ACP Digests | Marriage | Community Property

MULLER VS MULLER FACTS Petition for review on certiorari which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between

petitioner and respondent P and R (German) were married in Germany and resided there in a house owned by R’s parents but later permanently resided in the Ph. R had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo and in the construction of a house. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of P. After they separated, R filed a motion for separation of properties RTC DECISION: terminated the regime of absolute community of property It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. Re Antipolo property, R cannot recover his funds coz it was a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibited aliens from procuring private lands.

PACIFIC ACE VS YANAGISAWA FACTS R (Japanese) and Evelyn married. Evelyn then bought a townhouse unit which was registered in her name. R filed a PDN against Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. During the pendency of the case, R filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin her from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. R’s petition became moot coz Evelyn committed in open court that she will not dispose of the property during the pendency of the case. Evelyn obtained a loan from P (PAFIN) and executed a REM (real estate mortgage) in favor of P over the townhouse unit. R filed for an annulment of the REM. MAKATI RTC DECISION: (at the time of the mortgage) dissolved the marriage between R and Evelyn and ordered the liquidation of their properties. PQUE RTC DECISION: - a foreign national, cannot possibly own the mortgaged property. - Without ownership, or any other law or contract binding the defendants to him, Eiji has no cause of action that may be asserted against Evelyn and P. CA DECISION: annulled the REM executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN. ISSUE


CA DECISION: there is nothing in the Constitution preventing R from procuring land then ordered P to reimburse him said amount. ISSUE

WON pque rtc’s decision was improper WON respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property? RATIO NO. respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. W Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. R cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. HELD Granted. HELD RATIO YES. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending[41] appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an “insurmountable barrier” to the subsequent assumption by the Parañaque RTC. .Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a standing injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who are not in good faith. The party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of the offending actions

Guillermina M. Such inference is more emphatic in this case. if any. Gelano refused to pay on the ground that said amount was for the personal account of her husband asked for by.." There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. par. the sheriff levied his sugar quedans which were conjugal property of the Garcia spouses. neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage. A Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm for the P’s properties. Luzon Surety appealed to the CA which affirmed the lower court’s decision. 163 of the New Civil Code states that as such administrator the only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career. a conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. HELD Petition denied LUZON SURETY CO VS DE GARCIA 30 SCRA 111 FACTS Luzon Surety granted a crop loan to Chavez based on a surety bond executed in favor of Philippine National Bank where Garcia was one of the guarantors of the indemnity agreement. Gelano (wife) Carlos Gelano (husband) obtained cash advances but refused to pay his unpaid balances. ISSUE WON a conjugal partnership. parental authority over him belongs to his parents. As to one of the children. Art. when no proof is presented that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor received consideration therefor. CFI DECISION: issued a writ of execution for Garcia to pay the amount of P3. There is none in this case. Art. ISSUE WON Joena had the right to the claim? RATIO NO. The lower court ruled in favor of PNB in the first case and ordered 1 the guarantors in the second case to pay Luzon Surety. GELANO VS CA 103 SCRA 90 FACTS Insular Sawmill. HELD CA’s decision affirmed. and the fruits and the income. The Garcias filed a suit of injunction which the lower court found in their favor based on Art. *P has been previously married to another woman but their marriage has already been dissolved. 92. PNB filed complaint against Luzon Surety which subsequently prompted Luzon Surety to file a complaint against the guarantors (one of which was Garcia).ABRENICA VS ABRENICA FACTS P and R were law firm partners. On April 1957. could be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company? RATIO NO. and given to him. leased the paraphernal property of Guillermina M. of that property.839. in the absence of any showing of benefits received. . Thus. which may redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On August. Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she and her stepchildren owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied and that it was under their ACP. P filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner Joena. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage. This is not true in the case at bar for we believe that the husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement as that involved in this case did not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In Article 161 of the CC. profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. 161 of the CC. R filed a case against P d to return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land and sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlando’s children. her claim cannot be sustained. Inc.

Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for “all the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Cleodualdo and Michele have voluntarily agreed to set forth their obligations. Guillermina refused to pay on the ground that she had no knowledge of such accommodation. Spouses Gelanos purchased lumber materials on credit for the repair and improvement of their residence. Insular filed a complaint for collection against the spouses before the CFI. Luis Narciso entered into Contract o Hire of heavey Equipment with petitioner G-Tractors where G-tractors leased former tractors. The obligation/debt contracted by petitioner-husband Carlos Gelano redounded to the benefit of the family. He operates a logging concession. one of which was conjugal property of land. it must be inferred that it is conjugal and redounded to the benefit of the family. Article 1408. married to Michele U. as well as to the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains in a compromise agreement. Narciso is a conjugal debt for which the conjugal partnership property can be held answerable? RATIO YES. Pursuant to paragraph 1. and hence. Article 161 of the New Civil Code. Co tract stipulated payment for rental. Francisco. as coowners. WIFE’S CONTENTIONS: -whatever transpired in the civil case against them could be binding only on the husband Luis R. leaving unpaid amounts. and attorney's fees.17. a commercial enterprise for gain which he had the right to embark the conjugal partnership. Francisco shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha. and those contracted by the wife. Hence. G TRACTORS INC VS CA 135 SCRA 192 FACTS Luis Narciso is married to Josefina Narciso. CA DECISION: Michele's obligation was not proven to be a personal debt. Real property donated to Cleodia and Ceamantha were used as payment.” There is no doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to enhance the productivity of said logging business. as accomodating party.08 FACTS Coz of a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. However Luis wasn‘t able to pay. CFI DECISION: held Carlos liable. when they reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old. The obligations were contracted in connection with his legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal partnership. FRANCISCO VS GONZALES GR 177667 09. Property of Luis was sold to pay for his debt. ISSUE WON the conjugal property of the former spouses may be held accountable? . CA DECISION: held spouses jointly and severally liable. the conjugal property is liable for his debt. ISSUE WON the couple’s conjugal property is liable? RATIO YES. visitation. rights and responsibilities on matters relating to their children's support. Civil Code of 1889 which provision incidentally can still be found in paragraph 1. unpaid telephone bill. in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. Narciso and could not affect or bind the plaintiff-wife Josefina Salak Narciso who was not a party to that case that the nature of the Sheriff's sale clearly stated that only the property of the husband may be sold to satisfy the money judgment against him that the conjugal property of the plaintiffs-spouses could not be made liable for the satisfaction of the judgment in the civil caseconsidering that the subject matter of ISSUE said case was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or of the family WON the judgment debt of private respondent Luis R. the property may be held answerable for it.without her knowledge and consent and did not benefit the family. Respondent ordered Michele and her partner Matrai to vacate the premises leased to them and to pay back rentals. Ownership of the conjugal property consisting of a house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate in the name of Cleodualdo M. custody. Joseph Tan Yoc Su. executed a joint and several promissory note with Carlos Gelano in favor of China Banking Corporation bank payable in 60 days to help renew the previous loan of the spouses but Carlos only paid a fraction of it. The debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. also for the same purpose.

because of his incurable promiscuity. in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse. filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. a notice of sheriff’s sale was issued days prior to the bidding. husband of Erlinda. The property should not have been levied and sold at execution sale. *Cleodualdo and Michele married prior to the affectivity of the FC thus their property relations are governed by the Civil Code on conjugal partnership of gains. There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Michele. and thereafter. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property. the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. he did not pay the consideration of P200K. out of her personal funds. Ong purchased a parcel of land (Rizal Property) from Aurora Seneris. volcanic temper. However. In 1968. Also. ISSUE WON wife’s criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership? RATIO NO. she reluctantly agreed to execute a Deed of Sale of the Rizal Property on the promise that Yu Bun Guan would construct a commercial building for the benefit of the children. YU BUN GUAN VS ONG 36 SCRA 559 FACTS * Paraphernal property refers to property over which the wife has complete control. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. In this case as the liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai. who was then already living separately from Cleodualdo rented the house in Lanka Drive for her and Matrai's own benefit. prompting spouses Buado to put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond. sheriff deigned to issue a notice of levy on real property on execution. Romulo Nicol. a Third Party Claim was received at the sheriff’s office from one Arnulfo Fulo. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Sale proceeded with the spouses Buado emerging as the highest bidder A year after the sale. they purchased a house and lot out of their conjugal funds. In fact. The consideration for the sale was the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor their children and the payment of the loan he obtained from Allied Bank. when they entered into the lease agreement. Before their separation in 1992. and alleged that the property was directly levied upon without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda. when the Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Yu Bun Guan. which was affirmed by CA and SC court issued writ of execution. . By no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Michele and Matrai purported themselves to be husband and wife. directing the sheriff to collect the indemnification from Erlinda insufficient. This property is not part Yu Bun Guan and Ong are married since 1961 and lived together until she and her children were abandoned by him in 1992.RATIO NO. Both Michele and Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership of the house and lot in Taal St.when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the needed sum -when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband -or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. He suggested that the property should be in his name alone so that she would not be involved in any obligation. and other vicious vices. during their marriage. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she -purchases things necessary for the support of the family . for lack of legal basis. BUADO VS CA FACTS Civil case for damages that arose from slander filed by spouses Buado against Erlinda Nicol RTC ruled that Erlinda is liable and ordered her to pay for damages. supposedly the "ostensible" valuable consideration. in favor of petitioners. in the present case to those belonging to Michele and Matrai. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent. RTC DECISION: considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn. Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin. also using the latter’s funds. Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out.” in the said case. from his father. their respective spouses did not sign the same. Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. 28-91. the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping. or as “Mr. with an Affidavit of Loss attached. Joselyn and Benjamin. RTC ruled in favor of Ong that the lot was her paraphernal property since she purchased it with her personal funds. in which the stated consideration had not in fact been paid. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property. ISSUE WON the lot in question was paraphernal property? RATIO YES. either of the spouses can sign the petition. CA affirmed. * A deed of sale. 1994 applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping. married Joselyn C. Yu Bun Guan then filed for a Petition for Replacement of the TCT. any transaction involving said property required his consent. authorizing the latter to maintain. the new title was issued in his name was not delivered to him by Ong. executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and asked that the sale be declared null and void . The property was the paraphernal property of respondent. and Mrs. dated February 8.” over a property in which they have a common interest. Ong. the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the property. The petitioners were sued jointly. Joselyn bought a lot Boracay property. since he had signed the Deed of Absolute Sale that stated that she was the “absolute and registered owner”. While their marriage was subsisting. At first he maintained that the money came from his own personal funds. Petitioners were found guilty of failure to comply with the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum Shopping coz while petitioners Ronnie Dar. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. a 17-year old Filipina. and next. sell. Section 7. (2) petitioner had categorically admitted that the property was in her name. lease. Such being the case. Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines. a British subject. Taylor (Benjamin). ISSUE WON The signing of one of the spouses in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping? RATIO YES. MATTHEWS VS TAYLOR FACTS Respondent Benjamin A. save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. Randy Angeles. and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and . * Revised Circular No. It was also sufficiently proven that she had means to do so. The testimony of petitioner as to the source of the money he had supposedly used to purchase the property was at best vague and unclear. (3) petitioner was estopped from claiming otherwise.Because of this. Joy Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Taylor (Joselyn). ISSUE WON Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same? RATIO NO. is null and void: DAR VS LEGASTO FACTS Private respondent Nenita Co Bautista filed a case for unlawful detainer against herein petitioners where they were sued as “Mr. constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. and Mrs. and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: since what is involved in the instant case is their common rights and interest to abode under the the system of absolute community of property. because (1) the title had been issued in her name. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. on the other hand. CA affirmed. and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee. and (4) she had paid the real property taxes. thus. entered into an Agreement of Lease10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years. Then he said that it came from his mother.

the property became conjugal property. Jr. Benjamin. Sr.’s renunciation. the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved. (Protacio. Sr. pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code. although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership. conjugal partnership terminates in the case of Judicial Separation of Property. he and petitioner entered into an agreement which provided.petitioner. Sr. Sr. 386. Jr. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Sr. Servacio (Servacio).. who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property). not he.that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta . UGALDE VS YSASI FACTS P and R married and got separated after 6 years. but not the interest of his coowners.. Go. otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines. Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with the RTC against respondent but respondent countered that on 2 June 1961. Hence. among others. whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father.. the law in effect when the property was acquired. could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Sr. hence. HELD . They sued Servacio. Sr. the existence of a conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage. Respondent allegedly married another.). and mother of the petitioners). the marriage was null and void. they submitted an Amicable Settlement to CFI. 4791 approving the parties’ separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Also. a co-owner could sell his undivided share. NONETHELESS. (Protacio. Protacio Go. Twenty three years later Protacio. 3330. Under ART 175 (4). and Marta. Considering that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license. * A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment. their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. et al. it should not impair vested rights. Until then. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property.that under Article 160 of the Civil Code. and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation. and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses HEIRS OF GO VS SERVACIO FACTS Jesus B. that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. R also said that P already obtained a divorce from him in Mexico. all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife ISSUE WON the sale by Protacio. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Sr. Sr.declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code. They had a son. Sr. and Marta was null and void. The applicable law at the time of their marriage was Republic Act No. Protacio. and his son Rito B. P and R were married on 15 February 1951. being an alien. Sr. Upon Marta’s death. RTC DECISION: dismissed and CA affirmed. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation? RATIO NO. Protacio. The petitioners demanded the return of the property. and Dina) .). no implied trust was created in his favor. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: following Protacio. Jr. Jr. and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio. The finality of the Order in Civil Case No. Protacio. she acquired sole ownership thereto. Sr. Sr. Pursuant to the agreement. not the exclusive property of Protacio. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest. all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio. but Servacio refused to heed their demand. when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. RTC DECISION: affirmed the validity of the sale . no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed. ISSUE WON P and R’s conjugal partnership of gains was dissolved? RATIO YES. Marta Barola Go died (wife of Protacio. Rito. because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio. the conjugal partnership was dissolved.. and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it. is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. and no community of property was formed between them. Since Protacio.

of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse. equally or in the proportion the parties have established. asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned. instead of Article 102. the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code.” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. 3. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses.  The RTC in its decision.” It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties.  Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision.QUIAO V. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community. he was wellaware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. First. the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. 2. And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved. In the present case. that common mass is divided between the spouses. 2.  Brigido’s share. in his Answer. While the appeal was pending. irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned. 000. and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. . upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership. ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15. No. (2) of the Family Code. what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits. the CA. when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code. declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property. the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal partnership– NO. Rather. however. the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements. Brigido will still be left with nothing. the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. Buenaventura VS. the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification. since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits. Thus. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code. there is nothing to return to any of them. QUIAO FACTS:  Rita C.” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.” While one may not be deprived of his “vested right. upon respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20. On the other hand. 3. Quiao (Brigido).000 monthly.  Petitioner appealed before the CA. or their respective heirs. and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the commo n mass of the couple’s properties. because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor. Second. CA Facts:  Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.  The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code. since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the Family Code. Second. Again. the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.” From the foregoing provision. Thus. lest we be confused. it establishes a complete separation of capitals. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. – Art 129 will govern. (2) and 43. pursuant to Articles 63.” And since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children. ordinarily. First. pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code. what remains in the abovelisted properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. RATIO: 1. “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry. which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties. when the decision for legal separation was promulgated.”  RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. like in the absolute community regime. RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community? NO. shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children. it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned. In the instant case. However. subject to modification as the necessity arises. the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. No. In this case. or when the same are void. the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process. and divide equally. pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code. In fact. each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties. ISSUES: 1. assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable.

as the case maybe. Diño (respondent) got married. to have been acquired during the union of the parties. their marriage was declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Thus. Held:  Yes. In the absence of proof to the contrary. properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts. Caridad L.  On 30 May 2001. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. The decisive factor in determining whether a parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage.  It thereby ruled that ½ of the conjugal property of the first marriage constituted the nd separate property of the husband during the formation of the 2 conjugal partnership st uponremarriage.Delizo Facts:  Nicolas Delizo’s first marriage which produced 3 children lasted 18 years. st  RTC rendered judgment distributing the properties:½ to children of 1 marriage¼ to surviving spouse¼ to children of both marriages Petitioner appealed but the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modifications.  Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found. until after the termination of their cohabitation. petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. do not apply. and had abandoned her responsibility to the family. Held/Ratio: Submitted evidence on appeal claims that the property in dispute were actually homestead grants acquired by ND through different other homesteaders and thus could not belong to the conjugal properties of the first wife because they were lands of the public domain.  Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other. a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.½ of property – share of 1 wife½ of property – ND and all his children Issue: WON the partition was equitable. live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. the same would be covered by the co-ownership. Held:  Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage. Issue:  Whether or not the property relations of the parties should fall under 147 of the Family Code. choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. filed special proceedings. hence this petition. For purposes of this Article. is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfilment of the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent. providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. and shall be owned by them in equal shares.  Article 147. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common. the property regime applicable to be liquidated. wife of the second marriage. it was not shown that all the requirements of the Homestead Law to warrant the granting of patents to the homesteader was complied with. his second marriage which produced 9children lasted 46 years. and would at times become violent and hurt him.  The trial court ruled that petitioner was able to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. Alain M. The property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.  In short.  In the meantime. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.  No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. heirs of the first marriage instituted an action for partition of the land but heirs of the second marriage opposed the partition claiming that the said properties were theirs. the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.  The defendant’s appeal stressed that the Original Cert. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. married to Dorotea de Ocampo” but the CA held that such was not proof that the property was owned by the conjugal partnership and was a mere description of ND’s civil status. . Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage. The land in dispute totalled 66 hectares of agricultural land in Caanawan and a150 sq. but whose marriage is nonetheless void. Dorotea de Ocampo. In this case. both by the RTC and the CA.  Rather the general rule applies.  After he died.of Title covering the 66 hectare land was in the name of: “ND. their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent. which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio. Diño v Diño “Property regime of unions without marriage” Facts:  On 14 January 1998. without the consent of the other. work or  industry.  Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful. This was adhered to by the SC because prior to the death of the first wife. In Valdes. Delizo v. what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership. 42 and 43 of the Family Code. m lot in Manila. the provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41. citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

the total mass of these properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership.Having neither legal nor equitable title. 1407 of the old one) which states that “All property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife”. Thus. Hence the CA erred in holding that the entire Caanawan properties belong with the conjugal partnership of ND and his first wife. what was acquired by ND were not rights of ownership but inchoate rights as applicants over portions of the public domain. the st nd whole estate should be divided accordingly:9/64 – Share of 1 wife23/64 – Share of 2 wife32/64 – Share of ND to bedivided into 13 equal parts . important considerations preclude the SC from accepting whole-sale the statutory presumption of Art 160 of the new CC(or Art. therefore. Considering the circumstances and since capital of either marriage and contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision. as a matter of equity. Considering however that 20hectares of that land was cultivated from 1905 to 1909. Although some properties were not contested owing to the fact that they were acquired nd during the existence of the 2 marriage. should be given a share in such properties. justice and equity demand that the rights to said properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land lands had been complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership. There is established fact that he produce of the disputed lands have contributed considerably to the acquisition of these properties in dispute and thus the children of the first marriage.

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