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Janice Dornbush The Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania A Thesis: Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts May 2008 Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Jennifer Amyx
Abstract: The U.S.-Japan relationship is one of the longest and strongest such security relationships in the world. The majority of US forces in Asia are located in Japan and the majority of those forces are located on Okinawa. The U.S. military is currently in the process of working on a plan to move a significant number of U.S. service personnel from Futenma Marine Corps Base in Okinawa, Japan to Guam, USA. This move is unique in that the Japanese government is expected to bear 60% of the cost associated with the Futenma relocation. This move is the result of changing pressures and priorities with the U.S. and Japan. In Japan, the pressure comes from Okinawans, and recognition from the Japanese government of the need, to reduce US military presence on Okinawa. In the U.S., there is a desire for a modernized U.S. basing strategy for the Asia Pacific region. The move is a herculean task, fraught with difficulty and private sector help will be critical in completing this on time and on budget to usher in a new era of U.S.- Japan relations.
Author: Janice Dornbush Janice.Dornbush.firstname.lastname@example.org
Table of Contents 1. 2. 3. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..5 Japan: Understanding Changes that Led to Adoption of this Plan…………………………...7 U.S.: Understanding Dynamics that Led to the Adoption of this Plan .................................. 14 3.1 Decision to Move Troops as Part of U.S. Rebasing Strategy………………………..16 3.2 Why Was Guam Selected? …………………………………………………………..19 The Move: Understanding Funding and Execution to get from Okinawa to Guam…….….25 4.1 Relocation Plans and Cost…………………………………………………………...25 4.2 Funding………………………………………………………………………………26 4.3 Execution…………………………………………………………………………….27 4.3.1 Japan Bank for International Cooperation…………………………………………28 4.3.2 Joint Guam Program Office………………………………………………………..30 4.4 Potential Problems with Funding from Japan………………………………………..32 4.5 Potential Problems with Funding from the U.S. Side………………………………..34 4.6 Logistics……………………………………………………………………………...35 Conclusion: ……………………………………………………………………………...…44 Appendix……………………………………………………………………………………47 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………..50
5. 6. 7.
At the end of World War II, the Allied Powers took control of Japanese military bases and the US stationed its troops in Japan to remove the threat of another rise of Japanese military power, and at the same time protect Japan, who was not allowed to maintain military forces of its own. During the 60 years following, the US/Japanese security relationship has evolved significantly as Japan’s economy grew stronger and the Japanese people pushed for greater independence, and less reliance on American troops. At the same time, the world political hegemony evolved and the US has begun to evaluate how to realign its military forces to be more efficient.
The proposed military buildup on Guam is expected to cost US 10 billion and is intended to facilitate a significant removal of troops from Okinawa, evidences a new kind of security dynamic between the US and Japan in the coming years. The Japanese government has pledged to fund 60% of this cost. Over the past 60 years, Japan paid various costs associated with maintaining U.S. military forces in Japan; by providing infrastructure and outright cash payments, but only to support U.S. military presence on Japanese soil. Until this point, Japan had never directly funded U.S. military base expenditure on non-Japanese soil or paid to relocate U.S. troops out of Japan. This is a key reason why this plan is especially notable; it is the first time for such type of joint economic cooperation between the U.S. and Japan to accomplish shared goals.
Analysts have debated who benefitted the most, Japan or the U.S., from the old model of security cooperation. Japan has hosted the bulk of U.S. troop presence in Asia, both physically and
economically, by providing land and financial support to sustain U.S. troops. At the same time,
Japan has benefitted from the U.S. security alliance that protected Japanese interests so that Japan, would not have to maintain its own military. The U.S. has long had a trusted partner in Japan and in exchange for providing military security for Japan; it has been able project U.S. presence in Asia through its series of relatively sovereign military installations in Japan. This plan to move troops from Okinawa is the most significant change to the face of American military presence in Japan, and Asia. This change reflects the new security dynamic of a more independent Japan and a more independent U.S., which will be important in the coming years.
The paper is organized into several main sections: 1) description of the evolution of Japanese and US priorities regarding troop presence, 2) discussion of the how the plan will be executed with both Japanese and US management and how the private sector Japanese and US companies are involved in the actual buildup and 3) a conclusion that recaps the changes in Japanese and US priorities that have led to this move which reflects a new security partnership between two important actors in the Asia region. After reading this paper, the reader should have the
necessary information to agree that this proposed plan, whether it is successful in achieving its objectives or not, reflects a new type of cooperative arrangement between the U.S. and Japan.
2. JAPAN: Understanding Changes that Led to Adoption of this Plan The current plan to rebase a large number of U.S. troops currently in Japan, to places outside of Japan, results from a series of events that caused the Japanese government to change its priorities for their country regarding U.S. troop presence. In the past ten years, the Japanese citizens on Okinawa have ‘found their voice’ and been successful at getting the attention of the Japanese central government to make changes in regards to the American troop presence which also alters the dynamic of U.S. Japan security cooperation. Over the years, the U.S. troop presence in Japan has been managed by the Japanese central government and largely concentrated on the island of Okinawa. After nearly 60 years of U.S. troop presence in Japan, the Japanese government is in the process of making some of the most significant changes to the U.S. military presence in their country.
As of 2007; there are 33,453 U.S. military personnel (Army: 1,965, Navy: 3,742, Air Force: 13,322, Marines: 14,424) stationed in Japan, and another 5,500 American civilians employed there by the United States Department of Defense1. Two-thirds of the of US forces in Japan are stationed on the Japanese island of Okinawa and US bases on Okinawa comprise 75% of the total US military land area in Japan while Okinawa only makes up 1% of Japan’s total land area. Okinawa’s location far from the main island of Japan and the central government location of Tokyo made it easy for Tokyo to ‘forget’ about the concentrated U.S. troop presence on Okinawa.
Currently, the Japanese government provides subsidies and support to the U.S. government to maintain the US forces in Japan. In 2007, the Japanese government paid JPY 217 billion (US 2.0
U.S. Department of State Website. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm. (accessed April 2008)
billion) as annual host-nation support called Omoiyari Yosan (思いやり予算)2. Since 1979, the Japanese Government has paid over JPY 2 trillion for the construction of facilities inside U.S. military bases in Japan from Japan's "sympathy" budget for the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. This payment alone makes Japan an extraordinary payer among all U.S. allies.3 Following the troop relocation to Guam, and fewer US troops on Japanese soil, it is expected that these types of costs to Japan will decrease.
During the 60 plus years that the US forces have been in Japan, there have been roughly 200,000 accidents and crimes committed by the U.S. soldiers.4 According to the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, U.S. personnel have partial extraterritorial right, so in most cases suspects were not arrested. Following a brutal rape of a young girl in 1996 by US service personnel, the Okinawan government called for a return of US bases on the island in three stages, with the goal of an Okinawa free of bases by 2015.5 As described later in the paper, the central government effectively ignored Okinawan sentiment, partially due to economic reasons and never seriously advanced a plan to reduce American military presence on Okinawa. In February 2008, there was another attack on a young Japanese girl by an American service man, which only increased the Okinawan’s efforts to reduce American military presence on their island.
In a recent conversation with an Okinawan student, they doubted that this plan would really achieve their goal of an Okinawa free of bases. The fact that the plan to move the troops has taken this long to develop and does not remove all US troops from Okinawa is reflective of the
思いやり予算８億円減で日米合意、光熱水料を３年間で, Yomiuri Shimbun, December 12, 2007. Japan Press Co. “Paying Cost of Relocation of USMC to Guam is Absurd: JPC Ichida.” http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/3390/1/167 (accessed February 2008) 4 衆議院外務委員会議事録、平成 17 年 7 月 1 日, House of Representatives of Japan Foreign Affairs Committee, July 2, 2005 5 Global Security. Org. “Okinawa, Japan”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm (accessed February 2008)
fact it is difficult to change the long standing status quo of US/Japan relations. Although the Okinawan people feel the troop presence is a burden, they realize that the US troop presence also provides significant economic benefit to their economy and there is a potential vacuum when the troops leave. An equally significant reason for the delay is because the Japanese Government has worked for nearly 10 years, from 1996 to 2006, to find ways to stall the relocation. Japan sought to maintain its position as one of America’s most staunch allies by not forcing Americans to leave Okinawa. The fact that the central government has now pledged to support this move financially is in itself a major signal that there is a new dimension in US /Japan security relations , in part because the Japanese central government is showing more respect for Okinawan sentiment than in the past.
Since 1996, Okinawan residents have overwhelmingly supported mayoral and gubernatorial candidates who profess a desire to reduce American military presence on Okinawa. Notably, a Nago City plebiscite election in 1998 returned a resounding “No” vote to a proposed new US military base at Nago City to replace the Futenma base. After the vote results were announced, unexplainably, the mayor of Nago City flew to Tokyo to pledge support for the new base at Nago City. Fortunately, Okinawa’s Governor Ota supported the result of the plebiscite; and informed Tokyo that the Nago base would not go forward. This promptly put relations between Tokyo and Okinawa on shaky grounds.6
In 1999, the Okinawan gubernatorial election resulted in the selection of an anti-base expansion Governor Inamine. At that time, the economy was stalled and Tokyo offered significant
Gavan McCormack. “The Okinawan Election and Resistance to Japan’s Military First Politics.” Policy Forum Online 06-99A: November 18th, 2006, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0699McCormack.html (accessed February 2008)
financial incentive packages to Okinawa.
In return for the economic incentives, Governor
Inamine reluctantly agreed to construction of a Futenma base replacement under three conditions: 1) the airport would have joint civilian-military use, 2) be limited to a 15 year use agreement and 3) only be constructed after an environmental assessment could reasonably guarantee that there would be no environmental damage. Since Futenma is located practically in a city, the idea of moving the base more towards the outskirts appealed to the Okinawans because it would ‘give them back’ their city..But it was 2002 before a basic plan following these guidelines was agreed upon by Japan and the US Governments.7
The 2002 plan eventually failed because of a never before seen show of Japanese solidarity; Okinawans effectively blockaded the construction/environmental assessment site for a year and a half. “At a makeshift tent headquarters, Okinawan elders, some in their 80s or even 90s, mingled with fishermen and townspeople from around the island, while fishing boats, canoes, and even hardy swimmers, conducted an offshore "blockade".” 8 This action vividly reflects the
Okinawan’s feelings regarding U.S. bases because it united residents from around the island, across generations, in an effort to make sure the central government understood their view: the status quo of U.S. basing on Okinawan could not continue9. In October 2005, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi acknowledged that the plan would have to be scrapped and after that, the central government finally seemed to hear and support the Okinawan demands to reduce U.S. military pressure.
ibid ibid 9 Okinawans wanted to protect their island, and its beautiful beaches, from development into a military base at Nago.
In January 2006, a mayoral election was held in Nago City and all three candidates took an antibase construction stance. The winner, an LDP candidate named Shimabukuro Yoshikazu, wasted little time after the election in reversing himself, like his predecessor in the aftermath of the 1996 Nago plebiscite. When he did so, 68% of his electorate opposed him, according to an Okinawa Times survey, and the prefecture-wide opposition to the construction plan stood at 71%. 10 Although the base construction was unappealing to the Okinawan people, the economy was struggling and even though reducing American troop presence was important, the residents needed to consider how to bolster the economy and were required to consider plans to continue U.S. troop presence on Okinawa.
Later in, November of 2006, the Okinawan gubernatorial race featured two candidates: Nakaima Hirokazu, a 67-year old business leader and former head of Okinawa Electric Power, who was backed by the ruling coalition's LDP and New Komeito. His opponent was a woman, a 58-year old former bus guide, Itokazu Keiko, who had been elected to the Upper House in 2004 and is supported by a coalition including the Democratic Party of Japan, Social Democratic Party, Communist Party, and Okinawan Social Mass Party, together with labor and civic groups. Nakaima had the support of the LDP ruling party, but could not bring himself to endorse the base construction plan and wanted the Futenma replacement to be built somewhere outside of Okinawa. Since the public was 70% opposed to the plan, it was clear that neither candidate
could win by supporting the plan. Nakaima focused on economic issues in his election platform and pledged to do what was necessary to reduce Okinawan unemployment. At the same time, Itokazu was perceived as a risk because in part she was a woman and perhaps unpredictable in
Excerpt from Ryukyu shimpo, 14 April 2006 as cited in: Gavan McCormack. “The Okinawan Election and Resistance to Japan’s Military First Politics.” Policy Forum Online 06-99A: November 18th, 2006, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0699McCormack.html (accessed February 2008)
her actions.11 Nearly 65% of the electorate turned out and Nakaima won by only about 40,000 votes (Nakaima: 347,303 votes and Itokazu: 309,985 votes). The economic issues and relative stability of Nakaima’s platform led to his narrow margin of victory over the more maverick Itokazu and it was presumed the status quo would continue with US troop presence on Okinawa.
In April of 2006, though, Japan’s Defense Agency Minister had already agreed to fund a portion of the cost to move U.S. troops out of Okinawa and it appeared that a serious plan to reduce U.S. troop presence on Okinawa would go forward. According to the Japanese Communist Party, the government’s plan does not fully address Okinawan concerns, largely because troop movement is potentially overstated and does not remove all military presence.12 Additionally, they point to the fact that a new base is being built at Nago City, Okinawa and construction of a new based does not suggest that U.S. troops will leave anytime soon.
The magnitude of this plan, however, will significantly reduce US presence on Okinawa and the fact that there is a plan, is wholly unlike anything in the past. The effective 2003-2004
‘blockade’ and the results of both the 2006 Nago City mayoral election and 2006 Okinawan gubernatorial election reflected the strong opposition to continuation or expansion of US military presence on Okinawa. These events evidenced a growing conviction of the Okinawan people to seriously reduce U.S. troop presence on their island. Prior to these events, the political
leadership in Okinawa had habitually caved to pressure from Tokyo, partially due to economic pressures on the island and the need to continue U.S. troop presence to stimulate the economy.
Gavan McCormack. “The Okinawan Election and Resistance to Japan’s Military First Politics.” Policy Forum Online 06-99A: November 18th, 2006, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0699McCormack.html (accessed February 2008) 12 Japan Press Co. “Paying Cost of Relocation of USMC to Guam is Absurd: JPC Ichida.” http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/3390/1/167 (accessed February 2008)
As a result, it took nearly 10 years to develop the current plan to move troops, following the 1996 attack that essentially catalyzed Okinawan sentiment regarding U.S. troops. In conclusion, the pledge of support to fund the movement shows that the central government and Okinawan government finally seem to be united in addressing the issue of reducing US troop presence in Okinawa.
3. US: Understanding Dynamics that Led to the Adoption of this Plan During the same period, the US military had been examining its global basing strategy and especially focusing on Asia, as the region is expected to be tremendously important for the foreseeable future due to the changing geopolitical and economic climate. Even though the U.S. – Japan security relationship has been historically been strong; the U.S. has looked to increase its independence; in part by reducing the number of troops on foreign soil. Additionally, the U.S. is working to make the military more efficient by increasing cooperation across the different military branches over the recent years. These factors have led to this proposed shift of U.S. troops from Okinawa to Guam.
The majority of U.S. troops in Asia are located in Japan, largely a result of decommissioning of Japanese military bases following World War II, when the bases were taken over by the United States Air Force. The allied countries wanted to demilitarize Japan, and the U.S. imposed the Constitution of Japan with a no-armed-force clause in 1947. In 1951, the Treaty of San
Francisco was signed by the allied countries and Japan, which restored its formal sovereignty. At the same time, the US and Japan signed the Japan-America Security Alliance. As a result of this treaty, the USAF is legally responsible for the defense of Japan. In return, the Japanese
government has offered military bases, funds and various other means of compensation as defined by the Status of Forces Agreement. In 1960, at the expiration of the treaty, the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was signed between the United States and Japan. The status of the United States Forces Japan was defined in the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. The treaty is still in effect and the Japanese foreign policy is based on these reciprocal obligations.
As detailed earlier, the majority of US troops in Asia are in Japan and the majority of US troops in Japan are located in Okinawa. As a result, Okinawa has long been an important part of US military presence in Asia. Due to the previously described sentiment of Okinawans regarding the number of US troops on their island, it has long been apparent that the current basing strategy of US troops, comprised largely of Marines, on Okinawa cannot continue. From 1996 until 2003, though, there was very little evidence that the US was considering relocating the troops on Okinawa and it appeared that the Japanese Government would not force the issue.
In 2003, the situation really began to change and the US considered moving most of the 20,000 Marines on Okinawa to new bases that would be established in Australia, while increasing military presence in Singapore and Malaysia. In addition, the US sought agreements to base Navy ships in Vietnamese and Philippine waters. In total, the US planned to move 15,000 Marines out of Okinawa 13 . A key reason that the proposal did not get very far, though, is because the Japanese central government continued to support the status quo of U.S. military presence in Okinawa and did not press the U.S. to change alter its basing strategy.
During the Okinawan blockade of 2003-4, however, the Japanese government realized that they must find way to change the status quo on Okinawa and they began to talk more seriously with the U.S. about the need to reduce troop presence on Okinawa. As a result of this change in Japanese government mindset, relations with the U.S. military began to shift. As a result, eventually the US government began talking more with the military, and eventually convinced the Marines that it would be possible to find another place to serve as a replacement for the Futenma MCAS on Okinawa.
Global Security. Org. “Okinawa, Japan”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm (accessed February 2008)
Right about this time, the US government began to seriously consider using Guam as the right place to relocate troops from Okinawa. The military felt that Guam offered advantages over Japan, although the distance from Guam to East Asia was significant. This represented a change in thinking from the past because the U.S. military down sized their presence on Guam in the mid 1990s. During that time, they transferred the U.S. Naval Air Station (Brewer Field) in Hagatna to the Government of Guam, largely because of political pressures from Guam and it business leaders. The government and business people of Guam wanted to increase international air traffic into Guam and needed the extra space14 so the US Government acquiesced to their request.
In 2005, though, the Marines found training sites in Guam that were adequate for their needs, despite the greater distance from Asia. They also found that they could have greater freedom to operate out of a US territory and would not be subject to political restrictions that required them to disclose certain activities to the Japanese government as was the case with the bases located in Japan.15 Specifically, they would be able to pick up Marines on Okinawa and dispatch them around the world, without consulting the Japanese government.16 In a sense, this move could increase the effectiveness of U.S. forces because they would be able to act more independently, without having to get approval from the Japanese government to accomplish missions.
3.1 Decision to Move the Troops as Part of the US Re-Basing Strategy in the Pacific Theater
Jerry M. Rivera, “Guam: America’s Forward Fortress” (strategy research project, U.S. Army War College, 2002),
Richard Halloran, “Guam, All Over Again,” Air Force Magazine Online, http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan2008/0108guam.asp (accessed February 2008) 16 This is especially key now, because the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is in power and they have the potential to cause unnecessary delay in the approval process required to move troops and effectively hamstring American military power.
On a broader level, the U.S. currently has significant presence in Asia with troops located in Japan, South Korea and Guam. There are roughly 29,000 army soldiers based permanently in Japan and South Korea and the U.S. government must consider where to base these troops in the event that the two Koreas unite and/or Japan takes full responsibility for its defense17. Various experts believe that is it not a concern of if, but when, these changes take place in Korea and Japan and so it makes sense for the U.S. to re-examine it’s basing strategy sooner rather than later to determine how to best allocate military resources. (For further information on the basing strategy, please see Appendix #1.)
Some analysts believe that U.S. troops in Korea is perceived negatively by China, could potentially lead to unnecessary escalation of tensions18, so some analysts believed that locating troops further from the border could prove ‘beneficial’. In 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and built permanent wharf structures as part of its military exercises and diplomatic tactics to apply pressure to Taiwan. The Philippines reacted by signed a visiting forces agreement with the U.S. in February 1998 which seems to reflect a desire for continued U.S. presence in the region 19 because of the uncertainty of China’s intentions. Based on this and general sentiment in Asia, it appears that Asian countries welcome a certain amount of US presence in the region.
China, Taiwan, Russia and North Korea all represent potential ‘flash points’ in Asia and the political uncertainty associated with these countries necessitates U.S. military presence to stabilize the region. If the situation between China and Taiwan gets more tenuous, the reaction
Jerry M. Rivera, “Guam: America’s Forward Fortress” (strategy research project, U.S. Army War College, 2002),
Ibid, p 8. Ibid, p 11.
of U.S. forces could force a confrontation with China and therefore requires continued U.S. presence in the region to maintain the balance of power. According to retired Army Gen Barry R. McCaffrey (s20) “by 2020 we will face resurgent and expanding Russian Federation military power projection capacity as well as the likely emergence of other major maritime and air nuclear powers.”20 It is clear that the region has the potential to undergo significant geopolitical change in the near future and the U.S. should create a military backbone, on U.S. soil, to support the Asian region.
Lastly, roughly half of the world’s merchant fleets pass through the South China Sea lanes, which are important to the economic health of the Asian economies which have a strong dependence on trade with the rest of the world. Northeast Asia imports oil and other good through these sea lanes and export finished products around the world. As such, it is critical that these sea lanes remain open or there could be significant disruption of shipping and international trade,21 and so the US must maintain a significant presence in Asia for political and economic reasons. (See Appendix #2 for Information on US Navy Presence in Asia/US Defense Strategy)
Considering the aforementioned reasons, it seems necessary that the US re-examine its basing strategy in regards to the security developments of the major East Asian nations of China, Japan and Korea, as well as Russia. Each of these nations has the ability to influence US foreign policy over the next few years as they undergo change in the political and economic status quo, so the US should move pro-actively to realign its Pacific Forces on US soil. For these reasons, the
Richard Halloran, “Guam, All Over Again,” Air Force Magazine Online, http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan2008/0108guam.asp (accessed February 2008) 21 Jerry M. Rivera, “Guam: America’s Forward Fortress” (strategy research project, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 11.
military decided that Guam, as a U.S. territory, would become more important in the context of U.S. military basing. 3.2 Why was Guam selected? Guam’s location became more and more attractive to the U.S military for three primary reasons; firstly, because of Guam’s geographic location in relation to Asia. Secondly, because of the U.S. government’s desire to create a more efficient military by achieving greater cooperation among the different branches made sense, and was necessary, due to Guam’s small size. Additionally, the military sought to increase control over their military, by locating the bases on U.S. soil,
Guam is a Pacific Island and US Territory with a population of 173,000 in a land area of 220 square miles, which is roughly three times the land area of Washington DC and equivalent to the size of Singapore. Guam is roughly 4,000 miles southwest of the U.S. State of Hawaii, 1,500 miles south of Japan and 1,500 miles east of the Philippines. Guam is the largest island in the North Pacific between Hawaii and the Philippines and between Japan and New Guinea. It is 35 miles long and 4 to 10 miles wide. The north part of the island is flat and sits on a high plateau which is well-suited for airfields while the southern part of the island is more mountainous and scenic with views of the Pacific Ocean and Philippine Sea22.
Jerry M. Rivera, “Guam: America’s Forward Fortress” (strategy research project, U.S. Army War College, 2002),
Guam has been called the ‘tip of the spear’ for its location in defending US Military’s interests in the Far East.24 The US military maintains jurisdiction over 39,000 acres, or 29%, of Guam’s total land area and currently has an active duty and dependent military population of 14,195, which is expected to increase by 176% to 39,130 by 201425. The military looks favorably at Guam for several reasons: firstly, it has existing DoD infrastructure and secondly, because it has been the site of unusual cooperation between the different military forces.
The US military has seven existing installations on Guam, primarily consisting of Naval and Air Force facilities; including Apra Harbor (US Navy), Andersen Air Force Base, as well as a Coast Guard facility and the Joint Forces Headquarters. “Guam has several advantages, including its position in the Western Pacific,” said Air Force Lt. Gen. Dan Leaf, deputy commander of the
U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. Report to Congressional Committees, September 2007. p10 24 Okinawa Times. “Guam Braces for Peaceful Military Incursion,” April 19, 2006. 25 U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. Report to Congressional Committees, September 2007. p33.
U.S. Pacific Command and the military’s point man on the build-up in Guam. “The fact that there’s an existing [Department of Defense] infrastructure is another advantage because of the significant amount of land” held by DoD.26
This is not the first time Guam’s location has made it strategically important to the military. During World War II, Guam was actually captured by the Japanese during the war and later liberated by the US. At one point during WWII, Guam and Tinian hosted a significant number of US troops and Pacific Fleet. More recently, the different branches of the armed forces have worked together to maximize the value of this relatively small location. In 2006, Exercise Valiant Shield brought together ‘three aircraft carrier strike groups operating together, along with other Navy ships and aircraft, Coast Guard units, and Air Force and Marine Corps aircraft. Exercise Resultant Fury in December 2004 involved joint sea strike exercises with Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy aircraft’27. This type of joint-cooperation is especially important to maximizing synergies that will make the armed forces more efficient in the future, which is critical as the U.S. government deals with funding pressures for the military budget and as security issues evolve in Asia. According to Navy Rear Adm. Gary A. Engle, former
commander of the Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, “the advent of the Marines creates the opportunity for forces on Guam “to be a model of joint-ness in how we operate.28” Just as moving the US troops from Okinawa to Guam signals new priorities in Japan, the troop movement to Guam also shows a new kind of cooperation between US forces. In 2002, U.S. forces began to increase their presence on Guam when the Navy moved several attack submarines to the naval base on Guam to bring them closer to deployment regions. This
Richard Burgess, “Guam’s Return to Prominence,” Military.com, http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,123418,00.html (accessed February 2008). 27 Ibid 28 Ibid
reduced transit time, thereby creating more time for operations. The Air Force followed the same idea and started rotational deployments to Guam29. According to Air Force Col. Joel S. Westa, vice commander of the 36th Wing at Andersen. “If deterrence fails and hostilities break out, Guam will become a front-line base. We will fight from here. The island’s benefits are clear: It is sovereign US territory, it is central to numerous possible flash points, it provides strategic depth, and it has space available for a military buildup”30. Guam has regained its status as a place that is strategically important to the U.S. from a security perspective.
Perhaps even more importantly from a location perspective; Guam is out of China’s strike range and could serve as an excellent patrol base or secure rear area during any sort of conflict or crisis. Experts believe that ‘Guam is also situated along what the Chinese call the “second island chain” to which the communist military intends to project air and sea power in the foreseeable future. That island chain is anchored in central Japan, passes through Guam, and extends into the South Pacific. (The first island chain passes from southern Japan through Taiwan into the South China Sea.)’31 Guam provides a sufficiently close location to Asia, yet is removed enough to be a strong basing location in peace and war time.
Ibid Richard Halloran, “Guam, All Over Again,” Air Force Magazine Online, http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan2008/0108guam.asp (accessed February 2008) 31 Ibid
Based on these comments by Air Force and Naval leaders, it is clear that Guam has been and will continue to be an important strategic location for their branches.
In conclusion, the US has been to work on the most major realignment of its Pacific Forces as a result of changing relations with Japan and new priorities within the military. Although the shift in Japanese central government’s priorities provides some of the reason behind the move, an equally important part of the impetus for this move is the US desire to re-evaluate its Asian basing strategy to increase its operational autonomy. By locating on U.S. soil and by locating
U.S. military branches in closer proximity so they can work together more effectively, the U.S. military is changing the operational status quo . By moving troops to Guam, the U.S.
government will also pull its troops out of the strike range of Asia and create a ‘safer’ basing location to continue its peacekeeping activities in the Asia region.
4.The Move: Understanding Funding and Execution to get from Okinawa to Guam As the preceding sections show; there has been increasing pressure within Japan and the U.S. to think beyond the old status quo and create a new kind of U.S.-Japan security relationship, which is evidenced by the plan. These pressures have led to the creation of the proposed plan, and the fact that there is a mechanism for joint funding also illustrates a new type of partnership between Japan and the U.S. 4.1 Relocation Plans and Cost The US government is estimating a cost of US 10.27 billion dollars to move 8,000 Marines
and their dependents from Okinawa, Japan to Guam, USA. On April 23, 2006, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Japan's Defense Agency Director, General Nukaga Fukushiro discussed the cost and Japan agreed to pay JPY 706.4 billion/US 6.09 billion, or 60% of the JPY 1.19 trillion /US 10.27 billion of the estimated cost. 33 At present, 2014 is the targeted completion date for the relocation, which means that the process will have to move quickly to be completed on time.
Initially, the US Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs said that Japan should shoulder 75% of the cost burden because they initiated the plan. Tokyo protested and said that they should only have to pay US 3 billion. They felt this amount would cover costs for housing/roads/water and other things related to daily lives of the Marines, costs that essentially Japan has borne as the host country.34 Although costs are estimated at US 10 billion35, they
David Pilling, “Japan and U.S. End Marines Wrangle,” Financial Times, April 25, 2006. IHT/Asahi Shimbun, April 25, 2006 and Yomiuri Shimbun, April 25, 2006. “Japan to Pay $6BN to Move U.S. Marines to Guam, http://japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2005, (accessed February 2008). 35 To understand the magnitude of this expenditure, the U.S. military construction appropriation request for fiscal year 2008 was roughly $21.3 billion for military construction and family housing, with nearly $1.2 billion, or 5.6%,
could easily surpass US 13 billion when including the cost of upgrading additional civilian infrastructure36.
Although the above-mentioned actual dollar cost division seems clear, it is apparent that there is still uncertainty as to what costs are directly attributable to DoD facilities. According to the Guam Power Authority website: “US Department of Defense monies are for infrastructure development on-base, behind the fence. Japanese Government money is earmarked for
infrastructure development outside the base for the Guam civilian community, but it is unclear at this point what this will mean and how much will be directly related to DOD facilities”.37 As evidenced by the prior quote, there is significant interest from the public and private sector to understand how the expensive troop movement proposal will provide opportunity for private sector participation, through a never before seen type of US/Japan joint effort. 4.2 Funding As regards the actual move, the US and Japan are planning to use a unique, never before seen type of funding partnership. Japan is expected to shoulder 60% of the estimated US 10 billion cost. Japanese funding will come from several different funding mechanisms: US 2.8 billion in grants from national coffers, US 1.5 billion in the form of investment into a new special company and US 1.79 billion in loans extended by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, or JBIC, and other entities. According to the Japanese Communist Party, the loan portion will be
designated for overseas locations. The money for overseas locations is mainly used to maintain, not build, the 766 installations which make up 20% of the U.S. military’s 3,731 installations. As per source: IHT/Asahi Shimbun, April 25, 2006 and Yomiuri Shimbun, April 25, 2006. “Japan to Pay $6BN to Move U.S. Marines to Guam, http://japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2005, (accessed February 2008). 36 Straits Times, “U.S. Buildup in Guam”, March 5, 2008. 37 Guamainian Power Authourity Website, FAQ regarding Military Buildup Money. http://www.guampowerauthority.com/rates/BaseRateCaseFAQ/MilitaryBuildupMoney.html (accessed March 2008).
subject to repayment over a 50 year term, which is further evidence of the generous terms of the Japanese assistance. 38 These costs are only estimates, as the plan has not been finalized or approved, so could be subject to revision.
Actual construction funding will be divided into U.S. and Japanese responsibilities. US funding will be used to build training sites, runways and entertainment establishments. 39 Japanese investment/loans will be used to build family housing and on-base infrastructure, including utilities and the investment is planned to be recouped by Japan via rent, through collection of service member’s housing allowance paid with U.S. funds, and other miscellaneous service charges.40 Japanese grants will cover facilities not directly connected to US military training; such as barracks, administration and school buildings. Essentially, the reason for this delineation of spending is to focus Japanese money on more ‘infrastructure’ type costs, costs that they would have borne had the U.S. stayed in Japan and continued to use Japanese infrastructure as if the move to Guam never happened. By the same token, costs for building actual military training infrastructure/improvements will be borne by the U.S. as would have been the case if the Marines remained on Okinawa. 4.3 Execution The US effort is being led by the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO) and the Japanese effort is currently being directed by Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). These two entities
Japan Press Co. “Paying Cost of Relocation of USMC to Guam is Absurd: JPC Ichida.” http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/3390/1/167 (accessed February 2008) 39 IHT/Asahi Shimbun, April 25, 2006 and Yomiuri Shimbun, April 25, 2006. “Japan to Pay $6BN to Move U.S. Marines to Guam, http://japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2005, (accessed February 2008). 40 U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. Report to Congressional Committees, September 2007. p31.
are responsible for planning and conducting necessary due diligence on the departure from Okinawa and construction/phasing on Guam. It is important to note that both of these entities are relatively new; JGPO was created in 2006, especially for implementing this project to interface with all associated parties. JBIC is actually transitioning to be part of a new entity tentatively called the Japan International Cooperation Agency, or JICA, in November 2008; with new mandates regarding international financial cooperation/aid. The next sections will look at understanding the history and mission of these two entities. 4.3.1 Japan Bank for International Cooperation
The Japanese Diet has authorized the JBIC to take necessary steps on behalf of the Japanese government to fulfill Japan’s share of commitments related to the Okinawa to Guam troop relocation.41 JBIC is important to understand because it will be the main interface with the US in executing this move and it is a reformed organization. JBIC is evolved from existing agencies and was created through the passing of the Japan Finance Corporation Law in May 2007. JBIC and five other organizations, including the National Life Finance Corporation (NLFC) will merge to promote government policies and be wholly owned by the government. In October of 2008, the merger will create “one of the largest bilateral development organizations in the world with a network of 97 overseas offices, projects in more than 150 countries, and available financial resources of approximately JPY 1 trillion ( US 8.5 billion). This new company is
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates Minister, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation,” (for Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma), May 1, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/U.S./security/scc/joint0705.html, (accessed February 2008).
tentatively named “Japan International Cooperation Agency” (独立行政法人国際協力機構 dokuritsu gyōseihōjin kokusai kyōryoku kikō), or referred to as JICA.42
The reorganized agency will also administer part of Japan's grant aid which is currently under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has historically been an integral part of Japan’s foreign policy as it has disbursed development aid, which has historically been a large line item in the Japanese budget. Due to covenants imposed after World War II, Japan was not allowed to maintain a military force, so the US has ‘defended’ Japan’s security interests and in return, Japan has ‘donated’ large amounts of money through official development aid channels as a way to support peace keeping and economic development in the world, in lieu of maintaining a military.
In the future all three major ODA components--technical cooperation, grant aid, and concessional loans--will be managed "under one roof." New JICA will also strengthen research and training capacity in the years ahead, acting as a kind of ODA think tank, contributing to global development strategies, strengthening collaboration with international institutions, and being better able to communicate Japan's position on major development and aid issues.43 (For further information on JICA, please see Appendix #3)
This strategy will allow JICA to manage the Guam relocation effort for Japan and will be instrumental in making sure the Guam redevelopment receives the promised funding from Japan. As this entity is officially being formed in October 2008, in parallel to the completion of the
Asahi Shimbun, “Shrinking Public Lenders,” August 21, 2007. Japan International Cooperation Agency website, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/, (accessed February 2008).
Guam master development plan, it is critical that communication between JBIC/JICA and JGPO remain open to keep this proposed move on schedule. 4.3.2 Joint Guam Program Office
The Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO) was established within the Department of the Navy in August of 2006 under the direction of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England. Initial implementation details for the movement of Marines to Guam and associated military construction projects took place under the leadership of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)44. The JGPO “is responsible for facilitating, managing and executing requirements associated with rebasing Marine Corp assets from Okinawa to Guam, including master planning efforts” in addition to any base realignment or closure decisions related to establishing a joint base on Guam, which might include realignments at Andersen AFB. JGPO is required to conduct the environmental impact assessment process and prepare and Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the relocation of the troops from Okinawa to Guam. In short, JGPO will coordinate all facets of the relocation and construction associated with the Guam buildup under the leadership of Major General Bice and Captain Robert Lee who are key to orchestrating this Guam buildup.
As of March 2008, the JGPO has conducted a series of scoping meetings to solicit input from Guamanians/military/private sector/other parties regarding the proposed buildup and post troop relocation concerns that will impact the EIS. 'We'll have a working-level master plan done by this summer , and a draft environmental impact study a few months later,' said Captain Robert Lee, a US military planner by background and acting director of the Joint Guam Program
Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo website, “Military Buildup on Track, January 9, 2007, http://www.house.gov/bordallo/Press_Releases/2007/pr010907-2.html, (accessed February 2008).
Office (JGPO)-Forward. Capt Lee's JGPO team of six, stationed at Naval Base Guam, will eventually grow to 20.45
As of March 2008, the US government Office of Economic Adjustment has provided nearly $1.7M in grants to the island’s government to support planning studies and federal government is reviewing how to make high-priority upgrades to Guam’s infrastructure. 46 According to the GAO report on the potential Guam buildup, infrastructure is a serious concern:
The effects of the increased demand on Guam’s roads, port capabilities, and utility services—such as electrical generation, wastewater treatment, and solid waste disposal—have not been fully addressed. DOD and Guam officials recognize that the island’s infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand and will require significant funding to address these needs. For example, the Government of Guam has estimated that it will cost about $2.6 billion to improve the local infrastructure to accommodate forecasted military and civilian growth on the island and that federal assistance is needed to meet these requirements. DOD officials and the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan identified several infrastructure areas that are in need of improvements: (1) the two major roads in Guam are in poor condition and, when ordnance (ammunition and explosives) is unloaded from ships for the Air Force now and for the Marine Corps in the future, it must be transported on one of these major roads that runs through highly populated areas; (2) the Government of Guam plans a number of projects to upgrade the capability and efficiency of Guam’s port facilities that total about $155 million with only $56 million funded at the time of our review; (3) the utilities transmission lines are antiquated and the system is not reliable, and voltage and frequency fluctuations are common; (4) the wastewater treatment facilities have a long history of failing and are near capacity; and (5) the solid waste landfills have a number of unresolved issues related to discharge of pollutants and are near capacity. Although the Government of Japan has agreed to provide $700 million for utilities infrastructure on DOD bases in Guam, this funding is neither intended nor is it sufficient to improve the infrastructure throughout the island. Future DOD operations may be constrained on 47 Guam if improvements are not made to Guam’s infrastructure
After this report was completed, it appeared that another US 2.6 billion would be necessary to prepare the island for the arrival of the troops and related infrastructure before the actual
Straits Times, “U.S. Buildup in Guam”, March 5, 2008. Defense Community Newsletter, “Guam Update,” March 14, 2008, http://www.defensecommunities.org/DC360_031408.pdf, (accessed March 2008). 47 U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. Report to Congressional Committees, September 2007. p35.
relocation construction can begin. It appears that the U.S. and Japan have created entities that will be effective in orchestrating this move, but that is only part of the process. It is clear that this task is mammoth, very expensive to complete as a result of necessary infrastructure upgrades as well as actual construction of the facilities for the relocation and on a very tight timeline.
There is potential for a unique opportunity to see tremendous united effort to accomplish an important goal, while at the same time, there is a risk of serious miscommunication and execution error which could stem from a range of factors: mechanics of the move, the fact that the organizing entities are new and potential problems with securing the necessary funding. Although funding it has been tentatively approved by both sides, there is potential for a reduction, or even cancellation, of pledged funds due to changes in national political parties and economic conditions for both countries. 4.4 Potential Problems with Funding from Japan
Although preliminary plans are being made to move the troops and the Japanese government has committed to funding a share of the costs; there are still many undecided issues. For one, based on my conversations with a small sample of Japanese citizens, the Japanese government has not extensively communicated their proposed contribution to the relocation effort to their citizens. As this is the case, it is unlikely that there is full support within the country. As the country faces the koureisha mondai, （高齢者問題） or two pronged challenge of a shrinking and aging population, Japan’s funding priorities could easily shift.
Funding has been approved by high level bureaucrats, however, the actual money has not been funded and this poses a real problem. According to Foreign Ministry North American Affairs
Bureau Director Kawai Chikao, “here is no precedent for having Japan or any other country use money from the government coffer to pay for building a military base in Guam, which is U.S. territory. The Japanese government has repeatedly acknowledged that the payment lacks legal basis. SOFA is not applicable”48 Clearly, there are hurdles to getting funding approved by the government.
As an example, the Japanese Communist Party Secretariat Head Ichida Tadayoshi criticized the US-Japan agreement by saying "At no time in history has Japan ever used tax money to help construct new foreign military bases on foreign territory. There's no such international precedent, either. The US should pay all costs of relocation of US troops”. He also said: "The aim of relocating USMC units to Guam is not to reduce Okinawa's burdens. They are moving to Guam because the US wants to effectively implement its world strategy in this region by linking up their units/facilities in Guam, Hawaii, Okinawa”49. The fact that this statement is from the head of the Japanese Communist Party should be noted, as they are only a marginally important political entity; but if it is spreads to, or is representative of, other political parties, getting the funding approved could be very problematic.
Furthermore, the Government of Japan funds will not be available until there are specific construction plans and they can see exactly what they will be building. The risk here is that the planning process is lengthy and the administration and policy priorities in Japan could change. Specifically, if the planning process for the relocation of MCAS Futenma from Okinawa to Guam is delayed; that could delay the entire construction and move process which would create
Japan Press Co. “Paying Cost of Relocation of USMC to Guam is Absurd: JPC Ichida.” http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/3390/1/167 (accessed February 2008) 49 Ibid
greater uncertainties regarding funding and government support for the Guam buildup. At this time, “the Japanese legislature approved $228 million for planning and initial construction funds for force posture alignments, including efforts for project planning in Guam, and authorized the Japan Bank for International Cooperation to invest in businesses for Guam development.” 50 Whether or not there is a delay in the proposed schedule, Japan’s national funding priorities could shift away from military to social spending and this might place a larger funding burden on the U.S. 4.5 Potential Problems with Funding from the US
In 2008, just as the Guam master plan is scheduled for completion, the American people will be electing their new President. At a time when the near term economic prospects seem grim for the US and the war in Iraq seems to have no end in sight, it is difficult to say whether the US people, and their representatives in Congress, will approve additional military spending for the proposed move to Guam. Only if it can be shown that U.S rebasing will 1) be more
economically efficient and 2) improve America’s reputation abroad will the funding be approved.
If the move from Okinawa to Guam proceeds on plan and on schedule, the U.S. will incur additional costs to fund operations/maintenance for the Marines, as well as additional airlift costs because Guam is further from Asia. It is estimated that this operational cost will reach an estimated $465 million.51 As mentioned earlier, the US Government has approved $1.7 million to fund studies regarding Guam’s infrastructure and planning related to the troop buildup. The
Japan Press Co. “Paying Cost of Relocation of USMC to Guam is Absurd: JPC Ichida.” http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/3390/1/167 (accessed February 2008) 51 U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. Report to Congressional Committees, September 2007. p31.
military will certainly advocate the move as part of a plan to make the military more efficient and as part of a longer term strategy. After completing the environmental assessment process, the military will have to convince the US Congress and the new President that long term benefits of this move are greater than the short term costs, which are high as described earlier. Considering the fact that the 2008 fiscal year military budget for all military construction and family housing is US 21 billion, and the Guam move will be at least US 7 billion (4M US share of the 10 billion, plus US 3M for infrastructure improvements) is significant. 4.6 Logistics
Assuming that the funds are approved by Japanese and US governments, the actual move itself will proceed along the following schedule, with a master plan complete in 2008, presentation to Congress for funding approval in 2009 and a construction start date of 2010 (please see Appendix 3 for a more detailed timeline). This is a tight schedule, which allows little room for deviation if the move is to be complete by the targeted 2014 date. It has taken nearly 10 years since the Okinawans stated their goal to remove U.S. troop presence from their island; but the actual execution of this move could take place in just 8 years since the US and Japan agreed to the plan and to share costs.
The process is complex because the US government requires a high level of oversight, advance planning and cooperation before it can send a request to Congress for funding. As such,
planning, and certainly not construction, cannot officially begin until the Environmental Impact
Statement, or EIS, is completed52. The EIS was started on March 7, 2007 and could take up to three years to complete53. Because the timing is relatively tight, a preliminary joint planning process54 is being run simultaneously in an effort to meet the 2014 completion deadline.
Capt Lee estimates this buildup could involve between 8,000 and 15,000 workers. The coming influx of foreign workers is among several issues that have prompted apprehension among Guam's government and its people. 55 Guam’s construction capacity has historically been approximately US 800 million per year and the estimated build out schedule calls for US 3 billion per year to meet the 2014 completion date; so there is a clear gap in capacity necessary to meet targets. 56 Okinawan politicians have lobbied to get authorization for Okinawans to be involved with the build out, but the Guam Contractors Association (GCA) feels that this is not the most cost-effective solution.57 To address the construction labor issue, the DoD has been working with Congress to increase the number of H-2B visas for temporary foreign workers coming to Guam and Marianas, these are the workers who would provide labor for the construction on Guam. 58 In the end, Japanese construction workers may prove essential to providing the expertise to complete the job, especially since the Japanese have expertise in building on Guam, evidenced by the number of Japanese resorts on the island. So, even if the
Environmental Impact Statement; a process that tries to determine issues related to social, physical infrastructure and environmental impact of any proposed developments that must be completed before projects can be planned or approved. 53 U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. Report to Congressional Committees, September 2007. p26. 54 Ibid. 55 Straits Times, “U.S. Buildup in Guam”, March 5, 2008. 56 U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. Report to Congressional Committees, September 2007. p7. 57 Gerardo Partido, “Japan May Control Military Money,” August 24, 2007, http://decolonizeguam.blogspot.com/2007/08/japan-may-control-military-money.html7, (accessed March 2008). 58 Defense Community Newsletter, “Guam Update,” March 14, 2008, http://www.defensecommunities.org/DC360_031408.pdf, (accessed March 2008).
actual plan and subsequent funding is actually approved, assembling the manpower necessary to build the facilities poses another serious hurdle to completion and could provide another avenue for US-Japan cooperation.
Despite the fact that the plan to execute this move is so daunting because of its magnitude and timing, there is tremendous interest from several key groups; the Guamanian government and also private sector companies, in Japan, the U.S. and beyond. During 2007, JGPO launched its series of scoping meetings on Guam to: 1) educate the Guamanians about the buildup and at the same time, get their input regarding the build up to ferret out any concerns in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that must be completed to receive funding, and 2) provide information to potential contractors who might bid on the jobs to facilitate the construction process.59 These key entities will all have a stake the buildup, so it is critical to get their input early in the process to make sure the plan can proceed on schedule and not jeopardize funding commitments from Japan which will be helpful to completing this move.
The first scoping meeting in April of 2007 drew close to 800 attendees from Guam, Saipan and Tinian; attendees provided more than 900 comments on the relocation’s affect on education, law enforcement, immigration, and other social and economic concerns. Based on preliminary
reports, it is clear that Guam needs substantial investment in physical and social service infrastructure to absorb the proposed troop relocation and associated buildup. “In the end, we will build a capability that enhances our national security, supports peace and stability in the Pacific, preserves Guam’s precious culture and provides economic opportunities for the people
Captain Lee, interview by Clynt Ridgell, KUAM News, October 3, 2007, http://video.aol.com/video-detail/jointguam-program-office-and-environmental-impact-statement/299649121, (accessed March 2008).
of Guam and surrounding islands,” said Bice.60 The information from this meeting is being used to develop a comprehensive environmental impact statement that is sensitive to Guamanian concerns to present to Congress as part of the funding approval process.
As detailed in this paper, the actual execution of this move as planned is fraught with potential difficulties due to domestic political priorities for both countries, as well as national funding priorities as a result of macroeconomic pressures, acceptance by the Guamanians (please see appendix 4) and lastly, difficulties with the actual construction process due to Guam’s remote location. A bright spot though, is the strong interest from private side contractors. In August of 2007, the first Guam Industry Forum was co-hosted by NAVFAC Pacific and the JGPO. “Initially planned for 600 attendees, the event drew over 1,000 industry participants from Guam, Europe, Asia, Hawaii and the U.S. mainland, and was simulcast between two venues. Army, Coast Guard, Air Force and Marine Corps senior officers were also on hand to provide answers to service-specific questions, and the government of Guam provided senior executives to answer questions on topics such as utilities, roadways, public works, labor, immigration, taxation and infrastructure development”61. The scope of this project and timing has made it attractive to many potential developers as the real estate market is entering what some analysts fear is a sluggish period and government funded projects of this type become especially attractive as a way to guarantee income during a potentially slow time.
“The forum went further and drew more widespread participation than originally anticipated,” reflected Andy Wall, acquisition director for NAVFAC Marianas and forum coordinator. “It was
Jesse Leon Guerrero, “Forum Focuses on Military Buildup,” U.S. Naval Forces Marianas Public Affairs, Official Website of the Navy, August 30, 2007, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31566 (accessed March 2008). 61 Kyra Hawn, “Guam Industry Forum Unites Industry Innovation With DoD Opportunity,” Naval Facilities Engineering, August 28, 2007, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31509, (accessed March 2008).
all about sharing ideas and generating momentum.” This type of enthusiasm from the private sector may prove essential to keeping this project on track and on budget. In the course of the scoping meetings, JGPO received information from international companies about the best way to handle the build out in a short amount of time, in a relatively isolated location. One
suggestion was to do some construction, such as concrete, off the island where labor is available and then ship the finished goods to Guam for actual building construction62. Creative solutions like this will be necessary to meet the proposed timeline of completion in 2014. Future events are being planned to address the needs of stateside and foreign contractors, as well as small business owners. JGPO anticipates release of a formal infrastructure and personnel phasing roadmap in 2008 in concert with the Program Objective Memorandum 2010 budget planning process.63
Because Guam is likely to see $400 million to $1 billion in construction per year for a period of six to ten years, there is intense competition from various entities to get the bids. The joint U.S. and Japan funding mechanism also creates additional complexity with the construction bidding process. Projects will range from on-base utilities, to housing, barracks, and highway
modifications. A significant portion of the projects will be military construction projects requiring Congressional authorization64 and must follow appropriate protocol for Congressional funded construction.
Brett Kelman, “JGPO: Space running out for industry forum,” Guam Pacific Daily News, February 18, 2008, http://www.guampdn.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080219/NEWS01/802190308/1002, (accessed March 2008). 63 Kyra Hawn, “Guam Industry Forum Unites Industry Innovation With DoD Opportunity,” Naval Facilities Engineering, August 28, 2007, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31509, (accessed March 2008). 64 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney and JGPO’s David Bice, interview on KUAM news, October 5, 2007, http://video.aol.com/video-detail/general-bice-and-federal-offical-on-guam-for-militarymeetings/1307375410, (accessed March 2008).
Since Japan controls 60% of the construction budget, there is a concern that Japanese contractors may be given preference for jobs. This could potentially be helpful, though, as Guam is in ‘typhoon alley’ and Japanese contractors are accustomed to buildings structures to withstand typhoons. It is likely, though, that U.S. and Guamanian firms will be tapped as subcontractors. It is reported that Mitsubishi Industries has already sent representatives to Guam to inspect the territory and several other major Japanese firms attended the second scoping meeting, according to a list of companies on the Guam Industry Forum website65. Japanese firms already have extensive experience building on Guam as it is a favorite vacation destination for the Japanese and there are a significant number of Japanese resort facilities. It is important to note that Guam feels that they already have a strong relationship with the Japanese business community and this will provide them with the opportunity to be involved with many of the projects, regardless of whether the project is funded by U.S. or Japanese sources.
According to the Guam Industry Forum website, which catalogues information from the meetings and about the process, many questions have been raised about how the joint US/Japanese funding mechanisms would actually work. Specifically, there have been questions regarding Japanese SPEs and rules of engagement for US and Japanese companies in the bidding/construction process. Regarding SPEs that will be funded with Japanese monies; it seems that American firms will be more likely to be involved with housing construction, while utilities construction will likely be led by Japanese firms. Regarding rules of engagement; there will be an attempt to create a level playing field to the best of the JGPO’s ability and to maximize the buying power of US and Japanese monies by not requiring the ‘buy American’ principles usually used for US government sponsored projects. This should help to raise the
Website for Guam Industry Forum, www.guamindustryforum.com, (accessed March 2008).
level of competitiveness in achieving the highest value for the allocated dollars, because the Guam project will be expensive to execute for two reasons: 1) Guam’s remote geographic location and 2) it’s location in ‘typhoon alley’ on an island that also has seismic shocks, both of which will require sturdy building construction (please see Appendix #5). Each industry forum has served to advance knowledge of the plan and generate ideas on how to proceed most effectively, which is critical to overcoming obstacles and minimizing confusion.
In March 2008, the JGPO and NAVFAC (Naval Facilities Group) sponsored a second industry forum that attracted over 1,300 U.S. and international industry representatives, along with senior representatives from the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO), the government of Japan, government of Guam and the Department of the Navy for a three-day forum. Considering the fact that the first forum was expected to draw 600 attendees and drew over 1,000, there is clearly interest in this project which will likely increase competitiveness and thereby increase efficiency of construction and use of funds. The amount of interest from the private sector is growing and will be critical for executing this move efficiently, with respect to time and money.
Major actors are concerned about creating an environment to work efficiently as evidenced by comments from the military and Guamanian government. "This industry forum and the whole Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) endeavor is historic; our work is in front of us, no doubt about it," said Capt. Louis Cariello, operations officer for NAVFAC Pacific. "We feel good about where we are in the process, and we're encouraged by the dialogue we've had to date." As stated by Cariello, the intent behind the forum and associated discussions is to "leverage industry expertise to optimize the strategy." Felix P. Camacho, governor of Guam, extended the island's hospitality to industry participants, and expressed his optimism for the
future. "There are businesses in Guam ready to join you in a prosperous future. We welcome you to join this community effort to be part of the bright future of Guam and her people." Brig. Gen. Rex McMillian, deputy commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific provided the key note address to forum participants on day one. At the start of his remarks, McMillian emphasized that Marines in the Pacific are good neighbors, and will set the bar high for positive community engagement on Guam.66
Despite all of this enthusiasm, analysts are estimating that the construction start will be delayed in part because the EIS completion/master planning could uncover additional issues and costs. An un-indentified Japanese businessman feels that the JGPO office has not done enough to provide information that would be helpful to private sector partners for the construction planning to proceed; although this is admittedly difficult because the scope of the project is somewhat unclear as regards how the project will be funded and what will be ultimately approved after the completion of the EIS is done. Additionally, a Japanese Defense Ministry official noted that they had received very little information from JGPO in advance of the most recent Industry Forum meeting in March of 2008. 67 Comments like this are to be expected because of the project’s magnitude, but they must remain few in number or could signal serious problems with proposed execution.
Kyra Hawn, “$10 Billion Price Tag Draws Industry Leaders to Guam,” Naval Facilities Engineering, Command Marianas Public Affairs, March 7, 2008, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=35593, (accessed March 2008). 67 Editorial, “FOCUS: Guam nonplussed by mounting challenges for hosting Okinawa Marines,” Kyodo News, March 14, 2008, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/FOCUS:+Guam+nonplussed+by+mounting+challenges+for+hosting+Okinawa...a01610938211, (accessed March 2008).
This relocation has many moving pieces; so it is important the JGPO has full oversight and coordination responsibility to keep the project moving forward. Generally speaking, it appears they have done a good job to educate the public on Guam and communicate with private contractors in the US, Japan and beyond about the process as evidenced by generating a lot of comments from Guamanians and a lot of interest from private side contractors; two constituencies who can help to make sure the process goes smoothly. In the next year, it will be critical to keep lines of communication open as the master plan is finalized and the budgetary approval process begins so that the project can be completed as scheduled.
5. Conclusion: The Troop Relocation from Futenma Base Okinawa to Guam Reflects New US/ Japan Security and Economic Relations
At present, the plan to move US troops from Okinawa to Guam reflects several new dynamics in the US/Japan security relationship. The plan’s evolution can be linked to changes in both US and Japanese preferences, as a result of social, political and economic issues. In regards to Japan, the most significant changes are that Okinawa seems to have a ‘louder’ voice in determining its destiny and will have increased support from Tokyo in working to reduce US troop presence. The Okinawan people have never seen troops leave their island, so they will only believe this plan when it is complete. Additionally, the Japanese government is looking to change the pattern of funding US troops; in part by helping them move out of Japan. Once troops are out of Japan, the funding burden on Japan will also decrease. This is part of Japan’s transition toward becoming more independent with regard to its own security. The US military has not made a plan to wholly leave Japan, but this is a big step to changing Japan’s role in the US-Japan security relationship.
In regards to the US, there is recognition from within that the US military will look to reduce the American troop burden on Japan, both physically by removing troops from Okinawa and economically by shouldering more of the cost to maintain those troops once they are back on US soil in Guam. Additionally, the U.S. will increase effectiveness among the different military branches, by encouraging more cooperation between forces.
Before the Guam troop movement can be completed there are several key measures that must be approved and executed by the US and Japanese governments. Firstly, funding approval from the
US must be secured; pursuant to favorable EIS reports that garner Congressional support and budgetary authorization for the move. Secondly, funding approval from the Japanese
Government is pursuant to approval by the Japanese Diet, which in the face of expensive national costs in an era of a shrinking population, is not a sure bet. After funding is secured, the actual construction process will likely be completed with joint U.S. –Japanese cooperation as both countries control how the monies will spent and how the projects will eventually be built.
After the plan is complete and funding is approved, the actual construction can begin. As described, Guam needs serious infrastructure improvements before the estimated US 10 billion in military facilities can be built. There is likely to be significant cooperation between private sector Japanese and US companies to achieve this joint goal.
At the end of the day, although this move is costly and complex, it is critical to complete as it will improve overall US/Japanese relations and security partnership for the longer term. As this is move is yet to be executed; it is difficult to assemble information to fully understand the magnitude of this effort. As this is only in the preliminary planning stages; it is not certain if and how the troop relocation will actually take place. Even if this move is not completed, as planned, the genesis of this idea to significantly change the status quo of U.S. basing in Japan reflects a real evolution and change within the context of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.
Considering the changing roles of the US and Japan in the geopolitical context of their neighbors in Asia, it is critical that these two countries continue to respect each other and work to achieve common goals in the most efficient manner; as evidenced by the Guam relocation plan. The plan represents many years and many attempts to find a mutually beneficial plan for the future. Both U.S. and Japanese Governments have adapted to the new global security and internal country 45
pressures to create and approve this preliminary plan. If the Guam troop movement is executed according to/close to plan it will be with the creativity of private side contractors and will signal a new era of US/Japanese cooperation with a more autonomous Japan and independent US. As Asia is expected to see the most geopolitical change in the world as a result of economic growth in the region during the next century, the US/Japan security alliance will continue to be important in the region and will be strengthened by this type of joint cooperation to proactively manage the relationship into the future and not simply maintain the status quo.
6. APPENDIX 1) Overseas master plans defined the bases categories as the following: (1) main operating base, a facility outside the United States and U.S. territories with permanently stationed operating forces and robust infrastructure and characterized by command and control structures, enduring family support facilities, and strengthened force protection measures; (2) forward operating site, a scalable location outside the United States and U.S. territories intended for rotational use by operating forces with limited U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment; and (3) cooperative security location, a facility located outside the United States and U.S. territories with little or no permanent U.S. presence that is maintained with periodic service, contractor, or host nation support. Cooperative security locations provide contingency access, logistics support, and rotational use by operating forces and can be a focal point for security cooperation activities.68 2) The US Navy's Pacific Fleet area of responsibility covers over half of the earth; which is roughly one hundred million square miles. Each day, USPACFLT’s ships are at sea in the Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans, from the West Coast of the United States to the Arabian Gulf. The Pacific Fleet is roughly comprised of 178 ships, 1,500 aircraft, and more than 159,565 sailors, marines, and civilians which keep the sea lanes open, deter aggression, provide regional stability, and support humanitarian relief activities. 69 In general, the U.S. military strategy has three goals as outlined in the current Quadrennial Defense Review70: 1) Assure allies and friends: U.S. must maintain a forward presence to respond to regional threats against any Asian ally or friend and create a favorable balance of power to discourage aggression or coercion by fostering security cooperation among Asian nations. 2) Dissuade future military competition: Maintain significant advantage in major areas of military capability to discourage other countries from competing with the U.S. or starting future military competitions. 3) Deter threats and coercion against U.S. interests: Maintain forward deployed and stationed forces with global intelligence that requires a minimum of reinforcement from other theaters. 3) Timeline for Guam Buildup US Japan Agreement Signed PACOM GIMDP Released JGPO Established Service Requirements Received NEPA NOI Published First NEPA Scoping Meeting Japan Diet JBIC Authorizations
May 2006 July 2006 August 2006 January 2007 March 2007 April 2007 May 2007
U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. Report to Congressional Committees, September 2007. p10 Jerry M. Rivera, “Guam: America’s Forward Fortress” (strategy research project, U.S. Army War College, 2002),
First Guam Industry Forum Second Guam Industry Forum Working Level Master Plan Completed NEPA Draft EIS Completed FY 10 (Construction Program) Submitted to Congress NEPA Record of Decision Signed Master Plan Finalized Guam Construction Begins Estimate III MEF Relocation Begins FRF Guam Agreed Completion
August 2007 March 2008 July 2008 January 2009 February 2009 January 2010 July 2010 2012 2014
4) Guamanian Sentiment Regarding Buildup In general, the increase in military personnel is met with mixed feelings on Guam. On one hand, the projected 25% increase in the island’s population in a relatively short, five year, time frame causes concern. Gov Felix Camacho indicates Guam needs $3 billion in local infrastructure to handle the increase in the island’s population, figuring in the increase in construction workers, military and their dependents.71 On the other hand, Guam will maintain sole control of the additional taxes generated by the increase in personnel and will have a more stable tax base to fund their operations and diversify their economy further from tourism driven. A survey commissioned in August [of 2007] by the Pacific Daily News, a newspaper published in Guam, indicated that 61 percent of Guamanians -- including 56 percent of Chamorros -- rated the military expansion of Guam as “a good thing.”72 Guam’s representative in Congress, Madeleine Z. Bordallo, said the build-up will “provide an economic boost to the island with opportunities for new jobs, increased tax revenues for the government, increased utilization of Guam’s hotels, businesses, restaurants and the like and other corollary positive impacts.” “The governor and Guam’s local leaders are working toward partnering arrangements in all places possible,” she said. “Further, we can predict now that increased revenue that will come in to the government of Guam can provide new opportunities to be dedicated to improving Guam’s aging infrastructure.”73 “We don’t have a monopoly,” said Camacho. “We have a market share and we have local companies that have knowledge and technical expertise to ensure the success of this venture.” Camacho stressed the island’s strategic location as being mutually beneficial for the people of Guam and the military, and he encouraged the assembled business owners to continue supporting the island with their investments. “We are where America’s day begins, and we are Asia’s closest U.S. connection,” Camacho said.74 With the influx of thousands of new residents to the island, Penn said Guam and its surrounding islands will benefit in many ways. Not only will the military construction projects generate increased jobs and revenues for the construction industry, but the Marines and their families will also spend for services affecting housing, consumer spending, entertainment and other quality of life issues. “The arrival of men and women who continue to volunteer in support of churches,
Defense Community Newsletter, “Guam Update,” March 14, 2008, http://www.defensecommunities.org/DC360_031408.pdf, (accessed March 2008). 72 Richard Burgess, “Guam’s Return to Prominence,” Military.com, http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,123418,00.html (accessed February 2008). 73 Ibid 74 Jesse Leon Guerrero, “Forum Focuses on Military Buildup,” U.S. Naval Forces Marianas Public Affairs, Official Website of the Navy, August 30, 2007, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31566 (accessed March 2008).
schools, youth sports, philanthropic organizations and community events will add to the social fabric of the community,” Penn added.75 5) Actual Construction: DOD estimates suggest that Guam is 2.64 times more expensive than the baseline average construction costs considering: 1) cost of construction material, 2) labor, 3) equipments and factors such as weather, climate, seismic conditions, mobilization, overhead and profit, labor availability and labor productivity, in addition to additional facility repair costs from typhoons and seismic shocks.76
Jesse Leon Guerrero, “Forum Focuses on Military Buildup,” U.S. Naval Forces Marianas Public Affairs, Official Website of the Navy, August 30, 2007, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31566 (accessed March 2008). 76 U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. Report to Congressional Committees, September 2007. p32
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