THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."[2] Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration. Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus: "WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent. "Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.

"SO ORDERED."
The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: "It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F). "Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. "They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts. "After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single. "After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. "All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house. "On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153). "Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver. "At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong. "In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100). "The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not. "The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise: "Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such noncomplied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4] Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues: "I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation. II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration ofpsychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations

of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests. In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows: "1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state. xxxxxxxxx 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to

cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. xxxxxxxxx (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10] The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated. We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part.There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.[12]At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation inMolina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent. QUISUMBING, J.: For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family Code. On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their in-laws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.5 On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7 A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date. On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity

under Article 36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness. Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children. 10 Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.11 On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code, disposing thus: "WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be null and void. The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage this declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory . SO ORDERED." On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13

"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage. In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code. These findings of facts are uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family members are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not common in marriage. Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist only in name. WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED" The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14 On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing thus: "Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.

Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)." 16 Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were proven by preponderance of evidence during trial. At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice. Article 36 of the Family Code provides "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis ofa priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.18 In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code: "(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code20as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code21 in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095."22 Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered. In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals of the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein that "Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra. )"24 WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

THIRD DIVISION

LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 173614 Present: YNARESSANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIAMARTINEZ, CHICONAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ.

versus -

HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.

Promulgated: September 28, 2007 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order,[1] dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order,[2] dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for

declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.[3] They begot seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.[4] On 1 May 2004,Trinidad died.[5] On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.[6] Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.[7] In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34[8] of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible. In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,[9] granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,[10] dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:

The Complaint should be dismissed. 1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)[11] that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and void.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)

The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads: WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. [13]

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order[14] dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,[15] which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living.[16] Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus: The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Nial vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme

Court has rejected the case of Nial vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties. It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court. If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the parent. For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable.[17]

Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states: In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.[18]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein.[19] Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar. At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts. We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court. [20] Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.[21] However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.[22] Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law. Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death. We grant the Petition. In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[23] What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit: Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriagesunder the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.[24] Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. (a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz: 1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a] Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional

right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS,

G.R. No. 162368

Petitioner, Present: Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ. BRIX FERRARIS, Respondent. Promulgated:

- versus -

July 17, 2006 x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 andFebruary 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.

On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision[1] denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners

marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order[2] dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed [3] in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his defects were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.[4] The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayans testimony failed to establish the substance of respondents psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondents character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations.[5] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied[6] for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error. Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. [7] The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment[8] but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioners motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.

After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.[9] Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. [10] It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,[11] save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,[12] which are unavailing in the instant case.

The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[13] As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[14] It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained,[15] which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:

Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondents psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.

Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioners evidence showed that respondents alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couples relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioners own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting respondents fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioners lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x. xxxx At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called schizoid, and why he is the dependent and avoidant type. In fact, Dr. Dayans statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayans information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder can be part of his family upbringing x x x. She stated that there was a history of respondents parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondents parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was

really a natal or supervening disabling factor on th e part of respondent, or an adverse integral element in respondents character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondents supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.[16] We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-thehouse attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[17] where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness. Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[18] that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. While petitioners marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.[19] No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity

of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to beprotected by the state.[20] Thus, in determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,[21] 37,[22] 38,[23] and 41[24] that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45[25] that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.[26] Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. [27] Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.[28] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more. The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court. Antecedent Facts Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later. On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit: (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11 (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12 (3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13 (4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15 (5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18 (6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20 (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21 In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23 In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She presented her version, thus: (1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25 (2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26 (3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27 (4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28 (5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. 29 (6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts.30 (7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32 In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34 In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35 After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established. Ac cording to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39 Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding th at respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity. In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43 Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36. This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance. Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36 Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage. The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51 Marriages

with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58 Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61 There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65 The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he

was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68 It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70 We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71 Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72 The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as

well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76 Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage. But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only

constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages illequipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition. Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full: 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its

incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate

tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77 Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case. As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines. We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80 As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81 These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows: WITNESS: Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage? A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage? xxx ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioners

officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness? A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy. Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage? A- Yes, Maam.83 The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84 These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses. Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise: To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In

persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87 Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage. Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable. It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence. At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between

misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36. Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent. In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced: The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows. The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its

deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94 Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court. Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95 Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable. From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable. But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point. The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101 This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that required a m edical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence. We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level. We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral

requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted. All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court. There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Carlos vs Sandoval 19112010 Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilos d eath, two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him. HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment

on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application. Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage? True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008] RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, G.R. No. 173294 Petitioner, vs. MA. LOURDES A. BIER and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION CORONA, J.: This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the March 20, 2006 decision[2] and July 3, 2006 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 66952. Petitioner Renne Enrique E. Bier met respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier through his sister. Their courtship, which blossomed as a result of the exchange of long distance calls between them, lasted six months. Back then, petitioner observed respondent to be a very sweet and thoughtful person. This, he said, made him fall in love with her. On July 26, 1992, six months after their first meeting, they were married at the UST Santissimo Rosario Parish Church. Everything went well for the first three years of their marriage. Respondent was everything petitioner could hope for in a wife sweet, loving and caring. She also took good care of the house. As petitioner was based in Saudi Arabia as an electronics technician at Saudia Airlines, the parties decided to maintain two residences, one in the Philippines and another in Saudi Arabia. They took turns shuttling between the two countries just so they could spend time together. The couple started experiencing marital problems after three years of marriage. According to petitioner, respondent ceased to be the person he knew and married. She started becoming aloof towards him and began to spend more time with her friends than with him, refusing even to have sexual relations with him for no apparent reason. She became an alcoholic and a chain-smoker. She also started neglecting her husband's needs and the upkeep of their home, and became an absentee wife. After being gone from their home for days on end, she would return without bothering to account for her absence. As a result, they frequently quarreled. Finally, on April 10, 1997, respondent suddenly left for the United States. Petitioner has not heard from her since. On April 1, 1998, petitioner instituted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89, a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations to petitioner. It was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33993. Per sheriff's return, summons was served through substituted service as personal service proved futile. Respondent, however, did not file an answer. Thereafter, the RTC ordered Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua to investigate if there was collusion between the parties and to intervene for the State to see to it that evidence was not fabricated. Assistant City Prosecutor Paragua manifested that, since both parties failed to appear before him, he was unable to make a ruling on the issue of collusion and determine if the evidence was fabricated.

After petitioner filed his pre-trial brief, Prosecutor Paragua filed a second manifestation stating that petitioner had appeared before him and that, after investigation, he was convinced that there was no collusion between the parties and that the evidence was not fabricated. At pre-trial, only petitioner appeared. As respondent failed to attend the same, the RTC declared her to have waived the pre-trial. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Again, respondent did not take part in the proceedings. Petitioner filed a written offer of exhibits which was admitted by the trial court. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a certification and manifested its disfavor towards declaring the marriage null and void. It argued that no persuasive evidence was presented warranting the grant of the petition, specially since petitioner failed to comply with the guidelines laid down in Republic v. CA and Molina[4] (Molina). After trial, the trial court rendered judgment[5] granting the petition: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID, based upon the respondent's psychological incapacity, the marriage contracted on July 26, 1992 between Renne Enrique E. Bier and Ma. Lourdes A. Bier. As such, their property relations shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. Henceforth, their property relations shall be governed by the regime of complete separation of property. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General, National Census and Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, ordering them to attach a copy of this Decision to the Marriage Contract of herein petitioner and respondent on file with respective office. With costs against the respondent. SO ORDERED. Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, appealed the decision of the RTC to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66952. The CA held that petitioner failed to comply with the guidelines laid down in Molina as the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was not medically or clinically identified. Worse, the same was not even alleged in the petition filed in the court a quo. As such, it granted the appeal and reversed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision[6] read: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 06 March 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q98-33993, which declared as void the marriage between appellee and respondent, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Renne Enrique E. Bier and respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Bier remains valid and subsisting. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA decision. The same was denied. Hence, this recourse. Petitioner contends that the guidelines enunciated in Molina, specifically its directive that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained, and that it must be proven to be existing at the inception of the marriage, need not be strictly complied with as Molina itself stated the guidelines were merely handed down for the guidance of the bench and bar and were not meant to be a checklist of requirements in deciding cases involving psychological incapacity. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the Molina doctrine should be applied, the RTC erred in ruling that he failed to comply therewith. The petition must fail. Preliminarily, we must pass upon petitioners argument that the finding of the trial court on the existence or non-existence of psychological incapacity is final and binding on us absent any showing that its factual findings and evaluation of the evidence were clearly and manifestly erroneous.[7] Petitioners position is of course the general rule. In the instant case, however, it is the exception to the general rule which must be applied; the court a quo clearly erred in granting the petition. It stated in the body of its decision that: While this Court agrees with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that the juridical antecedence of the psychological disorder and its root cause were not established, the same will not serve as a hindrance for the Court to declare that respondent is indeed suffering from a psychological incapacity. The failure of the Psychological Report to identify the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity is not a fatal flaw that will prevent the Court from declaring a marriage a nullity based on psychological incapacity. (Emphasis supplied) The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that this Court has been consistent in holding that if a petition for nullity based on psychological incapacity is to be given due course, its gravity, root cause, incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage must always be proved.[8] As early as Santos v. CA, et al.,[9] we already held that: [P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. xxx This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx (Emphasis supplied) These must be strictly complied with as the granting of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give

meaning and significance to the marriage.[10] This is specially so since the Family Code does not define psychological incapacity. The determination thereof is left solely to the discretion of the courts and must be made on a case-to-case basis.[11] Also, even if Molina was never meant to be a checklist of the requirements in deciding cases involving Article 36 (psychological incapacity) of the Family Code, a showing of the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the party's psychological incapacity and its existence at the inception of the marriage cannot be dispensed with. In Marcos v. Marcos (Marcos),[12] a case cited by petitioner to support his argument that the totality of evidence presented was enough to prove the existence of respondent's psychological incapacity, this Court reiterated that: The [Molina] guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. xxx xxx xxx [t]he totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. (Emphasis supplied) Furthermore, the 2005 case of Republic v. Iyoy [13] held that even if Marcos (2000) relaxed the rules such that the personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the totality of evidence must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity. Failure in this regard will spell the failure of the petition. From the foregoing, one can conclude that petitioner's insistence that Marcoseffectively overturned the need to present evidence on the aforesaid requirements has no merit. Thus, unless the law itself or the Court provides otherwise, these requirements must be established before a petition for nullity of the marriage based on psychological incapacity can be granted. We hold that the trial court's decision to declare the parties' marriage void ab initio by reason of respondent's psychological incapacity was clearly and manifestly erroneous as it overlooked the need to show the gravity, root cause and incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity and that it was already present at the inception of the marriage.

Be that as it may, the main question that begs to be answered in the instant case is whether the totality of the evidence presented was enough to establish that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. We rule in the negative. Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent.[14]He failed to discharge it. The evidence for petitioner consisted of his own testimony and that of his brother, Roderico Bier. He also presented as evidence a psychological report written by Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist, who also testified on the matters contained therein. Dr. Tayag's report, which found respondent to be suffering from psychological incapacity, particularly a narcissistic personality disorder, relied only on the information fed by petitioner. This was admitted by petitioner in his petition for review on certiorari and memorandum filed in this Court. In both instances, petitioner reasoned out that the personal examination of respondent was impossible as her whereabouts were unknown despite diligent efforts on his part to find her. Consequently, Dr. Tayag's report was really hearsay evidence since she had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Her testimony should have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.[15] Furthermore, as already stated, the report also failed to identify the root cause of respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. It merely concluded that: This extremely egocentric attitude manifest a person suffering Narcissistic Personality Disorder that is considered to be severe, incurable and deeply rooted with her functioning. Thus, making herself psychologically incapacitated so as to comply with the essential marital functions. Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist (as a condition sine qua non), there is nevertheless still a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder.[16] In the case at bar, petitioner was able to establish that respondent was remiss in her duties as a wife and had become a happy-go-lucky woman who failed to attend to her husband's needs and who eventually abandoned him. However, the totality of her acts, as testified to by petitioner and his brother, was not tantamount to a psychological incapacity, as petitioner would have us believe. Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or refusal to meet one's duties and responsibilities as a married person and eventual abandonment of a spouse do not suffice to nullify a marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be due to some psychological (as opposed to physical) illness.[17]

The undeniable fact is that the marriage, according to petitioner's own evidence, was off to a good start. According to him, respondent used to be a sweet, loving and caring wife who took good care of him and their home. She even willingly consented to the difficult living arrangement of taking turns in going back and forth between the Philippines and Saudi Arabia just so they could be together. Perhaps it was this unusual arrangement which took a heavy toll on their relationship. They barely saw and spent time with each other. Respondent could have gotten used to petitioners absence. And although absence can indeed make the heart grow fonder, the opposite can just as well be true: out of sight, out of mind. The couple drifted apart and respondent obviously fell out of love with petitioner. Nevertheless, we agree with the CA that the change in respondent's feelings towards petitioner could hardly be described as a psychological illness. It was not enough that respondent, the party adverted to as psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations, had difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated her from complying with her essential marital obligations,[18] had to be shown. This petitioner failed to do. Consequently, we are unconvinced that respondent's condition was rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating disorder. Even if we assume the correctness of petitioner's contention that the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, there is still no reason to disavow the same as the facts and circumstances in this case do not warrant a deviation therefrom. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The March 20, 2006 decision and July 3, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66952 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 165424

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CORONA, - versus VELASCO, JR.,* LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and PERALTA,** JJ.

CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.

Promulgated: June 9, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION CORONA, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004 resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), PasigCity, Branch 158.

He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and

wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake.

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void.[3]

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.

The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.

Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We grant the motion for reconsideration.

In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,[4] this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.

Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.[5]

In this case, the testimony[6] of petitioners expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent personality disorder. Thus:

Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted, can you briefly tell this court your findings [and] conclusions?

A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed personality disorder from self-defeating personality disorder to[dependent] personality disorder and this is brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir.

Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological incapacity to handle the essential obligations of marriage?

A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was a very impulsive decision. I dont think he understood what it meant to really be married and after the marriage, there was no consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three months he refused to see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death, and he never thought it was a really serious matter at all.

xx xx xx

Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent suffered from a grave lack of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this? A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone. [It was] just a spur of the moment decision that they should get married xx xx I dont think they truly considered themselves married.

xx xx xx

Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude xx xx that petitioner and respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?

A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never consummated the marriage. During the very short relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment.

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder[7] as

[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.

In her psychological report,[8] Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions.[9] Petitioners mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek

legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real.[10]

Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in a selfdenigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him.[11] This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father who treated his family like robots[12] and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father.[13] When petitioner could no longer take respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage.[14]

Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit:[15]

Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?

A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysf unctional. The father was very abusive, very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the children never had affirmation. They might [have been] x x x given financial support because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact family. x x x The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature and somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it] meant to have a real family life.

Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent.[16]

It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[17] Particularly, personality disorders are long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others.[18]

From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, the

motion

for

reconsideration

is

hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court and theJanuary 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.