[Classification] MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview

with Toby Miller, First Line Supervisor Area C, Traffic Management Supervisor on 9/11 Type of event: Interview Date: Monday, September 22, 2003 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New Hampshire Participants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 238 7045] Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Miller explained the TMU outlook as a "system" view for balancing air traffic. He explained that some of the positions at the TMU at ZBW are: a military coordinator, an en route specialist, a severe weather specialist, and an arrival sequencing specialist for Boston Logan Airport. On 9/11, TMU staff was Dan Bueno as superviser, Joe Cooper, Dennis Wishheart and Steve Wills. When Miller arrived at 5:30am everything was as usual. He worked the departure coordinator position until his break. Around 9:15am Miller heard of the WTC impacts, and went back to TMU. He was briefed by the supervisor of Area E. He contacted ZNY and was told that New York would not take any aircraft through ZNY airspace. He received word after this that there would be an impeding ATC Zero through Herndon Command Center. At this point he informed all of the supervisors, then went back to his desk. By the time he was back at his desk the ATC Zero had been called, and he went back down the aisles and informed the supervisors. He personally verified with the northeast area towers that no aircraft was to take off. Through his proximity with the Operations Desk he heard of the reported bomb threat and also of possible inbound planes towards ZBW. It was at this point that the ZBW building evacuation order was issued. Miller and Bueno remained at the TMU to handle

air traffic for an additional ten to fifteen minutes, then the operations manager told them to go. It was around one o'clock at this point, as far as Miller could remember. Miller stated that it was Dan Bueno who contacted Otis for a fighter scramble. And that it was his understanding from conversation in the TMU that Bueno's attempt was unsuccessful. Regarding the AA11 anomalies, Miller noted that the DynSim and CBI training prepared ATCs for hijack scenarios in which the pilot was communicating with the ATC. He acknowledged that the uncontrolled flight of AA11, which refers to the airplane's serious course deviation, was a factor that calls for a higher level of concern, but stated that without the "tip off from the pilot as per training, it would not be in an ATC's ability to distinguish definitively that a plane had been hijacked. Miller has daily contact with HUNTRESS regarding training in the military areas. Miller informed Commission staff that "huntress" is NEADS call sign. Miller would get the huntress training exercise in the evening and clear the appropriate space the next day. Miller stated his belief that a military fighter could not have reached AA11 or UAL 175. Miller does not believe the ROC has a role to play in 9/11 type events. Miller noted that the slowing airspeed of AA11 indicates its descent. He had no knowledge of reports of AA11 airborne after the first tower impact. Miller distinguished an ATC handoff as a transfer of transponder frequency and a ATC point out as showing another airspace sector that a plane is passing through that sector's airspace, but that the original radar controller is maintaining the plane on the original radar sector frequency. It is called "clipping" when a plane travels through an airspace but does not switch it's communications over. Miller stated that the DEN network now running is a useful tool, and that training since 9/11 has been adequate to address their work. He also stated that important training for ATC personnel would be information on who to contact in different emergency circumstance. Miller also noted that this type of training is more important on the supervisor level than on the ATC level, since it is the supervisors who make decisions on who to involve. Miller stated that the military and FAA have an excellent relationship.

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