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Part two: More planes missing
The skies in lock-down
At yet another air traffic control center in Clevelandt_Stqcey Taylor is keeping a close ey^njTeMNights. The FAA is warning controllers to watch transcontinental flights headed west, for anything suspicious. And then, something very suspicious does happen. "I hear one of the controllers behind me go, 'Oh my God, oh my God,1 says Stacy Taylor. "And he starts yelling for the supervisor. He goes what is this plane doing? I wasnlt.that_hajs^jgt.thejj.met_and I pulkdjt upjpn my screen. And Jiewaij:]m^^ descending but very, gradually. He'd go up 300 feet, and he'd go down 300feet. And it turned ouUg_be United 93." By this time United Airlines has warned crews still in the air about the potential for a hijacking. Electronic messages — similar to an e-mail, have been transmitted to pilots. "Beware, __ cockpit intrusion" the message read. The pilots of flight 93 __ typed back, "confirmed". At the Boston center, controllers are taking matters into their own hands to safeguard crews. Tom Roberts'. "I saw controllers step up to the plate and start warning flight crews. This was totally by the seat of their pants. It's not because they were directed to by anybody. It's just, OK, everybody's on alert right now." Tom Brokaw: "Watch for cockpit intrusion? That kind of thing?"
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Air Traffic Controllers in this type of facility work in a dimly lit room, commonly referred to as a TRACON. These work area either located within the control tower complex or in a sep building located on or near the airport it serves. Using radar so these controllers typically work an area of airspace with a 50 radius and up to 17,000 feet of altitude. This airspace is configur provide service to a primary airport, but may include other aii that are within 50 miles of the radar service area. Aircraft withii area are provided vectors to airports, around terrain and weathei separated from other aircraft. Controllers in TRACONs determin arriving sequence that enter into the control tower's desigi airspace. Find our more about the radar approach control facility in your Start by clicking on the 3 letter identifier for the facility, i TRACONs are co-located and are listed with the control tower < airport it serves. All information listed for a selected facility is pro by an air traffic controller working in that facility. Information is si to changes and updates. We are working on gathering the information specific to the facilities listed below. The facilities that are active have theii name highlighted in red. We have made adding facility information automatic and easy. If
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New York Center, in Ronkonkoma, New York, is one of 20 Federal Aviation Administration radar facilities nationwide that provide air traffic services for high altitude aircraft. New York Center is unique because it functions as a domestic enroute control facility as well as an oceanic control facility. Two separate computer complexes perform these functions. AIRSPACE New York Center controls approximately 3.27 million square feet of airspace. The airspace contatins 17,000 square miles of domestic airspace and 3.25 million square miles of oceanic airspace. New York Center's oceanic airspoace shares common boundaries with five FAA facilities, four foreign air traffic control centers and one foreign air traffic control tower. The U.S. ceners include San Juan, Miami, Jacksonville, Washington and Boston Centers; the foreign centers are in Canada, Portugal, and Trinidad/Tobago; and the air traffic control tower is in Bermuda.
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CQNIROJLLED AlR PORTS UNCONTROLLED AIRPORTS ARINC
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125.300 - Gabreski Airport (Westhampton) - Tower 121.800 - Gabreski Airport (Westhampton) - Ground Control 132.250 - Gabreski Airport (Westhampton) - Approach/Departure (NY) 122.950 - Gabreski Airport (Westhampton) - Unicom 119.300 - MacArthur Airport - Tower 135.300 - MacArthur Airport - Ground Control 121.850 - MacArthur Airport - Clearance Delivery 128.450-MacArthurAirport-A.T.I.S. 118.000 - MacArthur Airport - Approach/Departure (NY) 120.050 - MacArthur Airport - Approach (NY 126.950 - MacArthur Airport - Approach (NY) 122.950 - MacArthur Airport - Unicom 122.100 - MacArthur Airport - Flight Service Station 122.200 - MacArthur Airport - Flight Service Station 122.600 - MacArthur Airport - Flight Service Station 477.2125 - MacArthur Airport - Fire/Rescue (PL 107.2) 476.3875 - MacArthur Airport - Ground Operations (PL 107.2) 452.875 - MacArthur Airport - Parking 46.46 - MacArthur Airport - Fire (Countywide) 46.44 - MacArthur Airport - Fire (Division 3)
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Guardian 'We have planes. Stay quiet' - Then silence
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'We have planes. Stay quiet' - Then silence
Michael Ellison in New York Wednesday October 17, 2001 The Guardian It was 7.45am at Logan airport in Boston and ground control was going through the perfunctory business of talking the pilot of American Airlines flight 11 through the manoeuvres towards takeoff. Sixty-seven minutes later, with the jargon silenced, the plane was slammed into the north tower of the World Trade Centre, the first calamity in a chain that would leave more than 5,500 dead in the US. Five weeks after the attacks, transcripts of what went on between the pilots of the hijacked planes and air traffic controllers trace the air paths from banality to doom. At 8.14am two controllers are recorded discussing the fact that the pilot is out of contact. There is silence for 10 minutes until a hijacker's voice is heard. "We have some planes," it says. "Just stay quiet and you will be OK. We are returning to the airport." A controller asks "Who's trying to call me?" and one minute later air traffic control centres are told that a plane has been hijacked. Then silence. Transcripts of words carried on the frequency used by pilots and air traffic controllers on the two planes that hit the World Trade Centre and the one flown into the Pentagon were obtained by the New York Times. The newspaper also discloses that a military cargo plane was asked to identify the Boeing that crashed into the Pentagon two minutes before it did so and that three National Guard F-16s might have had time to shoot down flight 93 before it reached its target had it not crashed. On United Airlines flight 175 at 8.37am, with no reason to suspect that 26 minutes later he and the other 64 innocent people on board would be dead after being used as a projectile against the south tower, the pilot receives a message from ground control asking him to look for the silent flight 11. Ninety seconds before his plane was taken over by the hijackers the pilot betrays his unease. "We heard a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston," he says. "Someone keyed the mike and said 'Everyone stay in your seats." Silence again. At 8.53am another controller realises what is going on: "We may have a hijack." The first indication that something is wrong with American flight 77 comes nine minutes after the trade centre was attacked, when a controller in Indianapolis is unable to make contact with the pilot. He never does again and 42 minutes later the Boeing 757 with six crew and 58 passengers crashes into the Pentagon. American Flight 11 Boston to Los Angeles (crashed into north tower of World Trade Centre) 8.00 Plane takes off from Logan international airport, Boston. 8.13 Boston control centre: "AAL11 turn 20 degrees right." Pilot of AAL11: "20 right AAL11." Controller: "AAL11 now climb maintain FL350 [35,000 feet]." Controller: "AAL11 climb maintain FL350." Controller: "AAL11 Boston."
September 11, 2001 - The FAA Responds
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From ffte takeoff of Flight 11 at 8:00 a.m. to U.S. airspace clear of civil aviation flights at 12:15 p.m., here are the times of key Sept. 11, 2001, events.
0800. American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767 with 92 people on board, takes off from Boston Logan airport for Los Angeles. 0814. United Air Lines Flight 175, a Boeing 767 with 65 people on board, takes off from Boston Logan airport for Los Angeles. 0821. American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 with 64 people on board, takes off from Washington Dulles airport for Los Angeles. 0840. FAA notifies the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 11. 0841. United Air Lines Flight 93, a Boeing 757 with 44 people on board, takes off from Newark airport for San Francisco. 0843. FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of United Flight 175. 0846. (approx.). American Flight 11 crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center. 0902. (approx.). United Flight 175 crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center. 0904. (approx.). The FAA's Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center stops all departures from airports in its jurisdiction (New England and eastern New York State). 0906. The FAA bans takeoffs of all flights bound to or through the airspace of New York Center from airports in that Center and the three adjacent Centers - Boston, Cleveland, and Washington. This is referred to as a First Tier groundstop and covers the Northeast from North Carolina north and as far west as eastern Michigan. 0908. The FAA bans all takeoffs nationwide for flights going to or through New York Center airspace. 0924. The FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77. The FAA and NORAD establish an open line to discuss American 77 and United 93. 0926. The FAA bans takeoffs of all civilian aircraft regardless of destination - a national groundstop. 0940. (approx.). American Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon. 0945. In the first unplanned shutdown of U. S. airspace, the FAA orders all aircraft to land at the nearest airport as soon as practical. At this time, there were more than 4,500 aircraft in the air on Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plans. 1007. (approx.) United Flight 93 crashes in Stony Creek Township, PA. 1039. Reaffirming the earlier order, the FAA issues a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) Landing so manj so quickly was a outstanding achi> A series ofarticit Today explains t behind-the-scen* decisions and ac Sept. 11,200
Hundreds of FAX worked to impro\y and rest aviation after the were closed on £ 2001. Here ares their portraits. Week of Septem Week of Septem
Memories and th from our jemployi Weefc of Septem Week of Septem September 11 Weefc of Septem September 18
transcript American Airlines Flight 11
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I M S W feB
October 16, 2001
Transcript American Airlines Flight 11
By THE NEW YORK TIMES
ollowing is a transcript of the radio communications between air traffic controller at Logan International Airport [46R] in Boston and several jetliners identified by their call signs on the morning of Sept. 11. Among the jetliners were American Airlines Flight 11 (AAL11) and United Air Lines Flight 175 (UAL 175), which took off from Logan and then were crashed into the World Trade Center. The transcripts were obtained by The New York Times. 8:08:54 — 46R: FDX3258, Roger, uh, fly heading 180 maintain mach 80 or less. 8:09:02 — FDX3258: 180 Roger and, uh, for the heading, uh, is mach 8 or less 3258. 8:09:10 — 46R: FDX3601, Maintain mach 80 or greater. 8:09:12 — FDX3601: Mach 80 or greater, FDX3601 heavy. 8:09:17 — AAL11: Boston center, good morning, AAL11 with you paassing through 190 for 230. 8:09:22 — 46R: AAL11, Boston center, roger, climb and maintain FL280. 8:09:25—AAL11:280 AAL11. 8:09:28 — 46R: FDX3258, you're recleared direct to, uh, Barnes. 8:09:34 — FDX3258: Direct to Barnes, FDX3258. 8:09:52 — 46R: DAL544, Contact Boston center 125.57. 8:09:56 — DAL544: 2557 for Boston, DAL544, Good day. 8:10:04 — DAL1149: Boston, DAL1149, Leveling at 310. 8:10:06 — 46R: DAL1149 Boston center, roger. 8:10:13 — 46R: AAL11 Climb, maintain FL290. 8:10:16 —AAL11: 290 AAL11. 8:10:37 — 46R: FDX3258 Cleared direct biggo. 8:10:41 — FDX3258: Direct biggo, thank you, FDX3258. 8:10:47 — 46R: FDX3258, your traffic you're going to be following is 12 o'clock and about, uh, 10 miles also southbound with company, company jet. 8:10:54 — FDX3258: Uh, where's that traffic, sir?
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/16/national/16FLIGHTl l-TEXT.html?ei=5070&en=09... 7/30/2003
Los Angeles Times: Aboard Flight 11, a Chilling Voice
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Aboard Flight 11, a Chilling Voice
By ERIC LICHTBLAU Times Staff Writer September 20, 2001 WASHINGTON — A chilling telephone call from a flight attendant aboard Am 11 details for the first time the frantic struggle aboard the doomed airliner as hij of a passenger and stormed the cockpit. "I see water and buildings. Oh my God! Oh my God!" Madeline Amy Sweeney told a ground manager in Boston after the hijacked plane took a sudden and unexpected detour, according to an investigative document compiled by the FBI and reviewed by The Times. The water she saw in those agonizing final moments was the Hudson River. The buildings were the famed New York City skyline, its trademark towers still upright. And the detour was Flight 11 's calamitous descent into the World Trade Center's north tower about 8:45 a.m. on Sept. 11. In recent days, snippets of cell phone calls that originated from the four hijacked flights have revealed tearful goodbyes and valiant pledges of resistance. But Sweeney's phone call, with details that coincide with the hijackers' takeover of the cockpit, could provide investigators with one of their most valuable pieces of evidence in reconstructing the hijackings. FBI officials in Dallas, where American Airlines is based, were able, on the day of the terrorist attacks, to piece together a partial transcript and an account of the phone call. American Airlines officials said such calls are not typically recorded, suggesting that the FBI may have reconstructed the conversation from interviews. Sweeney, a 35-year-old mother of two young children, had worked for American Airlines for 12 years, usually taking weekend duty so she could spend more time during the week with her family in Acton, Mass. She was one of nine flight attendants working Flight 11, which left Boston's Logan International Airport with a light load of 81 passengers at 7:45 a.m. The plane lifted off uneventfully, but investigators think it was commandeered within about 15 minutes. Sweeney (identified in the law enforcement report as Amy Sweeny) called American flight services manager Michael Woodward on the ground at Logan. She displayed remarkable calm as she related numerous details about the unfolding events. "This plane has been hijacked," Sweeney said, according to the FBI report. Two flight attendants, whom she identified by their crew numbers, had already been stabbed, she said. "A hijacker also cut the throat of a business-class passenger, and he appears to be dead," she said. Investigators have identified five suspected hijackers on the flight-Satam Al Suqami; Waleed M. Alshehri; Wail Alshehri; Mohamed Atta; and Abdulaziz Alomari. They are believed to be part of a well-orchestrated network of 19 hijackers who used box cutters, razors and even small knives concealed in cigarette lighters to take control of the four planes.
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The smarter ww lo find a better job.
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Calm Before the Crash
Flight 11 Crew Sent Key Details Before Hitting the Twin Towers
July 18 — On the morning of Sept. 11, American Airlines ground manager Michael Woodward received a phone call that immediately got his full attention.
Flight attendant Amy Sweeney called ground staff after American Airlines Flight 11 was hijacked on Sept. 11. (ABCNEWS.com)
"Listen, and listen to me very carefully. I'm on Flight 11. voice on the other end. The caller was Amy Sweeney, a flight attendant on board Ai been hijacked on its way from Boston to Los Angeles. Over the next 25 minutes, Sweeney, a 13-year veteran with the airline, calmly relay later be crucial in helping the FBI identify the men who hijacked the plane and flew i Center. Another flight attendant, Betty Ong, who had been with American Airlines for 14 yea Seat Numbers Identified Hijackers Flight 11 had taken off from Boston's Logan Airport at 7:59 a.m., with a light load of 81 passengers. There were 11 crew on board: a captain, a first officer, and nine flight attendants. A few minutes into the flight, five men got up from their seats and made their way to the cockpit, soon taking control of the plane. Sweeney and Ong were in the coach section of the plane. Using crew telephones, they made the calls to their colleagues on the ground, Sweeney to Woodward, a flight services manager at Logan Airport, and Ong to the airline's reservations line. Woodward said Sweeney spoke "very, very calmly... in a way which was quick but calm." She gave him the seat numbers for four of the five hijackers, allowing airline staff to pull up their names, phone numbers, addresses — and even credit card numbers — on the reservations computer. One of the names that came up was Mohamed Atta, the man the FBI would later identify as the leader of all 19 of the Sept. 11 hijackers. Sweeney told Woodward the hijackers seemed to be of Middle Eastern descent and said they had gone into the cockpit with a bomb with yellow wires attached. She said they had stabbed the two first-class flight attendants, Barbara Arestegui and Karen Martin, whose station at the front of the plane likely made them the first crew members to confront the hijackers. She said they had also slashed the throat of a business class passenger, who was bleeding severely.
The Telegraph Online | FAA worker says hijacked jeltiners almost collided before strikin... Page 1 of 3
S E R V I N G N A S H U A AND S O U T H E R N N8W H A M P S H I R S
Staff photo by Dean Shalhoup Several Nashua police officers block the entrance to the Boston Air Traffic Control Center on Northeastern Boulevard in Nashua Tuesday morning where they rushed shortly after two passenger aircraft that departed from Boston crashed into the World Trade Center buildings in New York.
FAA worker says hijacked jeltiners almost collided before striking World Trade Center
Thursday, September 13, 2001 By ALBERT McKEON, Telegraph Staff , email@example.com
The two hijacked jets that sliced into the World Trade Center nearly crashed into each other before reaching New York City, according to a Federal Aviation Administration employee who works in the Nashua control facility. FAA air traffic controllers in Nashua have learned through discussions with other controllers that an F-16 fighter stayed in hot pursuit of another hijacked commercial airliner until it crashed in Pennsylvania, said the employee, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
Story Index | Forum
By 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, the military had taken control of U.S. airspace, the employee said. The jet crashed into a field at 10:37 a.m. The incidents fell in line with a handful of incredible and unprecedented events that unfolded in America on Tuesday, said the employee, who worked in the control center that fateful morning. The center is one of 20 FAA facilities that monitor long-distance flights once they leave airports. The morning's surreal moments included a controller, who had just arrived for work, discovering that his wife's American Airline flight was involved in the day of terror, the employee said. Controllers never expected that the terrorists who hijacked the plane had their sights set on the north tower of the World Trade Center, the employee said. Even as the tower burned, controllers still hadn't concluded that another hijacked plane - United Airlines Flight 175 - would slam into the other New York skyscraper, the employee said. The terrorists, however, nearly had their plans dashed when the two planes almost collided outside the city, the employee said. "The two aircraft got too close to each other down by Stewart" International Airport in New Windsor, N.Y., the employee said. Controllers have also learned that an F-16 fighter closely pursued hijacked United Airlines Flight 93 until it crashed in southwestern Pennsylvania, the employee said. Although controllers don't have complete details of the Air Force's chase of the Boeing 757, they have learned
'aul Boutin : Transcript of American Airlines Flight 77
Paul Boutin Technology writer for Slate, Wired, The New York Times, Salon, etc Home I Portfolio I TV and Radio appearances I Bio I Resum6 ^ Today's Entry: Transcript of American Airlines Flight 77 [UPDATE: See "Hunt the Boeing" Answers with science writer Patrick Di Justo] Source: The New York Times Following is a transcript of the radio communications of American Airlines Flight 77 (AAL77), which took off from Dulles International Airport outside Washington on Sept. 11 and then was crashed into the Pentagon. The transcripts were obtained by The New York Times. 8:12:29 — AAL77: Good morning ground American seven seven is off of dixie twenty six with information tango. 8:12:36 — Ground Control West: American 77 Dulles taxi to runway three zero. 8:12:39 — AAL77: Taxi three zero American seven seven. 8:16:01 — Local Control West: American 77, Dulles tower. Runway three zero taxi into position and hold you'll be holding for landing traffic one left and for spacing wake turbulence spacing behind the DC 10. 8:16:29 — AAL77: And American ah seven seven is ready. ^^ 8:16:32 — Local Control West: American 77, Dulles tower. Runway three zero. Taxi into position and hold you're holding for wake turbulence landing traffic one left and you need to be fifteen in trail of that DC 10. 8:16:41 — AAL77: Position and hold three zero, American seven seven. 8:19:20 — Local Control West: American 77 your departure frequency will be one two five point zero five. Runway three zero cleared for take off. 8:19:27 — AAL77: One two five oh five. Runway three zero cleared for takeoff, American 77. 8:20:26 — Local Control West: American 77, turn left heading two seven zero contact departure. 8:20:31 — AAL77: Two seventy heading departure, American 77. Good day. 8:20:38 — AAL77: Is with you passing one decimal one for three. 8:20:43 — North Departure: American 77, Dulles departure radar. Contact climb and maintain five thousand. 8:20:47 — AAL77: Five thousand, American 77. ^kv 8:22:05 — North Departure: American 77 climb and maintain one one thousand eleven thousand 8:22:08 — AAL77: up to one one thousand American 77.
3/26/03 1:57 P
FAA - 2001 Testimony by Key FAA Officials
here! Public Affairs » Testimony >» 2001 Testimony by Key FAA Officials
JANE F. GARVEY ON AVIATION SECURITY FOLLOWING THE TERROR ATTACK ON SEPTEMBER 11TH. SEPTEMBER 21,2001
STATEMENT OF JANE F. GARVEY ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, ON AVIATION SECURITY FOLLOWING THE TERRORIST ATTAC SEPTEMBER 11TH SEPTEMBER 21, 2001
Chairman Mica, Congressman Oberstar, Members of the Subcomm I appear before you today to discuss the events of the September 1 that were so unspeakable that they were virtually unimaginable a fe< weeks ago. The world has been forever changed. As President Bu said, "Great tragedy has come to us, and we are meeting it with the that is in our country, with courage and concern for others." As a nation, we have suffered horrific losses, but we are resolved nc allow those losses to overwhelm us. We can be proud of America's response to this crisis; the stories of heroism, generosity, and patrio are countless and compelling. We must gain strength from these examples as we face the many challenges that lie ahead of us. On of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and its employees, son who have suffered their own devastating losses, I would like to extei sympathies to the many thousands of Americans who were victimize the terrorists' actions. I assure you that all 48,425 employees of the will continue to work night and day to make the air transportation sy:
1 of 6 4/7/03 4:13 PW
The Journal of American History
excellent examples of what works and what does not. The essay is especially useful for its analysis of how people often derive their identity and purpose from their attachments to community, whether community is defined as a locale or a social network Shopes's essay marks an end to the annual oral history section in dre JAH. (jAft editors have decided to use this space for other purposes.) Her presence in this issue is fitting for many reasons, perhaps most notably because she and Michael Frisch were die first coeditors of this section from 1987 until we assumed these duties in 1997 Over the last fifteen years, forty-eight essays have appeared in these pages. Authors have focused on how oral interviews have been used to illuminate the histories of war, journalism, business, agriculture, jazz, the military, labor, women, die 1960s, World War II, sports, music, foreign relations, philanthropy, medicine, the civil rights movement, science, and much else. Throughout, the authors have been mindful diat their readers most likely would use evidence from oral history interviews to obtain information about the past. Yet we think they would share Ronald J. Grele's belief diat oral histories have even greater values. One of die nation's foremost oral historians, Grele said in die first essay to appear in this series in September 1987 that oral histories "can also be used to discover unfolding consciousness, to document the varieties of ideology, the creation of meaning, and the more subjective aspects of historical experience."1 We hope this series has stimulated interest in exploring these possibilities. Michael A. Gordon University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Lu Ann Jones East Carolina University I I
The September 11, 2001, Oral History Narrative and Memory project: A First Report
Mary Marshall Clark
One of the dilemmas in the debate over whether memory or history dominates die interpretation of major events is that few opportunities exist to study how people reconstruct the past before a dominant public narrative has been created by diose who have a vested interest in defining the political meaning of events. Oral historians have often claimed that the lived experience of history is more complex than subsequent interpretations reveal. Rarely do we have the opportunity to document the historic evidence of that complexity through first-person interviews collected close to a historical event that has the power to transform our ideas about history. As a result, debates over the relationships between memory and history and between individual and collective memory often remain abstract and theoretical. In the case of an episode such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which immediately stirred a public debate over the ultimate significance of the events for American history and foreign policy, die stakes over how and by whom memory is shaped were particularly high. Given the nature of the attacks and the need for government response to them, it is no surprise that an official public interpretation of the meaning of September 11 was generated soon after the events occurred. This dominant account portrayed a nation unified in grief; it allowed government officials to claim that there is a public consensus that September 11 was a turning point in the nation's history that has clear implications for national and foreign policy. It is important to remember that this consensus was constructed not by those who lived through the terrorist attacks and their aftermath, but by those who observed it and had political reasons to interpret it as they did.
Columbia University's Oral History Research Office and the university's Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy created the September 11, 2001, Oral History Narrative and Memory Project within days of the attacks to explore a variety of memories and interpretations of the events and their aftermath that we believed could only be constructed over time through personal accountings of the catastrophe. Peter Dearrnan, a sociologist interested in the formation of identity in the wake of such
• Ronald J. Grele, "On Using Oral History Collections: An Introduction," Journal ofAmtrican Hi*9 ' (Sept. 1987), 570.
Mary Marshall Clark is director of the Oral History Research Office, Columbia University. of American History September 2002
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Ftderal Aviation Administration FAA REGIONAL BOUNDARIES
Including Locations of Rtglonal Haadquarttra and Cantara
LOS ANGELES • ( A l a s k a n Reoion £ Regional Office Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center Regional Boundary National Headquarters
O 1 Includes Puerto Rico, the Republic of Panama andthe Virgin Islands 2 Includes Wake, Samoa, and Guam.
July-August, 2002 National weather Service Central Region
Volume l Number 4
Air Traffic Control System Command Center
Minimizing weather impacts efficiently and safely
Jim Roets, Lead Forecaster Aviation Weather Center Nestled within the high-tech corridor of Northern Virginia, just outside of Washington, Dulles International Airport, is the nerve center for air traffic operations in the United States. Called the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC), it occupies one section of a building owned by EDS, Incorporated - a technology giant and a government contractor for military and other agencies for data services. Once inside the building, I was struck by the massive screen displays in the front of the room. The main control room itself is fairly large and contains several dozen people all performing tasks designed to Keep air traffic in this country moving without delay. Their job is massive. With five- to six-thousand aircraft in the air at any given time during the peak air traffic periods, the ATCSCC must react to any one of myriad complex interactions caused by weather, equipment outages, security concerns, and the push of traffic, in order to keep the traveling public on their way to their destinations safely and efficiently. The role of the ATCSCC is to manage this flow of air traffic within the continental United States. The ATCSCC has been operational since 1994. There are many support components that aid in the successful balance of air traffic demand with system capacity. They are: Airport Reservation Office (ARO) The The Airport Reservation Office (ARO) processes all requests for IFR operations at designated high density traffic airports and allots reservations on a first come, first served basis. The high density traffic airports are: John F. Kennedy International La Guardia Chicago O'Hare International Ronald Reagan Washington National
In this issue:
ATCSCC - Getting the traffic around the weather.
CCFP - Meteorological Mediators make the NAS more efficient.
Signatures for clear air turbulence - A view from 22,500 miles
Color weather radar arrives at ARTCC sectors
Mission Statement To enhance aviation safety by increasing the pilots' knowledge of weather systems and processes and National Weather Service products and services.
Figure 1. The main operations room at the ATCSCC is a high tech overview of the NAS. Air Trafflce Control Specialists work out alternative routing for the high volume of air traffic that is frequently disrupted by thunderstorms. 1
Aviation Safety I Traveler Briefing I Newsroom I Regulatory/Advisory I Certification I Air Traffic I
Air Traffic Services - ATS
SENIOR MANAGEMENT Steven J. Brown Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services Deputy Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services Director, Air Traffic Service Deputy Director, Air Traffic Service Director, Terminal Business Service Director, Airway Facilities Service Deputy Director, Airway Facilities Service Director, Air Traffic System Requirements Service As the Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services, Steve Brown manages the 35,000 air tn controllers, maintenance and software technicians, flight inspection pilots and administrative p« who are responsible for the day-to-day operation of the nation's airspace system. Air Traffic Se employees provide air traffic control through 579 facilities as well as maintaining the National A System (NAS) infrastructure. The US air traffic control system is the world's largest, currently h over 150 million operations a year, carrying an estimated 695 million passengers in 2000. Air T Services also maintains terminal instrument flight procedures and airway segments, conducts f inspections nationally and internationally, assigns and protects the aeronautical radio frequenc in air traffic control, and evaluates the modernization of the NAS infrastructure. Prior to his 1998 appointment at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Mr. Brown was the of the National Aeronautic Association (NAA). The NAA consists of more than 100 corporate m the aerospace industry and is the nation's oldest aviation organization. Prior to becoming Presi NAA, Mr. Brown was senior Vice President of Government and Technical Affairs at the 350,00( Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA). He managed the AOPA government affairs prc the Federal, State, and local levels, served as AOPA's leading lobbyist, and directed the assoc international activities. Previous to his current position, Mr. Brown served on the Board and chaired the Finance Comr RTCA, Inc. and also served on the FAA Administrator's ad hoc task force on ATC Modernizatic served as Chair of the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Federal Advisory Committee and was a mer the FAA Committee for Free Flight Implementation. Additionally, he was the designated repres* for general aviation on the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) FANS Committee served on numerous industry advisory committees to both the Secretary of Transportation and Administrator. Prior to joining AOPA, Mr. Brown was a faculty member at Texas A&M University where he tau number of aviation-related courses. He previously worked for the Texas Aeronautics Commissi was also employed as an air taxi pilot and full-time flight instructor. Steve Brown is a graduate of the executive management programs at Pennsylvania State Univ the University of Virginia and is a qualified Aviation Accident Investigator certified by the Univei Southern California. Steve holds a bachelor's degree in Business Management and a master's Industrial Education.
As a pilot, he has flown more than 3,000 hours over the past 25 years and is certified as a com James Hevelone Deputy Director, Air pilot and flight instructor. He also has instrument, seaplane, and glider ratings. Steve and his w own and maintain a single-engine aircraft. Traffic System Requirements Service Director, Office of
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System Capacity (Vacant) Deputy Director, Office of System Capacity Director, Office of Independent Operational Test and Evaluation Joe Schanne Deputy Director, Office of Independent Operational Test and Evaluation Director, Runway Safety Program Peter H. Challan Deputy Associate Administrator for Air Traffic Services FAA Administrator Jane Garvey appointed Peter H. Challan acting Deputy Associate Administr Air Traffic Services in July 1999. Peter Challan began his career in 1970 as a field civil enginee FAA Eastern Region working in the Airway Facilities Division. From 1973 to 1983 he held the p Supervisor in the Field/Office Facilities and Equipment Branch, assuming greater responsibility September 1983 he was appointed as the Supervisor, Terminal/EnRoute Section. In February was appointed acting Manager, Construction Engineering Branch. In February 1989, he moved to Washington DC and was the Headquarters Program Manager 1 new Denver Airport. From July 1990 to August 1993, Mr. Challan was the Program Manager, T Air Traffic Control Automation under the Associate Administrator for System Engineering and Development. In August 1993, Mr. Challan was named the Program Manager and in April 199f appointed the Integrated Product Team Lead for the Voice Switching and Control System Prog March 1996, Peter Challan was appointed Deputy Director, Office of Air Traffic Systems Deveh under the Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions. Before assuming his new po: was the Director, Office of Air Traffic Systems Development. Peter Challan received his B.S.E and B.S.C.E. from City College in New York. He is a registers Professional Engineer. Mr. Challan is a resident of the District of Columbia, an avid gardener and a novice golfer.
Biff G. Peacock Director, Air Traffic Service Bill Peacock was appointed Director, Air Traffic Service in January 2001. Since February 2000. served as the Program Director for Air Traffic Tactical Operations, which provides leadership a strategic direction to the air traffic control system. Prior to this appointment, Bill Peacock serve< New England Air Traffic Division Manager. Bill Peacock served in the federal service for over 29 years. He began his air traffic career with 25 years ago. Bill has been very active in Personnel Reform and received the Hammer Award for Task Force 1996. In 1994, he received the Administrator's Award for Excellence in EEO, and in 1995, he r< the Associate Administrator's Team Award. A graduate of Embry Riddle Aeronautical Universit; attended the Kellogg Executive Program, the Federal Executive Institute, and is a private pilot < instrument rating.
Jeff Griffith Deputy Director, Air Traffic Service Jeff Griffith became the Deputy Director of Air Traffic at the Federal Aviation Administration in
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f Select for FOCUS™ or Delivery Business Wire December 17, 2001, Monday Copyright 2001 Business Wire, Inc. Business Wire December 17, 2001, Monday DISTRIBUTION: Business Editors LENGTH: 972 words HEADLINE: 11 Airplanes Astray On September 11, According to Exclusive Aviation Week & Space Technology Report On FAA Air Traffic Control Command Center DATELINE: Dec. 17,2001 BODY: Suspicions Lead To Nationwide Grounding An exclusive examination of the activities at the FAA air traffic control command center on September 11 reveals that in the minutes following the attack on the World Trade Center, 11 airplanes had either flown off course or were out of communication, leading the FAA to ground all air traffic for the first time in US history. The in-depth analysis, in the December 17 issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology, also reveals the air traffic control system responded quickly, decisively, professionally and with surprising cooperation among government and industry groups. Just minutes after the second of two hijacked airliners had flown into the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. EOT the air traffic control command center in Herndon, Va., asked field facilities to advise it of any aircraft that weren't in communication or were flying unexpected routes. The facilities reported 11 such aircraft, according to AW&ST. As the reports of unusual operations grew, Herndon issued a ground-stop order at 9:26 a.m. "We just thought, OK, enough is enough, let's keep them on the ground and see what we've got," Linda Schuessler, manager of tactical operations at the command center told AW&ST. Two of the 11 aircraft were American Airlines Flight 77, which was flown into the Pentagon at 9:41 a.m., and United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in southwestern Pennsylvania at 10:10. The anomalies that caused controllers to flag the other nine aircraft were explained later to Herndon's satisfaction. "We followed up on that, at the end of the day and the following day," said Schuessler, "People here continued to say (they had) a little discomfort about the information (they) received. We followed up with the security people and got enough information that the specialists here felt very comfortable that they understood the situation." One of the nine aircraft was identified in later press reports as a Delta Air Lines transcontinental flight out of Boston. The FAA declined to provide information about any of the nine for the AW&ST report, however. An agency official told AW&ST the FAA has no open issues regarding the flights with respect to ATC, but it doesn't know their status in the FBI's criminal investigation of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The AW&ST report tracks the timeline of activities at the control command center, beginning with normal morning staff and industry meetings, then immediately bringing in FAA headquarters office, the secretary of transportation's office and other agencies in the minutes following the first attack. The first indication of trouble began when the national operations manager, in charge of supervisors and ATC specialists on the command center's operational floor reported a possible hijacking in progress. In a stroke of luck, the Department of Defense was represented at the control command center. The Pentagon staffs the center only three days per month for refresher training to coordinate priority aircraft movement during warfare or emergencies, and September 11 happened to be one of those days. John Carr, National Air Traffic Controllers Association president, told AW&ST the air traffic controllers landed
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Statement of Cl audio Manno Assistant Under Secretary for Intelligence Transportation Security Administration before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence October 1, 2002 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Select Committees, I am pleased to represent the Department of Transportation and participate in your joint inquiry into the performance of the intelligence community concerning the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States. My statement addresses questions posed in your letter of invitation. You asked about the policies and procedures in place at the Department to receive and act on intelligence information from the Intelligence Community and law enforcement organizations concerning terrorism. It is helpful to look at this issue first in terms of how intelligence relating to terrorism flows from producer agencies of the Intelligence Community to the Department of Transportation (DOT), including the Office of the Secretary, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The second part of the process concerns how (and how much) information from the Intelligence Community is passed to state and local law enforcement agencies, as well as the private sector. The mechanisms for passing information by the Intelligence Community (1C) to DOT arc well established. DOT (including the Office of the Secretary, FAA and TSA) identifies and updates its intelligence needs in detailed "statements of intelligence interest" or "reading requirements," which the 1C producer agencies keep on file to determine which products (both raw intelligence and finished products) DOT receives. To help ensure that the Intelligence Community agencies share pertinent intelligence fully with DOT, section 111 (a) of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-604) required "the agencies of the intelligence community [to]... ensure that intelligence reports concerning international terrorism are made available . . . t o . . . the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration." The agencies responsible for producing most of the intelligence DOT receives on terrorism are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State (DOS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DOT, especially through TSA, is a full and active participant in the national counterterrorism and law enforcement communities by virtue of its relationships with these agencies. A full-time CIA liaison is posted to the Secretary's Office of Intelligence and Security, and that office has established a part-time liaison position at FBI. FAA has also provided a DOT liaison officer to the National Infrastructure Protection Center at FBI. TSA's Transportation Security Intelligence Service (TSIS) maintains full-time
Fact Sheet: Chronology of Events on September 11, 2001 (August 2002)
Federal Aviation Administration Washington, DC 20591 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Date: August 1 2, 2002 Contact: William Shumann Phone: 202-267-3883
0800. American Airlines Flight 1 1 , a Boeing 767 with 92 people on board, takes off from Boston Logan airport for Los Angeles. 0814. United Air Lines Flight 175, a Boeing 767 with 65 people on board, takes off from Boston Logan airport for Los Angeles. 0821 . American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 with 64 people on board, takes off from Washington Dulles airport for Los Angeles. 0840. FAA notifies the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 1 1 . 0841. United Air Lines Flight 93, a Boeing 757 with 44 people on board, takes off from Newark airport for San Francisco. 0843. FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of United Flight 175. 0846. (approx.). American Flight 1 1 crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center. 0902. (approx.). United Flight 1 75 crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center. 0904. (approx.). The FAA's Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center stops all departures from airports in its jurisdiction (New England and eastern New York State). 0906. The FAA bans takeoffs of all flights bound to or through the airspace of New York Center from airports in that Center and the three adjacent Centers - Boston, Cleveland and Washington. This is referred to as a First Tier groundstop and covers the Northeast from North Carolina north and as far west as eastern Michigan. 0908. The FAA bans all takeoffs nationwide for flights going to or through New York Center airspace. 0924. The FAA notifies NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector about the suspected hijacking of American Flight 77. The FAA and NORAD establish an open line to discuss American 77 and United 93. 0926. The FAA bans takeoffs of all civilian aircraft regardless of destination - a national groundstop. 0940. (approx.). American Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon. 0945. In the first unplanned shutdown of U. S. airspace, the FAA orders all aircraft to land at the nearest airport as soon as practical. At this time, there were more than 4,500 aircraft in the air on Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plans.