HOWARD'S COMMAND AND CONTROL OF IDAHO'S NEZ PERCE WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

CHARLES K. FORD. MAJ, USA B.S.E.E., University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho, 1979

Fort Leavenworth. Kansas

1993

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Thesis Title: Nez Perce War

Major Charles K. Ford

Howard's Command and Control of Idaho's

Approved by:

J e d l d R. Brown. Ph.D.

Qb.~BF&

, Thesis Committee Chairman

Accepted this 4th day of June 1993 by:

Philip J . ' Brookes, Ph.D.

, Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those o f the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT HOWARD'S COMMAND AND CONTROL OF IDAHO'S NEZ PERCE WAR BY MAJ Charles K. Ford, USA, 128 pages. This study investigates Brigadier General 0 1 iver Otis Howard's command and control of Idaho's Nez Perce War of 1877. The Nez Ferce War of 1877 aroused a wide range of emotions in the public and military. While most Easterners labeled the army as being bloodthirsty and inhumane, most Idaho Territory settlers looked at the army as lifesavers. Secretary of War, George W. McCrary, recognized and complimented Howard for his endurance, courage, and skill, but General Sherman thought his former Corps Commander lacked drive and aggressiveness. Should Howard have been relieved of command? The one armed praying Brigadier General 0. 0 . Howard did a very professional job when one considers all the factors. Howard had to work quickly to prevent an Indian coalition uprising while mustering sufficient forces to protect the settler and subdue the hostile Nez Ferce. He faced a very experienced foe who had the means to fight a war in very demanding terrain. On the other hand, the army improperly equipped Howard's substandard soldiers. Howard had to prosecute the war over a vast territory which crossed several lines of command. Upon reviewing the whole s i tuation , Howard effectively commanded and controlled h i s operations to accomplish his missions.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Most importantly, I thank my wife, Ginger, for her patience and support in taking care of our three children during the endless weekends and evenings while I researched and wrote this thesis.

I greatly appreciate Ginger's and

the family's patience and support that they have given me during the "best year of our life." Chairman, Dr. Jerold R .

I also thank my

Brown for his guidance, patience,

and understanding a s he pulled me through the MMAS process. His task was an especially thankless task; he proved t o b e instrumental in this endeavor. grateful. T o him, I am eternally

I additionally thank the staffs, on the second

and the third floors, of the Combined Arms Research Library and of the Idaho Historical Society Library their assistance.

I am indebted t o Irv Faling for getting me

interested and providing m e insight into the Nez Perce. And, I extend a special thanks t o my proofreaders.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

................. ....... A B S T R A C T . . . . . . . . ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPROVAL PAGE LISTOFFIGURES CHAPTER
1.

................

L.
C)

3 .
4 .
6.

.............. THE ARMY. . . . . - . - . - - . - . . THE NEZ PERCE INDIANS . . . . . . . . . THE INDIAN DIPLOMAT . . . . . . . . . . THE INDIAN FIGHTER . . . . . . . . . . .
INTRODUCTION THECONCLUSION. ORDER OF

7 .

APPENDIX:

............ BATTLE . . . . . . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY INITIAL

.................. DISTRIBUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

L I S T OF FIGURES

F i g u r e 1, The Nez P e r c e War

.............

F i g u r e 2 , M i l i t a r y Department and D i v i s i o n s i n t h e West F i g u r e 3 , Nez P e r c e Hands

33
57

...............

C H A P T E R O N E

INTRODUCTION

A g r e a t deal o f cheap w i t has been wasted over t h e f a i l u r e of Gen. Howard's command t o c a t c h t h e l i g h t l y mounted I n d i a n s i n a s t e r n chase, b u t t h e r e i s no s o r t o f doubt t h a t Napoleon and Von Moltke, i f reduced t o t h e same c o n d i t i o n s chasing an I n d i a n r a i d e r over hundreds o f m i l e s would f a i l i n t h e task j u s t as sign all^.^ Army and Navy Journal, 8 S e p t . 1877

...

. .... .

During t h e quarter century f o l l o w i n g t h e C i v i l War, as g r e a t e r numbers o f Americans headed west, took t h e i r p l a c e of prominence. I n d i a n wars

The waves of emigrants t h e Santa Fe T r a i l , or the Following

chose e i t h e r t h e Oregon T r a i l ,

Smokey H i l l T r a i l as t h e i r path t o t h e i r f u t u r e s . t h e discovery of

g o l d i n Montana and Idaho, many s e t t l e r s , commerce, or adventure, now

~

i n a quest f o r land, gold,

headed northwestward along t h e Bozeman T r a i l t o Montana and Idaho. West, As several m i l l i o n people made t h e i r homes i n t h e a showdown over land ownership was brewing between t h e As a r e s u l t of these showdowns,

s e t t l e r s and Indians.

943

engagements occurred between t h e U S Army and t h e v a r i o u s Indian tribes.=

Eleven of these engagements made up the Nez Perce War of 1877. The Nez Perce conflict was only one in a series of

Indian struggles in the West that occurred as the country's leaders and citizens fulfilled its Manifest Destiny. Other

significant western conflicts included the Sioux in the Northern Plains, the Kiowas and the Commanches in the Southern Plains, and the Apaches in the Southwest. While

the Nez Perce War resulted from the culmination of unrest due to the routine practice of uprooting Indians from their homeland, this war is noted as, 'One of the most remarkable and dramatic campaigns in all American history.'" The

army's pursuit of the heroic Nez Perce flight over the Bitterroot Mountains towards Canada is rich in lessons. Of the -numerous Indian wars that occurred following the Civil War, the Nez Perce War is an excellent illustration of the dynamic interactions between the various players' strengths and weaknesses. These players were the Because the Nez

army, the Indians, and the government.

Perce war produced voluminous, but extremely biased, first-hand documentation, a modern understanding of the Nez Perce War is a mixture of facts and fiction. This thesis

cuts through the myths and focuses on Brigadier General Oliver Otis Howard, the commander of the Military Department of the Columbia.

General William T. Sherman, the Commanding General, greatly influenced the US Army's approach to and the handling of the Indian problem. Sherman desired to see

civilization brought to the virgin territories of the West in order to tap the endless resources of the frontier. When

the Indians interfered with this process, Sherman believed that the Indians had to be crushed. Yet, Sherman had

written the following about the Nez Perce after their surrender: The Indians throughout displayed a courage and skill that elicited universal praise; they abstained from scalping, let captive women 80 free, did not commit indiscriminate murder of peaceful families which is usual 1-1, and fought with almost scientific skill, using advance and rear guards, skirmish-lines and field fortifications. Nevertheless, they would not settle down on lands set apart for them ample for their maintenance; and, when commanded by proper authority, they began resistance by murdering persons . . . .4 The conduct of the Nez Perce in their war against the government not only engendered American sympathy. but brought about changes in public policy dealing with Indian affairs. Long known for being peaceful and helpful to both the settlers and the military, the Nez Perce influenced the initial development of the Pacific Northwest by helping the Lewis and Clark Expedition. In 1831, the Nez Perce's

request for missionaries stimulated a wave of missionary activity which in turn brought more settlers to the Pacific

Northwest.

Yet, their request ultimately led to thelr The Nez Perce wanted their beloved

conflict over land.

Wallowa Valley and their life-style as was allowed them by the 1855 Steven's Treaty.

Hostilities started at Slate Creek when wild young warriors murdered settlers who had recently wronged their people. The young braves eventually struck down the

innocent along wlth the guilty before the chiefs gained control of the situation. However, these selected murders From that point

escalated into the Slate Creek massacre.

on, the warring Nez Perce conducted their engagements according to the recognized rules of civilized warfare as noted by Sherman's comments above. Even though the Nez

Perce fought against the army, many citizens in the eastern United States openly approved of these courageous, humane Nez Perce warriors in their futile opposition. In the end.

the Nez Perce's conduct during the war and Chief Joseph's post-war visits to the East contributed to the development of a more sympathetic American attitude toward the Indian problem. Their actions also initiated some reforms in the

Commission of Indian Affairs, the forerunner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.= After the Slate Creek massacre occurred, the army used force to get the warring Nez Perce to submit to the government. Not only did Howard have a poorly trained and

ill-equipped force structured for a conventional war, he had to conduct military operations in extremely rugged terraln under very diverse adverse conditions. During this campaign, every type of climatic hardship was experienced. In the spring, the combatants endured the

drenching cold rains which made the rivers swift and the ground too muddy to maintain their footing. Then, as the

Indians and soldiers traveled across the rugged land, the summer heat drained their strength. During the autumn, the

participants experienced the entire spectrum of temperature extremes. At midday, the summer heat scorched them, while

the night brought a cold that in the morning left an inch of ice in their water buckets. At the conclusion of the

campaign, the lightly clad soldiers and Indians also had to battle the effects of a blinding snow s t ~ r m . ~ A special correspondent from the California Associated Press accompanied Howard's force and provides us with a description of the terrain and the effects the weather had on it: The country is most wild and rugged character. precipitous mountains and canyon rendering i t extremely difficult for troops to travel. Adding to the natural obstacles, heavy and continuous rains have made the mountains almost i m p a ~ s a b l e . ~ Howard suffered constant and merciless criticism at the time and has not fared too well in the history that has been recorded since. One military historian described

Howerd'd performance as 'lethargic' and as an -embarrassment to the army. In spite of the criticism and lack o f support from his superiors both during and after the campaign, Howard pushed his men to their limits while pursuing the nontreaty Nez Perce for one hundred and fifteen days and over fifteen hundred miles. This thesis examines the effectiveness of To illustrate the further

Howard's command and control.

implications of a historical study, it is appropriate to review the United States Army current definition of command and control: The process through which the activities of military forces are directed, coordinated, and controlled to accomplish the mission. This process encompasses . and procedures the personnel, equipment, . necessary to gather and analyze information, to plan for what to be done, and to supervise the execution of operation.'

For Howard. effective command and control will be the successful completion of his threefold mission. Upon the

outbreak of hostilities, Howard had the mission to calm and protect the settlers, to prevent a general uprising of the alienated Indians, and to rid the area of the hostile Indians. First, this thesis looks at the frontier army's structure, composition, and characteristics to see what assets Howard had to execute his mission. Secondly, we will

look at the Indian's background, structure, and the path

that led to war in order to gain an understanding of Howard's enemy. To understand the atmosphere in which

Howard executed this mission, we will review his diplomatic actions to prevent hostilities and his initial response to their outbreak. Lastly, we will look at his campaign t o s e e The

what he planned and how he supervised its execution. thesis concludes with an overall analysis. Howard, as an Indian fighter and as an Indian diplomat, was an important frontier figure.

His own views

of his frontier career and his written observations about the tribes he encountered make his recollections an important part of any well-rounded history of the American West. Prior to the Nez Perce War, he protected the Indians

from the settlers while working on behalf of the Indians. Later, when the situation dictated, Howard attempted to get the nontreaty Nez Perce to accept the government's Upon the outbreak of hostilities, he prosecuted the campaign. l o In spite of enormous logistical obstacles, difficult terrain with challenging and changing weather, sheer bad luck. and repeated discouragements. Howard remained on the trail to the bitter end. to be relieved? Did the one-armed general deserve offers.

After reviewing all the factors concerned

and the situation on hand, one will see that Howard did a professional job and that he was criticized for problems beyond his control.
7

*Army and Navy Journal 8eptember 8,

1877, 73.

&&y,

aRumsel F. Weigley, H i s t o r y of The United Btatem (New Y o r k ~ M c M i l l r n P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1967), 269.

SDeoartmmt of t h e Army, Center a4 M i l i t a r y (Washington DC: History, k r i c a n M i l i t a r v History, Government P r i n t i n s - o f f i c e , 1989). 311; and John A. Carpenter, Sword and t h e O l i v e Branch, 246. *William T. Sherman, "Report o f t h e Oeneral o f t h e Army," Headquarter o f t h e Army, Washington DC, November 7, 1877, of t h e Annual Report of t h e Secretarv of W a r on t h e Oaeratione of t h e Department f o r t h e F i s c a l Yaar Endina June 30. 1877 (Washington8 i3ovmrnment P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1877), 15. s F r r n c i r D. Haines, "Nea Parca and Shaehuni Influence on Northwest H i s t o r y M 379-93 of Ormatar Americn~ (Berkeley and Los Essavr- i n Honor o f Herbert Eugene Bolton, Angles: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1945), 391-2.
"C. E. S. Wood, "Chief Joseph, The Nez Perce," Century I f l u m t r a t s d Monthly Mamarina, May 1889, 141.

The

%-my' and Navy Journal, Q%obarC Woostor.

1 Septmmbrsr 1877, b2.

T ~ P M i l i t a r y and United Btwtas

of t h e Army, F M 101-5-1. O ~ e r a t i o n a l DCr Qevarnment W i n C i w q (Wa(~nskingCen, O f f i c e , October 1985), 1-16. %*Robert M. U t l e y , I n t r o d u c t i o n t o 0.

-

-Department

0. Howard's

B@rsondl, O % bs sll~ ~tt-~ a S i a n Adviimt~wes, n~ ~~ ~ and Campaians Amanq t h e l n d i a n r af t h e a r e a t West w i t h Some Accounts of Their L i f a, Habits. T r a i t s , Re1i g i a n , Ceremonies, Dress Savane I n s t i n c t s , and Custama i n Peace and W a r (New 'fork: D a Capo Press, l 9 7 2 ) , v.

OF

F i g u r e 1 , Map of T h e Nez Per-ce War

C H A P T E R TWO T H E ARMY

The army's I n d i a n mission m e r i t s no c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n determining i t s proper strength, organization, and composition. l General Winf i e l d S. Hancock 1876 Congressional Testimony With thousands o f u n c i v i l i z e d I n d i a n s and on1y two hundred twenty-six armories, m i l i t a r y posts, seventeen arsenals or

and +our storehouses o r depots manned by o n l y

24,581 o f f i c e r s and s o l d i e r s s c a t t e r e d throughout t h e

country, t h e utmost v i g i l a n c e was needed t o p r o t e c t t h e

l i v e s and p r o p e r t i e s of our f r o n t i e r c i t i z e n s . '

As

commander of t h e Department of t h e Columbia, B r i g a d i e r General O l i v e r O t i s Howard had o n l y eleven p o s t s t o p r o t e c t t h e c i t i z e n s o f t h e s t a t e o f Oregon and t h e t e r r i t o r i e s of Idaho and Washington. I n a d d i t i o n t o l i m i t e d number of

p o s t s and s o l d i e r s t o p r o t e c t t h e s e t t l e r s from t h e Indians, t h e army's senior leaders d i d n o t consider t h e I n d i a n mission when s t r u c t u r i n g , equipping, and t r a i n i n g t h e army.

I n a d d i t i o n t o p r o t e c t i n g our f r o n t i e r s e t t l e r s and t r a v e l routes, t h e United States Army i n 1877 had several

railroad, built roads, and atrung telegraph lines on the frontier. areas. ' In addition, the congressionally controlled reconstruction army of the South had finally ended its occupation of the defeated Confederate states, but the role of the army in domestic issues continued.* The Hayes They also explored and mapped unsettled frontler

administration used troops in a dozen states to protect property during a wave of railroad strikes. The governors of these states requested the Federal soldiers to restore order after wage reductions caused the labor r i ~ t s . ~ From the end of the Civil War until 1877, the United States essentially had two armies. Congress controlled one

army through the reconstruction acts to administer the former Confederate states. The other army, controlled by This

the President, consisted of the staff and the line.

situation caused the already small army to have even fewer troops available for the defense of the frontier.' Amidst all this turmoil. the soldiers and officers received no pay because the House had not passed the annual army appropriation bill for the new fiscal year that started on 1 July. The House and the Senate could not agree on

either the army's size or its properly employment.' Having defined the roles of the army of 1877, the army's organization is examined. For admlnistrative

purposes and to fix responsibility, the War Department divided the country into ten military departments which were commanded by either a brigadier general or the senior colonel in the department. The ten departments were under

the three geographic divisions, each commanded by a general officer. The President of the United States appointed and

"
specially empowered the department and division c~mmanders.~ Although the War Department had set up geographic departments under the geographic division for command and control as well as administrative support of the forces, the boundaries were changed frequently or simply ignored. department commanders were situated to gain perspective without losing focus on local conditions and had a large degree of autonomy. They maintained contact with their post While the The

commanders and set standards and guidelines.

department commanders could normally handle local Indian troubles, problems developed when the hostiles crossed department geographic boundaries. In such cases. the

division commanders had to coordinate and enforce cooperation between department commanders. When the hostile

Indians crossed division geographic boundaries, often the commanding general or the Secretary of War had to make the various division and department commanders cooperate with each other.'

The Commanding General, General William T. Sherman, controlled matters pertaining to the d iscipline and military control of the army. The Secretary of War, the Honorable

George W. McCrary, controlled the fisc al, administrative. and logistical matters through his bureaus and staff department. Hence, the commanding general did not have Consequently, the

habitual control of these elements.

bureaus controlled the distribution and division o f their support; thereby, influencing the operational tempo. bureaus' control of the assets limited the commanding general's control of his territorial The

commander^.'^

The War Department staff consisted of ten bureaus or corps: Adjutant General's Office, the Inspector General's

Office, the Quartermaster Department, the Judge Advocate General's Office, the Subsistence Department, the Ordnance Department, the Medical Department, the Pay Department, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Bureau. Except for the

Inspector General and Chief of Signal Officer, which had a colonel as their heads, brigadier generals headed the virtually autonomous staff elements.ll The Adjutant General's Bureau, the custodian o f

records and archives, published the orders and determined which units received replacements without consulting the Commanding General. During the Nez Perce War. General

Sherman wanted the 2nd Infantry Regiment transferred from

the Department of the South within the Division of the East to the Department of the Columbia within the Division of the Pacific. Once the Adjutant General got around to publishing department had already taken staff, without

the order, the Quartermaster's the lead.

Hence, the Secretary of War's

being required to consult the commanding general, determined matters that directly influenced the tempo of the military

operation^.^'
The Quartermaster of the Army provided transportation and all supplies except rations and ordnance. Therefore, he

arranged for the movement of the 2nd Infantry Regiment from Georgia to Idaho. Likewise, the Subsistence Bureau and the

Ordnance Bureau had to provide rations and ordnance--arms and ammunitions--for the 2nd Infantry Regiment as well as volunteer units mustered for the crisis. Hence, Howard,

McDowell, and Sherman had to rely on two staff elements, which they did not control, for critical reinforcements for the Nez Perce War.'= The other departments were the Judge Advocate General's Department, responsible for reviewing military courts and providing the Secretary of War's legal advice; the Medical Department, charged with health and hygiene of the army; the Pay Bureau, whose pay agents traveled endlessly to distribute soldiers' wages; the Corps of Engineers, responsible for conducting surveys and mapping

expeditions plus overseeing coastal and harbor

construction:

and the Signal Corps, charged with weather forecasting and communications, especially the emerging telegraph network. l* Rank heavy and politically in tune with the Washington establishment, bureau chiefs answered only to the Secretary of War and functioned outside of Sherman's authority. Likewise, the division and department s t a f f s ,

working for their bureau chiefs, functioned outside of their commander's authority. This total separation of the staff

from the line gave the b u ~ e a uchiefs their own mini-armies. While the staff elements answered only to the secretary of war, the division and department commanders answered to Sherman. l S The problem was one of control. Sherman had McCrary had While

regulatory control over military affairs;

regulatory control over staff and fiscal matters.

Sherman announced requirements to conduct a campaign, McCrary set priorities for his staff. Furthermore, fiscal

and staff control affected troop operations within a department by influencing the distribution or diversion of personnel and supplies. As an example, Sherman's concern

was with the Nez Perce War, but the staff assigned some of the f e w available soldiers to the East to put down the labor riots. l *

With an understanding of the roles and organization of the army o f 1877, let's examine who made up the army. Like the Roman legions or the British expeditionary forces in India, the U. S. Army, although composed of many men, had a personality that displayed distinctive traits and characteristics, which were strongly influenced by the Civil War.17 As the reunified country mustered out over a million soldiers from the victorious Union Army, the demographics of the army that Howard had served in for four years changed. The Union offered Confederate prisoners of war freedom in exchange for their service in fighting Indians. Howard

would later command some of his former enemies, now known as 'Galvanized Y a n k e e ~ . ' ~ ~ The US Army could easily match the French Foreign Legion for variety of nationalities. In addition to the

foreign born that fought in the Civil war; the stead3-styam of immigrants from Ireland, Germany. France, Russia, and other countries poured into the great melting pot that the United States had become. While finding a cordial home and

learning to speak English, these immigrants could reach beyond the teeming eastern port cites where their countrymen often suffered in poverty and despair.Is The waves of

immigrants seeking a better life replaced the ranks of men motivated to merely save the Union. The New York Sun

charged that:

-. . .

the Regular Army is uomposed of

bummers, loafers, and foreign paupers.'20 While there were a few brave-hearted men who enlisted for adventure, many either wanted a means to the gold fields or simply couldn't find any other work. The quality of

soldiers did temporarily increase because of the high unemployment during the Panic of 1873. The post Civil War

army resembled the European 18th century army that had to be kept away from the townspeople. as: criminals, brutes, perverts, and drunkards. to name a few. But there were also active youths seeking adventure, men of varying ability fleeing misfortune, and foreign paupers who turned out to be excellent soldiers.21 The characteristics of the soldiers and officers were Utley describes the army

a mix of the past and the present.

The army was unique ln

that many of the officers and soldiers were not whole. Many, such as Howard, had lost a limb in the war of the rebellion. officers. Missing a limb was not restricted to the

A limping cavalry man was a common sight.

Civil War veteran, while enlisting in a regiment on active service in Montana, was questioned about his limp. old wound and it's only so once in a while. 'It's an

I can ~ i d e

first-rate,' he pleaded, and so was assigned to duty. Missing fingers and toes that were frozen off in winter expeditions were considered only a minor inconvenience.2J

The enlisted force varied widely in social and economic backgrounds. Although it included some skilled

tradesmen. laborers, farmers, and even musicians and schoolteachers, the usual monthly pay of 813 to $22. execrable living conditions, and harsh discipline offered little incentive to-attract a more elite caliber of men. Consequently, the civilian populous looked down upon the very men they wanted to protect them from the native savages. Since it appealed to so few, the army had an Twenty-five to forty

extraordinarily high turnover rate.

percent of the enlisted soldiers either died, deserted, or were discharged each year." With the harsh living conditions and the lure of instant wealth of gold fields, desertion eroded the manpower of the army. While the Department of the Columbia gained 173 to discharge, 16 to

208 solders in 1877, they lost 326:

disability, 67 for other causes, 23 to death, and 4 7 to desertion.'. Because the House had not passed the annual

army appropriation bill, the issue of rations. clothing, and other provisions to enlisted men continued, but the army received no pay resulting in a decline in morale. The high

turnover, especially the desertions, ate away on the morale, discipline, and efficiency of the army.

Poor training further contributed to the problems created by the high loss and poor enlistment rates. Company

officers and soldiers, were inadequately trained to fight the Indians. The noncommissioned officers (NCO) and officers of

the company. in theory, trained the soldiers how to perform their duties. Severe undermanning, however, limited Except for the rudimentary

training in the line units.

instruction at the recruit depot, troops received little more training than drilling on the post parade grounds. Training deficiencies were most glaring in horsemanship and marksmanship. Due to a lack of funds, only a handful of

bullets were supposed to be used for target practice.

recruit could, in fact, complete a five-year enlistment and never fire his weapon."" Predictably, the deficiencies in training would show up in the battlefield. After the terrible showing of 1st

Cavalry at the opening battle of the Nez Perce War, CPT Dave Perry, a company commander, underwent a court of inquiry. His defense centered on inadequate mounted training and lack o f ammunition. He blamed the unit's unsatisfactory

p e r f o r m a n c e o n not being well drilled in firing while mounted. Secondly, he testified that he was not at fault He claimed there The court

since the troops ran out of ammunition.

was no ammunition available for the operation. cleared him of all charges.=*

The army's embarrassing showing against the Nez Perce. especially Colonel John Gibbon's 7th Infantry surprise attack at Big Hole, helped start a reform movement in the army training program. Four years later, the army In

formed instructional companies at the recruiting depots. these companies, recruits receive four months of training before their first assignment." While some felt that the United States Army was better armed and equipped than anytime in its hlstory, the

Indians and some settlers were equitably or better armed and equipped for the time. Due to limited funding and slow

procurements, the Department of the Columbia was armed wlth a variety of weapons. The Ordnance Department had converted

50,000 Civil War vintage Springfield rifled muskets to flre the metallic cartridge. This Allin conversion shortened the In

rifle barrel and reduced the caliber from .58 to .50.

addition, the Cavalry used a variety of carbines: Spencer, Sharps, and a variety of experimental models. The troops

preferred the Spencer, a .50 caliber repeater that was fed from a tube in the stock containing seven rounds. popular model was the single-shot Sharps carbine. Another In

addition to the Spencer and Sharps models, the army started procuring and issuing the 1873 ~prin'gfield.45 caliber rifle for the infantry and the 1873 Springfield .45 caliber carbine for the cavalry. The cavalry started receiving, as

a sidearm, the 'Peacemaker'; rev~lver.'~

a Colt $ 4 5 eelibrr

To complement their carbine and revolver, the cavalrymen carried a saber. However, due to its weight and

clumsiness, most men commonly carried a sheath knife instead of the saber into the field. The infantryman carried a Both the cavalry and the

bayonet to complement his rifle.

infantry used the prairie belt. a leather belt with canvas l o o p s s e w e d on it, to carry their basic load of ammuniti~n.'~ To finish outfitting the frontier soldier o f 1877, the cavalryman tied his gear--picket-pin, canteen, and utensels--to his saddle. The infantryman carried his gear

in a blanket roll slung over his shoulder, or in a regulation knapsack."O The soldier's clothing is important because the pursuit of the Nez Perce occurred during the heat of July and the snow of October. Howard's soldiers wore dark blue

blouses and light blue trousers trimmed in the distinctive colors of his branch of service. This uniform, made out of

only one weight of cloth, caused the soldier to roast in the summer and freeze in the winter. The absence of seasonal Howard's

clothing inflicted undue hardship - on the soldier.

column left Idaho in July with only one uniform with which to endure the severe swings in weather conditions.

Durlng the Nez.Perce war, the twelve-pound mountazn howrtzer, the two-pound Hotchkiss mountain gun, and the Gatling gun supported the campaigning cavalry and infantry. While some hailed them as super weapons that could disperse, repulse, and demoralize Indian concentrations, others deemed them useless in Indian warfare. The 12-pound mountain

howitzer originated during the Civil War, but s a w less use in the frontier than the Hotchkiss mountaln gun or the Gatling gun. All three crew-served weapons were mounted on

wheeled carriages, which decreased mobility. General Miles raved about the effectiveness of the light, compact 1.65 inch, 2-pound Hotchkiss mountain gun. except in timbered country around Yellowstone National Park."% Except for the last part of the war, the Nez

Perce War was fought entirely in timbered and mountainous terrain. In fact, only at the Battle of Clearwater and the

Battle of Bear Paw Mountain did the employment of mountazn guns significantly contribute to the defeat of the Nez Perce. *' The Gatling gun, a forerunner of the machine gun. could fire 350 rounds per minute, but the range was the same as the rlfle. While the Gatling gun was employed during the

campaign. it hindered the army's mobility while contributing little to the army's firepower. The guns often jammed as a

result of the refuse of black powder and high heat.

Even

w i t h a part of an artillery regiment assigned to Howard's command, he had to detail men from the other units to man the Gatling guns and other crew-served weapons.sJ Mobility of the columns with their wagon and crew-served weapons was the biggest problem the frontier army faced. Since the infantry and cavalry carried their

supplies and ammunition in wagons, mountainous or wooded terrain restricted their agility and rate of advance.

In

addition, their mobility depended on the endurance of their grain-fed horses to sustain themselves on grass. Even when

they carried adequate supplies of grain forage. their horses became jaded and exhausted after extended campaigns. Colonel Hazen, of the Sixth Infantry, stated: After the fourth day's march of a mixed command, the horse does not march faster than the foot soldier, and after the seventh day, the foot soldier begins to out march the horse, and from that time on the foot soldier has to end h'is march earlier and earlier each day, to enable the cavalry to reach the c a m p . . . .3 4 Doctrine called for the cavalry to ride to the battle. then dismount to fight. Since they had lighter

weapons than the infantry and had to detail one in four soldier to hold the horses, the cavalry delivered less firepower upon the enemy. Even though the cavalry had poor

staying power and poor mounted performance, they were more

likely to close with the Indians in combat.

While the

cavalry could not match the infantry for endurance on long distance marches, the infantry could not keep up with the highly mobile mounted Indian~.'~ Of the two parts of the army. line and staff, the line manned those 226 military posts with forty regiments: twenty-five infantry regiments composed of ten companies each, and ten calvary and five artillery regiments with twelve companies each. mounted batteries. Each artillery regiment had two

A colonel commanded each of the forty

regiments with a lieutenant colonel serving as deputy commander or executive officer. Captains commanded, with

the assistance of a first lieutenant and a second lieutenant, each of the 430 companies of the regiments. the assigned strength of 24,501, only 20,610 officers and men served in the line. As defined by the act of 1866, Of

almost four thousand officers and men manned the War Department staff and its subordinate

element^."^

After the Civil War, the army became a skeleton force because Congress reduced the total army strength without deactivating any units. As a result, commanders

combined two or more companies to perform the work of one. For example, Gibbons fought the Battle of Big Hole with six companies of the Seventh Infantry. Together, the companies

had only 19 officers end 146 enlisted men for an averag* of

24 men per company.

"7

After the Civil War. one of the challenges for the War Department was to sort out who would get the limited vacancies. Regular officers had brevet rank in volunteer In

units several grades above regular army grades.

addition, brevet grades had been liberally passed out for wartime service not only to combat soldiers but also to staff members who had never seen any combat. Volunteers This

applied for the few regular army officer vacancies.

situation caused intense competition and rivalry among the officer corps. Officers would prefer charges against each

other for the slightest provocation or seek to steal the glory of a battlefield victory.3s The officers dealing with the Nez Perce Indians could count on their age advancing faster than their rank. It was not uncommon for an officer to be a lieutenant for two decades. Overcautiousness and age prevented some from Extremely slow

successfully combatting the elusive Indians.

advancement--by today's standards--diminished their initiative. Troubled by low pay, extremely slow promotions,

and inadequate training, jealous officers often magnified petty quarrels into major controversies instead of seeking self improvement. Besides fragmenting the officer corps

into hostile factions, the conditions narrowed the

o f f i c e r s ' focus.

The post parade ground w i t h i t s two or

t h r e e companies d e f i n e d t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l and p r o f e s s i o n a l sphere. The g e o g r a p h i c a l l y s c a t t e r e d companies seldom came As a r e s u l t , o f f i c e r s had A n

together t o t r a i n as a regiment.

l i t t l e t r a i n i n g f o r I n d i a n f i g h t i n g o r anything else. I n d i a n scout t o l d one o f f i c e r : South a r e crazy. Indians.""7 They d o n ' t

"You men who fought down

know anything about f i g h t i n g

Whether t h e o f f i c e r s were a product of West t h e s c o u t ' s comment was e m p h a t i c a l l y

P o i n t o r t h e C i v i l War, true.

What t h e army needed was n o t merely more I n d i a n fighters, b u t o f f i c e r s who were I n d i a n t h i n k e r s . Since

H a l l e c k ' s tenure as Commanding General o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Army, t h e army had focused on defending t h e resources o f t h e not dealing w i t h

home l a n d against f o r e i g n aggressors, Indian h o s t i l i t i e s . o r i g i n of

While t h i s decade of t h e 1870's saw t h e the

m i l i t a r y p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m i n t h e United States,

focus was on a Napoleonic t y p e war. The United S t a t e s M i l i t a r y Academy, f o r many years,

used as t h e i r standard m i l i t a r y science and a r t textbook C F T O'Conor's t r a n s l a t i o n of S.

F. Gay de Vernon's

T r e a t i s e on B'Connor

The Brfime& 3 4 War 8 n d Ford1 Fieaklon.

I n ndditlen,

t r a n s l a t e d a summary of Baron de Jomini f o r t h e cadets t o study European s t r a t e g i c concepts. Jomini's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

of Napoleon became t h e education standard of West P o i n t .

As a result, newly commissioned West Point graduate8 a n t r ~ ~ d an army which, except for its size and frontier mission, resembled a minute scale Imperial force. Hence. army

officers s a w their role as to defend the country's resources from European invasion. They did not concern themselves

with a military policy that dealt with the Indians or small neighbors such as Mexico and Canada.*= Indian campaigns found their way.into professional literature as interesting history rather than as case studies. Case studies could have improved the army's Instead, the

organization, doctrine, and officer education.

army focused on conventional means for their next foreign war. When the 19th century conventional army fought an

unconventional enemy like the Indian. the army had to mobilize great numbers of soldiers to defeat the Indians. Throughout the nineteenth century, the American Army fought like the conventional forces of Europe. American

military doctrine came from European experiences and teachings. The United States, as a test of security,

measured itself against European military conventional forces. For Indian fighting, however, these tactics would Only

work only i f the Indians would stand and give battle. rarely did the Indians cooperate.

Heavy columns of slow

moving troops with the heavy and noisy impediments of wagons and cannons served to alert and scatter the Indians.

Once the Indians scattered, the army was unable to brlng the enemy to a battle in which it could use its conventional t a c t i c s : = However, during the winter months the Indians lost their mobility when their grass-fed ponies were weakened by the lack of food and the severe weather forced them to stay in their camps and villages. The army would then attack the

Indians' winter villages, which were heavily occupied by the warriors' families. While destroying their food stockpiles

and possessions, the army inflicted heavy causalities on the surprised warriors. Instead of developing a formal Indian

fighting doctrine to deal with the Indian mobility, the military continued to emulate Europe's military.*=

When an Indian uprising occurred, the depleted companies were too weak to handle it without additional companies. Transporting these additional companies to the Since the

crisis was extremely costly and time consuming.

under-trained, poorly equipped army had to be able to move quickly in order to implement the vague government policy, command and control of these forces was critical. Movement

of the frontier army. however, was seriously hindered by the distinct, confusing chain of command from the post commander to the Commanding General, General William T. Sherman. In summary, few in the national leadership cared a great deal about Indian affairs until a crisis threatened

the peace on the frontier.

When Indian hostilities

disturbed the peaceful frontier, the national leaders wanted an immediate end to the disturbance. Yet, because the

nation's leaders had previously paid little attention to Indian warfare, high level military officials did not organize or equip the army to perform the dominate mission they were called upon to do. This omission compounded the

challenges of Howard's command and control during the Nez Perce war. Beside being tasked for many nondefense roles,

Howard commanded units organized and equipped for a conventional war instead of his unconventional enemy, the Nez Perce. The additional burdens of the administrative and

the organizational quagmires of the army's command and staff made more difficult for him to command and control the soldiers and equipment needed to prosecute the campaign. Whlle Howard had a difficult task and was pressed to meet the demands placed upon him. he had a force that was not impotent.

Endnotes 'Robert M. U t l e y , F r o n t i e r Regularsr The United States Army and t h e Indians, 1866-1891 (Lincoln: U n i v e r s i t y o f Nebraska Press, 1984) 45. =William T. Sherman, "Report of t h e General o f t h e November Army," Headquarters o f t h e Army, Washington D. C., 7, 1877, of t h e Annual Renort o f t h e Secretary of W a r on t h e Oeerations of t h e Department f o r t h e F i s c a l Year Endina Juno, (Washington : Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1877) 1-13. =Robert M. U t l e y , "The F r o n t i e r and t h e American M i l i t a r y T r a d i t i o n , " t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of S o l d i e r s West. Bioaraphies from t h e M i l i t a r y F r o n t i e r , e d i t e d by Paul Andrew Hutton, (Lincoln: U n i v e r s i t y of Nebraska Press, 4Russell w, (New York:

F.

Weigley, H i s t o r y of t h e United States MacMillan P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1967) 266.

Wmerican M i 1 i t a r y H i s t o r y , United States Army, D. C.: U S Government Center' of M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y . (Washington . P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1989) 285. &Department of t h e Wmy, Center of M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , American M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , (Washington DC: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1989) 284. 'Robert Wooster, The M i l i t a r y and United States Yale U n i v e r s i t y I n d i a n P o l i c y , 1865-1903, (New Haven: Press, 1988) 87. Wtley, Vtley, ao1bid. F r o n t i e r Reaulars 13-14. F r o n t i e r A r m y 33.

%=Utley, F r o n t i e r Regulars 31-32. lXIbid.

York:

' y f a i ~ l r w Downing, Zndiwn Fighting Army, (New Charles Scribner's Son, 1944) 15.

laPeter Camejo, Racism. Revolution. Reaction. 1861-1877: The Rise and Fall of Radical Reconstruction, (New York: Monad Press, 1976) 30. '-Robert M . Utlev. "The Frontier and the American Military Tradition," the. introduction to Paul Andrew Hutton, Soldiers West, Bioaraphies from the Military Frontiers, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987) 8 . znArmy and Navy Journal, 20 Oct 1877, 170. ZlRobert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars, (Bioomington: Indiana University Press, 1977) 23.

--

--Fairfax Downing, Indian-Fighting Army Z"Utley, Frontier Renulars, 23.

22.

Z4Yajor General Irwin McDowell , "Mi 1 itary Division of Pacific Report", 113 of "Report of the Secretary of War to the 48 Congress," 17 November 1877. lwRobert Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1863-1903, (New Haven: Yale University Press, l988), 32. "OIdaho Statesmen, 8 March 1879, Boise, Idaho Territory. T7Ztley, Frontier Requlars, 24. zeDowny, Indian Fighting Army, 17; and Utley, Frontier Regulars, 69-71. x7Utley, Fruntier Regulars, 71-75.

"lYs1 lowstone P a r k , established in 1872, was the Nation's first National Park.

G.tory Omega,

3.f

--,isnald I::. F i s h e r , Thunder i n t h e Mountains. The t h r ) Nez ?ere@ War, :Caeur D'Alene, Idaho: alpha 1992; 312. Z'titley, T4Utley, "=titley, F r o n t i e r Requlars,

7.--

72-73.

F r o n t i e r R e g u l a r s SO.

Ibid.
"Report of t h e General o f t h e Army," c i t e d i n U t l e y , F r o n t i e r Regulars,

JoSherman,

5;

and 14 Stat. 532-58

,371' did. '

11.

SvdL:ry, F r o n t i e r Regulars 21; and Wooster, M~litary and t h e U S I n d i a n P o l i c y 71, 62.

T h e

LeEwzeel F. Weigley, The American Way o f War: A H i s t o r y o i t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s M i l i t a r y S t r a t e n v and P o l i c v , M i v e r s i t y Press, 1977) 88. (i3iooming~can: I n d i a ~ a 41'&ei51e. ,
I

The American Wav o f War 82-83.

-" -.+.*;;ley, .
,i.cy,

The Gcnorican Way O f War 67.

F ~ * a n t i c rRegulars SO; and Weigley,

. , . : I . ."

The

Aws-ican * a v s4 War 1T9.

(MISSOURI J

DEPARTMENT

OC

THE MISSOURI (MISSO~RI)

DEPARTMBNT OF

- --

D g p ~ ~ ~BOVNDARIES f i ~ ~ ~ ~ b

D l V l f ]ONAL B J U N ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~

~hiu,,.Milir~rrvC ; r w @ M J ' v a.l the n i l i t a r v Department and D i v i s i o n s i n the west Z, 3 1= ~ ~ u d A ted i S t a t e s . InJi an Pol-, source:Robert ~ o o s t e r -~ ~ 1 i.li

C H A P T E R T H R E E N E Z P E R C E INDIANS

I have known t h e Nez Perce t r i b e s i n c e 43. They were under m y charge as Superintendent of I n d i a n A f f a i r s from June 1857 u n t i l 1859. They are t h e f i n e s t specimens o f t h e a b o r i g i n a l r a c e upon t h i s c o n t i n e n t and been f r i e n d l y t o t h e whites from t h e time o f Lewis and Clark.' J. W. Nesmith Oregon Senator
The reader should understand t h e background and ways of t h e peaceful and h e l p i n g Nez Perce Indians. To f u r t h e r this

appreciate Howard's command and c o n t r o l challenges,

chapter w i l l r e v e a l how these peaceful I n d i a n s could be such s k i l l e d w a r r i o r s t h a t they almost defeated t h i s c o u n t r y ' s best generals and s o l d i e r s . Finally, t h e chapter w i l l

demonstrate what caused t h e Nez Perce t o t a k e up arms. While a r c h a e o l o g i s t s c l a i m t o be a b l e t o t r a c k t h e Nez Perce ancestors from t h e S i b e r i a n p l a i n s across t h e Bering S t r a i t t o t h e P a c i f i c Northwest more than 50,000 years ago, Perce have t h e i r own legend about t h e i r origins.' b e l i e v e t h e Coyote S p i r i t , epic b a t t l e w i t h a monster. monster, t h e Nez

They

Speelyi created them f o l l o w i n g an A f t e r Speelyi slew t h e which he t h e pieces

he c u t t h e monster's body i n t o pieces, Miraculously,

promptly threw i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s .

of monster became Indian t r i b e s .

Speel y i ' s f r i e n d b u t asked him who would For t h e i r b e a u t i f u l

complimented him on a job w e l l done, l i v e i n t h e i r most beloved v a l l e y . valley,

Speelyi had saved t h e monster's h e a r t t o make t h e Nez Perce o r Nimpaus as they The Coyote S p i r i t , Speelyi,

l a s t and best t r i b e - - t h e

o r i g i n a l l y c a l l e d themselves. r e p o r t e d l y said,

"Let t h i s be t h e i r homeland forever."=

While both t h e I n d i a n legend of Speelyi and t h e archaeological f i n d i n g s are i n t r i g u i n g , t h i s I n d i a n legend provides i n s i g h t about t h e Nez Perce. The Nez Ferce loved

t h e l a n d t h a t they had l i v e d on f o r so many years. Secondly, t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e Nez Perce o r i g i n a t e d from t h e In

monster's h e a r t symbolized t h e i r h e a r t f e l t kindness. fact,

t h e Nez Perce are b e t t e r known f o r t h e i r peaceful

achievements i n t h e settlement and development of t h e P a c i f i c Northwest than they are f o r massacre o f s e t t l e r s and I n d i a n wars, i n c l u d i n g t h e Nez Perce War.4

H i s t o r i a n s c r e d i t t h e French-Canadian trappers t h a t traded i n t h e area w i t h t r a n s l a t i n g p i e r c e d noses i n t o Ner Perce. They c a l l e d them "Cho punnish" o r p i e r c e d noses

because they wore s h e l l s i n t h e i r noses when t h e Europeans f i r s t made contact w i t h them. The f i r s t recorded encounCer w i t h t h e

Ne@ F @ w @

occurred d u r i n g t h e Lewis and Clark Expedition, o i i i c i a l l y c a l l e d t h e Corps of Discovery. This f i r s t exposure t o

the

Nez Perce r e i n f o r c e d t h e I n d i a n legend t h a t t h e Nez Perce I n d i a n s were warm-hearted people. t h e e x p e d i t i o n met t h e

A f t e r crossing t h e L o l o t r a i l , Nez Perce Indians.

The extremely hungry and t i r e d e x p l o r e r s days journey t r a v e r s i n g t h e

had j u s t completed a f i f t y - t w o gate of

t h e mountains on t h e Missouri River i n Montana t o

t h e c r e s t o f t h e Lo10 Pass i n t h e B i t t e r r o o t M o u n t a i n s . While t h e e x p l o r e r s took f i f t y - t w o days, t h e Nez Perce could

cover t h e same distaaeeimnf6onrddps6. of

TR~esS$uw~mggmmmhbe~~

t h e Lewis and Clark p a r t y k i l l e d and butchered a Nez Instead of r e t a l i a t i n g for

Perce horse w i t h o u t permission. t h i s heinous a c t ,

t h e Nez Perce greeted t h e s t r a n g e r s w i t h

open-hearted h o s p i t a l i t y and gave them food and s h e l t e r . " A f t e r t h e e x p l o r e r s had recovered from t h e i r journey, W i l l i a m Clark and Merriwether Lewis h e l d a c o u n c i l w i t h t h e Nez Perce chiefs. Great White Father, They explained t o t h e Nez Perce t h a t t h e President Thomas Jefferson, had sent

them t o explore a r o u t e t o t h e P a c i f i c . leaders asked f o r t h e I n d i a n s ' help. food,

The e x p e d i t i o n

Besides g i v i n g them

t h e Nez Perce showed them t h e best r o u t e and taught They used thasa canoes on

them how t o b u i l d dugout canoes.

t h e i r journey down t h e r i v e r s toward present day Portland. Before departing, t h e i r kindness. Snake, t h e e x p l o r e r s gave t h e I n d i a n s g i f t s f o r While t h e p a r t y canoed down t h e Clearwater, t h e Nez Perce took care o f t h e

and Columbia Rivers,

expeditfan'a ~ x h r u s t 8 d hwrmw.

O n t h e Corps o f Discovery's L o u i s i n 1806,

r e t u r n t r i p from t h e P a c i f i c Ocean t o S t .

they picked up t h e i r rejuvenated horses and enjoyed t h e l r new found f r i e n d s ' h o s p i t a l i t y again, weeks. for During t h a t time, t h i s time f o r s i x

t h e snow had melted s u f f i c i e n t l y

t h e e x p l o r e r s t o r e c r o s s t h e mountainous L o l o F a ~ s . ~ During t h e i r extended t i m e w i t h Nez Perce, t h e

e x p l o r e r s made and recorded numerous observations.

Howard

and o t h e r government o f f i c i a l s could have gained great i n s i g h t and knowledge about t h e Nez Perce I n d i a n s from t h e Lewis and Clark journals. For example, besides l e a r n i n g

g r e a t d e t a i l s about t h e L o l o T r a i l , egress d u r i n g t h e war, h i s adversaries'

t h e Nez P e r c e ' s r o u t e of

Howard could have a l s o learned about leadership, and c u l t u r e .

social structure,

From t h e Lewis and C l a r k j o u r n a l s ,

w e can l e a r n how The j o u r n a l s

t h e Nez Perce organized themselves s o c i a l l y .

s t a t e d t h a t these I n d i a n s c o n s i s t e d of many autonomous i n d i v i d u a l bands. thousand people, The Nez Perce Indiana, numbering several

r e s i d e d i n several hundred separate Each v i l l a g e had a permanent camp s i t e Not s u r p r i s i n g 1y, t h e bands claimed They l e f t t h e i r t o d i g camas

autonomous v i l l a g e s . located i n a valley. ownership of

t h e land near t h e i r v i l l a g e .

homeland t o f i s h d u r i n g t h e annual salmon runs, and kouse r o o t s on t h e p r a i r i e s , b u f f a l o i n Montana.'

and o c c a s i o n a l l y t o hunt

Each v i l l a g e o r small band consisted o f several extended f a m i l i e s l i v i n g under t h e l e a d e r s h i p of c h i e f and c o u n c i l . i t s own

O f t h e t e n t o f i f t y a d u l t males w i t h i n

each band, t h r e e or f o u r o f t h e o l d e r and more respected men, t h e band's e l d e r s o r headsmen, and t h e i r c h i e f s would

c o n s t i t u t e t h e band's c o u n c i l which was an informal governing body. Frequently, t h e c h i e f was a blood r e l a t i v e Most often, t h e c h i e f ' s son The c h i e f ' a The

o f a m a j o r i t y of t h e band.

would become c h i e f upon h i s f a t h e r ' s death.

primary f u n c t i o n i n t h e v i l l a g e was t o s e t t l e disputes.

v a r i o u s Nez Perce bands seldom quarreled among themselves; they were normally f r i e n d l y t o one another. marriages c e r t a i n l y drew t h e groups closer.extremely i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , Interband Being

t h e Nez Perce recognized no

supreme head c h i e f t a i n because t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n precluded

it.
With such a loose s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e r e was l i t t l e a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e leaders. The c h i e f and t h e other

i n f l u e n t i a l headmen had l i t t l e a u t h o r i t y over t h e i r followers.

chief

d e r i v e d h i s a u t h o r i t y mainly from h i s

p e r s o n a l i t y and h i s support from t h e o t h e r members of t h e band. I n their village, the chief, w i t h t h e a i d of public

opinion,

could normally keep h i s young men under c o n t r o l

most of t h e time..

hlthough t h e whites considered t h e Nez Perce a t r i b e o r even a n a t i o n , organization. t h e Nez Perce lacked a d i s t i n c t t r i b a l

The Nez Perce were groups o f people w i t h a While a language

common language and a common c u l t u r e . x o

and c u l t u r e i n some ways u n i f i e d these autonomous i n d i v i d u a l bands, t h e i r c u l t u r e a l s o p o l a r i z e d them i n t o two d i f f e r e n t Upper and Lower Nez Perce. The Upper Nez Perce

groups--the

l i v e d i n t h e r e g i o n drained by t h e Salmon and t h e Clearwater r i v e r s i n what i s now Idaho. As roamers, they tended t o

borrow t h e i r c u l t u r e from t h e f a r away p l a i n s t r i b e s east of t h e B i t t e r r o o t Mountains. O n t h e o t h e r hand, t h e sedentary

Lower Nez Perce l i v e d i n t h e Imnaha and Grande Ronde River r i v e r s i n present-day Washington, northeastern Oregon -and southern The l a t t e r group drew

u n t i l they got horses.

t h e i r c u l t u r e from t h e c l o s e r Columbia River and P a c i f i c Coast t r i b e s . Even though a common language and c u l t u r a l t h e i r geographical s i t u a t i o n s and

t r a i t s aided cohesion,

t h e i r t r a v e l h a b i t s e v e n t u a l l y p o l a r i z e d t h e Nez Perce i n t o two d i s t i n c t

group^.'^

The common c u l t u r e and t r i b a l

l o r e that unified the

d i f f e r e n t bands drew upon a c o l o r f u l p a s t f i l l e d w i t h dramatic events. The Nez Perce's c u l t u r a l t i e s w i t h t h e i r

d i s t a n t neighbors were p r i m a r i l y due t o t h e i r considerable communication s k i l l s and w i l l i n g n e s s t o t r a v e l . The Nez

Perce could understand both t h e s i g n language of t h e P l a i n s

I n d i a n s and t h e Chinook d i a l e c t of t h e coast. Perce, especially,

The Lower Nez

roamed a vast area i n t h e i r e f f o r t s t o From t h e coast, they traded f o r seashells from t h e p l a i n s came

b a r t e r f o r goods.

w i t h which they adorned themselves;

feathered war bonnets and b u f f a l o horned-headdresses. Throughout h i s t o r y , they wandered over t h e vast areas of mountains, plains, valleys, and sagebrush plateaus not b u t a l s o t o hunt and

merely t o t r a d e and acquire new t h i n g s , t o fish.'=

The Nez Perce f i r s t acquired horses from t h e Shoshonis between 1710 and 1720. Once mounted, their

a b i l i t y t o t r a v e l increased g r e a t l y .

Within a generation,

they had bred a toughness i n t o these horses t o match t h e rugged t e r r a i n i n which they l i v e d . of wind and limb, durable. hard-hoofed, Their horses were sound

sure footed and i n c r e d i b l y

The I n d i a n s h i g h l y valued these horses f o r t h e i r The horse now allowed t h e Nez Perce

tremendous endurance.

t o make more frequent seasonal eastward and westward Journeys. O n t h e i r journeys over L o l a Pass t o t h e b u f f a10 country o f Montana a t t h e headwaters of t h e Missouri and Their

Yellowstone r i v e r s , they took everything w i t h them. baggage included t h e i r e n t i r e f a m i l i e s - - c h i l d r e n grandparents--animals, possessions. and

horses, dogs and a l l t h e i r p o r t a b l e

Even a f t e r t h e m i s s i o n a r i e s taught them

c a t t l e raising,

t h e Lower Nez Ferce continued t h e i r annual two reasons. The I n d i a n s valued t h e

b u f f a l o hunts f o r

b u f f a l o robes and t h e t r i p s were a p a r t of t h e i r traditi~n.'~ The Nez Perce horses were a f o c a l p o i n t f o r t h e i r culture. wealth, To t h e Nez Perce, t h e i r horses were

form of

a means of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,

and an a l l y on t h e h u n t

o r on t h e warpath.

Because they had developed t h e i r warring

c a p a b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t t h e i r p r i z e d horse and other possessions, they could s a f e l y roam a wide area. Since t h e i r horses expanded t h e i r horizons, they

guarded and p r o t e c t e d them from t h i e v e s and h o s t i l e I n d i a n war p a r t i e s . Nez Perce war p a r t i e s o f t e n went on t h e

o f f e n s i v e throughout Idaho and Oregon against t h e Shoshonis, t h e Nez Perces' t r a d i t i o n a l enemies. They a l s o t r a v e l e d t o

n o r t h e r n Idaho and Washington t o encounter t h e Spokane and Coeur D'Alene I n d i a n t r i b e s . These two t r i b e s were enemies. During t h e i r

sometimes f r i e n d s and a t other times,

buff a10 hunting t r e k s t o Montana, they o f t e n encountered h o s t i l e Crow, Sioux o r Blackfeet. Therefore, t h e Nez Perce while

developed a f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t y out of self-defense

t r a v e l i n g and t o p r o t e c t t h e i r valuable horses from r a i d i n g

fhLW@g,
The Hudson Bay Company introduced a new f a c t o r i n t o Nez Perce warring c a p a b i l i t y - - t h e gun. The B l a c k f e e t , one

of

t h e i r enemies,

had guns, so t h e Nez Perce needed guns t o The nearest source was

p r o t e c t t h e i r f a m i l i e s and horses. i n t h e Dakota country.

I n 1805, a p a r t y o f Nez Perce

w a r r i o r s decided t o t a k e a b o l d course o f a c t i o n and t r a v e l through h o s t i l e land i n search of guns i n t h e Dakota country. They t r a v e l e d over snow choked L o l o Pass and

through t h e open p l a i n s of t h e Yellowstone and Missouri rivers. These lands were t h e homeland of t h e h o s t i l e Sioux, and Crow. Since these t h r e e I n d i a n t r i b e s t h e Nez Perce needed t o avoid

Blackfeet,

were already armed w i t h guns,

them t o reach t h e f u r t r a d e r s i n t h e Dakota country t o procure guns. The Nez Perce's successful t r e k f o r guns n o t o n l y increased t h e i r l e t h a l i t y , b u t i t g a v e them an o p p o r t u n i t y t o rehearse t h e a r t of evading an enemy. They chose a

shrewd r o u t e and d i d much n i g h t r i d i n g w i t h t h e use of f a s t horses. Having e x t r a horses allowed t h e Nez Perce t o r o t a t e The Nez

t h e i r mounts as t h e rugged t e r r a i n wore them down.

Perce w a r r i o r s s u c c e s s f u l l y obtained t h e desired guns and acquired t h e s k i l l s t h a t would serve them w e l l i n t h e 1877 war. The Nez Perce d i d n o t l i m i t t h e i r war time leadership t o t h e i r normal c h i e f s . I n war, o n l y t h e most capable
A war c h i e f d i d n o t have

w a r r i o r s would assume leadership.

t o be a c h i e f from one o f t h e many I n d i a n bands.

The

p o s i t i o n normally went t o t h a t w a r r i o r who had mast d i s t i n g u i s h e d himself i n war o r on a b u f f a l o hunt. The

young males grew up w i t h t h e w a r r i o r s t o l e a r n by example about horses, hunting, and sporting. After a young I n d i a n he

proved h i m s e l f as a t r u e horseman and a g r e a t hunter,

then accompanied t h e warring p a r t i e s t o l e a r n f i r s t hand how t o fight. U n l i k e t h e army, t h e Nez Perce changed war c h i e f s

t o whoever best represented t h e c o u n c i l ' s desire.17 Besides a c q u i r i n g combat experience w h i l e r a i d i n g o t h e r I n d i a n t r i b e s o r defending t h e i r t r i b e , t h e Nez Perce The

gained experience from f i g h t i n g along s i d e t h e army.

Nez Perce had aided t h e s o l d i e r s s i n c e t h e establishment of army p o s t s i n t h e P a c i f i c Northwest. much from these encounters I n 1855, Chief Kamiakin of u p r i s l n g w i t h a confederation of tribes. t h e Yakima fomented an P a c i f i c Northwest I n d i a n The I n d i a n s learned

He wanted a general I n d i a n u p r i s i n g throughout t h e

r e g i o n which he b e l i e v e d would d r i v e away a l l w h ~ t e settlers from t h e I n d i a n homeland. But, t h e powerful Nez Perce

n a t i o n stood w i t h t h e government and prevented a t o t a l uprising. Following t h i s incident, Nez Perce scouts served

w i t h an army column of
RBW ~ R B W Ra5

157 s o l d i e r s t o end t h i s war which i s

Cke I p o k a n m I n d i a n War."

I n 1858, t h e Nez

Perce again a l l i e d w i t h t h e men i n b l u e against a new c o a l i t i o n of h o s t i l e Indian tribes. The c o a l i t i o n consisted

of

w a r r i o r s from t h e Spokane, Coeur D'Alene,

Palouse,

and

Yakima t r i b e s .

These h o s t i l e t r i b e s again u n s u c c e s s f u l l y The

t r i e d t o d r i v e t h e whites from t h e I n d i a n ' s homeland.

o f f i c i a l army dispatches from t h e 1858 campaign c i t e d t h e Nei Perce f o r b r a v e l y and p r o f e s s i o n a l l y s e r v i n g as spies, guides, guards, and f i g h t e r s . The army campaign commander

asked Nei Perce Chief Lawyer what he d e s i r e d t o be p a i d f o r h i s tribes' services. Chief Lawyer r e p l i e d , "Peace, plows,

and schools." against war,

Although a peace-loving people who a r e t h e Nei Perce proved t o be brave and s p i r i t e d

w a r r i o r s as w e l l as being i n d u s t r i o u s workers. While t h e cause o f t h e Nez Perce W a r can e a s i l y be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e s e t t l e r s s t e a l i n g t h e I n d i a n ' s homeland, t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of C h r i s t i a n i t y upon t h e Nei Perce p o l a r i z e d c u l t u r e c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o t h e problem. Although t h e Nei Perce s o c i e t y c o n s i s t e d of bands, autonomous

t h e Nei Perce c u l t u r e p o l a r i z e d them i n t o two Nez Perce and Lower Nei Perce. The

fractions--Upper

I n d i a n s ' f i r s t exposure t o t h e army s t a r t e d t h e i r C h r i s t i a n experience. During t h e long s t a y of Lewis and Clark, t h e Nez The

Perce became aware o f C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f s and p r a c t i c e s .

I n d i a n s saw t h e e x p l o r e r s and subsequent t r a p p e r s pray, read t h e i r Bibles, and discuss t h e i r s i n g l e Great S p i r i t . ' * r e l i g i o n i n t e r e s t i n g because

The Nei Perce found t h e w h i t e s '

they wanted t h e w h i t e s ' a t t r i b u t e d the whites'

power and knowledge.

The I n d i a n s religion.

s u p e r i o r i t y t o t h e whites'

The Nez Perce b e l i e v e d power equated t o t h e i r medicine o r religion. religion, Since w h i t e s ' s u p e r i o r power must come from t h e i r religion.=a Nez

t h e I n d i a n s wanted w h i t e s '

I n quest o f t h e w h i t e s '

r e l i g i o n and power,

Perce and Flathead d e l e g a t i o n went t o St. r e l i g i o u s teachers. attention.

L o u i s i n 1831 f o r

The I n d i a n s ' v i s i t gained great

Several church newspapers f e a t u r e d a r t i c l e s salvation. F i v e years l a t e r ,

about t h e I n d i a n s i n search of two missionaries,

Marcus Whitman and Henry Harmon Spalding, a r r i v e d a t t h e mountain men Many

along w i t h t h e i r wives,

rendezvous on t h e Green River i n present day Wyoming. Nez Perce met t h e m i s s i o n a r i e s and escorted them t o t h e P a c i f i c Northwest."' I n 1836, Henry and E l i s a Spalding s t a r t e d t h e

herculean task of e s t a b l i s h i n g a mission a t t h e mouth of Lapwai Creek. I n l i n e w i t h t h e government's p o l i c y of they s e t out t o

c i v i l i z i n g and C h r i s t i a n i z i n g t h e Indians, educate and convert t h e Nez Perce.

To educate t h e Indians,

t h e m i s s i o n a r i e s had t o t r a n s l a t e t h e Nez Perce language, Shahaptin, t o w r i t t e n form i n order t o teach t h e I n d i a n Upon r e c e i v i n g a p r i n t i n g press

c h i l d r e n t o read and w r i t e .

from t h e FImerican Mission Board i n Hawaii, they produced a Shahaptin d i c t i o n a r y and grammar book. They hoped t h a t

l i t e r a t e I n d i a n s could s u r v i v e t h e changing world of white domination t o come. They could n o t f o r g e t t h a t they a l s o had t o develop a mission t h a t could be s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g I n d i a n needs and customs. w h i l e coping w i t h they provided guns,

From t h e mission,

t h e I n d i a n s w i t h medicines, c l o t h s , and o t h e r valuable t r a d i n g goods.zs

metal u t e n s i l s , Still,

t h e Spaldings

had known t h a t a s e t t l e d C h r i s t i a n i z e d community centered around farming would best s u r v i v e t h e expansion of t h e pioneer. The o l d ways of b u f f a l o h u n t i n g and- salmon f i s h i n g

c o n f l i c t e d w i t h new s e t t l e r s moving i n t o t h e i r t e r r i t o r y .

TO accomplish t h i s task,
and a pastor.=4

Spalding had t o be both a foreman

As t h e m i s s i o n a r i e s discouraged t h e t r i b a l t r a d i t i o n s of r o o t g a t h e r i n g and b u f f a l o hunting, they encouraged t h e growing of t y p i c a l garden vegetables and t h e r a i s i n g of domestic l i v e s t o c k - - c a t t l e , sheep, and hogs. 'By removing

t h e need f o r b u f f a l o hunting, t h e Nei Perce could have avoided warfare w i t h t h e P l a i n s Indians.'" The m i s s i o n a r i e s were most successful i n making farmers and converts of faction. I n contrast, t h e more sedentary Upper Nez Perce t h e roaming Lower Nez Perce r e s i s t e d Noteworthy

conversion and t h e a g r a r i a n 1i f e s t y 1e.

exceptions t o t h i s t r e n d of conversion w i t h i n t h e Lower Nez Perce I n d i a n s were Chief Old Joseph and h i s two sons, Young

Joseph and O l l o k o t . r e s o u r c e f u l leader,

Chief

Old Joseph,

an i n t e l l i g e n t and

l e d t h e Wallowa band t h a t l i v e d i n t h e i r Chief Old

b e a u t i f u l l a n d u n t i l white m e n began t o s t e a l i t . Joseph's sons, key leaders i n t h e 1877 War,

spent t h e i r

boyhood a t t h e Lapwai Mission u n t i l i t s c l o s u r e which was due t o t h e Spaldings' departure a f t e r t h e Whitman massacre."L The Spaldings' departure l e f t t h e C h r i s t i a n

Nez Perce I n d i a n s t o t h e i r own devices f o r twenty-four years.

"7

As mentioned e a r l i e r ,

t h e Spaldings had not converted Many of them

a l l t h e Nez Perce before t h e i r departure.

objected t o farming and t h e m i s s i o n a r i e s ' a t t a c k s on 1iquor, gambling, and polygamy. As a r e s u l t , t h e Nez Perce Indians or

separated i n t o a C h r i s t i a n group and a non-Christian Dreamer's group. The Dreamers b e l i e v e d i n a blend of Chief

C h r i s t i a n i t y and I n d i a n pagan b e l i e f s . Too-hul-hul-sote, man,

a Dreamer's r e l i g i o u s leader or medicine

l e d t h e Snake River band w i t h 183 I n d i a n s which fought

i n t h e Nez Perce War."With t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of Perce people, C h r i s t i a n i t y t o t h e Nez

t h e gap between t h e two p o l a r i z e d groups t r e a t i e s by t h e United States years before t h e

enlarged w i t h t h e s i g n i n g of

and the Nmz Pmrcm.

outbreak of t h e war,

During t h e twenty-two

government t r e a t i e s s l o w l y nurtured t h e

seed of h o s t i l i t y w i t h i n t h e Lower Nez Perce ~ n d i a n s . The

f i r s t government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o sow t h e seed of h o s t i l i t y was t h e ambitious, Territory, newly appointed governor of Washington

Isaac Stevens.

I n 1855, Governor Stevens wanted t o calm t h e P a c i f i c Northwest a f t e r t h e Whitman massacre so he could get a t r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l r a i l r o a d route.

I fhe could convince a l l

he could get t h e

t h e v a r i o u s t r i b e s t o l i v e on r e s e r v a t i o n s ,

next t r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l r a i l r o a d b u i l t along t h e n o r t h e r n route. Governor Stevens l o b b i e d Congress f o r money t o W h e n these t h e land

n e g o t i a t e t r e a t i e s w i t h a l l t h e area t r i b e s .

t r e a t i e s p u t t h e I n d i a n s on r e s e r v a t i o n s f o r e v e r , would then be opened t o t h e new s e t t l e r s . The f i v e major t r i b e s of Perce, Cayuse, U m a t i l l a ,

t h e Columbia Basin--Nez Yakima--met i n the

Walla Walla,

Walla Walla V a l l e y a t an ancient I n d i a n c o u n c i l grounds. With s i x thousand I n d i a n s and one hundred whites, Stevens worked out a treaty.=* headmen, and delegates, ceded a p o r t i o n of 6s f i f t y - e i g h t Governor

chiefs,

signed t h e t r e a t y of

1855, they

t h e i r land t o t h e United States. Indian A f f a i r s , t h e Nez Perce

k c o r d i n g t o t h e Commission of

o r i g i n a l l y i n h a b i t e d t h e country i n Idaho between t h e B i t t e r Root and Blue Mountains. Palouse River; Valley. The n o r t h e r n boundary was t h e

t h e southern boundary was t h e Salmon River t h e I n d i a n land

The t r e a t y ceded o n l y a p o r t i o n of

t h a t l a i d t o t h e west and south.

O f t h e major I n d i a n bands,

Chief Lawyer occupied t h e Kamiah V a l l e y , Lapwai, Timothy t h e Alpowai,

B i g Thunder t h e and B i l l y

Joseph t h e Wallowa,

t h e Salmon River Valley.so Before disbanding t h e conference, g i f t s t o t h e various chiefs, payments f o r t h e ceded land, a n n u i t i e s i n t h e form of and g r i s t m i l l s . s s While t h e l o s s o f l a n d was not a s i g n i f i c a n t event t o any of t h e Nez Perce, two p r o v i s i o n s of t h e 1855 t r e a t y t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t o come. t h e army presented As

headmen, and delegates.

t h e government promised t r i b a l teachers, shops, sawmills,

schools,

proved t o be a precursor of First,

t h e t r e a t y attempted t o change t h e i r c u l t u r e i n t h e The t r e a t y p r o h i b i t e d t o r e s i d e on t h e The t r e a t y

areas o f leadership and t r a v e l i n g . any white,

except government o f f i c i a l s ,

I n d i a n r e s e r v a t i o n without t r i b a l permission.

a l s o took away t h e Nez Perce a b o r i g i n a l way of l i f e , s p e c i f i c a l l y b u f f a l o hunting on t h e p l a i n s . The sedentary

Upper Nez Perce q u i c k l y accepted t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n s i n c e they seldom roamed t h e b u f f a l o hunting. The Lower Nei Perce T h i s a c t i o n planted

simply ignored t h e t r a v e l r e s t r i c t i o n . t h e seeds f o r t h e f u t u r e c o n f l i c t of

1877.

The second troublesome p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e 1855 t r e a t y addressed t h e Nez Perce's s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and leadership. Earlier, w e noted t h a t t h e Nez Perce s o c i e t y contained

extended f a m i l i e s grouped i n t o autonomous bands.

These

autonomous bands now i d e n t i f i e d themselves p r i m a r i l y as e i t h e r Dreamers o r C h r i s t i a n s . c o u n c i l comprised of Previously, a temporary

t h e c h i e f s of

t h e v a r i o u s bands would Now, the

address any issues applying t o a l l Nez Perce.

t r e a t y provided f o r a s a l a r y f o r a head chief.*= The Nez Perce then had t o e l e c t a head c h i e f who would decide f o r a l l t h e Nez Perce, w i t h t h e i r c u l t u r e and t r a d i t i o n . e l e c t twelve sub-chiefs which was i n c o n s i s t e n t The t r i b e a l s o had t o and

who a s s i s t e d t h e head c h i e f

worked as a l i a i s o n between whites and Indians.

Historians

have c i t e d t h e head c h i e f p o l i c y as being t h e l e a d i n g cause a r because i t negated t r a d i t i o n a l and of t h e 1877 Nez Perce W c u l t u r a l c o u n c i l leadership s t y l e . s s The discovery of gold by E l i a s P i e r c e i n t h e Clearwater D i s t r i c t i n 1860 changed everything. r a n t h e Nez Perce Reservation i n v i o l a t i o n of treaty. The I n d i a n agent, Miners over

t h e 1855

A.

J.

Cain attempted t o keep t h e

i l l e g a l miners out by b l o c k i n g a l l t r a i l s w i t h I n d i a n scouts. Surprisingly, t h e miners were n o t a cause f o r worry

by t h e Nez Perce.

They b e l i e v e d t h e miners would e v e n t u a l l y But, t h e Nez

leave l i k e t h e fur t r a p p e r s had b e f o r e them.

Perce had n o t counted on t h e mining economy o r t h e s e t t l e r s t h a t came w i t h t h e miners and stayed a f t e r t h e g o l d and miners had l e f t . = -

To f u r t h e r aggravate t h e problem of encroachment on t h e Nez Perce land, t h e United States government,

preoccupied w i t h i t s C i v i l War, continued t o disregard t h e i r 1855 t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s .

A government appointed commission

neqotiated a new t r e a t y t h a t eased t h e burden on t h e war-torn settlers. government w h i l e f u r t h e r opening t h e l a n d t o To add some order t o t h e s i t u a t i o n , the

government ordered f o u r c a v a l r y companies t o camp next t o t h e c o u n c i l s i t e as a show o f force. As t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s

became heated over t h e issue of t h e Wallowa V a l l e y i n Oregon, t h e Lower Nez Perce I n d i a n s simply l e f t t h e

negotiations i n protest. Under t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e 1855 t r e a t y , the

government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ignored t h e departure and c a r r i e d on n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e head c h i e f . The new t r e a t y

adjusted t h e r e s e r v a t i o n s i z e by ceding t e n thousand acres of Nez Perce land t o t h e government. While t h e Upper Nez

Perce l o s t l i t t l e land, t h e Lower Nez Perce l o s t t h e i r beloved Wallowa Valley. Only t h e f orty-seven c h i e f s and

headmen from t h e Upper Nez Perce signed t h i s new t r e a t y . The four Lower Nez Perce bands seceded and became known, thereafter, as t h e nontreaty Indians. The previous c u l t u r a l

and r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e , t h a t had been t h e crack, would now

d i v i d e the Nez Percr i n t o two d i s t i n c t factions."'

The government p o s i t i o n was t h a t t h e t r e a t y a p p l i e d t o a l l Nez Perce I n d i a n s s i n c e t h e head c h i e f signed i t . The Commissio.n of I n d i a n A f f a i r s i n s t r u c t e d t h e Lapwai

I n d i a n agent t o i n f o r m t h e n o n t r e a t y I n d i a n s t h a t t h e Treaty o f 1863 a p p l i e d t o them as w e l l . taken toward war.=The n o n t r e a t y Nez Perce continued t o work through t h e I n d i a n agents i n an attempt t o have t h e t r e a t y reversed. Based upon a Secretary of I n t e r i o r recommendation, President One more step had been

Grant signed an executive order i n 1873 t h a t s e t aside t h e Wallowa v a l l e y f o r Chief Joseph's band. pressure from Governor Grover o f Oregon, However, under Grant succumbed t o

p o l i t i c a l pressure and reversed h i s e a r l i e r executive order. W h e n Chief Joseph learned of the s i t u a t i o n , he t o r e

up h i s B i b l e over t h e l o s s of

h i s homeland.

The seed of

h o s t i l i t y began t o blossom i n t o a c o n f l i c t . Since t h e t i m e of t h e Lewis and Clark Expedition, t h e Nez Perce had l i v e d i n peace w i t h t h e whites. f i r s t w h i t e s ' r e c o r d i n g s of From t h e

i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h t h e Nez Perce, With

they had been f r i e n d l y and h e l p f u l t o white s e t t l e r s . t h e a r r i v a l of t h e missionaries, c u l t u r a l differences

between t h e Upper Nez Perce and Lower Nez Perce sharpened. The t r e a t i e s w i t h t h e United States government weakened t h e u n i f y i n g aspects o f language and common c u l t u r a l t r a i t s . The 1863 Treaty f i n a l l y d i v i d e d t h e Nez Perce i n t o two

d i s t i n c t factions.

One p a r t y agreed t o a l l terms and stayed The d i s s e n t i n g bands of

w i t h i n t h e f i x e d boundaries.

n o n t r e a t y I n d i a n s re4used t o accept t h e t r e a t y and t h e restrictions. As t h e d i v i s i o n of t h e Nez Perce occurred, they The Nez

continued t o develop t h e i r keen w a r r i o r s k i l l s .

Perce had acquired t h e i r warring experience by r a i d i n g other Indian t r i b e s , s i d e t h e army. defending t h e i r own bands, or f i g h t i n g along

U n t i l now, t h e Nez Perce boasted t h a t they would soon change. W h e n the

had never k i l l e d a white--that

Nez Perce took up arms against t h e s o l d i e r they had

p r e v i o u s l y fought alongside, enemy.

they proved t o be a formidable

While Howard's f o r c e s already lacked proper equipment, training, and m o t i v a t i o n , Howard's

structure,

command and c o n t r o l problems were f u r t h e r challenged by t h e h o s t i l e Nez Perce's superb f i g h t i n g prowess. Perce's g r e a t e r a b i l i t y , endurance, Due t o t h e Nez t h e Nez

and a g i l i t y ,

Perce had t h e i n i t i a t i v e and p u t Howard on a r e a c t i o n a r y trend. Having already looked a t t h e f r o n t i e r army, t h e next

t o p i c i s B r i g a d i e r General O l i v e r O t i s Howard assuming command of t h e M i l i t a r y Department o f t h e Columbia.

Endnotes 'Idaho Semi-weekly August 1877. Territory)

World,

(Idaho C i t y ,

Idaho

" A l v i n M. Josephy, Jr., " O r i g i n s o f t h e Nez Perce People", Idaho Yesterdays, (Spring Issue, 1962; Volume V I , Number 1) 2-3. " B i l l Gulick, Chief Joseph Country, Land of t h e Nez (Caldwell Idaho: Caxton P r i n t e r s , Ltd., 1981) 6-7.

Perce,

-Francis D. Haines, "Nez Perce and Shoshoni I n f l u e n c e on Northwest H i s t o r y " , 379-93, i n Greater America, Essays i n Honor o f Herbert Eugene Bolton, (Berkeley and Los Angles: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1945) 379. = B i l l G u l i c k , Chief Joseph Country 21. &Ronald K. Fisher, Thunder i n t h e Mountains, The S t o r y o f Nez Perce War, (Coeur D'Alene, Idaho: Alpha Omega, 1992) 14-7. 'Mark H . Brown, The F l i g h t o f t h e Nez Perce, (Lincoln: U n i v e r s i t y o f Nebraska, 1982) 20-21. "Francis Haines, Nez Perces, 15. (Norman: The U n i v e r s i t y

*Francis Haines, Nez Perce, o f Oklahoma Press, 1955) 86. 'OFrancis

Haines, Nez Perces.

14-15

' " B i l l Gulick, Chief Joseph Country: Land of t h e Nez Perce, (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton P r i n t e r s , L t d , l 9 8 l ) , 9-10. '"Gulick, P a t r i o t Chiefs, Ibid., 11; and A l v i n M. Josephy Jr., T h e (New York: The V i k i n g Press, 1962) 315. Chief Joseph Country, 17-18.

'"Bill

Gulick,

Story,
25-26.

14Lucullus V i r g i l McWhorter, Yellow Wolf, h i s O w n (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton P r i n t e r s , Ctd., 1940)

+3Gulick, Ibid., 48: and Josephy, Patriot Chief

315.

+&Bill Gulick, Chief Joseph Country 21. "Helen

"R.

Howard, Saga of Chief Joseph 1 6

Idaho:

Ross Arnold, Indian Wars of Idaho (Caldwell, The Caxton Printers, LTD., 1932) 25-7.

SgAlvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Nez Perce Indians and the Opening of the Northwest, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965) 81. "ORrown, Flight of the Nez Perce 21. "Merrill D . Real, "I W i l l Fight No More Forever": Chief Joseph and the Nez Perce War, (Seattle: University of Washington Press) 15-16. ""Fisher, ' " M a r k Thunder in the Mountains 51.

H. Brown, The Flight of the Nez Perce, 22

=*Real, "I Will Fiqht No More Forever" 16. "=Fisher, Thunder in the Mountains 5. *&The superstitious Cayuses killed the Whitmans and destroyed their mission because they believed that the Whitmans' "bad medicine" caused the measles out break that killed many of them.
& Eleanor Merrill, "Talmack," 4 " ' A l l e n Yesterday, 1964, Volume 8 Number 3, page 2-14.

in Idaho

"*Real, I Will Fight No More Forever, 16; and Fisher, Thunder In The Mountains 50. "9Gul ick, Chief Joseph Country, 96-101.

aiHolon Howard, Saga of Chief Joseph 55-57.

sZRrown, =-Fisher, =*Beal,

F l i g h t of

t h e Nez Perce, 23.

Thunder i n t h e Mountains 60.

I W i l l F i g h t No More Forever 18-20.

= s E l l i s Paxson O b e r h o l t z e r , A H i s t o r y of The U n i t e d S t a t e s Since The C i v i l War, (New York: M c M i l l i a n Company, 1926) 424. =-Addison, Saga of Chief Joseph 76-79.

F i g u r e 3 , Map o f t h e Nez Per-ce Hands Source: A l v i n N. Josephy. JI-. The Nez P e r c e Indi_ans and t h e o p e n i n s of t h e Northwe5.t. 162-3.

.,

C H A P T E R F O U R T H E INDIAN DIPLOMAT

Howard took w i t h him t o h i s f i r s t f r o n t i e r command, The Department of t h e Columbia, a r e p u t a t i o n as an Indian diplomatist. Robert N. U t l e y , H i s t o r i a n

'

Thus f a r ,

w e have looked a t t h e F r o n t i e r Army of W e have learned something of t h e

1877 and t h e Nez Perce.

c a p a b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e former F r o n t i e r Army and have seen how t h e seed o f h o s t i l i t y l a t e r developed w i t h i n t h e Nez Perce. T h i s chapter w i l l look a t Howard's

involvement i n t h e Nez Perce W a r by addressing h i s r o l e as an I n d i a n diplomat. To p u t Howard i n proper perspective, t o know something about him.

i t i s necessary

Howard's r o l e as an I n d i a n The f i r s t phase

diplomat can be viewed i n four phases.

consisted o f Howard's a c t i v i t i e s and s e r v i c e s as a diplomat f o r t h e Nez Perce p r i o r t o t h e peace commission of 1876.

The second phase e n t a i l e d h i s r o l e as peace cornmissioner. During t h i s phase, Howard's a t t i t u d e changed toward t h e n o n t r e a t y Nez Perce. The t h i r d phase of Howard's

d i p l o m a t i c l i f e was h i s r o l e on behalf of t h e United States

government with the Nez Perce and hia associated military activities leading up to the Lapwai conference of 1877. The

final phase was Howard's role in the Lapwai conference and the subsequent White Bird Battle. This chapter begins with Howard's and after the Civil War. activities during

The well-educated Oliver Otis

Howard was a Civil War leader, a religious fanatic. and a humanitarian.

A graduate of Bowdoin College, Howard entered

While some

the United States Military Academy in 1846.

credited his rapid rise through the ranks during the Civil War to his connection with politicians in his home state of Maine, others credit his promotions and selections for various commands to his military talent complemented by his capacity to quickly learn from his experiences which kept him from repeating mistakes. Competency and bravery, with occasional controversy, characterized Howard's Civil War service. With the help of

some influential friends from Maine following seven years as a Regular Army ordnance lieutenant, Howard became the Colonel of the Third Maine Volunteer Regiment. His

performance at the Battle of First Bull Run earned him a promotion to brigadier general. This newly promoted

brigadier general became a legend at the Battle of Fair Oaks when he continued to lead his brigade even after two minie balls shattered his right arm and another minie ball killed

his horse from under him. relinquish command.

Even then, he refused to

He received the Medal of Honor for his

gallantry in this battle. After the amputation of his right arm due to his wounds, Howard returned to his brigade in time for the Second Battle of Bull Run. During this battle, he continued

to distinguished himself among his fellow officers and soldiers. After the battle, thirty-six officer of his

brigade petitioned the commander of Army of the Potomac to give Howard a division command because they felt his qualifications merited it. Howard's subsequent performance

as a division commander at Antietam and Fredricksburg won him a promotion to major general and a command of a corps. While Howard's corps' normally sterling performance was not particularly noteworthy at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. he ensured his units learned from their experience. Even

though fellow officers criticized Howard, his soldiers gravitated toward him and his superiors praised him. Controversy continued to cloud Howard's image when

Lieutenant General William T. Sherman chose Howard over other senior officers to command the Army of the Tennessee during Sherman's march to the sea. Howard's fellow officers

credited his selection to political connections; Sherman, however, stated that Howard got the position because he could better get along with the other

commanders.

With the end of the Civil War, the reunified

country rewarded the heroic, one-armed, praying general for his military leadership and tactical ability by appointing him a brigadier general in the Regular Army." Howard's prevailing religious outlook gave him strength, courage, a strong resolve, and compassion that helped him accomplish the many things he did while others criticized him. Yet, when Howard displayed, like a

conquering banner, his strong religious resolve, he often irritated those around him--subordinates and superiors alike.' Howard admitted that he was a religious fanatic.

Being an excellent speaker with an eloquent voice, Howard was known to preach or lead a religious meeting anywhere at anytime. His often perceived destructive religious

tendencies caused him to be unpopular among his officers.

Sherman declared on one occasion, 'Well, that Christian soldier business is all right, but he needn't put on airs

C&l

when we are among o ~ r s e l v e s . ' ~ Howard's religious zeal generated a social

consciousness within him that led to his lifelong crusade to elevate the disadvantaged and minorities. Based on Howard's

humanitarian tendencies, President Lincoln had recommended that Howard be appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Land, also known as the Freedmen's Bureau. This was a Congressional instrument for

the caring of freed slaves and whites disturbed by the war. While heading the Freedmen's Bureau, Howard helped

found the present-day Howard University in Washington D.C. in 1867. From 1869 to 1874, he simultaneously served as the

head of the Freedmen's Bureau and the President of Howard University. However, the demands of holding these two

positions along with his other charitable works caused him to neglect his duties as Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau. In addition to a Congressional investigation, his

neglect led to a severe scandal that involved several military courts of inquiry and civil suits from 1870 to 1879--which included his tenure as commander of the Military Department of the Columbia. Despite his eventual

vindications. the Freedmen's Bureau scandals not only ruined Howard's reputation with charges of corruption,

inefficiency, and fanaticism,. but devastated his financial affairs.

A series of poorly chosen investments and a

nationwide depression further aggravated his financial difficulties. To revive his slumping finances while serving

as Commander 'of the Columbia, Howard had written articles for periodicals, lectured, and also had written a book about his boyhood experiences. A11 these problems and the

additional endeavors to alleviate his financial

situation must have added a tremendous additional burden to Howard for many years.. In 1872, while the Congressional investigations were in process. President Grant twice sent Howard on two very notable and successful trips to Arizona as a peace emissary to the warring Apaches. Consequently, Howard had proven

himself to be an able Indian diplomat in addition to being a humanitarian. After his last Military Court of Inquiry,

Howard wanted a change of environment from Washington and hoped to exercise some of his options. He believed his rank

and previous hard service entitled him to have his choice of assignments. Sherman, the Commanding General of the Army,

also knew that Howard needed a change of environment, but he felt that Howard had been in possession of an easy and desirable job for far too long. Sherman concluded that

Howard would be well-suited to command the fast settling Military Department of the Columbia. While Howard only

admired the f a c t t h a t it was the farthest corner of the country from Washington, his assignment gave him an opportunity to get some recognition for his soldiering ability again.7 In July 1874, Howard assumed command of the Military Department of Columbia. To better acquaint himself with his

new command, Howard soon visited all the military posts and Indian agencies located within his command. During his

tour, a messenger from Chief Joseph requested a meeting with the new commander to discuss the nontreaty Nez Perce's problems. While the department was still recovering from

the nasty Modoc War of 1873, Howard found other Indian problems. He discovered the previously described Nez Perce

treaty problem, plus a scattering of groups of Indians with an assortment of grievances.. The scholarly Howard directed his very talented department adjutant, Major H. Clay Woods, to review the various claims and to prepare a study to determine the root of the Nez Perce treaty problems. After interviewing all

parties concerned and reviewing all official records and newspaper files, Woods' final concise written report supported the nontreaty Nez Perce stand. Woods declared

that the nontreaty Nez Perce could not be legally bound by the treaty of 1863 and that the nontreaty Nez Perce had a right to occupy the Wallowa Valley. Howard admitted that

the United States government and Oregon had done an injustice to Chief Joseph's band.While working through proper channels to resolve the situation, Howard positioned two cavalry companies in the Wallowa Valley to pacify both the Indians and the settlers. Howard finally got the government to authorize a Nez Perce commission after he secured the endorsement of his division commander, Major General Irwin McDowell. The Nez Perce

commission consisted of Howard, Woods, a repreaentative of the Board of Indian Commissioners, and two Eastern businessmen. As the Nez Perce commission met with the

nontreaty Nez Perce in November of 1876. Howard championed the rights of Chief Joseph and his band. The Nez Perce

commission labored to cause the nontreaty Nez Perce to agree to compromise on the issues at hand.lo After several days of meetings, Howard's previously sympathetic approach towards the nontreaty Nez Perce changed into one of animosity, primarily because of the Indians' attitudes. Howard, a deeply religious man who risked his

life to enforce the authority of the federal government over states' rights, did not approve of the nontreaty Nez Perce Dreamer religion and their defiance of the government. Now, instead of being a diplomat, Howard began acting like an officer who would tolerate no question of his authority--right or wrong. Two factors contributed to

Howard's change in outlook of the nontreaty Nez Perce. Since he had proposed the Nez Perce commission, its failure to get the nontreaty Nez Perce to negotiate an acceptable deal wounded his pride. Secondly. his personal reputation.

which had already been severely damaged, was under substantial strain and tension which added to his professional and personal life by his experiences with the

Freedmen's Bureau.

One more controversy or scandal could

have ruined Howard's military career.lX At the Department of the Interior in Washington DC, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs quickly acted on the Nez Perce Commission's recommendation by directing the Lapwai Indian Agent. John B. Monteith, to persuade the nontreaty Nez Perce to move onto the Lapwai Indian Reservation. In

addition, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs worked through the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of War, the Commanding General of the Army. and the Commander of the Military Division of the Pacific to have Howard support Monteith with force, i f necessary. While Monteith sent

treaty Indians to act as messengers and as good-will ambassadors to the nontreaty Nez Perce, he requested Howard to again send two companies of soldiers to the Wallowa Valley to aid him. Instead of sending trobps to pacify both the Indians and the settlers, Howard now developed contingency plans to protect the settlers i f the nontreaty Nez Perce disobeyed Monteith. Howard let his concern for the settlers be known On the second day o f the Nez

to the nontreaty Nez Perce.

Perce Commission. Howard openly challenged the non'treaty Nez Perce. He told them that i f trouble came to the Wallowa, he

would send two soldiers to deal with each nontreaty Nez Perce warrior.12

Yet, when the official taaking to eupport the Indian Agent arrived in ~ a n u a r yof 1877. McDowell had his adjutant add an emphatic restrictive endorsement for Howard: The division commander has examined the various papers transmitted from the headquarters of the Army, hereinbefore [sic]referred to, and it seems to him that the Indian Bureau anticipate possible, not to say probable, resistance to the demand on Joseph to remove to the reservation. In fact the case seems not unlike that of the recent difficulty with the Sioux, which resulted in the war of last year against these Indians. It is therefore of paramount importance that none of the responsibility of any step which may be made shall be initiated by the military authorities. You are to occupy Wallowa Valley in the interest of peace. You are to comply with the request of the Department of the Interior, as set forth in the papers sent you, to the extent only of merely protecting and aiding them in the execution of their instructions." During the next four months. Howard could not initiate any actions. When asked. Howard could only assist

Monteith, which amounted to conducting several interviews and meetings 'with Chief Joseph or his representatives. During these meetings, Howard attempted to explain the government's instructions and that the nontreaty Nez Perce The decision of when to move the

had no other options.

nontreaty Nez Perce onto the Lapwai reservation belonged to the Indian Agent and not to Howard. While Howard wanted to

take charge of the situation and put the nontreaty Nez Perce on the reservation. he had no say in regard to the approach or time table in resolving the nontreaty Nez Perce problem.

67

For a professional and experienced officer who had served gallantly in the Civil War and successfully as a Presidential peace emissary with the warring Apaches, Sherman had put Howard in an awkward and inappropriate position. Howard had to implement a policy he had no say in

nor did he necessarily agree with. Interestingly, a local newspaper, The Idaho Statesman. criticized Howard instead of Monteith for allowing the nontreaty Nez Perce to roam freely for too long. Also, they criticized Howard for not having

sufficient force to immediately compel the renegade bands to move onto the reservation.'* Following his work with the Nez Perce Commission and the associated damage to his pride, Howard wanted to show the nontreaty Nez Perce that the United States government had authority over the defiant Indians. Yet. McDowell's

guidance prohibited him from taking charge of the situation. Also, since Howard had other discontented

Indians that he had to watch throughout his command, he could not concentrate his forces merely around the Lapwai Reservation. The Secretary of War, George W. McCrary, had

only a total of twenty-five thousand troops to handle labor riots in the East, Reconstruction in the South, the Sioux and Apache disturbances in the West and Southwest, and other routine taskings that the army handled. In his 1877 annual

report to Congress, Secretary McCrary cited the Division of the Pacific as an example of insufficient troop strength to handle the local Indian problems. Even though Howard did

not control the amount of troops available in the area nor the time table of when the nontreaty Nez Perce would go onto the Lapwai Reservation, he nevertheless received the blame. I' Finally, Monteith gave the nontreaty Nez Perce a deadline of 1 April 1877 for them to move onto the Lapwai Reservation. After the April Fool's Day deadline passed and

no new Nez Perce bands occupied the reservation, Monteith requested Howard's assistance.

If Howard could not persuade

them into following the government instructions, Monteith then wanted Howard to take military action. On 20 April 1877, while Howard met with Monteith at Fort Walla Walla to make plans for the proposed occupation of the Wallowa Valley, Chief Joseph and a small delegation requested a meeting with Howard. Besides offering

assurances that the nontreaty Nez Perce were peaceful, the delegation discussed the government instructions with Howard. Howard stressed that the nontreaty Nez Perce must Howard and Joseph

comply with the government instructions.

agreed to a conference of all the nontreaty Nez Perce at the Lapwai reservation in two weeks. At this point, Howard was

planning for the noncompliance of the nontreaty Nez Perce.

He did not believe progress was being made with the nontreaty Nez Perce. During the two weeks before the Lapwai conference, Howard made preparation for the worst--a repeat of the previous year's Sioux uprising or another Canby Massacre during the late Modoc W a r . ' . Howard met with the volatile

Columbia River Renegades and with Father Cataldo, who had a significant amount of influence with Indians living around the Spokane Plains. Besides trying to prevent a coalition

of Indian tribes, Howard wanted his troops positioned for war. Howard sent two companies, E and L, of the 1st Cavalry He had these companies

Regiment to the Wallowa Valley. prepared for possible war.

These two cavalry companies went

with two Gatling guns, an ambulance, two government six-mule teams, five citizen teams, and twelve pack mules. He also

sent H company of the 1st Cavalry to Lewiston and H company of the 21st Infantry Regiment to Fort Walla Walla. To avoid a recurrence of the Canby Massacre. he had a big pitch-tent set up with the wa1,ls rolled up. did not want the proceedings closed in. Howard

Besides doubling

the visible guards, Howard also had the two companies of soldiers armed and staged in their barracks throughout the conference. In summary. Howard was clearly prepared for any

event~ality.~"

On 7 May 1877, all of the nontreaty Nez Perce gradually and ceremoniously arrived at the Lapwai Indian reservation. Monteith read the government's orders while The instructions

someone translated them for the Indians.

specified that Howard and Monteith had to stay and listen to all that the Indians had to say no matter how long it might take. However, the nontreaty Nez Perce had to understand

that the decisions of the government would be e n f o r ~ e d . ' ~ For two days, the nontreaty Nez Perce explained why they should not have to abide by the 1863 treaty. Joseph explained his views with this story: Chief

If we ever owned the land we own it l-I still, for we never sold. In the treaty councils the commissioners have claimed that our country had been sold to the Government. Suppose a white man should come to me and say, 'Joseph, I like I say to your horses, and I want to buy them'. him, 'No, my horses suit me, I will not sell them'. Then he goes to my neighbor, and says to him: 'Joseph has some good horses. I want to buy them, but he refuses to sell'. My neighbor answers, 'Pay me the money, and I will sell you Joseph's horses.' The white man returns to me, and says. 'Joseph, I have bought your horses, and you must let me have them.' If we sold our lands to the Government, this is the way they were bought.'la
Chief Joseph remembered Howard saying, 'The law says you shall go upon the reservation to live, and I want you to do so, but you persist in disobeying the law.' The discussions

became very heated, so Howard adjourned the conference with a day off for all. Howard wanted the situation to calm down

and he wanted to insure that his troops had arrived in the Wallowa Valley.
71

During the break, a nontreaty Nez Perce runner returned from the Wallowa Valley and informed Chief Joseph that the soldiers had occupied their homeland. Chief Joseph When the

then knew that Howard had meant what he had said.

conference continued, Too-hul-hul-sote, the Dreamer Medicine Man, addressed the group. He openly challenged Howard's

authority and ability to put him on the reservation. Fearing that the hostile spirit of the Medicine Man would spread. Howard arrested him. Armed guards put the defiant Howard's risky

Too-hul-hul-sote into the post stockade.

approach caused the crisis to pass since Chief Joseph knew that Howard was prepared to back up his words with war."O The nontreaty Nez Perce finally agreed to come on the reservation. When Howard's diplomacy started to falter,

he displayed the courage that won him the Medal of Honor during the Battle of Fair Oaks. Howard continued to work

with the nontreaty Nez Perce by personally escorting chief Joseph, Chief Looking Glass. and Chief Whitebird around the Lapwai Indian Reservation so they could select sites for their camps. Furthermore, he offered to remove some white

Settlers from the reservation so the Indians could have exclusive ownership and use of the area.'= The general did give some concessions to the nontreaty Nez Perce. Howard originally granted the

nontreaty Nez Perce only two weeks to move their families,

possessions, and livestock from the Wallowa Valley to the Lapwai Indian Reservation. After substantial arguments,

Howard allowed them thirty days for the move, but he told the nontreaty chief that he would use his soldiers i f they were late. Chief Joseph petitioned Howard to release Howard complied.

Too-hul-hul-sote from the post stockade.

In retrospect, the decision to release the hostile Mediclne Man was Howard's biggest mistake, but he probably thought that the other nontreaty chiefs could control him.2z Upon Chief Joseph's return to the Wallowa Valley, he had to convince the rest of his band that it was time to move onto the Lapwai Reservation. While Too-hul-hul-sote

talked about war and aroused the passions of some of the young warriors to the point of war, Chief Joseph urged his people to be calm instead. Responding to Joseph's

convincing arguments, the Wallowa band of the nontreaty Nez Perce gathered their belongings and their livestock and headed towards Lapwai. After the treacherous crosslng of

the over-flowing Snake River, the various bands of nontreaty Nez Perce gathered for their last couple days of freedom at Tepahlewam, an ancient camping ground near the boundary of the Lapwai Reservation. During the festive time, the

nontreaty Nez Perce, and even some treaty Nez Perce from the reservation, visited, danced, gambled, and raced horses while their women dug camas roots. Yet. the fun time

turned sour when Chief Joseph went off to slaughter some cattle back in the Wallowa Valley. A group of allegedly

drunk young warriors revenged some smoldering discontent when they murdered several whites at Slate Creek. nontreaty Nez Perce knew Howard would hold them all accountable for the killings, so they quickly moved their lodges to Whitebird Canyon.21 Expecting the outbreak of hostilities to occur in the Wallowa Valley. Howard had positioned hzs forces there. When the Indians left their homeland without any resistance. he thought the crisis was over. Howard would have alarmed The

and irritated the nontreaty Nez Perce by assembling forces while everything progressed smoothly. The presence of the

soldiers could have forced the nontreaty Nez Perce to react with violence to save their pride.=* Howard responded to the crisis by sending Captain Perry with ninety-nine men of the 1st Cavalry and eleven treaty Nez Perce. After a two days' ride with only a few

hours rest. Perry, with eleven citizen volunteers from Mt. Idaho, attempted to bring the nontreaty Nez Perce to the Lapwai. On 17 June, the sixty warriors from the normally

peaceful nontreaty Nez Perce met Perry's outfit with a peace party under a white flag. Perry's chief scout, Arthur

Chapman, fired upon the truce party and a sharp fight erupted. The hostile Nez Perce routed and almost

annihilated their opponents.

Then they pursued the shocked

troops, treaty Nez Perce, and citizen volunteers almost to Mt. Idaho. While the hostiles suffered only two wounded As Perry

warriors, Perry had suffered thirty-four dead.

first rode off, Howard had started planning for a conflict. When Howard received word of the disaster, he immediately started preparing for a sustained campaign."' Prior to taking command of the Military Department of the Columbia, Howard had demonstrated great bravery and superb diplomacy. Yet, his humanitarian activitres had

caused him personal and financial problems that followed hrm to his command. After his arrival at the department, Howard

worked on behalf of the nontreaty Nez Perce to resolve the government injustices to them, but he failed. He did not

foresee the ability of the young nontreaty Nez Perce to instigate problems. As a result, Howard sent Perry out with

a force to bring nontreaty Nez Perce to the Lapwai Reservation. The hostile Nez Perce routed Perry's force.

The war that no one wanted was on and Howard would take charge of it.

Endnotes %Robert M. U t l e y , i n t r o d u c t i o n t o M y L i f e and Experiences Among Our H o s t i l e Indians: A Record of Personal Observations, Adventures, and Campaigns Among t h e I n d i a n s of t h e Great West by O l i v e r 0. Howard (New York: Da Capo Press, 1973) x . "John A. Carpenter, Sword and O l i v e Branch: O l i v e r O t i s Howard ( P i t t s b u r g h , Pennsylvania: U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h Press, 1964) 23-77. "Robert M. U t l e y , i n t r o d u c t i o n t o M y L i f e and Experiences Among Our H o s t i l e I n d i a n s by O l i v e r 0. Howard, viii -Lloyd Lewis, Sherman, F i g h t i n g Prophet (New Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1972) 349.

York:

=Oliver 0. Howard, M y L i f e and Experiences Among Our H o s t i l e I n d i a n s w i t h i n t r o d u c t i o n by Robert M. U t l e y (New York: Da Capo Press, 1973) 120, 226. &Carpenter, sword and O l i v e Branch, 235, 244.

7 0 l i v e r 0. Howard, By L i f e and Experiences Among Our H o s t i l e Indians, 226-27. -Oliver 0. Howard, Nez Perce Joseph: A n Account of H i s Ancestors, H i s Lands, H i s Confederates, H i s Enemies, H i s Murders, H i s War, H i s P u r s u i t , and Capture (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972;,repr. of f i r s t e d i t i o n , Boston, 1881)

A 'Alvin M. Joseph J r . , The P a t r i o t Chief: Chronicle o f American Leadership (New York: V i k i n g Press, l 9 6 l ) , 431-32.

*OHoward, Nez Perce Joseph

30-1.

"Mark H. Brown, The F l i g h t of t h e Nez Perce ( L i n c o l n , Nebraska: U n i v e r s i t y o f Nebraska Press, 1982; repr., N e w York: Capricorn Books, 1971) 73-5.

'=General W i l l i a m T. Sherman, "Report of t h e General o f t h e Army" (Washington, D. C.: Headquarters of th.e Army, November 7, 1877) 3-15 Annual Report Of t h e

x41daho Statesmen,

(Boise C i t y ) , 30 June 1877.

'"George W. McCrary, "Report of t h e Secretarv of Annual War, ' War ~epa&ment, ~ o v e h b e r 19, 1877, 111-XXVII Report of t h e Secretary of W a r on t h e Operations of t h e Department f o r t h e F i s c a l Year Ending June SO, 1877 (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1877), I V .

'&As a r e s u l t of L i t t l e B i g Horn, Congress appropriated funds f o r two new f o r t s i n t h e area and twenty-five hundred a d d i t i o n a l c a v a l r y p r i v a t e s t o counter t h e Northern P l a i n s Coal i t i o n of Oglalas, Hunkpapas, Sans Arc, Blackfeet, and Cheyene. During t h e Modoc Indian W a r in southwestern Oregon i n 1872, t h e h o s t i l e I n d i a n murdered General Edward S. Canby during a s i m i l a r c o u n c i l .
'"Brown, Ibid.

, 80-2.

amCharles Erskine, "Chief Joseph, t h e Nez Perce, " w i t h i n t r o d u c t i o n by W i l l i a m H. Hare, 136-41, The Century I l l u s t r a t e d Monthly Magazine X X V I I (May 1884): 136 a9Young ( C h i e f ) Joseph, . . "An I n d i a n s ' s View of I n d i a n A f f a i r s , " 412-33, The North American Review C X X V I I I ( A p r i l 1879) 419-20. 30Brown, "'Howard, 253-7. Ibid., 80-2.

M y L i f e and Experience Among Our H o s t i l e

Indians,

=*Young Joseph, 423-4. ""Francis Haines, The Nez Perce: Tribesmen of t h e Columbia Plateau (Norman: U n i v e r s i t y of Oklahoma Press, l 9 5 3 ) , 221.

l e W l v i ~ JoBephy, Th.

P a t r i o t Chief,

326-7.

C H A P T E R FIVE T H E INDIAN FIGHTER

Had not General Howard, by h i s judicious d i s p o s i t i o n o f h i s troops, and by h i s r a p i d p u r s u i t , guarded t h e passes of mountains so as t o prevent Joseph's r e t u r n , t h e new settlement i n Eastern Washington and Northern Idaho would had been r a i d e d and destroyed, and probably years would have elapsed before they could have I t would have been necessary t o recovered. abandon t h a t whole f e r t i l e region, and a blow would have been f e l t throughout t h e whole northwest. Oregonian 25 October 1877

'

Howard's problems continued t o plague him when he took command of t h e M i l i t a r y Department of t h e Columbia. H e

had o r i g i n a l l y labored on behalf of t h e nontreaty Nez Perce u n t i l they refused t o recognize t h e f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t y or n e g o t i a t e a new agreement or t r e a t y .

A t t h a t time,

Howard

worked w i t h I n d i a n Agent Monteith d u r i n g a s e r i e s of meetings and conferences t o convince t h e nontreaty Nei Perce t o abide by t h e 1873 Treaty and move on t o t h e Lapwai reservation. Perce, A f t e r t h e l a s t c o u n c i l w i t h t h e nontreaty Nez

Howard and everyone i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e proceedings

thought they had resolved t h e n o n t r e a t y Nei Perce issue u n t i l word of t h e Mount Idaho a t r o c i t i e s reached them on 15 June 1877.

This chapter addresses Howard's role as protector of immigrants, his prosecutor of the Idaho Campaign of the Nei Perce War, and finally, pursuer of the Nez Perce until their

8 7 7 . capture at Cow Island on 4 October 1

While publicly displaying great confidence that the troubles with the nontreaty Nez Perce-would soon be under control, Howard started planning and organizing for a substantial campaign, not just one battle.
A s Perry and his

two companies rode off, Howard sent Captain Wilkinson to Walla Walla with dispatches warning of a possible war. He

directed four more companies and an army surgeon under his command to Lewiston. He also requested thirty days of

supplies needed to sustain his troops in the area of operation. Howard sent another dispatch to San Francisco,

where his superior, McDowell, commanded the Military Division of the Pacific. This dispatch informed McDowellof

the Nez Perce's murder of several white men and requested the authority to hire twenty-five scouts to help h i m in the campaign. Upon receiving word of Perry's terrible defeat,

Howard informed McDowell of the thirty-four deaths at the White Bird Canyon Battle and the possibility of an Indian movement that could unite the disaffected Indians in the region." Howard's planning focused on three points: to

protect and calm the settler; to prevent a general Indian

uprising of the alienated t r i b e s ; nontreaty Nez Ferce t o j u s t i c e . =

and t o b r i n g t h e h o s t i l e

Although Howard l e f t t h e remnants of

P e r r y ' s command h i s biggest

a t G r a n g e v i l l e t o calm and p r o t e c t t h e s e t t l e r s , challenge was preventing o f confederation of tribes. Since Howard's f i r s t t o u r of

h o s t i l e Indian

h i s command, he had

been aware of

many d i s a f f e c t e d t r i b e s t h a t could be e a s i l y I n southern

persuaded t o take up arms against t h e whites. Idaho, he had seen two such t r i b e s : t r i b e and t h e Wei ser tribe..

Chief Winnemuca's P a i u t e

The t r i b e s o f t h e Spokane P l a i n had h e l d a c o u n c i l a few days b e f o r e t h e S l a t e Creek massacres where some drunken young w a r r i o r s revenged t h e smoldering discontent when they murdered numerous whites. D'Alenes, During t h e counci I, t h e Coeur and Falouses considered t h e The

Spokanes, Yakimas,

p o s s i b i l i t y o f j o i n i n g t h e h o s t i l e Nez Perce p a r t y .

general sentiment was t h a t t h e d i s a f f e c t e d I n d i a n s would go on t h e warpath ift h e warring Nez Ferce had another victory.
I f a l l t h e r e g i o n a l t r i b e s joined t h e h o s t i l e s ,

t h e d e s t r u c t i o n would be t r e m e n d o u ~ . ~ Following t h e men i n b l u e ' s d i s a s t r o u s showing a t Whi'te B i r d Canyon, Howard had t o proceed c a u t i o u s l y even though t h e s e t t l e r s clamored f o r immediate p r o t e c t i o n and then revenge. The White B i r d Canyon b a t t l e proved t h a t t h e

h o s t i l e Nez Ferce were more courageous and b e t t e r f i g h t e r s

than the army had originally thought.

Also, the soldiers of

the frontier army were not as skilled or experienced as the soldiers of the Civil War. The overconfidence of the whites

changed to wholesome respect for the prowess of their foe. In addition to Ferry's defeat, Howard also had two recent battles to remind him of the fighting skills of the Indians. Surpassed only by Custer's massacre at Little Big

Horn and a mere year before the White Bird Canyon battle, the United States Army suffered the second most disastrous defeat ever suffered at the hands of Indians. When Howard

assumed command of the Military Department of the Columbia, everyone--settlers, soldiers, and Indians alike--were General Edward Canby,

recovering from the Modoc Rebellion.

Department Commander, had sent four hundred soldiers in two columns against seventy-five Modoc warriors with one hundred and fifty women and children. column attack; The Modocs repelled the two

the soldiers ruff ered sixteen dead and Only after enlarging the army's force

fifty-three wounded.

to one thousand soldiers, was the government able to defeat the Modoc warriors at the expense of eighty-two dead troopers. The Modoc War still haunted many of the soldiers Several of Howard's Lieutenant William H.

of the Department of the Columbia. officers fought in the Modoc War:

Boyle, Major Edward C . Mason, Colonel Frank Wheaton, and Captain Dave Perry.&

With Howard 's appreciation of Nei Perce fighting ability and a keen sense of the volatile situations at hand, one can understand why he aggressively collected the necessary manpower and equipment before prosecuting the war. Howard wanted t o position forces in Southern Idaho t o

counter the possible threats by the Paiute and Weiser and troops in the Spokane Plains t o counter the possible threat from the tribes living in that vicinity. In response t o Howard's requests, reinforcements came from all quarters. As he had redirected troops within

his department, he also had requested reinforcements from the other two military departments within the Military Division of the Pacific. Men came from Vancouver, Stevens,

Canby, Townsend, Klamath, Harney, San Diego, San Francisco, and a s far away a s Yuma, Arizona. had in the Lewiston-Lapwai and three of infantry. By 20 June 1877, Howard

area four companies of cavalry

Howard's decisive actions also

guaranteed fourteen companies of either cavalry, infantry, or artillery were enroute from the other two departments t o either Lewiston, Boise, or the Weiser River areas.' Additional units followed. For example, after

Howard had led his column around the rugged countryside of the Salmon River, he realized that he had an inadequate force t o simultaneously pursue the hostiles and protect the settlers. Therefore, on June 30, Howard requested an

infantry regiment from the East.

With the approval of the

Secretary of War and the President, General Sherman permanently assigned the 2nd Infantry Regiment from Georgia to Howard's department. While waiting for the soldiers to

arrive, Howard's quartermaster arranged for scouts, subsistence and transportation. Since Howard was the senior commander in his department working for one boss, he was arranging for the decisive application of all available combat power he could muster. Within his department and his boss's

division, he had unity of effort so he could get the sufficient number of soldiers with adequate supplies and equipment to defeat the Nez Perce. Howard's original request for scouts met with resistance due to Congress' failure to pass an army appropriation bill for the upcoming fiscal year. At first,

Sherman told NcDowell that he would have to release scouts in Arizona i f he acquired sco~ttsfor the Nez Perce campaign. Eventually, however, Sherman authorized Huward to Prior to the

hire twenty-five scouts for h i s campaign.

Clearwater Battle, Sherman authorized McDowell and Howard to increase the number of scouts up to eighty. While the

additional scouts aided the campaign, more scouts would have greatly helped the

Howard designated Lewiston as h i s f i e l d depot and h i s base of operation. Since he knew t h e Napoleonic axiom he d i r e c t e d t h e r a p i d food before t h e Weeks, Chief

t h a t an army marches on i t s stomach, procurement and t h e p r e p o s i t i o n i n g of assembled t r o o p s could march. G!uartermaster of

Major George H.

t h e Department of

t h e Columbia,

forwarded

what subsistence he had on hand t o Lieutenant Peter S. Romus, Howard's Post Quartermaster. Lieutenants E . F. Ebstein, John Q . I n addition, Adams, and Peter Leary,

Jr.

searched t h e countryside of

Idaho, and l a t e r Mantana,

f o r t h e s o i d i e r s ' various n e c e s s i t i e s . * Due t o t h e extremely rugged t e r r a i n , Bomus had t h e

d i f f i c u l t and t i m e consuming task of h i r i n g packers and mules i n s t e a d of wagons t o t r a n s p o r t a l l t h e n e c e s s i t i e s t o sustain the soldiers. S t a r t i n g w i t h e i g h t y mules, Bomus

eventual 1y h i r e d an a d d i t i o n a l 426 c i v i 1i a n pacL mules. Romus had a d i f f i c u l t time h i r i n g so many mules and packers because he had t o pay f o r them w i t h government vouchers--a promise t o pay. coins, Romus had no money, e i t h e r greenbacks or

s i n c e Congress had n o t yet passed t h e new f i s c a l year Even w i t h o n l y a promise of

army a p p r o p r i a t i o n b i l l .

payment, which drew a higher r a t e , t h e numerous miners i n t h e area had t o stop searching f o r t h e i r fortunes. miners were p u t out of work because of The

t h e tremendous number

o f mules needed t o support Howard's campaign.'O

W h i l e Howard w a i t e d f o r t h e l o g i s t i c a l p r e p a r a t i o n %

t o be completed, he spent t h e t i m e d r i l l i n g t h e g a r r i s o n
s o l d i e r s and p l a n n i n g t h e campaign. S i n c e h e d i d n o t want

t o r e p e a t t h e White B i r d i n c i d e n t by t a k i n g undue r i s k s , h e
w a i t e d u n t i l h e had s u p e r i o r t r o o p s t r e n g t h o v e r t h e h o s t i l e N e i P e r c e bands. Howard h a d a l r e a d y r e c e i v e d r e p o r t s f r o m

t r e a t y N e i P e r c e t h a t t h e h o s t i l e N e i P e r c e b a n d s numbered t h r e e hundred warriors." The r e a d e r s h o u l d n o t m i s t a k e Howard's c a u t i o n f o r fear.

H e had r e p e a t e d l y d i s p l a y e d g r e a t b r a v e r y t h r o u g h o u t
A Medal o f Honor r e c i p i e n t , h e s i m p l y d i d

t h e C i v i l War.

n o t want t o t a k e u n n e c e s s a r y r i s k s .

A f t e r t h e sound d e f e a t

of P e r r y , n o o n e d o u b t e d t h e N e i P e r c e w e r e a t least e q u a l

to, i f not superior t o h i s best troops.

T h e Nez P e r c e

w a r r i o r s -may h a v e l a c k e d d r i l l a n d d i s c i p l i n e , b u t t h e y were accurate sharpshooters. Howard r e c o g n i z e d t h a t h e h a d t o

e x e r c i s e s k i l l a n d c a u t i o n t o a v o i d a d e f e a t much a s C u s t e r h a d a t t h e L i t t l e B i g Horn t h e p r e v i o u s y e a r . A n o t h e r Nez

Perce victory could i n c i t e t h e other t r i b e s i n t h e regiun t o t a k e t h e w a r path. W h i l e Howard w a s i n i t i a l l y more c o n c e r n e d a b o u t preventing a nontreaty N e i Perce victory than obtaining a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y , h e h a d a t h r e e f o l d t a s k b e f o r e him. F i r s t , Howard h a d t o p r o t e c t t h e settlers i n t h e area. S e c o n d , h e h a d t o p r e v e n t t h e s p r e a d of h o s t i l i t i e s t o o t h e r

I n d i a n t r i b e s w i t h i n h i s department. subjugate t h e warring Nez Ferce. began t o assemble a t Lewiston, and defeat them. Because of

Third,

h e had t o

As h i s requested f o r c e

he planned t o f i n d t h e enemy

t h e great h y s t e r i a among t h e

s e t t l e r s caused by t h e I n d i a n t h r e a t and t h e s c a r c i t y of s o l d i e r s i n t h e area, superiors, Howard had coordinated w i t h h i s and Vancouver

t h e Chief of t h e Ordnance Bureau,

Arsenal f o r t h e i s s u e o f arms.

E v e n t u a l l y t h e government

issued one thousand stands o f arms t o Oregon, f i v e hundred t o Idaho, and f i v e hundred t o Montana t o h e l p w i t h t h e c i v i l i a n s e l f defense.

'=

Howard sent f r i e n d l y I n d i a n s t o t h e v a r i o u s t r i b e s t o discourage them from j o i n i n g t h e h o s t i l e Nez Ferce. Howard planned t o prevent t h e I n d i a n s i n southern Idaho from j o i n i n g t h e h o s t i l e Ner Ferce and t o prevent t h e renegade Nez Ferce from escaping t o t h e south. H e directed a force

under Major John Green from F o r t Boise t o move toward Weiser V a l l e y and then t o j o i n him. Howard would e v e n t u a l l y depart he wanted t o assure

from Lewiston w i t h t h r e e o b j e c t i v e s :

and r e s t o r e confidence among t h e s e t t l e r s w i t h t h e Army's presence; he wanted t o p r o t e c t them; and he wanted t o subdue

t h e h o s t i l e Ner Ferce.*= By h i s and h i s subordinates' prompt and d e c i s i v e actions, infantry, Howard had assembled a f o r c e o f 237 c a v a l r y , and a r t i l l e r y troops p l u s scouts and packers t h a t

were p r o p e r l y equipped f o r an I n d i a n campaign i n a rugged terrain. The t i m e f o r provision, p r e p a r a t i o n had come and gone. and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n were ready. Arms,

ammunition,

By noon of h i s column o u t ,

22 June 1877, a s Howard p r e p a r e d t o l e a d

he commented:

O u r whole f o r c e numbered l e s s t h a t o n e - f i f t h of a f u l l r e g i m e n t as such as t h o s e w e took i n t o t h e rebellion. S t i l l t h i s body of r e s o l u t e men C G I made a f i n e appearance. The c a v a l r y men s a t on t h e i r h o r s e s w a i t i n g t h e word; t h e i n f a n t r y f i r m l y g r a s p i n g t h e i r r i f l e s , ready t o move; t h e a r t i l l e r y , who were r e a l l y f o o t s o l d i e r s w i t h a b r i g h t uniforms, p r e s e n t e d t h e i r p e r f e c t r a n k s , s l i g h t l y r e t i r e d from t h e r e s t . "
Howard's m i l e - l o n g G a t l i n g guns, cautiously. column o f twos, w i t h a mountain gun, two

and e i g h t y mules w i t h p a c k e r s advanced Scouts and s k i r m i s h e r s covered t h e f o r c e s as

t h e y t r a c e d t h e same r o u t e t o t h e Salmon R i v e r t h a t P e r r y had t a k e n e a r l i e r .

lc

O n t h e f i r s t d a y ' s march, Ranch where he observed, renegade Nez Perce.

Howard reached t h e Norton the p i l l a g e of the he

first-hand,

D u r i n g t h e second d a y ' s march,

contemplated l e s s o n s l e a r n e d from P e r r y ' s a c t i o n s : IfColonel P e r r y c o u l d have a n t i c i p a t e d t h e r e s u l t s were t o f o l l o w h i s h a s t e t o White B i r d Canyon, and h a l t h e r e a t N o r t o n ' s and s t o o d on t h e d e f e n s i v e t i l l I came up, i t would have been a good t h i n g , i n a m i l i t a r y p o i n t o f view; b u t t h a t would n o t have t h e e f f e c t , l i k e h i s b o l d advance, o f s t o p p i n g t h e I n d i a n murders. D u r i n g Howard's second day of operations, he s e n t t r o o p s t o Perry's shattered

G r a n g e v i l l e and p i c k e d up t h e remnants of

command, soldiers.

which r a i s e d h i s s t r e n g t h t o over t h r e e hundred

O n Sunday,

24 June 1877,

Howard h a l t e d t o send out

s c o u t i n g p a r t i e s and t o w a i t f o r reinforcements from Boise. As w e have already seen, Therefore, Howard avoided r e p e a t i n g mistakes.

he wanted t o know where t h e h o s t i l e Nez Perce He a l s o sent T r i m b l e ' s c a v a l r y

were b e f o r e he proceeded.

company t o S l a t e Creek t o p r o t e c t t h e s e t t l e r s and t o guard h i s l e f t flank. moved a t once, Howard feared t h a t ift h e whole column i t would s t i r up t h e h o s t i l e I n d i a n s t o

a t t a c k t h e s e t t l e r s again.'During t h e next four days, Howard marched t o White After caring f o r A s

B i r d Canyon t o f i n d and bury h i s dead. t h e i r f a l l e n comrades,the

t r o o p s scouted t h e canyon. White B i r d Canyon, the

t h e column reached t h e bottom of

s o l d i e r s could see t h e h o s t i l e band moving around on t h e other s i d e o f t h e r i v e r . w a r r i o r s w i t h t h e i r women, The band consisted of t h e and baggage. The

children,

s o l d i e r s t r i e d t o engage t h e few renegade Nez Perce t h a t were on t h e near s i d e of engagement could occur, t h e other s i d e of the river. Before a s i g n i f i c a n t

t h e renegade w a r r i o r s r e t r e a t e d t o Howard paused w h i l e boats ar His

lT

the r i v e r .

r a f t s were c o l l e c t e d t o continue h i s p u r s u i t . attention,

however, was d i v e r t e d t o a new c r i s i s .

Chief Looking Glass' Nez Perce band was l i v i n g on t h e Lapwai Reservation, - b u t had been accused of plundering a the

s e t t l e r ' s home between t h e middle and south f o r k of

C l earwater River.

I n response,

Howard sent Captain

Whipple's c a v a l r y company,

along w i t h Captain R a n d a l l ' s t o investigate the incident.

Mount Idaho Volunteer Company,

Whipple's subsequent conference on 2 J u l y 1977 w i t h Chief Looking Glass erupted i n t o a f i g h t . two wounded Nez Perce w a r r i o r s , Besides one dead and

Whipple's f o r c e destroyed

Chief Looking Glass' v i l l a g e and captured 750 I n d i a n horses. However, t h e warring Nez Perce gained i o r t y

w a r r i o r s when Looking Glass and h i s band joined them. Whipple returned t o Cottonwood t o continue guarding t h e s e t t l e r s . =a What Howard d i d n o t know was t h a t n o n t r e a t y Nez Perce had conducted a ruse w h i l e they evacuated t h e i r f a m i l i e s and belongings. The n o n t r e a t y Nez Perce, also

gained some w a r r i o r s who had j u s t r e t u r n e d from t h e b u f f a l o country, action. now h e l d a c o u n c i l of c h i e f s t o choose a course of Two n o t a b l e w a r r i o r s who had j u s t joined t h e group,

F i v e Wounds and Rainbow, advised them t o w a i t near t h e r i v e r t o e n t i c e Howard t o cross i t . They had wanted Howard and

h i s t r o o p e r s t o cross t h e s w i f t f l o w i n g Salmon so t h e warring Nez Perce could move downstream and cross back over

the r i v e r .

Then,

t h e h o s t i l e Nez Ferce could e a s i l y move t o

t h e Wallowa V a l l e y o r b u f f a l o country i n While Whipple was d e a l i n g w i t h Looking Glass, Howard

had obtained boats and cables t o c o n s t r u c t a f e r r y t o get h i s f o r c e s across t h e s w i f t Salmon River. continued t o cross, As t h e s o l d i e r s .

t h e volunteer u n i t s l e d t h e long l i n e of

troops up a wet winding steep t r a i l as they pursued t h e i r

f 0e.l"
For days Howard's column plodded through t h e r a i n and mud as they went up and down t h e steep, t r a i l s i n p u r s u i t o f t h e i r foe. soggy, winding Howard The As they

During t h e process,

l o s t several pack mules. along t h e treacherous t r a i l s . mules l o s t t h e i r f o o t i n g and f e l l i n t o t h e ravines.

tracked t h e Indians, t h e i r t r a i l l e d t h e t r o o p e r s back down t o t h e r i v e r ' s edge near C r a i g ' s c r o s s i n g where t h e h o s t i l e Nez Ferce crossed again. After losing a r a f t f i l l e d with

equipment and several horses w h i l e attempting t o cross t h e s w i f t current, Howard turned h i s column around and r e t r a c e d

t h e t r a i l they had j u s t traveled."= While Captain Ed McConvi l l e and h i s Lewiston Volunteer Company b r a v e l y fought t h e nontreaty Nez Ferce a t t h e R a t t l e of Cottonwood, Howard's column crossed t h e Salmon

River f o r a second time and s t a r t e d searching f o r t h e nontreaty Nez Perce again. f o r c e of O n 11 J u l y , with a reinforced and

440 s o l d i e r s and 180 scouts,

packers,

teamsters, Howard once again pursued the warring Nez Perce. As the column descended the right bank of the Clearwater River, they sighted the hostile's camp below them on the opposite bank. After positioning the two Gatling guns and

the mountain howitzer for a plunging bombardment, Howard ordered his men to open fire. While the indirect fire

continued, Howard prepared for an attack.". Although Howard had taken the hostile Nez Perce by surprise, Too-hul-hul-sote, the.Dreamer Medicine Nan, led

twenty-four warriors across the river where they scaled a bluff t o the level of the soldiers. There, they took

shelter behind boulders, and engaged the soldiers with fierce and accurate gun fire that held them up until more Indians could join them. As more Indians continued t o

appear, Howard ordered his men t o dig in with their trowelel bayonets. force. Howard eventually counter attacked the hostile

Although Howard had over four hundred men, he could

not immediately overcome the approximately three hundred Nes Perce warri ors.23 Howard personally led and directed the two-day battle'that took place on the South Fork of the Clearwater River. On the first day, 1 1 July, neither side was able to To reduce vulnerability,

inflict much damage on the other.

Howard placed his supply train behind a semicircular battle line with hastily erected barricades and trenches, while

the Nez Perce engaged him from behind large boulders. the second day, Howard tried another tactic. Using his

On

artillery gunners a s infantry, Howard had them charge through the Nez Perce lines. The spirited attack caused the Corporal John

Indians to rapidly retreat across the river.

F. Schorr, 1st Cavalry, wrote in his diary about the

battle: We had 40 men killed and wounded, and it always remained a mystery why they CNez Percel d i d not pick off General Howard, who was always at the front line giving orders and at the same time sacrificed C e 1 as few lives a s possible." The soldiers immediately pursued the fleeing Nez Perce as far a s Kamiah. Private Mayer wrote in his diary on July 13:

Commenced firing at daybreak and kept it up until 2 p.m. At that time the order for a charge was given. We routed them out of their Stronyhould C G I and followed them across the Clearwater, the Cavalry crossing with the 1st 2 Co's deployed in skirmish line and the other followed in them across ~7 the Clearwater

....

Howard sent Captain E. C. Mason, his chief of staff, with his available cavalry to further press the hostile's rear guard as they headed for the Lolo pass. Howard had achieved a much needed success. To

accomplish his success on the battlefield, he employed all the features of a conventional Civil War battle: troop

movements, flanking operations, use of artillery and Gatling Guns, and sharpshooters.=-

Howard's well-earned r e l i e f f r o m command.

v i c t o r y p o s s i b l y prevented h i s

J u s t p r i o r t o t h e Clearwater R a t t l e , but

P r e s i d e n t Hayes's c a b i n e t had proposed Howard's removal,

h i s t i m e l y v i c t o r y stopped t h e i n i t i a t i v e .
. t h a n k s t o h i s a d j u t a n t , Major H McDowell's a i d e , victory. Major Clay Wood,

Howard owed some and t o

B .

Keeler,

who had observed t h e

Wood t e l e g r a p h e d t h e news o f Howard's v i c t o r y w h i l e K e e l e r t e l e g r a p h e d what and s t a t e d t h a t

d i r e c t l y t o P r e s i d e n t Hayes,

he c a l l e d "a most i m p o r t a n t success,"

"Nothing can surpass t h e v i g o r o f General Howard's movements and a c t i o n . " Howard's boss, McDowell, a l s o passed K e l l e r ' s

comments t o t h e President.". The C l e a r w a t e r B a t t l e was an i m p o r t a n t m i l e s t o n e i n t h e Nez Perce War. Idaho T e r r i t o r y . suffered. I t ended t h e danger t o r e s i d e n t s o f t h e The w a r r i n g Nez Perce had f i n a l l y t h e y had a l s o l o s t supplies, b u t t h e war

Besides l o s i n g p r e s t i g e ,

manpower and a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of was n o t over.

Howard now r e t u r n e d t o F o r t Lapwai t o r e f i t h i s command b e f o r e heading f o r Spokane c o u n t r y . Enroute, he Upon

r e c e i v e d word t h a t Chief Joseph wanted t o s u r r e n d e r . meeting w i t h Chief Joseph,

he l a i d down terms t h a t s u r r e n d e r

would be u n c o n d i t i o n a l and t h a t t h e I n d i a n l e a d e r s would be t r i e d by a m i l i t a r y court. During t h e negotiations, a abruptly

h o s t i l e Nez Perce r e a r guard f i r e d upon t h e t r o o p s ,

ending t h e proceedings.

The Lewiston T e l l e r reported t h a t

Chiefs White B i r d and Looking Glass threatened t o k i l l Chief Joseph and h i s band ifthey surrendered. The t h r e a t s

against Joseph were because he went against an e a r l i e r agreement. meeting, During an e a r l i e r n o n t r e a t y Nez Perce c o u n c i l These

they had agreed t o f l e e t o b u f f a l o country.

t h r e a t s i n d i c a t e d s e r i o u s d i s s e n t i o n among t h e h o s t i l e Nez Perce ranks.=O Howard sent Major Mason w i t h a b a t t a l i o n of c a v a l r y , McConville's Volunteer Company, and group of t r e a t y Nez Mason's

Perce scouts t o pursue t h e n o n t r e a t y Nez Perce.

o b j e c t i v e was t o see i f t h e h o s t i l e Nez Perce were headed f o r t h e L o l o T r a i l o r elsewhere. Unfortunately, t h e Nez the

Perce l a i d an ambush f o r t h e column a t Kamiah crossing, narrow entrance of L o l o T r a i l . f i r e on t h e advance guard, W h e n t h e h o s t i l e s opened

t h e s o l d i e r s dismounted and

deployed i n a s k i r m i s h l i n e among t h e f a l l e n t r e e s and t h i c k brush.

The s o l d i e r s '

quick a c t i o n s l i m i t e d t h e i r losses t o They a l s o

one dead and two wounded I n d i a n scouts.

determined t h e r o u t e and c o n d i t i o n of t h e r o u t e of t h e f l e e i n g Ner Perce. The escape r o u t e , the Lolo T r a i l , travel. would

be impossible f o r c a v a l r y t o e f f e c t i v e l y

Thus,

Howard planned t o pursue t h e n o n t r e a t y Nez Perce over t h e Mullan Road, a more e f f i c i e n t r o u t e f o r cavalry."*

Since Howard knew t h a t t h e h o s t i l e Nez Perce were heading towards t h e rough L o l o Pass, he knew t h e s e t t l e r s were safe. Therefore, he turned t o an o l d problem of

preventing t h e e s c a l a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s t o t h e other Indian t r i b e s on t h e Spokane Plains. He planned t o go t o Spokane

country w i t h I n d i a n Inspector E.

C.

Watkins,

I n d i a n Agent

Monteith, and s u f f i c i e n t troops t o enforce t h e government instruction. A f t e r completing t h a t task, he would go t o

Missoula by way of Mullan Road.

T h i s p l a n would prevent t h e

h o s t i l e s ' r e t u r n by l e a v i n g f o r c e s a t Kamiah.=* The out c r y from t h e l o c a l s e t t l e r s and guidance from McDowell changed h i s p l a n s as shown by h i s new p l a n published as F i e l d Order #3. While l e a v i n g a small f o r c e t o

p r o t e c t Kamiah, Howard l e d t h e main f o r c e over t h e L o l o T r a i l and sent Colonel Wheaton t o t h e l e f t f l a n k w i t h a secondary f o r c e t o calm t h e I n d i a n s o f t h e Spokane P l a i n s and t o h e l p prevent t h e h o s t i l e Nez Perce from r e t u r n i n g . Howard d i r e c t e d Wheaton t o maintain contact w i t h him so t h e i r movements could be c ~ o r d i n a t @ d . ~ ~ Before Howard could p u t h i s p l a n i n a c t i o n , he had t o delay h i s departure f o r t h e a r r i v a l of Major Green from Boise and u n t i l h i s quartermasters had obtained s u f f i c i e n t mules. Howard could t a k e o n l y horses and pack mules over i t was t o o rugged f o r wagons. Even without

the Lolo Trail; wagons,

Howard d i r e c t e d Captain W i l l i a m F.

Spurgin,

Twenty-first Infantry, to hire citizens to work as an engineering company. These civi 1 ian engineers, armed and

mounted, worked to clear the trails for Howard's column. The civilian engineers took with them the necessary axes, picks, and shovels. With the aid of Spurgin's engineering

crew, Howard's force showed great stamina and tremendous drive by traveling over .this tough pass of the Bitterroot Mountains i n a mere ten days. Owing to the character of the

trail, this citizen group also used pack mules to haul their supplies. While the swift-footed warring Nez Perce took

nine days to cross the rugged Lolo Pass, Howard's six mile-long column only took one more day.=-

As directed by Sherman, Howard had telegraphed the

news 07 his victory over the nontreaty Nez Perce at Clearwater and of the fleeing Nez Perce egress route to Montana. Howard's message went to Captain Charles C. Rawn,

Seventh Infantry, who was building a new post' at Missoula. At first, Rawn took no actions until induced to do so. Howard's boss, McDowell, advised the adjutant general that the warring Nez Perce were headed toward Montana over the Lolo trail. This advisory prompted Sheridan, the Commander

of the Military Division of Missouri, to order Colonel John Gibbon, commander of the Seventh Infantry, to put his troops in the field and to have Rawn block the trail.='

The s t a g e was s e t w i t h Howard coming a c r o s s t h e L o l o T r a i l and Wheaton coming b y t h e l e f t f l a n k over t h e M u l l a n Road. Rawn s i m p l y had t o d e l a y t h e h o s t i l e Nez Ferce. He

moved s i x t e e n m i l e s up t h e L o l o Canyon t o a p o i n t where t h e f l o o r o f t h e canyon narrowed t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y a q u a r t e r o f a m i l e i n width. O n t h e South s i d e o f t h e canyon, the

mountains were p r e c i p i t o u s and d e n s e l y covered w i t h s t a n d i n g and f a l l e n t i m b e r . While t h e s o u t h s i d e was impassable, t h e steep s l o p i n g r i d g e t h a t would Rawn had t h i r t y r e g u l a r and f i f t e e n o r

n o r t h s i d e was a grassy,

a l l o w passage i n any d i r e c t i o n . soldiers,

two hundred c i t i z e n v o l u n t e e r s ,

t w e n t y F l a t h e a d w a r r i o r s t o oppose between one and two hundred w a r r i o r s o f t h e s i x hundred f l e e i n g Nez Ferce. had h i s men b u i l d a l o g and e a r t h e n b a r r i c a d e which a p p a r e n t l y reached from one s i d e of other t h e canyon t o t h e Rawn

.=&
Rawn's o f f i c i a l report, which was w r i t t e n two months s t a t e d t h a t t h e c i t i z e n v o l u n t e e r s deserted t h e i r

later,

p o s t s because t h e n o n t r e a t y Nez Perce promised t o pass p e a c e f u l l y through M o n t a r ~ a . ~ I~ n contrast, Rarbour, Captain Chauncey

t h e e d i t o r o f The Weekly M i s s o u l i a n and a member o f

E .

A.

Kennedy's company of

volunteers,

observed and

m e t i c u l o u s l y c h r o n i c l e d t h e whole event.

W h i l e t h e renegade

Nez F e r c e passed w i t h i n r i f l e range o f t h e entrenched s o l d i e r s and v o l u n t e e r s , Rawn p r e v e n t e d anyone from f i r i n g

on them.

Barbour t h e n w r o t e t h e T e r r i t o r i a l Governor and

r e q u e s t e d h i m t o t a k e command o f t h e Montana m i l i t i a so t h a t good men would n o t be h u m i l i a t e d by another i m b e c i l e o r coward. "Wipe o u t t h e d i s g r a c e t h a t has been p u t upon us,

C G I

and never l e t any r e g u l a r o f f i c e r a g a i n command The r e l a t i o n s between t h e l o c a l

Montana M i l i t i a . " J '

m i l i t i a s and t h e r e g u l a r army v a r i e d g r e a t l y depending t h e p l a y e r s and t h e s i t u a t i o n . W h i l e Howard had a working P e r r y was always a t

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e Idaho M i l i t i a s , odds w i t h them. Rawn requested a c o u r t of

inquiry,

b u t Gibbon

d e c l i n e d because he f e l t t h a t no v i n d i c a t i o n was necessary. I n contrast, Howard a l l o w e d two c o u r t s o f i n q u i r y t o meet so

t h a t F e r r y c o u l d c l e a r h i s name due t o h i s a c t i o n s d u r i n g t h e Nez Ferce war. I t seems t h a t Gibbons d i d n o t want t h e t h e p o s s i b l e outcome.

i n q u i r y because he was a f r a i d of

Howard's r e q u e s t s f o r a s s i s t a n c e now r e s u l t e d i n s e v e r a l army columns s e a r c h i n g f o r t h e h o s t i l e Nez Perce. August, O n 4

Gibbon had assembled 160 r e g u l a r t r o o p s a t F o r t t h e h o s t i l e Nez Ferce.

M i s s o u l a f o r t h e p u r s u i t of August,

By 9

Gibbon had caught up t o t h e f l e e i n g I n d i a n s and After driving the

launched a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k a t B i g Hole. Nez F e r c e from t h e i r camp,

Gibbon's men s t a r t e d t o f i n i s h Suddenly, the surprised

t h e r o u t b y b u r n i n g t h e i r teepees.

Ne% Perce r e c o v e r e d and launched a s t r o n g c o u n t e r a t t a c k on the soldiers. Both s i d e s s u f f ered heavy losses.

vered message on t h e Howard r e c e i v e d a c o u r i e r - d e l i day o f t h e b a t t l e t h a t Gibbon's column had been a t t a c k e d and needed h e l p f o r h i s numerous wounded. c l o s e d w i t h t h e s e words: relief." Gibbon's message

"Hope you w i l l h u r r y t o o u r t h e w a r r i n g Nei Howard a i d e d the

A s Howard a r r i v e d a t B i g Hole,

Perce stopped t h e b a t t l e and q u i c k l y withdrew. t h e wounded, i n c l u d i n g Gibbon,

and assumed command of

remnants o f Gibbon's column.40 S i x days a f t e r l e a v i n g t h e scene of battle, t h e B i g Hole

t h e h o s t i l e Nez Perce a t t a c k e d Howard's column a t

Camas Meadows and c a p t u r e d many o f h i s h o r s e s and mules. After skirmishing with the hostiles, Howard succeeded i n

r e c o v e r i n g most a f t h e mules and a g a i n s e t t i n g t h e enemy i n r a p i d motion. The w a r r i n g Nez Perce headed t o t h e

Ye1 lowstone Rasi n.4' After t h i s battle, Howard c o n t i n u e d h i s p u r s u i t t o During t h i s time,

Henry Lake where he h a l t e d t o r e s u p p l y .

he m i s t a k e n l y s e n t a t e l e g r a m t o General Sherman w i t h t h e wrong message t h a t h i s column was r e t u r n i n g t o Idaho s i n c e he had more t h a n done h i s share. t r o o p s of Howard f e l t t h a t t h e

o t h e r departments c o u l d complete what h i s s o l d i e r s Nevertheless, Sherman d i r e c t e d him t o I n t h a t case,

had so w e l l begun.

c o n t i n u e u n l e s s he was t o o o l d t o h a n d l e i t .

Sherman d i r e c t e d Howard t o g i v e h i s command t o a younger o f f i c e r w i t h more energy. Howard q u i c k l y telegraphed Howard, once more,

Sherman t h a t he had p l e n t y of pluck. b a r e l y maintained h i s ~omrnand.~" Howard took h i s aides-de-camp m i l e s t o V i r g i n i a C i t y f o r supplies. night,

and went seventy-five A f t e r r i d i n g day and

he bought almost everything t h a t t h e small mining provisions, clothing, f r e s h horses,

v i l l a g e could f u r n i s h : and mules.

Within t h r e e days,

he had r e t u r n e d w i t h t h e

necessary p r o v i s i o n s and had h i s command back i n p u r s u i t of t h e f l e e i n g Nez Perce. While Howard pursued h i s foe, he was

being pursued i n t u r n by Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Gilbert.-= Howard described t h e s i t u a t i o n as: Thinking I was t o o t i r e d o r t o o o l d f o r such an e x t r a o r d i n a r y march, General Sherman dispatched C e J Lieutenant Colonel G i l b e r t , an o f f i c e r much o l d e r than I, though o f l e s s rank, w i t h a body of c a v a l r y from F o r t E l l i s t o overtake me, r e l i e v e m e from duty, and t a k e m y place; b u t i t was not t o be. The s t e r n chase was so hard t h a t a f t e r t e n days' t r i a l G i l b e r t and h i s worn-out horses gave up t h e chase and r e t u r n e d t o t h e f o r t . " 4 4 General Sherman had sent G i l b e r t w i t h a l e t t e r i n v i t i n g Howard t o r e l i n q u i s h h i s command t o G i l b e r t and go t o Sherman t o discuss t h e s i t u a t i o n . had t h e t i t l e of General of t h e Army, Even though Sherman t h e President Sherman could

appointed Department Commanders.

Therefore,

not f i r e Howard, so Howard could o n l y g i v e up h i s command

voluntarily. shakey.

Rut,

h i s s t a n d i n g w i t h h i s s u p e r i o r s remained

I n a d d i t i o n t o sending t e l e g r a p h messages t o Sherman and McDowell, Samuel D. Howard a l s o t e l e g r a p h e d messages t o Colonel S t u r g i s commanded t h e Seventh C a v a l r y

Sturgis.

Regiment t h a t had s u f f e r e d e x t r e m e l y heavy l o s s e s a t t h e b a t t l e of t h e L i t t l e B i g Horn, b u t he was n o t w i t h t h e Sturgis' objective The Seventh C a v a l r y ,

Seventh when Custer l e d i t t o d i s a s t e r . was t o c u t o f f t h e f l e e i n g Nez Perce. w i t h some w i l y Crow scouts, w a r r i n g Nez Perce.

attempted t o f i n d t h e i l l u s i v e S t u r g i s caught up t o them

Eventually,

and conducted a r u n n i n g f i g h t between h i s Crow s c o u t s and t h e f l e e i n g Nez P e r c e ' s r e a r guard. twenty-five m i l e m?rch, A f t e r completing a

Howard r e c e i v e d a r e q u e s t f o r With o n l y t h r e e hours

a d d i t i o n a l a s s i s t a n c e from S t u r g i s . rest,

Howard t o o k f i f t y cavalrymen and r o d e a l l n i g h t t o By t e n o ' c l o c k t h e n e x t morning,

s u p p o r t S t u r g i s ' s column.

Howard's f o r m a t i o n reached t h e b a t t l e f i e l d where t h e n o n t r e a t y Nez Perce had a g a i n f o u g h t and f l e d s u f f e r i n g o n l y a few losses.4s A f t e r t h e w a r r i n g Nez Perce c h i e f s had decided t o head f o r Canada, t h e y s k i l l f u l l y went t h r o u g h t h e mountainous w i l d e r n e s s t o a v o i d C o l o n e l S t u r g i s ' s Seventh Cavalry. O n 13 September, S t u r g i s ' s column s t a r t e d a Meanwhile

f u r i o u s f i g h t w i t h t h e h o s t i l e s a t Canyon Creek.

the Nez Perce women and children took all their belongings and drove away their herd of horses t o protect their main camp. Sturgis had three dead and eleven wounded while the While the Nez Perce

Indians had only three wounded.

suffered few casualties from the battle, they suffered heavily from t h e constant flight without an opportunity to rest. As the hostile Nez Perce traveled toward Musselshell country around the Missouri River, Howard had his Crow scouts harass the Nez Perce. of his enemy's decision cycle. Howard was able t o get inside Howard knew the Nez Perce He feared

would continue t o out distance t h e army column.

that the warring Nez Perce would escape t o British Territory, Canada. Therefore, he sent a message to Colonel

Nelson A. Miles, Commander of the Fifth Infantry , mounted on captured Indian horses. Howard wanted Miles to cut off the Realizing

fleeing Nez Perce a s they headed north.

that the nontreaty Nez Perce traveled only fast enough to stay ahead of him, Howard slowed his rate of march so Miles eould have time to overtake the e n e m y . . ' Thirty miles from Canada, at Bear Paw Mountain, Miles overtook the fleeing Indians. He surrounded their After

camp and captured almost all of the Indian horses.

several days of intense fighting, Miles started t o negotiate a surrender. During the surrender negotiations, over half

of

t h e h o s t i l e Nez Perce escaped t o Canada,

t h e r e s t were As Chief

t r a p p e d by t h e i n c r e a s i n g f o r c e of Joseph prepared t o s u r r e n d e r , party. From t h e f i r s t

the soldiers.

Howard a r r i v e d w i t h an advance

i n d i c a t i o n s of

problems,

Howard

e f f e c t i v e l y commanded and c o n t r o l l e d t h e f o r c e s and equipment under h i s command. While d i s p l a y i n g g r e a t .

c o n f i d e n c e t h a t t h e h o s t i l e Nez F e r c e would be q u i c k l y subdued, Howard s t a r t e d g a t h e r i n g and a n a l y z i n g t h e t h e Indians. From h i s a n a l y s i s ,

a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n of

Howard m o b i l i z e d t h e f o r c e s under h i s c o n t r o l w h i l e r e q u e s t i n g more t r o o p s from t h e o t h e r two departments w i t h i n the Division of the Pacific. t o Lewiston-Lapwai area, W h i l e h i s f o r c e s were e n r o u t e

Howard had h i s department s t a f f b u y

l o c a l l y o r o r d e r t h e necessary equipment t o s u s t a i n h i s t r o o p s from t h e department depot. From h i s knowledge o f t h e Nez Perce, t h e area, the settlers, settlers. and

he knew he had t o t a k e a c t i o n t o s a t i s f y t h e he c o u l d n o t s u c c e s s f u l l y engage h i s f o e Howard e n v i s i o n e d t h e

Hut,

w i t h o u t an adequate s i z e d f o r c e .

d e s i r e d end s t a t e and what a c t i o n s he must t a k e t o g e t there. it. As stated earlier, Howard had a p l a n and executed

Endnotes 'Lewiston

( I d a h o ) T e l l e r , November 3,

1877, 2 .

=Nark H . Brown, The f l i g h t of t h e Nsz Perce (Lincoln, Nebraska: U n i v e r s i t y of Nebraska Press, 1982; repr., N e w York Capricorn Books, 1971), 125-6, 131; and O l i v e r O t i s Howard, Nez Ferce Joseph: A n Account o f H i s Ancestors, H i s Lands. H i s Confederates, H i s Enemies, H i s Murders, H i s P u r s u i t , and Capture (New York D a Capo Press, 1972; r e p r , of f i r s t e d i t i o n , Boston, 1881), 119-29. "Brown, Flight, 138. Idaho T e r r i t o r y , 20 June

4The Idahoan, 1877.

Boise C i t y ,

*The Lewiston T e l l e r ,

7 J u l y 1877.

.Rrawn, F l i g h t , 89; David Effenberger, A D i c t i o n a r y of B a t t l e s , (New York: Cromwell company, 233; and Helen Addison Howard, Saga of Chief Joseph, (Lincoln: U n i v e r s i t y of Nebraska Fress, 19711 176. 'Brown, Flight, 142-47.

1767)

"Francis Columbia F l ateau, Oklahoma, 1955), '"Army

Haines, The Nez Perce: Tribesmen of t h e (Norman, Oklahoma: Uni v e r s i t y of 229-30.

and Navy Journal,

3 3 June 1877, 758.

'=John A. Carpenter, Sword and O l i v e Branch: O l i v e r O t i s Howard, ( P i t t s b u r g h , Pennsylvania: University of P i t t s b u r g h , 1972) 250. '*Oliver 0. Howard, Nez Perce Joseph: A n Account o f . H i s Ancestors, H i s Lands, H i s confederates H i s Enemies, H i s Murders, H i s War, H i s P u r s u i t . and Capture, (New York: Da Capo Fress, 1972; r e p r . of f i r s t e d i t i o n , Boston, 1881), 93; and Haines, The Nez Ferce, 230.

x3Howard, Nez Ferce Joseph,

129-30.

lCHaines, The Nez Perce, 230. "Howard, iOIbid., Nez-Perce Joseph, 135. 136.

=OH.

Howard, Saga o f Chief

Joseph,

184-87.

" a O l i v e r 0. Howard, My L i f e and Experiences among o u r H o s t i l e I n d i a n s , (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 297. ""Howard, zSHaines, Nez Perce Joseph, The Nez Perces, 159.

231. (New

York:

= 4 A l v i n N. Josephy, The P a t r i o t C h i e f s , The V i k i n g Press, 1962), 330. =3Brown, Flight, 188. 13 May 1931.

=CIdaho Statesmen, "Chicago

D a i l y News,

3 Nay 1941.

=eCarpenter, 291bid., JOH. 251.

Sword and O l i v e Branch, 249.

Howard,

Saga o f C h i e f Juseph,

215-6.

"'Ibid., =*Brown,

217-20. F l i g h t o f t h e Ner Perce,

205.

==Annual Report of t h e S e c r e t a r y o f War on t h e O p e r a t i o n s of t h e Department f o r t h e F i s c a l Year Ending :we 30, 1877. (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1277), 125-6. "*Carpenter, Sword and 01 ive Branch, 253; and 0 . M y L i f e and Experiences Among our H o s t i l e I n d i a n s ,

Howard, 290- 1.

Brown,

fsH. Howard, Saga o f C h i e f Joseph, F l i g h t of t h e Nez Perce, 225.

215-19;

and

=*H.

Howard, 219-30;

and Brown, 222.

"'Annual Report of t h e Secretary of W a r on t h e Operation of t h e department f o r t h e F i s c a l year Ending June 30, 1877, 501. anBrown, F l i g h t of t h e Nen Ferce, 227.

"*Carpenter, 40H.

Sword and O l i v e Branch, 253-4.

Howard, M y L i f e and Experience Among our

H w t i l a Indians, 291-2.
+'Chief Joseph, "An I n d i a n ' s View of I n d i a n Affairs," 135-42 The North American Review, !May 1884, Vol X X V I I , No. l ) , 139. -=0. Howard, M y L i f e and Experiences Among our H o s t i l e Indians, 292-3.

44H. Howard, M y L i f e and Experiences Among our H o s t i l e Indians, 295; and Brown, The F l i g h t o f t h e Nez Ferce, 339-40, 342, 352.
+"H. Howard, M y L i f e and Experiences Among Our H o s t i l e Indians, 295-6. +&A. Josephy, 337. The P a t r i o t Chiefs, 336.

+'Ibid.,

CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION

General Howard wore out his command--men and horses--in the pursuit; making unprecedented forced marches. He and his men enduring every specis Cs23 of hardship and privation; and that when he had driven the Indians to Ye1 lowstone; the work was virtual 1 y taken out of his hands by other officers with fresh well equipped troops, for whom the capture was made comparatively easy.* Milton Kelly Editor, Idaho Statesman October 16, 1877 This study looked at Brigadier General Oliver Otis Howard's command and control during the Nez Perce war.
This

chapter will briefly review the key points of the earlier chapters and further analyze some issues of the campaign. We have looked at the frontier army's structure, composition, and characteristics to see what assets Howard had to esecute his mission. It described an army structured

to fight an European conventional force, but it was tasked to do a multitude of other tasks. Of its many roles in 1877, the conventionally structured United States Army had the challenging job of battling the highly motivated, but normally peaceful,

nontreaty Nez Perce.

Due t o the army's senior leaders

failure t o address the frontier mission of fighting hostile Indians, the War Department developed the army's strength, organization, and composition for a conventional war. The

army's European style "stand and fight battle" tactics were ineffective against the highly mobile Nez Ferce traveling in very difficult terrain. The army was hindered by political

bickering, inadequate funding, and low public opinion. Additionally, the soldiers were poorly trained and supplied. The hindered army struggled agalnst a

considerably smaller, but a very brave, skilled, and equally equipped enemy.
A s a result, these factors compounded

Howard's tasks of directing, coordinating, controlling the personnel and logistical activities t o accomplish his mission. The army's failure t o understand the Nez Perce psyche, culture, and war-time organization allowed the Indians t a continually out maneuver and out perform the army. This situation ultimate1 y prolonged what could have

been a quick and decisive campaign because the Indians out performed and responded quicker than Howard's forces. the army's poor showing at Whitebird Canyon, Howard's mobilination and preparations were slowed by the organieational and administrative quagmires imposed by the bureaus, departments, and divisions in the hierarchical After

s t r u c t u r e o f t h e army.

However,

i n s t e a d of t h e army's

s e n i o r 1eaders acknowledging t h e problems and s h o r t c o m i n g s of t h e i r c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e f i g h t i n g an u n c o n v e n t i o n a l t h e army m e r e l y blamed B r i g a d i e r General O l i v e r O t i s

enemy, Howard.

An e x a m i n a t i o n of

t h e Nez Perce c u t t h r o u g h t h e structure, and t h e

myths and p r e s e n t e d t h e i r background, p a t h t h a t l e d them t o war.

S i n c e t h e army's f i r s t r e c o r d e d w e had known t h e Nez Perce t o t h a t loved f o r their

e n c o u n t e r s w i t h t h e Nez Perce, be p e a c e f u l , land. After

f a m i l y o r i e n t e d group,

t h e i r exposure t o C h r i s t i a n i t y d u r i n g t h e Lewis t h e Nez P e r c e s e n t a d e l e g a t i o n t o S t .

and C l a r k E x p e d i t i o n ,

L o u i s seeking missionaries. From t h e Nez P e r c e ' s background w e f i n d some s k i l l s t h a t a i d e d them i n t h e i r war. horsemen and h u n t e r s . l a r g e h e r d of The Nez Perce were e x c e l l e n t

They were v e r y w e a l t h y due t o t h e Reing a b l e t o change

h o r s e s t h e y owned.

h o r s e s d u r i n g t h e i r f l i g h t f r o m Idaho h e l p e d them s t a y j u s t o u t of s i d e of Howard's reach. The Nez P e r c e had a l s o f o u g h t I n d i a n wars, along

t h e s o l d i e r i n several

which gave them Hence, t h e Nez

an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of

t h e ways o f t h e c a v a l r y . horsemen,

Perce were e x p e r i e n c e d w a r r i o r s , knew t h e army's t a c t i c s .

and marksmen who

W h i l e t h e w h i t e s c o n s i d e r e d t h e Nez Perce a t r i b e , t h e Nez Perce c o n s i d e r e d themselves a s o c i e t y c e n t e r e d on

t h e v i l l a g e o r bands which were lead by a c h i e f and a band c o u n c i l c o n s i s t i n g of t h e senior men o r headsmen. While t h e they

Nez Perce had a common language and a common c u l t u r e , i d e n t i f i e d w i t h bands. Therefore,

t h e headchief p r o v i s i o n

o f t h e 1855 Steven's Treaty r a n countered t o t h e i r c u l t u r a l structure. During t h e n e g o t i a t i o n of t h e 1863 Tr'eaty, the

government r e l i e d upon t h e headchief t o come up w i t h a consensus on a t r e a t y . The d i s s e n t i n g f a c t i o n ignored t h e

headchief and t h e government's representatives. From our review of Howard's background and h i s d i p l o m a t i c a c t i o n before t h e outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s , w e

found b a s i s f o r Howard's p r a i s e and c r i t i c i s m d u r i n g h i s campaign. Competency and bravery, w i t h an occasional Hut,

controversy,

characterized Howard ' s C i v i l W a r service.

even when controversy surrounded Howard, h i s s o l d i r r n g r a v i t a t e d toward him, and h i s s u p e r i o r s s t i l l p r a i s e d him.

at

t h e conclusion of t h e war,

Howard received t h e r e g u l a r

army rank of B r i g a d i e r General f o r h i s h e r o i c service. Besides becoming known f o r bravery, Howard's strong

r e l i g i o u s outlook became h i s trademark. While Howard's p r e v a i l i n g r e l i g i o u s outlook gave him strength, courage, strong r e s o l v e , and a compassion t h a t times, h i s r e l i g i o u s resolve also h i s compassion g a t him t h e While t h i s job gave

helped him i n d i f f i c u l t

i r r i t a t e d those around him. job of

Yet,

heading t h e Freedmen Bureau.

Howard great personal satisf action, it destroyed his reputation and his standing with his peers and his superiors. Furthermore, the situation caused him lengthy These problems

and costly litigations and investigations.

and his additional endeavors t o alleviate his financial problems were also a burden t o Howard during the prosecution of his campaign during the Nei Perce War. Upon taking command of the Military Department of the Columbia, Howard continued his pursuit of help for the deprived by working on behalf of the Nei Perce. After

having his department assistant adjutant general thoroughly investigate the problem, Howard took an unpopular position of taking land away from the settlers and giving it back to the Nez Ferce. After his long fight for a peace commission,

Howard changed his previously sympathetic approach towards the nontreaty Nez Perce for two reasons. Howard had to get

the Indians t o compromise because the local government wanted t o continue the development of the area. Second,

Howard feared that a failure t o resolve the issue would severely hurt his already turbulent career. After several

days of meetings, the commission recommended that the nontreaty move onto Lapwai reservation, by force if needed. After this commission, McDowel l directed Howard to only aid the Indian agents and t o initiate no actions. McDowell directed, "It is therefore of paramount importance

that none of the responsibility of any step which may be made shall be initiated by the military authority."" Howard carefully planned and executed'a meeting with the nontreaty Nez Perce which convinced them t o relocate. Yet,

Howard's actions before the war created conditions from which his problems during the campaign developed. During Howard's pursuit of the Nei Perce, McDowell wrote a confidential letter about Howard's performance t o Sherman : who whilt Csic3 - doing his best was hounded by the press and had all manners of abuse heaped on him. But orders seem addressed t o another audience a s well a s to his troops, and he cannot quite confine I think himself rigidly t o his mere soldier work. it is t o this, in dealing with Joseph's case in the beginning, that largely caused the attack on him in t h e papers when the effort t o put Joseph on the reservation failed ! Both your. orders and mine required this work t o be left absolutely t o the Indian Dept., he merely aiding with his military force in case of need. But he could not keep in the background and hence received t h e stings of the press when the efforts failed.= As we have seen, Howard's roles in the Nez Perce War were a s a protector of immigrants, a s a prosecutor of the campaign of the Nei Perce War in Idaho, and a s a pursuer of the Nez Perce until their capture. In spite of criticism

and lack of support from his superiors, Howard did all three roles professionally especially when we consider the conditions he had t o operate in.

While displaying great confidence that the Indian troubles would soon be under control, Howard started planning for an extended operation. He visualized the

conditions that must be created t o safeguard the settlers while defeating the hostile Nez Perce. Howard rapidly

mobilized forces under his control and requested more troops in order t o have a sufficient force t o subdue his enemy. Simultaneously, he requested the necessary supplies and equipment to sustain the force. Howard also directed his

efforts to prevent the possibility of an Indian movement that could unite the disaffected Indians in the region. Cabinet ' While the press and President ~ a ~ e s criticized his slowness to take the field, no one can argue with his results. He successfully protected and calmed the

settlers while preventing the spread of hostilities to other Indians. Howard did defeat the hostile Nez Perce at the

Clearwater Rattle and drove them out of his area of responsibility. He could not satisfy the unrealistic

expectations of the press and the government concerning time and expense. After the defeat of the hostile Nez Perce at the Clearwater Battle, Howard planned to refurbish his forces at his temporary supply depot at Lewiston and then move out. Howard planned to take the northern route over the Mullan trail because he knew he had a chance of meeting his enemy

as they came off the Lolo trail.

He changed his plans to Howard's

protect the settlers from reported Indian raids.

revised plans continued to support his initial three objectives: protect and calm the settler, prevent further

hostilities, and defeat the hostile Nez Perce.

A s he prepared to travel the Lolo trail to Montana,

Howard's command and control of all military operation in the Nei Perce War greatly diminished. Before, Howar'd could

effectively direct, coordinate, and control the forces to accomplish the mission. Howard was about to enter the

Military Division of the Missouri where his command and control was limited t o his forces.
. .

Previously, Howard

effectively controlled and coordinated for the necessary resources to restore peace in his area of operations. During Howard's of the fleeing Nez Perce, he lacked

command and control of the various columns attempting to block the Nez Perce as they headed for Canada. Had conditions permitted Howard t o head north over the Mullan trail, he could have ended the war. Instead,

Captain Charles C. Rawn d i d not engage the Nez Perce as they came off the Lolo trail because he felt he had an insufficient number of men to battle them. When Howard

reached Rawn's abandoned fortification at the east end of Lo10 trail, he saw and appreciated its strength. f i t that

time, he probably realized that Rawn could have safely

engaged and delayed the fleeing Nes Perce.

Had Hawn taken

actions before receiving directions from the Adjutant General, Rawn could have mustered sufficient forces to stop the Nei Perce. While Rawn hesitated t o engage the Nez Perce, his boss, Colonel John Gibbon, did not wait for Howard t o reinforce his 160 men. Whether Gibbon was overconfident or

merely seeking the glory of defeating the Nez Perce by himself, many deaths and injuries could have been prevented. The Nez Perce had slowed their pace and dropped

their rear guards because they believed they had left Howard in Idaho. Historians often focused on a series of dispatches between Howard and h = s bosses, McDowell and Sherman, and his delay at Henry Lake t o rest his forces and replenish their supplies. While traveling 1256 miles, Howard had led his If the units to

column for.twenty-six days without a stop.

the east had cooperated, the hostile Nei Perce could have been stopped twice. and exhausted. Howard and his troops were discouraged

Unfortunately, Howard's state of mind was

reflected in his dispatches t o McDowell and Sherman. Howard made two mistakes in his dispatches t o his. bosses. He requested guidance when he had earlier been

directed t o pursue the Nes Perce without boundaries.

Second, he implied a lack of cooperation from the departments t o the east--a valid point.4

In his annual report, Sherman acknowledged that Howard needed to stop for two reasons. Howard had t o rest

his men and animals and t o collect food and clothing. Sherman further commented:

I recognized the full measure of the labors, exposure, fatigue, and fighting of General Howard and his command, having personally seen much of the route over which he passed and knowing the great difficulty of procuring food for men and horses in that mountain region. It is simply impossible for infantry, or even cavalry with their single horses t o overtake Indians, who drive along a herd, changing from a tired horse t o one comparatively fresh at pleasure, knowing the country perfectly, ready t o hide in the many rocky canons C e 3 , ravines, and dense woods in which that country abound, and able with a small rear-guard t o hold at bay any number in pursuit, who of ten for miles must follow trails in single file.=
Sherman's report seemingly counters his dispatch, dated August 24. Sherman's dispatch directed Howard to give Yet,

up his command if he was too tired t o continue.

Sherman's report explained why Howard would be tired. Sherman addressed the earlier dispatches: Several dispatches passed between General Howard and myself, which I insert here entire [ G I , because they explain themselves. They have never heretofore been published in full, while garbled parts of them have somehow without authority reached the press and were misconstrued L

....

Sherman's report conflicts with the letter he gave t o Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Gilbert t o give t o Howard.

In his letter,

Sherman says:

I would l i k e t o c o n s u l t w i t h you and f e e l your see no reason f o r your commanding absence much a department a f t e r h a v i n g d r i v e n t h e h o s t i l e I n d i a n s I a u t h o r i z e you t o o u t o f your department t r a n s f e r your command, i n t h e f i e l d , t o Gilbert 7

. ..

...

....

...

After

t w o weeks an Howard's t r a i l ,

G i l b e r t was u n a b l e t o Obviously,

c a t c h up and d e l i v e r t h e l e t t e r t o Howard. Howard and h i s men had p l e n t y of Sherman's d i s p a t c h . p u r s u i t i n vain, Perce's capture.

pluck a f t e r receiving

Even though Howard c o n t i n u e d t h e

h i s p u r s u i t a i d e d i n t h e h a s t i l e Nez

Howard had c o n t i n u e d t o send d i s p a t c h e s i n hopes a f a c t i v a t i n g o t h e r u n i t s t o c l o s e i n on t h e f l e e i n g Nez Perce. C o l o n e l Nelson A. M i l e s s t a r t e d o u t t o i n t e r c e p t t h e Nrz Howard slowed h i s

Perce b e f o r e t h e y c o u l d r e a c h Canada.

march because he knew t h e h o s t i l e I n d i a n s would slow t h e i r pace i f he slowed h i s r a t e o f march. Howard g o t i n t o h i s

enemy's d e c i s i o n c y c l e when he knew what f a c t o r s a f f e c t e d t h e enemy's d e c i s i o n process.When Howard r e c e i v e d word t h a t M i l e s had t h e n o n t r e a t y Nez Perce surrounded, f o r c e and rushed t o t h e scene. Howard t o o k a p o r t i o n of I n s t e a d of his

t a k i n g command o f Howard After the

t h e o p e r a t i o n s because he was t h e s e n i o r o f f i c e r , a l l o w e d M i l e s t o a c c e p t Chief Joseph's s u r r e n d e r .

end of the campaign, the question of the surrender would cause a great rift between Howard and Miles and between Howard and Sheridan. Howard wanted his trodps, who had

suffered s o much hardship, t o get a share oP the praise. Therefore, he wrote a congratulatory order to his soldiers.
No one reading his report would take exception t o it except

the over ambitious and very sensitive Miles who wanted to b r a brigadier general. stopped it. The conflict continued unti 1 Sherman

This conflict caused Howard's critics to l o o k

only at part of the facts. While the critics illuminated only part of the facts, Howard's forces and his enemy impacted on his ability t o command and control the campaign. Since the military

leaders did not focus on their primary threat, hostile Indians, the army's structure, equipment, and training hindered Howard's ability t o command and control his forces. When attempting t o compensate for inadequate forces

by bringing additional forces from other areas, the administrative quagmires compounded Howard's ability t o gather the forces he need to accomplished his missions. Howard did not have a command structure in existence' prior t o the start of the conflict. Howard developed it prior to

h i m t a k i n ~his column into the field after the hostile Nez

Perce. In addition to Howard's command and control problems

with his organization, the Nez Perce's excellent warrior

abilities further compounded it.

The Nei Ferce warrior

easily out maneuvered Howard's ability to command and control his frontier forces. In spite of all these challenges and hindrances, Howard's command and control was effective enough for him to accomplish his mission. Howard calmed and protected the

settlers in his department from harm of the warring Nez Ferce. By Howard gathering and analyzing the available

information on the disaf+ected Indians, he directed forces t o prevent a general uprising in his department. Finally,

Howard also brought together the necessary troops, subsistence, and equipment t o bring the hostile Nez Ferce t o battle that drove them from his department. Hence, Howard

effectively commanded and control led his operations to accomplish his mission. Upon reviewing the whole situation, Howard clear1 y did a commendable job during the Nez Ferce War. The

problems of the nineteenth century frontier army are lessons learned for the Defense Department of the post Cold War military. As the military force structure becomes smaller,

the military planner must focus on having a force designed, equipped, and trained t o do the mission the country wants them t a perform. In the 1990's the citizens may want the

military t o perform disaster relief or fight forest fires.

If the citizens want their military t o perform these functions, the military planner must accept it and plan for it. For example, if the country wants the military t o supply disaster relief, the Defense Department should prepare contingency plans in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Then, the services should esercise those plans. The lessons learned should be

incorporated into the Joint Strategic Planning System s o the military is geared t o perform the mission they have been assigned. Otherwise, the military of the twenty-first

century will still be focussed on the Soviet threat, but fighting a different enemy.

Endnotes ' M i l t o n K e l l y , "The N e i Perce," Tuesday Morning, October 16, 1977. Idaho Statesman,

"William 1 . Sherman, "Report of t h e General of Army," Headquarters of t h e Army, Washington DC, November 7, 1877, o f t h e Annual Report o f t h e S e c r e t a r y of War on t h e O p e r a t i o n s o f t h e Department f o r t h e F i s c a l Year Ending June 30, 1877 (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1877), 9.

" I r w i n McDowell, " C o n f i d e n t i a l L e t t e r from McDowell t o W i l l i a m T. Sherman, J u l y 31, 1877, Sherman Papers, L i b r a r y of Congress, v o l 46, quoted i n Robert M. U t l e y , introduction t o M y L i f e and Experiences Among Our H o s t i l e A r e c o r d o f Personal Observations, Adventure, and Indians: Campaigns Among t h e I n d i a n s o f t h e Great West by O l i v e r 0. Howard, (New York: Da Capo Pres, 177Z), x i v .
4John A. Carpenter, Sword and O l i v e Branch: Oliver O t i s Howard (Pittsburgh: U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h Press, 1964), 225. *Sherman, Ibid., 12.

'Mark H. Brown, The F l i g h t of t h e Nez Perce (Lincoln: U n i v e r s i t y of Nebraska Press, 1967) 340.

- O l i v e r 0. Howard, M y L i f e and Experiences Amona Our H o s t i l e I n d i a n s (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972) 297. The d e c i s i o n making c y c l e i s a dynamic process which a l l o w d e c i s i o n s about c u r r e n t o p e r a t i o n t o occur s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h d e c i s i o n s and p l a n n i n g about f u t u r e operations. Howard knew what f a c t o r s t h e enemy c o n s i d e r e d when t h e y made t h e y p l a n s about how f a r t o t r a v e l each day. The f l e e i n g Nei Perce were moving j u s t f a s t enough t o s t a y ahead of Howard.

ORDER OF BATTLE Whitebird Canyon Battle Captain David Perry, Commander Companies F & G, 1st Cavalry Regiment Mount Idaho Volunteer Company Clearwater Battle Brigadier General Oliver Otis Howard, Commander Captain Norwoord's Cavalry Rattalion consisted of Companies H, E, F, G, L, 1st Cavalry Regiment Captain Miller's Artillery Battalion consisted of Companies A, D, E, G, & M 4th Artillery Regiment Captain Miles Battalion consisted of Companies H, C, D, E , H, & I of 21st Infantry Regiment Idaho Volunteer Battalion (The volunteers called themselves Idaho's 2nd Volunteer Regiment) consisted of three volunteer companies: Lewiston Volunteer Company, Dayton (WT) Volunteer company, Mount Idaho Volunteer Company Kami ah Crossing Skirmish Same units except Company E, 1st Cavalry, which buried the dead and escorted the wounded to Grangeville. Rig Hole Battle Companies A, D, F, G, I, & K 7th Infantry Regiment Stevensville Volunteer Company Bear Mountain Battle Companies B, F, 6 , & I of 5th Infantry Regiment Companies A, D, & K of 1st Cavalry Regiment Companies F, G, % H of 2nd Cavalry Regiment

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books Addington, L a r r y H. The P a t t e r n s o f War S i n c e t h e E i g h t e e n Century. Bloomington: I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984. Arnold, R. Ross. I n d i a n Wars o f Idaho. Caxton P r i n t e r s , LTD., 1932. Caldwell, Idaho:

W i l l F i g h t No More F o r e v e r " : Chief B e a l , M e r r i l l D. "I Joseph and t h e Nez Perce War. S e a t t l e : U n i v e r s i t y o f Washington Press, 1963.
Brawn, Mark H . Nebraska: New York: The F l i g h t o f t h e Nez Perce. L i n c o l n , U n i v e r s i t y o f Nebraska Press, 1982; r e p r . , C a p r i c o r n Books, 1971.

Oliver Otis Carpenter, John A. Sword and O l i v e Branch: Howard. P i t t s b u r g h , Pennsylvania: U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h Press, 1964. Camejo, Peter. New York: Racism, R e v o l u t i o n , Monad Press, 1976. Reaction, 1861-1977.

Downey, F a i r f a x . I n d i a n F i g h t i n g Army. S c h r i b n e r ' s Sons, 1944.

New York:

Charles

E f f e n b e r g e r , David. A D i c t i o n a r y o f B a t t l e s . Cromwell Company, 1967.

New York:

The S t o r y of F i s h e r , Ronald K. Thunder i n t h e Mountains: t h e Nez Perce War. Coeur D'Alene, Idaho: Alpha Omega, 1992. Haines, F r a n c i s . The Nez Perce: Tribesmen of t h e Calumbia Plateau. Norman: U n i v e r s i t y o f Oklahoma Press, 1955. Howard, Helen Addison. Saga o f C h i e f Joseph. U n i v e r s i t y of Nebraska, 1971. Lincoln:

Howard, O l i v e r 0. M y L i f e and Experiences Among O u r H o s t i l e Indians: A Record of Personal Observations, Adventures, and Campaigns Among t h e I n d i a n s of t h e Great West. N e w York: D a Capo Press, 1972. Nez Perce Joseph: A n Account o f H i s Ancestors, H i s Lands. H i s Confederates, H i s Enemies, H i s Murders, H i s War, H i s P u r s u i t , and Capture. N e w YorC: D a Capo Press, 1972; r e p r . of f i r s t e d i t i o n , Boston, 1881. Hunt, E l v i d . H i s t o r y o f F o r t Leavenworth 1827-1937. F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas: The Command and General S t a f f School Press, 1937. Hutton, Paul Andrew. S o l d i e r s West: Biographies from t h e M i l i t a r y Frontier. L i n c o l n and London: University of Nebraska Press. 1987. Gulick, B i l l . Chief Joseph's People and Their War. Caldwel I, Idaho: The Caxton P r i n t e r s , L t d . 1961. Chief Joseph's Country, Land o f t h e ~ h ' i e f Joseph's Country, Land of t h e Nez Perce. Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton P r i n t e r s , 1981. I r v i n g , Washington. The Adventures of Captain Bnnneville. Undated. Portland, Oregon: Binsford & Mort.. Josephy, A l v i n M. J r . of t h e Northwest. U n i v e r s i t y Press,

N e w Haven and London: 1965.

Yale

A Chronicle of American The P a t r i o t Chief: Leadership. N e w York: V i k i n g Press, 1961.

Lavendar, David S i e r v e r t , Tragedx. N e w York: Let M e R e Free: The Nez Perce Harper C o l l i n , 1992. N e w York: Harcourt,

Lewis, Lloyd. Sherman, F i g h t i n g Prophet. Brace, and Company, 1932.

McWhorter, L u c u l l u s V i r g i l . Yellow Wolf, H i s O w n Story. Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton P r i n t e r s , 1940. Oberholtzer, E l l i s Passon. Since t h e C i v i l War. 1926. A H i s t o r y of The United States N e w York: The MacMillan Company

Schmitt, Martin F. and Dee Frown. Fighting Indians 0+ the West. New York: Bonanza Books, 1948.

Utley , Robert Marshal 1. Frontier Regulars: The United Ststrs Army and the Indian, 1866-1891. Rloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. The American Heritage History of the Indian Wars. New York: American Hertiage Pub1 ishing Company, 1977

. . The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890. Albuquerque: University Of New Mexico .

Press, 1984. Weigley, Russel F. History of the United States Army. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1967.

he American Way Of War: A Hi story of United States Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.
Wooster, Robert A. The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903. West Haven: Yale University Press,
1988.

Periodicals, Newspapers, and Articles Army and Navy Journal. June 30, 1877. Army and Navy Journal. September 1, 1877. Army and Navy Journal. September 8, 1877. Chicago Daily News. 3 May 1941. Erskine, Charles. "Chief Joseph, The Nez Perce," with introduction by William H. Hare, 136-141, The Csntury Illustrated Monthly Magazine. XXVII (May 1884). Haines, Francis D., "Nez Perce and Shoshoni Influence on Northwest History," 379-93 of Greater America: Essays in Honor of Eugene Bolton. Los Angles: University o+ California Press, 1945. Idaho Semi-weekly World. (Idaho City, Idaho Territory, 7 August 1877. Idaho Statesmen. (Boise) 30 June 1877.

M e r r i l l , A l l e n & Eleanor. "Talmack," 1964, Vol V I I I , No 3. Joseph, Young ( C h i e f ) . A f f a i r s , " 412-33 A p r i l 1879.

Idaho Yesterdays.

"An I n d i a n s ' s View of I n d i a n The N o r t h American Review. C X X V I I I ,

Josephy, A l v i n , M. " O r i g i n s of Yesterdays. S p r i n g Issue, K e l l y , M i l t o n . "The Nez Perce," Morning, October 16, 1877. Lewiston (Idaho) T e l l e r . Lewiston (Idaho) T e l l e r . Ross,

t h e Nez Perce People," 1962 Vol V I , No 1. Idaho Statesman.

Idaho

Tuesday

November 3, J u l y 7,

1977.

1977.

Steven T. "Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare", The Harmon Memorial L e c t u r e s i n M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y . 1959-1957. Washington, DC: O f f i c e o f A i r Force H i s t o r y , 1985. Excerpt r e p r i n t e d i n U S A r m y Command and General S t a f f Term I ~ y l l a b k s / ~ o oO kf Readings, College, ~ 6 2 0 54-63. F o r t Leavenworth.: USACGSC, August, 1992. (Boise C i t y , Idaho T e r r i t o r y ) June 20, 1877.

The Idahoan. Wood,

C. E. S. "Chief ~ o e s p h , " The Century I l l u s t r a t e d Monthly Magazine, May 1959.

Government Documents U n i t e d S t a t e s Army, Center of M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y . American M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y . Washington, DC: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e . 1989. Annual Report of t h e S e c r e t a r y of War an t h e O p e r a t i o n s o f t h e Department f o r t h e F i s c a l Year Ending June, 1977. Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , :877. Department o f t h e Army. F M 101-5-1, O p e r a t i o n a l Terms and Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , Symbols. Washington DC: October 1985. " R ~ p o r to f t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e I n t e r i o r " , a p a r t o f t h e P t - c e i d a n t i d A@pat-t t o t h e F o r t y F i f t h Congress. Washington DC: Government P r i n t l n g O f f l c e , 1877.

I N I T I A L DISTRIBUTION L I S T

Major Joe R i t t o 6630 T o d d Street F t . Hood, TX 77504

D r . J e r o l d E. Brown C S I , USkCGSC F o r t Leavenworth, K S

55026-5900

Comhined A r m s R e s e r a r c h L i b r a r y U.S. Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e F o r t L r a v e n w o r t h , K S 56026-6900 D e f e n s e T e c h n i c a l I n +o r m a t i o n C e n t e r Cameron S t a t i o n A l e x a n d r i a , V i r g i n i a 22314 Irv Faling 2 4 2 8 11th Ave L e w i s t o n , ID 8 3 5 0 1 B e t t y Ford 1015 N. 8 t h S t r e e t Coeur D' Alene, I D

83814

Bud F o r d 9554 E a s y Street H a y d e n L a k e , I D 83835

Major C h a r l e s K. F o r d 1753 C a r a C r e s c e n t Orleans, Ontario K 4 4 1 M 8 , Canada

A l Heckman 6463 Z e p h e r S t r e e t A r v a d a , CO 81004

Karen Hudson 27190 E a s t R i v e r Road C a t a l d o , ID 83810

Idaho State Historical Library 325 West State Street Boise, ID 83702 LTC James R. Martin DSRO, USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, KS

66026-6900

Robyn Parsons-Paf fendorf 1280 Cedar Lake Poctello, ID 83204 Dale & Mary Ellen Parsons 2701 Alder #63 Fruitland, ID 83619 LTC Jeffrey C . Prater Air Force Section, USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, ES 66026-6900 Rob Rich 4704 N. W. Cad y Court Vancover, WA 98663

W i l Roy 844 Valencia Boise, ID 83507

Josi e Spell man 607 17th Street Coeur D'Alene, ID Ray Stark 3358 Agate Court Boise, ID 8.3705 Criag Stremel 5215 Tarra Heights Manhattan, K S 66502

83814