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BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ Facts: Herminia Borja Manzano was married to David Manzano on May 21, 1996.

However, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge Sanchez. Clearly stated in the marriage contract that both contracting parties were separated in their previous marriages, thus, judge must have knowledge that subsequent marriage was void and bigamous. Nonetheless, the judge agreed to solemnize the marriage between David and Luzviminda as he knew they lived together as husband and wife for almost seven years. Hermenia filed a charge of gross ignorance of law against the respondent. Issue: Whether the marriage between Davin and Luzvinda is valid. Held: One of the requisites under Article 34 of Family code is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Clearly, as indicated in the marriage contract that they are separated is a legal impediment that would make their subsequent marriage void. Mere separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another for at least 5 years does not severe the bond of previous marriage. Sanchez demonstrated fross ignorance of law for the solemnization of a void and bigamous marriage of David and Luzviminda.

Bernabe vs. Alejo Case Digest Bernabe vs. Alejo G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002 Facts: Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal died as well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir. Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabes estate. RTC dismissed the complaint and that the death of the putative father had barred the action. CA ruled that Adrian be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Petitioner Ernestina averred CAs ruling to be of error due to RTCs ruling based on Article 175. Issue: Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter. Ruling: SC ruled in affirmative. an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The FC makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.

G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002 DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents. FACTS: On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a time and lived with private respondents parents and sister in the latters house in Quezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents. On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith. On March 9, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court rendered only on April 1, 1992. The petitioner filed a petition for relief for judgment, the trial court then set aside its original judgment and allowed the petitioner to an opposition to the respondents petition. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner then filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her which was granted. The private respondent filed a petition for certiorari to the CA but was dismissed due to lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, the CA reversed its decision and granted private respondents temporary custody of Gardin until otherwise adjudged Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.

Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gardin should remain in custody of her father Edgar Daguimol HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court In arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should be given, the court must take into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision.1wphi1 Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission: The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation

This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized that both parents "complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child." For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for "compelling reasons." Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness.11 If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the childs preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person. In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person

Carlos vs. Abelardo 380 SCRA 361 G.R. No. 146504 April 4, 2002 Facts: Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the Php25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign. Issue: Whether or not a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal partnership? Held: Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.

Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

G.R. No. 129248. December 7, 2001. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUSTINIANO GLABO, alias TOTO BUGOY FACTS 1. On October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and her 11-year old sister, Judith, were summoned by accused-appellant, their maternal uncle, to his house. The sister was told to wash the clothes of his wife. Judith eas ordered to a loation about 200 meters away from his house. while Judith was gone the accused-appellant pushed Mila Lobrico to the floor and made her lie down. He undressed the victim, then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made push and pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellant s brute strength. She shouted for help, but there were no neighbors nearby.While returning and was underneath the house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She looked up through the bamboo floor and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith went to the kitchen, and she saw accused- appellants penis as he stood up and raised his briefs. 2. the victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no longer be concealed. It was Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought Mila to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court. 3. In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that during the entire month of October 1991, he was plowing the field of one of his sisters in Palawan. The victims mother, Gloria Glabo-Lobrico, testified for the defense. She stated that she wanted the case to be settled to restore her good relationship with accused- appellant, who is her brother. 4. JUSTINIANO GLABO, ALIAS TOTO BUGOY, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of rape and was Sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA ISSUE Whether or not the accused-appellant has Parental Authority over the offspring of the Victim under circumstance of Guilty Conviction of the case of Rape with a penalty Reclusion Perpetua?

DECISION NON, parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs status the accused should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victims child. Concerning the acknowledgement and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children.

SOLINAP vs LOCSIN Facts: Eleven months after Juan Jhonny Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed a Petition for Letters of Administration praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin and that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent. January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondents petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime never affixed Sr. in his name. January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondents clainm as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations. The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr., (brother of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), Likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased. To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. It contains the information that respondents father is Juan C. Locsin stated therein as evidenced by his signatures. To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit was machine copied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Juan C. Locsin Jr is an interested party and is qualified to be granted letters of Administration. DECISION: No, Juan C. Locsin is not an interested person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of administration since he failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr., (Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is spurious). Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration. Upon the other hand, Section 2 of the Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person. An interested party, in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person in the estate and is considered as next of kin. But has respondent established that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased. The petition is denied.

Jader-Manalo vs Caisma
Petitioner saw an ad on a news paper placed by Camaisa spouses for the sale of their ten-door apartment in Makati and Taytay, Rizal. She had negotiations with Edilberto Camisa through a real estate broker. Petitioner made a visual inspection of the said lots with the real estate broker and was shown the tax declarations, real property tax payment receipts, location plans, and vicinity maps relating to the properties. Petitioner met with the Camaisa spouses and made a definite offer to buy the properties to with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker. After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of the parcels of land in question. The agreement was signed by Edilberto and assured petitioner of his wifes conformity and consent to the sale since the properties were conjugal in nature. Contracts to Sell were prepared by petitioner and signed by Edilberto and the checks were delivered. Petitioner received a call from respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts. During the meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts. When petitioner met again with respondent spouses for the formal affixing of Normas signature, respondent spouses are backing out of the agreement. Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Normas refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses. The court dismissed the complaint based on Art. 124 of the Family Code and ordered for the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens by reason of its filling in the Registry of Deeds at Makati and Rizal and to pay Camaisa spouses for damages and other costs. Petitoner appealed to CA, CA affirmed decision of the lower court but deleted the payment of damages and other costs. Hence, the present recourse. Issue: Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wifes written consent Decision: Article 124 of the Family Code requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife; otherwise, the disposition is void. The other

spouse may only assume sole power of administration if the other spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. In the case at bar, Norma Camaisa did not give her consent but has actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the properties. Mere awareness of the negotiation does not mean that she has given her consent. Petitioner may be correct in alleging that if consent has not been obtained, the matter may be brought to court but such claim is only applicable to the exception provided in Art. 124 of the Family Code. In the absence to prove wifes incapacity, courts authorization cannot be sought. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA.

CARINO VS. CARINO 351 SCRA 127 FACTS: SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted two marriages, the first was on 1969 with petitioner Susan Nicdao with whom he had two offspring; the second was on 1992 with respondent Susan Yee with whom he had no children. The respondent which is the second wife took care and spent expenses for SPO4 Carinos medical and burial expenses. The first wife Susan Nicdao collected a total of P 146,000.00 from the death benefits of the deceased from various government agencies while the second wife respondent Susan Yee only received P 21,000.00. The respondent claimed half of the money which the petitioner received although admitted that her marriage with the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a juridical declaration of nullity. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to the death benefits of the deceased which the first wife collected. DECISION: YES, respondent is entitled to the death benefits of the deceased which the first wife collected. The court first determines the status of the two marriages to determine the entitlement of each wife from the death benefits of the deceased. Under the Civil code, a marriage solemnized without license is considered void therefore first marriage is void. The property regime which governs their marriage is Article 147 of the Family Code which states that wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share onehalf thereof.

However, even if the first marriage is void, it does not render the validity of the second marriage because under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage which is not obtained in this case, hence the property regime which governs the second marriage Article 148 of the Family Code which states that the wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or exclusively. Therefore, the second wife is not entitled. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,i[20] where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that; x x x However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. . . x x x

Docena vs. Lapesura Case Digest Docena vs. Lapesura G.R. No. 140153 March 28, 2001 Facts: Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. The CA reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have leased from Casiano. The Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was dismissed. A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the Writ of Demolition. Issue: Whether or not joint management or administration does require that the husband and the wife always act together. Ruling: Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. The signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents. FACTS: * Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1974. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. * Respondent married Grace T. Garcia on January 12, 1994 at Our Lady of Perpetual Help church in Cabanatuan city. Since October 22, 1995, they lived separately without proper dissolution of marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996. * On March 3, 1998, Grace filed for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy claiming that she learned only in November 1997, respondents marriage to Editha. ISSUE: * Whether or not, the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven. * Whether or not, respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. HELD: * The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

* On the other hand, under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either: (1) An official publication or (2) A copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be: (a) Accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) Authenticated by the seal of his office. * Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will convincingly verify respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001 JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents FACTS: Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982. In a notarized document, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. ISSUE: Whether or not the illegitimate filiation of the petitioners with Juan Dizon in a notarized document would impugn their status as legitimate children of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. DECISION: No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,13 or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the

legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected. The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,15 one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.16 Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.17 WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.

13 Republic v Dagdag REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent. FACTS: On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage was issued by the Office of the Local CCivil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelion begot two children. Avelino would disappear for months without explanation and attend to drinking sprees with friends and return home drunk when with the family. He even forced his wife to have sexual intercourse and if she resisted, would inflict injure to the latter. On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job to fend for themselves. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail who remains at-large at date. On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990. Subsequently , a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts and on December 17, 1190, the date set for presentation of eveidence, only Erlindan and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sisterin law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness. The trial court issued an Order for the investigating prosecutor to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found no collusion between the parties which he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence On December 27, 1990 without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under Artcile 36 of the Family Code. However, on January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgement on the ground that decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting

controverting evidence. Likewise, the Office of the Solicitor-General filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground the same is not in accordance with the evidence of the law. The trial court denied the motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals raising that the lower court erred in declaring the apellee's marriage to Avelino Dagdag null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychological incapacity of the nature contemplated by the law not having been proven to exist. However, on APril 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Solicitor-General then filed for petition in the Supreme Court alleging that the psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court and Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Artcile 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice. RULING: Yes, the trial court made an erroneous decision in the case at bar.In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

POP v. Magtibay G.R. No. 142985. August 6, 2002 Facts: Raymundo Magtibay was found guilty of rape and sentence to life imprisonment. The incident happened in Oriental Mindoro when the accused forcibly and successfully raped Rachelle Recto while on her way home. Because of accused-appellants threat on her life, Rachelle kept silent about the incident. It was not until she became pregnant that she was constrained to tell her mother what happened. She eventually gave birth to a baby boy. Issue: Whether the child born out of rape is entitled of support from the accused father. Held: Yes. Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. Under Artilce Article 176 of Family Code, The illegitimate child shall be under the parental authority of the mother. The accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victims child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

Sin vs. Sin GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001 FACTS: Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him. ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings. HELD: Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001 LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner vs. ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent. Facts: Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie. It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. Being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence. For these reasons the petitioner with her child left the conjugal home. Later she gave him a chance to change and returned home but matters became worse. On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment. This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite.

On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Respondent appealed to CA and the above decision was reversed and declared it valid and existing. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not, there is psychological incapacity in this case Held: WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family6 that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we

Beso vs. Daguman 323 SCRA 566 A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, January 28, 2000 Facts: Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority by Beso. In the Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, the complainant charged judge with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar with the following facts: (a) On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainants fiance, Bernardito A. Yman, got married under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondents residence in Calbayog City, Samar; (b) That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the complainant; (c) That when Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding her Marriage Contract. The complainant found out that her marriage was not registered; (d) The complainant wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that all the copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent. The respondent averred with the following rationale: (a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the complainant and Yman. He also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the complainant deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy; (b) Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married; (c) Respondents failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because Yman absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate. (d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated, August 11, 1998 found the respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000). Issues: Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction? Held: Yes. The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, Any incumbent member of the judiciary with the courts jurisdiction. In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of the Family Code, there are only three instances with which a judge may solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction:

G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000. ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BA Y ADOG, respondent FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void? 2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death? DECISION YES, Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical.

SY vs CA FACTS: Private respondent Jaime Sahot started working as a truck helper for petitioners family-owned trucking business named Vicente Sy Trucking. Throughout all the changes in names and for 36 years, private respondent continuously served the trucking business of petitioners. When Sahot was already 59 years old, he had been incurring absences as he was suffering from various ailments. Particularly causing him pain was his left thigh, which greatly affected the performance of his task as a driver. Sahot had filed a week-long leave sometime in May 1994. On May 27th, he was medically examined and treated for EOR, presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy G II), HPM, UTI, Osteoarthritis and heart enlargement. On said grounds, Belen Paulino of the SBT Trucking Service management told him to file a formal request for extension of his leave. At the end of his week-long absence, Sahot applied for extension of his leave for the whole month of June, 1994. It was at this time when petitioners allegedly threatened to terminate his employment should he refuse to go back to work. They carried out their threat and dismissed him from work, effective June 30, 1994. He ended up sick, jobless and penniless. On September 13, 1994, Sahot filed with the NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, a complaint for illegal dismissal for recovery of separation pay against Vicente Sy and Trinidad Paulino-Sy, Belen Paulino, Vicente Sy Trucking, T. Paulino Trucking Service, 6Bs Trucking and SBT Trucking, herein petitioners. Petitioners, on their part, claimed that sometime prior to June 1, 1994, Sahot went on leave and was not able to report for work for almost seven days. On June 1, 1994, Sahot asked permission to extend his leave of absence until June 30, 1994. It appeared that from the expiration of his leave, private respondent never reported back to work nor did he file an extension of his leave. Instead, he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal against the trucking company and its owners. Petitioners add that due to Sahots refusal to work after the expiration of his authorized leave of absence, he should be deemed to have voluntarily resigned from his work. They contended that Sahot had all the time to extend his leave or at least inform petitioners of his health condition.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the company. It held that Sahot failed to return to work. However, upon appeal, the NLRC modified the LAs decision, ruling that Sahot did not abandon his job but his employment was terminated on account of his illness, pursuant to Article 284 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid termination of employment due to his illness. HELD: The SC held that although illness can be a valid ground for terminating an employee, the dismissal was invalid. Article 284 of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to terminate an employee on the ground of disease. However, in order to validly terminate employment on this ground, Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Labor Code requires: Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal- Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employees illness and thus defeat the public policy in the protection of labor. In the case at bar, the employer clearly did not comply with the medical certificate requirement before Sahots dismissal was effected. Since the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter should likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public health authority, this Court has ruled against the validity of the employees dismissal. It is therefore incumbent upon the private respondents to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law that petitioner was not dismissed, or if

dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified. This Court will not sanction a dismissal premised on mere conjectures and suspicions, the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant his separation from work. In addition, we must likewise determine if the procedural aspect of due process had been complied with by the employer. From the records, it clearly appears that procedural due process was not observed in the separation of private respondent by the management of the trucking company. The employer is required to furnish an employee with two written notices before the latter is dismissed: (1) the notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, which is the equivalent of a charge; and (2) the notice informing the employee of his dismissal, to be issued after the employee has been given reasonable opportunity to answer and to be heard on his defense. These, the petitioners failed to do, even only for record purposes. What management did was to threaten the employee with dismissal, then actually implement the threat when the occasion presented itself because of private respondents painful left thigh. All told, both the substantive and procedural aspects of due process were violated. Clearly, therefore, Sahots dismissal is tainted with invalidity. Petition is denied.

Young vs. Mapayo Complainant Young is an American, residing in Davao filed a complaint against respondent Judge Mapayo for grave misconduct. Young alleges respondent performed marriage between him and Virginia Parba on March 15, 1993 and that the respondent demanded and received P10,000.00 for the ceremony. The complainant adds that he was out of the country when the marriage was officiated and also filed annulment for said marriage but still no development after 2 years. Moreover, the complainant alleges that there was a conspiracy between Mapayo and Parba because they threatened him with deportation. Mapayo submitted an affidavit denying all allegations and the same with Parba. The marriage was later annulled. The complaint was referred to Associate Justice Salazar-Fernando for investigation, report and recommendation and held that Mapayo be absolved of the charges of grave misconduct. The complainant later on executed an affidavit withdrawing his complaint against respondent but such withdrawal will not result to dismissal of complaint. However, complainant later executed an affidavit withdrawing his complaint against respondent. Such withdrawal will not result in the dismissal of the complaint. In Marcelino vs. Judge Singson, Jr., 15 we ruled: The Court has held in a number of instances that mere desistance on the part of complainant does not warrant the dismissal of administrative complaints against members of the bench. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. The Court's interest in the affairs of the judiciary is a paramount concern that must not know bounds. Issue: Whether respondent committed grave misconduct Decision: Charges against respondent were not proven. With regard to the respondent receiving money, the complainant later on stated that the money was given not given to the respondent but to the aunt of Parba during the ceremony. With regards to the other allegation of solemnizing the marriage, a certification from the computer Section of the Bureau of Immigration stated that Young departed via Northwest Airlines on March 16, 1993 and arrived Manila via the same airline on October 6, 1993; departed Manila via the same airline on October 29, 1993 and arrived Manila on February 8, 1994 which only proves

that complainant was indeed out of the Philippines at the time the marriage was celebrated on June 9, 1993. However, it cannot be known for certain that Young who had a birth date of January 20, 1942 and the one who left the Philippines on March 16, 1993 was the same Young who arrived on October 6, 1993 having the birth date of June 20, 1942. Thus, it cannot be ascertained if the complainant entered the country through port other than the abovementioned airports. Also, alleged entries on the complainants passport could hardly be read and cannot be compared to the original because complainant refused to produce the original documents. Another factor which militates the complainants cause is the fact that in his petition for annulment of marriage, he stated that marriage took place on June 9, 1993 which bellies his allegation that he was out of the country at that time. Furthermore, the allegation that the marriage was celebrated on March 15, 1993 is bellied by documents supporting the application for marriage such as the Affidavit in Lieu of Legal Capacity to Contract Marriage for American Citizens of complainant issued on May 19, 1993 subscribed and sworn to before the Consul of the United States and Pre- Marriage Counselling dated May 25, 1993 because how can a marriage be celebrated on March 15, 1993 when the documents necessary for its validity were available only months later. It is well-settled that entries in official records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. We likewise note that, aside from requesting this Court not to pursue the case against respondent Judge, complainant refused to participate in the investigation despite due notice. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint against respond for lack of merit.

Mallilin vs. Castillo 333 SCRA 628, June 16, 2000 FACTS: Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation. Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living together. HELD: The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other and were living together could not have owned properties in common. Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other. Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case.

Meynardo Beltran vs People and Judge Tuazon On November 19, 2010 Article 40 In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but after 24 years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felixs PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar. HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Article 40 of the Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

GR 138509 July 31, 2000 IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent. FACTS: * On October 21, 1985, Isagani contract Maria Dulce B. Javier. But their marriage was not annulled, nullified or terminated. Respondent had his second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996. Then his third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. * Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb. 25, 1998, at the RTC of Quezon City. Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage license. He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding for bigamy invoking the civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The RTC granted the motion, while petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. ISSUE: * Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a question to a criminal case for bigamy. HELD: * A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the civil case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential elements are (a) the civil

action involves an issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. * Respondents subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a question to a criminal case for bigamy. During the time when he contracted his second marriage, he was considered already as a married man even if it was a marriage without a marriage license. Article 40 of the Family Code, which has already been promulgated on his second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before the respondent could have married for the second time. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It is not for the parties, especially the accused to determine if his first marriage was null or void, but of a court. The respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage in order to escape the bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is also void due to the absence of judicial declaration of nullity of the first. Thus, the decision in the civil action has been reversed and may proceed with the criminal case.

G.R. No. 119064 August 22, 2000 NENG "KAGUI KADIGUIA" MALANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON, Presiding Judge of 5th Shari'a District Court, Cotabato City, HADJI MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU MALANG, FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG and MABAY GANAP MALANG, respondents. FACTS: On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Sharia District Court in Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of his estate with a prayer that letters of administration be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban.Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji Abdula; that his other legal heirs are his three children named Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula and Kueng Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of land, five (5) of which are titled in Hadji Abdulas name "married to Neng P. Malang," and a pick-up jeepney. On February 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court ordered the publication of the petition.1 After such publication2 or on March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang ("Hadji Mohammad", for brevity), the eldest son of Hadji Abdula, filed his opposition to the petition. He alleged among other matters that his fathers surviving heirs are as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang, surviving spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Mabay Malang, surviving spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e) oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also known as "Teng Abdula," son; (f) Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, also known as "Keto Abdula," son, (g) Fatima Malang, also known as "Kueng Malang," daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son, and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang alleged that since he and his brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, had helped their father in his business, then they were more competent to be administrators of his estate ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.

DECISION: The decisionof the Fifth Sharia District Court of Cotabato City is SET ASIDE, and the instant petition is REMANDED. The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were celebrated was during the effectivity of the Civil Code which, accordingly, governs the marriages. Article 78 of the Civil Code31 recognized the right of Muslims to contract marriage in accordance with their customs and rites by providing that ---Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article 92. Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the provisions of the Civil Code contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage. "Bigamous or polygamous marriages" are considered void and inexistent from the time of their performance.37 The Family Code which superseded the Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a subsequent marriage celebrated before the registration of the judgment declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be void.38 These provisions illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is monogamous, and that subsequent marriages entered into by a person with others while the first one is subsisting is by no means countenanced.Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before the enactment of the Muslim Code was touched upon in two criminal cases, the Court applied the perspective in the Civil Code that only one valid marriage can exist at any given time. In keeping with our holding that the validity of the marriages in the instant case is determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property relations, some of its provisions are also material, particularly to property acquired from and after August 3, 1988.

Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how the subject properties were acquired.

26 Marcos v Marcos Marcos v Marcos G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000 PROCEDURAL HISTORY: This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals , reversing the previous ruling of RTC in favor of the petitioner. FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos married to Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of their marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has psychological incapacity. The appellee submitted herself to psychological examination, while the appellant on the other hand, did not. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. 2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity. ANSWER: 1. No, psychological examination is not a requirement for declaring a person as such. 2. No, the Court was not convince, based on the evidence presented, that it constitute psychological incapacity. REASONING: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined by a physician

or a psychologist as a condition since quo non for such declaration. Although this court is sufficiently convince that the respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that this defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to the said period and not to the inception of marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina. HOLDING: The petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical examination as a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity.

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents. G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzos brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the fathers name was left blank. On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery against her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; afterwhich, they bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985. On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate, contending that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse. In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating that Lorenzos divorce decree was void and inapplicable in the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate the two-thirds would be divided equally among the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal administratix of the estate. ISSUE: Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.

HELD: Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the fore ther en voi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determinging the validity of Lorenzos will. The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents. G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986 FACTS Lilia Olivia Wiegel got married to Karl Heinz Wiegel on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. Karl, upon learning that Lilia had a subsisting marriage, filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Lilia contracted her first marriage with Eduardo Maxion on June 25, 1972. She claims that the first marriage is not valid because they were forced to enter the union and Maxion was married to someone else at that time. ISSUE: WON Lilias first marriage is void? HELD: No. Its voidable. Petition dismissed. RATIO: 1. Presence of force only makes a marriage voidable, not void. (CC ART. 85) It is valid until annulled and since there was no annulment, marriage is still valid. 2. Even if marriage is void, judicial declaration of nullity is still needed especially for purposes of remarriage.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 58 June 2, 1977 PEDRO ODAYAT, complainant, vs. DEMETRIO AMANTE, respondent. Facts: Pedro Odayat charged Atty. Demetrio Z. Amante, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance, Branch IX, Basey, Samar, with oppression, immorality and falsification of a public document. The complaint alleged that: (1) the respondent grabbed a portion of complainant's land, (2) the respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive; and (3) the respondent, although married, falsely represented his status as single in the information sheet submitted in connection with his appointment to his present position as Clerk of Court. When the matter was submitted to Executive Judge Segundo M. Zosa of the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, for investigation and recommendation, the following findings were submitted: 1. The charge of oppression was not addressed having been acknowledged by complainant as more properly a cause for civil action. 2. On the issue of immorality, complainant testified and submitted documents attesting to the existence of the marriage between respondent and Filomena, and that the two bore children. Complainant likewise testified that the respondent was also married to Beatriz with whom he also had children. For his defense, the respondent, while admitting his marriage to Filomena on October 16, 1948 and subsequently to Beatriz on April 4, 1964, claimed that he was coerced into marrying Filomena, unaware that she was already married to another man, and they separated in 1949 after Filomena told him of her previous marriage, and that from 1949 to 1964, the respondent did not hear or received any communication from her, much less knew of her whereabouts. The respondent presented a certification from the Local Civil

Registrar of Pateros, Rizal attesting that Filomena was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948 thereby making the respondents marriage with Filomena void ab initio. Issue: W/N respondent should be found guilty of immorality on the basis of his marriage to Beatriz during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Filomena. Held: The Court adopted the findings of Executive Judge Zosa and found his recommendation, exonerating the respondent from the charges, in accordance with law and the evidence on record. Indeed, there is no question that Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of the New Civil code, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. As regards the charge of falsification of a public document, the complainant failed to prove this charge. Contrary to the allegation, the document in question showed that the respondent actually placed in "Item 6. Civil Status" therein the word "Married" and not Single as alleged in the complaint.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila 95 Phil. 845 (1954) Republic of the Philippines, complainant, vs. Arturo Mendoza, respondent. Facts: Arturo Mendoza and Jovita de Asis were married on Aug. 5, 1936 in Marikina. While the marriage was still subsisting, Mendoza got married to Olga Lema in Manila on May 14, 1941. De Asis died on Feb. 2, 1943. Then, Mendoza contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna on Aug. 19, 1949. He was sued and convicted of bigamy for the second marriage. Issue: W/N the respondent is guilty of bigamy. Held: The Court ruled that the respondent is not guilty of bigamy. Sec. 29 of Act 3613 (Marriage Law) states that Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void unless the first marriage has been annulled, dissolved or first spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive years without news if he/she is still alive. Thus, his marriage with Lema is null and void without need for judicial declaration. With respect to his third marriage with Carmencita, the same was not bigamous having been contracted after the death of the first spouse.

No. L-10016. February 28, 1957 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PROCESO S. ARAGON FACTS: 1. On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 2. While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused, under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934 in Iloilo City. It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. 3. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu 4. Case was filed against the defendant and a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy. ISSUE Whether or not the defendant is guilty of Bigamy with Jesusa C. Maglasang filed by Maria Faicol his second wife? DECISION NO, It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellants prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.

Te vs. Court of Appeals G.R. 126746 November 29, 2000 Facts: Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married on September 14, 1988 in civil rites. They did not live together after the marriage, and later on, Choa gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989 May 20, 1990, Te contracted a second marriafe with Julieta Santilla Choa filed an affidavit on June 1990, and filed a charge of bigamy with the RTC on August 1990 July 20, 1990, Te filed in RTC an action for annulment of their marriage, alleging that Choa c oncealed her pregnancy to another man at the time of their marriage, and she was psychologically incapacitated to perform marital obligations Nov 8, 1990, Choa also filed with the PRC (professional regulation commission) for the revocation of the engineering licenses of Santella and Te, on grounds of acting immorally by living together and marrying, despite the fact that petitioner was still married to her, as well as act of falsification, by stating in Te s marriage contract that he is still single. Te accused RTC for showing antagonism and animosity on part of his counsel during the hearings of this case. He claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and Choa was not presented, and the signatures were not properly identified, as well as the fact that the marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented as well Te filed a case in CA alleging grave abuse of discrertion on part of RTC for: Showing antagonism and animosity on part of his counsel during the hearings of this case violating requirements of due process by denying petitioners demurrer to evidence even before the filing of such

disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by SC ruling that in a criminal case, only prima facie evidence is sufficient for conviction of accused CA upheld the RTCs decision, on grounds that Te failed to show any concrete evidence that the RTC prejudged the case. Issue: Marriage annulment case had to be resolved first before criminal andadministrative case be rendered judgment? Held: No. SC held that there was no abuse in discretion on part of the judge of RTC, for they were not deprived of fair and impartial trial. The denial by the judge of petitioners motion to suspend the criminal proceedings are in accordance with the law and jurisprudence. SC also states that RTC based its denial of demurrer on two grounds: first, Choa and her counsel established a prima facie case for bigamy against petitioner, and second, petitioners allegation of demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. SC also clarifies that by denying of demurrer of petitioner of demurrer doesn t mean that he is pronounced as liable for the case. Tes petition is denied for lack of merit.