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U.S. Department
of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum
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Date: September

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Subject:

Information: AAL77 Flight Path Information

17, 2001

From:

Automation Manager, AOS-370.ZE)

Reply to A"n' °':

To:

Air Traffic Manager, ZID-1

Our office has been asked to provide analysis on the flight path of beacon code target 3743 (AAL77) from September 11, 2001. Specifically, we were asked to analyze any data available from the time of the loss of a transponder response (approximately 12:56:19Z, Point A) and the time that a plausible "primary" radar target was identified (approximately 13:04:32Z, Point B). Although our office holds no certification in analyzing radar data, we periodically compile and analyze this form of data in reviewing HOST/NAS performance. Several of the specialists from this office, contractors and AF personnel conducted a manual analysis and plotting of radar data available. The results from this activity include a depiction of the route of flight that is supported by the data available and is deemed to be most likely by the participants. This attached depiction is a manual reconstruction of this analysis. This reconstruction is an approximation and is not intended to give the exact flight path. At the time the transponder stopped responding, the radar sort box area for the flight was QHY (Higby, WV), which is a "beacon only" site and does not report "primary" radar data. Once the transponder stopped responding, QHY could not provide any radar data on the flight. The secondary source of radar data for this radar sort box area was QRJ (Lynch, KY). QPJ did not provide conclusive primary radar data in ascertaining the aircraft position or flight path. The most useful data used in this activity was derived from data recordings of the QBE (Bedford, VA) radar site. QBE reported a radar reinforced beacon target up until the transponder stopped responding. At the time the transponder stopped responding, QBE reported a primary target that is consistent with the expected radar values and matches the route of flight, which would be expected, given the approximate location of the plausible "primary" radar target observed at Point B. The approximate location of the plausible "primary" radar target is derived from the SATORI analysis and other supporting data, which indicate a "primary" radar target displayed to the Air Traffic Control Specialists at Point B of the depiction. The availability of a "primary" target display to the ATCSs at Point B is likely the result of better data being available from QPJ radar at that point. Between the time of the lost transponder data (Point A) and the time of the "primary" target being displayed (Point B), no radar data was available to the Air Traffic Control Specialists. The reconstruction attached was only possible through the compilation of other radar data sources not ordinarily displayed to the controllers under these circumstances.

If you have any questions regarding this information, please contact me at extension 591.

Robert E. Mount Automation Manager AOS-370.ZID cc: William A. Orr, SMQA, Indianapolis ARTCC Jim May, Manager, En Route Operations Support Branch, AOS-370

National Transportation Safety Board Office of General Counsel
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W. Washington. D.C. 20594-2001 202/314-6080 FAX 202/314-6090

July 17,2003 VIA HAND DELIVERY Daniel Marcus General Counsel c/o Dana Hyde, Esquire National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 301 7th Street, SW, Room 5125 Washington, DC 20407 Dear Mr. Marcus: I write in response to the July 2,2003 request by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States for production of copies of certain documents by the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB"). As you know, the NTSB is an independent establishment of the United States Government, responsible for, among other things, investigating aircraft accidents. See 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a)(l)(A). The law enforcement investigation of the events of September 11,2001 was under the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), but, at FBI's request and under its direction, the NTSB provided technical assistance. The NTSB helped document factual information regarding the aircraft involved in the events of September 11th, and delivered this information and numerous reports and other technical products to the FBI. The material collected and produced by NTSB personnel for the FBI is, and was at all tunes, under the FBI's control. The Commission's electronic request specifically sought, "[a]ll records relating to the NTSB's review of radar data from the United States Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration concerning (1) the hijacked aircraft on September 11, 2001, and (2) the United States Government's air defense response to the hijacked aircraft." The request also specifically "includes, but is not limited to, both the raw radar files and the NTSB's analysis of the combined radar information."1 Subsequently, Christopher Julius, an attorney on my staff, and I have had
1 As you can see from the attached list, NTSB only has material responsive to the first part of your request. I am advised that the NTSB did not conduct any investigation or collect any records (other than those we are providing in response to the first part of the request) that would pertain to the United States Government's air defense response to the hijacked aircraft.

conversations with Commission Deputy General Counsel Steven Dunn and staff counsel Dana Hyde, as well as with Department of Justice liaison counsel Brian Hook, about your request. Today, the FBI authorized NTSB to provide to the Commission copies of all material that NTSB delivered to the FBI. For your convenience, I have attached a list of that material. I am advised that this material is included within the nondisclosure agreement for Moussaoui-related material reached between the Commission and the Executive Branch. With the exception of a copy of the cockpit voice recorder recording ("CVR") and an early copy of a working draft of the CVR transcript from United Airlines Flight 93 CVR, I am herewith providing the Commission with copies of all such material.2 We trust our production, which is both responsive to and extends beyond the boundaries of your written request, will prove helpful to you. If you have any questions, or need assistance with anything, please feel free to call on us. Mr. Julius can provide the best assistance, and he can be reached at (202) 314-6087. Sincerely,

Ronald S. Battocchi General Counsel Enclosures

2 CVR recordings require different treatment, in part because of the special restrictions against public disclosure imposed by Congress. See 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c); see also 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (setting forth detailed provisions designed to minimize dissemination of non-public CVR information). I am advised that the FBI, however, which is in possession of the original CVR tape and the final draft of the CVR transcript from Flight 93, will respond directly to any Commission request pertaining to the CVR. You will note that some of the products we are delivering to you incorporate information from the FBI transcript of the Flight 93 CVR recording.

Information Paper AAL77 Flight Path
Subject: AOS-3 10 analysis of AAL77 Flight Path From: To: Date: January 2 \,

Stephen Snyder (National En Route Automation Host System Support, AOS-3 1 0) Air Traffic Service Investigation Division, AAT-200

Background: AOS-3 10 has been asked to provide analysis on the flight path of AAL77, and validation of the initial analysis performed by Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZID ARTCC). Refer to the Memorandum titled: Information: AAL77 Flight Path Information, dated September 17, 2001. Conclusions: 1. A beacon target was last displayed at 12:56:19z. 2. A beacon target was last received at 12:56:30z. This target was not displayed due to Radar Sort Box (RSB) assignments. Note: The beacon target received at 12:56:30zfrom the Supplemental Radar was not displayed because a return was expected from the Preferred Radar at 12: 56:31z. Because no subsequent beacon target was reported, in can be assumed that the transponder was disabled between 12:56:30zand 12: 56:3 7z. 3. The track position presented to the controller beyond 12:56:19z consisted of extrapolated track positions (i.e., 'coasting' track) based upon last known track position and heading. The presentation first indicated lack of Mode 3/a at 12:56:59z (per system requirements), and indicated the track to be in 'coast' status at 12:57:20z (per system requirements).

4. ZID's initial analysis and description of the radar reporting capability is accurate (refer to Memorandum of September 17, 2001). The flight path depiction appears to contain moderate positional inaccuracies; most probably the result of limited time constraints and rudimentary transformation techniques. It should be noted the ZID paper stated the depiction to be an "approximation and is not intended to give the exact flight path". 5. The flight path was re-plotted to reflect the results of the AOS-3 10 analysis to provide a more accurate depiction of flight position and situation display. The 'first displayed primary' was the first primary target presented for display that fell along the calculated flight path. This target was received from Lynch Radar and presented for display at 13:04:32z. The following diagrams accurately depict the flight path from 12:46:58z through 13:06:30z: a. The green path depicts the beacon track as received and presented to the display (12:46:58z through 12:56: 19z) b. The blue path depicts the trail of primary returns (12:56:45z through 13:06:30z). Note that the majority of these returns were not presented for display due to RSB assignments and lack of target reporting by the Preferred and Supplemental Radar. c. The red path depicts the track display as presented to the controller beyond 12:56:19z d. Each 'box' represents 256 square nmis.

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US Department of Transportation F»d»raJ Aviation

Memorandum
Dale ' September

Sut>'ectr

Information: AAL77 Flight Path Information

1 7, 200 1

Reply to
From:

Automation Manager, AOS-370.ZID

*""' °':

To:

Aar Traffic Manager, Z1D-1 Our office has been asked to provide analysis on the flight path of beacon code target 3743 (AAJL77) from September 1 1 , 200 1 . Specifically, we were asked to analyze any data available from the time of the loss of a transponder response (approximately 12:56: 1 9Z, Point A) and the time that a plausible "primary" radar target was identified (approximately 13:04:32Z, Point B). Although our office holds no certification in analyzing radar data, we periodically compile and analyze this form of data in reviewing HOST/NAS performance. Several of the specialists from this office, contractors a n d p e r s o n n e l conducted a manual analysis and plotting of radar data available. The results from this activity include a depiction of the route of flight that is supported by the data available and is deemed to be most IDcely by the participants. This attached depiction is a manual reconstruction of this analysis. This reconstruction is an approximation and is not intended to give the exact flight path. At the time the transponder stopped responding, the radar sort box area for the flight was QHY (Higby, WV), which is a "beacon only" sile and does not report "primary" radar data. Once the transponder stopped responding, QHY could not provide any radar data on the flight. The secondary source of radar data for this radar son box area was QRJ (Lynch, KY). QR1 did not provide conclusive primary radar data in ascertaining the aircraft position or flight path. The most useful data used in this activity was derived from data recordings of the QBE (Bedford, VA) radar site. QBE reported a radar reinforced beacon target up until the transponder stopped responding. At the time the transponder slopped responding, QBE reported a primary target that is consistent with the expected radar values and matches the route of flight, which would be expected, given the approximate location of the plausible "primary" radar target observed at Point B. The approximate location of the plausible "primary" radar target is derived from the SATORI analysis and other supporting data, which indicate a ''primary" radar target displayed to the Air Traffic Control Specialists at Point B of the depiction. The availability of a "primary" target display to the ATCSs at Point B is likely the result of better data being available from QRI radar at that point. Between the time of the lost transponder data (Point A) and the time of the "primary" target being displayed (Point B), no radar data was available to the Air Traffic Control Specialists. Tne reconstruction attached was only possible through the compilation of other radar data sources not ordinarily displayed to the controllers undtr these circumstances.

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission: Team 8 NND PROJECT NUMBER: 51248 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30441

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 07/08/2008

BOX: 00001

FOLDER: 0005 9

TAB: 1

DOC ID: 31180483

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

l_ACCESS RESTRICTED^ The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: FAA GL Region DOCUMENT DATE: 01/21/2004 FROM: TO: SUBJECT: Detail of Indianapolis ARTCC Surveillance Configuration DOCUMENT TYPE: Briefing Slides

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

American Air 77, Leaves NEADS Coverage
0853-0851 EOT PA
HNN-R: American 77 cleared direct FALMOUTH 0850:47 AA77: Direct FALMOUTH, American 77 thanks. 0850:51

\NV

DC 03R: American 77 contact Indy AA77: Thanks sir, Good Day AA77: Center, American 77 with you level 330 Indy HNN-R: Roger, squawk 3743

Commission Sensitive

American Air 77 Disappears
0851-0909 EOT
81W

PA

WV

HNN-R: No exchanges with AA 77

DAC-RA and HNN-R Six attempts to contact American 77 0858:20-0900.56 HNN-R: American 77, Indy. 0903:06

_ ^^-0909:55 HNN-R: Six attempts to contact American 770856:32-0858:16

KY
Commission Sensitive

American Air 77, Indy Center Actions
0857-0900 EOT PA

wv
HNN-R: American 77, Don't know what happened, looks like a turn South, Don't know altitude, what he's doing 0857:39. DAC-R: Just let me know. HNN-R: Still haven't got American 77, he was at 35 to Falmouth, don't know where he is, I'm trying to get hold of him, we contacted] Company. 0859:44

Ashland AA2493: We sent message to dispatch to have him come up on 22.7, that what you want. 0900:33 HNN-R: Had him on West side of airspace, went into coast, don't have a track, not talking, we don't know what happened, we also contacted your company. 0900:37

KY

Commission Sensitive

American Air 77, Company Notified
0858-0902 EOT
81W

wv

AAL: American dispatch, Jim McDonnel. 0858:14 HNN-RA: Indy trying to get hold of American 77. 0858:16 AAL: We'll get hold for you. 0858:38

Ashland

1
KY
AAL: Jim McDonnel, I cell called him, did not get a reply. 0902:12 HNN-RA: We lost track control, in coast, we don't know where he is, can't get hold of him—you tried and no response. 0902:15 AAL: No response. HNN-RA: Try again. AAL: We're doing it. 0902:28

Commission Sensitive

X

American Air 77, Controller and Company Discussion
0906-0909 EOT
81Wf

PA WV

OH

HNN-RA: You have radar is he over Falmouth 0906:22. DAC-RA: No, we just moved the track there. HNN-R: OK, you just have the track out there. DAC-RA: You never raised him. HNN-RA: We called Company, no radio communication, no radar. 0906:31 DAC-RA: Last clearance Falmouth, we're going to treat him non-radar, told next sector to sterilize until we find out. 0906:39

Ashland

KY

AAL: McDonnel. 0909:01 HNN-RA: You get hold of American 77. AAL: No but second plane hit WTC. HNN-RA: Say again. AAL: We lost American 11 to a hijacking, Boston to LA, we were hijacked.. .and 77 is Dulles to LA and—a second plane just flew into WTC. 0909:29

Commission Sensitive

Kevin Shaeffer
From: Sent: To: Subject: Miles Kara Thursday, January 29, 2004 2:30 PM Kevin Shaeffer FW: Mosaic

Kevin, FYI. I said we need to know when AA77 entered TRACON airspace, how far out they could pick it up, given the existence of Martinsburg, and how far out does Martinsburg extend TRACON coverage. Also, did AA77 ever actually enter ZDC airspace. Miles Original Message From: shirley.miller@faa.gov [mailto:shirley.miller@faa.gov] Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2004 1:25 PM To: Miles Kara Cc: anthony.ferrante@faa.gov; kshaeffer@9-llcommission.giv Subject: RE: Mosaic Miles, maybe you can tell us what information you need tomorrow on the feeds from Dulles and Martinsburg radars because I believe that we will need AOS assistance again. There is no AOS presence at Potomac TRACON.

"Miles Kara" <mkara@9-llcommi s <kshaeffer@9-11commission.giv> sion.gov> 01/24/04 03:56 PM

To: cc: Subject:

Shirley Miller/AWA/FAA@FAA, Anthony Ferrante/AWA/FAA@FAA RE: Mosaic

Shirley. Kevin and I had to stay over in Rome and got in early this morning, Saturday. Thanks for making Steve Culbertson available. It was a good sesson. Kevin and I are available at a mutual agreeable time. Monday. Let us sort our schedules out on

We, Kevin and I also need to make a short trip to Potomac TRACON to interview Mark Masaitis. While there, we would like to meet with the most knowledgeable person about the feed from the Dulles and Martinsburg radars on 9/11, as well. Miles Original Message From: shirley.miller@faa.gov [mailto:shirley.miller@faa.gov] Sent: Fri 1/23/2004 9:38 AM To: Miles Kara; kshaeffer@9-llcommission.giv Cc: anthony.ferrante@faa.gov Subject: Mosaic

Miles/Kevin answers to your questions from AOS below. got together again next week and go over 1

I think it might be useful if we

the presentation we gave you last time that AOS has revised. Please let me know when might be a good time next week. Forwarded by Shirley Miller/AWA/FAA on 01/16/04 09:09 AM

"Miles Kara" <mkara@9-llcommis Shirley Miller/AWA/FAA@FAA sion.gov> cc: Azzarello" <jazzarello@9-llcommission.gov>, "Kevin Shaeffer" "John To:

<kshaeffer@9-llcommission.gov>, "John Farmer" <jfarmer@9-llcommission.gov>, 01/16/04 08:29 AM <dhyde@9-11commission.gov> Subject: Mosaic "Dana Hyde"

Shirley, pardon the piecemeal approach here, but my perspective is we have now established a continuous dialogue on this issue. We can document that thru e-mails. Here is another analytic question. Given: Each sort box has 4 radars that feed it, selected and prioritized based primarily on distance from the sort box Each sort box has up to 4 radars feeding it. Unless there is a failure only the top two priority radars feed the box There were no failures that day Has this been verified or is it known as fact? determination. AOS-310 made no such

In all cases, with perhaps one exception (don't have chart in front of me) Higby was one of the two radars feeding the boxes thru which AA77 flew There were no exceptions, Higby was the Preferred or Supplemental site for each RSB profiled. Also note that RSBs are not 'fed' by certain Radars; RSBs are calculated for each given Radar return as a precursor to selective rejection. Higby is beacon only Therefore: Does the act of a controller to turn on primaries move Higby out of the equation and promote the tertiary radar in its place? Did the system allow for and provide for that or did Higby remain as one of the two radar feeds in all concerned sort boxes. We are not sure what is meant by a controller 'turning on primaries'. A controller has no such ability. The Commission may be referencing the Primary Filtering key, or perhaps the manual request to track primary. Regardless, neither of these actions will result in promotion of subordinate radars. Also, when a radar is declared failed, it is not necessarily replaced by the tertiary; it is replaced by the subordinate radar with highest ranking. 2

Page 1 of3

Kevin Shaeffer
From: Sent: To: Subject: Kevin Shaeffer Friday, January 09, 2004 1:30 PM Miles Kara (mkara@9-11commission.gov); Dana Hyde (dhyde@9-11commission.gov); John Azzarello (jazzarello@9-11commission.gov); John Farmer (jfarmer@9-11commission.gov) FAA MTG 1/9/04

Importance: Low Tracking: Recipient
Miles Kara (mkara@9-llcommission.gov) Dana Hyde (dhyde@9-llcommission.gov) John Azzarello (jazzarello@9-llcommission.gov) John Farmer (jfarmer@9-llcommission.gov) Miles Kara John Farmer Dana Hyde Read: 1/9/2004 1:45 PM Read: 1/9/2004 3:07 PM Read: 1/9/2004 3:26 PM

Read

All,

I met with the FAA folks this morning (me only as Miles was at a doctor appointment). At the meeting Miles and I attended with Doug Gould and Ferrante yesterday, they told us an FAA radar expert, Steve Schneider, was in town and could talk to us if we thought it would be useful. Shriley, Ferrante, Gould and Schneider were present. SS is from FAA's "AOS-310", which is their national enroute maintenance division, also known as "Operational Support." SS's primary job involves analyzing and correcting "host" software problems, at the national level and at centers. First, some background: I used the 9/17/01 memorandum from ZID on "AAL77 Flight Path Information" as a reference in the discussion. For those who haven't seen it yet, it was produced in the immediate days following 9/11 by a verbal tasking from Doug Gould to ZID to figure out "why we missed the turn of AA77." Everyone needs to get a copy of this memo, and its attachments. I was told today by FAA that it is the only assessment done that even comes close to #1 below. Yesterday, Dana, Miles and I put our heads together on mapping out our goals with the AA77 radar issue. It basically comes down to two parts:

1. Definitively assess all of the technical aspects as to why AA77 was "lost" after it began its turn to the east. * The ZID memo concludes that ""Between the time of the lost transponder data (Point A) and the time of the "primary" target being displayed (Point B), no radar data was available to the Air Traffic Control Specialists. The reconstruction attached was only possible through the compilation of other radar data sources not ordinarily displayed to the controllers under these circumstances." The central aspect of the technical assessment is to answer why the above is true. The ZID memo does provide some assessment as to why that is true, but there are some key questions remaining. Such as (there will be more): \. Did 77 ever truly "disappear" from FAA's radar system? If it did, comprehensively explain exactly why. If it did, when and where exactly did it disappear and reappear? When it reappeared, which tower site(s) picked it up, and what sort boxes and centers did that

*

1/12/2004

Page 2 of3
site(s) feed into? ii. If it never disappeared from the system, what sort boxes received the primary radar data? What FAA centers received the primary radar data? iii. If it never disappeared, did the tower(s) that had the AA77 primary radar data (QBE, "Bedford", or others) transmit that data to ZID? If not, why not? Where did the AA77 primary radar from Bedford or others get transmitted to? If the data was transmitted to ZID, why was it "unavailable" (ZID memo 9/17/01) to ZID's Air Traffic Control Specialists? iv. Explain why, though AA 77 stopped transponding in QHY ("Higby") which was a "beacon only" site, other radar sites with primary radar capability did not report the AA77 primary track data? v. The secondary source of radar data for the radar sort box area where AA77 turned around was QRI ("Lynch, KY"). Why did QRI "not provide conclusive primary radar data in ascertaining the aircraft position or flight path" as the ZID memo states? Was QRI the only other potential source of radar data where/when AA 77 made its turn (if the sort box area can take in up to 4 separate feeds, and we know QHY and QRI did feed the sort box area in question, what other two radar sites could possibly have been available?)

2. Reconstruct the entire eastbound flight path of AA77 (including the turn) and ascertain exactly who's airspace it traveled through (to include center airspace and center sectors). * Upon talking about it and thinking though it, D+M and I think that #2 above is much less relevant and very likely doesn't need to be done. Let's assume we complete that assessment, so what? What would we do with it? JF & JZ - what do you think?

Now, turning to today's meeting: I laid out to them the technical assessment requirements (similar to the points in #1 above) we have. I asked them what organization within the FAA is best qualified to conduct the technical analysis of these AA 77 issues, and SS's response was "AOS." FAA is willing and able to assist in completing #1 above ~ from their side. I certainly still feel strongly that we'll need to employ our own radar expert, or the NTSB as an independent organization with this expertise, to work with and verify what the FAA does. As a starting point, SS has been tasked with ascertaining two items (to provide us next Thursday):

1. Identify all radar sites that were available on 9/11 to feed into the sort box area that the turn of AA 77 occurred in.

2. Identify and overlay all FAA radar sites within ~500mi of the sort box area. Throughout the meeting, Ferrante, Gould, and SS mentioned facts and factors that are important and add "context" (as I like to say). I explained to them that, simply put, we want FAA's assessment of #1 above including all of the contextual aspects they deem necessary to fully understand why AA77 was "lost." Bottom line is that they are willing to provide us their "answer" so-to-speak as to why AA77 was lost - technical and contextual aspects presented in a way that will allow us and the public to understand "why". Importantly, I don't think this should be done by the FAA in a vacuum, with no communication or collaboration with us (and hopefully our Radar guy). In my opinion, this will be a "process" that we'll engage in with them. That's were I left it. Thoughts and comments welcome.

1/12/2004

AA77

1. Did 77 ever truly "disappear" from FAA's radar system?\. If it did truly disappear, comprehensively Who is best qualified to conduct the technical assessment? FAA (who exactly?), NTSB?

3 . If it did truly disappear: - When and where exactly did it disappear and reappear? - When it reappeared, which tower site(s) picked it up? 4. If it never disappeared from the system, which sort boxes was the primary radar data transmitting to? What FAA centers are fed by that/those sort boxes? 5. If it never disappeared, why didn't the tower(s) (Bedford) feeding ZID transmit that data to ZID? If the data was transmitted to ZID, why wasn't it "unavailable" (ZID memo 9/17/01) to ATCS? 6. What program would be best suited to graphically reconstruct the entire flight path of AA 77 (with more accuracy than currently publicly available or the FAA's "Power Point" presentation)? Detailed questions about the ZID Memo: 1 . Explain QHY (Higby) being a "beacon only" site that doesn't report primary ~ radar data. Even though AA 77 stopped transponding in Higby, why couldn't ^ > other radar sites with primary capability report the track data? / , conclusive primary radar data in ascertaining the aircraft position or flight path." - Why? - Was QRI the only other potential source of radar data where/when AA 77 made its turn? 3. "The approximate location...."-What does that mean? ^ 4. "Between the time of the lost transponder data (Point A) and the time of the "primary" target being displayed (Point B), no radar data was available to the Air Traffic Control Specialists." - What does this mean?

L-\. QRI (Lynch,

^^, -g. -c K

** Who in the FAA is responsible for radar equipment? ** What exactly is Atlantic City?

Thomas H. Kean
CHAIR

NTSB DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 1 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") requests that the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB or the "respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following documents no later than July 16, 2003 (the "production date"): 1. All records relating to the NTSB's review of radar data from the United States Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration concerning (1) the hijacked aircraft on September 11, 2001, and (2) the United States Government's air defense response to the hijacked aircraft. This request includes, but is not limited to, both the raw radar files and the NTSB's analysis of the combined radar information. The Commission requests that the documents requested above be provided as soon as they are available, even though all requested documents may not be provided at the same time, through means of a "rolling" production. If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on an alleged claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon as possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and describe each such document or class of documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to allow a meaningful challenge to any such withholding. If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requested documents but has information about where such documents may be located, the Commission requests that the respondent provide such information as soon as possible and in no event later than the production date. If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of these document requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or concerns be raised with the Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior to the production date. July 2, 2003 Daniel Marcus General Counsel

Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR

Richard Ben-Veniste MaxQeland Fred F. Fielding Jamie S. Gorelick Skde Gorton John Lehman Timothy J. Roemer James R Thompson

Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

TEL (202) 331-4060 FAX (202) 296-5545 www.9-1 lcommission.gov

Thomas H. Kean
CHAIR

Lee H Hamilton
VICE CHAIR

NTSB BRIEFING REQUEST NO. 1 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") requests an informal briefing from appropriate personnel at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) relating to the NTSB's efforts in response to the aircraft hijacked on September 11, 2001. The purpose of this briefing is to gain an understanding of the NTSB's work related to the following topics: 1. The lack of radar and radio data from American Airlines Flight 77 during the period from 0856 to 0909 EDT on 9/11/01. 2. The determination of the flight path of American Airlines Flight 77 during that same time period. 3. The contribution of terminal and traffic control radar information to an understanding of the time and the force of the impacts of American Airlines Flight 11, American Airlines Flight 77, and United Airlines Flight 175 into their respective targets, and the accuracy of such radars as compared with en-route and joint surveillance system radars. 4. The accuracy of the time of impact of United Airlines Flight 93 as determined by the NTSB, as compared with publicly disclosed information citing a different time based on seismic data. 5. Other topics relating to the NTSB's efforts in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, that the NTSB believes may assist the Commission in its work. The requested briefing is for general background purposes only and will not be a substitute for later interviews the Commission and its staff may wish to conduct. The Commission asks that this briefing be scheduled at the earliest possible date. September 3, 2003 Daniel Marcus General Counsel

Richard Ben-Veniste MaxQeland Fred F. Fielding Jamie S. Gorelick Skde Gorton John Lehman Timothy J. Roemer James R. Thompson

Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

TEL (202) 331-4060 FAX (202) 296-5545 www.9-1 lcommission.gov

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