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Commission Sensitive MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site

Interview with Joeseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator. Type of event: Interview Date: Monday, September 22, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238 7045] Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account. Background Joe Cooper has been with the FAA since 1991, primarily working in Area B. He has been with the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) since 1999. At TMU Cooper generally manages traffic flows and considers TMU to be the "hub" of traffic for Boston Center. The Boston TMU communicates with Boston sectors and coordinates what is ongoing in Boston airspace with the TMUs of other national centers. Cooper identified TMU positions as departure spacing, en route spacing, arrival flow, military coordinator, and severe weather management. The en route spacing coordinator is responsible for the "metering" of air craft - at a rate of about 38 aircraft entering into a new air space per hour. The military coordinator is responsible for clearing airspace for military training purposes. "Al Trav" is the term used when the military makes an "altitude reservation" they receive these reservations when they plan on using an air "track" for mid-flight refueling. Reservations for this space can be done through Herndon Command Center. Herndon also handles any national severe weather coordination. Cooper never deals with the Region Operations Center or the Washington Operations Center. Morning of 9-11 On 9-11, Cooper first heard from Pete Pasquali in Area B that AA11 had lost communication capabilities and radar. The next step was for one of the TMU personnel to contact company (American Airlines). Cooper remembers thinking it odd that an air

carrier would loose both radio and transponder at once. TMU pulled the call sign for AA11 to monitor the flight. Controllers were alerted to move air craft away from the possible route of AA11 since the altitude was unknown; the last registered altitude was FL 290. At that point Area C told TMU that AA11 was a possible hijack. Terry Biggio told Bob Jones [Quality Assurance] to "pull the tapes" (the record of communication between the pilots and the ATC). AA11 veered to the right. The primary target had been tagged, so the data block of the last known information stayed with the primary. At first, with only three factors, no radio, no transponder, and serious course deviation Cooper thought AA11 had experienced serious electrical damage. But after the hard left turn and the confirmation of a hijack through the cockpit communication, there was no doubt in Cooper's mind. After Bob Jones confirmed the cockpit communications, Dan Bueno asked Cooper to call for military assistance. He asked Huntress to send F16s out of Otis Air Force Base. Cooper did not know the physical location of Huntress [Rome, New York]. Cooper asked Bradley {Hartford CN International Airport] to stop departures headed towards New York when AA11 was roughly five miles south of Albany. When speaking with the military, Cooper believes he spoke with Sergeant Powell. Cooper was unaware of any specific military exercises that were taking place on 9/11. Cooper believes there was a lack of understanding on the military's part of the FAA definition of "primary target", but he was eventually able to give the military a rough latitude and longitude location. Cooper thought they might vector an aircraft from the Falcon Axe area [over Griffiss AFB, Rome NY] that is composed of airspace 7,000 ft to 49,000 ft. Concerning the attempt to gain an altitude on AA11, Cooper believes that Colin Scoggins asked the military to use its height finding capability on AA11. [Staff note: the Joint Surveillance System radars feed both FAA and NORAD sites. The NORAD portion of that feed can determine altitude on a primary-only target, the FAA feed cannot.] Cooper stated that Terry Biggio, the Boston Operations Manager in Charge, was on a conference call that included New York Tracon and New York Center. He does not believe those calls were recorded, but the hotline on the New York side may have been recorded. They were still attempting to locate AA11 when Terry Biggio told the TMU they lost radar contact with AA11, and shortly after that one of the facilities personnel told the TMU a plane hit the WTC. Cooper went to the TV at the facilities and Cooper immediately knew it was AA11. Cooper was caught in "disbelief, but he then immediately thought of the strain on his controllers who were attempting to slow down traffic. New York Center then called and informed Boston Center of a possible second hijacking and that New York airspace was being shut down. Cooper stopped all departures planned through New York air space. He then heard of the second hit on the WTC. He immediately realized that control in order to keep the planes still in the sky was all he could do. He told Dan Bueno that maybe they should call ATC Zero. Bueno said to do it, and they sent out the message for a Boston ATC Zero.

They reviewed more of the audiotape and Biggio relayed the "we have some planes" through the conference call. The Pentagon then got hit and Herndon called for a National Ground Stop. Cooper discovered that UAL175 was also a Boeing 767 headed to Los Angeles. The TMU decided to check for planes in the air that were also flight planned from Logan to Los Angeles. They found that Delta Flight 1989 was a similar flight and immediately informed Cleveland Center. NEADS was called and the TMU asked what to do with military aircraft in the air but not part of the response to the attacks. NEADS announced that all military aircraft not on mission would return to base. The facility manager then ordered everyone evacuate Boston Center except for one supervisor per area, one controller per area, and two TMU personnel. Cooper is clear that any suspicion, today, of another airborne threat the DEN (Defense Event Network) line is the absolute first place to report to. It is open at all times. Cooper is not aware of how he would get the military involved except to use the DEN line. NOTE: Cooper provided Commission staff with a personnel account of the events of 911 he made a few days after the event.

[Classification] MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview 1 with Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor, Boston Center. Type of event: Interview Date: Monday, September 22, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA Boston Center, Nashua, New Hampshire Participants - Non-Commission: Chris , FAA General Consul Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Daniel D. Bueno began with the FAA in March of 1982, and began his career at Boston Center. He spent 6 to 7 years as an ATC (air traffic controller), then worked as a traffic management specialist in the Traffic Management Unit (TMU), then as both an Area D and Area C Supervisor, and finally in his current position, as Traffic Management Supervisor. The TMU "umbrella" includes Eastern Region and Boston Center, Carmine Gallo is its overall head. Bueno first became aware of a possible hijacking from Area C Operation Supervisor (OSIC), John Schippani. Area C covers airspace of Flight Level 240 (24,000 feet) to FL600 at and to the west of Boston, Massachusetts. Bueno paged Terry Biggio, who has Operations Manager in Charge (OMIC) at the time. The possible hijack was identified to Bueno and Biggio as American Airlines 11 by Schippani, who was informed from the air traffic controller (ATC) covering Sector 46 (R46), Peter A. Zalewski. Biggio brought AA11 up on his display module (MDM), and Bueno called the FAA's Herndon, Virginia

air traffic control headquarters via the Boston Center ATCSCC (air traffic controller ) to inform them that AA11 was "no radio communication" (NORAC), more commonly referred to as NORDO (no radio), and had turned off its transponder, which transferred its radio signature to a primary target, which consisted of no altitude information. Bueno stated that Terry Biggio asked Robert Jones to pull the "tape" from the recorder. Bueno identified the speaker at Herndon as "Tony". AA11 took a sharp right turn at 1227 UTC, and headed south. When AA11 started to slow down, Bueno called New York TRACON to advise them of a the situation. Bueno's experience as an ATC led him to believe that AA11 's slow down was indicative of a drop in altitude, and thus NY Center would need to clear all air traffic at all altitudes along the possible path of AA11. Based on Bueno's memory of the 19 hijack of , Bueno called Cape TRACON for an immediate fighter escort out of OTIS Air Force Base. He knew that the call should have gone to North East Air Defense (NEADS), but due to the urgency of the circumstance called directly to the FAA contact point for Otis . Bueno explained that he understood normal procedure for a NORAC airplane was to check the NAV 80, try to raise the aircraft by various means (check previous transponder frequency, use AIR Inc., notify the aircraft's company, ask other aircrafts to try and raise the NORDO airplane), but noted that although prior to 9/11 it was usual for pilots to be inattentive to ATCs at times, and that often there were 5 to 20 minute lapses in communication, the combination of circumstance (NORAC, no transponder, serious deviation off course) was infrequent. Despite this it was still unusual to call this to the attention of the "aisle supervisor" (area supervisor). Bueno stated that prior to 9/11, a hijack would be predicted as a flight to Cuba or a ransom demand, but not as an act of terrorism. He also noted that with AA11, until the threatening cockpit communication was confirmed, predominately the Boston Center staff was concerned the place had experienced serious mechanical or electrical failure. He noted that there was an occurrence of this sort involving a generator malfunction post9/11, and it was addressed immediately. According to Bueno, the key that alarmed Boston Center over AA11 before the threatening communication was the hard southern turn. The southbound course combined with a dropping altitude had already been reason enough for Terry Biggio to call for an

immediate "ground stop" in the Sparta/Carmella traffic corridor. Once Bob Jones communicated the tape's content to the TMU, Biggio informed ROC, WOC and New York Center of the necessity of an immediate ground stop at Logan. Bueno believes New York Center was working UAL 175 at this point. When asked about a timetable for military involvement, Bunco stated he took an initial role calling the hijacking to Collin Scoggins attention, who immediately called NEADS. Bunco noted that Collin Scoggins was a military operations specialist (MOS) at Boston Center, and is usually not on the ATC floor. The MOS is now part of the TMU. It became Cape TRACON's responsibility to coordinate the fighter scramble, and Boston Center took responsibility for clearing the skies, and that Huntress took did not take control of high altitude along the coast until later in the day. The procedure for active fighter scrambles was coordinated in the "Otis Cape TRACON Letter Agreement", and Bueno had experience in the early 1980s with a scramble to escort an airplane out of Kennedy Airport. Bueno has not participated in any tabletop scramble exercises. Regarding Operation Vigilant Guardian, a command post exercise that was scheduled to take place on September 11th, Bueno believes the military operation specialists may have been briefed, but that Boston Center was not involved beyond a NOPAR (no pass through air defense) order for the airspace involved in the exercise. Bueno stated that the system "worked absolutely" on 9/11. Boston Center was able to shut down the airspace on the east coast in a relatively timely manner, and were able to reroute and land planes successfully. Bueno stated that the Dynamic Simulation Training (DynSim) that ATCs are required to perform yearly serve their purpose, even though they are only simulation. He noted that in the past one of his DynSims might have involved vectoring an aircraft toward a hijack, but if so it is only a loose memory, but that he definitely has not exercised a NORAC hijack with no transponder. Nor had their been a hijack simulation or exercise that included FAA and NORAD co-participation. North Atlantic inbound flights on 9/11 were passed through to Canada.

Prior to 9/11, Bueno remembers numerous localized ground stops, but never a national one. After Cape TRACON was contacted by FAA personnel, Cape TRACON called Otis . Bueno mentioned the possibility of scrambling fighters from Atlantic City to Collin Scoggins. Bueno never thought that the scrambled fighters would receive an order to shout down a commercial airliner. Bueno recommended to heighten airline security passengers should no longer be allowed carry-on luggage, and all cargo should be thoroughly screened. Bueno commented that Boston Center staff now have a security and national defense role that has been added to their primary purpose of keeping aircraft separate from each other and from weather threats. Bueno is concerned that just as hijacks in the past created a conceptual box from which all planning and practice will be based on, the event of 9/11 was created another conceptual box, and unless planning and practice is exercised beyond this box, the country is still vulnerable. Bueno stated that a benefit of the improved relationship between FAA and military entities is that they now communicate daily over airspace caps and are linked through the Defense Event Network (DEN).