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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration Headquarters (FAA HQ) Type of event: Interview with Sharon Battle Date: Thursday, March 25, 2004 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Team Number: 8 Location: FAA HQ, 10th Floor, Washington, D.C. Participants - Non-Commission: David Weeguard, FAA Legal Counsel Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Dana Hyde, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details. September 11, 2001 (9/11): Battle began her shift at 7:00 AM. Jessie McCee called and informed her of the initial report of a possible hijacking. She reported to the Washington Operations Center (WOC) and McCee briefed her on the information he received from the FAA Northeast Regional office, which had received the information from Boston En Route Center (ZBW). McGee had already contacted the Civil Aviation Intelligence (ACI) watch. There were two staff members on duty, and they began fielding incoming calls at the same time as they began fulfilling their functions and notifications. They used a checklist of notification that they had developed with the ACI and Civil Aviation Security (ACS) office in conjunction with the FAA Crisis Management Handbook. Battle took the responsibility of fielding incoming calls and McGee fulfilled the checklist of notification obligations. Regarding notification calls, one of their customers is the action office, another is executives. Action officers need to receive as much information as possible, whereas executives receive the basic facts. Battle commented that after United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175) crashed into the south World Trade Center tower [9:03AM (approx.)], since their information is considered preliminary and subject to change by their customers, they would have integrated the CNN reports of the event into their notifications. Battle received direction from either FAA Security or from "Wickert" with ACI Watch to activate the Primary Net. To set the net, they had to physically push a button on the phone to activate its participation in the primary net - which is what Battle did in Commission Sensitive

Commission Sensitive anticipation of it being established. After this step was taken, they used the PC based conferencing system to speed dial the appropriate agencies. This was done from the WOC counsel. Once online with an agency, they identified themselves as the WOC, passed basic information regarding the crisis, and asked the agency to stand-by to be placed on the FAA Primary net. Battle believes that she may have joined McCee in the notification process. They would only notify a different agency than those that are on the pre-set priority on the list if directed so by the ACS. Battle believes that at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) line connects to a watch officer, and then they brief the senior watch officer. When notifying the White House, they brief whoever is in the White House situation room. When notifying the FBI, there is a brief of the watch officer and then "another" personnel. The chronologies and check lists from this notification activity were placed in a folder that would have been left in the WOC area as part of the office records, and this material, their running checklists, would have been incorporated into the FAA chronology. They have a speaker in the WOC through which they monitored the conference, and the process by which it was built. The FAA chronology indicates the Primary Net was activated at 9:20AM - when the request is made for it to be activated - but it does not indicate when the appropriate agencies were present on the net. The WOC staff monitors the net for technical problems - of which Battle does not believe there were any on 9/11. They had no unusual difficulty contacting all the personnel who needed to be on the net. The Tactical Net is also established through the WOC but not in the same way as the Primary Net. The Regions contact their own wanted participants, and then they dial into the WOC, Security then decides if they can be added to the Tactical Net. They also fielded calls from the public and the press for current information. Battle noted that the Administrator, Deputy, Air Traffic Executives, and Security Executives were all participants in the SVT (Secure Video Teleconference). She believes Abril Flynn from security may have monitored the SVT. Battle disagrees with Lee Longmire's assertion that the NMCC and FBI were not on the primary net. She informed Commission staff that she remembers them being on the net. Battle does not know if Herndon Command Center was added to the net, but she believes it likely. Battle believes that the air traffic personnel went to another region, possibly Eastern Region, to build the Cannoles Traffic Teleconference.

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