AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION -X MARCUS ISAIAH WASHINGTON, Claimant, -againstW I L L I A M MORRIS ENDEAVOR E N T E R T A I N M E N T , L L C , fon-nerly known as the W I L L I A M MORRIS AGENCY,

INC., JEFF M E A D E and S A R A H V A N H O V E N , Respondents. -X In the third Interim Decision of Arbitrator David L. Gregory, he stated: "Claimant shall first submit to me by Monday, October 7, 20] 3 an itemized list of the projected reasonable costs associated with this retrieval [of "emails contained on WME's 1998-1999 back up tape[s]"]. These documents must be submitted and approved by me prior to any work performed by the ediscovery expert." [pg. 3.] Due to the contumacious and "bad faith" conduct of William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and attorneys Michael P. Zweig, Christian Carbone and Michael Barnett, I am left with no choice but to submit this motion to ask Arbitrator Gregory to compel the Respondents to comply with my preliminary e-discovery requests and initial requests for production of documents. I also ask that Arbitrator Gregory issue monetary sanctions Respondents and their counsel for their repeated discovery abuses and willful noncompliance with all three of your Interim Decisions. ARGUMENT I. C L A I M A N T HAS B E E N G R A N T E D L I B E R A L D I S C O V E R Y B Y A R B I T R A T O R G R E G O R Y , B U T F O R M O R E THAN T E N MONTHS, T H E RESPONDENTS H A V E R E F U S E D T O C O M P L Y W I T H ANY O F C L A I A L \ N T ' S R E A S O N A B L E D I S C O V E R Y R E Q U E S T S . In the second Interim Decision of Arbitrator Gregory, he stated: "As to Exhibit [31] and any and all potentially forthcoming proferred evidence, I continue my April 18, 2013 First Interim Decision Order in full force and effect. Each party has the continuing duty of facilitating discovery. Pursuant to New York law, discovery requests, and the statutory law against unlawful employment discrimination, shall be liberally construed " (emphasis added) [pg. 13.] During our July 30, 2013 conference call. Arbitrator Gregory also stated: " I take arbitral notice on my sense is that Respondents, corporate Respondents, are in the norm, custodians of the record, maintain the archives, etc " and "urge[d] the Respondents to take a final look before we go to any other part of this proceeding to see whether or not the elements of the problematic exhibit can be retrieved." In the third Interim Decision issued on September 25, 2013, after admitting "Exhibit 3 1 " "into the evidence of record," Arbitrator Gregory stated, " I ORDER that Respondent WME cooperate with the e-discovery expert of Claimant's choice to facilitate access to and be permitted to retrieve the emails contained on WME's 1998-1999 back up tapes." [pg. 2.] In an "good faith" attempt to comply with Arbitrator Giegory's second Interim Decision, I e-mailed Michael Zweig on July 27, 2013, and asked him to forward questions I received from various e-discovery experts to William Morris' IT department, so I could obtain quotes and submit them to the Arbitrator. Zweig never responded. A A A Case No. 13 160 01426 12

CLAIMANT'S E M E R G E N C Y MOTION FOR ORDER TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS T O COMPLY WITH D I S C O V E R Y R E Q U E S T S AND R E Q U E S T F O R SANCTIONS F O R RESPONDENTS' D I S C O V E R Y ABUSES. DEMAND F O R O R A L HEARING.

Nearly two months later, on September 25, 2013, I forwarded the same e-mail to Zweig and stated that by September 27, 2013, William Morris' IT department needed to answer these preliminary questions. Again, I received no response. On September 27, 2013,1 e-mailed Zweig at 1:05 pm to see if the Respondents were going to actually comply with my request and stated: "Two months have elapsed since I initially e-mailed these questions and I have been more than patient with you, so i f not, I will have no choice but to bring this to the attention of the Arbitrator and ask for discovery sanctions for your contumacious behavior." Instead of receiving a response from Zweig, he had newly added attorney Michael Barnett speak on his behalf to tell me: "[W]e are still in the process of consulting with our client as to what electronic data in the form of e-mails still exists from 1998-1999. We will advise you and the Arbitrator of our findings in accordance with the deadlines that the Arbitrator has set." Given that the Arbitrator specifically asked the Respondents to do this during our July 30, 2013 conference call, this response was not acceptable at this stage in the proceeding. In a somewhat more lengthy response, I explained to Barnett how he was incorrect by quoting verbatim the various Interim Decisions of Arbitrator Gregory. See Exhibit A. Barnett then gave a similar reply, stating: "Please be advised that we are still in the process of consulting with our client as to what electronic data in the form o f e-mails still exists from 1998-1999. We will advise you and the Arbitrator of our findings in accordance with the deadlines that the Arbitrator has set." See Exhibit A. For the following reasons below, the Arbitrator must now intervene and compel the Respondents and their counsel to comply with my various discovery requests. First and foremost. Arbitrator Gregory has never asked for the Respondents to put together a "discovery protocol," although he did state the Respondents could submit "a proposed protective order regarding any such emails that may be obtained by Claimant's expert." [September 25, 2013 Interim Decision, 2.] I will oppose their proposed protective order at the appropriate time because it should be denied largely due to the fact that Magistrate Judge Francis denied Loeb & Loeb LLP's request for a protective order when the class of black concert promoters sought e-discovery. Also, you have already stated that I could stand in "political solidarity" with Mr. Rowe in your first Interim Decision, and since this spoliated evidence that you have compelled William Morris to produce for the third time was paid for by Leonard Rowe and ultimately belongs to him, he cannot be prevented fi-om acquiring this evidence. He currently has new legal representation and will be pursuing legal action against his former attorneys at SNR and the Willie Gary Firm for malpractice, and is also expected to file complaints with the Department of Justice and the attorney ethics committee in the state of Georgia this week. He will need this evidence to prove that all of the attorneys involved in this sinister conspiracy to interfere with the human rights of African Americans should be disbarred and imprisoned for their unethical and criminal actions. Additionally, since you said the most important question of our July 30, 2013 conference call was whether or not I brought this matter to the attention of Eric Holder and the Department of Justice, I will immediately file a complaint once I gain possession of the various documents that I've requested to be produced. Secondly, I never asked for William Morris' IT department and/or Loeb & Loeb LLP to tell me what "electronic data in the form of e-mails still exists from 1998-1999." The electronic discovery expert of my choice will answer that question for me once William Morris produces the back up tapes and pays for the search pursuant to Arbitrator Gregoiy's second and third Interim Decisions. Even i f I did I need to know that information, it doesn't take two months for William Morris' IT department to answer that question. For months, I was assigned to work in the IT department at William Morris' New York office ("dead-end assignments"), so 1 know that the employees in that department have a considerable amount of downtime and are more than capable of providing answers to these questions because the company backs up its files every day. Third, the answers to the preliminary questions I am asking William Morris' IT department to answer are the same types of answers William Morris had to provide to Somienschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP ("SNR") (now known as Dentons LLP) and Electronic Evidence Discoveiy ("EED") (now known as Documents Technology, Inc. or "DTP') when the class of black concert promoters paid $200,000.00 to have EED conduct this search on their behalf When Judge Francis denied Loeb & Loeb LLP's request for a protective order and compelled William Morris and CAA to produce the e-mails in Rowe, William Morris' IT department had to answer similar questions raised by SNR and EED. Therefore, Loeb & Loeb LLP and William Morris's IT department should have no problems answering the same types of questions that are being asked by my prospective electronic discovery -2-

experts. In Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity. 88 F.R.D. 191 (S.D. Ohio 1980), the court stated: "The court is wary of denying plaintiffs' [sic] full and adequate discovery of the defendants' computer systems, including access to and information about defendants' computer equipment, raw data, programs, data management systems, and the byproducts of their analyses To deny them this discovery may, in effect, be to deny them their day in court " (emphasis added) Id. at 196. There is absolutely no reason for me to publicly disclose this information. Answering these questions poses no danger to William Morris. I only need the information so I can obtain quotes from prospective e-discovery experts and William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP are well aware of this fact. Lastly, i f SNR was unsuccessful in concealing "Exhibit 31" from the class of black concert promoters because Leonard Rowe miraculously discovered it on the desk of Raymond Heslin after being told no derogatory terms were found weeks after EED's search and attorneys from Loeb & Loeb LLP, Weil, Gotsha! & Manges and other officers of the court, including Judge Patterson, were successful in making sure the underlying e-mails to the search result list - a document which shows executives referring to African Americans as "nigger," "nigga," "coon," "monkey" and other racially derogatory terms - never saw the light of day, then it's without question that Michael P. Zweig, Loeb & Loeb LLP and William Morris know where the back up tapes are today or what happened to them i f the e-mails no longer exist. Since Arbitrator Gregory has compelled William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP to produce spoliated evidence, this means that at no time after EED's search should the back up tapes been destroyed. I must also state for the record that William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP have also failed to comply with my initial requests for production of documents, which includes all documents received from EED, the actual e-mails Loeb & Loeb L L P received from EED pursuant to Arbitrator Gregory's July 15, 2013 Interim Decision, the compact discs (CDs) that Loeb & Loeb LLP had EED send to SNR containing all of the e-mails minus the ones Loeb & Loeb LLP deleted as privileged in violation of Magistrate Judge Francis' protocol and the privilege & responsive logs that were sent to SNR from Loeb & Loeb LLP. These requests have nothing to do with obtaining the actual back up tapes. It is well established that attorneys have an obligation to preserve evidence for 7 years after a case has been closed. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari on October 2, 2006, so even i f you hadn't compelled William Morris and their counsel to produce certain documents pertaining to e-discovery in Rowe six months ago, these documents had to be presen'ed until October 2, 2013. The Respondents' failure to produce any o f these documents constitutes a clear obstruction of justice because producing this spoliated evidence will immediately prove whether or not the e-mails of the five W M A music Agents that the class of black concert promoters asked SNR to search on their behalf, were actually searched. I f the Respondents are unable to produce emails from those five music Agents - since the alleged they did not receive e-mails from the names that appear on "Exhibit 31" - that will serve as fijrther confirmation that "fraud upon the court" did in fact occur in Rowe and supports my contention that by default, fraud is happening in this litigation due to Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP's mere presence in this case. It is well settled that "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final." Kenner v. C.I.R.. 387 F.3d 689 (1968); see also The People o f the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Steriing. 357 III. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); In re Village of Willowbrook. 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."), (emphasis added) [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 3, 52] "The ease with which e-mail and other electronic documents can be deleted (or at least hidden from view) leads many in the business worid to forget that principles governing document retention are format neutral. The same legal rules apply to the destruction of documents, whether they are in paper or electronic form and whether destruction involves hitting a button, shredding, or any other means. An email or other electronic file is just as much a 'document' as is a paper memorandum."' As you stated during our July 30, 2013 conference call, " I f the infamous n-word list were to come forward, it seems that from Mr. Washington's perspective, almost any variation or any version of that document is going to be vulnerable to, at least the possibility, i f not probability, of spoliation." Now that you have admitted the "n-word list" into the evidence of record, this proves that spoliation of evidence occurred ' Erin McAlpin Eiselein, Lino S. Lipinsky, and Kirke Snyder. Duty to Preserve Electronic Evidence After Enron and Andersen. The Colorado Lawyer, Vol. 32, No. 6 issue. June 2003. -3-

in Rowe. So, i f tiie 1998-1999 back up tapes or e-mails contained on the 1998-1999 back up tapes that need to be produced in Washington have been altered, deleted, destroyed, and/or tampered with in any way, shape or form after EED's search in or around September 2002, now is the time for Michael Zweig, Loeb & Loeb LLP and William Morris to be honest with themselves and admit the truth to the Arbitrator and I . I f these back up tapes are not produced, there will be absolutely no need for me to conduct depositions with Martin R. Gold, Raymond Heslin, Richard Primoff^ and Willie E. Gary and this is ftirther proof that the arbitration agreements I signed and/or its provisions are in fact unconscionable, tainted with illegality and malum m se and as a matter of law, you prematurely and erroneously concluded that the "arbitration agreement was not unconscionable." [September 25, 2013 Interim Decision, 4.] This will additionally prove that as a matter of law, William Morris' anticompetitive and exclusionary practices designed to maintain a race-based monopoly in the workplace, Hollywood and marketplace of ideas, have also violated federal and state antitmst law and you should not have dismissed these claims under the "polirical quesrions doctrine." Id. So yes, I am thankfijl that you have granted me "'liberal [ ] discovery," but if you are not going to make sure the Respondents comply with your orders, then you are clearly sabotaging my case because you are simultaneously chipping away at my claims and harmfully delaying a "final" decision from being made. I have demonstrated that Leonard Rowe's former counsel and counsel for the Booking Agency Defendants have a clear "meeting of the minds" with regards to what happened during e-discovery in Rowe. Their statements that "no derogatory terms" were found during the search are clearly lies and thus, Loeb & Loeb LLP's broad defenses for nearly three years, in which they have stated that my claims of systemic and individual disparate treatment were "unfounded," "wholly without merit, legally or factually," and that my pleadings were "filled with outrageous, self-contradictory, and utterly unsubstantiated allegations about WME and its employees" have also never been true.'^ [Claimant Summary Judgment, H 159.] By reftising to have William Morris' IT department answer these very basic questions, the Respondents and their counsel are preventing me from submitting "an itemized list of the projected reasonable costs associated with this retrieval" to the Arbitrator by October 7, 2013. Therefore, I ask that Arbitrator Gregory compel William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP to facilitate and fulfill aU of my initial discovery requests no later than October 4, 2013. I f ^ Between May 14-15, 2012, all four of Leonard Rowe's former attorneys [Gold, Heslin, Primoff and Christine Lepera] submitted Declarations in opposition to Leonard Rowe's FRCP 60 Motion, denying that any derogatory terms were ever found during electronic discovery in this case and acted as i f they had no clue as to what "Exhibit 31" was since Leonard Rowe hadn't gained possession of the document at the time of filing the motion. Loeb & Loeb LLP never responded to Mr. Rowe's motion, but Mr. Rowe's perjurious statements were used to support Judge Patterson's denial of Mr. Rowe's motion to have his case reopened due to his claims that "fraud upon the Court" had taken place in his case. ^ Throughout the Respondents' Cross-Motion to Dismiss, they continued to make duplicitous statements in "bad faith" such as: "While filled with unsupported accusations and invecrive, Washington's 54-page 'Reply and Request For Full Summary Judgment' is little more than a compendium of conclusory, incendiary, and speculative statements, lacking any concrete evidentiary support whatsoever" (pg. 1)... ."Claims are utterly implausible and without factual support" (pg. 2)...."In sum, Washington has presented and can present no factual basis to support any of his claims. Based largely on vast conspiracy theories, discredited allegations of institutional racism and his own animus, his claims are not only utteriy implausible, they are such that no reasonable finder of fact could rule in his favor" (pg. 4)...."Washington's Complaint, even supplemented by his Motion, is devoid of concrete facts showing any intentional discrimination, or any incident of racial animus" (pg. 5).... "Washington's Complaint and Motion is woefijlly devoid of hard facts, relying instead on supposition, stereotyping and generalization. His broad assertions and conclusory accusations fail to establish any issue of material facts and should be dismissed on all counts" (pg. 6) and "Washington has not - and cannot - point to any instance of direct discrimination or any circumstantial evidence to support his claim that he was treated different from other Trainees." (pg. 16) [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 89.] Not once have the Respondents stated that my statements or actions were being done in "bad faith" although now. Arbitrator Gregory has essentially stated that I am guilty of committing defamation, slander and libel against the Respondents and/or their counsel in his third Interim Decision. I f what I was saying weren't taie, how could you possibly admit "Exhibit 31" into the evidence of record after sitting with our pleadings for a year? -4-

not these documents are not produced and answers are not provided by William Morris' IT department about the 1998-1999 back up tapes, then the Arbitrator should also conclude that this evidence was destroyed as part of their sinister conspiracy to interfere with the human rights of African Americans and other people of color, which has ultimately allowed William Morris the ability to continue maintaining its unlawfirl discriminatory and anticompetitive practices, policies and procedures in violation of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981 ("Section 1981"), Tide Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e17 ("Title VH"), the New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law 290 et. seq. (the "NYSHRL"), the New York City Human Rights Law, New York Administrative Code 8-101 et. seq. (the "NYCHR.L"), the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 el seq, Donnelly Act, General Business Law 340 et seq and Ku Klux.Klan Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). R E Q U E S T F O R SANCTIONS D U E T O D I S C O V E R Y A B U S E AND C O N T U M A C I O U S B E H A V I O R O F W I L L L \ M O R R I S , L O E B & L O E B L L P AND M I C H A E L P. Z W E I G . "True discovery abuse is that conduct which hinders justice by hiding needed and relevant evidence."'' When this occurs, especially in a landmark human rights and antitrust case such as this, the types of sanctions that may be imposed upon an attorney, law firm and/or party for discover^' abuses include: striking a pleading, payment of attorney's fees, barring the introduction of certain evidence, ruling on certain issues in opposition to the position of the offending party, entering a default judgment, dismissal and disbarrment See Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co.. 140 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 265 (2d Dist. 2006), review denied, (Sept. 27, 2006). Also, under N.Y. CVP. Law 3126, it states: If any party, or a person who at the time a deposition is taken or an examination or inspection is made is an officer, director, member, employee or agent of a party or otherwise under a party's control, refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed pursuant to this article, the court may make such orders with regard to the failure or refijsal as are just, among them: 1. an order that the issues to which the information is relevant shall be deemed resolved for purposes of the action in accordance with the claims of the party obtaining the order; or 2 an order prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, from producing in evidence designated things or items of testimony, or from introducing any evidence of the physical, mental or blood condition sought to be determined, or from using certain witnesses; or 3. an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party, (emphasis added) As a result of the discovery abuses mentioned above, various sanctions should be imposed against William Morris, Michael P. Zweig, Christian Carbone and Loeb & Loeb LLP, particularly because this is not the first time Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP have engaged in this type of discovery abuse on behalf of William Morris. In a motion filed on November 22, 2000, counsel for the class of black concert promoters stated: "Plaintiffs bring this motion because they were left with no other acceptable course of action, after having negotiated in good faith with defense counsel for months over discovery matters. It is now over one and a half years since the Document Requests and Interrogatories were initially served, four months after plaintiffs wrote to defendants' counsel demanding compliance with these requests, and three months after this Court's August 2000 conference and scheduling order, dated September 15. 2000 (the "Order"^ requiring the completion of defendants' document Russell Smith. Litigating Tort Cases. "Discovery Abuse." 2013. -5-

production by December 1, 2000, and plaintiffs still have received no documents responsive to their requests. To be sure, none of the defendants has announced an outright refusal to cooperate with plaintiffs in discovery. Instead, defendants have attempted to convey a superficial veneer of cooperation. Once defendants' positions are analyzed and the veneer is stripped, however, it is evidence that defendants consistently have been unwilling to permit plaintiffs any meaningful inspection and/or copying of voluminous, yet necessary, responsive documents." (emphasis added) See Exhibit B. Also, in the October 26, 2001 Affidavit of Charles Kellner - former Eastern Region Vice President of Electronic Evidence Discovery, Inc. ("EED") (now known as Documents Technology, Inc. or "DTI") - he discussed on numerous occasions the difficulty he experienced in obtaining information from William Morris about their back up tapes. [Claimant Rep. April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 4, Exhibit F.] The Affidavit was submitted to "describe the discussions in which [he] participated with defendants' counsel and consultants in this case regarding defendants' production of e-mail data, to respond to certain assertions of their counsel and consultants, and to discuss the proposals EED made with respect to defendants' production of e-mail." In it, he stated, "Despite the fact that we spent two months and engaged in many communications, none o f the defendants demonstrated any willingness to make their e-mail data available to plaintiffs in an efficient and cost-effective manner. We made proposals that excluded examination of large volumes of e-mail and that v/ould result in significant cost savings. Each time, we were met by inflated cost estimates based on unnecessary processing and on projects of broader scope than plaintiffs proposed. None agreed even to the concept of using search terms. Each premised their processing and review costs upon all of the e-mail in question, rather than the small fraction that would result from searching. Despite all of our offers to discuss limitation by names, date intervals, and search terms, no defendant ever offered or suggested a counterproposal." He also specifically discussed his experiences and difficulty in dealing with William Morris and their IT department on pages 23 through 30. See Exhibit C . Due to the similarities of both racial discrimination and antitrust cases, there is a clear and consistent pattern of behavior and thought regarding the Respondents and their counsel. Five months have essentially been wasted already and I will not allow the Respondents to engage in the same types of discovery abuses that they engaged in with Rowe. I have not been overzealous with my discovery requests nor are my initial requests overly burdensome due to the fact that you have already compelled William Morris to produce "smoking gun," spoliated evidence on three separate occasions, and although Judge Patterson erroneously concluded that "Exhibit 31" was an "unauthenticated and unidentified document," you have now admitted this document into the evidence o f record. "When the evidence indicates that a party is aware of circumstances that are likely to give rise to fiiture litigation and yet destroys potentially relevant records without particularized inquiry, a fact-finder may reasonably infer that the party probably did so because the records would harm its case." Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l. Inc.. 81 F.3d 1148 (1 st Cir. 1996). I f these back up tapes are no longer available, then I have reason to believe that pertinent evidence pertaining to my claims has also been altered, destroyed and/or tampered with as well. Given the fact that Zweig has been named "Best Lavv^er" in Labor & Employment Litigation this year and has received similar accolades from predominately white organizations throughout his legal career, he is well aware that the duty to preserve arises when a party or prospective party has notice of litigation or the potential for litigation. Theoretically, William Morris should have been preserving evidence when they received notice that I field a complaint with the EEOC on or about June 9, 2010. However, on November 27, 2012 - ten months ago - 1 asked Zweig to inform me of the date he issued a litigation hold against William Morris and its employees because I told him that I would be pursuing legal action against William Morris via e-mail on October 19, 2010 during the time I was seeking legal representation and was unaware that he and his law firm represented William Morris in Rowe. This is not the first time I've brought this to your attention and you have done absolutely nothing to make sure Loeb & Loeb LLP has complied with your orders and/or complies with my discovery requests.^ [Claimant Rep. Summary

' The biggest reason why Loeb & Loeb LLP or any person would take your orders with a grain of salt is based on the fact that after you compelled William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and Michael P. Zweig to produce the 11 year old, "smoking gim" spoliated evidence that was responsive to EED's search and stated that i f both parties did not comply with your first Interim Decision, "an adverse inference" would be created, you did absolutely nothing when -6-

Judgment, 90, Exhibit Y.] See Exhibit D. Only someone who believes they are above the law or knows in advance that nothing will happen if they disobey your orders, can refuse to comply with simple discovery requests like this on multiple occasions over a span of ten months. Counsel is supposed to periodically communicate directly with employees most likely to have relevant information and monitor compliance with the litigation hold. See Zubulake V. UBS Warburg. LLC. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13574 (S.D.N.Y., July 20, 2004). When there is absolutely no type of repercussions or punishment from the Arbitrator for disrupting the arbitral process, that only adds fliel to their fire to act in contempt. Instead, you think it's more appropriate to punish me by saying my claims against the Respondents and their counsel have been defamatoi7, libelous and slanderous without providing one example of something I've said about the Respondents and/or their counsel that is untme or hasn't been supported with evidence, case law, sociological research, law literature, current events and other credible sources. Unless you step in and intervene, there is no question that the Respondents v^ill only continue their "bad faith" and abusive discovery tactics. I've had "Exhibit 3 1 " in my possession since May 15, 2012 - when I was appealing Judge Castel's erroneous decision which compelled this case into arbitration. When I filed my Demand for Arbitration with the A A A on June 15, 2012, "Exhibit 31" was one of the ten additional documents submitted in support all of my claims. Now that you have admitted this document into the evidence of record fifteen months later, it is without question that this document is authentic. Therefore, the Respondents should be sanctioned for their numerous misrepresentations about this document and discovery abuses after being compelled to produce various documents pertaining to e-discovery in Rowe. including the e-mails they allegedly received from EED and the underlying emails to this authentic document. Regardless of whether or not you are able to punish Respondents and their counsel for their criminal and unethical conduct in this arbitration proceeding, you have admitted into evidence of record spoliated, "smoking gun" evidence and have compelled the Respondents to produce documents that never saw the light of day. This in and of itself proves that Michael P. Zweig and his co-conspirators engaged in unethical and criminal conduct in Rowe/' As a result, many of the assertions made throughout Michael Zweig's pleadings over the last two and a half years in Washington have been "non-meritorious," "frivolous" and legally insufficient as a matter of law.' He has continued to "assert material factual statements that [he knows are] false" and has advanced these

the Respondents failed to produce any of the e-mails and other pertinent evidence produced and/or received during e-discovery in Rowe. As a result, five months have been essentially wasted in this case. ^ Michael Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP's intentional spoliation of evidence, failure to issue a litigation hold and other 'bad faith" tactics involving moral turpitude are in direct violation of the New York Code of Professional Conduct, including, but not limited to, "engag[ing] in illegal conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer;" "engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;" "engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;" "knowingly assist[ing] a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law;" and "engag[ing] in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer." Rule 8.4 (b), (c), (d), (f) and (h). The egregious and diabolical conduct of Zweig and various attorneys in Rowe showed a blatant contempt for the Court and a fimdamental disregard for the judicial process. Each attorney, without question, engaged in fraudulent conduct with the "purpose to deceive" and their behavior contains elements of "scienter, deceit, intent to mislead" and they "knowing[ly] fail[ed] to correct [their] misrepresentations." Rule 1.0 (i). A lawyer shall not "counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lavv^er knows is illegal or fraudulent." Rule 1.2 (d). The Rules clearly state that a lawyer shall not "suppress evidence that the lawyer or client has a legal obligation to reveal," "conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which the lawyer is required by law to reveal," "knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence" or "knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to these Rules." Rule 3.4 (a)(1), (3), (4) and (6). When you understand these Rules, it's not surprising that the Court recognizes a link between intentional spoliation of evidence and an individual's "bad faith" - a word that has appeared on numerous occasions throughout my pleadings to describe the actions of William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and Michael Zweig. Establishing "bad faith" can be established with either direct or circumstantial evidence where certain factors converge. Thornton v. Blitz USA. Inc.. 850 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (S.D. Ga. 2011). Even if William Morris "made" Loeb & Loeb LLP and Michael Zweig engage in criminal activity on their behalf, a lawyer "is bound by these Rules notwithstanding that the lavk'yer acted at the direction of another person." Rule 5.2 (a). Their unethical and criminal [Claimant's Rep. Summai^ Judgment, 14-15, 97.] ^ Nevi/ York Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.1. -7-

defenses in extreme "bad faitli" to "delay or prolong the resolution of litigation." Rule 3.1. In the federal court, a represented party who signs his or her name to documents filed in court bears a personal, nondelegable responsibility to certify the truth and reasonableness of the document and the failure to meet that duty may subject the signer to Rule 11 sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 25-26.] This means that Loeb & Loeb LLP's intentional misrepresentations on behalf of William Morris further demonstrates that they are guilty of perjury, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1621. Also, the criminal elements of their actions cannot be ignored as well. Under the Sarbanes-Oxley statute, 18 U.S.C 1519, it clearly states: "Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both." In Arthur Andersen. LLP v. United States. 544 U.S. 696 (2005), the Supreme Court made it clear that there must be requisite culpability and that the defendant must have intended to "corrupdy" persuade another in order to be liable under 18 U.S.C. 1512. The word "corruptly" normally means "wrongflil, immoral, depraved or evil" conduct. This again supports the fact that technically, Loeb & Loeb LLP should not be representing William Morris in this case, and that Zweig and his other co-conspirators should currently be in prison. I f these back up tapes and additional documents that I have initially requested are not produced, I ask that you strike your prejudiced, one-sentence decision in your third Interim Decision v/hich erroneously concluded that the pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration agreement I signed as a condition of employment - six years after this evidence was concealed - is "not unconscionable"* and allow this case to proceed back in the Southern District of New York so that it can be decided by a jury that reflects the diversity of America and not the opinions of white males over the age of 50. [pg. 4.] I f not, 1 ask that default judgment be granted on all claims since you told us during our July 30, 2013 conference call that i f we agreed to not have discovery and an oral heai'ing about "Exhibit 31," you would have been able to issue a "thorouglt decision on all o f the issues" by "Labor Day," which was September 2, 2013. In Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co.. Ltd.. 987 F.2d 1536, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 560 (11th Cir. 1993), court reaffirmed that a Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) default judgment sanction requires a deliberate or bad faith failure to obey a discovery order The court concluded that "[i]n this case, the defendants richly deserved the sanction of a default judgment, where the defendant manufacturers gave misleading answers to interrogatories and requests for production of documents, refused to answer general questions, falsely denied its awareness of General Motors decisions to not market the Suzuki Samura, and failed to produce, despite two court orders, the deposition transcript of two Suzuki engineers from another case." (emphasis added) If default judgment is not granted and the Respondents fail to produce the 1998-1999 back up tapes and additional documents, I ask that I instead be allowed to conduct a contemporary search of the hard drives of William Morris from 2002 and 2013 using similar search terms used in Rowe, as well as searching for any e-mails pertaining to myself (and African Americans in general) pre and post-hiring.' [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 90-91.]

This improvident decision should also be stricken regardless of the Respondents' discovery abuses because you are violating my constitutional rights to due process. Your second Interim Decision claimed that you were not able to make a "final" decision regarding the enforceability of the aititration agreement and/or all clainrs until after both parties conducted discovery and had an oral hearing regarding "Exhibit 31" and e-discovery in Rowe. During and after our July 30, 2013 conference call, I expressed that no decision could be made until this happened. Neither one of these things have occurred, hence the reason for this Motion. You also cited no case law to support your decision and I will not allow you to sabotage my case. I will be filing a second Motion for Clarification and Modification next week to address the errors contained in your third Interim Decision. ' "A second contemporary e-mail search should simultaneously be conducted in my case as well because it will allow me to flirther establish pretext to the Respondents' claims regarding my attitude and work performance, since it is obvious that e-mails are a major communicative source for William Morris and its all-White/"Jewish" decisionmakers to clandestinely express their discriminatory biases and prejudices about African Americans and other people of color. It will also demonstrate what we all know: even after committing these odious, race-based crimes against African Americans in Rowe, William Morris continued to willfully engage in its discriminatory and -8-

Since the Respondents have argued that "Exhibit 31" is iirelevant because the employees named on the list were not employed in the New York office, this will allow me the ability to fijrther prove my claims that the company's "unvarnished racial animus" towards African Americans is company-wide, systemic, institutional and embedded into the core of the company's "state of mind" - the reason why the company has maintained its employment practices, policies and procedures that have created a glaring disparate impact against qualified people of color from being hired and/or promoted as Agents. Since most employees that I worked with would never suspect that their emails could be inspected or searched, this is a large source of off record and informal communication by my peers and 1 have reason to believe that I will uncover additional evidence to support that I was a victim of pre-hiring discrimination and once I entered this insidiously discriminatory, all-White/"Jewish" work environment as the only African American employed at any level of the Agent Trainee program, that I was "set up to fail" because of my race, color and/or perceived national origin. Lying about my work performance seemed to be the go to strategy of many of the white/"Jewish" Agents and staff I worked with because Human Resources always accepted what they said as truth.'" When I tried to explain to Human Resources how many of these things that were being said about me were untrue and many of the evaluations given by Agents did not reflect my actual work performance because I was assigned mostly "dead-end assignments," they paid my comments no attention and continued to assign me Sisyphean tasks." I truly believe this was an attempt to eventually make me quit on my own accord. In the Respondents' motions for summaiy judgment, Michael Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP continued to advance these lies by stating throughout their Opposition that "many" of my similarly situated White/"Jewish" countei"parts in the Agent Trainee program "had post-college experience equal or at least far superior to" me although most of my similarly situated white/"Jewish" counterparts in the Agent Trainee program were recent college graduates with no work experience in the entertainment industry, (emphasis added) [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 36-37; Meade Aff., % 10.] They also tried to discredit my work performance by falsely stating that my inability to advance above the New York office's glass ceiling was due to a combination of my poor attitude and "uneven and eiratic performance." [Res. 0pp. Summary Judgment, 12, 16, 39; Van Hoven, ^ 10.]] I'm a hard worker and an over-achiever by nature. In no way do I believe I am perfect, but all of these statements, as well as the others advanced throughout their pleadings, are defamatory and libelous. By expanding discovery, I can fijrther prove this fact and demonstrate that their legally insufficient defenses are pretextual.

anticompetitive practices with "malice and/or reckless indifference" to the federally protected rights of African Americans. This explains why there continues to be zero African American Agents or Coordinators employed in the New York office and why I was extremely overqualified compared to my similarly situated White/"Jewish" counterparts when I started the Agent Trainee program. Additionally, since the Respondents have failed to meet their burden of production and persuasion by intentionally withholding documents such as the resumes of my similarly situated White,/"Jewish" Agent Trainees and recently promoted Agents, my evaluations, job descriptions for the Agent position, their response to my EEOC complaint, and other relevant documents, the Respondents should be compelled to produce these documents." [Claimant Rep. Summaiy Judgment, 96.] ' In the Affidavit of Jeff Meade, he also stated that I "received more negative comments [over 20], regarding [my] performance than any other Agent trainee." [Meade Aff. % 22; Res. Opp. Summary Judgment, 16.] This includes the "evaluation" of Chris Walsh, head of Special Services, who blatantly lied on me in two e-mails to Van Hoven in which he stated that I was a "few hours" late to a training although I have proven why his statements were not true. [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 48; Claimant Summary Judgment, 1] 104, Exhibit N ; Claimant SONY Complaint, HT] 89-97.] " Former COO of the New York office, Cara Stein, admitted during our second meeting on April 7, 2010, that my evaluations were not bad. During the first meeting, she stated that 1 was possibly the problem when I alleged that I was being set up to fail because of my race or the color of my skin. However, prior to those two meetings, all of the Agent Trainees/Floaters had a meeting with Stein, Van Hoven and Meade, in which they informed the group that the feedback from Agents was that our performance overall was poor. We were told we would all be given a "second chance," although this comment didn't really apply to me because I was given very little opportunities to work with Agents and mostly worked with support staff or with the Mailroom and this did not change. [Claimant Rep. Summary Judgment, 45.] -9-

In the meantime, one of the best ways to combat discovery abuses of the Respondents and their counsel at this stage in the arbitration is to "turn stonewalling to the plaintiffs advantage by making the [offender] bear the costs of its . . . abuse."'^ Due to their intentional misrepresentations, contumacious behavior, obstruction of justice and other discovery abuses, I should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred from trying to secure the Respondents' compliance with their discovery obligations and making the instant modon, in an amount equivalent to what Loeb & Loeb LLP has been paid by William Morris since you first compelled them to produce these documents in your April 18, 2013 Interim Decision. "The award of fees and expenses is the mildest of the sanctions authorized by Rule 37," and a court need not find that a paity "engaged in willful disobedience or gross negligence" before requiring a paity to pay its adversary's attorney's fees in connection with a discoveiy-related dispute. See Land Ocean Logistics. Inc. v. Aqua Gulf Corporation. 181 F.R.D. 229, 239 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) Rather, a court may impose an appropriate award of expenses wherever, as here, a party unreasonably and unjustifiably delays or otherwise frustrates discovery or fails to comply with a discovery-related court order. See Hoar v. Sara Lee Corp.. 882 .F.2d 682, 687 (2d. Cir. 1898) (affirming award of expenses and fees where plaintiff and his attorney "neglected to respond of their own initiative, ignored due dates, necessitated defendants' motions to compel, and disobeyed at least two previous court orders"); John B. Hull. Inc. v. Waterburv Petroleum Prods.. Inc.. 845 F.2d 1172, 1177 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of complaint and award of attorneys' fees to third-party defendant where defendant "neither offered a satisfactoiy explanation for its failure to comply with the court's orders nor demonstrated circumstances that would make the awaid unjust"); See Morua v. CompaniaDominicana de Aiacion C. por A.. 1990 WL 52104, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1990) ("Since plaintiffs' failure to respond fijlly to the intenogatones or to request for extension of time vv'as not substantially justified, this Court awards reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees...."); Valdan Sportswear v. Montgomery Ward & Co.. Inc.. 591 F.Supp. 1188, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (awarding defendants attorney's fees where plaintiff failed, "without excuse," to produce documents by date specified in court order). In the last year, my unemployment benefits have been exhausted and two months ago, I was told that I am no longer eligible for food stamps because the State of New York believes I should be working a decision that I'm in the process of appealing. I am not even able to help support my family who is allowing me to live rent free because I ' m not able to find employment and I must be restored to a position that takes into account the financial losses I've incurred as a result of the Respondents' counsel's diabolical and "bad faith" conduct. One thing is for certain, the Respondents cannot be ordered and then fail to produce any documents and tangible evidence pertaining to e-discovery in Rowe. and then you grant the Respondents' Cross-Motion to Dismiss and/or award them damages for alleged defamation, libel and/or slander. [.April 18, 2013 Interim Decision, 9-10; September 25, 2013 Interim Decision, 5.] CONCLUSION The Respondents have succeeded for the past several months in avoiding the production of any documents and frustrating the Arbitrator's orders. Their attempts to stall and impede the prosecution of this case must be sanctioned. For the foregoing reasons, I respectflilly ask that the Arbitrator grant my motion in its entirety. I ask that you compel Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP to comply with my discovery requests by October 4, 2013. I f these requests are not granted, I ask the Arbitrator to grant an oral hearing between October 16-18, 2013 to discuss these matters, as well as my pending Motion for Clarification and Modification to your third Interim Decision that will be filed no later than October 7, 2013, under oath in order to prevent this landmark human rights and antitrust case from sabotaged and harmflilly delayed any further, as well as to prevent this clear miscarriage of justice.

Francis H. Hare Jr. et al. Full Disclosure: Combatting Stonewalling and Other Discovery Abuses, p. 181 (1994). -10-

Dated: New York, New York September 30, 2013

By: / ^ V V ^ Marcus I. Washington Pro Se Claimant 54 Boerum St. Apt. 6 M Brooklyn, N Y 11206 (646) 504-6497 humanright s. areamust@gmai 1. com