FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS Docket No.

F28901-08 Elena Svenson, Plaintiff, -againstMichael Krichevsky, Defendant. OBJECTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT

STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS Michael Krichevsky (KRICHEVSKY), Pro Se, Sui Juris respectfully avers upon his firsthand knowledge under penalties of perjury: 1. That I am the defendant in error in the within action. 2. The facts stated in this affidavit are within my personal knowledge, and if called on as a witness, I could competently testify thereto. 3. I incorporate by reference herein my motion to take judicial notice per CPLR, which I filed in this court together with Motion to Hold in Contempt, exhibit A. This motion was personally served on petitioner Svenson together with motion to hold her in contempt on July 18,2013 and she did not object. More than a month has passed and this motion neither granted, nor denied. Mr. Fasone did not schedule a hearing on this motion if he needed. However, he proceeded to make decisions and issuing orders ( exhibit B) without 1st taking this mandatory judicial notice on the record. As such, I presume that my Motion to Take Judicial Notice ignored and object to such misconduct and long-standing, continuous, unconstitutional pattern of denial of due process. I take exception and object to Mr. Fasone's scheduled coercive hearing on September

20, 2013 and VOID orders after my motion to recuse Mr. Fasone was improperly denied by him. In my order to show cause, which Mr. Fasone denied on July 19, 2013 in ^ 4 I requested relief and gave jurisdiction to void his child support order due to perjury of petitioner Svenson during initial proceedings in 2009 and going forward till present. In his order, he is intentionally silent of my requested relief and only mentions his inability to adjudicate Svenson in contempt. It was his fiduciary duty as a judicial officer to apply CPLR 5015(a)(2), (3) and (4). It would have been a sanction to Svenson for perjury and fraud upon the court, but he refused to perform his fiduciary duty. 4. This objection is timely because his order was mailed on July 25, 2013 (exhibit B). 5. Now, I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take this mandatory judicial notice in writing and issue decision on it. 6. I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice of the case Hewlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) where the court stated: "Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress has determined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened or that state courts might provide a more convenient forum — although both might well be true —• but because the Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes those laws "the supreme Law of the Land," and charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce mat law according to their regular modes of procedure. "The laws of the United States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are. The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the State" 7. I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice of my Constitutional and Pro Se rights, which motion I filed in this court and attached to this Objection on the back. 8. I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice of the case U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d

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297 (1977). where the court stated: "Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading." 9. I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice of judge Paula Hepner's order in this case (exhibit A of the motion) as whole and particularly the critical findings of judge on page 5: "... The record seems to reflect that support magistrate Fasone attempted to curtail the motion practice, the motion should have been heard by support magistrate Fasone during the pendency of the hearing instead of being referred to the undersigned" 10. I move Flon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice of the critical findings of judge

Paula Hepner in her order (exhibit A of the motion) on page 7: "Currently, this case is a procedural quagmire with numerous motions filed on different supplemental petitions". In footnote # 10 the order states that on July 5, 2010 KRICHEVSKY filed motion to recuse Mr. Fasone and on July 12, 2010 KRICHEVSKY filed cross-motion for sanctions for frivolous motion to hold petitioner and her attorney in contempt. 11. I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice of the fact that while petitioner

Svenson's petition to hold KRICHEVSKY in contempt was pending for more than a year, KRICHEVSKY's cross-motion to hold petitioner and her attorney, Mr. Levoritz, in contempt •was denied on July 26,2010 by Mr. Fasone without heating., notice to parties and reply from petitioner's attorney (conspiracy against rights?). That denial order was not mailed to KRICHEVSKY. 12. Above-mentioned conduct makes this proceedings VOID due to denial of due process and

lack of subject matter/personal jurisdiction by the court because of "Fraud upon the court." It

has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, U 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final." I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice of this case 13. I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice and infer from ffif 5 - 7 that a)

KRICHEVSKY's due process was violated and b) such conduct by Mr. Fasone shows that he is not "unbiased and competent tribunal" as required by constitutional due process. 14. I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice of the, inter alia, orders of

judge Paula Hepner (exhibit A of the motion): ORDERED that support magistrate Fasone's decision on supplemental "A" is set aside; and it is further ORDERED that support magistrate Fasone's decision on supplemental "B" is set aside; and it is further ORDERED that support magistrate Fasone provide a detailed written decision on the "objection, notice of motion to dismiss and for summary judgment"; and it is further ORDERED that support magistrate Fasone explain the basis of his entry to $298 per month under supplemental "A," how he arrived at that amount, and whether it
was a temporary modification; and it is further

ORDERED should support magistrate Fasone reach the same decision as he did on supplemental "B" on July 6, 2011, he is to provide detailed written findings of fact to explain how he reached the result he did and how he arrived at the amount for the

money judgment; and it is further ORDERED should support magistrate issue new decisions on supplemental "A" and "B" after entertaining respondent's motion, he should issue final orders and detailed written findings of fact; and it is further ORDERED that in addition to deciding the respondent's application for leave to renew and reargue his motion to recuse, the support magistrate is to include a written decision on respondent's initial motion to recuse from July 26,2010, to complete the record so it will be clear why he did not grant the application; and it is further ORDERED that support magistrate Fasone is to review his record to make sure that motions were filed on appropriate supplemental and that all motions have been decided; and it is further ORDERED that the respondent is to refrain from filing any motion papers to the undersigned's attention when appearing before that support magistrate; and it is further ORDERED that the respondent shall not file any new motions until all of these outstanding issues have been resolved and the support magistrate has ruled on each one. Upon receipt of a final decision determining each of these outstanding issues, respondent might timely file an objection should he feel aggrieved by the result; and it is further [emphasis added] ORDERED that all decisions on motions, final orders and findings of fact be mailed to the petitioner and respondent upon completion; and it is further ORDERED that oral argument on the motion will be held before support magistrate Fasone on December 12, 2011 at 2:00 PM and parties are directed to appear on that date; 15. I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Fasone

never complied with any of the orders of Judge Paula Hepner and infer, adjudicate that Mr. Fasone is in contempt of every her order.

16.

I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice of the facts that because Mr.

Fasone did not comply with judge's orders, he did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing on December 12,2011, and therefore his orders are void ab initio. 17. I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to take mandatory judicial notice of her Fiduciary Duty to this

court to remove Mr. Fasone from this case and his position as hearing officer and report him to the appropriate authorities as per Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(D). 18. I move Hon. Jeanette Ruiz to issue declaratory judgment that all orders of Mr. Fasone are

void for fraud upon the court and lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this objection and motion to take judicial notice be granted in its entirety, and for such other and further relief as to this Court seems just and proper, including the costs of this litigation.

MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, PRO SE

Sworn to before me this 26 day of August 2013

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS Docket No. F28901-08 Elena Svenson, * -againstMichael Krichevsky, Defendant. Plaintiff, JUDICIAL NOTICE

MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND ASSERTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se, Sui Juris says under the penalties of perjury and move this Hon. court to take judicial notice of the following:

New York Rules of Civil Procedure state in Article 45 Evidence: R 4511. Judicial notice of law.

(a) When judicial notice shall be taken without request. Every court shall lake judicial notice without request of the common law, constitutions and public statutes of the United States and of every state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States and of the official compilation of codes, rules and regulations of the state except those that relate solely to the organization or internal management of an agency of the state and of all local laws and county acts. (b) When judicial notice may be taken without request; when it shall be taken on request. Every court may take judicial notice without request of private acts and resolutions of the congress of the United States and of the legislature of the state; ordinances and regulations of officers, agencies or governmental subdivisions of the state or of the United States; and the laws of foreign countries or their political subdivisions. Judicial notice shall be taken of matters specified in this subdivision if a party requests it, furnishes the court sufficient information to enable it to comply with the request, and has given each adverse party notice of his intention to request it. Notice shall be given

in the pleadings or prior to the presentation of any evidence at the trial, but a court may require or permit other notice. (c) Detemiination by court: review as matter of law. Whether a matter is judicially noticed or proof is taken, every matter specified in this section shall be determined by the judge or referee, and included in his findings or charged to the jury. Such findings or charge shall be subject to review on appeal as a finding or charge on a matter of law. (d) Evidence to be received on matter to be judicially noticed. In considering whether a matter of law should be judicially noticed and in determining the matter of law lo be judicially noticed, the court may consider any testimony, document, information or argument on the subject, whether offered by a party or discovered through its own research. Whether or not judicial notice is taken, a printed copy of a statute or other written law or a proclamation, edict, decree or ordinance by an executive contained in a book or publication, purporting to have been published by a government or commonly admitted as evidence of the existing law in the judicial tribunals of the jurisdiction where it is in force, is prima facie evidence of such law and the unwritten or common law of a jurisdiction may be proved by witnesses or printed reports of cases of the courts of the jurisdiction. 1. KRICHEVSKY moves this honorable court to take mandatory judicial notice mandated by above-mentioned rule, including his affidavits, motions, arguments, transcripts and exhibits lawfully in the file of this court, and other court proceedings involving parties. Recently, searching the court's file, KRICHEVSKY found a letter, sent by SVENSON to judge Paula Hepner in 2011. This letter and attachment to it is Ex Parte communication because KRICHEVSKY was never served with it. Attached to this letter, purported investigative report regarding KRICHEVSKY's activities - fraud and hearsay, which should be excluded and

removed from the court's file. KRICHEVSKY moves this Honorable Court to remove this letter from the court's file and strike it from the record. 2. KRICHEVSKY moves this honorable court to take mandatory judicial notice of his Pro Se status, assertion of his constitutional rights and binding precedents in cases involving pro se. 3. "Federal law & Supreme Court cases apply to state court cases." Hewlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990). Federal rules of civil procedures are similar to New York CPLR and there is no conflict of laws. 4. United States Constitution and Constitution of the State of New York protect individual constitutional rights to form a contract and conduct commerce. Therefore, "All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.137, 174,176. A law that "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 US 55, 76; Harris v. Mc&ze, 448US297,312. 5. A law that improperly infringes on Constitutional Rights is void from its inception and no person can be obligated to obey such a law, 16A Am Jur2d Constitutional Law, Section 203.5 6. "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 7. The Supreme Court has forcefully established that court proceedings must be within Constitutional provisions. Smith v. US, 360 US \\Muskrafv. United States, 219 US 346. 8. "But whenever the judicial power is called into play, it is responsible directly to the fundamental law and no other authority can intervene to force or authorize the judicial body to disregard It" Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S., 414 pg. 468. Violation of Constitutional Rights voids in personam jurisdiction. 9. "A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void." World Wide Volkswagen v.

Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 291; NationalBankv. Wiley, 195 US 257; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714. 10. "If the Bill of Rights is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment... pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void ..." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458,468. 11." ... the requirements of due process must be met before the court can properly assert in personam jurisdiction." Wells Fargo v. Wells Fargo, 556 F2d 406, 416. 12. "It is beyond question, of course, that a conviction based on a record lacking any relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged violates due process." Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 US 478. Assertion Of Constitutional Right To Petition Government For Redress Of Grievances 13. KRICHEVSKY requests the court and its officers to be mindful of his Pro Se status. In cases and precedents that mostly reported, there is a presumption that a party represented by trained and licensed attorneys. KRICHEVSKY, however, is none of them. Below are the controlling cases that apply directly to KRICHEVSKY's status and his pleadings: Wright v. SZCZUR, Dist. Court, WD New York 2012 "Although pled inartfully and in a rather conclusory fashion, considering the Wrights' pro se status, such allegations state a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Platsky v. C.I.A., 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.1991) ("[T]he Supreme Court has instructed the district courts to construe pro se complaints liberally and to apply a more flexible standard in determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint than they would in reviewing a pleading submitted by counsel"). See also "The Erie County Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity, which protects officials from § 1983 liability if their actions (1) did not violate clearly established law or (2) were objectively reasonable. See Warren v. Keane, 196 F.3d 330, 332 (2d Cir. 1999). However, if the Wrights establish that these Defendants violated their constitutional right to care for their children,

they are not entitled to this immunity for two reasons. First, this law is clearly established. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (noting Supreme Court's "historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"). Second, without more facts, this Court cannot conclude that it was objectively reasonable for these Defendants to believe that their conduct did not violate the Wrights' rights. It is alleged that they misrepresented and forged documents and testimony. Such acts are not objectively reasonable; Defendants are therefore not entitled to the protections of qualified immunity at this time. [Emphasis added] In Harriett v. Bear, 538 F. Supp. 2d 511 (2008) the court stated: A. Motion to Dismiss A court may not dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168,1172 (2d Cir.1994) (citing inter alia Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46,78 S.Ct. 99,2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The court must acceptthe material facts alleged in the complaint as true. Id. (citing Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964) (per curiam)). In determining whether a complaint states a cause of action, great liberality is afforded to pro se litigants. Platsky v. Central Intelligence Agency, 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.1991) (citation omitted).

B. Motion to Amend the Complaint

In using its discretion in determining whether to allow a party leave to amend, the court must follow Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) which provides that leave to amend will be granted "freely .. . when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). The court may also, "on just terms", grant a party leave to supplement,

setting forth transactions, occurrences, or events that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d). A court may allow supplementation even if the original pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense. Id. The standards for a motion to amend and a motion to supplement are the same. See Smith v. Goord, 04-CV-6432,2006 WL 2850597, *1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74015, *3-4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,2006 (emphasis added) In Kemer v. Johnson, 900 F. Supp. 677 (1995) the court stated: "In order to justify the dismissal of a pro se complaint, it must be 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief" Platsky, 953 F.2d at 28 (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 595). In Philippeanx v. North Central Bronx Hasp., 871 F. Supp. 640 (1994) the court stated: "Summary judgment may not be granted unless the submissions of the parties taken together "show that mere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. In making this judgment, the burden is on the moving party, and all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d202 (1986); Celofex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In addition, when determining whether to grant summary judgment in discrimination cases in which intent is an issue, the court must exercise extra caution. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, L.P., 22 F.3d 1219,1224 (2d Cir.1994). This extra caution is further wan-anted in cases such as this one in which there has been only limited document discovery. Finally, this Court must construe a pro se complaint more liberally and apply a more flexible standard in determining whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action. See Platsky v. C.I.A., 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.1991). Thus, in determining whether to grant summary judgment, this Court must (i) determine whether a factual dispute exists, and (ii) determine, based on the substantive law at issue, whether the fact in dispute is material."

In re Haines v, Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-421(1995), the court stated: "pro se litigants are held to less stringent pleading standards than admitted or licensed bar attorneys." "Regardless of the deficiencies in their pleadings, pro se litigants are entitled to the opportunity to submit evidence in support of their claims." In re Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), the court stated: "litigants' constitutional (guaranteed) rights are violated when courts depart from precedent where parties are similarly situated." "Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general principle or rule of law." Marbwyv. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,1 Cranch 137,177-78,900*900 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). This declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991); In Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821), the court stated: "These principles, which form the doctrine of precedent, were well established and well regarded at the time this nation was founded." See also "It is often said among judges that the volume of appeals is so high ... We do not have time to do a decent enough ...The remedy, instead, is to create enough judgeships to handle the volume, or, if that is not practical, for each judge to take enough time to do a competent job with each case." 14. If this Honorable Court finds any problem with KRICHEVSKY's pleadings, motions or affidavit, he moves this Honorable Court to instruct him and point to his mistakes so he can amend it or supplement it to come in compliance with CPLR. 15. Definition of THE BELLIGERENT CLAIMANT: "The privilege against self-incrimination is neither accorded to the passive resistant, nor the person who is ignorant of his rights, nor to one indifferent thereto. It is a fighting clause. Its benefits can be retained only by sustained combat. It cannot be retained by attorney or solicitor. It is valid only when insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in person." "The one who is persuaded by honeyed words or moral suasion to testify

or produce documents rather than make a last ditch stand, simply loses the protection. Once he testifies to part, he has waived his right and must on cross-examination or otherwise, testify as to the whole transaction. He must refuse to answer or produce, and test the matter in contempt proceedings, or by habeas corpus." -- United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 538, 540 (District Court, M.D. PA. 1947) 16.1 declare that I am acting according to Honorable Judge James Alger Fee's instructions in that case and do not break any law. 17.1 move this court to apply the controlling law and declare all orders of hearing officer John Fasone VOID ab initio, 18.1 do not consent and challenge John Fasone's jurisdiction, authority and qualification to proceed on my child support case and rush me into judgment. 19. I exercise reservation of my rights under U.C.C. § 3-501 on the record. I have exercised the U.C.C. remedy for reserving my Common Law rights, including personal Liberty under the 13th Amendment, not to be compelled to perform under any contract or commercial agreement mat I have not entered into Knowingly, Voluntarily, Intentionally, and with Informed Consent. 20. NOTICE TO THE AGENT IS NOTICE TO THE PRINCIPAL, NOTICE TO THE PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO THE AGENT. I declare that notice is served hereby upon all corporate government agents, that I have not, and will not accept the liability associated with the "compelled benefit" of any unrevealed "contract or commercial agreement." 21.1 declare all contracts whether expressed or implied, known or unknown by me null and void. I did not conscious!)', willingly and knowingly participate for consideration, but rather under fraud and duress. 22. Below is a list of crimes committed against me by, petitioner and her attorneys, YORAM NACHIMOVSKY and YONATAN LEVORITZ ratified by hearing officer John Fasone: Violation of the Constitutions of United States and State of New York, Violation of Federal

and New York laws, fraud against the undersigned and US government, official misconduct, public corruption, conspiracy to false arrest me, conspiracy to false incarcerate me, coercion, blackmail, conspiracy to perpetrate fraud, deprivation of rights including First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Seventh Amendment (access to the courts), Fourteenth Amendment (due process, equal protection and parental rights), falsification of official court documents, defrauding the Federal government and taxpayers (for incentive kickbacks and payments), perjury, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, evidence tampering, interference with federal right to employment, making and keeping me unemployable, and numerous violation of professional code of ethics. 23. As a result of misconduct by petitioner and/or her attorneys, my life and work were disrupted. I was subjected to multiple unnecessary court appearances and unwarranted anxiety and stress, which caused me to suffer stroke and depression. 24. Petitioner' attorneys exploited my broken family's money, time and energy to keep litigating issues that I offered to mediate. This shows their intent to force all of us into useless litigation so that they will keep themselves busy making profit out of hurting and plundering this broken family. I entered this proceeding as middle class hard working father. In one year, I was railroaded by mem tampering with my job. Now I am, at 58 years old, reduced to unemployed, unemployable and disable poor person. Fact: Brooklyn Family Court employees call this court "busiest court in America." 25.1 am vested with a 1st amendment right to remain silent, and conversely, to say whatever I please. 26. By Law, I am to be presumed innocent at all time! 27.1 am vested with a 5th amendment right to refuse to testify against myself. 28.1 am vested with the right to refuse to explain why I decline to testify. 29.1 am vested with a 6th amendment right to effective assistance of stand-by counsel - not 18B

attorney representing me as non Sui Juris and ward of the court. 30. I am aware that I am vested with a Griffin right to due process of law at all stages of this prosecution. Griffin v Illinois, 100 L Ed 891,351 US 12,76 S Ct 585,55 ALR2nd 1055 (1965) holds that everybody is entitled to Due Process at every stage of the proceeding - and a free transcript, too. 31. (Last chamber hearing) Due Process is defined, in part, as including notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard. This, in turn, means adequate time to prepare, which my attorney and I did not have. 32. Officer John Fasone did not have jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, as similar action involving same parties and issues was pending in Kings County Supreme Court Index No. 33343/08. Officer Fasone knowingly forced me into his proceeding. Supreme Court's general jurisdiction is superior to Family Court's limited jurisdiction and does not allow it to decide cases in Common Law and Equity that my case required. My former attorney, Daniel Singer, informed officer Fasone about this proceeding at first hearing on August 6, 2009. 33. From the first day that mis proceeding was assigned (8/06/09) to Mr. Fasone, he angrily ordered to stop motion practice and announced: "THE COURT: I don't know what went on in Part 29, but I don't do motion calendars. I do hearings. So either we're set for a hearing today or we're gonna have a lot of problems." Page 5, 19-23 THE COURT: Counsel, I don't care what the allegations are. I don't know why a temporary wasn't entered July 13th, 1 don't have a motion calendar. We're gonna get a Russian interpreter and we're gonna do a hearing today. Thank you. Page 6, 25; Page 7, 1-5. THE COURT: This is a disgrace. This petition was filed in November. It is now August. There is no temporary order. It took until July to get an order affiliation. I have no idea what's going on here, but this ends now. No more orders to show cause, no more motions.

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34.1 am aware of the fact that "Consent", which is the product of official intimidation, harassment or coercion is not consent at all. Citizens do not forfeit their constitutional rights when they are coerced to comply with an order that they know unlawful. 35. Was this an order to my attorney to stop zealously representing me and go along to get along? Was this an order to deprive me of my constitutional right to due process? Was I rushed to judgment? Was he intimidating my attorney and me? It is a good question for the Jury! "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or legislation which would abrogate them."U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona 380 US. 436 (1966). "One needs not be a criminal to claim Fifth Amendment (right), it applies to civil suits as well." Isaacs v. US., 256 F 2d 654 36. Motion Practice is the essence of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, discovery tool and substantial part of due process. 37. Officer Fasone in complete violation of part 205 of Uniform Rules for the Family Court: Section 205.12 Conference. (a) In any proceeding, a conference or conferences shall be ordered by the court as required as soon as practicable after the proceeding has been assigned. (b) The matters which may be considered at such conference may include, among other things: (1) completion of discovery; (2) filing of motions; (3) argument or hearing of motions; (4) fixing of a date for fact-finding hearing; (5) simplification and limitation of issues; (6) amendment of pleadings or bills of particulars; (7) admissions of fact; (8) stipulations as to admissibility of documents;

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(9) completion or modification of financial disclosure; (10) possibilities for settlement; and (11) limitation of number of expert witnesses. (c) Where parties are represented by counsel, an attorney thoroughly familiar with the action and authorized to act on behalf of the party or accompanied by a person empowered to act on behalf of the party represented shall appear at such conference. (d) At the conclusion of a conference, the court shall make a written order, including its directions to the parties as well as stipulations of counsel. Alternatively, in the court's discretion, all directions of the court and stipulations of counsel shall be formally placed on the record. 38. To my knowledge and believe none of the above in paragraph 37 took place. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this motion be granted in its entirety, and that such other and further relief be granted as to this Court seems just and proper, including the costs of this motion.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York August 26, 2013 Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se

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EXHIBIT A

FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS INDEX NO. F-28901-08/10/A/B/C Elena Svenson, Petitioner, v. Michael Krichevsky, Respondent. JUDICIAL NOTICE TO THE COURT

Notice to the court under the authority of the constitutions of the United States and the State of New York; authority of the United States Supreme Court and Demand for this court to follow the Supreme Law of the Land.

1.

Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se, (KRICHEVSKY) by special appearance UNDER DURESS

and without submitting to the jurisdiction of this court hereby puts this court on judicial notice to cease and desist any further unlawful assault against him. 2. KRICHEVSKY hereby challenges the jurisdiction of John Fasone and hereby puts him

on judicial notice that the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly established that once jurisdiction has been challenged, it is presumed that the court lacks jurisdiction unless or until the evidentiary sufficiency is provided and submitted to the record. 3. The presumption is that a court lacks jurisdiction on a particular issue until it has been

demonstrated that jurisdiction over the subject matter exists. The facts showing the existence of jurisdiction must be affirmatively in the record. 4. If jurisdiction is challenged, the burden is on the party claiming jurisdiction to

demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The limits upon jurisdiction

must be neither disregarded nor evaded. The requirement to submit admissible evidence upon the record proving jurisdiction once jurisdiction is challenged is mandatory. 5. The Supreme Court of the United States as well as lower courts have consistently

reaffirmed the requirement that once jurisdiction is challenged those who claim jurisdiction must submit the evidence to prove the validity of the claim. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct 14, 24 (1908), Old Wayne Mutual Life Association v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907), Scott v. McNeai, 154 U.S. 34, 14, S.Ct. 1 108 (1894), Pennoyer v.Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877), Hagen v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, at 533, 39 L.ed. 577, 94 S.Ct/1372 (N.Y. March 28, 1974), United States v. Ruger, 23 F. 658 (W.D. Ark. (1885), State of Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 900 S. Ct. 2502 (1980), McNutt v.Geneml Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, Inc. , 298 U.S. 178, 80 L.Ed. 1135, 56 S.Ct 780 (9136), (jurisdiction may never be presumed), Special Indemnify Fund v.Pruitt, 225 F.2d. 308, 201 Okl. 308, (jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown), United States v.Chairito, 69 F. Supp. 3 17 (D. Or. 1946) (jurisdiction cannot be presumed), Standardv.Olesen, 98 L. Ed. 1151, 74 S.Ct 768 (1954), Garciav. Dail, 586 S.W. 2d. 524, at 528, (Tex. C.A. 1980) (lack of jurisdiction requires dismissal), Burks v. Lasher, 441 U.S. 471 (1 979) and Title 5 U.S.C. §§556 & 558(b). 6. Generally, there is no requirement for one subjected to a "void" judgment to do anything

more than call the trial court's attention to the mistake or fraud with a request to correct its record and.order. 7. CPLR 5015(a) provides grounds and procedure for relief in this action. John Fasone had

fiduciary duty to provide justice and relief. 8. John Fasone has failed and refused to provide relief or dispute KRICHEVSKY's claims.

9.

Child support hearing was a sham hearing where every attempt by respondent and his

attorney to establish admissible evidence on the record, which would prove Fraud Upon the Court and perjury by petitioner and her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, was not allowed by John Fasone. 10. All of respondent's and his attorney's pleadings have been ignored. This court is hereby

ordered to cease and desist this unlawful attack in this proceeding and rebut with particularity anything in the judicial notice that you disagree with which is your duty. 11. In United States v. Prudden, 424 F. 2d 1021 (1970) judge stated: "silence can only be

equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading". 12. This court must take mandatory judicial notice of legal maxim: "Silence is

Acquiescence." 13. order). 14. This court must take mandatory judicial notice of hearing officer's John Fasone contempt This court must take mandatory judicial notice of Exhibit A (Judge Paula Hepner's

of the higher court by continuous refusal to comply with this order. 15. John Fasone is deprived of subject matter and personam jurisdiction to hear this case

because of the fraudulent and contemptuous behavior exhibited by John Fasone in these proceedings. 16. Supervising Judge Paula Hepner in her order dated October 24, 2011 (Exhibit A), inter

alia, put the child support order aside, and ordered John Fasone to issue written denial with explanation to KRICHEVSKY's motion to Recuse John Fasone. Because he did not comply with

this order, he did not meet condition precedent to gain jurisdiction over this case, and child support order still stands aside. 17. Unless, this court has subject matter/personam jurisdiction any order rendered by John

Fasone in this instant case is null and void and has no force of law. 18. Accordingly, Judge Hepner's order to KRICHEVSKY to appear on December 12, 2011

before John Fasone to reargue this case was void for Mr. Fasone's contempt and noncompliance with her order. According to evidentiary "admission by action" doctrine, John Fasone is not only biased toward KRICHEVSKY, but is shamelessly and openly hostile toward him. 19. John Fasone is personally benefiting though his pension fund and/or salary paid to him by

the State of New York from his own unfair child support orders against unsuspecting people. This scheme consists of keeping people in the state's "deadbeat father" list by issuing extremely high child support orders, which people cannot comply with. Thereafter, state gets billions of dollars from Federal Funding to prosecute "deadbeat fathers." 20. Therefore, Mr. Fasone's orders after December 12, 2011 hearing without KRICHEVSKY

present are void as well. 21. 22. KRICHEVSKY objects to these orders and appear as belligerent claimant under duress. As one anonymous attorney stated: "To put it bluntly, why would you ever rely upon

those who have been torturing you for so long to show you the way to find relief from the torture? All they are doing is moving you from the room with the rack to the room with the thumbscrews and the nail pullers. You are still going to be bent over, shafted and tossed onto the dung heap for the dogs to sniff at and pee on while "they", once again, laugh all the way to the bank."

THEREFORE, Michael Krichevsky, declare that child support order by John Fasone in this case is null and void as it stands for lack of jurisdiction. He demands that this court establish jurisdiction on the record with verifiable information and documentation that would contradict his above stated FACTS. In the same breath, he demands that this court pursuant to its inability to prove jurisdiction to dismiss its child support order in this case for want of jurisdiction.

L Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, under penalty of perjury declare that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated: Brooklyn. New York July 18, 2013

Michael Knchevsky, Pro Se, under duress, without prejudice

EXHIBIT A

At a Term of the Family Court of the State" of New .York, held in and for • the County of Kings at 330 Jay Street, Brooklyn, New York, 18"1 day of October 2011. PRESI'DING: HON. PAULA J. HEFNER Acting Justice of the Supreme Court In the Matter of a Proceeding .for Support under Article IV of the Family Court Act,' DECISION AND ORDER ELENA SVENSON, Petitioner, (After filing of Objections) Docket Number F-28901-08/10A/B/C Objection #1 & 2 on Supp *A" Objection #2 & 3 on Supp- "B". • Objection #1 on Supp "C"

- 'against 'MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY,'
.Respondent.

-x
NOTICE: YOUR WILLFUL FAILURE TO OBEY THIS ORDER MAY, AFTER A COURT HEARING, RESULT IN YOUR COMMITMENT TO JAIL FOR A TERM NOT TO EXCEED SIX MONTHS, FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. PURSUANT TO §1113 OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT, AN APPEAL MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RECEIPT OFTHE ORDER BY APPELLANT IN COURT, 35 DAYS FROM THE MAILING OF THE ORDER TO THE APPELLANT BY THE CLERK OF THE COURT, OR 35 DAYS AFTER SERVICE BY A PARTY OR LAW GUARDIAN .UPON THE APPELLANT, WHICHEVER IS EARLIEST.-

NOTICE:

The parties have, engaged in continuous litigation in" Kings County Family • "Court "b-efure" Support • Magistrate' Fasbne since" 20'0"8 and"

have had a lengthy'history before the undersigned.1 On February 3, 2010,2 the-Support Magistrate issued a Final Order of.Support and directed the Respondent to pay $2,045.00 monthly3 toward the support of the subject child, David Svenson (d.o.b. 8/14/94), and •set the arrears from the date of.filing at $31,599.42.' The Respondent was directed to enroll the child in his health insurance plan and authorized reimbursement of Petitioner's Counsel fees. Less than four months after the entry of the Final Order of Support, on April 22, 2010, Respondent filed Supplemental *A"

1 This is the fourth .objection before the undersigned- The first objection was filed by the Petitioner on August 18, 2009 to an interim, order of support. On October 9, 2009,•Petitioner withdrew the Objection. The second objection was filed by the Respondent on April 2, 2010 to the Final Order of. Support issued by Support Magistrate Fasone on February 3, 2010. The undersigned denied the Objection on procedural grounds due to the untimely filing of the Objection on June 2, 2010'. The third Objection was filed by the Respondent on August 9, 2010 to the Support Magistrate's verbal refusal to recuse himself. The Objection was denied on procedural grounds as the Obj action was not ripe for review'. • ••. • • •'

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2 • On that same date, the Support Magistrate denied the Respondent's. motion filed on September 9, 2009 to quash the subpoenas that Petitioner served on third parties and to-pay all counsel fees related to the motion. In .the Support Magistrate's order on the motion, he denied-the application as "unnecessary as the Court rules that objections to admission of proffered documents not previously disclosed to opposing counsel will be considered at point of trial."
3 The Support Magistrate did not deviate from the full' amount required under the child Support Standards Act. The Petitioner's adjusted gross income was determined to be $20,800,00 and the Respondent's adjusted gross income $145,145.40. The combined parental income was determined to be $165,945.40 of which the Petitioner's pro rata share was calculated at. 13% and the '. • Respondent's pro rata. share at 87%. Pursuant to the Child Support Standards Act, the Support Magistrate determined, the annual child support obligation for

!

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the combined income up to $130,000.00. The Respondent's share of -the first $130,000.00 is $1,602.25 monthly. The Support Magistrate applied the ' statutory percentage of 17% to the income over $130,000.00-, which was $35,945.40. The Respondent's pro rata share was $443.03 monthly. The ' Respondent's share for the income below $130,000($1,602.25) when combined with 'eh^~Re^pori<Jene'/"s"~sHa.re"''for'"tKe"'"i'nc6me ab6ve"~$13~0~"QO'0r'QO, '($M3~.'03)Y resulte.dJ' in a monthly order of $2045-28 for the Respondent. .

seeking a downward modification on the grounds that he lost his job, could not afford the health insurance premium and was disputing the amount of arrears owed. On June 21, 2010, Petitioner filed Supplemental "B" alleging that Respondent violated the Order of Support that directed him to pay $2,045.00 per month and Respondent failed to maintain the subject- child on his health insurance. Subsequent motion practice ensued. On July 26,. 2010, Respondent filed an Order to Show Cause (filed as Supplemental UC") for a Temporary Restraining Order to stay the current Order of Support and for the entry of an Order of Support in'the amount of $315.90 per month based upon his receipt of unemployment benefits. 'On' August 5, 2010, 'Support Magistrate Fasone declined to sign the Order to Show Cause and 'dismissed Supplemental *C." His Findings of Fact indicated that he did not

sign the Order to Show Cause because the issuance of a temporary restraining order was beyond the scope of his authority. The case continued.with multiple appearance dates on August 12, 2010, November 18, 2010, March 16-, 2011, April 13, 2011, June 1, 2Oil4 and ultimately concluded on July 6, 2011. On July 6, 2011, the Support Magistrate dismissed supplemental UA," Respondent's downward modification petition, because the Respondent-"made it impossible to conduct any meaningful inquiry into the totality of his financial circumstances." and entered a money judgment .on supplemental "B," Petitioner's.violation petition, in the amount of

• The order of Support remained in effect tlirougliout the pendency of tlie proceeding with the exception of the modification entered on Supplemental UA" to $298.00 monthly entered' on June 1, 2011.

$21,916.34.

On July 5, 2011, one day prior to the'last hearing date,. Respondent filed an "Objection, Notice of Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment" on Supplemental "A" and papers were ever filed.
%%B."5

No answering

The papers were recorded_as an Objection The "Objection, Notice of

and sent to the undersigned for review.

Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment"5 essentially argues the following: (1) The Final Order of Support entered on February -25, 2010 is void and the subsequent decision on the Objection' o f - t h e undersigned entered on June 2, 2010 is void. ( 2 ) Supplemental
fl B"

should be dismissed.

( 3 ) Respondent seeks an award of costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney's fees.

5 Attached to the "Objection, Notice of Motion to dismiss, and for • Summary Judgment" is an affidavit of service indicating that the Semyon Furmanov, a person over the age.of 18 and not a party to the action, mailed a copy to Elena Svenson at her residence. .

" [: ;
i i

Affixed to the Objection are the following Exhibits. Exhibit A: •Objection to Reply Affidavit of.Rebuttal dated May 15, 2010, copy of envelope from WYS Child Support Processing Center, notice from NTS Child Support^ Processing Center dated February 17, 2010, undated transcript of proceedings " before Support Magistrate Fasone, undated Affidavit of Merit from action in Kings County Supreme Court between Petitioner, Respondent, Victoria Edelstein • • and Boris Kotylar; undated transcript of proceedings before Support Magistrate Fasone, page 5 of the Final Order of Support without Clerk's endorsement, page .5 of the Final Order of Support with Clerk's endorsement, Decision on Objection entered by undersigned on June 2, 2010; Exhibit B: summons for Elena Svenson under docket F-28901-08/10A to appear on May 13, '2010, Respondent's modification petition; Exhibit' C: Yonatan Levoritz, Esq.'s e-courts web familywebpage for appearances; Exhibit D: Petitioner's violation petition, Order of Support entered on February 3, 2010, Division of Child Support Enforcement statement from May 1, 2010 through June 16, 2010, Verified Answer/ Jury Trial . Demanded dated September 21, 2010,_ Respondent's First Set of Interrogatories
Combined Demands for Discovery dated September 24,. 201.0; Exhibit E: 'Affidavit of Witness by Semyon Furrnaov dated July 1, 2011,

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(4) Respondent seeks leave to renew and reargue his recusal motion to disqualify the Support Magistrate from his case. '(5) Respondent asserts he is entitled to Summary Judgment on Supplemental *B" because no questions- of law or fact exist. (6) Respondent seeks to be relieved from the underlying order of support pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules 5015 (a) because of lack of jurisdiction. Upon further inspection, it appears that Respondent's motion is actually an omnibus motion rather than an Objection and was mistitled. "Objections are the equivalent of appellate review, and

this Court [may not] consider matters which were not brought before the Support Magistrate or preserved by proper objection" (JAE v AB, 10 MiscSd 446 [Fam Ct "Ulster County 2005]; see also Rzemieniewska Bugnacki v Bugnacki, '51 AD3d 1029 [2d Dept 2008]; Green v Wron, 151 Misc2d. 9 [Fam Ct New York County 1991] ) ,. While the record seems to 'reflect that Support Magistrate Fasone attempted to curtail the motion practice, the motion should have been heard by Support Magistrate Fasone during the pendency of the hearing instead of being referred to the undersigned. However, since the Support • j i i I \ i ' 'j ! '
i j
» ;

Magistrate does, not have the authority to revisit the under s i-gned' s decision of June 2, 2010, and in the interest of judicial economy, the undersigned will entertain solely #1 of"the Respondent's motion. .All other matters in this omnibus motipn are. respectfully referred to Support Magistrate Fasone for decision, . • . ' - - ... " . Respondent .seeks to argue that undersigned's denial of his Objection entered on June 2, 2010 based upon'the uhtimeliness of • • • • • • filing is void. Essentially, Respondent asserts that his position

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. .

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is based upon newly discovered evidence.

Respondent argues that lie

never received a copy of the Support Magistrate's decision from February 3, 2010 in the mail. 'He seeks to demonstrate that there .is a discrepancy between the Order in the Family Court record and a copy of the Order he reviewed that was annexed as an exhibit in the Civil Court action brought against him .by the Petitioner. Order in the Family Court record contains the date stamp of February 25, 2010, bears the initials of the Part Clerk, and'is .; The

endorsed that it was mailed to "VP, R, and P attny. " The exhibit in the Civil Court action lacks these markings. The exhibit in-the Civil Court is not a certified copy of the Family Court Order. While it is stamped by the Clerk of Civil Court, Nancy Sunshine, the Civil Court cannot certify the Family'Court's records. There are innumerable ways that an incomplete copy of an Order can be obtained. Therefore, the undersigned's decision of June 2, 2010 isnot void and that argument is denied.7. On August 18, 2011, the Respondent filed an actual "Objection"8 to Support Magistrate Fasone's final order and findings of fact entered on July 6, 2011. No rebuttal was

received, in his Objection, Respondent argues that he did not

7 Furthermore, the record reflects that the Respondent has. taken an appeal to the Appellate Division, Second Department, from the Court's June 2, 2010 decision. .-_

8 Attached to the ^Objection, Notice of Motion to dismiss, and for -Summary..Judgment".-.is .an. af f.idavit...of._serv.ice..indicating.-that the .Semyon.. Furraanov, a" person over the age of 18 'and not a'party to the action, mailed a copy to Elena Svenson at her residence on August 12, 2011.

consent to have the case adjudicated before Support Magistrate Fasone and that Support Magistrate Fasone is acting in a corrupt and punitive way" and is not following the law. He requests that •* all orders- be vacated, Supplemental W B" be. dismissed, and.

Petitioner be sanctioned for frivolous conduct. The. Orders on Supplementals "A" and n B" were mailed on July 11, 2011. Since the Objection was filed on August 18, 2011, more ' than thirty five days from the date of mailing, the Objection is deemed untimely (Family Court Act § 439 (e) / Russell v Gittens, 81 AD3d 652 [2d Dept 2011]/' Sanabria v Medina, 69 AD3d 947 [2d Dept 2010]; Hodges v Hodges, 40 AD3d 639 [2d Dept 2 0 0 7 ] ; Mazzilli Mazzilli', v

17 AD3d 680 [2d Dept 2 0 0 5 ] ; Pedone V Corpes, 24 AD3d 559

[2d Dept 2 0 0 5 ] ; Herman v Herman, 11 AD3d 536 [2d Dept 2 0 0 4 ] ; Chambers v Chambers, 305 AD2d ,672, 673 [2d Dept 2 0 0 3 ] ; Mayeri vr • Mayerl, 279 AD2d 473 [2d Dept 2001]; Werner v Werner, 130-AD2d 754 [2d Dept 1 9 8 7 ] ) . Therefore, the Objection to the Court's orders of July 6, 2010 is denied on procedural grounds.9 Currently, this case is a procedural quagmire with numerous motions filed on different supplemental petitions. 10 To enable the

Furthermore, the.Objection is moot since the final orders on
Supplemental "A"and Supplemental *B* are set aside pending the decision on Respondent's omnibus motion.

• Io On" July 5, 2010, Respondent filed'a motion for the Support Magistrateto recuse.himself because he ^reasonably believes that Support Magistrate Fasone is biased and prejudiced against him." There was no written decision on this motion, . __ ~Oii July '12; "2'0l'0~ 'Respondent "filed a cross "motion for" sanction's for" a frivolous motion to hold Petitioner and her attorney in contempt. This was labeled as Motion #1 .on 'Supplemental "C," Support Magistrate-Fasone noted that it should have been filed on' Supplemental U B" and was identical- to Motion #1 on Supplemental "B." Support Magistrate Fasone entered an Order denying the motion on July 26,. 2010. It was also denied as Motion #2 on Supplemental *C" on August.12, 2010, ' .On July 12,2010, Respondent filed a motion to have a court reporter

Support Magistrate to decide the omnibus motion in an orderly way, accordingly it is .. .

ORDERED that the Objection filed on August 18, 2011 is denied; and it is further . •

ORDERED that the "Objection, Notice of Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment" filed on July 5, 2011 be undocketed as an . Objection and calendared as an omnibus motion before Support Magistrate Fasone for him to decide; and it is further

ORDERED that should the Petitioner submit answering papers, any answering papers are to be submitted by November' 9, 2011; and i t i s . further' • • . " '' '.

present. This was labeled as Motion §2 on Supplemental .UC,'" but ..should have been filed as a motion under "Supplementals "A" and UB" -as Supplemental "C" was not yet filed. However, Support Magistrate Fasone denied Respondent's application on July 13, 2010 as Motion #1 on'Supplemental ^B." This is inconsistent with SupportMagistrate Fasone's Order dated July 26, 2010 indicating that Motion #1 on Supplemental "B" and Motion #1-on Supplemental "C" were-Respondent's application for sanctions. The Order dated July 13, 2010 was mistaken when it says that 'Respondent's-application for a court reporter was filed on July 26, 2010 and decided on July 13, 2010. • Support -Magistrate Fasone denied a motion seeking to void a. ctiild support order obtained by fraud and to issue a restraining order filed on August 9.,'2010. He denied this as Motion #3 on the underlying support docket'of F-28901-08 on • August 12, 2010. The Court could not'find a record of -the August 9^ motion and. it is unclear why any Order would be entered on the underlying support petition when-only Supplementals "A," and "B" were active. It appears this sought the same relief as the Order to Show Cause filed on July 26, 2010. " • There--i-s-no--indication--from-the-court file-that--any of these orders-were mailed to the Petitioner or the Respondent. •

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ORDERED that Support Magistrate Fasone's decision on Supplemental "A" is set aside; and it is further

ORDERED that Support Magistrate Fasone's decision on Supplemental *B" is set aside; and it is/ further

ORDERED that Support Magistrate Fasone provide a detailed written decision on the "Objection, Notice of Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment"; and it is further .

ORDERED should Support Magistrate Fasone reach the same decision as he did on Supplemental "A" on July 6, 2011, he is to provide detailed written Findings of. Fact to" explain how he reached the result he did; and. it is further • .

ORDERED that Supplemental "C" was appropriately dismissed, as a Supplemental petition, but the Clerk is directed to refile it as. a motion under Supplemental "A, " and the Support Magistrate is directed, to proceed under that docket; and it is further

ORDERED that Support Magistrate Fasone explain the basis of

. 9

his entry of a modification of the child support order on June 1, 2011 to $2-98.00 per month under Supplemental "A," how he arrived at that amount, and whether it was a temporary modification; and it is further

ORDERED should Support' Magistrate Fasone reach the same decision as he did on Supplemental "B" on July 6, 2011, he is _to provide detailed written Findings of Fact to explain how he reached the result he did and how he arrived at the amount for the money judgment; and it is further

ORDERED should Support Magistrate issue new decisions on Supplementals "A" and "B" after entertaining Respondent's motion, he should issue final orders and detailed.'written findings of fact; and it is further • I j !

ORDERED that in addition to deciding the Respondent's application for leave to renew and reargue his motion to recuse, the- Support ..Magistrate is to include a written decision on Respondent's initial motion to recuse from July 26, 2010 to complete the record so it will be clear why he did not grant the application; and it is. further .10.

• '

-

ORDERED' that Support Magistrate Fasone is to review his record to make sure.that motions were filed on. appropriate supplementals and that all motions have been decided; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondent is to refrain from filing any motion papers to the undersigned's attention when appearing before the Support Magistrate; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondent shall not file any new motions until all of these outstanding'issues have been resolved and the Support Magistrate has ruled on each one. Upon receipt of a final decision determining each of these outstanding issues/ Respondent may timely file an objection should he feel aggrieved by the result; and it is further

ORDERED that all decisions on motions, Final Orders- and

.-.

Findings -of Fact be mailed to the Petitioner and Respondent upon completion; and it is further

11

ORDERED that oral argument on the motion will be held, before Support Magistrate Fasone on December 12, 2011 at 2 PM and'parties are directed to appear on that date; and it is further

ORDERED that Petitioner and Respondent are to submit any documents for consideration to the Support Magistrate ten days in advance of the hearing date; and it is further

ORDERED that any. documents not received in advance will not be considered; and it"is further

ORDERED that each 'party will have 15 minutes to present their oral argument; and it is further '

ORDERED that Petitioner and Respondent are to be prepared to proceed on that date and should they choose to be represented by Counsel, -Petitioner, Respondent and-Counsel are to be prepared to proceed on that date; and'it is further

ORDERED that no adjournments are to be granted by the Support

•12

'

Magistrate in the absence- of extraordinary circumstances; and it is further •

ORDERED that all Counsel of record are to receive notice of .this decision; and it is further ' ••; -

ORDERED that the Court'is to notify Petitioner, Respondent, Support Magistrate Fasone and the Support Collection Unit of its decision.

PAULA j. HEPNER, k.j.s

13

innoo AIIVWJ Aiwnoo SONW FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS ELENA SVENSON, Petitioner, -againstMICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Respondent. NOTICE OF MOTION TO HOLD IN CONTEMPT Hon. Jeanette Ruiz COUNSELORS: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that upon the annexed petition of Michael Krichevsky, sworn to the 18 day of July, 2013, and upon all the pleadings and proceedings heretofore had herein, the undersigned will move this Court at Part 27, thereof, to be held at the Courthouse located at 330 Jay Street, Brooklyn, New York on the 18th day of July, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. in the forenoon of that day or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard: For an order by the Court: 1. 2. adjudging the Petitioner in contempt of this Court for perjuring herself under oath; adjudging the Petitioner in contempt of this Court for maliciously prosecuting in this court false Petition to punish Michael Krichevsky in contempt of court based on John Fasone's void order and without probable cause causing Michael Krichevsky to suffer stroke; 3. 4. referring this matter to district attorney for criminal prosecution. declaring that support order against respondent dated February 3, 2010 by magistrate John Fasone of Kings County Family Court is VOID on the grounds that it was obtained by Petitioner's actual fraud, fraud upon the court, perjury, attorney's misconduct, misrepresentation, witness-tempering, obstruction-of justice and in absence of due process pursuant to CPLR 2002, R5015(a) (3),(4), R5012, and 5019

rin? R T inr
Q3AI303d DOCKET NO. F-28901-08/10/A/B/C

'

(a)-

TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that, pursuant to Section 2214(b) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, all answering papers, if any, shall be served at least seven (7) days before the return date of this motion.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York July 18, 2013 Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se 4221 Atlantic Ave Brooklyn, New York 11224 (718)687-2300 ELENA SVENSON 2620 Ocean Pkwy, Apt 3K Brooklyn, NY 11223

FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS ELENA SVENSON, Petitioners), -againstMECHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Respondent. PETITION TO HOLD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT DOCKET NO. F-28901-08/10A/B/C

STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS

ss.:

MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 1. I am the Respondent in the action herein. 2. I have first-hand knowledge regarding facts set forth below and is competent to testify. 3. On April 27, 2012 Petitioner (SVENSON) filed for bankruptcy. In her bankruptcy petition she revealed for the first time that on or about April 2009 she was working at the home health care agency, exhibit A, 4. While working at that agency, on August 6, 2009 at the hearing for child support in this court, SVENSON testified under oath that she is not working, but looking for work. The hearing was adjourned due to her testimony that in 2 months she will find some work. 5. After about 2 months, during November 2009 hearing in this court SVENSON testrfied under oath that she is not employed, was not looking for work, but instead she is going to medical school to become a nurse. She testified that she would graduate in 2012. 6. From April of 2009 until July 18, 2013 SVENSON and her attorney, Yonatan Levoritz, deliberately concealed from the court and KRICHEVSKY material fact that she was

working all this time while claiming that her income is zero and she is going to medical school, when she did not. 7. During child support proceedings from 2008 until 2013 hearing officer John Fasone was and is involved in covering up that fraud. 8. KRICHEVSKY was ordered to pay SVENSON $31,599.42 in arrears, petitioner's attorney fees, about $700 per month for parties' child health plan to pay to his employer in addition to $2045 in monthly child support while getting gross income of $4000 per month. 9. That order was impossible to comply with because after incomplete deduction of some taxes respondent would have no more $3694 per month in disposable income. If he would try to deduct from that amount $3067.50 plus $700 for child health care it would be more (3067.50 + $700 = 3767.50) than $3694 of respondent's disposable income, not to mention that respondent had basic human needs too and no more than 65% would be possible legally to deduct pursuant to Consumer Credit Protection Act Limitations on Withholdings for Support (15 U.S.C. 1673 (b)) 10. This child support order and others were issued by Mr. Fasone in deliberate disregard to KRICHEVSKY's human needs, because after KRICHEVSKY was fired, his unemployment insurance benefits were plundered by child support collection unit and he was left with $150 per week not counting his housing expenses, utilities, car expenses, etc. 11. This order was issued in violation of Bill of Rights and FDCPA. 12. SVENSON and her attorneys, Yoram Nakhimovsky, Michael Biancanello, and Yonatan Levoritz, in the name of the parties' child welfare in concert engaged in malicious

prosecution terrorizing respondent "as hired hit men." 13. It started in 2008 with petitioner, at the advice of her attorney, Yoram Nakhimovsky, stealing respondent's personal records, files, documents and electronic backup media, not to mention her attempts to provoke violence by, inter alia, looting respondent's apartment on 4336 Manhattan Avenue in Brooklyn. 14. It continued with Family Offence Petition falsely reporting family offence, child abuse and request for child support and ex parte order of protection on October 27,2008. 15. By the end of that day after petitioner obtained this order of protection, she brought parties' child at respondent's place of work. They were so afraid of respondent that they started badmouthing respondent and harassing his employer, Harlan Wittenstein, Esq., by demanding that he fires respondent. 16. Petitioner falsified facts in her petition for order of protection and, during hearing, this petition was withdrawn by her before the court had any opportunity to rule. 17. Mr. Levoritz and SVENSON committed fraud upon the court by filing fraudulent financial disclosure affidavits with the court. For example, in her family offence .petition she stated that due to Mr. Krichevky's offence she and the child "temporary living in apartment her parents own" at 2620 Ocean Parkway in Brooklyn. She intentionally concealed from the court that her parents are decedents and she owns this apartment so that she could "show the court how miserable they are and how atrocious Mr. Krichevsky is." To be consistent in her statements she and her attorney Mr. Levoritz intentionally and consistently with her prior statement did not list her 2620 Ocean Parkway cooperative apartment as "Other real estate owned" under H ASSETS: e) of post-father financial disclosure affidavit, and Ests

parties 120 Oceana condominium as "Residence owned" under d). During child support hearing, she admitted that she does not live therein Oceana, but collects $2825 in rent. She kept perjuring herself by continuing falsely testifying in court "She and child live in her parent's apartment" rent-free. 18. Testifying in Court that she is getting cash support from her sister from Germany is another perjury as her sister, Larissa Gaber, is on public assistance there. 19. Her attorney, Mr. Levoritz, obstructed justice through witness tampering by making her sister not to appear in court on January 6, 2010 after she was served with subpoena. 20. In post-father financial affidavit, petitioner and her attorney state that with ZERO assets her income is $2850 per month while expenses are over $4000. This fact was pointed out to magistrate John Fasone, but he "turned a blind eye to this fact." 21. Mr. I^evoritz and petitioner spoiled evidence by destroying and/or concealing (it is unknown which) unfavorable to them evidence. 22. Petitioner and her attorney did not deny the fact that Svenson stole these documents and electronic media from respondent. 23. KRICHEVSKY reserves his right to supplement this petition with memorandum of law, supplemental affidavit, and exhibits. WHEREFORE, respondent respectfully moves this Court to grant this motion in its entirety, including all costs in these court's proceedings.

X
MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se, under duress

Sworn to before me this 18th day of My, 2013_

YELENA RUVINSKAYA Notap/ Public, Stats of New York Np.01RU6138024 9-sled in Kings County Commission Expires December 12,

NOTAK

EXHIBIT A

Case 1-12-43U&u-ess

\JarI£.l I \£-

vri7i,j /

B6I (Official Form 61) (12/07)

In re

Siena Svenson

Case No. Debtors)

SCHEDULE I - CUHBENT INCOME OF INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR(S)
The column labeled "Spouse" must be completed in all cases filed by joint debtors and by every married debtor, wneiner or not a joint petition is filed, unless the spouses are separated and a joint petition is not filed. Do not state the rtame of any minor child. The average monthly income calculated on mis form may differ from me current monttly income calculated on Form 22A, 22B, or22C, Debtor's Marital Status: Single Employment: Occupation
DEPENDENTS OF DEBTOR. AND SJOUSE
RELATIONSHIP®: AGE(S):

Son

.

17 years

Hc

me Attendant As sooiation ror Services for the

red How long employed 3 years J-36 33rd Street Address of Employer 31 As toria, .NY 11106 INCOME: (Estimate of average or prc jected monthly income at time case filed) 1. Monthly gross wages, salary, and ccmmissions (Prorate if not paid monthly) 2. Estimate monmly overtime

$ S j S

DEBTOR 1,924.65 0.00 1,924.65

S
S S

SPOUSE N/A
N/A N/Al

4. LESS PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS a. Payroll taxes and social security b. insurance c. Union dues d. Omer (Specify): ' 5. SUBTOTAL OE PAYROLL DEDUCTIONS 6. TOTAL NET MONTHLY TAKE HOMETAY 7. Regular income from operation of business or profession or farm (Attach detailed statement) 8. Income fiom real property 9. Interest and dividends 10. Alimony, maintenance or support payments payable to the debtor for the debtor's use or mat of dependents listed above 11. Social security or government assistant* (Specify): 12. Pension or retirement income 13. Otter monMy income (Specify):

S S S S S
S S S S

321.40
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

$ S

S

$
S
S

S

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
' N/A

321.40
i, 603. 25 0.00 0.00

S

0.00
400.00

S S S

N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A

S S S S

0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

;
I

S

S .
S S

s'

N/A N/A

14. SUBTOTAL OF. LINES 7 THROUGH 13 15. AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME (Add amounts shown on lines 6 and 14)

400.00 .2,003.25

.$ S

N/A
N/A

2,003.25 S 16. COMBINED AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME: (Combine column totals from line 15) (Report also on Summary of Schedules and, if applicable, on Statistical Summaiy of Certain Liabilities and Related Data) 17, Describe any increase or decrease in income reasonably arricipated to occur wiihmtteye^^^

EXHIBIT B

GF15,8/2010

At a term of the Family Court of the State of New York, held in and for the County of Kings, at 330 Jay Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201, on July 18,2013 John M. Fasone, Support Magistrate File#: 142040 Docket #: F-28901-08/10A CSMS #: NV05003T1

PRESENT:

In the Matter of a Support Proceeding Michael Krichevsky, SSN: XXX-XX-7181, Petitioner, - against Elena Svensori, SSN: XXX-XX-8546, Respondent..

ORDER ON MOTIONS
(#02 on Supplemental "A" and #03 on Supplemental "B" & "C")

A motion having been filed with this Court on July 17, 2013, requesting an order on a(n) Motion to contest Court's jurisdiction and a Support Magistrate of this Court upon examining the motion papers and supporting affidavit(s) and hearing testimony in relation thereto and the following having appeared: Michael Krichevsky; Elena Svenson, finds that respondent-father seeks to reargue/reopen denial of his prior motions denied'on December 12, 2011 due to his refusal to participate in court proceedings in an appropriate manner, as well as to challenge entry of a money judgment against him in the amount of $21,916.34 on July 6,2011 and for recusal of the undersigned in any future proceedings under this docket. Inasmuch as the undersigned may have inadvertently failed to enter a written decision on respondent-father's prior motion for recusal such matter is easily remedied as there is no basis for such relief presented or upon review of the record below in any prior proceeding under this docket. Simply stated any request for recusal not based upon Judiciary Law §14, " is a matter of discretion and personal conscience." Grucci v. Villanti. N.Y.S.2d ,2013 WL345562(2ndDep't2013).1 As Grucci v. Villanti further instructs that positive proof is required of the party asserting recusal of "bias or prejudgment" on the part of the support magistrate assigned to hear and determine the matter before the Court. Here, rather than any evidence of "bias or prejudice" on the part of the undersigned against respondent-father, the latter has more than adequately .expressed his animism towards the former for having the temerity to decide the matters squarely placed before him on the issues of paternity and child support. It is quite simply his aberrant and disruptive behavior before the Court that prejudices his cause. In the interests of justice, however, if respondent-father is now prepared to amend/conform
Judiciary Law § 14 provides in pertinent part: "[a] judge shall not sit as such in, or take any part in the decision of, an action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding to which he is a party, or in which he has been attorney or counsel, or in which he is interested, or if he is related by consanguinity or affinity to any party to the controversy within the sixth degree

Page: 2 of 2 Docket No: F-28901-08/10A GF15

his behavior to accepted norms - i. e. to take the oath, to state identifying information required by law and to focus his testimony to the matter(s) at issue - the undersigned is prepared to entertain whatever pertinent arguments he may choose to offer. However, respondent-father is pre-warned that he will be required to disclose the disposition(s) of any of the property(ies) he held individually and/or j ointly with petitioner-mother at the onset of the paternity/support proceedings initiated under this docket, as well as to detail the diligent efforts he has made to replace the income purportedly lost due to the Court's orders entered herein. ORDERED that the motion of Michael Krichevsky is granted in the following respect(s): the supplemental petitions "A"-"C" are reinstated to be heard with the "E" supplemental petition for modification filed, herewith,; _ SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THIS ORDER MAY BE FILED WITH THIS COURT WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE THE ORDER WAS RECEIVED IN COURT OR BY PERSONAL SERVICE, OR IF THE ORDER WAS RECEIVED BY MAIL, WITHIN 35 DAYS OF THE MAILING OF THE ORDER.

Dated: August 9,2013

. ENTER

JohmM. Fasone, Support Magistrate

Check applicable box: D Order mailed on [specify date(s) and to whom mailed]: D Order received in court on [specify date(s) and to whom given]:_

FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS
In the Matters of Elena Svenson Michael Krichevsky To: Elena Svenson 2620 Ocean Parkway, Apt, 3K Brooklyn, NY 11235 ' ' File#: Docket #: 142040 F-2&901-08/13F

RESCHEDULING NOTICE Michael Krichevsky 4221 Atlantic Ave, Brooklyn, NY 11224

You are hereby notified that the matter previously scheduled for August 20,2013 has been rescheduled

to:
~ " "' Date/Time; September 20,2013 at 9:00 AM "Purposes: Fir^TAppearaiK^-aiiQ^etmirof 'Process Part: 27 Floor/Room: Floor 5/Room 5037 Presiding: John M. Fasone, Support Magistrate Location: 330 Jay Street Brooklyn, NY 11201 - -

Please bring this notice with you and check in with the Court Officer in the Part.

Dated: July 30, 2013

Robert Ratanski, Clerk of Court

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