emergence of Islamism, spiking again with the Iranian revolution.

• After 1979 Islamism and Soviet expansionism into the region are two major regional areas of
concern for the U.S.

• Afghan-Soviet war leads to a number of transformative factors in the region:

1. Involvement of Arabs in the war:

—Arab fighters in Afghanistan seen as "completely useless" and largely disliked by Afghans,
mostly kept in camps not far from Pakistan border and kept out of most of the lighting;

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/ification] Page 2 of 5
/
/

' -Influx of Arab money (from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE), tending to fund Islamist projects
(mosques & madrasas); Saudi money (through NGOs) continued after the war as they sought to
counter Iranian ambitions in Afghanistan.

2. Socioeconomic changes that transform traditional society:

--Traditional Afghan social structures disrupted and new, (artificial) structures emerge, eg. tribal
elders replaced by younger elites with different sources of authority (mullahs; military leaders);

—Refugee camps: an artificial environment; increasingly radical version of Islamic teaching
being taught to refugee children; stricter adherence to some tribal practices (eg. veiling of
women).

• The Taliban itself grows out of both the Afghan-Soviet war (and the involvement in it of Arab
radicals) as well as regional factors (rise of Islamism in South Asia and the Middle East),
eventually laying the foundation for al Qaeda.

• In 1997, Taliban "shifts" to the right, controlled by Mullah Omar.

2. Pakistan as a Critical Factor in the Rise of the Taliban

• Afghan-Soviet war changes the strategic calculus for Pakistan with respect to Afghanistan.

- Pre-1979, Pakistan views Afghanistan as an area to be denied to India; ISI is only moderately
engaged in Afghanistan, conducting small operations (but opening the door for greater
engagement);

— With start of the war, Pakistan becomes fully engaged, and plays the U.S. for whatever it can
get.

• Involvement of ISI: "the war is an ISI show":

— ISI officers run the resistance in Afgh., fighting, training and distributing CIA weapons;

— Individual relationships of trust between ISI, key Afghans and Afghan Arabs develop across
the porous Pashtun border over a number of years; familiar connections on both sides of the
border;

— Unique border relationship continues today: field grade and lower ISI officers probably know
where 2nd tier al Qaeda officers are.

• By the late 1980s, Pakistan had invested an enormous amount in Afghanistan:

~ shift in geo-strategic thinking (Afgh. as area of direct Pakistani involvement);

~ quiet, forward engagement (training, armed support);

— deleterious side-effects on Pakistan politics, economy and society:

— deeper sectarianism,

- upset of ethnic balance (huge influx of Afgh. refugees),

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Ossification] Page 3 of 5
/

~ rampant heroin problem,

~ corruption in government,

-- deepening Islamization.

• Post-war conditions lead Pakistan to play the Taliban card:

~ Pakistan gives itself the credit for defeat of Soviets in Afgh. and fall of Soviet empire;

~ But in post-war period Afghanistan is in chaos and Pakistan is not benefiting from the opening
of ex-Soviet markets;

~ Taliban emerges as pro-Pakistan, offering a degree of stability that will allow transit trade and
possibly a pipeline to go through Afghanistan;

• Taliban emerges as a vehicle by which Pakistan can make Afghanistan pay off its huge investment
in the region. Oil/gas in Central Asia was a secondary "downstream" issue.

• Was the Taliban its own indigenous movement or a creation of Pakistan? According to Goodson,
Taliban was an indigenous group (and not an ISI creation—though ISI had ties with groups
involved in Taliban). At some point early on, Pakistan made a conscious decision to shift its
support to the Taliban, which then grew into something less pliable than anticipated.

3. U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan/Taliban

• 1989-1996: U.S. policy of abandonment/disengagement toward Afghanistan (and Pakistan);

~ mid-late 1994, rise of Taliban and continued requests from Pakistan for U.S. engagement in
the region;

• 1996: U.S. begins to pay attention, because:

1. Taliban looks as if it can bring stability to the region, and consequently seems to have some
popular support;

2. Taliban is clearly being backed by the Paks and Saudis.

• By 1997, after Pakistan recognizes the Taliban government, U.S. is very close to doing the same
(existing predisposition to follow the Pakistan lead), but held back by the 4 issues driving USG
policy:

1. human rights issues, especially treatment of women (though Goodson sees this as a symbolic issue
only);

2. concern about opium-heroin production (though mainly a European and Pakistan problem);

3. notion of necessity for broad-based government, involving all regional groups;

4. terrorism and UBL: a real strategic concern for the U.S.

-- Late 1990s, widely spread and believed rumors throughout the region that the U.S. would
target UBL if it could;

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ossification] Page 4 of 5

~ 1998-2001, rumors that U.S. had some kind of asset (human or electronic) by which it was
keeping its eye on UBL.

• 1998-2001, U.S. views Afghanistan/Taliban as a problem best managed by keeping it contained:

• USG takes a calculated decision to put UBL in a box unless there are opportunities to target him
that involve an acceptable risk (eg. cruise missile attacks); according to Goodson, US population
would not have supported "boots on the ground";

— USG uses traditional methods (diplomacy, UN sanctions) to lean on Taliban—Taliban responds to
a limited extent. USG also pressures Saudis/ Paks to press the UBL issue with the Taliban.

~ Note regional context: Taliban/UBL threat overshadowed by other South Asian concerns within
USG in late 1990s: India-Pakistan rivalry; Pakistan's internal instability; nuclear threat; Kargil crisis.

~ According to Goodson, UNOCAL did not have a decisive influence over US policymakers.

4. Where Did We Go wrong?

• Taliban-al Qaeda nexus not fully understood by USG:

— UBL primarily seen as financier of terrorism;

-- USG did not distinguish al Qaeda message from typical radical Islamic rhetoric;

— Importance of internal shift within Taliban not appreciated:

> decline of moderate Mullah Rabbani faction and rise of hardline leaders by 2000/1, with
regional aspirations (Islamization);

> closer relationship between UBL and Mullah Omar; UBL gaining more influence over Taliban
leadership.

failure to perceive the 'newness' of the Taliban-al Qaeda nexus, ie. a break in the pattern of state-
sponsored terrorism toward new model of terrorism emerging from failed states.

• Afghanistan under the Taliban was not a state (and the Taliban was not a government) in the sense
understood by USG:

~ autonomous, sub-state actors—eg. family networks, cross-border tribal ties—incompatible with
strong central leadership;

~ U.S. lacked people on the ground in the region, with regional expertise and specialization;

range of instruments being used to try to influence the Taliban (eg. UN sanctions) had little influence;
were we pushing the levers in the right way?

were we pushing the right levers? Eg. traditional approaches in Afghanistan to entice the local
population to cooperation with U.S. programs through payment (eg. crop substitution, buy-back
Stinger program) hadn't worked in the past—what made us think a bounty on UBL's head would be
any more successful? (Goodson thinks the bounty ~$5M—was just too low).

was the USG using a box of old tools—geared toward state-sponsorship of terrorism—to dismantle a

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/assification] Page 5 of 5

completely new model?

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

4

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/view.php?thismailbox=INBOX&index=701&id=2... 8/5/03
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00010 Folder: 0026 Document: 59
Series: Team 1 Files

Copies: 1 Pages: 8

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Matt Levitt
Document Date: 08-01-2003
Document Type: Briefing Slides
Special Media:
From:
To:

Subject' Briefing on Afghanistan and Taliban by Army War Co
liege, with notes

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 281
Withdrawn: 06-03-2008 by:

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00010 0026 59
System DocID: 2578

'
.4

£<a-ft>r*. «V,4."t/e
Mail:: INBOX: Re: Fwd: Interview notices Page 1 of 1

85.67MB / 476.84MB (1 7.97%)
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2003 10:13:26 -0400
From: "" <kheitkotter@9-11commission.gov>^
To: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>4P
Subject: Re: Fwd: Interview notices
Yoel :

Conference Call-in # is 1-866-f 541-8377
Participant passcode - 523250
Leader passcode - 370933
Just send an all -staff email out saying you will be using the conference line
at that time so that no one else will get on the line.
Karen
Quoting "" <ytobin@9-llcommission.gov>:

> ----- Forwarded message from Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>
> Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2003 08:38:45 -0400
> From: Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>
> Reply-To: Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>
> Subject: interview notices
> To: "" <mcoleman@9-llcommission.gov>
> Marquittia,
>
> Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two
> interviews:
>
> 1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington institute for Near
> East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street).
>
> 2. Professor Greg cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday,
> NOV. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE.
>
> For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine,
> if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a
> room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily.
>
> Thanks.
> Dan

End forwarded message

Karen Heitkotter
Executive Secretary
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the united States
khei tkotter@9-llcommi ssi on.gov
t-202-331-4060
f-202-296-5545

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Mail:: INBOX: Re: Interview notices Page 1 of 1

85.67MB / 476.84MB (17.97%)
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2003 09:26:43 -0400
From: Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>4F
To: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>^
Subject: Re: Interview notices

® 2 unnamed text/html 1.68 KB IH

I'm going to try to come to the office today about 3:00 or so. Can we shoot for a conference call with Matt at 3:30? If that does
work, we can try the phone conferencing technology out.

Dan

ytobin@9-11commission.gov wrote:

Thanks, Dan. I am still interested in doing the Levitt interview -- do you
want to do a joint phone call to him so that he knows what each of us is
interested in?

Quoting Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>:

Marquittia,

Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two
interviews:

1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street).

2. Professor Greg Cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday,
Nov. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE.

For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine,
if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a
room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily.

Thanks.
Dan

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX&... 10/22/03
Mail:: Sent Items: Re: Interview notices Page 1 of 1

85. 18MB /476.84MB (17.86%)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct2003 18:34:10 -0400
From: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>4l
To: Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>4P
Subject: Re: Interview notices
I am told that we do have such capabilities, and I will get the details
tomorrow.
Quoting Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>:
> I'm not going to be in the office this week, unfortunately. Do we have
> conference call capabilities?
>
> ytobin@9-llcommission.gov wrote:
>
> >Thanks, Dan. I am still interested in doing the Levitt interview -- do you
>
> >want to do a joint phone call to him so that he knows what each of us is
> interested in?
> >
> >Quoting Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>:

> »Marquittia,
> »
> »Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two
> »interviews:
> »
> »1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington institute for Near
> »East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street).
> »
> »2. Professor Greg Cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday,
> »NOV. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE.
> »
> »For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine,
> »if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a
> »room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily.

> »Thanks .
> »Dan

http://kinesis. swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX. S... 10/21 /03
(ail:: INBOX: Re: Interview notices Page 1 of 1

85.18MB /476.84MB (17.86%)
Date: Tue, 21 Get 2003 14:15:51 -0400
From: Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>4|
To: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov><^
Subject: Re: Interview notices

^H 2 unnamed text/html 1.56 KB |g

I'm not going to be in the office this week, unfortunately. Do we have conference call capabilities?

ytobin® 9-11commission.gov wrote:

Thanks, Dan. I am still interested in doing the Levitt interview -- do you
want to do a joint phone call to him so that he knows what each of us is
interested in?

Quoting Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>:

Marquittia,

Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two
interviews:

1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street).

2. Professor Greg Cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday,
Nov. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE.

For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine,
if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a
room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily.

Thanks.
Dan

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX&... 10/21/03
vlail:: Sent Items: Re: Interview notices Page 1 of 1

85.09MB /476.84MB (17.85%)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2003 10:52:29 -0400
From: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>^
To: Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu><#
Subject: Re: Interview notices
Thanks, Dan. I am still interested in doing the Levitt interview -- do you
want to do a joint phone call to him so that he knows what each of us is
interested in?
Quoting Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>:
> Marquittia,
> Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two *
> interviews: '"•
> 1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington Institute for Near "^
> East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street). /
>
> 2. Professor Greg cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday, «*
> NOV. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE.
> For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine,
> if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a ;
> room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily.
>
> Thanks.
> Dan

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Aa.il:: INBOX: Interview notices Page 1 of 1

85.09MB/476.84MB (17.85%)
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2003 08:38:45-0400
From: Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>^
To: "" <mcoleman@9-11commission.gov>4P
Cc: "" <ytobin@9-11commission.gov>4f,"" <team3@9-11commission.gov>4|
Subject: Interview notices
Marquittia,

Could you please send out notices to the other teams for these two
interviews:
1. Matt Levitt, a terrorism expert at the Washington institute for Near
East Policy (Tuesday, October 28, at 9:00 at 2100 K Street).
2. Professor Greg Cause, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia, Thursday,
Nov. 6th, at 2:00. This interview WILL BE DONE BY PHONE.
For Matt, I will need to reserve a room (Philip's office would be fine,
if the conference room is not available). For Greg, I will also need a
room, and an office would be preferred so I can use the phone easily.
Thanks.
Dan

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=148&mailbox=INBOX&... 10/21/03