Alfred P.

Sloan
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Alfred P. Sloan

Cover of Time magazine (December 27, 1926) Alfred Pritchard Sloan, Jr. Born May 23, 1875 New Haven, Connecticut Died February 17, 1966 (aged 90) Education Massachusetts Institute of Technology Known for President & CEO of General Motors Alfred Pritchard Sloan, Jr. (May 23, 1875 February 17, 1966) was an American business executive in the automotive industry. He was a long-time president, chairman, and CEO of General Motors Corporation.[1] Sloan, first as a senior executive and later as the head of the organization, helped lead (and grow) GM from the 1920s through the 1950sdecades when concepts such as the annual model change, brand architecture, industrial design, automotive design (styling), and planned obsolescence transformed the industry, and when the industry changed lifestyles and the built environment in America and throughout the world. Sloan's memoir, My Years with General Motors,[2] written in the 1950s but withheld from publishing until an updated version was finally released in 1964,[3] exemplified Sloan's vision of the professional manager and the carefully engineered corporate structure in which he worked. It

is considered one of the seminal texts in the field of modern management education, although the state of the art in management science has grown greatly in the half century since. Sloan is remembered for being a rational, shrewd, and very successful manager, who led GM to become the largest corporation on earth, a position it held for many years after his death. His rationality and shrewdness are also remembered by his critics as extending even to cold, plutocratic detachment or avarice. However, the magnitude of Sloan's philanthropy suggests that he saw himself differentlya man with greater talents and greater responsibilities than others, who was thus entitled to authority but also obligated to, and committed to, beneficence. Sloan and the management of GM in the 1930s and early 1940sthe time of the Great Depression, German re-armament, fascism, appeasement, and World War IIare part of a larger narrative about the complex nature of multinational corporations. GM in America, as a corporate parent to Adam Opel AG, its German subsidiary, is remembered today for being cozy with Nazism and for profiting from German re-armament prior to the war. The war showed how nationality was not irrelevant to multinational corporations, as the national governments on both sides of the AlliedAxis divide used the industrial capacity of GM (the Allies, Detroit and Vauxhall, the Axis, Opel) to churn out materiel for their war efforts. Like Henry Forda contemporary of Sloan with a rather special relationship to him as the other "head man" of an automotive colossusSloan is remembered today with a complex mixture of admiration for his accomplishments, appreciation for his philanthropic legacy and unease or reproach about his attitudes during the interwar period and World War II.[citation needed]

Contents

1 Biography 2 Philanthropy 3 Criticism

o o o o

3.1 Overly rational and profit-driven orientation 3.2 Accounting system drawbacks 3.3 Streetcar scandal 3.4 Nazi collaboration

4 Quotes 5 See also 6 References 7 Works cited

8 Further reading 9 External links

Biography
Sloan was born in New Haven, Connecticut. He studied electrical engineering and graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1895. While attending MIT he joined the Delta Upsilon fraternity. He became president and owner of Hyatt Roller Bearing, a company that made roller and ball bearings, in 1899. Oldsmobile was Hyatt's first automotive customer, with many other companies soon following suit. In 1916 Hyatt merged with other companies into United Motors Company, which soon became part of General Motors Corporation. Sloan became VicePresident of GM, then President (1923), and finally Chairman of the Board (1937). In 1934, he established the philanthropic, nonprofit Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. GM under Sloan became famous for managing diverse operations with financial statistics such as return on investment; these measures were introduced to GM by Donaldson Brown, a protege of GM vice-president John J. Raskob. Raskob came to GM as an advisor to Pierre S. du Pont and the du Pont corporation; the latter was a principal investor in GM whose executives largely ran GM in the 1920s. Sloan is credited with establishing annual styling changes, from which came the concept of planned obsolescence. He also established a pricing structure in which (from lowest to highest priced) Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick and Cadillacreferred to as the ladder of success did not compete with each other, and buyers could be kept in the GM "family" as their buying power and preferences changed as they aged. These concepts, along with Ford's resistance to the change in the 1920s, propelled GM to industry sales leadership by the early 1930s, a position it retained for over 70 years. Under Sloan's direction, GM became the largest industrial enterprise the world had ever known. In the 1930s GM, long hostile to unionization, confronted its workforce, newly organized and ready for labor rights, in an extended contest for control.[citation needed] Sloan was averse to violence of the sort associated with Henry Ford. He preferred the subtle use of spying and had built up the best undercover apparatus the business community had ever seen up to that time.[peacock term][citation needed] When the workers organized the massive Flint Sit-Down Strike in 1936, Sloan found that espionage had little value in the face of such open tactics.

Alfred P. Sloan in 1937 The world's first university-based executive education programthe Sloan Fellowswas created in 1931 at MIT under the sponsorship of Sloan. A Sloan Foundation grant established the MIT School of Industrial Management in 1952 with the charge of educating the "ideal manager", and the school was renamed in Sloan's honor as the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, one of the world's premier business schools. Additional grants established a Sloan Institute of Hospital Administration Sloan Program in Health Administration in 1955 at Cornell University Cornell University-the first two year graduate program of its type in the US, a Sloan Fellows Program at Stanford Graduate School of Business in 1957, and at London Business School in 1965.[4][dead link] They became degree programmes in 1976, awarding the degree of Master of Science in Management. Sloan's name is also remembered in the Sloan-Kettering Institute and Cancer Center in New York. In 1951, Sloan received The Hundred Year Association of New York's Gold Medal Award "in recognition of outstanding contributions to the City of New York." The Alfred P. Sloan Museum, showcasing the evolution of the automobile industry and traveling galleries, is located in Flint, MI.[5] Sloan maintained an office in 30 Rockefeller Plaza in Rockefeller Center, now known as the GE Building.[6] He retired as GM chairman on April 2, 1956. His memoir and management treatise, My Years with General Motors,[2] was more or less finished around this time; but its publication was held up for nearly a decade longer by GM's legal staff, who feared that it would be used to support an antitrust case against GM. It was finally published in 1964. Sloan died in 1966.[1] Sloan was inducted into the Junior Achievement U.S. Business Hall of Fame in 1975.

Philanthropy
The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation is a philanthropic non-profit organization established by Sloan in 1934. The Foundation's programs and interests fall into the areas of science and technology,

standard of living, economic performance, and education and careers in science and technology. The total assets of the Sloan Foundation have a market value of about $1.8 billion.[citation needed] The Sloan Foundation bankrolled the 1956 Warner Bros. cartoon Yankee Dood It, which promotes mass production. According to Edwin Black, Sloan was one of the central, behind-the-scenes founders of the American Liberty League, a political organization whose goal it was to defend the constitution. In turn, the League would finance other groups with openly more extreme agendas. One such group was the Sentinels of the Republic to which Sloan himself made a $1000 check. After a Congressional investigation into this group went public in 1936, Sloan issued a statement pledging not to further support the Sentinels.[citation needed] Also according to Black, the GM chief continued to personally fund and organize fund-raising for the National Association of Manufacturers, which was critical of the New Deal.[7] The Sloan Foundation has made two grants, of USD 3 million each, to the Wikimedia Foundation (WMF). These are some of the largest grants that the WMF has received.

Criticism
Overly rational and profit-driven orientation
According to O'Toole (1995),[8] Sloan built a very objective organization, a company that paid significant attention to "policies, systems, and structures and not enough to people, principles, and values. Sloan, the quintessential engineer, had worked out all the intricacies and contingencies of a foolproof system." But this system left out employees and society.[9] One consequence of this management philosophy was a culture that resisted change. Proof that the system did not remain foolproof forever was seen in GM's problems of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. In fact, Sloan's memoir and management treatise, My Years With General Motors,[2] foresaw some of these problems. About them, Sloan implied that only vigilant, intelligent management could meet them successfully. He predicted that remaining at the top [of its industry and the economy] would prove a bigger challenge for GM than was getting there; and it turned out that he was right. But he also seemed confident that the management style of GM under his leadership, if continued and adapted, could meet these challenges. He said, "There have been and always will be many opportunities to fail in the automobile industry. The circumstances of the ever-changing market and ever-changing product are capable of breaking any business organization if that organization is unprepared for changeindeed, in my opinion, if it has not provided procedures for anticipating change. In General Motors these procedures are provided by the central management, which is in a position to appraise the broad long-term trends of the market. [] As the industry has grown and evolved, we have adhered to this policy and have demonstrated an ability to meet competition and the shifts of customer demand."[10] As these words of Sloan 1964 show in juxtaposition with the words of Drucker 1946, Sloan (and his fellow GM executives) never agreed with Drucker on the lessons that Drucker drew from his

study of GM management during the war. However, unlike many GM executives, Sloan did not put Drucker on his blacklist for writing the 1946 book; Drucker, in his new introduction [foreword] for the 1990 republishing of Sloan's memoir, said, "When his associates attacked me in a meeting called to discuss the book, Sloan immediately rose to my defense. 'I fully agree with you,' he said to his colleagues. 'Mr. Drucker is dead wrong. But he did precisely what he told us he would do when we asked him in. And he is as entitled to his opinions, wrong though they are, as you or I.'"[11] Drucker related that for 20 years after that meeting, Sloan and Drucker had a good relationship, in which Sloan would invite Drucker to lunch once or twice a year to discuss Sloan's philanthropic plans and the memoir that Sloan was working on assembling (what became My Years). Drucker said, "He asked for my opinions and carefully listenedand he never once took my advice."[11] History seems to have vindicated Drucker in his belief that Sloan's faith in rationality aloneand in the ability of other white-collar managers to be as astute as he himself waswas overardent, because 40 years later, the management and board of directors who had run the original General Motors Corporation into the ground by 2009 were not "in a position to appraise the broad long-term trends of the market"or were in that position, but not doing the job successfully therein.[12] O'Toole described Sloan's style as follows[13]: "[W]hereas Taylor occasionally backs off to justify his ardor for efficiency in human terms, not once does Sloan make reference to any other values. Freedom, equality, humanism, stability, community, tradition, religion, patriotism, family, love, virtue, natureall are ignored. In the one personal element in the book, he makes passing reference to his wife: he abandons her on the first day of a European vacation to return to business in Detroit. His language is as calculating as that of the engineer-of-old working with calipers and slide rule, as cold as the steel he caused to be bent to form cars: economizing, utility, facts, objectivity, systems, rationality, maximizingthat is the stuff of his vocabulary."[13]

Accounting system drawbacks

In 2005, Sloan's work at GM came under criticism for creating a complicated accounting system that prevents the implementation of lean manufacturing methods.[14] Essentially, the criticism is that by using Sloan's methods a company will value inventory just the same as cash, and thus there is no penalty for building up inventory.[14] Carrying excessive inventory is detrimental to a company's operation and induces significant hidden costs. This criticism must be viewed in the context that it is provided in hindsight. During the period in which Sloan advocated carrying what would now be considered excess inventory, the industrial and transportation infrastructure would not support what is now known as just-in-time inventory. During this period, the auto industry experienced incredible growth as the public eagerly sought to purchase this lifechanging utility known as the automobile. The cost of lost sales due to lack of inventory was likely greater than the cost of carrying excess inventory. Sloan's system seems to have been widely adopted because of its significant advancement over previous methods.[citation needed] In his memoir, Sloan (who would freely acknowledge that he was not a trained accountant) said that the system that he implemented in the early 1920s was far better than what it replaced (which was, in so many words, an undesigned cacophony in which financial controls mostly didn't exist). He said that years later, a professional accountant (Albert Bradley, longtime CFO of GM) "was kind enough to say [that it] was pretty good for a layman."[15] Sloan was far from the sole author of GM's financial and accounting systems, as GM later had many trained minds in

accounting and finance; but regardless of authorship, GM's financial controlsat one time considered top-notcheventually proved to have latent drawbacks. Systems similar to GM's were implemented by other major companies, especially in the United States, and they eventually undermined the ability to compete with companies that used different accounting, according to Waddell & Bodek's 2005 analysis.[14] Sloan's memoir, particularly Chapter 8, "The development of financial controls",[16] indicates that Sloan and GM appreciated the financial dangers of excess inventory even as early as the 1920s. However, Waddell & Bodek's 2005 analysis[14] indicates that this theory was not successfully implemented in GM's practice. For all of the intellectual understanding, the reality remained slow inventory turnover and an accounting system that functionally treated inventory similarly to cash.

Streetcar scandal
See also Great American streetcar scandal and History of General Motors > Criticism > Great American streetcar scandal. During Sloan's leadership of GM, many public transport systems of trams in the US were replaced by buses in what became known as the Great American streetcar scandal. Some critics, such as Edwin Black, claim that Sloan was also instrumental in the demise of public city transport streetcar throughout the United States[17] GM was found guilty of violating anti-trust laws,[citation needed] but the penalties imposed were nugatory, even for the time: a $5,000 fine for the company and $1 fines for each convicted executive.

Nazi collaboration
See History of General Motors > Criticism > Collaboration with Nazi Germany.

Quotes

"The business of business is business." "A car for every purse and purpose". (Sloan 1963, p. 438) "I am sure we all realize that this struggle that is going on through the World is really nothing more or less than a conflict between two opposing technocracies manifesting itself to the capitalization of economic resources and products and all that sort of thing."May 1941 "It seems clear that the Allies are outclassed on mechanical equipment, and it is foolish to talk about modernizing their Armies in times like these, they ought to have thought of that five years ago. There is no excuse for them not thinking of that except for the unintelligent, in fact, stupid, narrow-minded and selfish leadership which the democracies of the world are cursed with But when some other system develops stronger leadership, works hard and long, and intelligently and aggressivelywhich are good traitsand, superimposed upon that, develops the instinct of a racketeer, there is

nothing for the democracies to do but fold up. And that is about what it looks as if they are going to do."June 1940

"Technological progress-and it is a pity more do not appreciate it-is the one sound approach to increased employment and higher wages. There is no other way." (Sloan 1941, p. 10) "General Motors was becoming large through a process of evolution, but only because it was rendering a service to community. As its volume of business expanded it became able to do more for workers, stockholders and customers." (Sloan 1941, p 144) Scientific management means a constant search for the facts, the true actualities, and their intelligent, unprejudiced analysis. Thus, and in no other way, policies and their administration are determined. I keep saying to the General Motors organization that we are prepared to spend any proper amount of money to get the facts. Only by increased knowledge can we progress, perhaps I had better say survive. (Sloan 1941)

General Motors streetcar conspiracy

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Pacific Electric Railway streetcars stacked at a junkyard on Terminal Island, Los Angeles County, California, March 1956

The General Motors streetcar conspiracy (also known as the Great American streetcar scandal) refers to allegations and convictions in relation to a program by General Motors (GM) and other companies to purchase and dismantle streetcars and electric trains in the 1930s and 1940s. Several of the major companies involved were convicted in 1949 of conspiracy to

monopolize interstate commerce but were acquitted of conspiring to monopolize the ownership of these companies. Some believe that this plot helped to cause the mid-century decline of public transit in United States cities. A key proponent of this theory is Bradford C. Snell, whose 1974 testimony against G.M., Chrysler, and Ford brought the issue to national awareness. Snell argued that the deliberate destruction of streetcars was part of a larger strategy to push the United States into automobile dependency.[1] Others say that independent economic factors brought about changes in the transit system. This group accuses Snell and others of falling into simplistic conspiracy theory thinking, bordering on paranoid delusions.[2][3] The story has been explored several times in print, film and other media, notably in Who Framed Roger Rabbit, Taken for a Ride and The End of Suburbia. During the period from 1936 to 1950, National City Lines and Pacific City Lineswith investment from GM, Firestone Tire, Standard Oil of California, Phillips Petroleum, Mack Trucks, and the Federal Engineering Corporationbought over 100 electric surface-traction systems in 45 cities including Baltimore, Newark, Los Angeles, New York City, Oakland and San Diego and converted them into bus operation. In 1946, Edwin J. Quinby, a retired naval lieutenant commander, alerted transportation officials across the country to what he called "a careful, deliberately planned campaign to swindle you out of your most important and valuable public utilitiesyour Electric Railway System". GM and other companies were subsequently convicted in 1949 of conspiring to monopolize the sale of buses and related products via a complex network of linked holding companies including National City Lines and Pacific City Lines. They were also indicted, but acquitted of conspiring to monopolize the ownership of these companies. Snell presented his testimony during the 1973 oil crisis, for a United States Senate inquiry into the causes of the decline of streetcar systems. He alleged that there was a wider conspiracyby GM in particularto destroy effective public transport systems in order to increase sales of automobiles and that this was implemented with great effect to the detriment of many cities. Only a small handful of U.S. cities have surviving effective rail-based urban transport systems based on streetcars or trams, including Newark, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Pittsburgh, and Boston. There is now general agreement that GM and other companies carried out a largely unpublicized program to purchase many streetcar systems and convert them to buses, which they supplied. There is also acknowledgment that the Great Depression, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, labor unrest, market forces, rapidly increasing traffic congestion, taxation policies that favored private vehicle ownership, urban sprawl, and general enthusiasm for the automobile all helped to cause America's shift away from streetcars. Wrote one author, "Clearly, GM waged a war on electric traction. It was indeed an all out assault, but by no means the single reason for

the failure of rapid transit. Also, it is just as clear that actions and inactions by government contributed significantly to the elimination of electric traction."[n 1]

Contents

1 History o 1.1 Background

o o

1.2 Early years 1.3 Conversion

1.3.1 National City Lines, Pacific City Lines, American City Lines

o o o o

1.4 Edwin J. Quinby 1.5 Court cases 1.6 Conviction, $1 fine 1.7 1960s to present

2 Other factors 3 Myths and mysteries

o

3.1 Myths

4 Relevant actors 5 See also 6 Notes 7 References 8 Further reading 9 External links

History
Background
In the 19th century, city transit systems were rail-based, first with horsecars and later cable railway or trams powered by electricity. Electrically powered trolleybuses were also common. At one time, nearly every city in the U.S. with population over 10,000 had at least one streetcar company: nearly all were privately owned and were later dismantled.[4] Author and former U.S. Senate antitrust attorney Bradford Snell estimates that in 1920, 90% of all trips were via rail

using 1,200 separate electric street and interurban railways with 44,000 miles of track, 300,000 employees, 15 billion annual passengers, and $1 billion in income. Only one in 10 Americans owned an automobile[n 2]

Early years
In 1922, GM President and CEO Alfred P. Sloan established a special unit within the corporation charged with the task of replacing America's electric railways with cars, trucks and buses.[n 3] The Omnibus Corporation was formed in 1926 by John D. Hertz with "plans embracing the extension of motor coach operation to urban and rural communities in every part of the United States" and that said that "it was not the purpose of the corporation to enter into competition with street car companies or railroads, but to work with them for the rehabilitation of street car companies or parts of railroads in sections where the service was now inadequate."[5] Omnibus owned the Chicago Motor Coach Company which Hertz founded to operate buses in Chicago, and the Fifth Avenue Coach Company in New York. That same year, the Fifth Avenue Coach Company acquired a majority of the stock in the struggling New York Railways Corporation. Hertz was made a GM board member by 1927 when the company acquired a controlling share of the Yellow Coach Manufacturing Company, a successful bus and coach manufacturer founded by Hertz in 1923. In 1932, GM formed a new subsidiaryUnited Cities Motor Transport (UCMT)to finance the conversion of streetcar systems to buses in small cities. UCMT purchased several smaller systems within Michigan and Ohio before being censured by the American Transit Association after approaching the city of Portland, Oregon with a similar proposal. UCMT was dissolved in 1935.[6]

Conversion
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 caused great difficulties for the streetcar operators by making it illegal for a single business to both provide public transport and supply electricity to other parties. E. Quinby later asked "Who is behind this campaign to separate the obviously economical combination of electric railway and its power plant?".[n 4] When the New York Railways Corporation converted streetcars to buses in 1935 and 1936, the new bus services were operated by the New York City Omnibus Corporation which shared management with The Omnibus Corporation.
National City Lines, Pacific City Lines, American City Lines

1936 was the year that saw GM establish several front companies for the express purpose of purchasing and dismantling America's streetcar systems. National City Lines (NCL), a bus operation founded in 1920 by an E. Roy Fitzgerald and his brother[7], was reorganized into a holding company. By 1938, Pacific City Lines (PCL) was formed to purchase streetcar systems in the western United States.[n 5] NCL raised funds to

purchase transportation systems in cities "where streetcars were no longer practicable" and to replace them with buses. Investors consisted of Firestone Tire, Standard Oil of California (now Chevron Corporation), Phillips Petroleum (now part of ConocoPhillips), GM, Mack Trucks (now a subsidiary of Volvo), and the Federal Engineering Corporation.[n 5] In 1941, PCL attempted a hostile takeover of the Key System, which operated electric trains and streetcars in Oakland, California (details about this were not made public until 1955).[8] American City Lines (ACL) was organized to acquire local transportation systems in the larger metropolitan areas in various parts of the country in 1943 and merged with NCL in 1946.[n 5] As the 1940s progressed, the three companies gained more power. NCL acquired the Los Angeles Railway (aka the "Yellow Cars") in 1945 and converted many lines to bus routes. By 1946, the company acquired 64% of the stock in the Key System which operated electric trains and streetcars in Oakland, California. Many of these conversions to buses resulted in public outcry.

Edwin J. Quinby
That same year, Edwin J. Quinby, a recently retired naval lieutenant commander, published a 24page expose on the owners of NCL. It was addressed to "The Mayors; The City Manager; The City Transit Engineer; The members of The Committee on Mass-Transportation and The TaxPayers and The Riding Citizens of Your Community" and began, "This is an urgent warning to each and every one of you that there is a careful, deliberately planned campaign to swindle you out of your most important and valuable public utilitiesyour Electric Railway System".[n 6] Quinby had previously worked for the North Jersey Rapid Transit which operated in New York and had established up the Electric Rail Users Association in 1934 which lobbied on behalf of rail users and services.[9] He was later to write a history of North Jersey Rapid Transit.[10] By 1947, NCL owned or controlled 46 systems in 45 cities in 16 states.[n 7]

Court cases
On April 9, 1947, nine corporations and seven individuals (constituting officers and directors of certain of the corporate defendants) were indicted in the Federal District Court of Southern California on counts of 'conspiring to acquire control of a number of transit companies, forming a transportation monopoly" and "Conspiring to monopolize sales of buses and supplies to companies owned by National City Lines"[n 8] which had been made illegal by the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act. The initial court case was in the Federal District Court of Southern California. In 1948, the venue was changed to the Federal District Court in Northern Illinois following an appeal to the United States Supreme Court (in United States v. National City Lines Inc.)[11] who felt that there was evidence of conspiracy to monopolize the supply of buses and supplies.[n 9] The San Diego Electric Railway was sold to Western Transit Company, which was owned by a J. L. Haugh, Oakland, for $5.5 million in 1948.[12] Jessie Haugh was also president of Key Systems which later purchased Pacific Electric Railway. The financial arrangements were not public at

the time.[13] In the same year the Baltimore Streetcar system was purchased by NCL and started converting the system to buses.[14]

Conviction, $1 fine
In 1949, Firestone Tire, Standard oil of California, Phillips Petroleum, GM and Mack Trucks were convicted of conspiring to monopolize the sale of buses and related products to local transit companies controlled by NCL and other companies; they were acquitted of conspiring to monopolize the ownership of these companies. The verdicts were upheld on appeal in 1951.[n 9] Bradford Snell summed up the controversial verdict, as the punishment so poorly matched the crime: "The court imposed a sanction of $5,000 on GM. In addition, the jury convicted H.C. Grossman, who was then treasurer of GM. Grossman had played a key role in the motorization campaigns and had served as a director of Pacific City Lines when that company undertook the dismantlement of the $100 million Pacific Electric system. The court fined Grossman the magnanimous sum of $1."[n 10] According to Snell, GM's own testimony had shown that by the mid-1950s, GM and its agents had canvassed more than 1,000 electric railways and had motorized 90%more than 900 systems.[n 11] The struggling Pacific Electric Railway was purchased by Metropolitan Coach Lines in 1953. Jesse Haugh, who operated Metropolitan Coach Lines and was a former executive of PCL, had previously purchased San Diego Electric Railway though a separate company in 1948. The remaining streetcars were converted to buses by 1950. The remains of the Pacific Electric Railway and of the Los Angeles Railway were taken into public ownership in 1958; all routes were converted to bus routes. Though Federal anti-trust action was taken against NCL, the damage was already done: Los Angeles was dominated by automobiles.[15] Haugh sold the busbased San Diego system to the city in 1966.[16]

1960s to present
The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 created the Federal Transit Administration with a remit to "conserve and enhance values in existing urban areas" noting that "our national welfare therefore requires the provision of good urban transportation, with the properly balanced use of private vehicles and modern mass transport to help shape as well as serve urban growth." Funding for transit was increased with the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970 and further extended by the 1974 National Mass Transportation Assistance Act which allowed funds to support transit operating costs as well as construction costs. In 1970, Harvard Law student Robert Eldridge Hicks began working on the Ralph Nader Study Group Report on Land Use in California to report the wider conspiracy to dismantle U.S. streetcar systems. These allegations were first published in Politics of Land: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Land Use in California.[17] In 1974, Snell testified before a United States Senate inquiry into the causes of the decline of the transit car systems in the U.S., highlighting

the NCLines acquisitions as the primary cause.[n 12] San Francisco mayor and antitrust attorney Joseph Alioto testified that "General Motors and the automobile industry generally exhibit a kind of monopoly evil", adding that GM "has carried on a deliberate concerted action with the oil companies and tire companies...for the purpose of destroying a vital form of competition; namely, electric rapid transit." Los Angeles mayor Tom Bradley also testified, saying that GM through its subsidiaries (namely PCL) "scrapped the Pacific Electric and Los Angeles streetcar systems leaving the electric train system totally destroyed".[n 13] GM published a rebuttal the same year titled "The Truth About American Ground Transport"[18] The role of GM and buses in the decline of mass transit was further explored in the doctoral thesis of David Lipson in 1987.[19] In the 1988 film Who Framed Roger Rabbit, the scandal is masked and set in Los Angeles.[n 14] Script-writers Jeffrey Price and Peter S. Seaman explained: "the Red Car plot, suburb expansion, urban and political corruption really did happen. In Los Angeles, during the 1940s, car and tire companies teamed up against the Pacific Electric Railway system and bought them out of business. Where the freeway runs in Los Angeles is where the Red Car used to be."[20] In recent decades, many cities have started reconstructing new streetcar systems, light rail, and other public transport systems. However, most U.S. cities still have high levels of automobile dependency with limited or non-existent levels of public transport. This limited transport consists of poor bus service with limited frequency and quality and typically utilized by those with no other transportation options. Commuter rail had been similarly limited or eliminated entirely in some areas, but commuter rail systems have been maintained or new ones built in other areas during recent decades. The only national passenger rail service has been operated by the government-subsidized Amtrak since 1971.

Other factors
A number of analyses have suggested that the eventual replacement of electric-powered street cars with buses was inevitable and indeed occurred within the same timeframe in several other cities where NCL was not involved.[n 15] It has been suggested that the ultimate reach of GM's conspiracy extended to approximately 10% of all transit systems,[21] but the areas affected by GM's interference include 7 of the currently largest 9 Combined statistical areas (government term for metropolitan areas) in the country. Other significant factors included:

Difficult labor relations, and tight regulation of fares, routes, and schedules took their toll on city streetcar systems in the first third of the 20th century. By 1916, street railroads nationwide were wearing out their equipment faster than they were replacing it. While operating expenses were generally recovered, money for long-term investment was generally diverted elsewhere.[22]

The Dual Contracts signed by operators in New York City restricted their ability to increase fares at a time of high inflation; however, these contracts also allowed the city to operate them. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (an antitrust law) prohibited regulated electric utilities from operating unregulated businesses, which included most streetcar lines. The act also placed restrictions on services operating across state lines. Many holding companies operated both streetcars and electric utilities across several states; those that owned both types of businesses were forced to sell off one. [23] Declining streetcar business was often somewhat less valuable than the growing consumer electric business, resulting in many streetcar systems being put up for sale. [24] The independent lines, no longer associated with an electric utility holding company, had to purchase electricity at full price from their former parents, further shaving their already thin margins.[25] The Great Depression left many streetcar systems short of funds for maintenance and capital improvements with local governments reluctant to contribute to their upkeep. Streetcar lines were built using funds from private investors and were required to pay numerous taxes as well as dividends. By contrast new roads were constructed and maintained by the government from tax income. The U.S. Government responded to the Great Depression with massive subsidies for road construction, notably with the creation of the Interstate Highway System which was authorized by the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 and approved the expenditure of $25 billion for the creation of a new 41,000 miles (66,000 km) interstate road network. Federal Fuel taxes, introduced in 1956 was paid into a new Highway Trust Fund which could only fund highway construction (until 1983 when some 10% was diverted into a new Mass Transit Account). Streetcar operators were also at times required to pay for the reinstatement of their lines following the construction of the freeways system (see Transportation in metropolitan Detroit).[26] Urban sprawl, white flight and suburbanization created land-use patterns which could not be easily served by streetcars, or indeed by any public transport.[citation needed] Every first time purchaser of an automobile deprived the streetcars operator of income whilst simultaneously created additional traffic congestion which often reduced service speeds and thereby increased their operational costs and making the services less attractive to the remaining users. [citation needed] Free parking facilities were generally provided at business and leisure destinations with the costs often being paid by all client, regardless of mode of transport.[citation needed] Others have suggested that streetcars were naturally replaced by the private automobile and the bus following the development of reliable internal combustion engines. These include Cliff Slater[n 16] and also by Randal O'Toole

of the Cato Institute, (a libertarian think tank[4] which receives significant funding from oil industry interests[27][28]).

Myths and mysteries

The facts around what actually happened have only come out slowly. Businesses were registered in different states; some, such as National City Lines, were incorporated in Delaware, which does not require disclosure of any public information about directors or shareholders. It is clear that the parties involved did not want to be traced. It is inevitable that myths have built up and that there are still mysteries.

Myths

According to Snell's testimony the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad line in New York was profitable until it was acquired and converted to diesel trains.[n 17] In reality the line had been in financial difficulty for years and had filed for bankruptcy in 1935.[29] Ironically, the rail company had itself been indicted in 1914 on a charge of "conspiracy to monopolize interstate commerce by acquiring the control of practically all the transportation facilities of New England".[30] "GM killed the New York street cars". [n 17] In reality the New York Railways Company had entered receivership in 1919,[31] 6 years before it was bought by the New York Railways Corporation with funding from GM and others. "GM Killed the Red cars in Los Angeles".[n 17] In reality Pacific Electric Railway (who operated the 'red cars') had been hemorrhaging routes as traffic congestion got much worse with growing prosperity and car ownership levels after the end of WW2 long before GM got involved in 1953 [n 18] (There is however a more compelling case that GM's actions precipitated the demise of the more central/urban transit system that was serving the same area: the Los Angeles Railway 'Yellow Cars'.) The Salt Lake city system is mentioned in the 1949 court papers. However, according to one source the city's system was only purchased by National City Lines' in 1944 at a time where all but one route had already been withdrawn and the withdrawal of this last line had been approved three years earlier.[32] (See Utah Transit Authority)

Relevant actors
The businesses and people in this section have all been referenced by one other external sources in relation to the 'streetcar scandal'.
Holding companies for transport operators

National City Lines (1920-?) Main holding company for public transport operators

The Omnibus Corporation (19251954) Started by John D. Hertz, who was a director of GM[33] Also known as the 'Omnibus Corporation of America' New York City Omnibus Corporation (19261962) Shared management with The Omnibus Corporation[n 19] Later known as 'Fifth Avenue Coach Lines' United Cities Motor Transport (1932?-1934?) Was 'censored by the American Transit Association for its obviously self-serving role'.[n 20] Pacific City Lines (19371948) Merged into National City Lines in 1948 [34] American City Lines (19431946) Merged with National City Lines 1946. [34]

Personnel William Randolph Hearst American newspaper magnate and leading newspaper publisher who, according to Guy Span "had been supporting a populist campaign against the so-called "Traction Trusts" for years" [n 21] John D. Hertz President of many relevant businesses and main board member of General Motors

John Francis Hylan Mayor of New York from 1918 to 1925 who complained about the power of the "bankers and Rockefeller-Standard Oil interests" Alfred P. Sloan Head of General Motors Charles Erwin Wilson Former head of General Motors, later Defense Secretary[n 22]

Manufacturing companies

In addition to the six business indicted in 1947:

Yellow Cab Manufacturing Company Manufacturer of Taxicabs and parent company of 'Yellow Coach Manufacturing Company'. Yellow Coach Manufacturing Company Major manufacturer of Buses Coaches, acquired by General Motors

Finance organizations General Motors Acceptance Corporation There were allegations that the organization encouraged conversion to buses by offering the operator's banks deposits in return for conversion to buses. [n 23] Training General Motors Institute Training city planners with alleged bias towards buses.[n 24] Advocacy groups American Highway Users Alliance . Founded in 1932 by Alfred P. Sloan, president of General Motors

Affected transit lines Chicago North Shore Line[n 25] Cleveland Railway (Ohio)[n 26] Details are in short supply.

Key System Los Angeles Railway "Yellow Cars" History of MTA Maryland New York and Harlem Railroad Pacific Electric Railway "Red Cars" using 'Metropolitan Coach Lines' San Diego Electric Railway[12] Philadelphia trolleys Streetcars in St. Louis. Mentioned in the 1949 court papers.
[36] [35]

History of General Motors

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search

The Renaissance Center in Detroit, Michigan, is the world headquarters of General Motors. The history of General Motors (GM), one of the world's largest car and truck manufacturers, reaches back more than a century and involves a vast scope of industrial activity around the world, mostly focused on motorized transportation and the engineering and manufacturing that make it possible. Founded in 1908, in Flint, Michigan, as of 2012 it employs approximately

202,000 people around the world.[1] With global headquarters at the Renaissance Center in Detroit, Michigan, United States, GM manufactures its cars and trucks in 35 countries. In 2008, 8.35 million[2] GM cars and trucks were sold globally under various brands. The GM automotive brands today are Vauxhall, Daewoo, Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, GMC, Holden, Opel, and Wuling. Former GM automotive brands include Oakland, Oldsmobile, Pontiac, Hummer, Saab, and Saturn. In addition to these brands selling assembled vehicles, GM also has had various automotivecomponent and non-automotive brands, many of which it divested in the 1980s through 2000s. These have included Electro-Motive Diesel (locomotive, marine, and industrial diesel engines); Detroit Diesel (automotive and industrial diesel engines); Allison (transmissions, gas turbine engines); Frigidaire (refrigeration and air conditioning); New Departure (bearings); Delco Electronics and ACDelco (electrical and electronic components); GMAC (finance); GM Defense (military vehicles) and Electronic Data Systems (information technology).

Contents

1 19081932 2 19331958
o o

2.1 World War II 2.2 Post-war growth

3 19581980 4 1981present
o o

4.1 Production of SUVs and trucks vs. cars 4.2 Corporate restructuring

5 History of General Motors in various countries

o o

5.1 General Motors in South Africa 5.2 General Motors in Argentina

6 Corporate spin-offs
o o o o o

6.1 Electronic Data Systems Corporation 6.2 Delco Electronics Corporation 6.3 Hughes Electronics Corporation 6.4 Delphi Corporation 6.5 Diesel engines

6.6 General Motors Acceptance Corporation

7 General Motors leadership

o o o o

7.1 Chairmen of the Board of General Motors 7.2 Chief Executive Officers of General Motors 7.3 Vice Chairmen of General Motors 7.4 Presidents of General Motors

8 Criticism
o o o o o

8.1 1930s Germany 8.2 Great American streetcar scandal theory 8.3 Corvair 8.4 Top-level management 8.5 EV1

9 See also 10 References 11 Bibliography

o o

11.1 Works cited 11.2 Further reading

12 External links

19081932

GM's headquarters from 1923 until 1996, a National Historic Landmark, is now Cadillac Place state office building.

General Motors was founded on Wednesday, September 16, 1908, in Flint, Michigan, as a holding company for Buick (then controlled by William C. Durant). Durant's company, the Durant-Dort Carriage Company, had been in business in Flint since 1886, and by 1900, was producing over 100,000 carriages a year in factories located in Michigan and Canada. Prior to his acquisition of Buick, Durant had several Ford dealerships. With springs, axles and other key components being provided to the early automotive industry by Durant-Dort, it can be reasoned that GM actually began with the founding of Durant-Dort.[3] Durant acquired Oldsmobile later in 1908. The next year, he brought in Cadillac, Cartercar, Elmore, Ewing, and Oakland (later known as Pontiac). In 1909, General Motors also acquired the Reliance Motor Truck Company of Owosso, Michigan, and the Rapid Motor Vehicle Company of Pontiac, Michigan, the predecessors of GMC Truck. A Rapid became the first truck to conquer Pikes Peak in 1909. In 1910, Welch and Rainier were added to the ever-growing list of companies controlled by GM. Durant lost control of GM in 1910 to a bankers trust as the deal to buy Ford for $8,000,000.00 fell through, due to the large amount of debt (around $1 million) taken on in its acquisitions. Durant left the firm and co-founded the Chevrolet Motor Company in 1911 with Louis Chevrolet. After a brilliant stock buy back campaign with the McLaughlin and DuPont corporations, and other Chevrolet stock holders, he returned to head GM in 1916, with the backing of Pierre S. du Pont. On October 13 of the same year, GM Company became incorporated as General Motors Corporation[4] (reverting to General Motors Company[5] upon emergence from bankruptcy in 2009). Chevrolet entered the General Motors fold in 1917; its first GM car was 1918's Chevrolet 490. Du Pont removed Durant from management in 1920, and various Du Pont interests held large or controlling share holdings until about 1950. In 1918 GM acquired the McLaughlin Motor Car Company of Oshawa, Ontario, Canada, manufacturer of the McLaughlin automobile since 1907 (later to be renamed McLaughlin-Buick) as well as Canadian versions of Chevrolet cars since 1915. The company was renamed General Motors of Canada Ltd., with R.S. "Colonel Sam" McLaughlin as its first president and his brother George as vice-president.[6] GM's headquarters were located in Flint until the mid-1920s when it was moved to Detroit. Its building, originally to be called the Durant Building, was designed and began construction in 1919 when Durant was president, was completed in 1923 (Sloan became president that year) and officially dedicated as the General Motors Building in 1929.[7] GM maintained this headquarters location, now called Cadillac Place, until it purchased the Renaissance Center in 1996.[8] The Buick Division headquarters remained in Flint until 1998 when it was relocated to the Renaissance Center.[9] In 1925, GM bought Vauxhall of England, and then in 1929 went on to acquire an 80% stake in German automobile manufacturer Opel. Two years later this was increased to 100%. In 1931, GM acquired Holden of Australia.

In 1926, GM created the Pontiac as a "companion" to the Oakland brand, an arrangement that lasted five years. The companion outsold its parent during that period, by so much that the Oakland brand was terminated and the division was renamed Pontiac. GM surpassed Ford Motor Company in sales in the late 1920s thanks to the leadership of Alfred P. Sloan. While Ford continued to refine the manufacturing process to reduce cost, Sloan was inventing new ways of managing a complex worldwide organization, while paying special attention to consumer demands. Car buyers no longer wanted the cheapest and most basic model; they wanted style, power, and prestige, which GM offered them. Sloan did not neglect cost, by any means; when it was proposed Chevrolet should introduce safety glass, he opposed it because it threatened profits.[10] Thanks to consumer financing via GMAC (founded 1919), easy monthly payments allowed far more people to buy GM cars than Ford, as Henry Ford was opposed to credit on moral principles. (Nevertheless, Ford did offer similar credit arrangements with the introduction of the Model A in the late 1920s but Ford Credit did not exist until 1959.) At one time each of GM's automotive divisions in the United States was targeted to a specific market segment, and, despite some shared components, each distinguished itself from its stablemates with unique styling and technology. The shared components and common corporate management created substantial economies of scale, while the distinctions between the divisions created (in the words of GM President Sloan) a "ladder of success", with an entry-level buyer starting out with a "basic transportation" Chevrolet, rising through GMC, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, and ultimately to Cadillac.

19331958
During the 1920s and 1930s, General Motors assumed control of the Yellow Coach bus company, and helped create Greyhound bus lines. They replaced intercity train transport with buses, and established subsidiary companies to buy out streetcar companies and replace the railbased services as well with buses. GM formed United Cities Motor Transit in 1932 (see Great American streetcar scandal for additional details). In 1930, GM also began its foray into aircraft design and manufacturing by buying Fokker Aircraft Corp of America (U.S. subsidiary of Fokker) and Berliner-Joyce Aircraft, merging them into General Aviation Manufacturing Corporation. Through a stock exchange GM took controlling interest in North American Aviation and merged it with its General Aviation division in 1933, but retaining the name North American Aviation. In 1948, GM divested NAA as a public company, never to have a major interest in the aircraft manufacturing industry again. General Motors bought the internal combustion engined railcar builder Electro-Motive Corporation and its engine supplier Winton Engine in 1930, renaming both as the General Motors Electro-Motive Division. Over the next twenty years, diesel-powered locomotives the majority built by GM largely replaced other forms of traction on American railroads. (During World War II, these engines were also important in American submarines and destroyer escorts.) Electro-Motive was sold in early 2005.

In 1935, the United Auto Workers labor union was formed, and in 1936 the UAW organized the Flint Sit-Down Strike, which initially idled two key plants in Flint, but later spread to half-adozen other plants including Janesville, Wisconsin and Fort Wayne, Indiana. In Flint, police attempted to enter the plant to arrest strikers, leading to violence; in other cities the plants were shuttered peacefully. The strike was resolved February 11, 1937 when GM recognized the UAW as the exclusive bargaining representative for its workers.

World War II
See also Criticism > 1930s Germany (below) General Motors produced vast quantities of armaments, vehicles, and aircraft for the Allied war effort during World War II. Its multinational interests were split up by the combating powers during the war such that the American, Canadian and British parts of the corporation served the Allied war effort and Adam Opel AG served the Axis war effort. By the spring of 1939, the German Government had assumed day-to-day control of American owned factories in Germany, but decided against nationalizing them completely (seizing the assets and capital). Soon after the war broke out, the nationalization came.[11] GM's William S. Knudsen served as head of U.S. wartime production for President Franklin Roosevelt, who called Detroit the Arsenal of Democracy. The General Motors UK division, Vauxhall Motors, manufactured the Churchill tank series for the Allies. The Vauxhall Churchill tanks were instrumental in the UK campaigns in North Africa. Bedford Vehicles and GM of Canada, CMP manufactured logistics vehicles for the UK military, all important in the UK's land campaigns. In addition, GM was the top manufacturer of U.S. Army 1 ton 4x4 vehicles.[12] By mainstream accounts, General Motors' German subsidiary (Adam Opel AG) was outside the control of the American parent corporation during World War II. Some conspiracy theorists posit that this was a hoax, with the American GM as a secret war profiteer on both sides, but Alfred Sloan's memoir, for example,[13] presents a description of lost control that is much more Occamcompliant than the fringe alternatives. However, even without any such conspiracy, GM found criticism for its tax avoidance around the Opel topic. During the war, GM declared it had abandoned its German subsidiary, and took a complete tax write-off worth "approximately $22.7 million", yet after the war, GM collected some $33 million in "war reparations" because the Allies had bombed its German facilities.[14]

General Motors Corporations Specimen Stock Certificate

Post-war growth
At one point GM had become the largest corporation registered in the United States, in terms of its revenues as a percent of GDP. In 1953, Charles Erwin Wilson, then GM president, was named by Eisenhower as Secretary of Defense. When he was asked during the hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee if as secretary of defense he could make a decision adverse to the interests of General Motors, Wilson answered affirmatively but added that he could not conceive of such a situation "because for years I thought what was good for the country was good for General Motors and vice versa". Later this statement was often misquoted, suggesting that Wilson had said simply, "What's good for General Motors is good for the country."[citation needed] At the time, GM was one of the largest employers in the world only Soviet state industries employed more people. In 1955, General Motors became the first American corporation to pay taxes of over $1 billion.[15]

19581980
By 1958, the divisional distinctions within GM began to blur with the availability of highperformance engines in Chevrolets and Pontiacs.[citation needed] The introduction of higher trim models such as the Chevrolet Impala and Pontiac Bonneville priced in line with some Oldsmobile and Buick offerings was also confusing to consumers. By the time Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick introduced similarly styled and priced compact models in 1961, the old "step-up" structure between the divisions was nearly over.

A classic General Motors muscle car, the 1969 Pontiac GTO The decade of the 1960s saw the creation of compact and intermediate classes. The Chevrolet Corvair was a flat 6-cylinder (air cooled) answer to the Volkswagen Beetle, the Chevy II was created to match Ford's conventional Falcon, after sales of the Corvair failed to match its Ford rival, and the Chevrolet Camaro/Pontiac Firebird was GM's countermeasure to the Ford Mustang. Among intermediates, the Oldsmobile Cutlass nameplate became so popular during the 1970s that Oldsmobile applied the Cutlass name to most of its products in the 1980s. By the mid 1960s, most of GM's vehicles were built on a few common platforms and in the 1970s GM began to further unify body panel stampings.

The 1971 Chevrolet Vega was GM's launch into the new subcompact class to compete against the import's increasing market share. Problems associated with its innovative aluminum engine led to the model's discontinuation after seven model years in 1977. During the late 1970s, GM would initiate a wave of downsizing starting with the Chevrolet Caprice which was reborn into what was the size of the Chevrolet Chevelle, the Malibu would be the size of the Nova, and the Nova was replaced by the troubled front-wheel drive Chevrolet Citation. In 1976, Chevrolet came out with the rear-wheel drive sub compact Chevette. While GM maintained its world leadership in revenue and market share throughout the 1960s to 1980s, it was product controversy that plagued the company in this period. It seemed that, in every decade, a major mass-production product line was launched with defects of one type or another showing up early in their life cycle. And, in each case, improvements were eventually made to mitigate the problems, but the resulting improved product ended up failing in the marketplace as its negative reputation overshadowed its ultimate excellence. The first of these fiascos was the Chevrolet Corvair in the 1960s. Introduced in 1959 as a 1960 model, it was initially very popular. But before long its quirky handling earned it a reputation for being unsafe, inspiring consumer advocate Ralph Nader to lambaste it in his book, Unsafe at Any Speed, published in 1965. Ironically, by the same (1965) model year, suspension revisions and other improvements had already transformed the car into a perfectly acceptable vehicle, but its reputation had been sufficiently sullied in the public's perception that its sales sagged for the next few years, and it was discontinued after the 1969 model year. During this period, it was also somewhat overwhelmed by the success of the Ford Mustang. The 1970s was the decade of the Vega. Launched as a 1971 model, it also began life as a very popular car in the marketplace. But within a few years, quality problems, exacerbated by labor unrest at its main production source in Lordstown, Ohio, gave the car a bad name. By 1977 its decline resulted in termination of the model name, while its siblings along with a Monza version and a move of production to Ste-Thrse, Quebec, resulted in a thoroughly desirable vehicle and extended its life to the 1980 model year. Oldsmobile sales soared in the 1970s and 1980s (for an all-time high of 1,066,122 in 1985) based on popular designs, positive reviews from critics and the perceived quality and reliability of the Rocket V8 engine, with the Cutlass series becoming North America's top selling car by 1976. By this time, Olds had displaced Pontiac and Plymouth as the #3 best selling brand in the U.S. behind Chevrolet and Ford. In the early 1980s, model-year production topped one million units on several occasions, something only Chevrolet and Ford had achieved. The soaring popularity of Oldsmobile vehicles resulted in a major issue in 1977, as demand exceeded production capacity for the Oldsmobile V8, and as a result Oldsmobile quietly began equipping some full size Delta 88 models and the very popular Cutlass/Cutlass Supreme with the Chevrolet 350 engine instead (each division of GM produced its own 350 V8 engine). Many customers were loyal Oldsmobile buyers who specifically wanted the Rocket V8, and did not discover that their vehicle had the Chevrolet engine until they performed maintenance and discovered that purchased parts did not fit. This led to a class-action lawsuit which became a public relations nightmare for GM.[16][17] Following this debacle, disclaimers stating that "Oldsmobiles are equipped with engines produced by various GM divisions" were tacked on to advertisements and

sales literature; all other GM divisions followed suit. In addition, GM quickly stopped associating engines with particular divisions, and to this day all GM engines are produced by "GM Powertrain" (GMPT) and are called GM "Corporate" engines instead of GM "Division" engines. Although it was the popularity of the Oldsmobile division vehicles that prompted this change, declining sales of V8 engines would have made this change inevitable as all but the Chevrolet (and, later, Cadillac's Northstar) versions were eventually dropped. In the 1980 model year, a full line of automobiles on the X-body platform, anchored by the Chevrolet Citation, was launched. Again, these cars were all quite popular in their respective segments for the first couple of years, but brake problems, and other defects, ended up giving them, known to the public as "X-Cars", such a bad reputation that the 1985 model year was their last. The J-body cars, namely the Chevrolet Cavalier and Pontiac Sunbird, took their place, starting with the 1982 model year. Quality was better, but still not exemplary, although good enough to survive through three generations to the 2005 model year. They were produced in a much-improved Lordstown Assembly plant, as were their replacements, the Chevrolet Cobalt and Pontiac Pursuit/G5.

1981present
Roger B. Smith served as CEO throughout the 1980s. GM profits struggled from 1981-83 following the late 1970s and early 1980s recession. In 1981, the UAW negotiated some concessions with the company in order to bridge the recession. GM profits rebounded during the 1980s. During the 1980s, GM had downsized its product line and invested heavily in automated manufacturing. It also created the Saturn brand to produce small cars. GM's customers still wanted larger vehicles and began to purchase greater numbers of SUVs. Roger Smith's reorganization of the company had been criticized for its consolidation of company divisions and its effect on the uniqueness of GM's brands and models. His attempts to streamline costs were not always popular with GM's customer base. In addition to forming Saturn, Smith also negotiated joint ventures with two Japanese companies (NUMMI in California with Toyota, and CAMI with Suzuki in Canada). Each of these agreements provided opportunities for the respective companies to experience different approaches. The decade of the 1990s began with an economic recession, taking its inevitable toll on the automotive industry, and throwing GM into some of its worst losses. As a result, "Jack" Smith (not related to Roger) became burdened with the task of overseeing a radical restructuring of General Motors. Sharing Roger's understanding of the need for serious change, Jack undertook many major revisions. Reorganizing the management structure to dismantle the legacy of Alfred P. Sloan, instituting deep cost-cutting and introducing significantly improved vehicles were the key approaches. These moves were met with much less resistance within GM than had Roger's similar initiatives as GM management ranks were stinging from their recent near-bankruptcy experience and were much more willing to accept the prospect of radical change. Following the first Gulf War and a recession GM's profits again suffered from 1991-93. For the remainder of the decade the company's profits rebounded and it made market share gains with the popularity of its SUVs and pick-up truck lines. Rick Wagoner had served as the company's Chief Financial Officer during this period in the early 1990s. GM's foreign rivals gained market

share especially following U.S. recessionary periods while the company recovered. U.S. trade policy and foreign trade barriers became a point of contention for GM and other U.S. automakers who had complained that they were not given equal access to foreign markets. Trade issues had prompted the Reagan administration to seek import quotas on some foreign carmakers. Later, the Clinton administration engaged in trade negotiations to open foreign markets to U.S. automakers with the Clinton administration threatening trade sanctions in efforts to level the playing field for U.S. automakers.[18] Jos Ignacio ("Inaki") Lpez de Arriorta, who worked under Jack Smith in both Europe and the United States, was poached by Volkswagen in 1993, just hours before Smith announced that Lpez would be promoted to head of GM's North American operations. He was nicknamed Super Lpez for his prowess in cutting costs and streamlining production at GM, although critics said that his tactics angered longtime suppliers. GM accused Lpez of misappropriating trade secrets, in particular taking documents of future Opel vehicles, when he accepted a position with VW. German investigators began a probe of Lpez and VW after prosecutors linked Lpez to a cache of secret GM documents discovered by investigators in the apartment of two of Lpez's VW associates. VW, faced with a plummeting stock price, eventually forced Lpez to resign.[19] GM and Volkswagen since reached a civil settlement, in which Volkswagen agreed to pay GM $100 million and to buy $1 billion worth of parts from GM. [20] After GM's lay-offs in Flint, Michigan, a strike began at the General Motors parts factory in Flint on June 5, 1998, which quickly spread to five other assembly plants and lasted seven weeks. Because of the significant role GM plays in the United States, the strikes and temporary idling of many plants noticeably showed in national economic indicators. In the early 1990s, following first Gulf War and a recession, GM had taken on more debt. By the late 1990s, GM had regained market share; its stock had soared to over $80 a share by 2000. However, in 2001, the stock market drop following the September 11, 2001 attacks, combined with historic pension underfunding, caused a severe pension and benefit fund crisis at GM and many other American companies and the value of their pension funds plummeted.

Production of SUVs and trucks vs. cars

In the late 1990s, the U.S. economy was on the rise and GM and Ford gained market share producing enormous profits primarily from the sale of light trucks and sport-utility vehicles. Following the September 11 attacks, a severe stock market decline caused a pension and benefit fund underfunding crisis. GM began its Keep America Rolling campaign, which boosted sales, and other auto makers were forced to follow suit. The U.S. automakers saw sales increase to leverage costs as gross margins deteriorated. In 2004, GM redirected resources from the development of new sedans to an accelerated refurbishment of their light trucks and SUVs for introduction as 2007 models in early 2006. Shortly after this decision, fuel prices increased by over 50% and this in turn affected both the trade-in value of used vehicles and the perceived desirability of new offerings in these market segments. The current marketing plan is to tout these revised vehicles extensively as offering the

best fuel economy in their class (of vehicle). GM claims its hybrid trucks will have fuel economy improvements of 25%.[citation needed]

Corporate restructuring
See also: List of GM factories and General Motors Chapter 11 reorganization Wikinews has related news: GM Chapter 11 news After gaining market share in the late 1990s and making enormous profits, General Motors stock soared to over $80 a share. From June 1999 to September 2000, the Federal Reserve, in a move to quell potential inflationary pressures created by, among other things, the stock market, made successive interest rate increases, credited in part for "plunging the country into a recession."[21] [22] The recession and the volatile stock marketed created a pension and benefit fund crisis at General Motors and many other American companies. General Motors' rising retiree health care costs and Other Post Employment Benefit (OPEB) fund deficit prompted the company to enact a broad restructuring plan. Although GM had already taken action to fully fund its pension plan, its OPEB fund became an issue for its corporate bond ratings. GM had expressed its disagreement with the bond ratings; moreover, GM's benefit funds were performing at higher than expected rates of return. Then, following a $10.6 billion loss in 2005, GM acted quickly to implement its restructuring plan. For the first quarter of 2006 GM earned $400 million, signaling that a turnaround had already begun even though many aspects of the restructuring plan had not yet taken effect. In 2003, GM responded to the crisis by fully funding its pension fund with a $15 B payment; however, its Other Post Employment Benefits Fund (OPEB) became a serious issue resulting in downgrades to its bond rating in 2005. The company expressed its disagreement with these bond rating downgrades. In the late 1990s, the U.S. economy was on the rise and GM and Ford gained market share producing enormous profits primarily from the sale of light trucks and sport-utility vehicles. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, a severe stock market decline caused a pension and benefit fund underfunding crisis. GM began its Keep America Rolling campaign, which boosted sales, and other auto makers were forced to follow suit. The U.S. automakers saw sales increase to leverage costs as gross margins deteriorated. Although retiree health care costs remain a significant issue, General Motors' investment strategy has generated a $17.1 billion surplus in 2007 in its $101 billion U.S. pension fund portfolio, a $35 billion reversal from its $17.8 billion of underfunding.[23] In February 2005, GM successfully bought itself out of a put option with Fiat for $2 billion USD (1.55 billion). In 2000, GM had sold a 6% stake to Fiat in return for a 20% share in the Italian automaker. As part of the deal, GM granted Fiat a put option, which, if the option had been exercised between January 2004 and July 2009, could have forced GM to buy Fiat. GM had agreed to the put option at the time, perhaps to keep it from being acquired by another automaker, such as Daimler AG, competing with GM's German subsidiary Opel. The relationship suffered and Fiat had failed to improve. In 2003, Fiat recapitalized, reducing GM's stake to 10%.

In February 2006, GM slashed its annual dividend from $2.00 to $1.00 per share. The reduction saved $565 million a year. In March 2006, GM divested 92.36 million shares (reducing its stake from 20% to 3%) of Japanese manufacturer Suzuki, in order to raise $2.3 billion. GM originally invested in Suzuki in the early 1980s. On March 23, 2006, a private equity consortium including Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Goldman Sachs Capital, and Five Mile Capital purchased $8.8 billion, or 78% of GMAC's commercial mortgage arm. The name of the new entity, in which GMAC owns a 21% stake, is Capmark Financial Group.[24] On April 3, 2006, GM announced that it would sell 51% of GMAC as a whole to a consortium led by Cerberus Capital Management, raising $14 billion over three years. Investors also included Citigroup's private equity arm and Aozora Bank of Japan. The group will pay GM $7.4 billion in cash at closing. GM will retain approximately $20 billion in automobile financing worth an estimated $4 billion over three years. GM sold its remaining 8% stake in Isuzu, which had peaked at 49% just a few years earlier,[25] on April 11, 2006, to raise an additional $300 million.[26] 12,600 workers from Delphi, a key supplier to GM, agreed to buyouts and an early retirement plan offered by GM in order to avoid a strike, after a judge agreed to cancel Delphi's union contracts. 5,000 Delphi workers were allowed to flow to GM. In 2006, GM offered buyouts to hourly workers to reduce future liability; over 35,000 workers responded to the offer, well exceeding the company's goal. GM gained higher rates of return on its benefit funds as a part of the solution. Stock value began to rebound - as of October 30, 2006 GM's market capitalization was about $19.19 billion. GM stock began the year 2006 at $19 a share, near its lowest level since 1982, as many on Wall Street figured the ailing automaker was bound for bankruptcy court. But GM remained afloat and the company's stock in the Dow Jones industrial average posted the biggest percentage gain in 2006.[27] In June 2007, GM sold its military and commercial subsidiary, Allison Transmission, for $5.6 billion. Having sold off the majority, it will, however, keep its heavy-duty transmissions for its trucks marketed as the Allison 1000 series. During negotiations for the renewal of its industry labor contracts in 2007, the United Auto Workers (UAW) union selected General Motors as the "lead company" or "strike target" for pattern bargaining. Late in September, sensing an impending impasse in the talks, the union called a strike, the first nation-wide walkout since 1970 (individual plants had experienced local labor disruptions in the interim). Within two days, however, a tentative agreement was achieved and the strike ended. On June 28, 2007, GM agreed to sell its Allison Transmission division to private-equity firms Carlyle Group and Onex for $5.1 billion. The deal will increase GM's liquidity and echoes previous moves to shift its focus towards its core automotive business. The two firms will control seven factories around Indianapolis but GM will retain management of a factory in Baltimore.

Former Allison Transmission president Lawrence E. Dewey will be the new CEO of the standalone company.[28] Kirk Kerkorian once owned 9.9 percent of GM. According to press accounts from June 30, 2006, Kerkorian suggested that Renault acquire a 20 percent stake in GM to rescue GM from itself. A letter from Tracinda to Rick Wagoner was released to the public[29] to pressure GM's executive hierarchy,[30] but talks failed.[31] On November 22, 2006, Kerkorian sold 14 million shares of his GM stake (it is speculated that this action was due to GM's rejection of Renault and Nissan's bids for stakes in the company as both of these bids were strongly supported by Kerkorian); the sale resulted in GM's share price falling 4.1% from its 20 November price, although it remained above $30/share.[32] The sale lowered Kerkorian's holding to around 7% of GM. On November 30, 2006, Tracinda said it had agreed to sell another 14 million shares of GM, cutting Kerkorian's stake to half of what it had been earlier that year.[33] By the end of November 2006, he had sold substantially all of his remaining GM shares.[34] After Kerkorian sold, GM lost more than 90% of its value, falling as low as $1/share by May 2009.[35] On February 12, 2008, GM announced its operating loss was $2 billion (with a GAAP loss of $39 billion including a one time accounting charge). GM offered buyouts to all its UAW members. On March 24, 2008, GM reported a cash position of $24 billion, or $6 billion less than what was on hand September 31, 2007,[dubious discuss] which is a loss of $1 billion a month.[36] A further quarterly loss of $15.5 billion, the third-biggest in the company's history, was announced on August 1, 2008.[37] On November 17, 2008, GM announced it would sell its stake in Suzuki Motor Corp. (3.02%) for 22.37 billion yen ($230 million)[38] in order to raise much needed cash to get through the 2008 economic crisis. In 2008, 8.35 million GM cars and trucks were sold globally under the brands Vauxhall, Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, GMC, GM Daewoo, Holden, Pontiac, Hummer, Saab, Saturn, Wuling [2] and Opel of Germany. In late 2008 GM, along with Chrysler, received loans from the American, Canadian, and Ontarian governments to bridge the late-2000s recession, record oil prices, and a severe global automotive sales decline (see also automotive industry crisis of 20082009) due to the global financial crisis of 20082009. On February 20, 2009, GM's Saab division filed for reorganization in a Swedish court after being denied loans from the Swedish government.[39][40] On April 27, 2009, GM announced that it would phase out the Pontiac brand by the end of 2010 and focus on four core brands in North America: Chevrolet, Cadillac, Buick, and GMC. It announced that the resolution (sale) of its Hummer, Saab, and Saturn brands would take place by the end of 2009. (By November, however, proposed deals to sell Saturn to Penske and Saab to Koenigsegg had failed to materialize.) The company had previously cancelled Oldsmobile.

On May 30, 2009, it was announced that a deal had been reached to transfer GM's Opel assets to a separate company, majority-owned by a consortium led by Sberbank of Russia (35%), Magna International (20%), and Opel employees (10%). GM is expected to keep a 35% minority stake in the new company.[41] However, GM delayed acceptance of the deal pending other bids, notably a proposed 51% stake by Beijing Automotive. By early July, a decision had not been made, but Magna remained confident and scheduled a meeting for July 14 to announce its acceptance.[42] After months of deliberation, however, GM decided on November 3, 2009 to retain full ownership of the German carmaker Opel, thus voiding the tentative deal with the Magna consortium.[43] In June 2010, the company established General Motors Ventures, a subsidiary designed to help the company identify and develop new technologies in the automotive and transportation sectors.
[44]

History of General Motors in various countries

General Motors in South Africa
Main article: General Motors South Africa General Motors was criticized for its presence in apartheid South Africa. The company withdrew after pressure from consumers, stockholders and Leon H. Sullivan.[45] It retained a commercial presence, however, in the form of its Opel subsidiary. Right Hand Drive Opel & Vauxhall production took place in GM's Uitenhage plants outside Port Elisabeth in the eastern Cape Province, and does so to this day.

General Motors in Argentina

In 1925 General Motors settled down in Argentina and started producing the Double Phaeton standard and the Double Phaeton called "Especial Argentino". The production was completed with a sedan model, a roadster and a truck chassis also adaptable to transporting of passengers. Sales increased and soon the Oldsmobile, Oakland and Pontiac brands were incorporated into the assembly line; the capacity of the facility was not enough to supply the increasing demand and the building of a new plant was required. A new 48,000 m2 plant with a covered area was opened in 1929, and since then the Buick, Marquette, La Salle, Cadillac, Vauxhaul and Opel marques also started to be produced. When the Second World War broke out the operations were complicated. In 1941, 250.000 Chevrolets were made, but shortage of parts made car production impossible. The last Chevrolet left the plant in August, 1942.[46] though in order to avoid total stoppage, the company made electrical and portable refrigerators and car accessories in addition to other items. After the war, GM started producing the Oldsmobile and Pontiac lines and later Chevrolet was added. Production resumed in 1960 with Chevrolet pickups and shortly thereafter in 1962 it started assembling the first/second generation Chevy II until 1974 as Chevrolet 400, and the early thirdgeneration (1968 model) Nova as the Chevrolet Chevy from late 1969 through 1978, both

models overlapping for several years, the Chevy II marketed as a family sedan while the Nova as a sporty alternative. Thenceforth several Opel models and Chevrolet pickups are being manufactured.

Corporate spin-offs
Electronic Data Systems Corporation
Main article: Electronic Data Systems In 1984, GM acquired Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS), a leading data processing and telecommunications company, to be the sole provider of information technology (IT) services for the company. EDS became independent again in 1996, signing a 10-year agreement to continue providing IT services to General Motors.[47]

Delco Electronics Corporation

Delco Electronics Corporation was the automotive electronics design and manufacturing subsidiary of General Motors. The name Delco came from the Dayton Engineering Laboratories Co., founded in Dayton, Ohio by Charles Kettering and Edward A. Deeds. Delco was responsible for several innovations in automobile electric systems, including the first reliable battery ignition system and the first practical automobile self starter. In 1936 Delco began producing the first dashboard-installed car radios. By the early 1970s Delco had become a major supplier of automotive electronics equipment. Based in Kokomo, Indiana, Delco Electronics employed more than 30,000 at its peak. In 1962 GM created the General Motors Research Laboratories, based in Santa Barbara, California, to conduct research and development activities on defense systems. This organization was eventually merged into Delco Electronics and renamed Delco Systems Operations. In 1985 General Motors purchased Hughes Aircraft and merged it with Delco Electronics to form Hughes Electronics Corporation, an independent subsidiary. In 1997 all of the defense businesses of Hughes Electronics (including Delco Systems Operations) were merged with Raytheon, and the commercial portion of Delco Electronics was transferred to GM's Delphi Automotive Systems business. Delphi became a separate publicly-traded company in May 1999, and continued to use the Delco Electronics name for several of its subsidiaries through approximately 2004. Although Delco Electronics no longer exists as an operating company, GM still retains rights to the Delco name and uses it for some of its subsidiaries including the AC Delco parts division.

Hughes Electronics Corporation

Hughes logo, adopted after its new owner General Motors Main article: Hughes Aircraft Hughes Electronics Corporation was formed on December 31, 1985 when Hughes Aircraft Company was sold by the Howard Hughes Medical Institute to General Motors for $5.2 billion. General Motors merged Hughes Aircraft with its Delco Electronics unit to form Hughes Electronics Corporation, an independent subsidiary. This division was a major aerospace and defense contractor, civilian space systems manufacturer and communications company. The aerospace and defense business was sold to Raytheon in 1997 and the Space and Communications division was sold to Boeing in 2000. Hughes Research Laboratories became jointly owned by GM, Raytheon, and Boeing. In 2003, the remaining parts of Hughes Electronics were sold to News Corporation and renamed The DirecTV Group.

Delphi Corporation
Main article: Delphi (auto parts)

Delphi Corp. logo Delphi was spun off from General Motors on May 28, 1999. Delphi is one of the largest automotive parts manufacturers and has approximately 185,000 employees (50,000 in the United States). With offices worldwide, the company operates 167 wholly owned manufacturing sites, 41 joint ventures, 53 customer centers and sales offices, and 33 technical centers in 38 countries. Delphi makes the Monsoon premium audio systems found in some GM and other manufacturer automobiles. On October 8, 2005, Delphi filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. On March 31, 2006, Delphi announced it would sell off or close 21 of its 29 plants in the United States.

Diesel engines
Detroit Diesel was originally the GM Diesel Division then Detroit Diesel Allison Division until 1988. It made diesel engines for truck, generating set and marine use. Electro-Motive Diesel (EMD) was originally the Electro-Motive Division of GM, until 2005. It made diesel engines and locomotives.

See also General Motors Diesel Division and GM Defense.

General Motors Acceptance Corporation

By the end of 2006, GM had completed the divestiture of 51% of its financing unit, GMAC. Currently GM is a 10% owner in GMAC.

General Motors leadership

Chairmen of the Board of General Motors
Chairmen of the Board of General Motors[48]

Thomas Neal -- November 19, 1912 - November 16, 1915 Pierre S. du Pont -- November 16, 1915 - February 7, 1929 Lammot du Pont II -- February 7, 1929 - May 3, 1937 Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. -- May 3, 1937 - April 2, 1956 Albert Bradley -- April 2, 1956 - August 31, 1958 Frederic G. Donner -- September 1, 1958 - October 31, 1967 James M. Roche -- November 1, 1967 - December 31, 1971 Richard C. Gerstenberg -- January 1, 1972 - November 30, 1974 Thomas A. Murphy -- December 1, 1974 - December 31, 1980 Roger B. Smith -- January 1, 1981 - July 31, 1990 Robert C. Stempel -- August 1, 1990 - November 1, 1992 John G. Smale -- November 2, 1992 - December 31, 1995 John F. "Jack" Smith, Jr. -- January 1, 1996 - April 30, 2003 G. Richard Wagoner, Jr. -- May 1, 2003 - March 30, 2009 Kent Kresa -- March 30, 2009 - July 10, 2009 Edward ("Ed") Whitacre, Jr. -- July 10, 2009 December 31, 2010[49] Dan Akerson -- December 31, 2010 present[50]

Chief Executive Officers of General Motors

Chief Executive Officers of General Motors[51]

Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. -- May 10, 1923 - June 3, 1946 Charles Erwin Wilson -- June 3, 1946 - January 26, 1953 Harlow H. Curtice -- February 2, 1953 - August 31, 1958 James M. Roche -- November 1, 1967 - December 31, 1971 Richard C. Gerstenberg -- January 1, 1972 - November 30, 1974 Thomas A. Murphy -- December 1, 1974 - December 31, 1980 Roger B. Smith -- January 1, 1981 - July 31, 1990 Robert C. Stempel -- August 1, 1990 - November 1, 1992 John F. "Jack" Smith, Jr. -- November 2, 1992 - May 31, 2000 G. Richard Wagoner, Jr. -- June 1, 2000 - March 30, 2009 Frederick A. "Fritz" Henderson -- March 30, 2009 - December 1, 2009[52] Edward ("Ed") Whitacre, Jr. -- December 1, 2009 September 1, 2010[53] Dan Akerson -- September 1, 2010 present[54]

Vice Chairmen of General Motors

Vice Chairmen of General Motors[51]

Donaldson Brown -- May 3, 1937 - June 3, 1946 George Russell -- November 1, 1967 - March 31, 1970 Richard C. Gerstenberg -- April 6, 1970 - December 31, 1971 Thomas A. Murphy -- January 1, 1972 - November 30, 1974 Richard L. Terrell -- October 1, 1974 - January 1, 1979 Oscar A. Lundin -- December 1, 1974 - November 30, 1975 Howard H. Kerhl -- February 1, 1981 - December 31, 1986 Donald J. Atwood -- June 1, 1987 - April 19, 1989 John F. "Jack" Smith, Jr. -- August 1, 1990 - April 6, 1992 Robert J. Schultz -- August 1, 1990 - November 1, 1992 Harry J. Pearce -- January 1, 1996 - May 25, 2001 John M. Devine -- January 1, 2001 - June 1, 2006

Robert A. Lutz -- September 1, 2001present Frederick A. "Fritz" Henderson -- January 1, 2006 - March 3, 2008

Presidents of General Motors

Presidents of General Motors[55]

George E. Daniels -- September 22, 1908 - October 20, 1908 William M. Eaton -- October 20, 1908 - November 23, 1910 James J. Storrow -- November 23, 1910 - January 26, 1911 Thomas Neal -- January 26, 1911 - November 19, 1912 Charles W. Nash -- November 19, 1912 - June 1, 1916 William C. Durant -- June 1, 1916 - November 30, 1920 Pierre S. du Pont -- November 30, 1920 - May 10, 1923 Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. -- May 10, 1923 - May 3, 1937 William S. Knudsen -- May 3, 1937 - September 3, 1940 Charles E. Wilson -- January 6, 1941 - January 26, 1953 Harlow H. Curtice -- February 2, 1953 - August 31, 1958 John F. Gordon -- September 1, 1958 - May 31, 1965 James M. Roche -- June 1, 1965 - October 31, 1967 Edward N. Cole -- November 1, 1967 - September 30, 1974 Elliott M. Estes -- October 1, 1974 - January 31, 1981 F. James McDonald -- February 1, 1981 - August 31, 1987 Robert C. Stempel -- September 1, 1987 - July 31, 1990 Lloyd E. Reuss -- August 1, 1990 - April 6, 1992 John F. "Jack" Smith, Jr. -- April 6, 1992 - October 5, 1998 G. Richard Wagoner, Jr. -- October 5, 1998 - April 30, 2003 Frederick A. "Fritz" Henderson -- March 3, 2008 - December 1, 2009[56]

Criticism

1930s Germany
In August 1938, a senior executive for General Motors, James D. Mooney, received the Grand Cross of the German Eagle for his distinguished service to the Reich. "Nazi armaments chief Albert Speer told a congressional investigator that Germany could not have attempted its September 1939 Blitzkrieg of Poland without the performance-boosting additive technology provided by Alfred P. Sloan and General Motors".[57][58][59][60] During war Opel's Brandenburg facilities produced bombers JU-88, trucks, land mines and torpedo detonators for Nazi Germany.
[61]

Charles Levinson, formerly deputy director of the European office of the CIO, clearly stated in his book, "Vodka-Cola":[62] "Alfred P. Sloan, James D. Mooney, John T. Smith and Graeme K. Howard remained on the Opel board . . . in flagrant violation of existing legislation, information, contacts, transfers and trade continued [throughout the war] to flow between the firm's Detroit headquarters and its subsidiaries both in Allied countries and in territories controlled by the Axis powers. The financial records of Opel Rsselsheim revealed that between 1942 and 1945 production and sales strategy were planned in close coordination with General Motors factories throughout the world.... In 1943, while its American manufacturers were equipping the United States Air Force, the German group were developing, manufacturing and assembling motors for the Messerschmitt 262, the first jet fighter in the world. This innovation gave the Nazis a basic technological advantage. With speeds up to 540 miles per hour, this aircraft could fly 100 miles per hour faster than its American rival, the piston-powered Mustang P51." David Farber, author of Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors (2002), stated that:[63] "GM destroyed Sloan's files to protect itself from lawsuits regarding antitrust issues, the neglect of automobile safety and its investments in Nazi Germany." Sloan's memoir presents a different picture of Opel's wartime existence.[64] According to Sloan, Opel was nationalized (along with most other industrial activity owned or co-owned by foreign interests) by the German state soon after the outbreak of war.[11] Sloan presents Opel at the end of the war as a black box to GM's American managementan organization that the Americans had had no contact with for 5 years. According to Sloan, GM in Detroit debated whether to even try to run Opel in the postwar era, or to leave to the interim West German government the question of who would pick up the pieces.[64] Given the extreme difficulty of civilian communications between Germany and Allied nations during the war, Sloan's lost-contact version of the wartime era seems crediblemore so than the CIO's version. However, GM's actions during the era before the war, between 1936 and 1939 when Germany was rearming in open-secret violation of the Versailles treaty, are much more difficult to defend. The idea that corporate interests weren't prioritized above national or ethical ones during that era seems basically defenseless. Not surprisingly, Sloan's memoir doesn't

mention this topic at all, either because Sloan himself avoided it or because GM's lawyers succeeded in getting it redacted. Defending the German investment strategy as "highly profitable", Alfred P. Sloan told shareholders in 1939 GM's continued industrial production for the Nazi government was merely sound business practice. In a letter to a concerned shareholder, Sloan said that the manner in which the Nazi government ran Germany "should not be considered the business of the management of General Motors...We must conduct ourselves as a German organization. . . We have no right to shut down the plant."[65] After 20 years of researching General Motors, Bradford Snell stated, "General Motors was far more important to the Nazi war machine than Switzerland ... Switzerland was just a repository of looted funds. Opel was an integral part of the German war effort. The Nazis could have invaded Poland and Russia without Switzerland. They could not have done so without GM."[65]

Great American streetcar scandal theory

Main article: Great American streetcar scandal The Great American Streetcar Scandal is an unproven theory developed by Robert Eldridge Hicks in 1970 and published by Grossman Publishers in 1973 in the book "Politics of Land, Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Land Use in California" at pp. 410-12, compiled by Robert C. Fellmeth, Center for Study of Responsive Law, and put forth by Bradford Snell again in 1974, in which GM, along with road-builders, is alleged to have engaged in a policy that triggered the shift from the mass transportation of the previous century to the 'one-person-onecar' trip of today.[66] The theory states that in order to expand auto sales and maximize profits GM bought local mass transit systems and privately owned railways, following which it would proceed to eliminate them.[67] Alternative versions of the events have been put forth by scholars in the field.[68][69][70] Slater, Cosgrove and Span all put forth evidence that counters Snell's theory.

Corvair
Consumer advocate, Ralph Nader, issued a series of attacks on vehicle safety issues from GM particularly the Chevrolet Corvair in his book Unsafe at Any Speed, written in 1968. Being the first major action taken by Nader, he soon established his reputation as a crusader for safety. GM was then accused of sending spies after him. "A woman at the supermarket confronted me and said, 'How would you like to have a talk on foreign affairs?' This wasn't a classroom, this was a supermarket, I was buying cookies - I don't think she wanted to talk about foreign affairs, I think she wanted to talk about domestic affairs", Nader said in the 2006 documentary An Unreasonable Man. Agents were supposedly trying to fix his mind and get him to engage in sexual activity. "Mother would get calls saying, 'We've got a package for Mr. Ralph Nader at 9 AM.' There would also be threats like, 'You better back off, buddy boy'", said Claire, Nader's sister. GM was put on trial for attempting manipulation with Nader, Robert Kennedy and numerous other notable figures present at the trial. In the end, the CEO apologized to Nader; however, Nader continued to work against General Motors.

Top-level management
In 1980, J. Patrick Wright wrote a book named On a Clear Day You Can See General Motors. This book, which critics acclaimed "blows the lid off the king of carmakers" was about the allegations of corruption, "mismanagement and total irresponsibility" at the top level of the company, as seen by John Z. DeLorean, the Vice-President, who, in 1973, resigned from his position in spite of a brilliant and meteoric rise. He was earning $650,000 per year and was expected to be the next President of GM.