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Calalang vs. Williams G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940 Petitioner: Maximo Calalang Respondents: A.D.

Williams Facts: Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal -drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30A m t o 1 2 : 3 0 p m a n d f r o m 1 : 3 0 p m t o 5 3 0 p m ; a n d a l o n g R i z a l A v e n u e e x t e n d i n g f r o m t h e railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one yearfrom the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to theDirector of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of them e a s u r e p r o p o s e d i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n a f o r e m e n t i o n e d i n p u r s u a n c e o f t h e provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from theSecretary of the Public Works and Communication to promul gate rules a n d r e g u l a t i o n s t o regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.O n A u g u s t 2 , 1 9 4 0 , t h e D i r e c t o r r e c o m m e n d e d t o t h e S e c r e t a r y t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission withmodifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10, 1940.The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and causedto be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal -drawn vehicles are notallowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. Issue: 1.Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondentspursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridgedthe right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? 2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon theconstitutional precept regardi ng the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people? Held: 1.No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoidobstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. Inenacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relievecongestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare liesa t t h e b o t t o m o f t h e p r o m u l g a t i o n o f t h e s a i d l a w a n d t h e s t a t e i n o r d e r t o p r o m o t e t h e g e n e r a l w e l f a r e m a y i n t e r f e r e w i t h p e r s o n a l liberty, with property, and with business and occupations . Persons andproperty may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to securethe general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty isa blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving. 2.N o . S o c i a l j u s t i c e m e a n s t h e p r o m o t i o n o f t h e w e l f a r e o f a l l t h e p e o p l e , t h e adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l e q u i l i b r i u m i n t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s o f t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existenceof all governments on the time-honored principles of s a l u s p o p u l i e s t suprema lex. Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of thep r o t e c t i o n t h a t s h o u l d b e e q u a l l y a n d e v e n l y e x t e n d e d t o a l l g r o u p s a s a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamentaland paramount objective of the

state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation should be the fair and current market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the decree, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be considered. In this case, the tax declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the declaration of martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case. Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation. Moday vs Court of Appeals On June 24, 2011 Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Disapproval by SP of SB Resolution

Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

Moday vs CA Date: February 20, 1997 Petitioners: Percival Moday, Zotico Moday and Leonora Moday Respondents: CA, Judge Evangelista Yuipco, and Municipality of Bunawan Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passedResolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by PercivalModay for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." TheResolution was approved by Mayor Anuncio Bustillo and was transmitted to the SangguniangPanlalawigan for its approval. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with thecomment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots inBunawan for the establishment of the government center." The municipality filed a petition for eminent domain against Percival Moday before theRTC. The municipality then filed a motion to take or enter upon the possession of the land upondeposit with the municipal treasurer of the required amount. The RTC granted the motion. Itruled that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves iteffective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review theordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg.337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the actsenumerated in Section 19 requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA held that thepublic purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid,expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. Meanwhile, the Municipality had erectedthree buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, theMunicipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which ismade of concrete.In the instant petition for review, petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision andresolution of the CA and a declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawanis null and void. Issue:WON a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolutionwhich was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. H e l d : Y e s Ratio: Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instantcase, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's rightto appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use orpurpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may bevalidly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there mustbe just compensation. The Municipality's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it isexpressly provided for BP 337, the local Government Code in force at the time expropriationproceedings were initiated. What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipalityto exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's

disapproval of Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm actionwhich does not render said resolution null and void. The law, Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grantsthe Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the soleground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue

U.S. v. Pompeya G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915

FACTS: This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance. Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the complaint do not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens. The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said law W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights therein guaranteed HELD: Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill? The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same. The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any governmental entity connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the maintenance of peace and good government? In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the feudal system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community. The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby. Is there a cause of action?

The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in the law. "For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered."

G.R. No. L-10255 August 6, 1915THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SILVESTRE POMPEYA, defendant-appellee FACTS: A Municipal Ordinance was enacted by the Province of Iloilo pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in themaintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the existence of such persons inthe locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same. A complaint was filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo against Pompeya with violation of the said ordinance for failing to renderservice on patrol duty required under the same defendant argued that the municipal ordinance alleged to be violated is unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, whichguarantees the liberty of the citizens I S S U E : whether or not the ordinance upon which said complaint was based is constitutional. HELD: Yes The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and the stat e was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of said Act are constitutional andnot in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby Police power has been defined as the power of the government, inherent in every sovereign, and cannot be limited. Thepower vested in the legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to be for the good of the state and its subjects. The power togovern men and things, extending to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protectionof all property within the state. The authority to establish such rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons as may be conducive to the public interest. Blackstone, in his valuable commentaries on the common laws, defines police power as "the defenses, regulations, anddomestic order of the country, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conformtheir general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, andinoffensive in their respective stations." The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole system of internal regulation, by which the state seeks n ot onlyto preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state, but also to establish, for the intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rulesof good manners and good neighborhood, which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to in sure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent, with a like enjoyment of the rights of others. The police power of the state includesnot only the public health and safety, but also the public welfare, protection against impositions, and generally the public's best best interest.It so extensive and all pervading, that the courts refuse to lay down a general rule defining it, but decide each specific case on its merits It will also be noted that the law authorizing the president of the municipality to call upon persons, imposes certain conditions as prerequisites: (1) Theperson called upon to render such services must be an able-bodied male resident of the municipality; (2) he must be between the ages of 18 and 55[50], and (3) certain conditions must exist requiring the services of such persons It will not contended that a nonresident of the municipality would be liable for his refusal to obey the call of the preside nt; neither can it belogically contended that one under the age of 18 or over the age of 55 [50] would incur the penalty of the law by his refusal to obey thecommand of the president. Moreover, the persons liable for the service mentioned in the law cannot

be called upon at the mere whim orcaprice of the president. There must be some just and reasonable ground, at least sufficient in the mind of a reasonable man, before thepresident can call upon the the persons for the service mentioned in the law. The law does not apply to all persons. The law does not applyto every condition. The law applies to special persons and special conditions A complaint based upon such a law, in order to be free from objection under a demurrer, must show that the person charged belongs to theclass of persons to which the law is applicable Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in the present case, the court would be unable to impose the punishment provided for by law, becauseit does not show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18years of age nor over 55 [50]; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for the servicesmentioned in the law

Ichong vs Hernandez Case Digest LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents. G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident,s corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws and due process? HELD: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violate the equal protection of laws and due process. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens

retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. DUE PROCESS The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ 101 PHIL 155 Facts: The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes theretail trade business, Republic Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate theRetail Business, prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in ourcountry.Petitioner, for an d in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents,corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA No.1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act isunconstitutional. Issue: Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, theUN Declaration of Human Rights and the PhilippineChinese Treaty of Amity.

Held: The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rightsand freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights containsnothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals upon the sameterms as the nationals of any other country. But the nationals of China are notdiscriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are allprohibited from engaging in the retail trade.But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty isalways subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the samemay never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOROF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, MetroManila, Branch 172, respondents. The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it asmany times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on thebasis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, MetroManila, to compel his admission to the test. After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring thechallenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that thepetitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitraryexercise of the police power RULING: There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat thatthe power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguishedfrom those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the meansemployed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to beaccomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of alawful subject and a lawful method.The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power.It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medicalprofession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the

YNOT vs IAC Case Digest RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents. FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A which provides that the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional due misapplication of police power, violation of due process, and undue delegation of legislative power? HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that there is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. This measure deprives the individual due process as granted by the Constitution. The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional. YNOT VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT QuickGuide: Petitioner assails constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. E.O. No. 626-A was held unconstitutional for violating the due process clause. Facts: - 13Jan1984: Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac for violating Executive Order No. 626-A - Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported in violation of E.O. 626-A shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the govt, to be distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection may see fit (carabeef) and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit (carabao). This amended E.O. 626; the latter prohibiting only the slaughter of carabaos of age. - Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of replevin after petitioner filed supersedeas bong of P12,000.00 - Trial Court (TC): confiscation of carabaossustained; ordered confiscation of the bond; declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack of authority and its presumed validity - Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC upheld the TC. Petitioners arguments: 1. E.O. is unconstitutional. It authorizes outright confiscation of carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. 2. Penalty is invalid. It is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. 3. Improper exercise of legislative power by the former President. Issue/s: - WON EO 626-A is constitutional.

Ruling: - EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional. CA decision reversed. Supersedeas bond cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to petitioner. Ratio: On the power of courts to decide on constitutional matters - Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by lower courts subject to review of the Supreme Court. ..while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to the review of the highest tribunal. - Sec. 5[2(a)] Art VIII, 1987 Constitution. On the presumption of constitutionality - Not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted On due process - Provisions of the charter are to be cats in precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. - Clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient; flexibility - MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: a) notice and b) hearing intended as safeguard against official arbitrariness. On the power used by President Marcos in promulgating EO 626-A - The challenged measure is denominated as an EO but it is actually a PD issued by Pres. Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. - But it was not shown that there is sufficient exigencies to exercise the extraordinary power Police power as used by the government to justify E.O. 626-A - Test: 1. Compelling state interest 2. Lawful method (as used in the case, but this is the same with the fit between means and objective test) - 1 = present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs. - Failed to comply with #2; there is no reasonable connection between conservation of carabaos (not having them slaughtered) and the means: non-transportation of carabaos. ZOILA DE CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. ENRIQUE ZOBEL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. [G.R. No. L-28610. January 17, 1974.] BARTOLOME DIMAALA, RUFO GARCIA, PAULINO ESGUERRA, FERNANDO VEROYA, WILSON ZAPATERO, RUFINO ZAPATERO, ALMARIO ALAB, ROMAN BEROYA, and ROMANA VIZCONDE, petitioners, vs. ENRIQUE ZOBEL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. DECISION FERNANDO, J p: These two petitions for the review of a joint decision of respondent Court of Appeals, sustaining the right of respondentlandholder, Enrique Zobel to eject petitioner-tenants and thus reversing a judgment in their favor by the Court of Agrarian 2 Relations, present the crucial issue of how far this Tribunal is bound by the cardinal policy set forth in a presidential decree that ordains the emancipation of tenants and confers on them ownership of the lands they till, upheld as part of the law of the 3 land under the Revised Constitution. This too, in the face of its avowed primordial objective: "The State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals 4 enunciated in this Constitution." As thus posed, its resolution is rather obvious. We cannot sustain respondent Court of Appeals.
1

Private respondent Zobel, as the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Calatagan, Batangas, known as Hacienda Bigaa, with an aggregate area of more than five hundred hectares, sought to eject petitioners, his tenants tilling lands in a portion thereof, relying on the provision of Republic Act No. 1199, which would justify such a move where the land is suited for 5 mechanization. Petitioners, as tenants, vigorously objected to such petition not only on the ground that the small areas they are occupying were not suited for mechanization, but likewise on the allegation that the true intention of respondent as landholder was to utilize the same for pasture and for the raising of sorghum. The Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the petition for ejectment, doubting such an intent to mechanize and at the same time holding that mechanization during the rainy season of the year was not practicable. The matter was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals, which reversed the Court of Agrarian Relations and granted such petition for ejectment. Hence this petition for review. There is no question as to the tenancy relationship as well as to the areas occupied by petitioners as tenants. For the decision of the Court of Appeals now sought to be reviewed did clearly specify: "At the hearing of these cases on July 15, 1963, the litigants, through their counsels, entered into the following stipulation of facts: 1. That the relation of landholder and tenant between the petitioner and the respondents is admitted; 2. That the respective area cultivated by each of the respondents is as indicated . . . as follows: Bartolome Dimaala 1 lot with an approximate area of 1.1440 hectare; Rufo Garcia area of lot is more or less one (1) hectare; Paulino Esguerra two (2) lots with an aggregate area of about two (2) hectares; Fernando Veroya one (1) lot with an area of about 1/2 hectare; Wilson Zapatero one (1) lot with an area of about less than 1-1/2 hectares; Rufino Zapatero one (1) lot with an area of about one (1) hectare; Almario Alab three (3) lots with an area of about 3 hectares; Roman Veroya one (1) lot of about 1/2 hectare; Romana Vizconde one (1) lot with an area of about 1/2 6 hectare; and Zoila de Chavez four (4) lots with an aggregate area of about 6 hectares." That is why, as set forth at the outset, the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and 7 transferring to them the ownership of the land they till and providing the instruments and mechanism therefor is unavoidable. Hence, again, as was made mention of at the outset, the decision of the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. 1. The tenancy problem in the Philippines is of ancient vintage. The opinion of Justice Tuason in the leading 8 case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration made reference to the concern shown by our great patriot and hero, Jose Rizal, one arising from first-hand knowledge and the bitter personal experience of his family. As was so vividly 9 expressed by Justice Labrador, speaking for this Court, in De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian Relations: "The history of land tenancy, especially in Central Luzon, is a dark spot in the social life and history of the people. It was among the tenants of Central Luzon that the late Pedro Abad Santos, acting as a saviour of the tenant class, which for generations has been relegated to a life of bondage, with out hope of salvation or improvement, enunciated a form of socialism as a remedy for the pitiful condition of the tenants forming the PKM organization of tenants and, during the war, the Hukbalahap, rose in arms against the constituted authority as their only salvation from permanent thralldom. According to statistics, whereas at the beginning of the century we had only 19% of the people belonging to the tenant 10 class, after 60 years, the prevailing percentage has reached 39%." Such situation calls to mind this apt observation of Laski, "of the normal life of the poor, their perpetual fear of the morrow, their haunting sense of impending disaster, 11 their fitful search for a beauty which perpetually eludes." The 1935 delegates to the Constitutional Convention were not unaware of the gravity of the problem. Under the Commonwealth and under the Republic therefore, the 12 appropriate legislation was enacted. Progress in the solution of this serious social malady, while considerable, did not supply the necessary corrective. On this vital policy question, one of the utmost concern, the need for what for some is a radical solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root, was apparent. Presidential Decree No. 27 was thus conceived. It was issued in October of 1972. The very next month, the 1971 Constitutional Convention voiced its overwhelming approval. There is no doubt 13 then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of 14 the law of the land according to the revised Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy goals.

2. With the disposition of these petitions for review thus so clearly indicated by the controlling constitutional provisions, a discussion of the errors assigned by petitioners would be fruitless. Nonetheless, insofar as they would stress the basic doctrine that the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, supported by substantial evidence, is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate tribunal, it is undeniable that such a submission is supported and buttressed by a 15 host of our decisions dating back to 1958. WHEREFORE, the joint decision in these two petitions of respondent Court of Appeals of November 23, 1967 is reversed and set aside, and the joint decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations of October 1, 1964 dismissing the actions filed by respondent Enrique Zobel is reinstated and given full force and effect. Costs against respondent Enrique Zobel. Zaldivar and Aquino, JJ ., concur. Chavez vs. COMELEC , GR 162777, Aug 31, 2004 Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520. He claims that said section in the nature of an ex post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. ISSUE: Is Sec. 32 of COMELEC Res. No. 6520 in the nature of an ex post facto law? HELD: NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of "propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office." Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case. Chavez vs. COMELEC , GR 162777, Aug 31, 2004 Facts: Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No.6520. He claims that said section in the nature of an ex postfacto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailedprovision makes an individual criminally liable for an electionoffense for not removing such advertisement, even if at thetime the said advertisement was exhibited, the same wasclearly legal. HELD: NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines anoffense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of thisnature must operate prospectively, except when they arefavorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, thatthe offense defined in the assailed provision is not the puttingup of "propaganda materials such as posters, streamers,stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing thepicture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements onprint, in radio or on television showing the image ormentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to theplacement or display thereof becomes a candidate for publicoffice." Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense theentering of contracts for such propaganda materials by anindividual who subsequently becomes a candidate for publicoffice. One definitely does not commit an offense by enteringinto a contract with private parties to use his name and imageto endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidatefor public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in theassailed provision, is the non-removal of the describedpropaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for publicoffice fails to remove such propaganda materials after thegiven period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of theOmnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed,nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shalloperate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto lawin this case.