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3086 February 23, 1988 ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant, vs. THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch 113, respondent. RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM: This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country. Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting his "commendable record as a fearless prosecutor" since his appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila on December 4, 1962, until his appointment eventually as RTC Judge on February 18, 1983; that at in the reorganization of the judiciary after the February 26, 1986 revolution, he was reappointed to his present position; that his length of service as prosecutor and judge is "tangible proof that would negate the allegations of the petitioner" (should be complainant), whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons only known to him; that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated by respondent on September 29, 1986, but the complaint against him was filed only on August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and illwill of the complainant to subject respondent to harassment, humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision, of which he submits a copy (Annex A) as part of his Answer, is based on "fundamental principles and the foundation of rights and justice" and that if there are mistakes or errors in the questioned decision, they are committed in good faith. Accordingly, respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition (should be complaint).
The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in rendering the decision in question. A judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers on July 9, 1986, while on board Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the time of his apprehension, he was found carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$ 355,349.57, in various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound, Malaysian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar and Hongkong Dollar, without any authority as provided by law. At the time the accused was apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations which he was supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in previous trips, namely, CB Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00 and Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No. 06346, dated June 29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00. An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960, as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the City of Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to take out of the Philippines through the Manila International Airport the following foreign currencies in cash and in checks:
Japanese Yen Swiss Franc Australian Dollar Singapore Dollar Deutsche Marck Canadian Dollar
Y 32,800,000.00 SW. FR 6,9000.00 A$ 17,425.00 S$ 9,945.00 DM 18,595.00 CS 13,330.00
Hongkong Dollar HFL Guilder French Franc US Dollar English Pound Malaysian Dollar (in checks) Australian Dollar British Pound US Dollar Canadian Dollar
HK$ 15,630.00 HFL 430.00 F/6,860.00 US$ 73,950.00 5,318.00 M$. 14,760.00
A$ 7,750.00 700.00 US$ 17,630.00 C$ 990.00 without authority from the Central Bank.
Contrary to Law.
The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, was subsequently raffled to Branch 113, presided by herein respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon. Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. — No person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the Philippines directly, through other persons, through the mails or through international carriers except when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or allowed under existing international agreements or Central Bank regulations.
hence. 1986. and July 8.600. that he had a group of business associates who decided to invest in business with him.1986 which he declared (Exh. 1).500. that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 1 0 times. When asked by the court why he did not present all of these declarations when he was apprehended at the airport. engaged in the garment business. he does not understand English and he was not told to do so. Hongkong. 2). the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman from Kowloon. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange .1986 (Exh. May 4. 4). No.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on May 4.000. he declared 8. Again. until he could get a confirmation as to the source of the money. tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3.00 and 8.1986. they would declare the money they were bringing in. He also brought in with him US$39. who had their own businesses in Japan and Hongkong.00 and 4. although the only dates he could remember were April 2. He also testified on cross-examination that the reason he was going back to Hongkong bringing with him all the money intended to be invested in the Philippines was because of the fear of his group that the "revolution" taking place in Manila might become widespread. Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan. (minimum of 12 years and I day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than fifty thousand (P50. For purposes of establishing the amount of foreign exchange brought in or out of the Philippines.— That any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.000. 1986.000.1986. June 28.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on June 28. started putting their money for this purpose in a common fund. his answer was that he was not asked to present the declaration papers of his associates.000. as per their agreement to invest in some business with him in the Philippines.D.000. he brought US$50. At the trial.00 Japanese Yen which he tried to declare but the Central Bank representative refused to accept his declaration. that when he came to the Philippines on April 2.Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them.000.000.00) Pesos. Lee Shiang Pin.000. P. every time anyone of them came to the Philippines. that the reason for his coming to the Philippines was to invest in business in the Philippines and also to play in the casino. and all declarations were handed to and kept by him. in which he had invested 4 to 5 million Hongkong Dollars. He also testified that his business associates. 1986. 1883. for which reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a telex was sent to him on April 3. which reads as follows: Section 1. The penal sanction is provided by Section 1. and besides. these currency declarations were presented at the trial as exhibits for the defense.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines. Kobayashi Nabuo. 1986 (Exh. It was because of this fear that he was . namely: Wakita Noboyuki.
Indeed. this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the defense that the currencies confiscated and/or seized from the accused belong to him and his business associates abovenamed. Courts of Justice are guided only by the rule of evidence. readily show that the currency declaration is required for the purpose of establishing the amount of currency being brought by tourist or temporary non-resident visitors into the country. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws. What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign currencies out of the country was done the very intention. This is due to its steadfast adherence and devotion to the rule of law-a factor in restoring the almost lost faith and erosion of confidence of the people in the administration of justice. the existence of which is shown by overt acts of a person. Intent is a mental state. is already (sic) intended to serve as a guideline for the Customs authorities to determine the amounts actually brought in by them to correspond to the amounts that could be allowed to be taken out. Why the Bureau of Customs representative never took part in all these declarations testified to by no less than five (5) Central Bank employees? Seemingly. In requiring proof of malice. simply reading the provisions of said circular will. these employees are the favorites of these travellers. this Court is amazed and really has its misgivings in the manner currency declarations were made as testified to by the Central Bank employees. tended to show that the accused had no wilfull intention to violate the law. The fact that the accused had in his possession the foreign currencies when he was about to depart from the Philippines did not by that act alone make him liable for Violation of Section 6.urged by his associates to come to Manila on July 8. 960. The currency declarations. the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law. stated: The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not the accused wilfully violated Section 6 of Circular No. 960. There must be that clear intention to violate and benefit from the act done. Yes. the respondent has by his . The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which. And from the unwavering and unequivocal testimonies of Mr.. The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. in his decision acquitting the accused. 1986 to bring the money out of the Philippines. according to him. 960. which are mala prohibita. It is that which qualifies the act as criminal or not.. According to the respondent in his decision: . Templo and all of currencies in question came from abroad and not from the local source which is what is being prohibited by the government. therefore. But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not be able to pin criminal responsibility on the accused. It is the hope of this Court that the authorities must do something to remedy the evident flaw in the system for effective implementation of the questioned Central Bank Circular No. The respondent judge.
960.349.gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free. Such fantastic tale. It did not matter to the respondent that the accused by his own story admitted. without any specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law. These were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines. Although contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior. The accused at the time of his apprehension at the Manila International Airport had in his possession the amount of US$355.57 in assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces). Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for violation of Central Bank Circular No. The respondent closed his eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts of foreign exchange found in the possession of the accused at the time of his apprehension consisted of personal checks of other people. that he was a carrier" of foreign currency for other people. the respondent judge chose to give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged business associates had brought in from time to time and accumulated and kept in the Philippines foreign exchange (of very substantial amounts in cash and checks in various foreign currency denominations) for the purpose of investing in business even before they knew and had come to an agreement as to the specific business venture in which they were going to invest. as well as cash in various currency denominations (12 kinds of currency in all). which clearly belied the claim of the accused that they were part of the funds which he and his supposed associates had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of investing in some business ventures. The respondent ignored the fact that most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the defense at the trial were declarations belonging to other people which could not be utilized by the accused to justify his having the foreign exchange in his possession. he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in his possession. supposedly to be used for the purpose of investing in some unspecified or undetermined business ventures. line and sinker. the respondent nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused based on his defense that the foreign currency he was bringing out of the country at the time he was apprehended by the customs authorities were brought into the Philippines by him and his alleged business associates on several previous occasions when they came to the Philippines. These and other circumstances which make the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the .1986 might spread. was swallowed by the respondent-judge "hook. in effect. that this money was kept in the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines to take the money out as he and his alleged business associates were afraid that the "attempted revolution" which occurred on July 6. At the time of his apprehension. although totally irrelevant to the matter of the criminal liability of the accused under the information." It did not matter to the respondent that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of the accused when he was apprehended at the airport-380 pieces in all-and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by the accused at the trial.
under Central Bank Circular No.000. Valenzuela. CB Circular No." His actuations in this case amount to grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice. Accordingly. There is nothing in said circular that would justify returning to him the amount of at least US$3. All leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of government service.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines. the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies. tourists or non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3. This. According to the above-cited CB Circular. if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of said amount without specific authority from the Central Bank.00. thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision "in good faith. the respondent judge again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. if the same exceeds the amount of US$3. which according to the respondent should be respected since the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in the alleged infringements of the aforesaid Central Bank Circular.00. 960 merely provides that for the purpose of establishing the amount of foreign currency brought in or out of the Philippines.000. tourists may take out or send out from the Philippines foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them.S. 135 SCRA 712). gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency. a tourist upon arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange he is bringing in at the time of his arrival. Dizon. guilty of gross incompetence. according to respondent. 960 to justify the release of US$ 3. Currency to the accused. Baltazar R. SO ORDERED.000. including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations. In other words. This resolution is immediately executory. in spite of the fact that forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted by the Bureau of Customs over the currency listed in the information." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960. . but directed in his decision the release to the accused of at least the amount of US$3. and consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary (People vs. He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai.accused. it is hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the service. There is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said amount of U. for the purpose of establishing such amount.000.000.00 to the accused. allowed.
Padilla. vs. Cruz. 1988 FILOMENO URBANO.J.. HON. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of . concur. Sarmiento Cortes. Jr.. Gancayco. GUTIERREZ. Bidin. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G. Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed.R. C. 72964 January 7. Fernan. Gutierrez. Melencio-Herrera. 1980. The records disclose the following facts of the case. JR. petitioner. JJ. J. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. Yap. No. Paras. JJ.Teehankee. petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang. San Fabian. At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23. Narvasa.. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. took no part.: This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. and Griño-Aquino. respondents.. Feliciano..
to wit: xxx xxx xxx Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine. right. by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand. as it was already treated by the other doctor. he and his companions returned to Dr. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there. After Javier was treated by Dr. for they are neighbors and close relatives to each other. Urbano promised to pay P700. Meneses. As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. causing a swelling on said leg. residing at Barangay Anonang. 88. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury. Upon the advice of Solis. The group went to Dr. rural health physician of San Fabian. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who . Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long. Dr. A quarrel between them ensued. 1980 and found the following: 1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence. Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. including the handle. married. Immediately thereafter. (p. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. 1980. Pangasinan on October 23. Javier was brought to a physician. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably. San Fabian. Emilio Erfe. This wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo.the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Guillermo Padilla. the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28. on October 27. Original Records) Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis. As suggested by Corporal Torio. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Hence.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. 20 years of age. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A). the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. 1981) which reads: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier. Antonio Erfe. and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. which was used in parrying the bolo hack.
00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven. At about 1:30 a. (p. 1981. and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other. PMC done and cadaver brought home by relatives. 02 inhalation administered. Javier died in the hospital. Original Records. On November 15. The medical findings of Dr.00 to Javier at the police station. Third Judicial District. Exconde are as follows: Date Diagnosis 11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus adm. With diffi#35. When admitted to the hospital. the additional P300. IM. 421 culty opening his mouth. Sudden cessation of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.) Urbano advanced P400. Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. 87. (p. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City..m. 1980.m. Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. at DX TETANUS 1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. 100. . Ambo bag resuscitation and cardiac massage done but to no avail. Novaldin 1 amp.M.shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment. on November 14. Dr. 1980 at exactly 4:18 p. Original Records) In an information dated April 10. Febrile 11-15-80 Referred. Cabugao at 4:18 P. 1980. Pronounced dead by Dra. inj. Restless at times. On November 3.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata. Rizal upon finality of the decision. . In a resolution dated July 16. I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus.Upon arraignment. FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal. we gave due course to the petition. as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years. I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions. I conducted a personal survey in the area affected. 1980. (p. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor. 1982. Pangasinan. That during the typhoon. and up to the present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17.or on November l5.000. Urbano pleaded "not guilty. in the amount of P12. San Fabian. That few days there after. 1986." After trial. That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields. l980. That sometime in the first week of November. Hence. while I was conducting survey. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states: That in 1980. the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes. That on November 5.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. together with the accessories of the law. the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang. and to pay the costs. in Muntinlupa. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison. in view of the nature of his penalty. Rollo) The motion was denied. a town of said province.000. The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30. 33. as maximum. That after the storm. the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced. to indemnify the heirs of the victim. Marcelo Javier. there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian. this petition.00 with costs against the appellant. 1980.
Cardenas. that on November 14. Cornel 78 Phil. and lately." (People v. Consequently. Dr. he died from tetanus. is an afterthought.P. People v. Oct. the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury. R. 5. 5072. The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm. 56 SCRA 631). and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed.. 78. The evidence . (Article 4. Under these circumstances. that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November. Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day.. Hence. Thus.C. Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed. the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. (pp. that the deceased did not die right away from his wound. 1981). And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. True. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. Rollo) The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence. par. 418). the appellate court said: The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death. and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. he was declared responsible for Javier's death. but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant.. November 15. Said wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death. 20-21. Red." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration.The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended .G. 1. People v. it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. p. 1981. that Dr. 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident. 1980. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn. CA 43 O.
in natural and continuous sequence. over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. "that cause. as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person. but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw. As the progresses. have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. In fact. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. As more muscles are involved. somehow got infected with tetanus However. and headache are encountered occasionally. 1181). and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent . we adopted the following definition of proximate cause: xxx xxx xxx . rigidity becomes generalized. i. most muscles are involved to some degree.. irritability.. ranges from 2 to 56 days. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.. v.. or back and difficulty swallowing. Medina (102 Phil. however.merely confirms that the wound. Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness. It is as follows: . However.e. and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected. a short . all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events. "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury."And more comprehensively. either immediately or by setting other events in motion. In the vast majority. and without which the result would not have occurred. Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom. A short incubation period indicates severe disease. which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment. In a small proportion of patients. an interval referred to as the onset time. We look into the nature of tetanusThe incubation period of tetanus. the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death. which. stiffness gives way to rigidity. and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. As in the case of the incubation period. trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted. produces the injury. and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should. abdomen.. cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. In Vda. therefore. et al. de Bataclan. pages 695696 of American Jurisprudence. 185-186) The issue.
1980. or less. he suffered the symptoms of tetanus. After 22 days. This incident took place on October 23. however.. and an onset time of 72 hrs. died on the second day from the onset time. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death. and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused . Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. trismus is marked. Emphasis supplied) Therefore. the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. November 15. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. 1980. the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Javier. or on November 14. 1980. therefore. which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. 1004-1005. Trismus is usually present. the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. Cardenas. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death. Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical findings. dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged. If. generalized convulsive spasms. it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct. but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine. Consequently. minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later . natural. (People v. however. Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction. pp. Therefore. In the case at bar. the onset time should have been more than six days. 1983 Edition. severe trismus. The following day. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant. dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present. the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery. he died. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time. like lockjaw and muscle spasms. As the disease progresses. medically speaking. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time.
with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. 1987). unrelated. Thus. 125) It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. Civil Code). 1508. in the recent case of People v. the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. (Padilla v. even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. After the hacking incident.. Court of Appeals. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. (Article 29. (G. therefore. No. 77 Phil.R. Section 2(3). while not criminally liable. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible. 118). (at p. At the very least. 74041. for failure to take necessary precautions. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G. successive. 129 SCRA 559). However. (See also People v. that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection. The infection was. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.R. we said: xxx xxx xxx . and efficient cause of the injury. Doubts are present. 127 SCRA 16). Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct. Caruncho. (99 Phil. 931-932). (People v. No. We must stress. et al. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition. Rogelio Ligon y Tria. v. however. et al. distinct and foreign to the crime. such condition was not the proximate cause.. Rellin. may still be civilly liable. the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. 1038).J.or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The well-settled doctrine is that a person. which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for ." (45 C. only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. Remoquillo. The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code. July 29. pp. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt. such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
private rights.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30. the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. One affects the social order and the other. when the latter is not proved. But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining party. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party." It is just and proper that. is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. has been explained by the Code Commission as follows: The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system.000. It will correct a serious defect in our law. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded. now Court of Appeals. . The questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court. for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused.the same act or omission. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice. WHEREFORE. However. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility. SO ORDERED. but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished. why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? "For these reasons. civil liability cannot be demanded. Costs de oficio.00. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime. the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case." The respondent court increased the P12. where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.000. the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
and rising in rage he moved towards Venancio. and they would work better. . 1921 THE UNITED STATES. vs. if he would not insult them. with a big knife in hand. Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee. and six others among whom was the deceased. defendant-appellant. JJ.: The rather singular circumstances attending the commission of the offense of homicide which is under discussion in the present appeal are these: At about noon. Upon this Venancio Gargantel remonstrated. STREET.. saying that it would be better. concur. The accused took this remonstrance as a display of insubordination. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. while Venancio Gargantel was at the bow. plaintiff-appelle. The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused. CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI. on November 29. L-16486 March 22.Fernan.R. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused. No. acting as helmsman. The accused was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of the boat.Cortes. 1919. and he accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive epithets. Bidin and. J. Calixto Valdez y Quiri. while the interisland steamer Vigan was anchored in the Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from where the river debouches into the Manila Bay. (Chairman). Feliciano. a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. Angel Roco for appellant. Venancio Gargantel.
For this reason they made no movement looking to rescue. At the instant when the accused had attained to within a few feet of Venancio. The proof is direct that he never rose to the surface after jumping into the river. in throwing himself in the river. As was once said by a British court. of no moment except tho show the temporary excitement under which he was laboring. where he lived as a bachelor in the house of an acquaintance. is conclusive of his death. immediately after Venancio leaped into the water. Two scows were moored to the shore. The circumstances narrated above are such in our opinion as to exclude all reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel may have survived. so far as the observers could see. it is needless to say. acted solely in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death. and we think that the trial judge did not err in holding that he is dead and that he came to his death by drowning under the circumstances stated. At it was full midday. His friends and relatives. but inasmuch as there witnesses are sure that Venancio did not again come to the surface. threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more. therefore. the latter. the failure of Venancio Gargantel to rise to the surface conclusively shows that. As to him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils. On the next day one of the friends of Venancio Gargantel posted himself near the lighthouse to watch for the body. for it is obvious that the deceased. coupled with the known fact that human life must inevitably be extinguished by asphyxiation under water. The possibility that he might have swum ashore. and any reasonable person under the same circumstances might have done the same. "If a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes such person to try to escape. The fact that the accused at his juncture threatened the crew with violence is. Two witnesses who were on the boat state that. he was borne down into the water and was drowned. 10 paces from the Vigan. we consider too remote to be entertained for a moment. take it for granted that he is dead. The boat in which this incident took place was at the time possibly 30 or 40 yards from shore and was distant. Though his friendly vigil lasted three days nothing came of it. It may be added that Venancio has not returned to his lodging in Manila. efforts at rescue would have been fruitless. and in so doing he . say. and his personal belongings have been delivered to a representative of his mother who lives in the Province of Iloilo. owing to his possible inability to swim or the strength of the current. the accused told the remaining members of the crew to keep quiet or he would kill them. evidently believing himself in great and immediate peril. and this circumstance.threatening to stab him. after rising in a spot hidden from the view of his companions. As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned the likewise can be no doubt. but between these and the boat intervened a space which may be estimated at 18 or 20 yards. in the hope that it might come to the surface and could thus be recovered. and there was nothing to obstruct the view of persons upon the scene.
concur. Having been convicted as the author of the homicide. enunciated the following doctrine: "That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery. Codigo Penal. C. 9 Penal Code. So ordered. after having inflicted sundry injuries upon another with a cutting weapon. to suffer the corresponding accessories. the trial court. Said sentenced is in accordance with law.) The accused must. art.S.injuries himself. 183. in order to escape the attack. nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed. with costs against the appellant. as follows: It appeared that upon a certain occasion an individual. supposing that he had received no succour. JJ. pointed a shotgun at the injured person and to escape the discharge the latter had to jump into a river where he perished by drowning. 1882. the accused alleged upon appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries. (Par.. occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was placed. J." (Reg. be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio Gargantel. vs. [N.J. 3. Avanceña and Villamor. reclusion temporal. in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide. Halliday. a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased.. and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. In this connection a pertinent decision from the Supreme Court of Spain. disallowing the appeal. Separate Opinions ARAULLO." (II Hidalgo. Mapa. the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result. of July 13. is cited in the brief of The Attorney-General.]. dissenting: . T. to leap into the river. and it being understood that the accessories appropriate to the case are those specified in article 59 of the Penal Code. The Supreme Court. and to pay the costs. 61 L. Rep. among others. The medical authorities charged with conducting the autopsy found that only one of the wounds caused by a cut could have resulted in the death of the injured person. to indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum of P500. Malcolm. as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused. or at most of frustrated homicide. an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having inflicted. by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from.) In accordance with this finding the judge sentenced the accused to undergo imprisonment for twelve years and one day. the same is affirmed.. 701. therefore. p. did not commit any error of law. and that by throwing himself in the river he in fact died of asphyxia from submersion.
1919. Venancio Gargantel was drowned. Sid Garzon himself testified. who lived in the municipality of Guimbal. when the information was filed. There is no evidence whatever that the corpse of Venancio Gargantel had been found or. and another witness. armed with a big knife. nor is there any evidence that it would have been impossible for him. that said Gargantel had died by drowning. by swimming or by any other means to rise to the surface at a place other than the Pasig River or that where the boat was. From November 28. that Venancio Gargantel then died by drowning. 711 San Nicolas Street. Another witness also declared that Gargantel was afterwards not again seen at the house where he lived in this city. The original information in the present case. This event took place at noon on November 29. that he had died. as is alleged in the information. were taken. All of these facts are stated in the decision itself. nine days afterwards. stated that he had probably died. the day when the event occurred. was presented on December 8. where he kept his trunks and some effects. as a consequence of his having thrown himself into the water upon seeing himself threatened and attacked by the accused.I dissent from the majority opinion in this case. to a student. one of those who were in a boat of the steamer Vigan subject to the orders of the accused Calixto Valdez and who at the time was engaged in the work of raising the anchor of that vessel. did not rise again to the surface. of the prosecution. and in the attitude of attacking him. it cannot in any manner be maintained that the necessary time had passed for us to properly conclude. to get the trunks and effects of Venancio from said house. 1919. until December 8. in the Province of Iloilo. and in that manner save himself from death. that he had no information about it. a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from its mouth at the Manila Bay. it only appears that Venancio Gargantel. a fact which caused his mother. to give special power on the 28th of that month of December. for the accused di not take the stand. which was then lying at the Pasig River. No. Such was the statement of two of those witnesses who were members of the boat's crew at the time. charging Calixto Valdez y Quiri with the crime of homicide and alleging that as a result of his having thrown himself into the river under the circumstances mentioned. from which he threw himself into the river. Neither does it appear in the evidence that all the precaution necessary for us to assure ourselves. Ignacio Garzon. there being two lighters moored to the shore and at a distance of about 18 or 20 yards from the boat. The only fact that the evidence shows in that Venancio Gargantel. as a sure and proven fact. Pedro Garcia. after having jumped from the boat. . what is the same thing. because he had not seen Venancio Gargantel. that is. From the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution which is the only evidence in the record. that is. upon being informed of it and upon the failure of Venancio to appear in said place. the boat being then about 30 or 40 yards from land and about 10 steps from the Vigan. one month afterwards. threw himself into the water and disappeared from the surface and had not been seen again. upon seeing that the accused was approaching him. 1919. upon being asked whether Venancio Gargantel had returned to the house of his parents since November 29.
And this is very probable inasmuch as it does not appear in the record that the necessary investigation has been made in order to determined even with only some measure of certainty. may be made. Then. and none of his friends. or legal that the period of one year and four months from his disappearance or since Venancio Gargantel threw himself into the water should suffice for us to impose . merely stated in the power of attorney executed in favor of Ignacio Garzon that the latter should take steps in order that the city fiscal might investigate the death of her son which.Therefore. It is stated in the decision that the friend and parents of Gargantel give him up for dead. For this reason it is stated in the decision that the circumstances therein stated are such that they exclude all reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel could have survived and that the circumstance that never rose to the surface after having jumped into the river. another member of the crew of that steamer. the only fact proved is that since Venancio Gargantel threw himself into the river. 1920. for the simple reason that this was not possible. upon being threatened with a knife by the accused. nor Ignacio Garzon himself has stated that he gave up Gargantel for dead. not to say beyond all reasonable doubt. for his mother Maria Gatpolitan. is conclusive that he died. or to some province of these Islands and is found in some municipality thereof. it is necessary that no information about him should have been received for seven years from his disappearance upon his throwing himself into the river. In my opinion this is not sufficient to convict the accused as guilty of homicide. that is. There is nevertheless in the record no statement of any parent of Gargantel to that effect. or. nor Pedro Garcia. that it was and is impossible to find said person or determined his whereabouts. that is. for in order that this presumption may exist. as witnessed by the persons present. which occurred on November 29. together with the admitted fact that human life is necessarily asphyxiated under the water. in order that a finding of a civil character in favor of or against some person. there is not even a presumption juris tantum that he had died. in short. Furthermore. for they only knew that he did not again rise to the surface and was not seen again after having thrown himself into the river from the boat. by virtue of that presumption. none of the two members of the party in the boat at that time and of the crew of the steamer Vigan. according to section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure. a resident of the municipality of Guimbal. according to information. that is. reasonable. there is nothing more than a deduction that Gargantel had died based upon those facts and circumstances. it is not just. 1919. only about one year and four months ago. because there is the possibility that Gargantel had risen to the surface at some place away from the where he threw himself into the river and had embarked on some other vessel in the same river or out of it in the bay and had gone abroad. nor Maximo Gumbog. two and one-half months after the occurrence of the event. his whereabouts has remained unknown even at the moment of rendering judgment in this case. it is necessary that seven years should have elapsed without any notice being received of the person whose whereabouts is unknown. February 9. and finally. was caused by another members. of the crew of the steamer Vigan. cannot be denied. And if. the owner of the house in which Gargantel lived in this city.
that some damage resulted to Gargantel. as a proven fact. that the accused Calixto Valdez y Quiri cannot be found guilty of homicide and should be acquitted. cited by the majority opinion is not applicable. in which the injured party had already been wounded with a cutting instrument by the accused before throwing himself into the river upon the latter aiming at him with his gun. 1882. with due respect to the opinion of the majority. it having afterwards been proved upon his being taken out of the river that the wound inflicted upon him by the accused was mortal. the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary to escape it and threw himself into the river. . it was declared by said court that. I am of the opinion. that Gargantel has died and at the same time finding said accused to be the author of that death. For the reasons above stated. the decision of the English Supreme Court or that of the Spanish Supreme Court dated July 13. The first. consequently. The second is not applicable because the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain refers to a case. by depriving him of all possible help and placing him in the serious situation related in the judgment appealed from -a case which. as is seen. Lastly. and. beyond reasonable doubt. even if the death of the deceased be considered as not having resulted exclusively and necessarily from that most grave wound.upon the accused Calixto Valdez such a grave penalty as that of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal. or that he had been injured or that he had suffered some injury after having thrown himself into the river as a result of the threat of the accused. just as it cannot be considered as proved that he had died. is not applicable because in the present case it is not proved. merely assuming without declaring it. is very different from that which took place in the present case.
In compliance therewith. No. plaintiff-appellee. J.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. Leyte. accused-appellant. 1987 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. FRANCISCO ABARCA. The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal. SARMIENTO.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo. With the approval of the new Constitution.R. committed as follows: . The information (amended) in this case reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca of the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder. sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder. abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life imprisonment. vs. 74433 September 14.
arriving there at around 6:30 p. M-16 rifle. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 1 xxx xxx xxx On arraignment. Sept. He got Talbo's firearm. in the City of Tacloban. Sept. His . He went back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had engine trouble and could not leave (pp. thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence. that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented their death. tsn. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp. He went to the house of a PC soldier. the accused found his wife. Koh was hit.). tsn. His wife was left behind in their residence in Tacloban. C). Id. 1985). trunk and abdomen (pp. However. Oct. tsn. 24. 17. 17-23. and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused. Leyte (pp. the above-named accused. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. C2C Arturo Talbo. armed with an unlicensed firearm (armalite). thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would have caused the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado. see also exh. tsn. then proceeded to the residence of his father after which he went home. 5-8. Sept. 1984. Id. tsn. The accused. and with treachery. but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. Leyte. the accused was in his residence in Tacloban. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. Jenny. he was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning).m. Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head. to fetch his daughter. an M-16 rifle. 1984. tsn. 1984). He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. 28. The Solicitor General states accurately the facts as follows: Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca. the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Nov. 9-13. 8-9. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. 1984.). The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different parts of his body. 45-47. On the morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores. with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation. The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. 65. tsn. 24. 24.). tsn. Id. Eastern Samar. 1984).That on or about the 15th day of July. Jenny. 1984. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. He arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. had illicit relationship. 34-49. see also exh. 28-29. On July 15. 13-19. Upon reaching home. and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. did then and there wilfully.
complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20. 3 xxx xxx xxx The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo: I. 48. IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.).000. He spent P15. Arnold Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1. and to pay the costs. tsn. that the accused had been deceived. betrayed. 4 . disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts. Manila. and pursuant to Art. II. It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and defendant's wife had illicit relationship while he was away in Manila.000. the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE. was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent Pl. the trial court rendered the appealed judgment.00 for the same purpose (pp. 1986. Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive clemency.000.00). ). 2 On March 17. Id. Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency. 23. 24-25.00 a month was not able to work for 1-1/2 months because of his wounds. to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30. SO ORDERED. finding the accused. Id. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. Francisco Abarca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder as charged in the amended information.wife. thru the Ministry of Justice. he is hereby sentenced to death.000. Lina Amparado.000. not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical reduction or commutation of his death sentence. tsn. the President of the Philippines.
6 we said: xxx xxx xxx . Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances . and must not have been influenced by external factors. does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour. and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse. shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Though quite a length of time. . supra. These rules shall be applicable. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person. while the daughters are living with their parents. These elements are present in this case. having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person. 5 In People v. immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse. does not define an offense. — Any legally married person who. 247. the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code. the victim in this case. Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter. shall suffer the penalty of destierro. he shall be exempt from punishment. in convicting the accused-appellant of murder. in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . therefore erred. The trial court. as a result of which. Article 247 reads in full: ART. he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Araque. complexed with double frustrated murder. had passed between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot.The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional circumstances. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. in the act of illicit copulation. . and their seducers. It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247. to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind. We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. about one hour. The killing must be the direct byproduct of the accused's rage. under the same circumstances.
far from defining a felony. incidentally. consequently. it could not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime. 672. the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation. we think. hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions. that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime. (Sec. considering the enormous provocation and his righteous indignation. admit them.As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code. in the information. and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd. vs. U. the accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide. parricide.. or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein. the abovequoted article. Coricor. This penalty is mere banishment and. and shall kill any or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. murder. is not inflicted upon the accused. Only "acts or omissons . xxx xxx xxx We. cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances. In effect. not being an essential element of the offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded. as the case may be — is punished only with destierro. Rule 106. He is banished. amount to an exempting circumstance. merely provides or grants a privilege or benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another.) And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted. . 79 Phil. 5.S. Rules of Court. conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for a specific crime.. 23 Phil. Thus. is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment. . 7 xxx xxx xxx Punishment. and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead.) That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There can. therefore. therefore.. since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the crime charged.. as held in a case. but that is intended for his protection. (People vs. We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.. or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. 368. for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted. . but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances therein mentioned. constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or information. would make the exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the offense. Campo. Article 247. the offender is exempted from punishment. . 8 It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances. not being a punishable act. or serious physical injury. and. in case of death or serious physical injuries.e. i.
") 10 that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. Accordingly. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1. he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas. the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Here. we therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period. however. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period. No special pronouncement as to costs. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16. that is.500. less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. This is where we disagree.The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony.) 12 For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. and being the more severe offense. with respect to Lina Amparado. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half months. While it appears that before firing at the deceased. 9 But the case at bar requires distinctions. This does not mean. . 11 there is no showing. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the accusedappellant. Although as a rule. The accusedappellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). IT IS SO ORDERED. that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. 13 WHEREFORE. of Article 365. as to the extent of her injuries. we hold him liable under the first part. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados. one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act.000. second paragraph. Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
88-89. 8 Supra.N. and Padilla JJ. 6 Supra." See T. 1984. 681-683. penned by Regional Trial Court Judge Auxencio C. Araquel. were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.. 2.S. art. 4 Brief for Accused-Appellant. PEN. 1985.. session of October 17. 10-11. CODE. . Footnotes 1 Rollo. 12 Record. see supra. 2 Id.S.-Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. The statement is translated as follows: "Those not concerned. 48. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property.N. rollo. concur. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Paras. session of November 28. 677 (1959). 29. 11 T. supra. 23-24. 5 People v. 9 Article 4 of the Code provides as follows: Art. 7 Supra. 4. art. 24. 71. Melencio-Herrera. 45. 10 Brief for the Accused-Appellant. 106 Phil.. 17-18. get out.Yap (Chairman). Criminal liability. 3 Id. 13 REV.. Dacuycuy..
was convicted of by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.R. and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12.: A man must love his wife. ULEP. Castor Naval for accused-appellant. When against this unwritten rule he beats her. And the law imposes the supreme penalty when in the process he kills her. No. Ulep. He must not lift a finger to hurt her. He becomes a beast. It is parricide pure and simple. 1988 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. GANCAYCO. This is what Macario A.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G. MACARIO A. . plaintiff-appellee. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. L-36858 June 20. Indeed he must be her protector.00 and to pay the costs in a decision of March 20. he ceases to be a man. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.000. 1973. vs. J. Second Judicial District. accused-appellant.
Macario. 1970. At the behest of the daughter. On May 21. the police chief and Dr. San Nicolas. Accordingly. caught up with the funeral Procession at the Catholic cemetery and thereupon conducted an autopsy on the deceased. The 4th and 5th ribs fractured along the midolavicular line. at nine o'clock in the evening. Ilocos Norte Date: May 25. a physician. the daughter of the deceased by a previous marriage asked for a day or two to decide on her preference. the Chief of Police of San Nicolas. The Chief of Police suggested that an autopsy be conducted but the husband refused to allow the same. 24. Eliseo Bonoan. right side. The following day. The 6th and 7th ribs fractured along the anterior auxillary line. left. Complete fracture of the 3rd and 4th ribs at the juncture of the rib and external cartillages with concomitant injury to its sounding tissues and extravascated blood. Ilocos Norte received a report of the said death of Asuncion Pablo who allegedly died of a heart attack. Ilocos Norte. left. in San Nicolas. left. one Asuncion Pablo Ulep died as a result of physical injuries inflicted upon her on that very day by her husband. However. 6th and 7th ribs.The facts are undisputed. left. Presence of extravascated blood and injuries of the surrounding tissues of the broken ribs areas. accused Macario Ulep. The Chief of Police and the Rural Health Officer went to the house of the deceased and there they saw the body on a bamboo bed surrounded by relatives. . friends. the request for an autopsy was made shortly before the burial. 1970 PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS SKIN: A rectangular area of about 1" x 3" bluish black in color was noted on the upper half. 5th. and the husband of the deceased. left. anterior aspect of the arm. SKELETAL SYSTEM: Complete fracture of the 4th. The autopsy reports read as follows: POSTMORTEM EXAMINATION Name: ASUNCION PABLO ULEP Age: 42 Nationality: Filipino Address: No.
was his elbowing her on her breast. 16. two (2) constabulary sergeants investigated Macario Ulep. His statement was reduced to writing and then subscribed to before Fiscal Abaya. 1 Two weeks after the burial. In this statement. of a serous fluid found within the cavity. This statement was marked Exhibit "B". Ulep narrated that this elbowing and attack took place at their home at 5:30 in the afternoon. (Exh. Asuncion Pablo. PC sergeant Damian Bautista of Camp Juan. CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM: Heart with small amount of clotted blood.). A statement was prepared and signed by the accused and was subsequently sworn to before Fiscal Cesar Abaya of Ilocos Norte. of serous fluid within the cavity. rec.THORACIC CAVITY: Presence of about 200 cc. he admitted that he caused the death of his wife by elbowing her because his wife was then drunk and was uttering indecent words. marked as Exhibit "A". D. Pleura lacerated at the points of fractures. The big blood vessels contained small amount of clotted blood. He reported this death to their barrio captain. The following day. . The accused then left for the fields and returned at around 9:00 in the evening and found his wife dead on her bed. CAUSE OF DEATH: CARDIAC ARREST PRIMARY SHOCK. ABDOMINAL CAVITY: Presence of about 500 cc. Laoag City conducted another investigation of accused Macario Ulep. He reiterated that the cause of death of his wife. Coronary vessels congested. p. She vomitted and then went to bed. DIGESTIVE SYSTEM: Apparently normal CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM: The meningeal vessels were congested.
EXHIBIT "A" AND EXHIBIT "A-1. their bullcart loaded with sacks of rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on her breast. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF SAID ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO A LONG STANDING PROCESS OR CONDITION IN HER BODY SYSTEM. Bonoan's testimony that the fractures in the chest could have been caused by blows or physical pressure. and while his wife went to have their palay milled. PEDRO BLANCO FOR THE DEFENSE. The defense took exception to Dr. We agree and see no fault in this finding made in the necropsy report of Dr. The husband who previously denied permission to conduct an autopsy was present when the autopsy was performed shortly before the body was buried at the cemetery of San Nicolas. AS ADMIRED BY HIM IN HIS AFFIDAVITS.Despite these statements. of the accused. she was treated by a country quack doctor or "arbularyo. the cause of death was manifestly due to cardiac arrest and primary shock. Could such injuries not have been inflicted by elbow blows when the victim was standing or by knee or feet blows when the victim was lying on her back or was sitting with her back against the wall? ." The accused took exception to his conviction when he raised the following errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO THE ELBOW BLOWS BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ON HER BREAST. In the necropsy report of Dr. Our primary concern is to determine the cause of death of Asuncion Pablo. the wife. With the pain in her chest. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED CONSEQUENTLY IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE. Bonoan. Was her death a result of cardiac arrest and primary shock due to fractured ribs? The appellant alleges that the gradual weakening of the heart due to a long standing illness of the body system caused the cardiac arrest which claimed the life of Asuncion Pablo. AS TESTIFIED TO BY DR. The post-mortem report on the deceased was prepared by Dr. Ulep retracted his statement in court by narrating that more than a year before that. Eliseo V. WHEN SUCH ADMISSION IS BUT A MERE BELIEF ON HIS PART. Bonoan. (Exhibits "A" and "B") admitting his guilt." ENGLISH TRANSLATION. Bonoan who conducted an autopsy at the behest of a daughter of tile deceased by a previous marriage. Ilocos Norte.
Even so. to the fact that the fracture conditions Were of long standing. Thus the theory of the defense is strengthened by the very evidence of the prosecution. The points of fracture did not cave-in or were not depressed and they did not injure or impede the heart to cause cardiac arrest. Blanco attributes the absence of swelling or contusion on the chest. while the victim was lying on her back. And even on the theory that the fractures were caused by stamping the foot on a piece of wood placed on the chest. the same could not have caused cardiac arrest or primary shock because the lacerations were limited to the pleura. of serous fluid and that this is normal. This means that the fractures were not depressed or that the fractured ends did not cave-in. Bonoan that the chest is pliant and is like an accordion which can be compressed is puerile to say the least. This is so because the serous fluid in the pleura -as not reddish. that is. The claim of Dr. the evidence of the prosecution shows that the deceased died of cardiac arrest because of the weakening of the heart due to a long standing process or condition in her body system. some repairs has happened and that sufficient time have elapsed for the swelling to disappear (t. This is so because a fracture necessarily results in the extravasation of blood in the fractured area and it is the extravasated blood that causes the swelling or contusion. there were no contusions on the chest of the victim. This indicates that the elbow blows were not of sufficient force to fracture the ribs. were not depressed fractures or cave-in fractures. so as to injure the heart and impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest. 4 Furthermore. 2 Dr. This is so because only extravasated blood was present around the immediate area of the fractures. The fractures merely caused the extravasation of blood within the fractured areas. Neither did the lacerations of the pleura cause primary shock because blood did not spill into the pleura. both sides in this case took issue to the presence of 200 cc. still the fractures could not have injured the heart or impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest. although the pleura or thoracic cavity was lacerated at the points of fracture. which means a mere breakage that would not cause the stoppage of the heart. 180). of serous fluid in the pleura. .While the accused admitted that he delivered several elbow blows on the chest of his wife immediately before her death and the prosecution attributed these blows as the proximate cause of the cardiac arrest and primary shock which resulted in the wife's death. the elbow blows of the accused could not have caused a compression of the chest wall. the defense assails this theory of the prosecution in the following manner: First. which indicates that the hemorrhage was nil. Bonoan were present. because the fractures. Anyway both agree that there should be enough serous fluid to lubricate the tissues..n.s. The appellant claims that it is not normal whereas the prosecution says that the pleura normally contains 100 to 200 cc. On the contrary. 3 And third. where the fractures were found. p. because it does not tend to compress the heart. the same could have not caused cardiac arrest and primary shock. And neither would the fractures cause primary shock because they were merely complete fractures. even on the theory that fractures of the ribs as that found by Dr. no matter how pliant it could be. Second.
the physician. 5 Dr. may be due to the chronic condition of the kidney like nephritis and edema or the hardening of the liver or a long progressively weakening of the heart. that he has not "attended a case of fractured ribs" 8 and that he explains cardiac failure as a "failing of the heart" and his further concept is that it is "the stopping of the heart. findings. In these affidavits. of serous fluid in the abdominal cavity which. Dr. 1970. right chest of Asuncion Pablo on the same evening of May 21. 5th. Bonoan. established in two affidavits. and 4th ribs. kneels or presses the body of a victim against a wall. the cause of death of the wife-victim in this case is cardiac arrest and primary shock caused by the strong pressure applied on the upper front chest bone. 6th and 7th ribs on her left chest and the 3rd. 7 There is an admission by Dr. Blanco. and an incisive study of the necropsy report. Another point raised in the necropsy report pertains to the presence of clotted blood in the heart and blood vessels as well as the congestion of the meningeal vessels.The presence of 500 cc. This witness said that two (2) ribs on each side of the chest were fractured. Bonoan of the prosecution disclosed that there were no signs of circulatory weakening and that blood clots were not found adherent to the heart and such being the condition there could be no abnormality and thus he further declares that such clots are normally found in the heart of a dead person or in any part of the circulatory system. Bonoan did not concur in this view when he said that the fluid was rather increased as a result of the diffusion of the medicine used in the embalming. The man-size blows coming from the elbow of the aggressor upon a thin-framed woman can only bring about fatal results. This attack caused the complete fracture of the 4th. the appellant's witness. the appellant presented a witness to prove that sometime in February or March. witness for the appellant. . The trial judge observed: "There was never any attempt on the part of the accused to repudiate the sworn statements wherein he admitted that the cause of death of his wife was his having elbowed her many times on her breast. She was legally married to Macario Ulep." He says that such stoppage could be due to trauma." was caused by said accused. according to Dr. 9 A resume of the evidence presented by the parties establishes the fact of death of Asuncion Pablo on May 21. Blanco. This happens when one steps. The death. 1970. From all these observations. the appellant herein. Exhibits "A" and "B. 1969 his wife was pinned down by a sack of rice and the side portion of a bullcart and was attended to by a town quack doctor called an arbularyo. The appellant bares that this is a sign of the hardening of the heart. such as a fracture of the ribs." 10 Having realized the gravity of his act. the appellant admitted that he elbowed and attacked his wife. without stating which particular ribs were so affected. 6 We find cogent basis in the explanation given by Dr.
.000. Shock. and even though the victim may have been previously affected by some internal malady." Again. then there is criminal liability. 13 Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. Death however. Slane. The indemnity to the heirs of his deceased wife should be increased to P30. There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell the blame for these in human acts on his wife. by itself appears to be unimportant is attested by experience. when a person receives a violent blow upon the pit of the stomach. had followed twenty minutes after the maltreatment and was evidently due to the shock." This is the rationale in Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by a person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. 225. or behind the ear.We find relevance in Wharton and Stilles' findings in their book. for instance. In the case of Reg. if the blow delivered by the accused — (a) is the efficient cause of death.. et al. 12 We have previously stated that: Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment. convinced that there is no fundamental disagreement between the two medical witnesses as to the cause of the victim's death and that cardiac arrest and primary shock took away the life of the victim. or (c) is the proximate cause of death. . but there were no marks of bruises present. as. Asuncion Pablo. liver or heart disease. No satisfactory explanation of the cause of the shock seems to have been found. 11 the deceased had received injuries to the abdomen by kick and blows. or tuberculosis. The prisoners were convicted of murder. . or anything to show the cause of death. he who caused such acceleration is responsible for the death as the result of an injury willfully and unlawfully inflicted. — Death may also be due to the shock associated with the injury. yet if the blow with the fist or foot accelerated death. it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and cause death. He should answer for her tragic death. or to the larynx. or (b) accelerated his death. The possibility of a person dying from the shock attendant upon an injury which. Shock from an injury may be fatal even when the blow leaves no trace behind it.. v. 14 We are.00. We elucidated that: even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any external wound. therefore. though it is due in some way to the upsetting of the nervous equilibrium of the body." to wit: Sec. Medical Jurisprudence under the title of "SHOCK.
concur. 13 People vs. Rollo.WHEREFORE. Rollo. 2 Page 36. Rollo. Appellant's Brief. Rosalinda Rodriguez. Rollo: page 16. 14 United States v. Rollo. Appellant's Brief. page 8. Rollo. 8 Ibid. Ilustre. Griño-Aquino and Medialdea. page 16. Decision of the Court of First Instance. Appellee's Brief. Ass. 12 Wharton & Stille's Medical Jurisprudence. 4 Page 36. page 13. 3 Page 36. 5th Ed. 54 Phil. Rollo. 594. 5 Page 36. . 22. 6 Page 56. 9 Page 56. Appellee's Brief. 1872. Appellant's Brief. Appellant's Brief. with the above modification as to indemnity. page 11. Rollo. JJ. page 7. page 15. 23 Phil. Cruz. 11 Citing Derham Wint. Narvasa. Rollo. SO ORDERED. 7 Page 56. page 9. Footnotes 1 Page 56. Appellee's Brief. 10 Page 13. the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects..
R. defendant-appellant. J. in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code. the accused Donato Bindoy willfully. plaintiff-appellee. inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the chest which caused his instant death. municipality of Baliangao. No. with the accessories of law. 1930. DONATO BINDOY.000. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1. in the barrio of Calunod. vs. according to the following information: That on or about the 6th of May.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. Florentino Saguin for appellant. L-34665 August 28.: The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal. Province of Occidental Misamis. and to pay the costs. unlawfully. and feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam. The crime charged against the accused is homicide. 1931 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. . VILLAMOR. Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. and his conduct was perfectly lawful. Carmen Angot. The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6. a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas. he hit Omamdam. attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest. who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him. One Donato Bindoy. The widow testified that she knew of her husband's wound being caused by Bindoy from his statement to her before his death. wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam. who. for. who was also there. There were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton). There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy. offered some tuba to Pacas' wife. hit . respectively. and in convicting him of the crime of homicide. judging by the description given by the sanitary inspector who attended him as he lay dying. and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife. and were on good terms with each other. The wound which Omamdam received in the chest. and as she refused to drink having already done so. while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death. it appears they were nephew and uncle. who was then behind Bindoy. Such testimony is not incompatible with that of the accused. and his counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. municipality of Baliangao. to the effect that he wounded Omamdam by accident. he was only defending his possession of the bolo. started by some of the tuba drinkers. Neither is there any indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place. tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo. 1930. on the contrary. in his effort to free himself of Pacas. The defendant. testified having seen the accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. but the defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent. with his family. Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas. The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. and his wife called Tibay. and instead of wounding him. lived near the market. This occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam. the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his house to satisfy his curiosity. Province of Occidental Misamis. In the course of this struggle. according to the testimony of the witnesses. indeed.The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court. which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening. Pacas and the widow of the deceased.
and Imperial. corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo. 1 of the Penal Code. that the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8. as we have said. (Art. Johnson. and especially of provincial fiscals. when possible. Street. there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side.Omamdam in the chest. Romualdez. concur. Wherefore. because Emigdio had passed behind him. JJ. . the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent. We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind.. who was therefore hit in the chest. nor I at him: It was a mishap. The witness for the defense. directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and proving. 47). at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up. would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case. we are of opinion and so hold. although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later. and that when the latter let go. C.. In view of the evidence before us. Avanceña. in his struggle with Pacas. Carlos (15 Phil. since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability. Malcolm. If. In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act. to wit: The attention of prosecuting officers. the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under investigation.J. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. Donato did not aim at me. No. Penal Code. as we have stated." And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve. had it existed. but. this is not the case..) But. and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. the judgment appealed from is reversed. which. and instead of doing so. So ordered. 8. Gaudencio Cenas. Villa-Real. and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this wound." The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal. without Donato's seeing him." adding further: "This wound was an accident. he would have had to answer for his act. had wounded Omamdam.
L-32066 March 15. and criminally and with a bolo which he then carried. the said Mapudul died. causing him a mortal wound on the left side of the neck and that as a consequence of said wound. Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. OSTRAND. in the municipal district of Pantukan. as within the jurisdiction of the court. Province of Davao. Capili for appellant. . Philippine Islands. J.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. the information reading as follows: That on or about October 26. vs. 1928. plaintiff and appellee. 1903 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. defendant and appellant. illegally. No. Jose Ma.R. assaulted the Mansaca Mapudul. the said accused voluntarily.: The defendant was charged before the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao with the crime of homicide. GONA (Mansaca).
with the result that a quarrel took the place between the Mansaca Dunca and the defendant. but his attorney argues that in view of the fact that said defendant had no intention to kill the deceased and committed the crime by mistake. Johns. Neither do we believe that the fact that he made a mistake in killing the wrong man should be considered as a mitigating circumstances. the mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicated on him a mortal wound with a bolo. cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility. So ordered. JJ. even that. . Villamor. the court said: Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario Lauigan instead of Pedro Acierto. 242). It appears from the evidence that on the evening of October 26. when it is proved that he acted maliciously and willfully..000. Romualdez and Villa-Real. The defendant left the house about the same time with intention of assaulting Dunca. Dunca and his son Aguipo eventually left the house and were followed by Mapudul and one Award. From this sentenced the defendant appealed. There seems to have been liberal supply of alcoholic drinks and some of the men present became intoxicated. 1928. in no way could be considered as a relief from his criminal act. and to the costs. That he made a mistake in killing one man instead of another. Johnson. a number of Mansacas celebrated a reunion in the house of the Mansaca Gabriel. in view of the mortal wound which inflicted upon the latter. In these case of United State vs. This contention is contrary to earlier decisions of this court. Mendieta(34 Phil. Malcolm. sentenced him to suffer twelve years and one of reclusion temporal with the accessory penalties prosecuted by law to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1.Upon trial the court below found the defendant guilty as charged in the information and taking into consideration the extenuating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication.. he should have been found guilty of homicide through negligence under paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code and not of the graver crime of intentional homicide. but in the darkness of the evening and in the intoxicated condition of the defendant. There can no doubt that the defendant killed Mapudul and that he is guilty of the crime charged. concur. The appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the defendant.
to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P700 and to pay the costs. L-25459 August 10.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. RAMON MABUG-AT. No. Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. making two assignments of error as committed by the trial court. Vicente Sotto for appellant. and . 1926 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. ROMUALDEZ.R. to wit: 1. vs. with the accessories of the law. plaintiff-appellee. The appellant appealed from this judgment.: The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros imposed upon Ramon Mabug-at the penalty of twelve years and one day cadena temporal. for the crime of frustrated murder. defendant-appellant. In holding that the crime committed is frustrated murder. J.
requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so.2. it not having been proven that it was the accused's intention to kill. The defense. and especially having aimed at her person--the head--are facts which. followed them without saying a word. revolver in hand. In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. The evidence of the prosecution shows that the accused and Juana Buralo was sweethearts. Due to proper medical attention. In not giving any credit to the evidence presented by the defense. later following her to her house. with injuries. it was the accused's intention to kill. and there are many cases in the books wherein the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that on discharging a firearm at another the actor was not in fact animated by the intent to kill. as in the case at bar. permit of no other conclusion than that. went to look for Juana Buralo at the house where the devotion was being held. On the third day. the bullet passing through a part of her neck. the fact that the accused. revolver in hand. Their relations were such that the accused invited Juana to take a walk on the afternoon of August 9.. As the two girls were going upstairs. There the accused. who was seen by the two girls. finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. which was completely destroyed. Montenegro (15 Phil. in firing the shot. without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not responsible for the crime. It is only a short distance from the house where the devotion took place to that of the offended party. later sending him a note of excuse. when they went in the direction of their house. the accused. Perfecta Buralo did not die and is on e of the witnesses who testified at the trial of this case. or the night of August 11th. 1925. The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo. 1). while standing at the foot of the stairway. Juana refused him. and where. the accused said: "If you do not want to go upstairs. in seeking to ascertain the intention with which a specific act is committed. the accused went to the threshold of Cirilo Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in some devotion. in our opinion. Juana had been jealous of the accused on account of the latter having frequently visited the house of one Carmen. The accused. fired a shot from his revolver which wounded Perfecta Buralo. contends that the crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a firearm. a revolver is twice . having entered the posterior region thereof and coming out through the left eye. But. it was held: We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of the intention to kill. it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they are developed by the evidence." The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came downstairs. his disappointment at her not accepting his invitation to take a walk. I will get Juana and if anyone tries to defend her I will kill him. the houses being adjacent.
The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another. in fact. the culprit not having. do. the acts should be held to be frustrated homicide and punished with the maximum degree of the penalty prescribed by law.) The circumstances qualifying the murder alleged in the complaint are evidence premeditation and treachery. 1. 1885 (Viada. etc. 29. in the instant case. as held by the trial court. the fact is that treachery was proven and must be taken into consideration in this case.. and the shots directed at the most vital parts of the body. he employed means which tended to insure the commission of the crime without any risk to himself arising from any defense that might be made by the offended party. yet. it is evident that in firing the gun which Alejandro Sola was carrying which caused the death of Nazario Iñigo. it cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the present case. the doctrine sustained therein is applicable to the case at bar so far as the concurrence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is concerned. but her aunt Juana Buralo. at whom the shot was aimed in order to kill him so that he might not testify as to the assault committed upon him shortly before. and there being no other qualifying circumstance of frustrated murder present in this case. The Supreme Court of Spain. p. (Art. because the accused fired at Perfecta Buralo. nor could Nazario Iñigo become aware of any attack so unjustified. 1890 ed. because the person whom the accused intended to kill was not Perfecta Buralo. (Question 2. . 30). in a decision of May 7. taking into consideration the substantial and intrinsical meaning thereof. it needs but little additional evidence to establish the intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt. 3. committed a crime different from that which he intended. whether with respect to the wounded Bartolome Lobejano or to the deceased Nazario Iñigo.. for neither the wounded party Bartolome Lobejano. according to the concept of treachery as it is explained in article 10 of the Civil code dealing with said circumstance. was not in a position to defend himself in any way. in holding a crime to be murder and not homicide. Penal Code.discharged point-blank at the body of another.) But. for which reason the rules of article 65 are not applicable herein. who was hit by the bullet. considering. does not alter his criminal liability. would have attended the crime had the bullet hit Juana Buralo was present in this case because the offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going upstairs with their backs towards the accused when he fired his revolver. Even when there is sufficient proof of premeditation (which we do not believe has been sufficiently established). par. further. The treachery which. that the purely accidental circumstance that as a result of the shot a person other than the one intended was killed. 28. the elements constituting the crime of murder qualified by the treachery with which Alejandro Sola acted. does not modify. pp. Viada's Penal Code. employing means which tended to insure the execution of the crime without running any risk himself from anyone who might attempt to defend the said offended party. Although the case just cited refers to the crime of consummated murder. stated the following: Considering that. according to the evidence. Had evident premeditation been proven. rapid and unforeseen.
the accused having intended to kill and performed all the acts of execution. did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. under conditions which intended directly and especially to insure. alias FRANCISCO ADMONES. Philippine Islands. Johns and Villa-Real JJ. 1933 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.. Street.) We find no merit in the first assignment of error.The crime now before us is frustrated murder. vs. L-38511 October 6. 3.. alias BUCOY. which would have produced the crime of murder but which. Caldwell and Sotto and Astilla for appellant. alias FRISCO GUY). nevertheless. J. in the City of Manila. Ostrand. the . defendant-appellant. No. With the exception of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Villamor. FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES (alias FRANCISCO CAGURO. we find no other aggravating circumstance. In regard to the second.: The accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of asesinato. 1932. (Art. without any just cause therefor and with intent to kill and treachery. plaintiff-appellee. committed as follows: That on or about the 24th day of July. it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts enumerated above constitute the crime of frustrated murder. C. the said accused did then and there willfully. concur. the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts costs against the appellant. Penal Code. unlawfully and feloniously. Avanceña. So ordered. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G. W. Office of the Solicitor-General Bengzon for appellee. assault and attack one Yu Lon by suddenly giving him a fist blow on the back part of the head.R. VICKERS.A. The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law and the facts proven.J.
who were walking along Calle Mestizos. After hearing the evidence. the victim to the crime charged in the information. Chin Sam and Yee Fung. saw the incident and joined him in the pursuit of Yu Lon's assailant. The wounded man was taken to the Philippine General Hospital. It appears from the evidence that about 8:30 on the night of July 24. The trial court erred in finding that the appellant the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon. 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee.accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim Yu Lon might make. under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. His head struck the asphalt pavement. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. the trial court erred in finding that the appellant struck his supposed victim. Assuming that the four preceding errors assigned are without merit. the lower part of his body fell on the sidewalk. and when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his father. with the accessory penalties of the law. and then lost sight of him. and to pay the costs. Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. and Jaboneros Streets. Yu Yee pursued him through San Fernando. father and son. Torres found the defendant guilty as charged. instead of convicting him of the crime of maltreatment. and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua. Judge Luis P. and that the appellant did strike his supposed victim (facts which we specifically deny) the trial court erred in finding that the blow was dealt from the victim's rear. a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice. which were necessarily mortal and which caused the immediate death of the said Yu Lon. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Yu Lon in the sum of P1. The trial court erred in finding that the identity of the appellant was fully established. While they were talking. with his back to the street. thus causing him to fall on the ground as a consequence of which he suffered a lacerated wound on the scalp and a fissured fracture on the left occipital region. under article 266 of the said Code. the man that had been passing back the forth behind Yu Lon approached him from behind and suddenly and without warning struck him with his fist on the back part of the head. 2. Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon. Camba. Two other Chinese. 3. His assailants immediately ran away. stopped to talk on the sidewalk at the corner of Mestizos and San Fernando Streets in the District of San Nicolas Yu Lon was standing near the outer edge of the sidewalk. Appellant's attorney de oficio makes the following assignments of error: 1.000. 4. were he died . Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon (a fact which we specifically deny). 5. the trial court erred in convicting the appellant of the crime of murder.
Yu Yee said that he could recognize his father's assailant. As to the contention that the deceased would have fallen on his face if he had been struck on the back of the head. 25 or 30 years old. that he had tuberculosis. Yu Yee without hesitation pointed out the defendant as the person that had assaulted Yu Lon. The accused was identified by Yu Yee and two other Chinese. and that he had died from cerebral hemorrhage. Yu Yee was immediately called to the police station. and that he had exceptional opportunities for observing his father's assailant. Another consideration is that sidewalks almost invariably slope towards the pavement. and this being true. Dominador Sales. to doubt the correctness of the findings of the trial judge. He was wearing a dark wool suit. Yu Yee promptly reported the incident to the police.1awphil. and although Yu Yee may have overstated at the trial some of the facial peculiarities in the defendant that he claimed to have observed at the time of the incident. because while that person was walking back and forth behind Yu Lon. and whether or not be struck the deceased. and a tumor in the left kidney. after considering the evidence and arguments of counsel. The accused was placed near the middle of a line of some eleven persons that had been detained for investigation. Yu Yee was facing the assailant. and described him as being about five feet in height.about midnight. who found that the deceased had sustained a lacerated wound and fracture of the skull in the occipital region. it must be remembered that Yu Yee without hesitation picked the defendant out of a group of eleven persons as his father's assailant. accompanied by Yu Yee. the expert testimony shows that in such a case a person instinctively makes an effort to preserve or regain his balance. and on August 4th the accused was arrested by detectives Manrique and Bustamante. he naturally tended to fall backwards. with long hair and wearing a suit of dark clothes. They were wearing different kinds of clothes. After Sergeant Sol Cruz had been working on the case for three or four days he received information that the accused might be the person that had assaulted Yu Lon. He identified him not only by his long hair combed towards the back and worn long on the sides in the form of side-whiskers (patillas). With respect to the first four assignment of error. went to the scene of the crime and found blood stains in the street. though not in an advanced stage. The evidence leaves no room for . whether he did so in a treacherous manner. and if he did assault the deceased.net The testimony of the three Chinese that a man struck the deceased and then ran away is corroborated by the testimony of a 15-year old boy. and about 3 o'clock the next morning Sergeant Sol Cruz and other detectives. but also by his high cheek-bones and the fact that his ears have no lobes. and that as result thereof the deceased may have fallen backwards. when the deceased straightened up. We find the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses as to the whereabouts of the defendant on the night in question unworthy of credit. we see no sufficient reason. The defendant was identified at the trial not only by Yu Yee. Anastacia Villegas. A post-mortem examination was made the next day by Dr. but also by Chin Sam and Yee Fung. which raise questions of fact as to the identification of the accused.
S.doubt that the accused struck the deceased on the back of the head. vs. Mallari. 16. There is nothing to indicate that it was due to some extraneous case. 14 U. but is merely a mitigating circumstance (U. Paragraph No. Can the defendant be convicted of murder when he did not intend to kill the deceased? . without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the offender. notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward mark of violence. or for slight physical injuries instead of murder. merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences. the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death. 29 Phil. is taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance." (Article 14. from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one's illegal acts. vs. does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility. In the fifth assignment of error it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all. 32 Phil. 344. Rodriguez. 14 Phil. of the Revised Penal Code. "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person. Luciano.S. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provide that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. but that in such cases. U. 23 Phil.S.. The next question is whether the crime committed by the defendant should be classified as homicide or murder. vs. 22). it was held that death may result from a blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal region. Brobst. or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution. it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present. Since the accused struck the deceased from behind and without warning. under the law in these Islands.) The fourth assignment of error is a repetition of the first. and the fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act. No. employing means.S. should be punished in accordance with article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. the lack of intention. and if the accused had not struck the deceased on the back of the head. U. that where death result as the direct consequence of the use of illegal violence. but in order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he proposed to commit.. 310. facing each other. while it does not exempt from criminal liability.. he acted with treachery. Diana. that one is not relieved. supra. There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon.S. to wit: (a) That a felony was committed. vs.. it would have been necessary for him to go between the deceased and Yu Yee. because when the deceased was assaulted he and Yu Yee were standing on the sidewalk.) In the Brobst case. 96.. methods. It was clearly the direct consequence of defendants felonious act. (U. vs. 2 Phil.) The reasoning of the decisions cited is applicable to the case at bar.
. or whether it was for the purpose of inflicting further punishment. being chargeable with the death of the offended party. (Decision of May 10. modes or forms are employed. Candelaria (2 Phil.. the fact is that by this means the defendants secured themselves against any risk which might have arisen from an attempt at self-defense on the part of the victim. between alevosia and the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to cause so great an injury: Considering that there is no moral or legal incompatibility between treachery and the mitigating circumstance No. Vol. Gazette of April 20. but it was a condition of the criminal act itself. etc. 156. 906. Whether it was to prevent him from making resistance.We have seen that under the circumstances of this case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon. although with mitigation corresponding to the disparity between the act intended and the act consummated. to the appreciation of the first of said circumstances and simultaneously of the second if the injury produced exceeds the limits intended by the accused. but this does not neutralize that other qualifying circumstance of the resulting death. p. 1905. in case treacherous means. If by this means the ill treatment was aggravated. and since the defendant did commit the crime with treachery. moral or legal. and therefore there is no obstacle. although he did not intend to kill the deceased. he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide. The Supreme Court of Spain has held that there is no incompatibility. or that the accused. It was not a condition of the purpose.) In the case of the United States vs. 3 of article 9 of the Penal Code. and for that reason it cannot be held in the instant case that this mitigating circumstances excludes treachery. because the former depends upon the manner of execution of the crime and the latter upon the tendency of the will towards a definite purpose. it follows that it is a qualifying circumstances in the death which resulted. because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a treacherous manner. Viada: 5th edition. We are of opinion that they had no intention to cause so great an evil as that which resulted. in whatever sense this be taken. The means employed were not made use of for the precise purpose of making certain the death of Jacinto de Jesus but as a safe means of illtreating him without risk to the persons who were doing so. whether it was to torture him for the purpose of making him give information. should not be liable due to the voluntary presence of treachery in the act perpetrated. because his death was the direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the head. 104). this court speaking through Chief Justice Arellano said: In trying Jacinto to a tree the three defendants acted treacherously (alevosamente). because if there was no alevosia for the purpose of killing there was alevosia for the purpose of the illtreating. he is guilty of murder. 2.
R. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G. From the records. and Butte. four months. Sulpicio Intod. In the morning of February 4.J. Avanceña. Lopez Jaena. Thereafter. JJ. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and . CAMPOS. 1979. Abad Santos.The penalty of murder (article 248 of the Revised Penal Code) is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. C.. 103119 October 21. Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.. Oroquieta City. and one day of reclusion temporal. and there being present in this case one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance the prison sentence of the appellant is reduced to seventeen years. we gathered the following facts. the decision appealed from is affirmed. Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. petitioner. Pangasian.. J. Jorge Pangasian. Street. filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. with the costs against the appellant. finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder. 1992 SULPICIO INTOD. Branch XIV. concur. vs. As thus modified. No. Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan. Sulpicio Intod.: Petitioner. JR. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Mandaya and Intod. respondents.
the crime is possible. At the instance of his companions. not impossible. The court (RTC). Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. Mandaya. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred: xxx xxx xxx 2. the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. 4(2). . all armed with firearms. respondent pointed out that: . Petitioner. otherwise. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime. the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots.. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property. It turned out. Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Lopez Jaena. No one was hit by the gun fire. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises. Pangasian. 4(2). 3 .that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men. . At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day. however. Further. Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. On the other hand. Instead. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. Misamis Occidental. that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. The crime of murder was not consummated.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. 3. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. Respondent alleged that there was intent. but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. Ibid. he would also be killed. Thereafter. arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan. citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides: Art. Petitioner. Tubio and Daligdig. Petitioner contends that. they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Pangasian. in its Comment to the Petition. Had it not been for this fact. Revised Penal Code). 2 After trial.
Article 4. 5 This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. To be impossible under this clause. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts. the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. and finally. . that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed. 9 Under this article. it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced. desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law. . paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. 13 Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive. would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate. the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be. (2) there is intention to perform the physical act. would not amount to a crime. the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. On the other hand. even if completed. inspired by the Positivist School. factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. So long as these conditions were not present. 10 That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. 17 The case at bar belongs to this category. the victim was not present in said place and thus. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime. that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality. although in reality. 6 The Revised Penal Code. and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. 14 The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category. . the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where: . (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act. recognizes in the offender his formidability.
the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed. no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered. to wit: It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent. State. aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait. the criminal attempt is committed. and where the bullet pierced the roof. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon. the court quoted Mr. The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. at that moment. In the case of Clark vs. State. with intent to kill. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. In disposing of the case. It only became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way. It held that: The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to commit the crime. and further. in short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party. the court held him liable for attempted murder. Lee Kong. what was supposed to exist was really present or not. However. intention will be carried out. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm. . equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket. renders it no less an attempt to kill. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder. In State vs. in other words. that the latter was in a different place. Justice Bishop. with intent to kill. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed. 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. Mitchell. and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time. fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. In People vs. . that he was arrested and prevented from committing the murder. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent.. however. excite apprehension that the evil. either by outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize. we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the . the victim was in another part of the house. It turned out. 21 defendant. etc. However. In the case of Strokes vs. The court explained that: It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. 18 the accused. .One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one.
issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes. In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos . The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
1 People vs. Intod, C.A-G.R. No. 09205, August 14, 1991; Justice Fidel P. Purisima, Ponente: Justices Eduardo R. Bengzon and Salome A. Montoya, concurring. 2 TSN, p. 4, July 24, 1986. 3 Records, p. 65.
4 Guevarra, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code 15 (4th ed., 1946). 5 Albert, Ibid. 6 Albert, Ibid. 7 Albert, Ibid. 8 Albert, Ibid. 9 Grogorio and Feria, Comments on the Revised Penal Code 76 (Vol. I, 1st ed. 1958). 10 Reyes, The revised Penal Code, 90 (Vol. I, 11th ed., 1977). 11 Reyes, Ibid. 12 Reyes, Ibid. 13 U.S. vs. Berrigan, 482 F. 2nd. 171 (1973). 14 U.S. vs. Berrigan, Ibid. 15 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, (Vol. I, 1987). 16 U.S. vs. Berrigan, supra, p. 13. 17 U.S. vs. Berrigan, Ibid. 18 21 L.R.A. 626 (1898). 19 21 L.R.A. N.S. 898 (1908). 20 17 S.W. 145 (1888). 21 71 S.W. 175 (1902). 22 U.S. vs. HENG AWKAK ROMAN, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 874 (1974). 23 565 F. Supp. 1416 (1983). 24 Supra, n. 13.
finding him guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two years and four months of prision correccional and to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor for being an habitual delinquent. L-43530 August 3. plaintiff-appellee. J. Honesto K. policeman Jose Tomambing. Bausa for appellant. caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street. was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. Tan Yu. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo. At early dawn on March 2. and to pay the costs of the proceeding. Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee. with the accessory penalties of the law.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. vs. No.: The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. RECTO. At that time the owner of the store. who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in . 1935. AURELIO LAMAHANG. 1935 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. defendant-appellant.
In the instant case. that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. the trial judge and the Solicitor-General. There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence. and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act. for the purpose of imposing penal sanction. as the material damage is wanting. will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. But it is not sufficient. 99) that in offenses not consummated. but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.unfastening another from the wall. by the circumstances of the persons performing the same. it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution. or to commit any other offense. that is. in order to commit an offense which. From the fact established and stated in the decision. like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect. Acts susceptible of double interpretation . it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. which we think is erroneous. It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular. p. the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature. in case of robbery. that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution. of some personal property belonging to another. did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. if carried to its complete termination following its natural course. when the policeman showed up. the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained. with the deed which. and by the things connected therewith. is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous. for the purpose of gain. it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession. was to rob.ñet It must be borne in mind (I Groizard. in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense. by the facts to which they are related. they must show without any doubt. will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code. once he succeeded in entering the store. That his final objective. upon its consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense. there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding. Thus. due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing. must not and can not furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated . The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo. to cause physical injury to the inmates. in favor as well as against the culprit.1avvphil. that. that the accused on the day in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store. concrete offense. passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall. as constituting attempted robbery. Hence. without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator. which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator. there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection. leading directly to its realization and consummation.
. In view of the foregoing.. The breaking of the wall should not be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact which in this case constitutes the offense of attempted trespass to dwelling. 509' U. 67.S. The accused may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt to commit this offense in accordance with the evidence and the following allegation contained in the information: ".. . The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated offense of trespass to dwelling. Ticson. This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist. vs. U. . if committed with force. The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct. I. 59 Phil. that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. is prision correccional in its medium and maximum . Villanueva. that is to say. vs. p. and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain therein cited). the accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of said store by breaking a board and unfastening another for the purpose of entering said store . in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice. said objective and finality to serve as ground for the designation of the offense: . 21 Phil. 292. vs. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts leading to the commission of the offense.. (U. Viada (Vol. 31 Phil. who upon hearing the noise produced by the breaking of the wall. — inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him — and in his favor. we are of the opinion... or that said acts be of such nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended. vs. 615. .S.S.. Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code. Panes..S. the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts.S. Ostrea. the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. U. 18 Phil.. this offense is committed when a private person shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will. and therefore they must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.. that the acts performed must be such that. promptly approached the accused .crimes." Under the circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is presumed. Mesina. U.." Considering — says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of March 21. . 1892 — that in order to declare that such and such overt acts constitute an attempted offense it is necessary that their objective be known and established. without the intent to commit an offense. and so hold that the fact under consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling (People vs... 606. 93.) Against the accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions. U. 215. 2 Phil. are not punished except when they are aimed directly to its execution. and that the accused did not succeed in entering the store due to the presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing. Tayag and Morales. they would be meaningless. the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary. 25 Phil. 25 Phil. vs. vs. Silvano.S.
Pursuant to article 29 of the same Code. Avanceña. the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby held guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling. arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. and Vickers. Because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance the penalty must be imposed in its maximum period. Rollo): . C. with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs. Manalo for defendant-appellant. the accused is not entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment. plaintiff-appellee. Abad Santos. CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito. Eastern Samar. vs.000 (art. C.. committed by means of force.R. Borongan. The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. 1990 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. or. No. 47. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.: The accused. Ceilito Orita alias Lito. The information filed in the said case reads as follows (p. 88724 April 3. JJ. par. Wherefore.J.periods and a fine not exceeding P1.. 83-031-B before the Regional Trial Court. 51). Hull. MEDIALDEA. Branch II. 280. 2)." defendant-appellant. with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor. J. therefore the penalty corresponding to attempted trespass to dwelling is to degrees lower (art. was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. concur.
335. ABAYAN. the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its December 29. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. PRISION MAYOR. unlawfully and feloniously lay with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Rollo): WHEREFORE. did. 129 in conjunction with Section 17. the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. to indemnify CRISTINA S. paragraph 3. 1989. and the appellant found guilty of the crime of rape. the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. maximum. On January 11. beyond reasonable doubt. the Court of Appeals rendered its decision. the amount of Four Thousand (P4. the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED. On August 5. the dispositive portion of which reads (p. Rollo): WHEREFORE. the defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. considering the provision of Section 9. and consequently. at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a boarding house at Victoria St. Borongan. Poblacion.. . and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. SO ORDERED. subparagraph 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Not satisfied with the decision.000.00. 102. Abayan against her will and without her consent. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. SO ORDERED. 1985.000. as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS PRISION MAYOR. CONTRARY TO LAW. above named accused with lewd designs and by the use of a Batangas knife he conveniently provided himself for the purpose and with threats and intimidation. Upon being arraigned. RPC). On December 29. and to pay costs. After the witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits were formally offered and admitted.The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior complaint under oath by the offended party.00) Pesos. 59-60. the trial court rendered its decision. with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same. sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30. Philippines. Thereafter. the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA @ LITO. then and there wilfully. imposes on accused an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY. 1983. of the crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. Eastern Samar. the prosecution rested its case. accuses CEILITO ORITA alias LITO of the crime of Rape committed as follows: That on March 20. paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 1988. the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 1988 decision and forwarded the case to this Court.
She fled to another room and jumped out through a window (p. In this position. ibid).The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows (pp. 7175. She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. In the early morning of March 20. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving (p. At said position. Her classmates had just brought her home from a party (p. appellant could not fully penetrate her. she knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. With one hand holding the knife. All of a sudden. Complainant thought of escaping (p. Since the door which led to the first floor was locked from the inside. they failed to apprehend appellant. 20. They heard a sound at the second floor and saw somebody running away. ibid). appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. however. 44. they entered complainant's room. Still naked. Donceras. Appellant pursued her and climbed the partition. 14. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house. Joseph's College at Borongan. At this stage. Appellant again chased her. the first policeman to see her. 8-9. Rollo): Complainant Cristina S. and knocked on the door. 23. Then he pulled off her bra. Scared. ibid). He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. When there was no answer. With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck. Upon entering the room. She pleaded with him to release her. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. ibid). Due to darkness. He then ordered complainant to take off her clothes. Eastern Samar. ibid). ibid). appellant forced complainant to use the back door leading to the second floor (p. she ran to another room. When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door. 1983. tsn. somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. Pat. appellant undressed himself. ibid). When they discovered what happened. 20. appellant had both his hands flat on the floor. When they reached the second floor. . Shortly after her classmates had left. ibid). they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. She then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another boarder (pp. 27. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. 1984). which was about eighteen meters in front of the boarding house. but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. pants and panty (p. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. May 23. she darted to the municipal building. he commanded her to look for a room. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier. complainant arrived at her boarding house. When she saw him inside the room. 5. she ran around the building and knocked on the back door. Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. 77. took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. she took off her T-shirt. With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck.
issued a Medical Certificate (Exhibit "A") which states: Physical Examination — Patient is fairly built. appears in state of shock. no discharges noted. Neck. the resident physician who examined complainant. In this appeal. The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. The most candid witnesses may make mistakes sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair . errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice. conical in shape with prominent nipples. linear abrasions below (L) breast. Vulva — No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva. As aforementioned. and 2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the accused." (p. the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be justifiably considered as manifestations of truthfulness on material points. the accused assigns the following errors: 1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses. no laceration fresh and old noted. the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined. These little deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. 33. Luisa Abude. tender. neck. came in with loose clothing with no under-clothes. Donceras because they "show remarkable and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt to its candor. Extremities — Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees. Back — Multiple pinpoint marks. examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty. truth and validity. Breast — Well developed. Ma. Rollo) A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the witnesses' straightforward attestations. per unambulatory. Dr. hymen intact.Meanwhile. vaginal canal tight. the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.— Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. PE Findings — Pertinent Findings only. Far from being badges of fabrication.
1985. No.their intrinsic credibility (People v. 66387-88. 34. However. 53498. When a woman testifies that she has been raped.R. are conclusive proof of struggle against force . No. L-41358. February 28.. Rollo): As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People. 1988. 55520. there is not much to be desired as to the sincerity of the offended party in her testimony before the court. Rollo). 160 SCRA 98). Samson. Reinerio Zamora (who was presented in view of the unavailability of Dr. one of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a little discussion which is. Rather than discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. June 27. G. Abude) declared that the abrasions in the left and right knees. The victim testified further that the accused was holding a Batangas knife during the aggression.R. People v. 153 SCRA 487. The victim's testimony from the time she knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the time she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by Pat. Cabato. multiple pinpoint marks. No. v. 140 SCRA 400). December 16. Court of Appeals." (p.R. she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and her sincerity and candor. the testimony of the victim that the accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in order to have carnal knowledge of her. This is a material part of the victim's testimony which the accused conveniently deleted. Dr. To the Court she was a picture of supplication hungry and thirsty for the immediate vindication of the affront to her honor. Interpreting the findings as indicated in the medical certificate. under all circumstances. No. 72573. It is inculcated into the mind of the Court that the accused had wronged her. erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender vulva. Alcid. 162 SCRA 609). 1988. March 16. No. 1988. are plain and straightforward. complete uniformity in details would be a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of spontaneity (People v. had traversed illegally her honor. G.R. No. April 15.R. People v. G.R. We quote with favor the trial court's finding regarding the testimony of the victim (p 56. Soterol G. 1989). G. Bazar.R. circumscribed hematoma at the anterior neck. As a matter of fact. free from suspicion (People v Alfonso. L-37400. G. 1985. According to the accused. We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth (People v. L-41829. this is strange because "this is the only case where an aggressor's advances is being helped-out by the victim in order that there will be a consumation of the act. The victim in this case did not only state that she was raped but she testified convincingly on how the rape was committed. Nos. The allegation would have been meritorious had the testimony of the victim ended there. discrepancies on minor details must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera et al. 1987. Her answer to every question profounded (sic). et al. Donceras. G. 135 SCRA 280. August 31. August 25. 158 SCRA 695). linear abrasions below the left breast.
R. like the offended party to whom honor appears to be more valuable than her life or limbs? Besides. even in the manner as narrated. .. Rollo). 65589. And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the ground which was correctly estimated to be less than eight (8) meters. Common experience will tell us that in occasion of conflagration especially occuring ( sic) in high buildings. the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first assignment of error fall flat on its face. the trial court added (p. The accused did not bother to contradict this statement. No. . June 29. the exposure of her private parts when she sought assistance from authorities. 117 SCRA 312). As for the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim. securedly nailed.R. is enough indication that something not ordinary happened to her unless she is mentally deranged. Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine who should be presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity (Tugbang v. May 31. et al.R. and would not give way even by hastily scaling the same. September 30.. . We ruled that: What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered entirely naked by appellant and that even in her nudity. G. will perhaps occasion no injury to a frightened individual being pursued. Sadly. et al. she had to run away from the latter and managed to gain sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to her. 52-53. People v. The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to corroborate the allegations in the complaint and the nonpresentation of the medico-legal officer who actually examined the victim. No. The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry the weight of both accused and offended party without the slightest difficulty. the trial court stated that it was by agreement of the parties that another physician testified inasmuch as the medico-legal officer was no longer available. Thus. 56679. Torio. 1983. Sambili G. Somera. December 21. No. as corroborated. Some were not even substantiated and do . nothing was adduced to show that she was out of her mind. 1982. The trial court even inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration of the scene of the incident and the conditions therein is true (p. All these acts she would not have done nor would these facts have occurred unless she was sexually assaulted in the manner she narrated.and violence exerted on the victim (pp. In a similar case (People v. Court of Appeals. L-48731. G. Rollo): . The partitions of every room were of strong materials. G. A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. Rollo): .R. 55. L-44408. No. Summing up. 1989). How much more for a frightened barrio girl. 1989. many have been saved by jumping from some considerable heights without being injured. 54. . 126 SCRA 265).
193). Correlating these two provisions. frustrated. do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. nevertheless. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is . When and how rape is committed. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. We are convinced that the accused is guilty of rape. Fifth Edition. 2. Article 6 of the same Code provides: Art. Consummated. The trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only. p. and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted. even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. When the woman is under twelve years of age.not. However. are punishable. and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. We believe the subject matter that really calls for discussion. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. 6. The Solicitor General shares the same view. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape: Art. Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and 3. is whether or not the accused's conviction for frustrated rape is proper. xxx xxx xxx Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman (Black's Law Dictionary. merit consideration. therefore. there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply to the crime of rape. By using force or intimidation. 335. On the other hand.
Thus. People v.. If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further. perfect penetration is not essential. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed . Necessarily.R. as amended by Republic Act No. No.R. 998  where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. which acts it is his intention to perform. August 21. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that. while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. the felony is consummated. Oscar. 2632 (dated September 12. Rabadan et al. Royeras. . 1974. Of course. because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. it can not be an attempt. People v. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ. 559 People v. by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. it appears that this is a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. L-32996. from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished . In other words. 36 Phil. G. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance. 694. United States v. there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime. 980. Likewise. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender. 4111 (dated March 29. Eduave. is prevented. after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts. it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts . In the leading case of United States v. 527. April 29. We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape. 53 Phil. 212. In a long line of cases (People v. Justice Moreland set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which is readily understood even by law students: . We are aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and. However. in the latter. Hernandez. Taking into account the nature. 209. against his will. Clearly. L-31886. Amores. to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence. rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender. elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter. People v. 1974. 58 SCRA 505). 1965) . in the crime of rape. Tayaba. . 1960) and Republic Act No. Eriña 50 Phil. We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. 48 Phil. No. 56 SCRA 666. Garcia: 9 Phil.not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. G. 62 Phil. 49 Phil.
. The testimony of the offended party is at variance with the medical certificate. he tossed back to the offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was penetration. or what act do you referred (sic) to. . in its penultimate paragraph. Q And was it inserted? . It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate (Exhibit "A") as interpreted by Dr. might have prompted the lawmaking body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the amendments introduced by said laws. As such.s. Royeras People v. Zamora when he "categorically declared that the findings in the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of penetration." (p. t. for otherwise to rely on the testimony alone in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate. both should in all respect. it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion. Orteza. It is true. xxx xxx xxx Q What do you mean when you said comply. would be productive of mischievous results. It bears emphasis that Dr. The Eriña case. and the Court is not oblivious. supra. the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. that conviction for rape could proceed from the uncorroborated testimony of the offended party and that a medical certificate is not necessary (People v. He merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there was penetration. 57.n. 53. even if only partially (pp. But the citations the people relied upon cannot be applicable to the instant case. In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim. 302. for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. 1984): Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina? A It entered but only a portion of it. As a matter of fact. when you said comply? A I inserted his penis into my vagina. as in inflammation) and tender. It should be stressed that in cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate. the victim positively testified that there was penetration.which provides. 113). On the contrary. compliment each other. May 23. the trial court stated (p. The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not exist. . a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the mind of the court. Rollo) Furthermore. 304. Rollo): . Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal declaration of the latter of uncertainty whether there was penetration or not. We are of the opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim. Anent this testimony. 6 SCRA 109.
see People v. 69778.R. Taduyo. Revised Penal Code. Ramirez. L38449. G. 1990). No.000. being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335. supra). G. People v. 138 SCRA 569. Moreover. Solis. People v. Alfonso. Arizala. Reclusion perpetua. 118 SCRA 705. G. Nos. L-43752. 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua (People v. Article 335.R. the Court has since February 2. The fact is that in a prosecution for rape.R. Zamora's testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this case (People v. No.R.R. the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. November 8. of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon. SO ORDERED. September 19. ACCORDINGLY. 1987.00. the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible (People v.. 154 SCRA 349). is imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63. 70744. of Article 111. et al. the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. G. that the cited Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. paragraph 3. paragraph 1.. L-38968-70. Tabago. . Aragona.R.R. Narvasa. paragraph 3. Dr. Manzano. 136 SCRA 702). 78732-33. Nos. G. L-37928-29. G. 1985. November 25. Millora. the proper imposable penalty is death. February 14. G. G. however. Cruz. concur. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. People v.. May 31. et al. 1989. JJ. March 15. September 29. No. No. it will not tilt the scale in favor of the accused because after a thorough review of the records. Gancayco and Griño-Aquino.A Yes only a little. 167 SCRA 65. Nos. Thus. 1982. We find the evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape. February 9. No. 1982.R. In view. 112 SCRA 615. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30. 1988. Although the second assignment of error is meritorious. 59713. Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Our ruling in People v. 1985. People v.
JJ. cralawPetitioners. . and VELASCO. No.R. JR. cralawTINGA.cralawPresent: cralaw cralawQUISUMBING. and cralawG. Chairperson. cralawPromulgated: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.. JR. J.cralaw . cralawCARPIO.. 145927 EXPEDITO TORREVILAS.versus -cralawCARPIO MORALES.SECOND DIVISION SIMON FERNAN.
2870. 2852. 2893. 2871. 2858. 2897. 2892. this infamous 86 million highway scam has few parallels in the annals of crime in the country. 2869. 1882. 2899. 2859. 2888. 2905. 2007cralaw x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION VELASCO. 2896. 2853.: cralawThe instant petition under Rule 45 originated from 119 criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) involving no less than 36 former officials and employees of the then Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) and several suppliers of construction materials for defalcation of public funds arising from numerous transactions in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District in 1977. 2845. 1889. 2889. 1823. and the ingenious scheme employed in defrauding the government. 1641. 1880. 2894. 1818. 1819. 2856. 2854. 2891. 2849. 2886. 1820. 2867. 2842.Because of the sheer magnitude of the illegal transactions. 1997 Decision of the SB in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 2884. 2868. 2864. 1822. 2877. the number of people involved. 1883. 1886. 2861. 2895. . 2880. 2866. J. 2912. 2882. 1643. 2846. 2875. 2887. 1642. 1888. 2903. 1879. 2865. 2907. 2911. 2878. 2872. 2840. 2909. 2874. 2879. Jr. 1821. 2848. 2850. 2855. 2847. and Expedito Torrevillas seek the reversal of the December 4. 2843. 2841. JR. 2904. 1887. 2839. 2898. 2883. 2890. 2885. 2900. 2881. 2851. 2860.. 2901. 2910. 2863. 2906.cralawRespondent. 2844. 2902. 1885. 2908. 2862. The Case cralawPetitioners Simon Fernan. 2873.cralawAugust 24. 1640. 1884. 2857. 1881. 2876.
2858. Rocilo Neis. Cebu 2nd and the Mandaue City Highway Engineering Districts. they conducted an investigation and in due course submitted their findings. 2928. all entitled People of the Philippines v.They discovered that two sets of LAAs were received by the districts. disputes the adverse judgment in only six (6) cases. and 2939. 7. 2938. 2885. 2936. The Facts cralawThe SB culled the facts this way: On June 21. particularly. 2914. exculpation is in order. finding them guilty of multiple instances of estafa through falsification of public documents.2913. 2856. 2000 SB Resolution which denied their separate pleas for reconsideration. Petitioner Fernan. et al.Complying with the directive. 2932. 2881. and 2932.One set consists of regular LAAs which clearly indicated the covering sub-allotment advices and were duly signed by . and the subsequent August 29. 2926. 2931. 2859. 2919. Both petitioners assert their strong belief that their guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and.Their report (Exhibit C) confirmed the issuance of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) in the districts mentioned. 2910. 2922. Quejada and Ruth I. 1978. 2914. Cebu 1st. namely: 2855. 2930. COA Regional Director Sofronio Flores Jr. 2909. 2915.. directed auditors Victoria C. hence. the Cebu City. Paredes to verify and submit a report on sub-allotment advises issued to various highway engineering districts in Cebu. Jr. 2919. 2880. 2918. and 2918. 2917. 2924. 2925. 2929. 2927. 2923. namely: 2879. while petitioner Torrevillas seeks exoneration in nine (9) cases. of COA Regional Office No. 2921. 2937. 2920.
he had already been detailed to the MPH Central Office. including the Cebu First Highway Engineering District. the expenditures were taken from obligations of the current year (1978) because all the supporting papers of the payment vouchers were dated in that year. Jose Bagasao.The LAAs were numbered in proper sequence and duly recorded in the logbook of the Accounting. the then Ministry of Budget released funds to the various .These fake LAAs were not numbered in proper sequence. xxxx Due to these serious irregularities. Budget and Finance Division. the flow in the release of funds to the various agencies of the government and the control devices set up for disbursement and accounting of public funds should first be explained.The entries in the journal vouchers filed with the MPH Regional Office were adjusted every month to 8-81-400 (unliquidated or prior years obligation). instead of the Finance Officer. however.The mission of the task force was to conduct a wider and more extended investigation in all the fifteen (15) highway engineering districts of MPH Region VII. Mangubat.They could not be traced to the files and records of the Accounting. the 1977 questionable disbursements of which are the subject matter of these cases. xxxx For a better understanding of these highways cases. Finance Officer of the MPH Regional Office. The other set consists of fake LAAs which do not indicate the covering sub-allotment advice and were signed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat and Engr. Angelina Escao. the Bureau of Treasury and the Commission on Audit. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). then President Marcos created a Special Cabinet Committee on MPH Region VII Ghost Projects Anomalies which in turn organized a Special Task Force composed of representatives from the Finance Ministry Intelligence Bureau (FMIB).Nevertheless.All of these were approved for the Finance Officer by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat.A chart (Exhibit B) graphically shows the flow of allotments from the Ministry down to the district level. 8-83-000 (liquidated or current year obligations) and 8-70-700 (Treasury/Agency Account). had no authority to approve them because since October 1977.Mrs. Budget and Finance Division. they were mostly undated and were sometimes duplicated.The accounting entry for the disbursements made on the fake LAAs was debited to the AccountsPayable Unliquidated Obligations (8-81-400) and credited to the Checking Account with the Bureau of Treasury (8-70-790). cralaw On the basis of appropriation laws and upon request made by heads of agencies. There were indications that the practice had been going on for years.
The ROA signifies that a certain amount of district funds has been set aside or earmarked for the particular expenditures stated in the RSE. debiting the account obligation (liquidated or unliquidated obligation. At the end of every month. the District Office puts up advertisements. how are funds released by the Regional Office to the different districts and ultimately paid out to contractors. listing all the checks issued during that period.Once the General Voucher (GV) has been prepared. the Central Office of the agency prepares the Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) and the Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDC) for each region. whichever is applicable).agencies of the government by means of an Advice of Allotment (AA) and a Cash Disbursement Ceiling (CDC). and crediting the account Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA). in accordance with the disbursement allotment. who certifies as to the availability of funds.These are sent to the Regional Office.On the basis of the ROA. conducts inspection and prepares the General Voucher for the payment of deliveries. Now. the District Engineer submits to the Regional Director a request for allotment in accordance with the program of work prepared by the former.The RSE is then submitted to the Regional Director for approval. . a Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) is prepared by the Chief Accountant of the district Senior Civil Engineer. the Budget Officer of the region prepares the corresponding Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAA) which are forwarded to the various districts of the region (The amount that goes to each district is already indicated in the Advice of Allotment). approved by the District Engineer.Upon receipt of the AA and CDC from the Budget.The RCIDDO is recorded in the Journal of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officers (JCIDDO) and posted in the general ledger at the end of each month. the corresponding check in the form of a Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA) is drawn by the Disbursing Officer and finally released to the contractor.Upon receipt of the RCIDDO. [conducts] biddings. This procedure starts with the preparation of a Requisition for Supplies and Equipment (RSE) in the District Office by the Senior Civil Engineer. makes awards and prepares purchase orders which are served on the winning bidder.The Advice of Allotment is an authority for the agency to incur obligations within a specified amount in accordance with approved programs and projects.The District Office also prepares a summary of deliveries with the corresponding delivery receipts and tally sheets.Once it is approved.Upon receipt.The RCIDDO is submitted to the accounting division of the region. The Cash Disbursement Ceiling is an authority to pay. the Regional Office draws a journal voucher. and signed by the Chief Accountant of the Highway Engineering District. the Report of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDD) is prepared.Only upon receipt of the LAA is the district office authorized to incur obligations.
once or twice a month. the fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of LAAs and RSEs so that the amount covered by each general voucher is less than P50.Upon receipt of the ROI. Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner).. met at the Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off large sums of money from government coffers.Mangubat had found a way to withdraw government money through the use of fake LAAs. accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant). the balances of each account shown in the general ledger are summarized in a statement called the trial balance. and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II).The ROI is then submitted to the Regional Office. Delia Preagido (Accountant III). depending upon the volume of transactions.In fine. the cancellation of checks through journal vouchers to conceal disbursements in excess of the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC).At the end of the month.e. xxxx The elaborate accounting procedure described above with its system of controls was set up obviously to make sure that government funds are properly released. and the manipulation of the books of account by negation or adjustment.000. it proved to be inadequate. disbursed and accounted for. all of MPH Region VII.Simultaneous with the flow of the RCIDDO. The trial balance is submitted to the MPH Central Office in Manila where it is consolidated with other trial balances submitted by other regional offices. 1977.In the hands of untrustworthy guardians of the public purse. i. so as not to reflect such disbursements in the trial balances submitted to the Regional Office.00 to do away with the approval of the Regional Auditor. Sometime in February. vouchers and other documents and to conceal traces thereof with the connivance of other government officials and employees. however. closing the account 8-70-709 to 871-100-199 at the end of each month.There were loopholes which an unscrupulous person adroit in government accounting could take advantage of to surreptitiously draw enormous sums of money from the government. .It is also recorded and posted to the general ledger.The journal voucher is prepared. the ROAs are summarized in the Reports of Obligations Incurred (ROI) in the District Office. the accountant of the Regional Office draws a journal voucher taking up the following entry: debiting the appropriation allotted (0-90-000) and crediting the obligation incurred (0-82-000). This is recorded in the general voucher and posted to the general ledger at the end of each month. the charging of disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the previous year to provide the supposed source of funds.
the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-790).These journal vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the disbursements made on the basis of the fake LAAs.All three agreed to help him carry out his plan. the PNB branch paid out the checks drawn against them. as appearing in the trial balance would not show the irregularity. consequently. particularly their flaws and loopholes. it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped notice due to the following manipulations: The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were generally not signed by the Finance Officer nor recorded in the books of accounts. account 8-81-400 and the excess of checks issued over authorized cash disbursements ceiling.There were no deposits of money made with the PNB from which withdrawals could be charged. Journal Vouchers and General Journal thru negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements.Thus. allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents. auditing and banking procedures. although the obligations being paid were not among those certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of the preceding year.To conceal the overcharges to authorized allotments. Cruz and Sayson to join him. adjustments were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790.The bank had also no way of knowing what amount was appropriated for the district. Thus.They typed the fake LAAs during Saturdays. however. the PNB and Bureau of Treasury had no inkling about it until the NBI busted the illegal operations. could have pulled off such an ingenious and audacious plan. cralawThe four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. in the initial report of the auditors (Exhibit D).The reason for this is that. (Some of the recipients of the stolen funds spent lavishly and bought two cars at a time). at that time. the PNB and Bureau of Treasury were not furnished copy of the mother CDC and the local branch of the PNB did not receive independent advice from the PNB head office in Manila.Other government employees. tempted by the prospect of earning big money.Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated Obligations (Account 8-81-400). Although the anomalies had been going on for sometime (February 1977 to June 1978). Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling the fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount. cralaw .Only CDCs were presented to it.Preagido on her part manipulated the General Ledger.The checks. it did not know if the limit had already been exceeded.Mangubat enticed Preagido.Only an insider steep in government accounting. and not knowing that some of the CDCs were fake. were actually issued.
they were not properly funded.04 for the period January 1. 1977.74. did not show any improvement. with expenditures amounting to P613. amounting to P5.The Cebu First HED received from Region VII thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4.692. 1977 to December 31.76 which however. Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez.On the other hand. cralaw It was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prior years obligations and chargeable to Account 8-81-400. the Cebu First HED appears to have also received for the same period another set of eightyfour (84) LAAs amounting to P4.00.677.Despite the enormous additional expenditure of P3.However.839. cralaw cralaw xxxx A total of 132 General Vouchers.839. the roads and bridges in the district.Furthermore.00.74. Regional Highway Engineer. as found out by the NBI.00. could not be traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) or matched to the Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH and Regional Office.694.839.734. through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the aforementioned materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national highways within the Cebu First HED. an additional amount of P3. and these were all completed within the period from November to December.These completed projects were properly funded by legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only P754.504.But apart from this.336. obviously because. the list of projects in Region VII for 1977 showed that Cebu First HED completed rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in its districts from February to May 1977.50 and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs). hereinafter referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity.Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds amounting to P3.This is highly irregular and not in consonance with accounting procedures. the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud employed in the other highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was followed.680.cralaw xxxx Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the Cebu First District Engineering District. 1977. the expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in 1977 amounted to P140.74 was spent by the Cebu First HED for maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to any authoritative document coming from the MPH.810. were traced back to Rolando Mangubat.810.810.160. also of Region VII.812.As testified to by cralaw . emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs.
Adventor Fernandez. after being found guilty in some of the cases. and Edgardo Cruz. 2879 reads as follows: The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis. namely: Rolando Mangubat. contractors. the road maintenance consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the national highway. Abelardo Cardona. The nuclei of this massive conspiracy. Leonardo Tordecilla. Basilisa Galvan. 2885. the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional amount of P3. Leonila del Rosario.839.several barangay captains. Delia Preagido.Petitioner Fernan. convictions were obtained. cralawOn the other hand. used as bases for the preparation of the corresponding number of general vouchers.810. Matilde Jabalde. all of MPH Region VII. and criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the accused. The other conniver. Informations were filed. Ramon . 2914.On the basis of her testimony and pertinent documents. Engracia Escobar. was included among the accused in Criminal Case Nos. Rolando Mangubat. Obviously. and 2918 allegedly for having signed six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries of materials. Delia Preagido. petitioners were both Civil Engineers of the MPH assigned to the Cebu First Highway Engineering District. Angelina Escao. Jr. Jose Sayson. 2879.74 were prepared for no other purpose than to siphon the said amount from the government coffer into the pockets of some officials and employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED. were found guilty in all 119 counts and were accordingly sentenced by the SB. 2881. in SB Criminal Case No. Edgardo Cruz. 2880. Agripino Pagdanganan. Jose Sayson. and payees based on these general vouchers. cralawThe Information against Fernan. as well as the suppliers and contractors who conspired and confederated with them. Heracleo Faelnar. became a state witness in the remainder. Josefina Luna.Fund releases were made to the suppliers. Jr. Camilo de Letran. Manuel de Veyra.
Region VII. Jose Sayson. Edgardo Cruz. Central Office. Camilo de Letran. Simon Fernan. Leo Villagonzalo. Zosimo Mendez. Assistant Chief Accountant. Leonila del Rosario. Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional Office. the Chief Accountant of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez. Heracleo Faelnar. to wit: 1. Asterio Buqueron. Central Office. MPH. Basilisa Galvan. Budget Officer. MPH. Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED. MPH. Property Custodian of Cebu I HED. Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED. Budget Examiner. Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED I. MPH. Ramon Quirante. then Assistant Director MPH Region VII. MPH. Rolando Mangubat. MPH. Region VII. Civil Engineer of Cebu I HED and Juliana de los Angeles. Matilde Jabalde.Quirante. conniving with each other to defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation and assistance of Angelina Escao. MPH. Auditors Aide of Cebu I HED. Asterio Buqueron. mutually helping each other did then and there willfully. Accountant II. Central Office. 1977. the accused Rocilo Neis. an alleged supplier. Jr. Mariano Jarina. Region VII. Simon Fernan. Mariano Jarina. in the City of Cebu and in Cebu Province. Auditor of Cebu I HED.both dates inclusive. Mariano Montera. Assistant Chief Accountant of same Regional Office. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling . Zosimo Mendez. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Leonardo Tordecilla. Chief Accountant. Central Office. Region VII. MPH. Mariano Montera. unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of the following documents. Engracia Escobar. Accountant I. Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways. Supervising Accountant. Manuel de Veyra. Josefina Luna. Agripino Pagdanganan. MPH. Region VII. 1976 up to January 31. Supervising Accounting Clerk. Leo Villagonzalo. Chief Finance and Management Service. Jr. Letter of Advice of Allotment 3. Abelardo Cardona. Delia Preagido. Regional Director. and Juliana de los Angeles for estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents. committed as follows: That on. Region VII. with the exception of Juliana de los Angeles. Central Office. Budget Officer III. MPH. about and during the period from December 1.. all of whom took advantage of their official positions. Clerk in the Property Division of Cebu I HED. Request for Allocation of Allotment 2. MPH. Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED.
once in possession of the said amount. that the road construction materials were delivered. m. 50.000. the above-named accused were able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P28. Abstract of Bids 7. misappropriated. 9933064 6. as all the accused know. 60. of item 108 for use in the repair of the Cebu Hagnaya Wharf road from Km.400 cu. Trial Balance by making it appear that Regional Office No. when in truth and in fact.000.000. . that a requisition for said item was made and approved.00 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to the Central Office by Region VII showing its financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher.4.00). B-15 5. as all the accused knew. Statement of Delivery 9. Report of Inspection 10.00). Check No. Philippine Currency. by making it appear in the voucher that funds were available and that there were appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment 11. that the said amount of P28. to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government in the total amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P28. inspected and used in the supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in fact. converted and misapplied the same for their personal needs. Purchase Order 8. all of the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing falsifications.30 to Km. General Voucher No. that a corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder. and the accused. as a designed means to cover-up the fraud. that a regular bidding was held. the same were not true and correct. VII of the Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of 1. in payment of the non-existing deliveries. Philippine Currency.00.
General Voucher No.00 .00 December 1. m. B-15. 1977 2880 1.00 2885 3. 1977 Allocation of Allotment 101-12112-76. General Voucher No. 1977 up 1.CONTRARY TO LAW. 1976 up to January 31. Jr.30 to Km. 50. from Km. 3. Check No. January 2. 9933125. of item 108 for use in the repair and rehabilitation of damaged roads and bridges by Typhoon Aring at the 2.000. m. cralaw cralawThe Informations in the six (6) cases involving Fernan. 9933104. of item 108 for up to January 31.00 to Km.00 2. Request for to February 28. B-245. 9933294. Fernan. Allocation of 1977 Allotment 101-256-77. 60. Check No.000. Allocation of use in the repair of the 1977 Allotment 101-12. B-76. 1977 up 1. PhP 31. General Voucher Tabogon-Bogo provincial road from Km. 2. Request for to January 31. 2879 Dates of Commission December 1. B-55.Bogo-Curva-Medellon road 105-76. Check No. 3. were essentially identical save for the details as highlighted in boldface above. of item 108 for use in the repair of the CebuHagnayaWharf road from Km. 98 No. 92 to Km.400 cu. 127. materials for use in the repair and rehabilitation of the Daan-Bantayan road from Km. General Voucher No.For ease of reference. 119.400 cu. Main Documents Falsified 1.000. 1976 1.s criminal cases are detailed below: Criminal Case No.00 2881 Approximately 1. 110. January 2. 136 PhP 30.500 cu.00 to Km. Items Allegedly Purchased Amount of Fraud PhP 28. Jr.000. Check No. 9933064. m.00 PhP 28. 2. Request for 1.
1. Heracleo Faelnar. in the City of Cebu and in Cebu Province. Matilde Jabalde. Jorge de la Pea. Ramon Quirante. about and during the period from June 1. the Chief Accountant of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez. Asterio Buqueron. Budget Officer. 1977 up 1. Barbon barangay road 1. m. Check No. MPH. Mariano Montera and Rufino V. 1977 2. Rolando Mangubat. 71 to Km. Adventor Fernandez. Agripino Pagdanganan. Delia Preagido. Abelardo Cardona. Rolando Mangubat. 76 PhP 27. 2855 reads as follows: The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis. Matilde Jabalde. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitation of the Cajel-Lugo.500 cu. m. No. Leo Villagonzalo. 2914. 2909.200 cu. Heracleo Faelnar. 1977 2. Basilisa Galvan. 1977 up 1. Leonardo Tordecilla. Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED.2914 2918 October 1. Camilo de Letran. MPH. Edgardo Cruz. 2855. Delia Preagido. of item 108 for the rehabilitation of the CebuNorthHagnayaWharf road from Km. then Assistant Director MPH Region VII. Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional Office. petitioner Torrevillas was one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. Regional Director. Manuel de Veyra. Josefina Luna. Angelina Escao. Region VII. B-927. Basilisa Galvan. January 2. Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry of Public Highways. The Information against Torrevillas in SB Criminal Case No. Leonila del Rosario. and 2932.00 On the other hand. conniving with each other to defraud the Philippine Government with the indispensable cooperation and assistance of Angelina Escao. Assistant Chief Accountant of same Regional Office. Region VII. 1977. 9403425. Supervising . Check No. B-107. No. 1977 up to June 30. Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED I. 9933157. 2910. 2858. 2856. 2919. Jose Sayson. the accused Rocilo Neis.00 PhP 30. General Voucher to November 30.000. Nuez for estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents. Manuel de Veyra. General Voucher to February 28. committed as follows: That on. Camilo de Letran. Engracia Escobar. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Expedito Torrevillas.000. 2859.both dates inclusive.
MPH. Engracia Escobar. 9403099 6. MPH. Request for Allocation of Allotment 101-10-186-76. Budget Officer III. Purchase Order 8. Expedito Torrevillas. Central Office. MPH. Central Office. Leonardo Tordecilla. Edgardo Cruz. MPH. Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED. Nuez. Jose Sayson. Nuez. Region VII. Property Custodian of Cebu I HED. Report of Inspection 10. 10-192-76. 10-188-76. MPH. Accountant I. Budget Examiner. Statement of Delivery 9. Auditors Aide of Cebu I HED. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment 11. Central Office. VII of the Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding letter of . Region VII. and Rufino V. Asterio Buqueron. Central Office. Assistant Chief Accountant. Letter of Advice of Allotment 3. Cebu I HED. MPH. unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the falsification of the following documents. Agripino Pagdanganan. Chief Finance and Management Service. all of whom took advantage of their official positions. with the exception of Rufino V. Auditor of Cebu I HED. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling 4. Abelardo Cardona. General Voucher No. Check No. Central Office. Leonila del Rosario. Supervising Accountant. Chief Accountant. Josefina Luna. Ramon Quirante. Abstract of Bids 7. Jorge de la Pea. mutually helping each other did then and there willfully. MPH. to wit: 1. Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED. MPH. 10190-76. 10-180-76 2.Accounting Clerk. Accountant II. an alleged supplier. Mariano Montera. representative of the Engineers Office. MPH. Trial Balance by making it appear that Regional Office No. Region VII. B-613 5. Leo Villagonzalo. Region VII.
431. when in truth and in fact. 108.85 310 for use in asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan road from Km. that a requisition for said item was made and approved. Request for June 30. 10-188- Items Allegedly Amount of Fraud Purchased 153. 10-190-76. the same were not true and correct.52.For ease of reference. by making it appear in the voucher that funds were available and that there were appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the aforesaid purchase. and the accused. t.63 m. cralawThe Torrevillas cases were substantially the same save for the details highlighted in the aforequoted typical accusatory pleading.advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of 153. Philippine Currency. of item 310 for use in asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan road at Km. Torrevillas criminal cases are particularized as follows: Criminal Case No.431. Philippine Currency.85 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to the Central Office by Region VII showing its financial condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher. CONTRARY TO LAW.85).431. as a designed means to cover-up the fraud. the above-named accused were able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48. that a regular bidding was held. as all the accused knew. t. that the road construction materials were delivered. misappropriated. 2855 Dates of Main Documents Commission Falsified June 1. of item PhP 48. as all the accused know. that a corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder. 108.34 to .85).34 to Km. in payment of the nonexisting deliveries. once in possession of the said amount. 1977 up to 1. that the said amount of P48. 1977 Allocation of Allotment 101-10186-76. 109. to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government in the total amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48.63 m. converted and misapplied the same for their personal needs.431. all of the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the foregoing falsifications. inspected and used in the supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in truth and in fact. 10-192-76.
9-184-76 Km. 1977 up to 1.65 2909 2910 1. 1977 up to 1. 1977 2.00 PhP 27.52 PhP 34.from Km 108.Toledo-Tabuelan road 76. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitation of the Buanoy-Cantibas. 9403115.109. 6-239-76. m. Check No. General Voucher to November 30. Request for June 31. 2. 1977 up 1. 9403426.09 2859 110.900. 3. 6-237. 108. 3.9-181.00 .34 to Km. 9403117. B-929.m.472. of item July 31. PhP 48. Check No. General Voucher No. June 1. September 1. June 1. t. 3. t.asphalting of the 76. Request for 151. June 1.713. 1977 Allocation Allotment 310 for use in the 101-6-234-76. 10-180-76. Km. B-631. 9403105. B-629.200 cu.01 m. 109. Check No.Toledo-Tabuelan road 76.900. General Voucher No. 6-240-76 from Km. 8-152. 108. 8-153-76.76. General Voucher No.34 to 76.76 m. September 1. 1977 Allocation of 310 for use in the Allotment 101-10-15. 109.52 2856 3.680. 8-12176 2. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitation of the Magay-Canamukan. Request for 153.200 cu. Balaban barangay road 1. General Voucher No. Check No. 8-102-76. 9403427. Compostela barangay road PhP 27. 1977 2. of item June 30. Check No.52 2.asphalting of the 76. No. 9403099. B-619. B-928. 1977 up to 1. 6-241. Check No. 1977 Allocation of Allotment 101-7-6376.52 2. General Voucher to November 30.35 m. 1977 up 1. 109.34 to Km. No. t.84 2858 PhP 47. of item 310 for use in asphalting of the Toledo-Tabuelan road from Km. B-613. 9-201-76.
thus: In Criminal Case No. General Voucher November 30.000.200 cu. m. 1977 up to 1. Barbon barangay road January 2. 108 for use in the 2. as maximum. and in its December 4.national roads and 76. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. 1977 up to 1. General Voucher B-643. 9403130. RAMON QUIRANTE. 1977 No.2914 October 1.500. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. 83 June 1. PhP 27. of item 108 for use in the rehabilitation of the Cajel-Lugo.00 PhP 31. Request for 250 gals of aluminum July 31. 1997 Decision. ZOSIMO MENDEZ. 7-84-76.00). B-927.762.550 cu. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Jr. to ten (10) years. . m. 2879.. B-244. 9403425.00 PhP 44. MARIANO JARINA and SIMON FERNAN. 1977 No. bridges 2. 2. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. Check No. repair and 9933293. it found him criminally liable in the six (6) cases against him. Check No..000. as minimum. Jr. Check No. 1977 Allocation of paint 324 gals of red Allotment 101-7-83. 8-170. General Voucher 1. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. 3. rehabilitation of damaged roads and bridges at the ToledoTabuelan national road from Km. 7-124. 2919 2932 1.lead paint for use in 76. of item February 28. with the accessory penalties provided by law. 8-153-76. MARIANO MONTERA. 71 to Km.58 The Sandiganbayans Ruling The anti-graft court was fully convinced of the guilt of petitioner Fernan.the maintenance of 76. the Court finds accused JOSE SAYSON. 1977 up to 1.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN.. as maximum.00). and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. to indemnify. Jr. JOSE SAYSON. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.00). and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. with the accessory penalties provided by law.00). hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31. ZOSIMO MENDEZ.. 2885. MARIANO MONTERA. and. and. and SIMON FERNAN. 2880.to indemnify. as minimum. as maximum.00). to ten (10) years. Jr.) In Criminal Case No. to indemnify. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor.000. (Emphasis supplied. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. as minimum. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. with the accessory penalties provided by law. with the accessory penalties provided by law. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3.00). (Emphasis supplied. as maximum. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN JOSE SAYSON.00). to indemnify. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. to ten (10) years.500.000. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28. to pay their proportionate share of the costs..000. Jr. as minimum. RAMON QUIRANTE. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos (P 28. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of . eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor.) In Criminal Case No.) In Criminal Case No. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. and. JOSE SAYSON.500. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN. RAMON QUIRANTE. to ten (10) years. 2881.500. RAMON QUIRANTE. (Emphasis supplied. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3.
with the accessory penalties provided by law. Jr.) In Criminal Case No. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. and ISMAEL SABIO.) In Criminal Case No. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3.00). to ten (10) years. to wit: In Criminal Case No. JOSE SAYSON. as minimum.000. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. and. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor.00). 2855. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27.) cralaw cralawPetitioner Torrevillas suffered the same fate and was convicted in the nine (9) criminal cases. to ten (10) years.Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30. as minimum..00). (Emphasis supplied.000. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN.500. Jr. to indemnify. as maximum.00). with the accessory penalties provided by law. ZOSIMO MENDEZ. SIMON FERNAN.000. Jr. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. RAMON QUIRANTE. (Emphasis supplied. RAMON QUIRANTE. as maximum. and. and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification .500. and. (Emphasis supplied. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. JOSE SAYSON. RAMON QUIRANTE. EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN. JOSE SAYSON. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. 2914. MARIANO MONTERA. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. 2918.00). to indemnify. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional.
with the accessory penalties provided by law.84).of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. as minimum.500.500. and.431. to indemnify. 2856. and. with the accessory penalties provided by law. RAMON QUIRANTE. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. 2859. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. and. as maximum. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171.) In Criminal Case No.500. to indemnify.09). MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN.00). JOSE SAYSON. JOSE SAYSON. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. RAMON QUIRANTE. to indemnify. MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. In Criminal Case No. (Emphasis supplied. RAMON QUIRANTE. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Two Pesos and 84/100 (P 48. to ten (10) years. MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO TOREVILLAS.85). and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. as maximum. to ten (10) years. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Thirty One Pesos and 85/100 (P 48.472. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. (Emphasis supplied. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. 2858. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. GUILTY beyond . the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. as minimum.) In Criminal Case No.00).713. with the accessory penalties provided by law. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Thirteen Pesos and 9/100 (P47. as minimum. as maximum. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. JOSE SAYSON.00). to ten (10) years.
JOSE SAYSON. with the accessory penalties provided by law. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional.00). jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P 27. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty Four Thousand Six Hundred Eighty pesos and 65/100 (P34. (Emphasis supplied.) In Criminal Case No. JOSE SAYSON. In Criminal Case No. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN.65). FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. (Emphasis supplied. 2909. as maximum. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance.00). RAMON QUIRANTE. as maximum.900. RAMON QUIRANTE.00). 2914. to ten (10) years. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. and. and. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification . as minimum. to indemnify.00).500. 2910. JOSE SAYSON. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. as maximum.reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171.500. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. with the accessory penalties provided by law. Jr.900. as minimum. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. to ten (10) years. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.. and . RAMON QUIRANTE. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P 27.680. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. with the accessory penalties provided by law.) In Criminal Case No.500. EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON FERNAN.00). to indemnify. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. to indemnify. to ten (10) years. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. as minimum.
as minimum.00). jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P 27.500. to ten (10) years. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. (Emphasis supplied. PEDRITO SEVILLE and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. Jr. MARIANO MONTERA.) In Criminal Case No. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31. and. (Emphasis supplied. MARIANO MONTERA. 2932. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. as maximum.00).762. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. to pay their proportionate share of the costs.00). GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171. JOSE SAYSON. RAMON QUIRANTE.00). with the accessory penalties provided by law. as maximum. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. to pay their proportionate share of the costs. as minimum. JOSE SAYSON. hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional. EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and ISMAEL SABIO. the Court finds accused CAMILO DE LETRAN. as maximum.) In Criminal Case No. to ten (10) years.500.000. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance.000. to indemnify. and. to indemnify. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. with the accessory penalties provided by law. to pay their proportionate share of the costs.58).500.of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171.00). as minimum. jointly and severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Two Pesos and 58/100 (P 44. in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. to indemnify. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. 2919.) . in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. to ten (10) years. RAMON QUIRANTE. to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3. and there being no modifying circumstances in attendance. with the accessory penalties provided by law. eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. and. (Emphasis supplied. ZOSIMO MENDEZ.
II THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONERS AS CO-CONSPIRATORS DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD IMPLICATE THEM AS CO-CONSPIRATORS AND JUSTIFY THEIR CONVICTION. The Courts Ruling . 2000 SB Resolution. The Issues cralawPetitioners put forward two (2) issues. viz: I THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN TOTALLY IGNORED PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE BURDEN OF CONVINCING THE HON.cralawPetitioners made the supplication before the court a quo to recall the adverse judgments against them which was declined by the August 29. COURT THAT THE DELIVERIES OF THE ROAD MATERIALS ATTESTED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THEM WERE NOT GHOST DELIVERIES RESTS WITH THE ACCUSED AND NOT WITH THE PROSECUTION. they now interpose the instant petition to clear their names. cralawFirm in their belief that they were innocent of any wrongdoing.
and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. Petitioners guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt cralawPetitioners mainly asseverate that their guilt was not shown beyond a peradventure of doubt and the State was unable to show that government funds were illegally released based on alleged ghost deliveries in conjunction with false or fake tally sheets and other documents which they admittedly signed.Reasonable doubt is present when after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences. .cralawWe are not persuaded to nullify the verdict. Jr. cralawWe are not convinced. cralawOur Constitution unequivocally guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions. leaves the minds of the [judges] in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction. reasonable doubt is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty. of the truth of the charge. to a moral certainty. but such uncertainty that a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of the evidence. cralawA thorough scrutiny of the records is imperative to determine whether or not reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of accused Fernan. a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding. the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.Definitely. and Torrevillas.This sacred task unqualifiedly means proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: xxxx 4. Other deceits. either by . thus: ART. the same to be applied in its maximum period.There is deceit when one is misled. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5. ART. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. Falsification by public officer. Deceit: Deceit is a specie of fraud. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. 318. or notary who. Penalty for complex crimes. employee. to his hurt.It is actual fraud. taking advantage of his official position. 171. and consists in any false representation or contrivance whereby one person overreaches and misleads another. The complex crime is pruned into the following essential elements: For estafa 1. 48.000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer.cralawPetitioners were charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents as defined and penalized under Articles 318 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter. or notary or ecclesiastical minister. ART. the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed. or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. employee.
the sale of such fake or irregular LAAs and SACDCs in said engineering district in the said year and the participation of the accused thereon. 889. 1988. That the offender is a public officer. (3) That in the previous testimonies of Mrs. etc. For falsification 1. cralaw cralawBefore the SB. employee. on May 18 and 19. the prosecution and the accused have agreed to reproduce and adopt as the testimony of Preagido in the instant cases.guile or trickery or by other means. or notary public. which questions will only be limited to the fake or irregular LAAs and SACDCs issued to Cebu I HED in 1977. disturbance in property right. 1987 and March 14. a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated September 1. Delia Preagido is presented to testify as a State witness in the instant cases without reproducing and adopting her previous testimonies in the Mandaue City HED 78 and the Danao City HED 77 cases. 2. both on direct and cross examination x x x without prejudice to whatever direct and/or cross examination question. 1988 was entered into between the State and the accused with the following stipulations and admissions: (1) To expedite the early termination of the instant cases and abbreviate the testimony of Mrs. 3. (Mandaue City HED 78 cases). she will identify documents and exhibits which have been previously marked and identified by other prosecution witness x x x. That he takes advantage of his official position. the sale of such fake or irregular LAAs and SACDCs issued to Cebu I HED in 1977. that may be propounded by the Prosecution and the accused on said State witness. to believe to be true what is really false. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts defined under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. 1446-1789. Delia Preagido. (2) That in the event Mrs. Damage: Damage may consist in the offended party being deprived of his money or property as a result of the defraudation. Delia Preagido in the Mandaue City HED 78 and the Danao City HED 77 cases. she identified twenty-six separate lists containing names of officials and employees of . etc. 1982 and in Criminal Cases Nos. (Danao City HED 77 cases) on November 10. her previous testimonies in Criminal Cases Nos. 2. or temporary prejudice.
documents.. substituted or re-marked accordingly as Exhibits LL. and the specific fake general vouchers. wherein she identified the methods. Regional Office No. and other related documents signed on separate occasions by petitioners. Jr. which were attached as supporting documents to corresponding general vouchers. therefore. and other pertinent papers that led to the crafting of fake Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs).The fake LAAs and general vouchers were. delivery receipts. in turn. general vouchers.e. i. to obviate Mrs. cralawPreagido confirmed and admitted under oath that the illegal disbursement of public funds pertained to non-existent projects and was supported by fake LAAs. 0000-1 to 0000-25 in the Danao City HED 77 cases. Exhibits KKK.Preagidos vital testimony. and the MPH Central Office who have allegedly received money or various sums from 1977 to 1978 out of the proceeds or sales of fake LAAs in 1977 and 1978 and. the alleged amounts and quantities of road construction materials delivered. LL-1 to LL-25 in the instant cases. fake general vouchers. and other pertinent papers that were also falsified. of the various Highways Engineering Districts in MPH. Region VII. Preagidos previous testimony of these lists. reports of inspection. disbursement of funds for non-existent projects. cralawAs a result of this MOA. dealt a major blow to the defenses raised by petitioners. or the unique and distinct method of procedure by which the malversation of public funds in Region VII of the MPH was perpetrated and accomplished. supported by signed tally sheets that pertained to alleged ghost deliveries of road construction materials for non-existent or illegal projects. the testimony of state witness Preagido on the modus operandi of the conspirators. VII. general vouchers. requests for supplies and materials.MPH. . KKK-1 to KKK-25 in the Mandaue City HED 78 cases and Exhibits 0000. and other documents. exhibits. the Prosecution hereby reproduces and adopts specifically such testimony and the markings of the lists. and other pertinent documents issued which led to the illegal disbursement of funds are summarized as follows: Petitioner Fernan. The fake tally sheets. was not even successfully refuted or overturned by petitioners. checks.
General Voucher Tabogon-Bogo provincial road from Km. T-89-f-1. 98 No. B-245. Request for 1.200 cu. etc.00 to Km. Check No. of item 108 for Not numbered PhP 28.500 cu. T-115-g-1. 9933125. 127. damaged roads and bridges by Typhoon Aring at the 2. 3.00 1.000. road from Km. Check No.Bogo-Curva-Medellon road official procedure 105-76. from Km. B-107.00 2.Criminal Case No. etc. etc.000. 2881 3. m. 110. 9933104. B-55. m. 76 2885 Materials for use in the Not numbered PhP 30. Request for Approximately 1. (Tally Sheets) 2880 T-87-f-1. Check No. use in the repair of the contrary to 2.400 cu. 119. Check No. B-927. (Tally Sheets) Main Documents Items Allegedly Purchased FAKE LAAs Amount of Falsified that authorized Fraud purchase 1. m.30 to Km. 136 2914 2918 .repair and rehabilitation of official procedure 56-77.400 cu. Request for (Tally Sheets) Allocation of Allotment 101-12112-76. Barbon 9403425.000. 1. B-15. from Km. 3.00 Allocation of use in the repair of the contrary to Allotment 101-12. of item 108 for Not numbered PhP 28. of item 108 for PhP 27. the rehabilitation of the contrary to 2. etc. General Voucher 1.00 to Km.000. 9933294. B-76. 1.00 No. CebuHagnayaWharf road official procedure 9933064. 50. use in the rehabilitation of 2. General Voucher No. m. 1.000. Not numbered PhP 31. CebuNorthHagnayaWharf official procedure 9933157. etc. 60. barangay road T-116-f-1. 71 to Km.00 repair and rehabilitation of contrary to the Daan-Bantayan road official procedure from Km.00 (Tally Sheets) Allocation of of item 108 for use in the contrary to Allotment 101-2. General Voucher 1. the Cajel-Lugo.500 cu. T-104-g-1. m. of item 108 for Not numbered PhP 30. 2879 Specific Exhibits T-86-f-1.000. 92 to Km. 1.00 (Tally Sheets) No.00 (Tally Sheets) No. General Voucher 1. 2. etc. Check No. Check No. General Voucher No.
B-631. Request for Receipt).109. 10-180-76. FAKE LAAs that Amount of Fraud authorized purchase 153. General Voucher No. 109.713. of item Not numbered 310 for use in contrary to official asphalting of the procedure Toledo-Tabuelan road from Km. t. B-629. 9-184-76 108. Request for Receipt).road from Km 76. t.472. 3. General Voucher No. 8-152.Allocation of 310 for use in the contrary to official 1 (Daily Tally Allotment 101-10-15.76 m. General Voucher No. of item Not numbered 310 for use in the contrary to official asphalting of the procedure Toledo-Tabuelan road from Km.34 to Km.Allocation Allotment 1 (Daily Tally 101-6-234-76.35 m.asphalting of the procedure Sheet).Toledo-Tabuelan 76.84 2858 151. of item Not numbered Receipt). 6-240-76 2.Petitioner Torrevillas Criminal Specific Exhibits Main Documents Case No. T-36-f (Delivery 1. 6-239-76. 8-153-76.34 to Km. 109. 2. 9-201-76. 109.9-181. 108. 108. 76. t.Allocation of 1 (Daily Tally Allotment 101-10Sheet). T-34-f (Delivery 1.34 to Km. 9403099. 8-102-76.52 Items Allegedly Purchased 2856 3. General Voucher No. PhP 48.52 PhP 47. Check No. 76. of item Not numbered PhP 48.01 m. 6-24176. 76.52 PhP 34.52 2. 9403105. T-35-f (Delivery 1. 8-12176 2.Allocation of 1 (Daily Tally Allotment 101-7-63Sheet). 10-18876. Request for 153.09 2859 110.680.63 m. Check No.34 to Km. 3. Request for Receipt). Check No.65 . T-33-f. 9403115. B-619. 6-237Sheet). T-35-f. 10-190-76. T-36-f. B-613. 108.431. 10-192-76.85 310 for use in contrary to official asphalting of the procedure Toledo-Tabuelan road from Km. 186-76. t. T-34-f. Falsified 2855 T-33-f (Delivery 1.
paint for use in the 76. Balaban barangay road 1. Check No. national roads and bridges 2.324 gals of red lead procedure 76. General Voucher for Supplies and No. 8-170. B-928. m. 9403130. 113-d (Report of 9403426. 71 to Km. Inspection).maintenance of 76. 9403117. Tally Sheets) 1. m.200 cu. Inspection). General Voucher B-643. 115-e (Report of 9403425. Inspection). T-117. General Voucher for Supplies and No.550 cu.000. 7-124. 3. T-113-b (Request 1. Compostela barangay road 1. Equipment). B-929. B-927. T114-f (Abstract of Sealed Quotation) T-115-c (Request 1. Receipt). m.900. 114-e (Report of 9403427.2. Check No.2.200 cu. T. Check No. T. of Not numbered item 108 for use in contrary to official the repair and procedure rehabilitation of damaged roads and bridges at the Toledo-Tabuelan national road from Km. PhP 31.2909 2910 2914 2919 3. (Daily 9933293. Request for 250 gals of Not numbered Allocation of aluminum paint contrary to official Allotment 101-7-83.00 PhP 27. B-244. Barbon barangay road PhP 27. g-1.2. etc.000.900. 7-84-76. 83 1. 8-153-76. Equipment). of item Not numbered 108 for use in the contrary to official rehabilitation of the procedure Buanoy-Cantibas. T. Check No. General Voucher (Delivery No. T115-f (Abstract of Sealed Quotation) T-117-g 1.762. Check No. T113-c (Abstract of Sealed Quotation) T-114-c (Request 1.200 cu. of Not numbered item 108 for use in contrary to official the rehabilitation of procedure the Cajel-Lugo.00 PhP 27.58 cralaw . Equipment).2. General Voucher for Supplies and No.00 PhP 44. of Not numbered item 108 for use in contrary to official the rehabilitation of procedure the MagayCanamukan.00 2932 1. Check No.m.
On the part of petitioners, they readily admitted that they either signed the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other related documents which became part of the supporting documents that led to the issuance of general vouchers and eventually the disbursement of public funds. The tally sheets are statements of delivery that purportedly indicated the specified quantities of materials for the construction and maintenance of roads that have been delivered on supposed project sites on given dates at specific places.
a result of petitioners signatures in the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of
inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other supporting documentswhich became the basis for payment to supplierspublic funds were released via general vouchers and checks to the said suppliers despite the fact that the latter did not make any deliveries in accordance with projects allegedly funded by mostly fake LAAs.
accusation that there were no actual deliveries of road construction and maintenance
materials in support of projects or otherwise funded by LAAs was proven true by the testimonies of the various barangay captains and residents of the barangay who were supposed to be benefited by the construction and repair activities of the Cebu First Highway Engineering District.The testimonies of these barangay captains and residents are summarized as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. MACARIO LIMALIMA,Barangay Captain of Barangay Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway stretching to a distance of 2 kilometers and 750 meters (Km. 122; Km. 123 to 125).He described the road as full of potholes.Except for filling up these potholes with anapog or crushed limestone, no major repairs were undertaken on the said road in 1978 or in previous years. (TSN., pp. 6-14, June 5, 1986). 2. FELOMINO ORBISO, Barangay Captain of Cawit, Medellin, Cebu, from 1972 to 1981, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 125 to Km. 127.9.He described the road as a rough or dirt road.No improvement was ever made on this road whether
during the year when he gave his statement to the NBI (1978) or in previous years. The road remained in bad shape, with numerous potholes which the camineros merely filled up with limestone. (TSN., pp.14-19, June 5, 1986). 3.TIMOTEO ANCAJAS, Barangay Captain of Paypay, Daan Bantayan, Cebu, from 1972 to 1982, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 132 to Km. 134 , or a distance of 2 kilometers.He described the portion of the highway as a rough road with potholes.He stated that the only improvement done on this road was the filling up of the potholes with anapog or crushed limestone and this was done only once in 1977.It even took the camineros three months from the time the limestones were delivered to start working on the road. (TSN., pp. 20-26, June 5, 1986). 4. LUCIA PEAFLOR, Barangay Captain of Don Pedro, Bogo, Cebu, from 1966 to 1982, testified that her barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 103 to Km. 105 , up to the boundary of San Remigio, and from the boundary to Daan Bantayan, a distance of more than 3 kilometers.It was only in 1984 or 1985 when this portion of the national highway was asphalted.Prior to that, the road was maintained by filling up the potholes with crushed limestone or anapog.These potholes started to appear between January and June of 1977.However, as alleged by her in her affidavit (Exh. II-1-d), these potholes were filled up only from January to June, 1978. (TSN., pp. 28-46, June 5, 1986). 5.MARCELO CONEJOS, Barangay Captain of Tapilon, Daan Bantayan, from 1972 to 1982, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 130 to Km. 134, or a distance of 4 kilometers.In 1977, said portion of the national highway was in bad condition and that nothing was done to improve it until 1982, except for the time when the potholes were filled up with crushed limestones. (TSN., pp. 48-56, June 5, 1986). 6. REMEDIOS FELICANO, Barangay Captain of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982, testified that her barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching form Km. 109 to Km. 110.She described said portion of the national highway as stoney.The only maintenance work undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of potholes with crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the roadside. (TSN., pp.57-67, June 5, 1986). 7. ALBERTO BRANSUELA, a resident of Barangay San Jose, Catmon, Cebu, from 1974 to 1978, testified that barangay San Jose is traversed by the national highway (Km. 58), covering a distance of kilometer more or less.He stated that while this portion of the national highway was already
asphalted as of 1977, there were potholes which the camineros filled up with anapog taken from the roadside. (TSN., pp. 69-80), June 5, 1986). 8. CARIDAD PUNLA, Acting Barangay Captain of Barangay Corazon, Catmon, Cebu, from 1977 to 1982, testified that the Poblacion of Catmon is traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 57 to Km. 58.In 1977, only more than of this portion of the national highway was cemented while the remaining portion was asphalted.While said portion of the national highway already had cracks and potholes as of 1977, the real problem was the uneven elevation of the surface of the shoulder of the road.No general repair was undertaken by the authorities to correct the uneven elevation, except for the work done by the camineros who covered up the potholes. (TSN., pp. 81-89, June 5, 1986). 9.FELIPE MOLIT, Barangay Captain of Bao, Sugud, Cebu, from 1975 to 1982, testified that barangay Bao was traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 59 to Km. 60 1/2.He described said portion of the national highway as a gravel road surfaced with anapog.In 1977, the said road already had potholes which maintenance men filled up with anapog beginning in March, 1977.The anapog was hauled in from Km. 64, the usual excavation place of anapog.It took only 3 truckloads of anapog to cover the entire length of the 1 kilometers traversing their barangay. (TSN., pp. 90-99, June 5, 1986). 10. LEONARDO PINOTE, Barangay Captain of Barangay Argawanon, San Remigio, Cebu, from 1972 to 1980, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway covering a distance of kilometers more or less.In 1977, this portion of the national highway was a rough road with potholes.In the same year, camineros worked on the road, using wheelbarrows, shovels and rakes, pitching up the potholes with anapog. (TSN., pp. 29-35, June 6, 1986). 11.PEDRO ORSAL, Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980, testified that his barangay is traversed by the national highway, from Km. 107 to Km. 110, or a distance of three kilometers more or less.In 1977, the road from Km. 107 to Km. 108 was a gravel road. It was properly maintained by the highways people, and every time potholes appeared on the road, they would be filled-up with anapog.This material was dumped along the road by trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways.On the other hand, the road leading to the heart of the poblacion was asphalted, but with potholes.In 1977, the potholes were filled up by camineros with gravel delivered by dump trucks of the Bureau of Public Highways.It was only in 1978 when the road was re-asphalted and extended from the junction of the poblacion to the adjacent barrio of Looc. x x x (TSN., pp.36-45, June 6, 1986).
107 to km. Compared to the testimony of Vice-Mayor Tudlasan. the road from km. that her barangay is traversed by the national highway. said testimony is not conclusive on the actual delivery of the supplies indicated in the tally sheets. that his barangay is traversed by the national highway. Clearly. Cebu and Barangay Captain Pedro Orsal of Poblacion. the testimonies of Barangay Captains Feliciano and Orsal are entitled to more weight and credit. The testimonies of Feliciano and Orsal are further buttressed by the findings and statements of government witnesses. Orsal testified that he was Barangay Captain of Poblacion. from km. 110. they would be filled-up with anapog. Cebu. who testified that he saw the asphalting of the Tabuclan Road from kilometers 18 to 19. On the other hand. stretching from km. Feliciano testified that she was Barangay Captain of Looc. as Tudlasan was not present at the time of alleged delivery. 107 to km. and that the only work undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of potholes with crushed limestone which camineros gathered from the roadside. and that it was only in 1978 when the road was re-asphalted and extended from the junction of the poblacion to the adjacent barrio of Looc. San Remigio. his testimony runs counter to the testimonies of Barangay Captain Remedios Feliciano of Looc. and are more credible considering the fact that they are residents of the area where the road supposedly to be repaired is located plus the fact that they saw only limestone. Cebu. 109 to km. 110. that was used in the repair of the road in 1977. 108 was a gravel road maintained by the highways people. namelyRuth Inting Paredes. San Remigio. Moreover. that in 1977. San Remigio. Supervising COA Auditor assigned to the . from January 1972 to 1980. Cebu from 1977 to 1982. San Remigio.The inescapable conclusion from the aforementioned testimonies of the barangay captains and residents of Cebu whose respective barangay are traversed by the national highway is that there were no actual major repair works undertaken on the national highway except the filling of potholes by crushed limestone (anapog). Felicitas Cruz Ona. there were no deliveries of supplies and materials for asphalting and repair of roads described in the tally sheets and other supporting documents signed by petitioners. which was dumped along the road by the Bureau of Public Highways. Supervising Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor assigned to Region VII. Cebu. While petitioner Torrevillas presented Vice-Mayor Emigdio Tudlasan of Tabuclan. and every time potholes appeared on the road. not asphalt.
Therefore. credible. the government witnesses have no motive to testify falsely against petitioner Torrevillas and.176. freely admitted signing tally sheets which pertained to nonexistent deliveries of road construction supplies and materials totaling PhP 146. Accountant III.50. including PhP 27. Jr. requisitions of supplies and equipment.32 circa 1977. We conclude that there were no actual deliveries of supplies for asphalting of road and repair on kilometers 108 and 109.693. 2855. Senior National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent of the Anti-Graft Section and member of the COA NBI team assigned to investigate the anomalies.150.000 in Criminal Case No. Rogelio C. Mamaril. and 2859. 2879. Glaring is the finding of the SB that the Cebu First Highway Engineering District. reports of inspection. (Criminal Case No. MPH. and Delia Comahig Preagido. had fake LAAs totaling to PhP 4. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On his part. petitioner Fernan. petitioner Torrevillas voluntarily admitted to signing tally sheets. Malvar. Supervising NBI Agent of the Anti-Fraud and Action Section. 2858. Jr. Federico A.924. These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Juliana de los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2885.Undeniably. to which petitioners were assigned. which were the subjects of Criminal Case Nos.000. 2881.The Cebu First Highway Engineering District had also issued checks per unrecorded reports in the total sum of PhP 1. These tally sheets were attached as the supporting papers to fake general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments to suppliers. 2918). Region VIIto the effect that the general vouchers and LAAs that corresponded to the aforementioned tally sheets signed by petitioner Torrevillas were fake or falsified.271. while the fake Cash Disbursement Ceilings issued amounted to PhP 6. and other pertinent documents totaling an even .82. 2880.366. hence. 2914 where petitioner Torrevillas was among the co-accused. 2856. the total illegal disbursements in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District alone were a staggering PhP 12.main COA office.330. and 2914) and Ismael Sabio. Of this total.135.
there exists not even an iota of doubt as to petitioners guilt. at the time of the commission of the crime. 2919). were public officerscivil engineersassigned to the MPH. Jr. Jr.Their signing of tally sheets and related documents pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for road repair and construction constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage of their official positions. 2858. was among the co-accused.000 in Criminal Case No. which were the subjects of the criminal cases where petitioners were charged. Juliana de los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. and 2914). and Manuel Mascardo (Criminal Case No.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary These general vouchers and checks could not be traced to genuine LAAs.These tally sheets were attached as supporting documents to fake LAAs and subsequently became the bases for the disbursement of public funds to the damage and prejudice of the government.01. (Criminal Case No. These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Rufino V. Nuez (Criminal Case Nos.greater amount of PhP 337. especially considering that they had the duty to inspect the purported deliveries and ascertain the veracity of the documents and the statements contained in them. 2909. 2932). including PhP 27. and 2859). 2855.These documents signed by petitioner Torrevillas were likewise attached as supporting papers to fake general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments to suppliers. The tally sheets bearing their signatures contained false recitals of material facts which the petitioners had the duty to verify and confirm. 2910.861.There is no question that petitioners. 2914 where petitioner Fernan. 2856. .Ergo. Ismael Sabio.Indubitably. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo that all the essential elements of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents were present. there were no actual deliveries of supplies and materials for the road repair and rehabilitation in Region VII.
these genuine LAAs were not introduced in evidence. Took advantage of their official position as highway engineers. Were public officers or employees at the time of the commission of the offenses.It is an age-old axiom that s/he who alleges something must prove it. 2. and hard evidence adduced by the State. as follows: 1.1. overwhelming.The essential elements of estafa through falsification of public documents are present in the cases against petitioners. and Torrevillas made it appear that supplies for road construction and maintenance were delivered by suppliers allegedly in furtherance of alleged lawful projects when in fact said supplies were not delivered and no actual asphalting or repair of road was implemented. as payments to various suppliers for the delivery of non-existent supplies. and 1. and PhP 337. Jr.Unfortunately. petitioners: 1. Petitioners assertion that the documents they signed were all genuine and duly covered by genuine LAAs was substantiated only by their own self-serving and uncorroborated testimonies. convincing.In doing so.We hesitate to give much weight and credit to their bare testimonies in the face of clear. Damage: The government disbursed PhP 146.2. cralawBy way of defense.3.861.01 in the case of Torrevillas. petitioners posit that the tally sheets and other documents could in fact be traced to genuine LAAs that were in the custody of the NBI. Deceit: Petitioners Fernan.000 in the case of Fernan. 1. Made untruthful statements in several narrations of fact. Jr. .
and they firmly believed that the documents were indeed in the custody of the NBI. Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another Petitioners vigorously claim error on the part of the lower court when it made the finding that they were co-conspirators with the other parties accused despite the dearth of evidence to amply demonstrate complicity. Pagalasan.However. the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the prosecution. the Court explicated why direct proof of prior agreement is not necessary: After all. secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.In People v. he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance . were in fact. showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Indeed. however.It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before. We are not convinced by petitioners postulation. settled jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by direct evidence.Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. connected and cooperative. each doing a part so that their combined acts. petitioners miserably failed to avail of subpoena duces tecum which the court a quo could have readily granted. during and after the commission of the crime.The inability to produce such important and exculpatory pieces of evidence proved disastrous to petitioners cause. indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.If the genuine LAAs were vital to their defense.To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy. the difficulty in establishing the existence of conspiracy. Considering.Their conviction was indeed supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt which was not overturned by defense evidence.Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object. then petitioners could have easily procured the compulsory process to compel the production of said documents. though apparently independent of each other.
The 36 disparate persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a single hub. we categorized two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies. and (2) the chain conspiracy. Del Rosario.Preagido manipulated the general ledger. journal vouchers and general journal through negative entries to conceal the illegal disbursements. Sandiganbayan. in elaborating the intricate web of conspiracy among the accused. namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant). and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II). in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler. usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband. who controlled the separate spokes of the conspiracy.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the wheel conspiracy.Petitioners were among the many spokes of the wheel. In Estrada v.or furtherance of the complicity. namely: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy. Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner). then wholesaler and retailer.Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or selling fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount.They typed fake LAAs during Saturdays. Paredes it was discovered that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped notice due to the following manipulations: The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were not signed by the Finance Officer nor (sic) recorded in the books of . Delia Preagido (Accountant III). in which there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes).In the initial report of COA auditors Victoria C. and then retailer and consumer. Chairperson of the Third Division. Cruz and Sayson to join him.There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. We recall the painstaking efforts of the SB through Associate Justice Cipriano A.All three agreed to help him carry out his plan. thus: Mangubat enticed Preagido. Quejada and Ruth I.
50 and twenty-nine (29) corresponding Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs). although the obligations being paid were not among those certified to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of the preceding year. as appearing in the trial balance.336. account 8-81-400 (sic) and the excess of checks issued over authorized cash disbursements ceiling. the Cebu First HED appears to have also received for the same period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting to P4.160.694.Other government employees. the list of projects in Region .But apart from this.These journal vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry to record the disbursements made on the basis of fake LAAs. tempted by the prospect of earning big money. amounting to P5.Disbursements made on the basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400).734. obviously because.680. adjustments were prepared monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790.The checks.cralawCebu First Highway Engineering District Anomalies Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in the Cebu First District Engineering District.To conceal the overcharges to authorized allotments. cralaw xxxx 3. Thus the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-790).accounts. would not show the irregularity.The Cebu First HED received from Region VII thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total sum of P4. allowed their names to be used and signed spurious documents. could not be traced to any Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) OR MATCHED TO THE Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the MPH and Regional Office. they were not properly funded. 1977 to December 31.04 for the period January 1. the Court finds that the same pattern of fraud employed in the other highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was followed. were actually issued.677. The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. however. hereinafter referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity. 1977.76 which however.Furthermore. It was also made to appear that the payments were made for alleged prior years obligations and chargeable to Account 81-400.This is highly irregular and not in consonance with accounting procedures.
m.300.000 cu.00 70.000.00 7.t.504.505.74.00.839.610.800 cu.00. of Vouchers 29 21 11 10 6 3 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 Kind of Materials Item 310 Item 108 Item 108 Item 108 Item 108 Lumber Hollow Blocks Equip.00 48. Jr. to wit: Supplier Rufino Nuez Juliana delos Angeles No. delos Angeles Iluminada Vega Florencio Gacayan Ismael Sabio.m.However. an additional amount of P3. Freent Ind.325 cu. 3. 1.m. No.R. The following payments for materials purchased for the year 1977 were made to appear as payment for prior years obligation and were paid out of fake LAAs: Supplier Rufino Nuez J.000. Santrade Mktg.198 cu.00 24.090.810. Total The NBI also discovered that there were purchases of materials in 1977 that were charged to current obligations but paid out of spurious LAAs.00 Iluminada Vega Florencio Gacayan 3 2 . 2.00 cu. 5. Eustaquio Ent.400.400. Rental Office Supplies Johnson Products Item 108 Paints Office Supplies Measurement 4.135.m.640.00 29. 1977. Pelagia Gomez M & M Ent. was spent by the Cebu First HED for maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year (1977) but the same could not be traced to any authoritative document coming from the MPH.m.275 mt 22.m.VII for 1977 showed that Cebu first HED completed rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in its districts from February to May.812.00 2. 13.On the other hand.00 7. 7.290 cu.20 590. the expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in 1977 amounted to P140.90 8.m. 8. with expenditures amounting to P613.000.00 156.00 cu.374.00 191.00 123.692.00 72.20 P2.m.147. 307 cu.m.736.00.600 cu.00 P276.392.461.000 cu.These completed projects were properly funded by legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only P754.000.580.m. 1977.00 49.00 433. of Kind of Vouchers Materials 11 Item 310 Item 108 16 Item 108 Item 111 Item 200 Item 108 Item 108 Measurement 162.960.880.549 m.982.475. 6.500. Amount P1.280 cu. and these were all completed within the period from November to December. Amount P529.90 40.m. FBS Marketing Cebu Hollow Blocks Bienvenido Presillas T.00 19.
810.839.950 cu.810.839. 1 5 3 Steel Frame Item 108 6.P3.00 128. and requests for supplies and materials by petitioners on separate occasions is vital to the success .The State is not tasked to adduce direct proof of the agreement by petitioners with the other accused. did not show any improvement (Exhibit II). in many cases. Jr. the signing of the fake tally sheets and/or delivery receipts.As testified to by several barangay captains.810.74 were prepared for no other purpose than to siphon off the said amount from the government coffer into the pockets of some officials and employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED. emanating from fake LAAs and ACDCs.000. would border on near impossibility. the roads and bridges in the district. the road maintenance consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of the national Highway.764.74.810.Vicon Ent.339.74 A total of 132 General Vouchers. through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the aforementioned materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national highways within the Cebu First HED. also of Region VII. Jabcyl Mktg.m. it will accord finality to the findings of facts of the SB.Undisturbed is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and in the absence of strong and compelling reasons or justifications. the Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the anti-graft court that petitioners are co-conspirators of the other accused. who were similarly convicted in practically all the 119 counts of estafa. the vouchers for payments of alleged maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional amount of P3.In the case at bench.80 P1.839.Despite the enormous additional expenditure of P3. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds amounting to P3.74 139.The feeble defense of petitioners that they were not aware of the ingenuous plan of the group of accused Mangubat and the indispensable acts to defraud the government does not merit any consideration.839. as well as the suppliers and contractors who conspired and confederated with them. headed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat. Bridge Materials Total 19. reports of inspection. Ismael Sabio. Regional Highway Engineer.042. were traced back to Rolando Mangubat.663. Obviously.74 Grand Total . for such requirement. Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez.74. as found out by the NBI.The State needs to adduce proof only when the accused committed acts that constitute a vital connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. After a close re-examination of the records.
Upon delivery of the supplies and materials. e. the requisitioning officer will prepare the general voucher which must be accompanied by the following documents: a. The PO.of the Mangubat Group in siphoning off government funds. the Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA) or the request for funds is signed by the District Engineer pursuant to the approved plans and budget and signed by the district accountant as to availability of funds. The ROA. the disbursing officer shall prepare and draw a check based on said voucher.Without such fabricated documents. and The tax clearance and tax certificate of the supplier. d.The Purchase Order (PO) is prepared and addressed to the winning bidder. elaborated on the procedure regarding the award of the contract more specifically to the payment of the contractor or supplier. c. After the preparation and submission of the general voucher and the supporting documents. b. Supervising COA Auditor. the general vouchers covering the supply of materials cannot be properly accomplished and submitted to the disbursing officer for the preparation of checks. State witness Ruth Paredes.Once the Request for Supplies and Equipment is approved by the Regional Office. The district office will advertise the invitation to bid and award the contract to the lowest bidder.The check is .Consequently. the supplier bills the district office for payment. The abstract of Bid together with the Bid quotations. The delivery receipts together with the tally sheets.
In People v.As a result. resulting in the inescapable conclusion that these LAAs were unauthorized.Thus. officials.Without the check payment. Ismael Sabio. he signed false tally sheets and delivery receipts on supplies allegedly delivered by Rufino V. Nuez. there were ghost or false deliveries of supplies and materials as convincingly shown by the testimonies of the barangay captains..These are undisputed tell-tale signs of the complicity by petitioners with the Mangubat syndicate.Without the general voucher.More importantly. he signed tally sheets on the ghost deliveries of Juliana de los Angeles and Ismael Sabio. it is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts.With respect to petitioner Fernan. there is nothing or not much to share with the more than 30 or so co-conspirators. Jr. Surely. and residents of the areas where the materials were allegedly used.Lastly. Mangubat. hence. petitioners acts in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Juliana de los Angeles.countersigned by an officer of the district office and/or the COA Regional Director based on the amount of the check. and Manuel Mascardo. fake or fabricated. the checks issued to these suppliers based on general vouchers supported by the false tally sheets and general vouchers signed by petitioners cannot be traced to any genuine LAAs. the court a quo elucidated the conspiracy in the Cebu highway scam in a trenchant manner: . the fake delivery receipts and tally sheets signed by petitioners were linked to the general vouchers upon which check payments were made to the suppliers who were found guilty of participating in the fraud. then there would be no need to fake the LAAs because the suppliers will have to be paid the cost of said materials plus a reasonable profit. Thus. the check for the payment of the supply cannot be made and issued to the supplier. Jr. On the part of petitioner Torrevillas.. if there were actual deliveries of materials made. the defraudation cannot be committed and successfully consummated. the general voucher cannot be prepared and completed.Moreover. for the suppliers would not be too dim-witted to part with even their cost in buying the materials they allegedly supplied. Jr.
WHEREFORE. the required quantum of proof has been adduced by the State on the conspiracy among the accused including petitioners. we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the December 4. which is to secure the illegal release of public funds under the guise of fake or simulated public documents. then no conspiracy could result as its consummation would then be impossible or aborted. once a conspiracy is directly or impliedly proven.Where the acts of each of the accused constitute an essential link in a chain and the desistance of even one of them would prevent the chain from being completed. so much so that the common objective is attained. JR. then each and everyone of said accused are equally liable as co-principals under the well-established and universally-accepted principle that. cralawNo costs. The conviction of petitioners must perforce be sustained. PRESBITERO J.But when each and everyone of the accused in the instant cases performed their assigned tasks and roles with martinet-like precision and accuracy. In sum. Associate Justice . VELASCO. cralawSO ORDERED. 1997 Decision of the SB in the consolidated criminal cases subject of this petition. by individually performing essential overt acts. the act of one is the act of all and such liability exists notwithstanding no-participation in every detail in the execution of the offense.
TINGA Associate Justice ATTESTATION cralawI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CARPIOCONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Associate Justice DANTE O. LEONARDO A.WE CONCUR: LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson . QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson ANTONIO T.
Article VIII of the Constitution.: . DECISION BELLOSILLO. J. and the Division Chairpersons Attestation. I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.CERTIFICATION cralawPursuant to Section 13. Petitioner. PUNO Chief Justice EN BANC [G. vs. 2001] JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA.R. cralawREYNATO S. Respondents. No. November 19. 148560.
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number. against his will. individually or collectively. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset. [2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic. the skein irregular and broken. . (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code. the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because. it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance. which society is justified in enforcing at all cost. 1. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada. par. (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness. Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to selfpreservation. against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test. often outright collision. inevitably followed.he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation. carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread . according to him. Thus he says The sole end for which mankind is warranted. (d). all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. Antagonism. Specifically. is self-protection. in his essay On Liberty. between the law as the expression of the will of the State. enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors. the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder: Section 1. business. (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions. enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof.asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference . and. In the process. is to prevent harm to others. the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. [1 as amended by RA 7659.JOHN STUART MILL. property. and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity.
The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Rule of Evidence. (2) By receiving. amasses. equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking. subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes: (1) Through misappropriation. nominees.acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies. or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.000. .000. business associates. gift. percentage. Section 2. in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50. subordinates or other persons. . Section 4. (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions. share. directly or indirectly. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. or (6) By taking advantage of official position. the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court.Any public officer who. industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests. relationship. accumulate or acquire ill-gotten . (5) By establishing agricultural. by himself or in connivance with members of his family. or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury. it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass. Penalties. (4) By obtaining. conversion.For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder. receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock. any commission. authority. relatives by affinity or consanguinity. In the imposition of penalties. kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned. agencies or instrumentalities. misuse. agents. accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof. Definition of the Crime of Plunder.
(e). and. (a). On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash. (c) Crim. 26558. and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. as amended by RA 6085)." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. for violation of RA 7080. par. Case No. par. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation. issued a Resolution in Crim. (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process. Case No. and. par. 183 of The Revised Penal Code). 26558. On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. and if so. (a). . as amended by RA 7659. inclusive. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash. 3. (e) Crim. 142.wealth. On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Cases Nos. 3. reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses. Case No. Case No. and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. (d)." and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. 26565. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused. Case No. for violation of Sec. of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). and. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness. 7. it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied). and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. 26564. respectively. for Perjury (Art. Third Division. whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. Noticeably. (b) Crim. par. 26559 to 26562. 26563. for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a. On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan. par. 3. for violation of Secs." "b. (d) Crim. Case No. docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum. (e) and 3. the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague. On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations. As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001.
the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. for absent such a showing. Thus 1. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution. relatives by affinity or consanguinity. the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers. for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest. v.Preliminarily. Of course. Verily. In La Union Credit Cooperative. Yaranon [4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court. where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law. the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. As it is written. and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. "To doubt is to sustain. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch . Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality. courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality. business associates. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm. invalidity being a measure of last resort. A doubt. even if well-founded. Inc. . courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. will hardly suffice. conduct and conditions required or forbidden. subordinates or other persons. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family. [3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack.the legislature. it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded. the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute. there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts. and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority." [5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
the counsel. and more importantly. any commission. it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50.k. 7080. Delia Rajas. 3.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. (d).a. equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking. Edward Serapio. of the Plunder Law. Yolanda T. No. Ricaforte. 1. Office of the Ombudsman. Charlie 'Atong' Ang. by himself AND/OR in . 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a. accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada. of the crime of Plunder. defined and penalized under R. industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests. In fact. directly or indirectly. in the Philippines. its validity will be sustained. (d) by obtaining.A. in defending one charged with its violation.a. Joseph Ejercito Estrada.k. accumulated or acquired is at least P50. EPIB. gift. That he amassed. or (f) by taking advantage of official position.a. 1998 to January 2001.00.000. in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation. (e) by establishing agricultural. and. the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law. relationship.000. indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed: "The undersigned Ombudsman. Uy. misuse. authority.000. No.' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada. 'JOSE VELARDE. the accused. or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury. kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer. and John DOES & Jane Does. share. THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed.A. Jane Doe a. a.2.000. conversion. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application.k. JOHN DOE a. percentage. Indeed. par.k. 12 of R. 7659. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties. Prosecutor and OIC-Director. as amended by Sec. hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. Alma Alfaro.a. (b) by receiving. agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions. committed as follows: That during the period from June.
Ricaforte.173.000. ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4. AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES. WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY.607.097. did then and there willfully.450. No. Alma Alfaro. MORE OR LESS. CONNECTION. converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY.CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused. SHARE.00).a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.000.855. 7171. OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY . DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. BUSINESS ASSOCIATES. accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF. representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200. MORE OR LESS. more or less.102. the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351.A. 329. MORE OR LESS. (b) by DIVERTING.878.804. RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY. in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING. OR INFLUENCE. AUTHORITY. Uy. AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES. Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada.a. unlawfully and criminally amass. public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130. MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545.000. misappropriating. described as follows: (a) by receiving OR collecting. BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION. Yolanda T.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R. OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS. (italic supplied).000.17). PERCENTAGE. Edward Serapio. FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT. KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT.k.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744. JOHN DOE a. RELATIONSHIP. BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG. RESPECTIVELY.965. through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts.00). Jane Doe a. and the Social Security System (SSS). by himself and/or in connivance with coaccused Charlie 'Atong' Ang. Delia Rajas. more or less.612.000 SHARES OF STOCKS. FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT. OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1. for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit.00). RECEIVING.000. directly or indirectly. ordering and compelling. on SEVERAL INSTANCES.000. SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS.000 SHARES OF STOCK.k. THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. (c) by directing.
Moreover. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein. hence. there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.578. however. or because of the employment of terms without defining them.000. par.50). IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES. These omissions. 1. in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3.CENTAVOS (P1. PERCENTAGES.057. GIFTS.847. DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY." We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous . Besides. render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. can be gathered from the whole act. these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. and the word "pattern" in Sec.00) MORE OR LESS. The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry.700.' (d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS. KICKBACKS. FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE. violative of his fundamental right to due process. Upon such unequivocal assertions. which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. Petitioner. [7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those . [6 much less do we have to define every word we use. 2. according to petitioner. AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING. it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural. and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will. 4.173. COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189. (d).104. petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK. and Sec. SHARES.that will confuse petitioner in his defense. BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES.as there is obviously none . OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS. Although subject to proof. plain and ordinary acceptation and signification.233. or at least.
GARCIA: Yes. two acts. REP. GARCIA: No. REP. we include series. REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. . Now when we say combination. GARCIA: Two. GARCIA: Yeah. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:" Combination . will these be included also? REP. REP. ISIDRO: Not twice? REP. misuse. we actually mean to say. no. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. REP. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters. Thus. it seems that REP.words. not twice. ordinarily. if there are two or more means. That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law: DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.but combination. GARCIA: Yeah. how about a series of the same act? For example. Series . untrained philologists and lexicographers . REP. through misappropriation. [8 The intention of the lawmakers . because we say a series. 7 May 1991 REP. the act or process of combining. REP. REP.the result or product of combining. ISIDRO: Series.who are. we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice . conversion. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration. ISIDRO: When we say combination.to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
It cannot be a repetition of the same act.. di ba? REP. thats it. so there are two. GARCIA: Series. meaning. GARCIA: Yes. ISIDRO: So. REP. on line 25. ISIDRO: No. SEN. That is why. ha. GARCIA: That be referred to series. GARCIA: Yes.. no. REP. REP. it is not a combination? REP... I said. So x x x x REP. two different acts. we seem to say that two or more.. 6 June 1989 SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already result in such a big amount. Because when we say combination or series. oo. ISIDRO: Thats not series.REP. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series? REP. REP... When we say combination. GARCIA: Its not. that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act. REP. REP. ISIDRO: Now. Its a combination. two different? REP. REP. would the Sponsor consider .. GARCIA: Yes. ano. TANADA: Two different. REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts. ISIDRO: Now a series. ISIDRO: When you say combination. yeah. ISIDRO: So in other words. two misappropriations. REP. we mean. GARCIA: Series. it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. repetition.. REP.. SEN. if it is a combination.. DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. Supposing one act is repeated. GARCIA: A series. Series. Two misappropriations will not be combination.. GARCIA: For example. REP. One after the other eh di. 733.
As for "pattern. (3). (d). par. subpar. par.. because a series implies several or many. the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass. there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. to read. Mr. at least.. two or more. Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination.g. subpar. and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec.deleting the words a series of overt or. in relation to Sec. say. 1. 1. misappropriation.. . Mr. Secondly." it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. (d). SENATOR TANADA: Accepted. subpar. (d). 1. As commonly understood. (d). (1). 1 (d). the criminal acts are in the plural. malversation and raids on the public treasury. 2 of the law. accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series. 1. Anyway. par. raids on the public treasury in Sec. (d). 4. THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be. then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1. President x x x x THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one. par." it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. In the alternative. Verily. par. 1. and Sec. if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary. to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. But when we say acts of plunder there should be. And thirdly. two or more." we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan [9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. Remove the idea of necessitating a series. the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. pursuant to Sec. President. (1). the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal. e. all of which fall under Sec.. On the other hand. par. therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. 1 (d) of the law. SENATOR ROMULO: In other words. SENATOR MACEDA: Yes. that is already covered by existing laws. SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this. a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. (d).
the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects . we agree with. [10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. Under the circumstances.e. that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. Flexibility. The first may be "saved" by proper construction. that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld . An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.. is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. [12 It must be stressed. however.Hence. as in this case. especially where. while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. rather than meticulous specificity. on the other hand. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity. violates the first essential of due process of law. In such instance. as petitioner seems to suggest. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. [11 With more reason. the observations of Mr. decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. especially the parties targeted by it. because of the nature of the act. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face. it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Justice Vicente V. and. fair notice of what conduct to avoid."[13 The overbreadth doctrine. hence we adopt. Moreover." [14 . petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways.it violates due process for failure to accord persons. i.
" [18 As for the vagueness doctrine. and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or. . Oklahoma. while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant. the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct." [19 In sum. since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. As the U. the doctrines of strict scrutiny. the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." For this reason. again. in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist. by their terms. First Amendment cases. the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. and. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully."[15 The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. [17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution. "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone. as they are called in American law. that "overbreadth claims. it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.S. Supreme Court put it. if entertained at all. there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the AntiPlunder Law on its face and in its entirety. In the area of criminal law."[20 As has been pointed out. the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation. With respect to such statute. seek to regulate only spoken words" and."[16 In Broadrick v. overbreadth. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes." [21 Consequently.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. A fortiori. Petitioners posited. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy.Indeed. petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage. and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes. . par. it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the wellentrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law. its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. For these reasons. among others. pinpointing its deficiencies.S. is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. To be sure. therefore. to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality. "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine."[25 and is generally disfavored. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses. (e). . "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. as the U. Sec. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage. where none exists. violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part." to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort. In that case. for its vagueness. so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner. and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect. petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. par. petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec.[22 It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. whichever way they might be decided. 3. (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith. that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents. . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions. [26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute. Sandiganbayan [28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details. that. is more imagined than real. Harris [24 [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute. and. . [27 In light of the foregoing disquisition. the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought. Ambiguity. The parallel case of Gallego v. (e). 3. of The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. [23 But.
in the discharge of his official. and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses. it being . Inc. 19). if not all." and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. C. x x x (Section 3 [e]. 2514). 43-A 1978. The phrases "manifest partiality. which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. (e). advantage or preference which is unjustified. they were being charged and prosecuted. Third International Dictionary. v. It seems lacking adequate or official support.For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder. administrative or judicial functions. In other words. petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec.(c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses. of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. cited in Words and Phrases. On the second issue. 405 F. 3. or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers. 3. advantage or preference in the discharge of his official.. unjustified. Supp. unauthorized (Webster. it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass.D. Pa. p. Cumulative Annual Pocket Part. . 4. as amended). of the statute may be committed. Rep. (e). this Court held that Sec. Consequently. p. US Dept." "evident bad faith. The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. 12. Vol. of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. in giving any private party benefits. evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in: x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits. unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. Rule of Evidence. par. Permanent Edition. In dismissing the petition. par. It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy SEC. this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality. through manifest partiality. Act 3019. par. (e). accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. 3. 8. of Justice. petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional. in that case.
Speaker. GARCIA: Mr. I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. Mr. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information. not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.000 and in the crime of extortion. he was only able to accumulate P1 million. what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. coercion. Now. In a criminal prosecution for plunder. the accused is entitled to an acquittal. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. MR. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080. Mr. there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of pants. 9 October 1990 MR. For example. by falsification is less than P100 million. say. Speaker. he was able to accumulate only P50. [29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. ALBANO: I am aware of that. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. theft? MR.sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. in the act of bribery. but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because. falsification of public document. [30 The following exchanges between Rep. Mr. Speaker. it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. bribery. ALBANO: Now. does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed. For instance. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important. Now. but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation. pieces of jewelry. when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill . as in all other crimes. Speaker. say. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies.
Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. Stated otherwise. par. proved beyond reasonable doubt. GARCIA: With due respect. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50.000. one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. 1. it is just one single act. Speaker.000. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime. 4. It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder.00. Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. if the amount involved in these transactions. is P100 million. accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.00. accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth.000. 4 is . so.000. supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. For example. but there are certain acts that could not be proved. (d). [31 A reading of Sec. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass. so how can we now convict him? MR. brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating.000. than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50. The thesis that Sec. Now." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts. for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime. we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved.000. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder. To illustrate.00 or more. Now.through the interpretation on the rule of evidence. Mr. acquiring or amassing hidden wealth." and that Sec. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids. 2 in conjunction with Sec. there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million. then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied). What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec.
"two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of? ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law? ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law? ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder? ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4? ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32 We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal: SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x xxx It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or
establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved. As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733: SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33 However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner: SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases? SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."[35 Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:[36 The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
In the checkered history of this nation. assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it. petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659. destructive arson resulting in death. that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. on constitutional grounds. any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government. is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office. no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue. the amendatory law of RA 7080. The legislative declaration in R. employees or officers. it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Viewed in this context. few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's .P. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. indeed. the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated. dishonesty. the very survival of the people it governs over. Indeed. No.There are crimes. they are mala in se[37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law. by necessary effect.A. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people. extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong. the same having been eternally consigned by People v. in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. To clinch. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population. Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. Echegaray [38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. if left unchecked. will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. These are times that try men's souls. especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which. however. Blg. Such is the Plunder Law. and in turn. and becomes. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking. The Plunder Law. without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State. and drug offenses involving government officials.
. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism. Buena. JJ.. Quisumbing. as amended by RA 7659.. Kapunan. Mendoza's concurring opinion. please see concurring opinion. Puno. JJ. JJ. Panganiban J. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION .. PREMISES CONSIDERED . Mendoza . join concurring opinion of J. Davide. Melo... no part. and De Leon. please see separate concurring opinion. Ynares-Santiago. is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently. this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law.. to rise above factionalism and prejudices. concur.J. the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. J.ignominious fall from the highest office. SO ORDERED. Was one of the complainants before Ombudsman. Pardo. Jr.. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. C. see dissenting opinion. Carpio. Jr.. and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment. concurred and joins J. Vitug. Mendoza. Sandoval-Gutierrez. JJ. J.
and RELITO M.433 square meters consisting of: . with prayer for preliminary injunction. That in pursuance to Resolution No. on March 11. the NWSA Board approved Resolution No. pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement with two unions of its employees and workers. ROLANDO M. 1968. the Court issued the preliminary injunction prayed for. series 1968. GENARO C. Petitioner. a raffle was held to determine who among its employees and workers would be allowed to purchase housing units. REYES. be set aside. 1971 and May 11. ALEJANDRO S.: Petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the orders of respondent court of March 5. Respondents filed their answer in due time. BOCAR as Judge. 113-'69. in his capacity as Chairman of the Housing Project Implementation Committee created by employees-awardees for the implementation of the NWSA Employees Housing Project. BAUTISTA. 1969 worded as follows: RESOLVED. which commands petitioner to execute certain deeds of sale of lots of the NWSA or the National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority (now the Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System). after which the parties filed their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument and the case was submitted for decision. TEODORO M. L-33535 January 17. MAZO.G. 1968. SANTOS. FRANCISCO R. considering that the estimated number of said units would not be enough for all the members of the two unions.) On December 23. TULALI. (Resolution 415-'68. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On June 18. through its board of directors. Acting on the petition. as the initial site of the proposed NWSA Housing Project for said workers and employees. the sale to the NWSA Labor Unions (KKMK & BELA) of raw land with a total area of 479. No. granting the mandatory preliminary injunction applied for by private respondents. in his capacity as Acting General Manager of the National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority (NWSA) and in his personal capacity. Respondents. BARREDO. NWSA. ICASIANO M. consisting of 58 hectares. in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of NWSA Employees Housing Project. 1971. UNTALAN. p. Court of First Instance of Manila.R. J. 43. PASCUAL. and "in line with the Housing Program of the Administration". 1971. vs. Branch XVI. PUMARADA. SALINAS. ANGELINO S. ISADA. and as a gesture of harmonious Labor-Management relationships in the NWSA. BENJAMIN M. JUDGE JUAN L. the KKMK-NWSA (Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng Mga Manggagawa sa NWSA) and BELA (Balara Employees and Laborers Association). 1975 SERGIO M.411 awardees were selected. SEVERINO MATEO. and more than 700 others in a class suit. Record. 415. Only 1. Annex A of the petition. segregated and set aside a portion of its land below the La Mesa Dam in Quezon City. on May 26. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library With the prospective awardees thus known.
113. 47. deductible from the payrolls. provided that the individual employee-awardees shall make a down payment in the amount of P100. shall be deducted from the proceeds of the loan in favor of the NWSA. which approved the request of the Union (KKMK-BELA) for the mass preparation of Transfer Certificate of Titles to individual employee-awardees in the NWSA Housing Project. a housing lot in the said housing project. the Board approved Resolution No. the request of the Unions (KKMK-BELA) for the mass preparation of lot titles and the transfer of the same to the individual employee-awardees so that such titles can be deposited under the care and custody of the GSIS to serve as collaterals of individual real estate loan applications. Record.917. series 1969. as reserved and allotted for the NWSA Housing Project under said Res. Record. or payable in cash.50 per square meter in order to absorb the cost of the land to be converted into streets. a notation of conviction of final transfer should be entered at the back thereof under the column "Memorandum of Encumbrance. s. That in the preparation of the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title to individual employee-awardees. a notation should be entered at the back of said titles . a provision shall be inserted therein whereby the cost of the lot or the unpaid balance of the cost of the same.Area for proposed main and side streets 130. m. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library RESOLVED FURTHER.) Shortly thereafter. within the portion of the NWSA property below the La Mesa Dam. be and is hereby approved.00 per square meter or at a total value of P1. be and is hereby approved. That in order to facilitate the financing of the housing project for the NWSA rank and file as contemplated under Resolution No. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx (Annex B P." to the effect that absolute ownership of the lot will only be obtained upon full payment of the individual loan applications to the GSIS.) chanrobles virtual law library This resolution was subsequently amended on June 17.732. That the second paragraph of Resolution No. Quezon City. 1969 to read as follows: RESOLVED. shall be priced at P5. Provided That. 415 series 1968 and Resolution No. at the minimal price of P4. series 1969. 1968. That in the preparation of the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) to the individual employee-awardees. 1969 reading thus: RESOLVED. 1969. 415. upon request of the unions made on March 24 and 26.00 for the awarded lot.735 sq. be and is hereby amended to read as follows: chanrobles virtual law library "Resolved Further. m. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx (Annex C p. in the repayment of the land by the Unions. 154-'69 on April 1. 45. Saleable Area 348.698 sq. No.00. 154.
Bautista. an interim loan of P1. be and is hereby authorized to sign for and in behalf of the Authority the individual deed of sale to employee-awardees. respectively. who acted with the assistance of a Housing Project Implementation Committee. a provision shall be inserted. to pay the contractor who had already started the work. by them. on the security of the lots sold by NWSA to its members. as will be stated more in detail later. NWSA. therein whereby the cost of the lot or the unpaid balance of the cost of the same. Annex D. That in line with the recommendation of Management. appointed and created. and the GSIS is agreeable to this arrangement. the awardees. That the Acting General Manager. called for bids in the newspapers. shall be deducted from the proceeds of the GSIS loan and paid to the NWSA.under the column "Memorandum of Encumbrances" that the said lot is mortgaged to the NWSA for the balance of the purchase price. That the GSIS shall make a written commitment to the NWSA that it will deduct from the loan of every individual awardee. it has gone to the extent of already granting the KKK-NWSA. for an interim loan pending completion of the individual lot titles of the NWSA employee-awardees who are qualified to borrow real estate loans with the GSIS. Obviously. the respondent Genero C. 49." chanrobles virtual law library RESOLVED FURTHER. among contractors. on the basis of which each awardee was to be allotted his respective lot. and on April 24. no titles could be immediately issued because payment to the NWSA would have to come from the GSIS. by way of implementing the sale of the homesite to the unions for the benefit of its individual members who had won in the raffle. to be identified by block number and lot number. so much so that. 283-'69. 141924 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx (Resolution No. one of the unions. 1This lot. p. would be the basis of the deeds. it was necessary to execute deeds of sale in favor respectively of each awardee. 1969. the KKK-NWSA requested the Board to allow it to obtain an interim loan with the GSIS. identified as TCT No. Record. after which the NWSA shall execute the corresponding Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage. in the meanwhile. the request of the KKMK-NWSA for authority to mortgage with the Government Service Insurance System the mother title of the land allotted as housing project of the KKMK-NWSA. Accordingly. 1969. through an attorney-in-fact. Acting on this request. so BHESCO could immediately start working on the project.5 M.) In other words. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Indeed. a subdivision plan was prepared. through paid advertisements. the Board approved the following resolution: RESOLVED. on August 29. and that in the preparation of the individual loan applications to the GSIS. be and is hereby granted and approved subject to the following conditions: chanrobles virtual law library 1. And in order not to lose time. the amount corresponding to the balance of the . the job was awarded to Builders Heavy Equipment and Service Corporation or BHESCO.
410-'69. 353.) GSIS agreed to these conditions and forthwith granted the interim loan of P1. private respondents asked for a writ of . and as it is drawing interest in the meanwhile. After this lifting. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library During the month of January. presumably with the knowledge of NWSA before the resolution of June 17. petitioner. 1969 was approved. And in connection with said petition. 150-'70) on August 18.735 square meters earmarked for the proposed main and side streets valued at P522. BHESCO proceeded to develop the site. and that such amount to be deducted in favor of NWSA shall be set off against the outstanding accounts of the NWSA with the GSIS." chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx (Annex C. 1970: RESOLVED. Incidentally.purchase price of the lot sold to the individual NWSA employee-awardee. abovereferred to. shall be entered a notation to the effect that the total area of 130.5 M. Annex B. That at the back of the aforesaid TCT No. 1 of Resolution No. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library All these notwithstanding. 410-'69. 354. like the unremitted insurance and retirement premiums as well as salary loan deductions. . it may be mentioned at this point that the P1. He has signed already 29 of them.5 M. the President ordered the suspension of the Housing Project but later. the awardees will have to carry the burden of said interests until the work on the project is resumed. p. as manager of NWSA and pursuant to the terms of above-quoted resolution No. instead of remitting the same directly to the NWSA.00 is not included as being mortgaged. That Condition No. Isada has refused and continues to refuse to sign the rest of the deeds corresponding to the remaining awardees. 1970. Hence. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. upon the joint request of the two unions. due to intra-union disputes. and shall remit the same to the NWSA. p.940. That the GSIS shall make a written commitment to the NWSA that it will deduct from the loan of every individual awardee. Record. 2On February 24. the NWSA approved the following resolution (No. interim loan given by the GSIS to the KKK-NWSA by virtue of the above resolution has to be assumed pro-rata by the individual awardees. the petition for mandamus in the lower court. be and is hereby amended to read as follows: chanrobles virtual law library "1. Record. 1970. 283-'69. on May 22. 1970. Please note that the award to BHESCO took place.) Accordingly. 141924. under the column "Memorandum of Encumbrance". the amount corresponding to the balance of the purchase price of the lot sold to the individual NWSA employee-awardee. began executing deeds of sale with mortgage in favor of individual awardees. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx (Resolution No. the suspension was lifted.
GSIS would credit to NWSA's account therewith the amount corresponding to the purchase price thereof. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is not pretended that there is any legal obstacle or any other factor impeding the consummation of the sale contract between the NWSA and the awardees. and the mortgage will forthwith be transferred from NWSA to the GSIS as mortgagee. 1969. While. as the completion thereof would already be a matter exclusively between the GSIS. It is against this provisional remedy that the instant petition before Us was filed. Manager Isada who is adamantly and arbitrarily failing to comply with his clear official duty in the premises. It is only petitioner. considering that it is not denied that the awardees listed in said Annex G have already paid the NWSA the corresponding down payment required by Resolution l54-'69. and the awardees and the contractor. The civil action filed by officers of PAFLU questioning the powers of respondents to enter into the agreements with NWSA and GSIS has been dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila. the President ordered the suspension of the project in question. there is already a partially consummated sale by the latter to the former of 479. The inter-union trouble which caused said suspension has already been finally settled. 1969. 1968 and listed in Annex G of the answer herein of respondents. even the excuse which petitioner attempted to give to the effect that he had to stop . thereby obstructing and impeding the implementation of a contract. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At first blush it would seem to appear that the remedy sought by respondents in their special civil action of mandamus is specific performance of their contract with NWSA embodied in the resolutions aforequoted. the said deeds would provide for a mortgage in favor of NWSA to secure the payment to it of the lots. There can be no question that as between NWSA and the 1.433 square meters of raw land. there is no need to compel it to comply. but this injunction was subsequently lifted. We reiterate that there can be no dispute that as between respondent employees and their unions. that NWSA is not reneging nor does it refuse to comply with its obligations. on the other. however. respondent court granted. which. for a price fixed in the resolution aforequoted of March 11. It is true that for a time. after a hearing wherein practically all the issues on the merits of the mandamus were threshed out and made the subject of the presentation of evidence by both parties. on the one hand. as a matter of procedure. there is already not only a perfected but a partially consummated contract of sale. the legality of which is not in issue. on the one hand. Under this procedure. In plain terms. The method of financing this purchase by respondents was duly approved by NWSA in its above resolutions of April 1. Indeed.411 awardees selected by raffle on December 23. the technical description of which is known and definite. Accordingly.preliminary mandatory injunction. upon being duly credited for the value of the lots. under the arrangement. 1969 and June 17. on the other. the arrangement is as follows: chanrobles virtual law library Respondent employees would secure individual loans from the GSIS. NWSA would have nothing to do anymore with the project. and said decision is now final. And since it is not pretended that NWSA is backing out of said contract. NWSA would have to execute the corresponding deeds in favor of the individual employees who won in the raffle to enable them to mortgage their respective lots to the GSIS. and NWSA. A closer scrutiny of the circumstances related to such contract readily shows. upon approval of the individual loans.
. See also: Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo . 420.) Otherwise. but absolutely nothing remains for the completion of the project except for the petitioner to sign the deeds in question and. therefore. Ganzon (1966). become definitely untenable. supra. 613. Salas.signing the deeds in question because of said union trouble has. 22 SCRA 415. March 20. Icasiano. Rule 65.) It requires a showing of a complete and clear legal right in the petitioner to the performance of ministerial acts. 21 SCRA 1243. Ruiz Castro. (Id. (JRS Business Corporation vs. We said: . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is. Under the terms of the resolution. among the functions of the Manager of NWSA is "to represent the Authority in all its business matters . Palileo vs. There is nothing in the resolution granting him any discretion to interpose his own will and thereby set at naught the action of the Board selling land of the Authority to respondents. 53 Phil.] 172. de Serra vs. citing cases.5 million to the respondents to pay the developer who had already started the work. the principle echoed and re-echoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined. 30 SCRA 541. See also: Ramos vs. Under Section 7 of Republic Act 1383 creating the NWSA. the GSIS has already granted an interim loan of P1. Wright. and (to) perform such other executive duties as may be prescribed by law or may be required of him by resolution of the Board. Gutierrez (1968). 3 chanrobles virtual law library In Vda. upon recommendation of no less than petitioner himself. 275. In several cases. to also sign the corresponding documents to complete the requirements for the final approval by the Land Registration Commission of the subdivision plan already bearing the imprimatur of the Quezon City Council. citing 3 Moran Comments on the Rules of Court [1963 ed. 1246. Montesa (1968). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Proof of the fact that the GSIS has agreed and is irrevocably committed to finance the project in dispute in the manner aforestated is that. citing Zamora vs. 12. 23 SCRA 661. Palileo vs. nothing. (Section 3. 1954. petitioner's contention that Resolution 283-'69 above merely "authorized" him to sign the deeds at issue but did not impose upon him the duty to do so cannot be sustained. Cochoco vs. 664. (Valdez vs. actually. the rule in mandamus that the rights of a party in a contract cannot be enforced by such remedy was held not to be really absolute. Ruiz Castro. of course. Indeed. clear and certain. with the approval of the NWSA Board. Aquino vs. 85 Phil. petitioner's duty to sign the deeds properly prepared in conformity with the conditions agreed between the parties is as ministerial as the duty of an auditor to sign the warrant for the payment of an obligation of a government office to pay money pursuant to a contract the legality of which is not in dispute. and Aprueba vs.. supra. the mandamus petition must be dismissed. 272. 18 SCRA 8. Ganzon. L599. therefore. General Manager (1968). We have held that mandamus would lie to compel the auditor to sign the warrant. citing Aprueba vs." In this connection. Diaz (1967). what respondent employees are asking for is a mandamus to compel an officer of a corporation to perform a duty imposed upon him by law. 197-198.) In varying language. Rules of Court. clear that the mandamus being sought by respondents is not for the specific performance of a contract. In essence. 23 SCRA 190.. A rule long familiar is that mandamus never issues in doubtful cases.
the Court has refused to deny mandamus on the ground thus invoked by petitioner. 866. he is in fact prevailing the compliance by the corporation with its legal obligation under the contract of sale with the awardees among said employees and workers. 4 chanrobles virtual law library We cannot see any adequate administrative remedy which respondents have not exhausted. much less sanction. 223. Compania General de Tabacos vs. Gimenez (1962). In effect. We can only say that indeed. 1 Phil. 59. Not only that. 8 SCRA 219. Wright. 893. 812-813. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We are not overlooking the strong suggestion of petitioner that respondent employees might be victimized by those in charge of the project. the contract of the unions or the awardees with the BHESCO and the contract of loan with the GSIS. not to speak of the legal ones. It is difficult to understand. that we should overlook the equally tested precept that where government contracts are completely performed on the part of the private party. has yet to be individualized and put in final form. Duvall. much less a substantial number of them. vs. Inc. which. supra. 440. 324. after all. Everything related to the rights of the parties is already before Us. His act has the effect of setting aside at least two other contracts already in the process of consummation. As to the allegation that the preliminary mandatory injunction has prejudged the case. the position of petitioner. and Guevara vs. 613.) This is not to say of course.). of course. he is not only obstructing the implementation of a laudable project of the NWSA for the benefit of its employees and workers. mandamus will avail to command the government's proper officials to sign and issue the corresponding warrants. in some instances. 47 Phil. 621. (Hoey vs. 86 Phil. and there is nothing more to do but to effect payment. There is no showing that any of them. Ynchausti & Co. 6 SCRA 807. Mandamus is a remedy in equity. there might be reason for Us to require a trial on the principal petition by the court below. See also: Villegas vs. If technically. The final decision of the case would be nothing more than a reiteration of the order of mandatory injunction. 16 Phil. 891. citing Tabigne vs. 34. 46 Phil. Baldwin. vs. Indeed. such a roundabout procedure can serve no useful purpose. 429. but aside from the fact that the apprehension is not shown to be beyond being merely speculative. We will only be delaying the housing project which has long been the dream of the respondent employees. 888-890.Zamora vs. citing Hoey vs. not factual. the employees themselves are the ones who have gone to court for relief. Wright. Baldwin. Quiogue vs. Agregado. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library . Auditor General (1966). demand that these contracts be respected and enforced. the law imposes the function only on him. 53 Phil. and We do not expect the Board to replace petitioner with another official who would be willing to execute the deeds in question because. 18 SCRA 877. 337. namely. and that petitioner does not put any further hindrance thereto. 39 Phil. 551. by his refusal to sign the deeds in question. Romualdez. 558. are complaining about the way the affairs of the project are being undertaken by those whom they have designated for the purpose. and equitable considerations. there is hardly anything else that remains to be litigated subsequently in the court below. Their complaint to the President has been referred to NWSA for action. French. Radiowealth. Alzate vs. Aldana (1963). 341.
The common man, like, for example, a salaried employee, is entitled not only "to a little more food in his stomach, a little more clothing on his back, and a little more shelter over his head" but also to a lot, even small, where he can build his house and establish a permanent abode. "A man with a home and a means of subsistence is a lover of peace and order and will profess affections for his country, whereas one without a home and in penury is not only a social parasite but also a dangerous element in the social order" (Moran, J., dissent in Kasilag vs. Rodriguez, 69 Phil. 217, 254, 264). The Government, as the biggest employer, should be the first to help its employees in the solution of their housing problem.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs. Makalintal, C.J., Antonio and Fernandez, JJ., concur. Fernando J., concurs in the result. Aquino, J., took no part.
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THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 116736. July 24, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE, MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA and JOHN DOE, accused, BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE and MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA, accused-appellants. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural and logical consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more serious than that intended. Hence, an accused who originally intended to conceal and to bury what he thought was the lifeless body of the victim can be held liable as a principal, not simply as an accessory, where it is proven that the said victim was actually alive but subsequently died as a direct result of such concealment and burial. Nonetheless, in the present case, Appellant Garcia can not be held liable as a principal because the prosecution failed to allege such death through drowning in the Information. Neither may said appellant be held liable as an accessory due to his relationship with the principal killer, Appellant Ortega, who is his brother-in-law. Statement of the Case This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia from the Decision,1 dated February 9, 1994 written by Judge Adriano R. Osorio,2 finding them guilty of murder. Appellants were charged by State Prosecutor Bernardo S. Razon in an Information3 dated October 19, 1992, as follows: That on or about October 17, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident premeditation and with abuse of superior strenght (sic) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which directly caused his death. During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, assisted by counsel de oficio,4 pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 Accused John Doe was then at large.6 After trial in due course, the court a quo promulgated the questioned Decision. The dispositive portion reads:7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary WHEREFORE, finding accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. y Conje and Manuel Garcia y Rivera [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the
Court hereby sentenced (sic) them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs of suit. Accused are hereby ordered to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 for funeral expenses of deceased Andre Mar Masangkay and death indemnity of P50,000.00. The Notice of Appeal, dated March 9, 1994, was thus filed by Atty. Evaristo P. Velicaria8 who took over from the Public Attorneys Office as counsel for the accused. The Facts Evidence for the Prosecution The trial court summarized the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as follows:9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that on October 15, 1992 at about 5:30 in the afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a drinking spree in the compound near the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal, Dalandanan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. That while they were drinking, accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were [already] drunk arrived and joined them. That victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him and later they [referring to the participants in the drinking session] heard the victim Andre Mar shouted, Dont, help me! (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) That he and Ariel Caranto ran towards the back portion of the house and [they] saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of Andre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a canal with his face up and stabbing the latter with a long bladed weapon. That Ariel Caranto ran and fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father of accused Benjamin, Jr. That he [Quitlong] went to Romeo Ortega in the place where they were having the drinking session [for the latter] to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. That Romeo Ortega went to the place of the stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal and brought Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latter inside the well. That Romeo Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia then dropped stones measuring 11 to 12 inches high, 2 feet in length and 11 to 12 inches in weight to the body of Andre Mar Masangkay inside the well. That Romeo Ortega warned him [Quitlong] not to tell anybody of what he saw. That he answered in the affirmative and he was allowed to go home. That his house is about 200 meters from Romeo Ortegas house. That upon reaching home, his conscience bothered him and he told his mother what he witnessed. That he went to the residence of Col. Leonardo Orig and reported the matter. That Col. Orig accompanied him
he and Ariel Caranto ran to the back portion of the house and saw Benjamin Ortega. on top stabbing the former. That on October 16. Jr. victim Andre Mar Masangkay. That accused Benjamin Ortega. on top of Andre Mar Masangkay and stabbing the latter. That at about 12:30 a. Romeo Ortega. Jr. That he did not see what happened to Andre Mar Masangkay. he said that he did not talk to the lawyer before he was presented as witness in this case. That he knows that Andre Mar Masangkay was courting Raquel Ortega. That he met the victim Andre Mar Masangkay only on that occasion. That accused Manuel Garcia was still in the drinking session when he heard Masangkay was asking for help. That the well was covered with stones and he asked the police officers to seek the help of theneighbors (sic) to remove the stones inside the well. 1992 at 5:30 in the afternoon when he arrived. That on October 15. 1992. That he called Romeo Ortega to pacify his brother Benjamin. That there was no altercation between Benjamin Ortega. That he relayed the information to the Valenzuela Police Station and a police team under police officer Param accompanied them to the place. PNP Superintendent Leonardo Orig substantially testified that Diosdado Quitlong is his neighbor for about 9 years. That accused Benjamin Ortega. the body of the victim was found inside the well. That he only heard Masangkay asking for help. That the lifeless body was pulled out from the . Jr. That the stabbing happened between 12:00 midnight and 12:30 a. That Benjamin Ortega. That he narrated the incident to his mother on the night he witnessed the killing on October 15. Jr.m.to the Valenzuela Police Station and some police officers went with them to the crime scene.m. That accused Benjamin Ortega. and Masangkay. On cross-examination. That there was no trouble that occurred during the drinking session. 1992 at 5:00 in the morning. That they drank gin with finger foods such as pork and shell fish. That he did not see any injuries on Benjamin Ortega. he was summoned by Diosdado Quitlong and reported to him the stabbing incident that occurred at Daangbakal near the subdivision he is living. and Manuel Garcia were not yet in the place. That Andre Mar Masangkay was lying down with his back in the canal and Benjamin Ortega. Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house.m. Jr. during the drinking session. and Manuel Garcia in one hand and Andre Mar Masangkay. Serafin and one Boyet were already having [a] drinking spree and he joined them.m. and Manuel Garcia joined them at about 11:00 p. and Manuel Garcia are his friends and neighbors. That he did not do anything to separate Benjamin Ortega. That he asked the police officers to verify if there is a body of person inside the well. That Raquel Ortega asked permission from Andre Mar Masangkay when she left between 8:00 and 9:00 p. Jr. Jr. and Manuel Garcia were apprehended and were brought to the police station. Jr. That when he heard Andre Mar Masangkay was asking for help. Jr. That after the stones were removed. That he cannot see Andre Mar Masangkay from the place they were having the drinking session. Jr.
On cross-examination. brought their feverish daughter. That the cause of death is multiple stab wounds. That the stab wound on the back left side of the body and the stab wound on the back right portion of the body may be produced when the assailant was at the back of the victim. That he came to know the victim as Andre Mar Masangkay. Ludivico J. he said that he found 13 stab wounds on the body of the victim. That the assailant was in front of the victim when the stab wound[s] on the left elbow and left arm were inflicted. The lungs is filled with water or muddy particles. On cross-examination. That there were 13 stab wounds. 1992. [a]sphyxia by submersion in water. to the Polo Emergency Hospital. went . Evidence for the Appellants Appellant Manuel Garcia testified that in the early morning of October 15. That two men were arrested by the police officers. 2 at the back and there were contused abrasions around the neck and on the left arm. That Benjamin Ortega. NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. That the contused abrasion could be produced by cord or wire or rope. That it is possible that the stab wounds was (sic) inflicted when both [referring to participants] were standing or the victim was lying down and the assailant was on top. That the body has several stab wounds. The heart is filled with multiple hemorrhage. The stomach is one half filled with muddy particles which could [have been] taken in when submerged in water. That Diosdado Quitlong told him that he was drinking with the victim and the assailants at the time of the incident. That he cannot tell if the assailant or the victim were standing. Jr. Marjorie. That he cannot tell the number of the assailants. Maritess Garcia. he said that he saw the body when taken out of the well with several stab wounds. 1992 at the Valenzuela Memorial Homes located at Macarthur Highway. That the victim was in front of the assailant. That he prepared the autopsy report and the sketch of human head and body indicating the location of the stab wounds. He left the hospital at seven o clock in the morning. Lagat substantially testified that he conducted [an] autopsy on the cadaver of Andre Mar Masangkay on October 16. stabbed the victim while the latter was answering the call of nature. That the large airway is filled with muddy particles indicating that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles. loss of blood or decreased of blood. That there is (an) incised wound on the left forearm. 8 of which were on the frontal part of the body. That the stab wounds which were backward downward of the body involved the lungs. That the stab wound on the upper left shoulder was caused when the assailant was in front of the victim. There was stab wound at the left side of the neck. That the assailant was in front of the victim when the stab wound near the upper left armpit was inflicted as well as the stab wound on the left chest wall. The brain is pale due to loss of blood. he and his wife. contributory.well.
Ortega moved to the left side of Masangkay to avoid being hit. who invited them to join their own drinking spree. he slept. Thereupon. Masangkay then gripped his neck with his left arm and threatened to kill him.home. He ignored Masangkay and continued urinating.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Benjamin Ortega. After the ritual. they left at eight o clock in the evening and headed home. he stabbed Masangkay ten (10) times successively. namely. a Mang Serafin and Boyet Santos. Maritess Garcia substantially corroborated the testimony of her husband. in the left chest and in the middle of the stomach. When the stabbing started. He answered that he did not know. he remained at home and attended to his sick daughter. with it. the lawmen proceeded to the well. He came to know the identity of the dead person only after the body was taken to the police headquarters. En route. he also left the drinking place to urinate. they chanced on Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar Masangkay. Appellant Garcias wife came and asked him to go home because their daughter was still sick. he saw the police officers lift the body of a dead person from the well. he saw police officers in front of his house. He then fell asleep but was awakened by police officers at six o clock in the morning of the following day. passed by the canteen at their place of work. Unable to move. From the railroad tracks where he was asked to sit. When he woke up at six o clock the following morning. After drinking beer.15 Quitlong chased Masangkay who ran towards the direction of the well. changed his clothes and went to work. to avoid being stabbed. She however added two other participants in the drinking session aside from Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar Masangkay.12 According to him. When he was about to stand up. hitting him on the left arm. he fetched his mother-in-law who performed a ritual called tawas. Thereafter. he and Benjamin Ortega. Thirty (30) minutes after Masangkay left. Jr. an attack that induced bleeding and caused him to fall on his back. Masangkay drew a knife and stabbed him.10 After office hours. To alleviate his daughters illness. Masangkay approached him and asked where his sister was. Ortega went home and treated his injured left armpit and lips. Then. Taking him with them. Masangkay left the drinking session. grabbed Masangkays right hand which was holding the knife. Masangkay allegedly boxed him in the mouth.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The Trial Courts Discussion The trial court explained its basis for appellants conviction as follows:17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary . Quitlong was able to wrest the knife from Masangkay and.13 He went behind the house where he saw Masangkay peeping through the room of his sister Raquel. Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came and. Jr. between eleven and twelve o clock in the evening. thereby immobilizing him.14 After he was through. Without warning. likewise substantially corroborated the testimony of Appellant Manuel Garcia.
and one Romeo Ortega in lifting. Jr. if any. 80 SCRA 382 (1977)). . Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. carrying and dumping the victim Andre Mar Masangkay who was still alive and breathing inside the deep well filled with water. and IV. Appellant Garcia deserves acquittal. Jr.The Court is convinced that the concerted acts of accused Benjamin Ortega. The trial court erred in convicting Manuel Garcia and in not acquitting the latter of the crime charged. we believe that the question to be resolved could be simplified thus: What are the criminal liabilities. Appellant Ortega is guilty only of homicide. Manuel Garcia. Accused (m)ust reimburse the heirs of victim Andre Mar Masangkay the amount of P35. head first and threw big stones/rocks inside the well to cover the victim is a clear indication of the community of design to finish/kill victim Andre Mar Masangkay.00 for the funeral expenses of the deceased. of Appellants Ortega and Garcia? The Courts Ruling We find the appeal partly meritorious. II. Conspiracy and the taking advantage of superior strength were in attendance. Wounded and unarmed victim Andre Mar Masangkay was in no position to flee and/or defend himself against the three malefactors.. III. Concert of action at the moment of consummating the crime and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal wound may determine complicity where it would not otherwise be evidence (People vs. The trial court erred in finding and holding that Andrew Masangkay was still alive at the time his body was dropped in the well.000. appellants fault the trial court with the following: 18 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary I. The trial court erred in holding that there is conspiracy on the basis of the prosecutions evidence that at the time both accused and one Romeo Ortega lifted the body of Andrew Masangkay from where he succumbed due to stab wounds and brought and drop said body of Andrew Masangkay to the well to commit murder. The Issues In their ten-page brief. On the basis of the records and the arguments raised by the appellants and the People. The crime committed by the accused is Murder. is guilty only of homicide alone. The trial court erred in not finding that if at all Benjamin Ortega Jr. Yu.
First Issue: Liability of Appellant Ortega The witnesses for the prosecution and defense presented conflicting narrations. Jr. unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which. It was Diosdado Quitlong who reported the stabbing incident to the police authorities. he will keep away from the police authorities and will go in hiding. As to which of the two contending versions speaks the truth primarily rests on a critical evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and their stories. x x x Because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the stand as they rendered their testimonies. detailed. if only out of gratitude to Quitlong who came to his rescue. his assessment of credibility must be respected.23 The natural tendency of a person . Also inconsistent with human experience is his narration that Masangkay persisted in choking him instead of defending himself from the alleged successive stabbing of Quitlong. vivid and logical. in asserting alibi and denial. If Quitlong stabbed and killed the victim Masangkay. treated his injuries and slept. If Ortegas version of the assault was true. the trial court held:19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The Court has listened intently to the narration of the accused and their witnesses and the prosecution witnesses and has keenly observed their behavior and demeanor on the witness stand and is convinced that the story of the prosecution is the more believable version. The prosecution witnesses described the commission of the crime and positively identified appellants as the perpetrators. The witnesses for the defense. might affect the result of the case.22 This is not the ordinary reaction of a person assaulted. the defense bordered on the unbelievable. it is difficult to believe that a man would just sleep after someone was stabbed in his own backyard. we have meticulously scoured the records and found no reason to reverse the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies21 insofar as Appellant Ortega is concerned. Thus. we deem it incredible that Diosdado Quitlong would stab Masangkay ten (10) times successively. It is straightforward. he went home. Likewise.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In the instant case. The narration of Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to be spontaneous and consistent. completely ignoring Benjamin Ortega. In this regard. if considered. attempted to prove denial and alibi. Prosecution eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appeared and sounded credible and his credibility is reinforced by the fact that he has no reason to testify falsely against the accused. Further. Therefore. who was grappling with Masangkay. he should have immediately reported the matter to the police authorities. it clearly deserves full credence. its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect. Appellant Ortega claimed that after he was able to free himself from Masangkays grip. On the other hand. on the other hand.
ALTUNA: QWill you please tell me the place and date wherein you have a drinking spree with Andrew Masangkay and where you witnessed a stabbing incident? AIt was on October 15. sir. . Roberto San Andres and Romeo Ortega. he was also there. Murder or Homicide? Although treachery. evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were alleged in the information. QYou said that the two accused. Benjamin Ortega. you (sic) in drinking in said place? A The other companions in the drinking session were Ariel Caranto y Ducay. It must be shown that the accused purposely used excessive force that was manifestly out of proportion to the means available to the victims defense. and the house of his son Benjamin Ortega. Benjamin Ortega. Quitlong described the assault made by Appellant Ortega as follows:26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ATTY. Manuel Garcia and Benjamin Ortega. 1992. sir. Jr. the trial court found the presence only of abuse of superior strength. Manuel Garcia.under attack is to defend himself and not to persist in choking a defenseless third person. who were the companions of said persons. QWhat about this victim. because the house of Benjamin Ortega Sr. it is necessary to evaluate not only the physical condition and weapon of the protagonists but also the various incidents of the event. Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take advantage of such superiority. where was he at that time? AAlso the victim. xxx xxx xxx QMr. We disagree with the trial courts finding. Andrew Masangkay. Sr. Andrew Masangkay.. Witness Dominador Quitlong mentioned nothing about Appellant Ortegas availment of force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim to defend himself. Witness.24 In this light. arrived drunk and joined the group? AYes. at about 5:30 in the afternoon we were drinking in the house of Mr. Jr. are near each other..25chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In his testimony. Jr.
followed Andrew Masangkay to answer a call of nature and after you heard huwag. was nakakabayo and with his right hand with closed fist holding the weapon. ATTY. Ariel Caranto. Manuel Garcia. (interrupted by Atty. he was thrusting this weapon on the body of the victim. tulungan nyo ako coming from the mouth of the late Andrew Masangkay. tulungan nyo ako. and Benjamin Ortega. QWill you please demonstrate to the Honorable Court how the stabbing was done telling us the particular position of the late Andrew Masangkay and how Benjamin Ortega. QAfter Benjamin Ortega. Jr. Roberto San Andres. Jr. the witness demonstrating.. myself and Andrew Masangkay.) Andrew Masangkay was lying down on a canal with his face up. he was making downward and upward motion thrust. Andrew Masangkay? INTERPRETER: (At this juncture. Romeo Ortega. QAnd what did you see? AAnd I saw that Benjamin Ortega. QWhat happened next? AAnd afterwards we heard a shout and the shout said Huwag. Jr. ALTUNA: (To the witness) . then Benjamin Ortega. followed him where he was. Altuna) QWho is that we? AReferring to Benjamin Ortega..QWhat happened next? AWhile we were there together and we were drinking. QFrom whom did you hear this utterance? AThe shout came from Andrew Masangkay. Jr proceeded with the stabbing against the late victim. Jr. Jr. what happened next? AAriel Caranto and I ran towards the back portion of the house. Andrew Masangkay answer to a call of nature and went to the back portion of the house. was on top of Andrew Masangkay and he was stabbing Andrew Masangkay..
Nilubayan lang nang saksak nang mapatay na si Andrew ni Benjamin Ortega. Thus. The offense was that of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery. (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony. whereas Appellant Ortega. Ortega is liable only for homicide. In assisting Appellant Ortega. But the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that the victim at that time was still alive. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Quitlong stated.32 This is evident from the expert testimony given by the medico-legal officer. Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors wrongful acts. the medico-legal finding that the large airway was filled with muddy particles indicating that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles did not necessarily mean that such muddy particles entered the body of the victim while he was still alive. True. Jr. even if the resulting offense is worse than that intended. The accused and the victim were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. 31 That drowning was the immediate cause of death was medically demonstrated by the muddy particles found in the victims airway. ALTUNA: . The essential requisites for the application of this provision are that (a) the intended act is felonious. that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide. It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-footer. Jr. Article 4. the prosecution evidence shows Masangkay was already dead when he was lifted and dumped into the well. lungs and stomach. Nothing in the foregoing testimony and circumstances can be interpreted as abuse of superior strength.QHow many times did Benjamin Ortega.30 Although Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was still alive when he assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the well. Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. 1. was only five feet and five inches tall.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary We do not agree with the above contention.27 There was no testimony as to how the attack was initiated. not murder. Hence. Jr. and that he died subsequently of drowning. Second Issue: Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court is based on mere assumption and conjecture x x x. quoted below:33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ATTY. stabbed Andrew Masangkay? AI cannot count the number of times. Jr. i. Garcia could be held liable only as an accessory. carry the body of Masangkay to the well. he is still liable for the direct and natural consequence of his felonious act. Hence.e.28 Allegedly. of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. par.
5 cms. that is sentence immediately after paragraph 10. QWhat could have caused this injury of the lungs? AThis is due to asphyxia or the loss of blood. Could the victim have possibly get this particular material? ANo. sir. 2. QAnd this may [be] due to stab wounds or asphyxia? AThese are the effects or due to asphyxia or decreased amount of blood going to the heart. the person is still alive? AYes.QWill you please explain this in simple language the last portion of Exhibit N. you are telling or saying to us that if there is no inhaling or the taking or receiving of muddy particles at that time. beginning with tracheo-bronchial tree. Will you please explain this? AThe trancheo-bronchial tree is filled with muddy particles. QNext point is the lungs? AThe lungs is also filled with multiple petechial hemorrhages. QThis asphyxia are you referring to is the drowning? AYes. sir. sir. sir. QAre you saying that the lungs have been filled with water or muddy particles? AYes. in short. QSo. QSecond point? AThe heart is pale with some multiple petechial hemorrhages at the anterior surface. QI ask you a question on this. QWhat do you mean by no? AA person should be alive so that the muddy particles could be inhaled. .
under the particular point hemothorax? AIt indicates at the right side. pale. loss of blood could be attributed to the stab wound which is number 13? AYes. in that particular portion of the body and caused admixing of granular materials? AYes. the muddy particles now came in. precisely. the last two portions. . Please explain the same? AThe victim could have taken these when he was submerged in water. There are around 1. QAnd the last one. QContinuing with your report. particularly. sir. you are now testifying that due to stab wounds or asphyxia. QSo. QThe last one.QAnd. QAnd. stomach 1/2 filled with muddy particles. QContinuing this brain and other visceral organs. will you please explain the same? AThe hemoperitoneum there are 900 cc of blood that accumulated inside the abdomen.400 cc of blood that accumulate at the thoraxic cavity and this was admixed with granular materials? QAnd what cause the admixing with granular materials on said particular portion of the body? ACould be muddy particles. because of the opening of the stab wounds. sir. QDue to the taking of maddy (sic) materials as affected by asphyxia? Am I correct? AIts due to stab wounds those muddy particles which set-in thru the stab wounds. the lungs have been damaged per your Report? AYes. What is this? AThe paleness of the brain and other visceral organs is due to loss of blood. of course. QAnd what could have cause the same? A[T]he stab wound of the abdomen. sir.
foam or foreign bodies in the air passage found in the medium where the victim was found. or specifically his tracheo-bronchial tree. a person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to kill. His responsibility relates only to . The drowning was the direct.QWhat is the take in? AMuddy particles. of the Revised Penal Code. par. The third and fourth findings were present in the case of Victim Masangkay. natural and logical consequence of the felony that Appellant Garcia had intended to commit.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held liable as principal in the crime of homicide. however. and stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA The prosecutions evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. 5. there are. was filled with muddy particles which were residues at the bottom of the well. 1. it exemplifies praeter intentionem covered by Article 4. (Underscoring supplied) A Filipino authority on forensic medicine opines that any of the following medical findings may show that drowning is the cause of death:34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 1. QAnd he was still alive at that time? AYes. Presence of water in the middle ear. 4. Increase in volume (emphysema aquosum) and edema of the lungs (edema aquosum). even as an accessory as prayed for by appellants counsel himself. two legal obstacles barring his conviction. It was proven that his airpassage. The unrebutted testimony of the medicolegal officer that all these muddy particles were ingested when the victim was still alive proved that the victim died of drowning inside the well. Even his stomach was half-filled with such muddy particles. The clenching of the hands is a manifestation of cadaveric spasm in the effort of the victim to save himself from drowning. 3. Under this paragraph. The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of attack[ing]. The presence of materials or foreign bodies in the hands of the victim. 2. assault[ing]. Presence of water and fluid in the stomach contents corresponding to the medium where the body was recovered. Presence of froth. sir. First.
This right was. against her will. impartial. Pailano. to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. after arraignment. (who) did. Anita Ibaez. now Article III. Sec. such conviction could not have been possible under the criminal complaint as worded. wilfully. thus: The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the crime through the first method although the prosecution sought to establish at the trial that the complainant was a mental retardate. unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant. being then provided with a scythe. This described the offense as having been committed by Antonio Pailano.the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay. unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. then and there. .and not through force and intimidation. and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. 19. (Underscoring supplied) In People vs. and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Sec. which was the method alleged -.37 this Court ruled that there can be no conviction for rape on a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious where the information charged the accused of sexual assault by using force or intimidation. by means of violence and intimidation. No mention was made of the second circumstance. trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. of course. Constitution of 1973. 2. it has not succeeded. of the 1987 Constitution explicitly guarantees the following: (2) In all criminal prosecutions. 15 years of age. Constitutionally. available to the herein accused-appellant.36 Section 14. Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while she was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason -. If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground that he violated Anita while she was deprived of reason or unconscious. par. Its purpose in doing so is not clear. But whatever it was. the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. and public trial. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right. to meet the witnesses face to face. However.would have violated his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[Article IV. to have a speedy. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. 14(2)] This right is safeguarded by the Constitution to every accused so he can prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense.
Second. Accessories. 19. More to the point is Tubb v. concealing. The records show that Appellant Garcia is a brotherin-law of Appellant Ortega. 2. and without having participated therein. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. ascendants. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia assisted in concealing x x x the body of the crime. [fn: 69 SCRA 144] we held that a person charged with rape could not be found guilty of qualified seduction.and acquitted -was not homicide but rape. provided the accessory acts with abuse . or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime. or the effects or instruments thereof. People of the Philippines. of the Revised Penal Code. but was convicted of swindling by means of false pretenses. descendants. take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners: 1. which was not alleged in the information.38 the latters sister. in order to prevent its discovery. under paragraph 2(b) of the said Article. On the other hand. [fn: 101 Phil. either as principals or accomplices. being his wife. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime. paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.In People vs. By harboring. Ramirez. 114] where the accused was charged with the misappropriation of funds held by him in trust with the obligation to return the same under Article 315.39 Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code: ART. By parity of reasoning. as the crime he was accused of -. 20. -. The Court said such conviction would violate the Bill of Rights. Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an information that charges murder by means of stabbing. Accessories are those who. the next preceding article provides: ART. In the case of People vs. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. par. 2.The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses. Maritess. x x x in order to prevent its discovery. he can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19. Montes. natural. and adopted brothers and sisters. [fn: 122 SCRA 409] the Court did not permit the conviction for homicide of a person held responsible for the suicide of the woman he was supposed to have raped. which had not been alleged in the criminal complaint against him. having knowledge of the commission of the crime. legitimate. 3. or relatives by affinity within the same degrees with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
Appellant Garcia. the Court can give credence only to those that are supported by receipts and appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death of the victim. or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.. Jr. that is.. is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim P50. Penalty and Damages The award of actual damages should be reduced to P31.00.42 Appellant Ortega shall also indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P50. Appellant Benjamin Ortega. or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive. .43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. as in the case of Appellant Ortega. Appellant Ortega.790.of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason. murder. concur. Jr. the joint appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. as minimum. which is imposable in its medium period.. This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit him.790. Benjamin Ortega. Melo.00. Narvasa C. Davide. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. a sister of the victim. as maximum.000.000. His immediate release from confinement is ORDERED unless he is detained for some other valid cause. and Francisco. Jr. JJ. being a covered relative by affinity of the principal accused. Indemnity requires no proof other than the fact of death and appellants responsibility therefor. Jr.00 from P35. SO ORDERED.41 However.000. Appellant Manuel Garcia is ACQUITTED.40 Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred.J. The former amount was proven both by documentary evidence and by the testimony of Melba Lozano. prision mayor. (Chairman). is found GUILTY of homicide and sentenced to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium. parricide.00 as actual damages. WHEREFORE. eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium. premises considered. absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance. in line with current jurisprudence.00 as indemnity and P31. to fourteen (14) years.. is legally entitled to the aforequoted exempting provision of the Revised Penal Code. the minimum term shall be one degree lower.