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failure of bottom up explanation (and the implicit failure of determinism) is due to the unpredictability of bottom up causality in any system formed of systems of lower genera. The most obvious example of such a system is the human mind. While neuro-psychologists continue to insist on a deterministic bottom up deterministic causality, the praxis of psychiatry demonstrate that not only is bottom up causality not deterministic, its not predictable statistically or in any other way. Its well known that depression, for instance, has a strong correlation with neurotransmitter levels, particularly serotonin, but also dopamine and norepinephrine. Depression triggered by external events (i.e. depression that begins with emotional effects that eventually cause a continuing state of being of depression disclosed by mood) predictably results in lower levels of these neurotransmitters. The original idea of antidepressant therapy was therefore to raise the levels back within a normal range, thus restoring the patients usual balance of neurotransmitters, with an underlying assumption that restoring these levels would result in a predictable restoration of the patients usual mood characteristics. The reality, though, of antidepressant therapy is much different. While SSRI, SDRI, and SNRI medications, all of which raise the level of serotonin, the latter two also increasing the levels of dopamine and norepinephrine respectively, they do so within a few days of beginning treatment, yet it is well known that the timing of mood improvement, if mood improvement in fact occurs, is generally a matter of weeks from the beginning of therapy. This in itself doesnt completely negate the notion of predictable upwards causality, since it can be posited that the effects of different neurotransmitter levels is indirect, and therefore a higher level takes time to indirectly trigger the real changes that result in mood improvement. However some of the other characteristics of antidepressant therapy are far more problematic for bottom up causality. None of the antidepressant medications, although their benefit over placebo is statistically significant, is very far beyond statistical insignificance. Yet the antidepressant family as a whole demonstrates a

much higher benefit over placebo. The result is known to patients as the medication merry-go-round. Since no particular antidepressant has a particularly high chance of working, combined with the significant delay before any assessment of whether it will work or not can be made, patients often have to try a good number of antidepressants, even within the same family (SSRIs for instance) before finding one that is even nominally effective. Even in the case of two antidepressants that are functionally and chemically very similar, in terms of both structure and composition, such as Celexa and Lexapro, the success or failure of one gives very little predictability as to the likelihood of success or failure of the other. Even past success with a given medication has little predictability on success of the same medication during a relapse of depressive symptoms. Given that the neurological effects of these medication is very similar, the lack of any apparent predictability puts deterministic upward causality in a difficult position. The very high correlation downwards, between a given mood and a predictable, progressive lowering of the neurotransmitters while the mood itself remains the same, implies that contingent life events can have a statistically predictable effect on brain function. The praxis of psychology provides an even stronger example of downwards causality in the form of neurogenic illnesses. Neurogenic illnesses are, according to nearly every major psychological model, precipitated by entirely contingent life events and their effect on the individuals psychological state. While single life events do not predict the likelihood of neurogenic pathology, the combination of the effect of past life events combined with the current event is generally considered the basic trigger for this type of pathology. Yet the past life events were themselves entirely contingent, and registered in the system of mental genera, rather than physiological genera. In any response to stimuli, the individuals neurology responds in a predictable fashion, yet the psychological results of the same stimuli range from a significant pathological reaction to no reaction whatsoever. While obviously the individuals neurology is registered in some way by the system at the higher level of systemic genera, the individual may respond psychologically or not, we are fully capable of completely ignoring the demands of our neurology or responding to them. Neurological demand-functions do not simply go away if ignored. The study of dreams demonstrates amply that precisely those demand-functions of

both neurology and subcomponents of psychology, when ignored at the functional level while awake, are satisfied in a manner that doesnt generally affect daily life through the dream function. Neurogenic illnesses, however, often manifest in a block of the demand-function resulting in an inability of the demand-function stimulating the appropriate contingent psychological function, and instead attach themselves incongruously to a completely different psychological function. In itself this simultaneously doesnt predictably result in pathology, pathology simply becomes a possible result, pathology is dependent on the nature of the contingent life events that are both blocked from being stimulated, and the nature of the contingent function the demand function in fact does stimulate. Since these are necessarily contingent phenomena that originate in psychological, and not neurological events, the predictability of the presence or nature of the psychological effect is effectively zero. The basic insight of Darwin, in terms of the totality of nature, dealt a significant blow to 19th century mechanistic determinism, since the environment is never a given but is produced precisely by the historical development of different species and variations within given species. Yet, since the abandonment of biological determinism is ideologically unacceptable to conservative biologists, neo-Darwinism abandons the fundamental insight of Darwin himself in favour of a genetically deterministic model proven by numerous researchers with weaker ideological biases to be unsound. Similarly, while the insights of Freud and his successors dealt a similar blow to psychological determinism, confirmed by the results of biological psychiatric interventions, the development, abandonment and redevelopment of similarly bottom-up pseudo-sciences such as socio-biology, evolutionary psychology and neuro-psychology demonstrates the power of ideology to predetermine what factors researchers view as relevant phenomena and what are a priori ignored as a result of undemonstrated preconceptions and presumptions of those researchers. Ironically, a proportion of this bias among biologists arises from a physics envy common to biologists. That very envy is itself predicated on an understanding of physics, common still among non-physicists, that physics function on invariant deterministic laws. While this was the view of Laplace and others in the 19th century, newer developments

in physics have demonstrated it as a false and simplistic notion. Within the standard model of modern physics, although a succession of more basic particles have been posited as the basis of material reality, the particular behavior of these (possibly only symbolic) particles is determined not from their own constitution but by the systems they compose, and even this top down causality is only statistically predictable, there is always an empirical residue of random results. That these particles are symbolic is demonstrable by the intentionally contradictory imagery used to describe them, where an unknown property is given the name spin, and then different spins are distinguished by arbitrary colors. Spin, aside from being an unobservable and completely arbitrary distinction, has nothing to do with color in any obvious sense, and on that level of posited reality there is no mechanism by which color could arise in the first place. The ideologue who has taken material reductionist to its furthest point is the Oxford theorist Cian Dorr, whose mereological nihilism only accepts unverifiable metaphors (unobservable and therefore not directly verifiable base particles) as the only acceptable real things. Aside from the obviously ridiculous notion that systems as complex yet in a general sense meaningful and predictable, such as the complex interactions that maintain a relatively stable overall biological system to the complex interactions that in a general sense give a meaningful statistically predictable set of interactions in a given human city, are all caused by chance interactions on the subatomic level, Dorrs nihilism fails on a personal level, since actually behaving in accord with his anti- ontology would result in an incapability to function at all, much less maintain a professorship at a university. On a purely logical level it also fails, since as an extreme reductionism, like all other reductionisms an arbitrary point is posited as the really real, in Dorrs case base particles that still exhibit features that on an observable scale are regarded as material. From a fully reductionist standpoint theres no reason not to go further in the standard model to those constituents, posited as the most fundamental basis of material reality, that themselves do not feature material properties that are functionally relevant only at a human scale. These include properties such as mass, response to field effects, and participation in the statistical predictability of physics itself. However from an ideological standpoint it makes perfect sense to stop at a level that can be metaphorically

foisted on others as an image of the reality they experience daily in a common sense manner. Its further failure arises from the reality that the existence of such particles, itself not demonstrable by direct observation, is only indirectly demonstrated by the behavior of higher genera of systems, the existence of which is precisely the idea Dorr is at such pains to invalidate. Similar reductionist stopping points include the genes of Dawkins, which is a self-defeating idea, since aside from the impossibility of determining the nature of a gene from its perspective, the notion of it as a gene in the first place, and not a merely random molecule, implies its telos as a precursor to a given organism, and originates in human beings incapacity to understand non-human realities other than as precursors to themselves i.e. for each human individual, they personally are the telos of history, whether that history is personal, societal or biological. Hegels determination of himself as the end of history was not an accidental case of personal egoism, but to Hegel himself was a necessary and universal posit of every human being. Dawkins feeble response to the critique of Richard Lewontin (a recognized geneticist who has actually demonstrated valid original work in the field, and is professor emeritus of zoology and genetics at Harvard not a PR person for Oxford) firstly conflates reduction as first described by Aristotle as a valid part of the scientists methodological arsenal, with reductionism as a belief-system supported by a further belief-system of conservative ideology, and undoes itself completely in the claim that Lewontin is incomprehensible, which is demonstrably fallacious since in fact numerous people understand Lewontin perfectly well. Dawkins personal insincerity is made fully obvious by his demonstration of the claim that Lewontin is incomprehensible by quoting half a sentence from Lewontins critique. Obviously not many sentences half quoted are meaningfully comprehensible, but as well the sentence in question, read in full, is in fact the core of Lewontins critique that Dawkins faulty methodology is due to ideologically motivated personal bias.