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[Classification] MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview

1 with Shirley Kula, Operations Supervisor, Boston Center. Type of event: Interview Date: Monday, September 22, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA Boston Center, Nashua, New Hampshire Participants - Non-Commission: Chris , FAA General Consul Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Kula has been an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) since 1982, and was an ATC supervisor for three years prior to 9/11. On 9/11 she was fulfilling a supervisor requirement to spend 8 hours per month at a radar scope, and was working the Athens Sector 38 Radar Associate (RA) position. On 9/11 Kula was notified from 46R that AA11 took a 20 degree turn but did not change elevation to the instructed Flight Level 350 (35,000 feet). 46R had called Sector 47 (Boston Approach) to see if AA11 had stayed on radio frequency 112.7. After that proved unsuccessful, Kula instructed a call be placed through Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (AKA Airlnc) to attempt to call AA11 through their system, and Kula instructed AA11 be contacted on "guard" (an open frequency used for the entire Boston Center airspace). Kula found out from John Schippani that there was suspicious communication in the cockpit. Kula instructed Ron Smith to call all vertical airspace under Sector 22 for AA11, and once AA11 took the hard southern turn Kula input the change in route to inform other ATCs there was an airplane that may cross the paths of their air traffic. Kula noted that it was at this point at which she became extremely concerned for AA11.

She noted that though it was usual to have a NORAC (no radio communication) airplane in that sector, the serious course deviation and unsure altitude were dangerous factors for the other air traffic traveling through Boston Center. In efforts to determine AAl 1 's altitude, Kula asked a Delta flight to visually check AAl 1 's altitude. The Delta flight reported approximately FL 290. Kula was no longer directly supervising AAl 1 after the handoff of the flight to Sector 20. It was definitive in Kula's mind after she heard of an impact at the World Trade Center that it was AAl 1. Military: Kula was unaware that military radar could find altitude, and she was not involved with the fighter scramble from Otis Air Force Base. Kula did vaguely recall a scramble in the "early 80s" off the eastern coast, but "certainly nothing since 1985." Kula noted the Dynamic Simulation (DynSim) training programs usually have a hijack scenario every year, but those scenarios in her experience have never consisted of multiple hijacks, or in her experience of a single hijack that necessitates a vectored military fighter. Kula noted that the Boston Center Watchdesk open line with Giant Killer (military airspace coverage of low to mid range altitudes along eastern coast), which rings once a shift for a line check, as well as the open line with DENS are both positive steps for more rapid communication.

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