The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon Part 19 http://www.sangam.org/PIRABAKARAN/Part19.

htm

The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon

Part 19

Sachi Sri Kantha

[20 October 2001]

Repercussions of Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord

Note to the Readers

In this part, I make liberal use of interviews and opinions, which have
appeared in the open sources of information since 1997. Lest some readers
think that I’m more or less using the ‘cut-and-paste’ version of writing
history, for reasons of accuracy, I prefer citing direct quotes (even if they
are lengthy!) from the main participants of the events under discussion,
rather than trying to paraphrase what they have described.

An [unidentified] Indian Intelligence Agency’s Assessment

Apart from J.N.Dixit, even the operatives of Indian Intelligence Agencies
had recorded the benefits of MGR’s patronage to Pirabhakaran and LTTE
in one of their reports in mid-1980s. Ten years later, the 1997 Jain
Commission Report on Rajiv Gandhi Assassination had made this public
by reproducing an excerpt of an unidentified Indian Intelligence Agency,
relating to Pirabhakaran and ‘other prominent personalities of the LTTE
during the period of 1981-86’.

This report makes interesting reading in that, it was written from the angle
of a spy (field officer) who was keen to find a ‘mole’ among the leading
LTTE members. I reproduce the relevant paragraphs.

“What helped Prabhakaran most in the early stages was the total
support given by the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister [i.e. MGR].
Prabhakaran was always very respectful towards MGR and used the
right phrases and right gestures. He admired MGR for the immense
popularity he evoked in the Tamil masses and wanted to emulate him.
On the other hand, Prabhakaran was seen as a real hero. Enormous
funds were made available which helped LTTE to sustain themselves
until they were in control of Jaffna peninsula and started collecting
taxes. On one or two occasions arms shipments were reportedly

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cleared and this gave a decisive edge to the group by the end of 1984.
This support added to the edge Prabhakaran had in his leadership and
the ability to invoke a kind of mad and total loyalty in his followers.
He has a self-constructive strain in him which he has successfully
passed on to some of his close followers. If driven to a corner,
Prabhakaran is capable of committing suicide rather than face
humiliation. He has a love for guns and his face is said to glow when
he sees a good weapon. He would always carry the latest pistol
available in the world market, and is a good shot too. [Jain
Commission Report, vol.5, chapter 16]

Now, to the assessment on Pirabhakaran’s closest company within LTTE

and search for a ‘mole’ amongst them. From the cited evidence of Kittu
being in Madras, it appears that this spy report was originally written after
the attack on Kittu, which happened on March 31, 1987. One should
overlook the stilted English description, since it probably was written by a
field officer of RAW who was on a mole hunt.

“At the moment, Prabhakaran does not carry any threat to his
leadership. Only two persons could have posed a threat. Of those,
Kittu is now in Madras to get an artificial leg, and though he is
consulted on all matters his disability and absence from the scene are
big handicaps. In the early days when Kittu wanted to marry his
girlfriend, Prabhakaran prevented it on the ground that a revolutionary
should be wedded to the revolution, though he himself fell in love
with one of the fasting girls of Jaffna University who was brought to
Madras by the LTTE, and got married to her. Kittu continues to hold
this against Prabhakaran.
Mathiasri [referring to Mahendrarajah alias Mahathaya] could claim
seniority even over Prabhakaran as he has continued with the Tigers
while Prabhakaran briefly joined TELO. Unlike Prabhakaran,
Mathiasri is very ambitious and the way Mathiasri has taken
precedence over Dileep Yogi (who joined the movement only after
1983) has not gone unnoticed. Other persons who are considered to
be very close to Prabhakaran would include Raghu, personal
bodyguard of Prabhakaran, and Thilagar, a political adviser, and
Shankar alias Swarnalingam who helped the LTTE in procuring arms
and other equipment from abroad. Anton Balasingham, the political
adviser (he is no doctor and does not hold a Ph.D.) is more a
spokesman who, as he himself had remarked, is there to justify the
action rather than advise on actions to be taken. Balasingham, after
taking his post-graduate degree in Jaffna, briefly dabbled in

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journalism before taking up a regular job in UK High Commission. In

the 1970s he went over to UK and in due course obtained British
citizenship. He lost his wife in London and married the Australian
nurse who was attending to her in the hospital. He is known to be
shrewd and has slowly eliminated all other intellectuals who could
have given sensible advice to Prabhakaran. Except for Balasingham,
Prabhakaran is surrounded by a group of school and college dropouts.
At this moment the rank and file is well-knit as the LTTE has the
muscle and money which would over to over an estimated 15 crores of
Sri Lankan rupees. The powerful motivation for attainment of Eelam
is no longer present and the problem would be how to keep the cadres
together with an alternative motivation. This is a major problem for
the group.” [ibid]

Readers should take note of Mahathaya’s profile as presented in this Indian

Intelligence wallah’s description and especially the comment ‘only two
persons’ (Kittu and Mahathaya) could pose a threat to Pirabhakaran. By
aligning this field report which was made public in 1997 via the Jain
Commission Report, with the already exposed fact that in July 1989, the
RAW officials had planted a news report in the Hindu newspaper about the
death of Pirabhakaran in the jungles of Vanni [see, The Pirabhakaran
Phenomenon – part 1], it appears difficult to contradict the accusation on
Mahathaya that he did turn into a Benedict Arnold of Eelam.

Col. John Taylor’s Assessment:

Col.John Taylor was one of the first officers assigned to the IPKF, and in
1997 he reminisced to the Rediff.Com.India his impression on the
confrontation with LTTE to the Rediff.Com.India. Col. John Taylor’s
observation is interesting in that he describes how the Eelam Tamil public
provided ‘tremendous mass support’ to the LTTE. His words on the quality
of RAW’s intelligence (both in literal and figurative senses) speak for
themselves. Excerpts from the website of Rediff.Com are as follows:

“By the time the Indian Peace Keeping Force was inducted after the
India-Sri Lanka Accord, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam had
emerged a strong militant group on the island. They had wiped out all
opposition, both Tamil and Sinhala. They had full control of the
North and East. They were running a parallel government. The
administration and judiciary were with them.
The LTTE was both loved and feared by all. When I was in Sri Lanka,
the only Sinhalas north of the Elephant Pass were the Sri Lankan
troops stationed there. Only Tamils were safe in the area. Such was

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the total control of the LTTE, because of their mass appeal… Many
critics have labelled the IPKF’s role on the island as India’s Vietnam.
The Sri Lankan Tamils, fed on LTTE propaganda, boasted of giving
the fourth largest army in the world, a bloody nose. Nothing can be
further from the truth.
The IPKF had successfully eliminated the middle order leadership of
the LTTE and broken their stronghold over the Jaffna peninsula. The
LTTE was forced to take refuge in the jungles of the North and East.
The Elephant Pass was open for the first time after the LTTE had
taken control of the Jaffna. Movement of goods from the South, East
and West was made possible after a long period of time. However, the
IPKF operations were not a complete success. We were unable to
unite the different Tamil groups, mainly because of the intransigent
attitude of the LTTE. It wanted the whole pie or nothing.
Anyone with a military background will tell you that for an army to be
successful in an operation of the size and magnitude in Sri Lanka, it
must have excellent intelligence, freedom of action to plan and
execute its operations, and sound logistic support… We were aware
of the LTTE’s domination over other militant organisations, but we
were not aware of their innovative tactics, resourcefulness,
tremendous mass support and, most importantly, their excellent
intelligence network.
Let me give you two small examples of their subtle yet fatally
successful methods of passing on information. Whenever an army
patrol left their camp or post, the nearest temple or church would ring
their bells to indicate how many men were in the patrol. If the bell
chimed six times the strength of the patrol was six, and so on. Only
later did we realise the truth of Hemingway’s classic For whom the
Bells Toll: they were tolling for us.
Passing through a village or township, a small boy or girl would run
ahead to the end of the street, pass information about the patrol. The
next messenger would be cycle-borne. Thus the message went ahead --
messengers changing every 150 metres or so. Even if they were
intercepted, the boy or girl only knew his portion of the route. No one
person knew the ultimate destination. While passing messages on
their [LTTE] radio sets, they switched frequencies continuously. So
the intercepts were just one line of a coded message. This was
something we were learning for the first time, and the hard way too.
The Research and Analysis Wing was in charge of collation of
intelligence. The less said about them the better. The intelligence

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agents were afraid for their lives and hardly dared to venture out of
their rooms. All the information they passed on was acquired from the
army. Things should have been the other way round. Unfortunately
Rajiv Gandhi mainly accepted the advise given by RAW and other
intelligence agencies, and decided to induct the IPKF. What we heard
on the grapevine was that the RAW advisors had told the PM, ‘We
will have Prabhakaran in our custody within 72 hours.’ This was
never confirmed, but was an indicator of our poor intelligence
assessment…”

Major General Harkirat Singh’s Assessment:

Major General Harkirat Singh served as the first commander of the Indian
army’s campaign in Sri Lanka. His views are lucid and he shoots straight.
Thus it is refreshing to digest this lengthy interview from a man who kept
silent for ten years. Though Pirabhakaran turned out to be his adversary,
this Indian soldier paid proper respect to the tenacity of Pirabhakaran. This
1997 interview, culled from Rediff.Com.India’s website, is also notable for
many of its revelations: (1) How Pirabhakaran was treated in New Delhi
before Rajiv Gandhi left for Colombo to sign the July 1987 Agreement? (2)
How the Indian authorities armed the EPRLF during August 1987 which
negated the spirit of LTTE’s surrender of weapons? (3) What caused the
suicides of LTTE leaders Kumarappa, Pulendran and another dozen cadres?
(4) on High Commissioner Dixit’s orders to ‘Shoot Prabhakaran – shoot
Mahathaya’, (5) on Pirabhakaran’s security cover.

In this lengthy excerpt, I have only deleted the infrequent Hindi

interjections in his responses, and altered the spellings of the names of
individuals and places to their conventional forms.

“One early morning in 1987, Indian army’s 54 Division landed in Sri

Lanka from Secunderabad. At its head was Major General Harkirat
Singh, the Indian Peace Keeping Force’s first commander. General
Singh first tried to buy peace with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam. When that failed, he plunged his men into a blood war. And
India suffered horrifying casualties.
After the infamous killing of Indian soldiers on the Jaffna University
football ground under his command, New Delhi inducted Lieutenant
General A.S.Kalkat. Thus, it slowly began relieving General Singh of
his charge. Within a year, he returned to India. General Singh has
been subject to much criticism. But, except for an interview
immediately after his retirement, he has kept his counsel. A decade
after those terrible days, he completed his memoirs on Lanka, wherein

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he blames key individuals involved in the IPKF operation for the

unprecedented loss of life, and questions several long-held beliefs.
In a candid interview to Josy Joseph, he accuses several people --
including then Indian army chief General K Sunderji and high
commissioner to Colombo J N Dixit -- and admits that “chaos”
reigned in the jungles of Sri Lanka where the Indian troops faced
humiliation.
Q: How did the IPKF, sent to enforce peace, get involved in a bloody
fight with the LTTE? Do you personally believe that it could have
been prevented?
One afternoon I was in my operations room when then vice chief of
army staff (S.F) Rodrigues came. Later he became [army] chief. He
talked of hard options. I advised him against it. I told him, If you
adopt hard options you would be fighting for the next 10 to 20 years.
And this will lead to insurgency and there is no stopping it. You are
fighting in Nagaland, Mizoram, all over. This will be another. And
sure enough, it has not ended to date. And it won’t end.
Q: Why?
I have all regards for Sri Lanka. The Tamils have sacrificed [a lot], the
LTTE is highly motivated and there is one aim: Eelam. Independence.
Till they get independence they are not going to stop…
Q: So you actually opposed what you went out to do?
Actually [yes]. And, you know, [General Rodrigues said], ‘No, no,
no... don’t get cold feet. We will take care of them.’ I said, ‘They have
fought their entire lives in the jungles.’ I have flown over the jungles
with Mahathiah, the number two man to Prabhakaran, in my
helicopter. We flew over the jungles of Vavuniya and he explained to
me how they fought against the Sri Lankans all these years. So they
knew each inch of the land. We would push them out of Jaffna, they
would get into the jungles. Then you would be fighting them for the
next 10 years.
Q: You had no intelligence inputs?
All these people who were in Delhi, I am afraid, they visited Sri
Lanka because it was a foreign country. They went back without any
hard intelligence. They had no intelligence to give me about terrain,
about enemy. I had to buy tourist maps in Hyderabad before I went
into operations. And I had to borrow a Sri Lankan photocopying
machine to make copies for my staff.

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Only one officer, now he is a general, Memon, he got hold of some

maps, because he was my staff officer. He was my brigade major once
upon a time. He said, ‘Sir, we have only these maps. You please take
them, you will need them. He was very nice, he gave me a dozen maps.
For army a dozen maps is nothing. Every platoon commander has to
have a map, a section commander has to have a map.
Q: So you went in with a tourist map?
We went in with a tourist map. We didn’t know the geography of this
country at all, except that it was an island country. That is it. What it
was inside, my God, you couldn’t see A to B, it was such thick
foliage…
Q: What were the options given to you?
It was wavering. Like this: if there is a coup in Colombo, how will we
reinstate [then Sri Lankan president] Jayewardane? Somebody came
out with some kind of plan. All right. If we have to favour the LTTE,
then how will we land in Sri Lanka? If we are to favour Sri Lankans,
how will we land in Sri Lanka? After all, you just cannot land, you
are going overseas, you are going by sea, going by air. So various
options had to be discussed. This kind of scenario we were working
on. War was never thought of. Nobody told us that behind-the-scenes
there was an Accord being worked out.
Q: You were not told that the Indo-Lankan Accord was being worked
on?
Of course not. What happened was, I was going back to
Secunderabad. As I arrived at the airport, all my staff were lined up
there. I said, Why are you all here, only my ADC is supposed to be
here. They said, ‘Sir, first flight is to take off at 1 O’clock tonight.’ I
said, ‘For where?’ ‘For Sri Lanka.’ I said, ‘It is 10 O’clock when I
arrived and we are on a six-eight hour notice?’ Then my staff
informed me, ‘Sir, the Accord has been signed in Sri Lanka, the prime
minister is there, he rang up the army commander Depinder Singh to
move a division to Sri Lanka.’….
Q: Your brigade commanders agreed to it?
They had no option, had to agree. Mentally we were prepared because
we had been talking about the Operation for sometime. Say, we may
be talking about it for a month, but there was no intelligence given to
us. I should have got a proper intelligence summary, this is the terrain,
this is the enemy strength. I should have been given a proper
operational instruction.

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When you are going into the blue in army terminology, a proper
operational instruction must be given. A proper overseas command
must be formed. Nothing was done. The air force was commanding its
own troops, army its own troops, navy its own troops. Who is there to
co-ordinate? Nobody. Everybody went independently, there was no
joint command. It was a tri-service operation, air force, navy and army
involved, but there was no joint command. There should have been a
single command to take this full force across.
Q: Each one on his own?
Everybody did his own and we landed there. And we landed there like
a refugee camp I saw in Assam, Chabua, when we were fighting the
Chinese. Everybody was just being inducted, nobody knew anything.
Anyway, I met the Sri Lankan brigade commander, went to his
operations room and he told me what it was all about.
I said, Have you seen the Tigers, LTTE? He said, Never. I sit inside
my bunker and at last light I have APCs [armoured personnel carriers]
outside my bunker. Why should I go and see the LTTE? I said, You
have been there for a long time. Alright, let us do one thing, you take
me to the LTTE, I want to establish contact with them.
We established contact. Kumaran [Kumarappa], who got killed in the
boat tragedy, he was the Jaffna commander, very nice chap, he came in
a car and took me and one of my brigade commanders, who got killed
in Srinagar, Fernandes, he got blown off by a mine aimed at the
ammunition depot. We both went with Kumaran. Mahathiah was
standing outside a bungalow. He said, ‘General, I am not prepared to
talk to you.’ I said, ‘Why? I have come here with a message of peace,
goodwill.’ He said, ‘Unless you bring back Prabhakaran, we will not
talk to you.’ I said, ‘Where is Prabhakaran?’
I didn’t even know that. They kept the army absolutely in the dark.
Prabhakaran was in the Ashoka Hotel in Delhi. Now I know the room
number also, 512 or 522. And he was to see the prime minister, before
the prime minister went in for the Accord. Anyway he saw him, the
PM gave him certain assurances, and before he could say ‘Jack
Robinson’, the prime minister was in Colombo, signing the Accord.
Prabhakaran learnt it on television that the Accord had been signed
and they were not party to it. It was one reason why the LTTE never
accepted the Accord and India’s stand.
If we had taken the LTTE into confidence, they would have known the
whole thing, their terms would have been put across to Jayewardene,
and the situation would have been different. Dixit was in a great hurry

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to get the Accord signed, with his name up. He became foreign
secretary; he got the award later. But he never studied the mood of the
people, especially the JVP. And since he didn’t study the mood of the
people, there was an attempt to assassinate the prime minister… Then
I spoke to Depinder. I said, ‘Prabhakaran must come back if you want
me to talk about surrender of weapons. That was the main issue.’ He
picked up the Sri Lankan phone, spoke to Delhi. Then he went back
to Madras and pursued the matter. He did a good job.
The next day Prabhakaran’s aircraft landed in Jaffna with
Prabhakaran and his bodyguards, his wife and children, Kittu (whose
leg was blown up) who was his right hand then. The air force pilot
wanted a receipt from me saying that I received these souls safely.
Then I was told that you will ensure that he reaches safely to Jaffna
town and handed over to his people. I said, Fine. We ensured that. We
put him and the others in various APCs so that if one is blown off, the
other is alive. We took them through the Sri Lankan lines to Jaffna.
I told my staff, take a receipt from Mahathiah that he has received
Prabhakaran. These are normal formalities. After all, Prabhakaran is
not a small man. He is the leader, a charismatic leader of the LTTE.
His life is very precious. And a very simple man. No bullshit about
him. His wife lived with three saris -- one she wore, one she washed
and one was ready to wear. That is all. They never drank Coca-Cola.
They offered us Coca-Cola, but never drank it themselves. They drank
that goliwala soda.
Q: So that was your first encounter with him?
After all that I said, ‘Prabhakaran, we must meet.’ He said, ‘General,
tomorrow, 11 o’clock.’ And we landed in the football ground of the
Medical College, Jaffna. The entire area was manned by LTTE guns. I
got down from the helicopter and looked around. I walked till I met
Prabhakaran. He was standing outside a conference hall. He took me
to his office. We spoke for five hours. I had to convince him that he
should surrender weapons.
Q: And he was convinced?
He gave it in writing. I can show you. The only letter he gave in
writing. I flew to Colombo showed it to [then Indian high
commissioner to Colombo J N] Dixit. His words: ‘General what you
have achieved the nation will appreciate. And I speak on the behalf of
the prime minister of India.’ These were his words to me at that point
of time.

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Right. The letter was flashed all over. Surrender ceremony was fixed
for 5th of August. Surrender started. Prabhakaran said, ‘I won’t come,
my political officer will come’. Quite right. Atal Bihari the Indian
prime minister doesn’t go for surrenders, it is his minister who goes.
So, Prabhakaran didn’t come. All the big shots of Sri Lanka were
there. Aircraft was there, propellers on.
Attygalle [then Sri Lankan defence secretary] said, My orders are that
I have to take the first weapon to Colombo and give it to Jayewardane.
The surrender took place. A token surrender. Yogi [Prabhakaran’s
representative] took his pistol and gave it. Then vehicle after vehicle
the LTTE came, piled up the whole area with ammunition, guns.
Bahut accha tha. Later on, all ran into trouble.
Q: Why?
Because they did not stop arming the EPRLF [Eelam People’s
Revolutionary Liberation Front]. RAW was doing it, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs knew about it, Dixit knew about it, but they couldn’t
stop it. With the result that handing over arms by 21st of August came
to a virtual standstill. And the whole thing took an ugly turn. They
started anti-IPKF demonstrations. Who is to answer? The general
officer.
My God, thousands of young girls and children used to come in front
in whites and later on what used to happen? When they used to come
we used to be careful, they used to go to the ground and behind would
be Tigers, with guns. That is how they used to take out our people.
You couldn’t kill them because there were children in the front,
women in the front. We were always fighting with our hands tied
behind our backs.
Q: Did you tell the army headquarters that the EPRLF was being
armed?
Of course.
Q: What was the reaction?
Nothing. No reaction. [Indian army chief] General [K] Sunderji never
said anything. In the army headquarters there was a core group headed
by defence minister, three chiefs and a few senior officers. They used
to take decisions, decisions are given to me by the staff officer.
Decisions, if I question, the answer will come, ‘These are orders from
higher echelons - Higher echelons’, that is the famous answer we got.
‘Higher echelons’.
Q: What happened after the surrender came to a standstill?

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There was a lot of problems. Ethnic riots broke out. They killed a lot
of Sri Lankans, tortured them. Between Tamils, Sinhalese, Tamil
Muslims. We did the spadework to stop it. But then the Thileepan
fast happened. We tried our best. I went and tried to meet him. LTTE
chaps told me, ‘General, the people’s emotions are so high that if you
appear on the scene they might create a problem’. They asked me to
stay there. I wanted to go and tell him, Give up. How will he give up?
Unless the assurances given by the prime minister of India are
fulfilled I am not giving up, he said. I kept requesting the high
commissioner, Come and meet, come and meet, come and meet. He
dragged his feet, he delayed it, he didn’t come. Finally he came when
the man was dead. We should have saved his life, one life.
Then the boat tragedy, I was in a meeting with Mahathiah and
Prabhakaran. You know, when we go for a meeting, they used to have
two video cameras focused on us, tape recorders, everything. With
great difficulty we had a thing like this [he points at this
correspondent’s recorder]. The poor brigade commander used to
keep that recording, then give it to his PA, and then send it to the
army headquarters. Whether anybody took action on what our reports
were, I don’t know.
Q: Even after the riots you were in touch with Prabhakaran?
Oh yes. I never gave up with Prabhakaran. He is a leader of the LTTE.
I had all the time to meet him because I knew he was the only man
who could solve the problem. Nobody else. Otherwise, you take up
arms, and we took arms and look what happened.
Q: And what exactly happened during the boat tragedy in which the
LTTE cadres committed mass suicide?
Yes, I was having a meeting with him, I came down from the boat.
Mahathiah had come down a little later. Kumaran (Kumarappa), and
Pulenderan (the Trincomalee leader), they were in the boat.
Mahathiah said, ‘General, I want to talk to you.’ I had a major who
could translate. Prabhakaran spoke to me in English many a time. He
appeared well-read. He [Mahathiah] said, ‘At all cost these people
[who were surrounded by Lankan troops] must be released. IPKF is
here to protect the LTTE, and they should not go to Colombo.
Otherwise, they will be tortured.’
They were 17, four we were able to save. So instead of going to
Colombo, we flew them from the naval base to the Jaffna airbase.
Now, the tamasha started. There were LTTE, around them were the

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Indian troops, around us were the Sri Lankan troops, around them
were the Indian troops, around them the APCs of Sri Lanka. Now tell
me, if you try to fight, there would have been a conflict between the
Sri Lankan and Indian troops. Of course, the orders were very clear to
the [Sri Lankan] brigade commander, otherwise get into the helicopter
and reach Colombo, relinquish the command.
Anyway I was told, ‘You go to Trincomalee and prevent reinforcement
of Trincomalee by Sri Lankans. Deny the airport to them.’ I reached
Trincomalee, and we took over the control tower, commandos were
deployed, no troop movement was allowed. It created lot of ill-feeling
with the Sri Lankan troops. In the meantime, I had said that it was
high time that Dixit, who was on leave in Delhi, go to Colombo, and
mediate their release in the boat. Depinder Singh also flew…
Q: So how did the boat tragedy end?
I was guarding the airfield. And all of them came, Depinder, Dixit and
some other staff officers. They landed there, they could not convince
Jayewardane, and he was too clever for them. Too clever… Depinder
next day flew into Trincomalee and told me, ‘Hand over, let them go
and do whatever they want. Let us go and have a cup of tea with them,
with the three chiefs.’ They were staring at me. This man created all
the problems.
Anyway, we had a cup of tea. At 2 O’clock I get a message, ‘Why is
the G-O-C [General Officer in Command] IPKF interfering in the
constitutional activities of Sri Lanka?’ These were the exact words.
This message came all the way from the force headquarters in Madras.
And, ‘Please lift your siege in Jaffna, Let the Sri Lankans do what
they want to.’ I was upset. I was in Trincomalee; they were in Jaffna,
my staff officers, everybody was taking charge of everything. I spoke
to my Colonel G S Hoshiar Singh. He said,’Anyway we have got
ambulances, cars, 13, 14 of them, the hospital is all geared up to flush
poison.’ Our troops withdrew, the Sri Lankan troops charged, and
these fellows swallowed cyanide. Those who chewed, they died on the
spot, those who swallowed were saved. This created chaos in the
Indo-Sri Lankan entity. That the Indian army, IPKF, could not save
them. Now this man blames me. This Dixit…
Q: What was Dixit’s approach to your attempts to buy peace with
LTTE?
Once he said, ‘Shoot Prabhakaran, shoot Mahathiah.’ I said, ‘Sorry I
don’t do that.’ Those were his orders. When they came to me at 12
o’clock at night for some work, he said ‘Shoot them. General, I have

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told you what I have ordered.’ I said, ‘I don’t take your orders. And
we are meeting under a white flag, you don’t shoot people under
white flag.’
Q: So who messed up during the boat tragedy?
The responsibility is entirely on the diplomats, entirely on the [Sri
Lankan] army headquarters. Otherwise, for me to save those people
was no problem. I would have just put them into few APCs and
smuggled them out. The Sri Lankans would have just looked on. We
would have taken them out, we had all the troops there. No problem.
Q: What did you feel when the orders came to leave the LTTE men to
their fate?
I felt terribly bad about it. Because Kumaran’s wedding was attended
by one of my brigadiers. Pulenderan was also there. A dreadful man.
Wanted for 34 murders by [Gen. Cyril] Ranatunga. Every day he used
to tell me, ‘General, Give me Pulenderan’ I used to tell him ‘I won’t
give you Pulenderan, he will travel with me in my Jeep’. And they [the
LTTE] were very cordial. They would take me anywhere. I had lot of
time for them.
Q: Specifically, did Dixit fail?
Dixit had the backing of the Prime Minister of India. He had a free
hand in the affairs of Sri Lanka. He could have thumbed the table and
told Jayewardane, ‘Sorry you have to do it. And if you don’t do it,
you know what the results will be. There will be riots, ethnic
killings.’ Dixit could have done it. There was no question about
Jayewardane not listening to him. Dixit may be a High Commissioner,
but he was a High Commissioner of great standing. When you have
the backing of the boss, you will be on the top of the world. You can
make any statement to these people.
Q: Could you tell us precisely what happened once the 17 Tigers
swallowed cyanide?
Riots all over. The entire Jaffna was red. We had to move, take up
defences. We had no defence stores. Remember, we had no defence
stores. We went with rifles. We did not have supporting weapons, we
did not have our defence stores... barbed by mines, pickets around
your positions so that nobody assaults the infantry without a stop. We
were in naked barracks. I had stopped even tents, because aircraft as it
is were few.
We carried our weapons and ammunition. We improvised wire around
us, put electricity on that so that nobody crosses over at night. We had

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to improve everything, there was nothing till the war started and
things started coming. And all the time they wanted us to fraternise
with the LTTE. All Madras battalions were flown into Sri Lanka. So
that we had more Tamil-speaking people. So that we spoke to the
LTTE, spread the message of goodwill, ‘We are here to protect you.
Surrender your weapons.’ They were no fools. They knew that the Sri
Lankan police was totally ineffective. The Sri Lankan police was
completely finished, yeh? If they surrendered their weapons who
would protect them?
Then they said, No, we will give 20 rifles for the protection of
Prabhakaran, 15 for Mahathiah... Jayewardane himself said this. And
Prabhakaran knew he could not survive with 15 people. He used to
have three-tier security around him. If Prabhakaran is here, here [the
innermost ring] will be the suicide people who will sacrifice their
lives. The next ring will be the fighters and the third ring will be for
early warning. We could never lay hands on him even during the war
once he left Jaffna. I got him only once where he said, ‘Now, I am not
going to survive, all commanders are independent and will take
over...’ When we did that bloody parachute drop.
Q: You mean the attack in the university campus?
Yeah. That was also a tragedy.
Q: But what exactly happened?
What happened? I planned with nine helicopters. I needed nine
helicopters to land the troops. When the hour came, when the flight
had taken off to mark the landing zone, the next flight had taken off
to land the people to secure the landing zone, I am told, Sorry,
helicopters are not available hereafter.
Q: Who said that?
The air force. Why are helicopters not available? They have gone to
the east, there is some exercise going on. But my requirement was
nine helicopters, it was accepted by [Lieutenant General] Depinder
Singh. [Lieutenant General A S] Kalkat had confirmed that your plans
are approved. And now you are saying the helicopters are not
available? It is too late!
It was too late for an operation: half on the ground, half in the air.
Bad luck. But that chap of a major who landed there in the third
flight... Five flights went in, he landed in the third. Out of the five,
one had a hole in it, so it never came back. Anyway, this major of the
17 Sikh Light Infantry, he did not dig down. In army, the moment you

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land, the first requirement is to give yourself protection. So that you

can fire your weapon and don’t get shot. Whereas the commandos got
into the barracks. They told the chap, You also come into the
barracks. He said, ‘No, no, my commanding officer is going to come.
So I must meet him here.’ At that time Prabhakaran said, ‘I have had
it, I am not going to survive.’ We had surrounded his headquarters.
All the commandos were behind the back. And we were very happy
because this intercept was taken by the Sri Lankans. The Sri Lankans
were our interceptors, incidentally. We had no interception set-up.
And we had a good rapport with the Sri Lankan [army] people; they
were ready to give us all intercepts.
Q: The Indian soldiers were killed after they entered the campus?
Yes, they never went into the campus. They went to the football
ground. Open space. Prabhakaran came there and kicked one chap.
‘Let him survive to tell the story’ he said. All the others were killed.
And so many people are dead, 24 people are dead… If it was a
success, it would have been a success, what a great success!
Prabhakaran captured! It is unfortunate that persons were killed…
Q: You were worried after the boat tragedy?
One should not worry about this and that. That is OK. The boat
incident was a diplomatic failure, diplomatic-political failure. The
IPKF had nothing to do with it. I can write in bold letters that even if
an open court is held people will talk about it. Operations, we had
planned and we had executed them. But our aircraft support at the last
minute was called off. In place of nine helicopters, we were given five
and four in the second sorties. So we had to ground operations to link
with that. That upset the whole thing, we suffered casualty…
Q: All that because you had no idea of the LTTE?
Only that we didn’t know their dispossession. Their caches. They had
buried all their weapons, they had buried all their ammunition, they
had buried all their supplies, they buried their money. And they knew
where to dig. Their caches were all over. Not like us. We had a long
administration tail. Even live goats were being sent. You can’t fight a
war like this…
Q: So from word go it was flawed?
They should have had a proper war game. They should have known
which troops to send. They should have known the terrain in Sri
Lanka. Not that we rescinded it, we were pretty happy. I had in my
mind that we would have the settlement by December and be back in

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Secunderabad. But then the whole critical political failure. We had no

political backing. There should have had a civil-military liaison office.
They should have come from the beginning. All IAS, IFS officers
came much later. All political problems, it is not for the army to
handle. We don’t handle political problems, we only fight.
Q: At the end of it all, when you were transferred out in an year, you
felt humiliated?
No. Why should I feel humiliated? No question. I never felt guilty. It
is this [then Indian high commissioner to Colombo J N] Dixit. When I
refused his orders it was Dixit who went and spoke to the chief…
Q: But people humiliated you?
Nobody. Even Dixit did not dare to talk to me. I will take off his
pants. Really, I have not forgiven him. He has done the greatest
damage…
Q: Was the [IPKF] withdrawal rightly timed?
The IPKF should have never withdrawn. Why should they be
withdrawn? Why they got withdrawn? Because [then Sri Lankan
prime minister] Premadasa wanted them to withdraw. At what cost
have we come back? We lost 1,500 to 2,000 people. All the weapons
we imported, we handed them over to the EPRLF. He had no business
to do that, [Lieutenant General] Kalkat. The IPKF boarded the ships,
the EPRLF was annihilated by the LTTE, and all the weapons were
taken away. EPRLF was put into a ship and rehabilitated in some
island off Orissa. They deserted Jaffna. And Jaffna is back with the
LTTE…
Q: Will the fight in Sri Lanka go on?
They are going to fight. We have parallels in Nagaland. Troops were
inducted in 1957, now how many years? Still, fighting... Every day
they are getting killed. This will carry on. The LTTE is not a simple
soul to crack. A hard nut. Lead by Prabhakaran, a highly-motivated
man. He has only one aim, Eelam. When India went in, they didn’t
want them [LTTE] to win independence outside the [Sri Lankan]
constitution because it had problems in Kashmir etc. They didn’t want
Trincomalee to become Diego Garcia, because there were oil wells
there. I don’t see any peace in the near future.”

In sum, Dixit (diplomat), RAW (Indian Intelligence Agency), and Indian

soldiers Col. John Taylor and Maj.Gen.Harkirat Singh represented
different faces of India. They worked against the interests of Pirabhakaran.

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However, their assessments of their encounters with Pirabhakaran and

LTTE, project unanimous conclusions; i.e., Pirabhakaran has been a highly
motivated strategist, who is innovative and talented. He possesses
exceptional survival and resilience skills. However, it took nearly 10 years
for their wisdom to be released to the public.

Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene Accord of 1987

The Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene Accord of 1987, which led to LTTE’s war

against the Indian army, is an ideal example for a ‘Rashomon’ event. [for
the explanation of Rashomon theme, see The Pirabhakaran Phenomenon –
Part 9]. An event occurred, in which quite a few participated and there was
an observer. Then there were others who heard the story. When the event
was later described by the participants, observer and the listeners, everyone
delivered his or her own version and the truth became entangled on the
description of the event, including what happened immediately before the
event and after the event.

Chronologically, I list some of the prominent versions, as they came out.

The EPRLF’s version was presented by the Broken Palmyra scribes in
1990. J.R.Jayewardene’s version was described by Prof.K.M.de Silva in the
second volume of his sycophantic biography on the UNP leader, which
appeared in 1994. Indian army’s version on its induction to Eelam was
presented by Gen.Harkirat Singh in 1997. Sri Lankan army’s version was
also presented by Major General Lucky Algama in 1997. India’s official
version came in the form of Dixit’s memoirs in 1998. Panrutti
Ramachandran, who was MGR’s right-hand man during that period,
presented MGR’s version in 2000. For record, I present Lucky Algama’s
version and Panrutti Ramachandran’s version as well.

Major General Lucky Algama’s assessment:

Lucky Algama lost his life in December 1999, at the campaign platform of
the last Presidential election in Sri Lanka. He was a major player in the Sri
Lankan army during UNP’s rule. In October 1997, he was interviewed in
London by Thilak S.Fernando, who has posted this interview in his website
[London Diary], with the note, ‘an interview which never found its way to a
Sri Lankan newspaper’. Excerpt:

Fernando’s question: ‘During the period of the Indian Peace Keeping

Force (IPKF) in the North and East of Sri Lanka, the strength of their
columns were reported to be in the region of 85,000 cadres. Yet they
could not capture Prabhakaran! What was the Sri Lankan Army’s role
during that period?’

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Algama: ‘The strategy of the IPKF was to saturate the captured areas
with their troops. They could do that because their manpower was
enormous. If they wanted to capture Prabhakaran, definitely there
were ample opportunities to do so. However, they did not capture him
because their arrival on Sri Lanka soil was for a completely different
purpose – due to the wrong foreign policy adopted by the Sri Lankan
Government at the time. Our foreign policy appeared to be detrimental
to India at the time, therefore, the IPKF came only to safeguard
India’s interests and certainly not to solve Sri Lanka’s problems.’

Panrutti S.Ramachandran’s assessment:

Of all the versions presented on the Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardene Accord,
this version seems to have closest alignment to what Pirabhakaran and his
patron MGR would have thought about it in July 1987.

“…. Though the accord contained some positive aspects, it was

inherently defective. The problem was between Sinhalese and Tamils
of Sri Lankan origin in Sri Lanka. The accord should have been
between them, and not between India and Sri Lanka. India can be a
guarantor at best to see the implementation of any such agreement.
Unfortunately, the accord was more like a pre-arranged marriage by
parents without consulting the daughter, the eventual bride. Moreover
there was a clause in it, putting the onus on India to disarm the LTTE,
within two days of signing of the accord.
The accord was shown to the then Tamil Nadu Chief Minister MGR,
almost as a fait accompli. He was asked to bring round the LTTE for
this arrangement. In fact the LTTE raised at that time a pertinent
question, as to why they should vouch for an agreement between India
and Sri Lanka. On behalf of MGR, I took the onerous responsibility
of trying to convince the LTTE. I prevailed upon the LTTE that there
were aspects in this to be looked into. For the first time, the
Government of Sri Lanka recognised Northern and Eastern provinces
of Sri Lanka as Tamil homeland. Secondly in the past whenever
Tamils entered into agreements with the Sri Lankan government, it
always went back. But this accord allowed India to be a guarantor.
Third, an interim government for the Tamil homeland was
incorporated which gave legitimacy to LTTE and allow it to form a
government. And furthermore it was only an interim arrangement.
When everything went as planned, the Sri Lankan government stabbed
India by arresting LTTE cadres, who ultimately committed suicide
under the custody of Sri Lankan army. The IPKF presence in Sri

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Lanka could not save their lives. Naturally LTTE was unwilling to go
by the accord. Instead of pacifying or renegotiating with the LTTE,
Rajiv ordered IPKF to disarm them. That was the fateful decision
taken at Delhi in which I too participated. I was asked to leave the
meeting because of my strong protests against the decision (emphasis
added). Immediately, I met G.Parthasarathy at his residence in Delhi
and apprised him of what happened in the meeting; he said, “this boy
(he was referring to Rajiv) is immature; Everything is gone; Nothing
can be saved”. His prophecy came true. The intention of the Indian
government to “disarm LTTE within 24 hours” almost went on for two
years, ending in a historical tragedy, including the death of Rajiv
Gandhi…” [India Today.Com website, May 2000]

Pirabhakaran’s assessment and a retrospective summary

Pirabhakaran’s assessment of the performance of LTTE against the Indian
army appeared in the Time magazine (April 8, 1990; Asian edition) and it
has already been presented (see, Pirabhakaran Phenomenon – part 1).
Retrospectively speaking, how did Pirabhakaran’s LTTE fare against the
Indian army?

Indians present a face-saving excuse that if they were allowed to stay a few
more months, they would have ‘finished’ their work in disarming the
LTTE, but Premadasa’s government spoiled this job. Sri Lanka’s
politicians and its army men (who were only spectators), harboring an
ample dose of jealousy that Pirabhakaran had gained more stature by his
confrontation with the Indian army, insist that if not for Premadasa’s
back-handed help, LTTE would have been history by 1990.

The strategy adopted by Pirabhakaran was similar to what Gen.Vo Nguyen

Giap did in Vietnam in the 1960s. As Giap reminisced his famous strategy
to Stanley Karnow in 1990,

“We were not strong enough to drive out a half-million American

troops, but that wasn’t our aim. Our intention was to break the will of
the American Government to continue the war. [Gen.] Westmoreland
was wrong to expect that his superior fire power would grind us
down. If we had focused on the balance of forces, we would have been
defeated in two hours. We were waging a people’s war – America’s
sophisticated arms, electronic devices and all the rest were to no avail
in the end. In war there are the two factors – human beings and
weapons. Ultimately, though, human beings are the decisive factor.
Human beings! Human beings!” [New York Times Magazine, June 24,
1990]

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Pirabhakaran was shrewd enough to learn from an Asian military genius

and innovate the methods to his environs 15 years later. Like what Giap did
to the American government, Pirabhakaran decisively broke the will of the
then Indian government. Pirabhakaran also adopted Mahatma Gandhi’s
strategy and modified it to the 1980s. Wrote Gandhi, about his strategy
against the British army,

“The British want us to put the struggle on the plane of machine guns.
They have weapons and we have not. Our only assurance of beating
them is to keep it on the plane where we have the weapons and they
have not.” [Time magazine, Feb.9, 1948]

Pirabhakaran’s success against the Indian army was achieved by blending

the strategies of Gandhi and Giap to his advantage. If tactical alliance with
Premadasa helped his goal, he was bold enough to give it a try. Next, I
trace the three major outcomes of the Indo-LTTE war in the 1990s. (To be
continued)

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