_______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

Report Information from ProQuest
12 September 2013 09:06 _______________________________________________________________

12 September 2013

ProQuest

.... 1 12 September 2013 ii ProQuest ........... A trade-off between non-fundamental risk and incentives............................................................Table of contents 1...

[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] Publication title: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Volume: 41 Issue: 1 Pages: 29-51 Publication year: 2013 Publication date: Jul 2013 Year: 2013 Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media Place of publication: Boston Country of publication: Netherlands Publication subject: Business And Economics--Accounting. Business And Economics--Banking And Finance ISSN: 0924865X Source type: Scholarly Journals Language of publication: English Document type: Feature DOI: http://dx.org/10.1 (Jul 2013): 29-51. the second conjecture is attributable to the interplay between the risk-incentive trade-off and delegation of responsibility to the agent.proquest. indicating that the optimal level of pay-performance sensitivity depends not only on the degree. Michael K Publication info: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 41. The two conjectures are strongly supported by this study's findings over a wide range of empirical specifications.com/docview/1370219182?accountid=44945 Copyright: Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 Last updated: 2013-06-27 _______________________________________________________________ 12 September 2013 Page 1 of 2 ProQuest .doi. While the first conjecture stems from the controllability principle.Document 1 of 1 A trade-off between non-fundamental risk and incentives Author: Fung. of performance uncertainty. This study devised measures for fundamental and non-fundamental performance using an ARIMA-based unobserved-component approach. and that the impact of non-fundamental risks is more negative than that of fundamental risks on pay-performance sensitivity. ProQuest document link Abstract: This study conjectures that CEOs are rewarded more heavily for fundamental than for nonfundamental performance. but also on the nature.1007/s11156-012-0299-7 ProQuest document ID: 1370219182 Document URL: http://search.

.Contact ProQuest Copyright © 2012 ProQuest LLC.Terms and Conditions 12 September 2013 Page 2 of 2 ProQuest . All rights reserved.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful