You are on page 1of 16

Risk Assessment Data Directory

Report No. 434 A1 March 2010

Appendix 1
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers

ublications

Global experience
The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers has access to a wealth of technical knowledge and experience with its members operating around the world in many different terrains. We collate and distil this valuable knowledge for the industry to use as guidelines for good practice by individual members.

Consistent high quality database and guidelines


Our overall aim is to ensure a consistent approach to training, management and best practice throughout the world. The oil and gas exploration and production industry recognises the need to develop consistent databases and records in certain fields. The OGPs members are encouraged to use the guidelines as a starting point for their operations or to supplement their own policies and regulations which may apply locally.

Internationally recognised source of industry information


Many of our guidelines have been recognised and used by international authorities and safety and environmental bodies. Requests come from governments and non-government organisations around the world as well as from non-member companies.

Disclaimer
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication, neither the OGP nor any of its members past present or future warrants its accuracy or will, regardless of its or their negligence, assume liability for any foreseeable or unforeseeable use made thereof, which liability is hereby excluded. Consequently, such use is at the recipients own risk on the basis that any use by the recipient constitutes agreement to the terms of this disclaimer. The recipient is obliged to inform any subsequent recipient of such terms. This document may provide guidance supplemental to the requirements of local legislation. Nothing herein, however, is intended to replace, amend, supersede or otherwise depart from such requirements. In the event of any conflict or contradiction between the provisions of this document and local legislation, applicable laws shall prevail.

Copyright notice
The contents of these pages are The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. Permission is given to reproduce this report in whole or in part provided (i) that the copyright of OGP and (ii) the source are acknowledged. All other rights are reserved. Any other use requires the prior written permission of the OGP. These Terms and Conditions shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales. Disputes arising here from shall be exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales.

RADD Appendix 1

Appendix I Data Presented in 1996 Datasheet: ESD and Blowdown Systems


This Appendix presents data previously given in the OGP (then E&P Forum) QRA datasheet ESD and Blowdown Systems. The current data is copyright, as stated in Section 2.1; the data previously presented is given in Table I.1 and Table I.2 for reference but should be regarded as illustrative and checked against one of the current sources listed in Table 2.1. Table I.1 Illustrative Data for a Riser ESD Valves System
Item Pilot Valve Pilot Valve Pilot Valve PO Check Valve PO Check Valve PO Check Valve PO Check Valve PO Check Valve Check Valve ESD SOV ESD SOV ESD SOV ESD SOV ESDV ESDV Valve Actuator Actuator Actuator Ball Valve Ball Valve Valve Limit Switch Switch Switch Pilot Line Regulator Accumulator Accumulator Accumulator Annunciator Air Supply Air Supply Pump Filter Filter Filter Gauge Pipework Description All Failures Fail energised Fail de-energised Fail energised fixed Fail de-energised fixed Fail de-energised dynamic Blocked or pilot signal lost Internal leakage Hydraulic; All failures All failures Fail energised Fail de-energised Reset pin failure Fail to close position Fail to re-open Needle, Hydraulic Hydraulic, fail to close Hydraulic, fail to open Hydraulic, all failures + incipient Fail to close All failures Hydraulic manually activated Failure, closed circuit Level; all failures inc. incipient Press; all failures inc. incipient Failure Spring induced failure Hydraulic Leaking Hydraulic no operation/piston fail Minor leakage Microprocessor based; fail to alarm Instrument air supply failure 3 50% Compressor system Hydraulic Air Fluid Blocked, (Pre filter low concentration level) Pressure: Faulty indication Instrument Connection Leakage Failure rate (per year) 0.018 0.012 0.006 0.012 0.012 0.006 0.00804 0.0107 0.0268 0.0115 0.0077 0.0038 1.15E-4 0.0219 0.00817 0.0119 not given 0.0278 0.00692 0.1458 0.00578 0.05589 0.0211 0.0021 0.0841 0.1139 0.0001 0.0230 0.0912 0.0120 0.0026 0.0860 0.6220 0.0296 0.0147 0.0105 0.0263 0.03416 0.1752 8.76E-5

OGP

RADD Appendix 1

Appendix II Data Presented in 1996 Datasheet: Active Fire Protection Systems


This Appendix presents data previously given in the OGP (then E&P Forum) QRA datasheet Active Fire Protection Systems. The current data is copyright, as stated in Section 2.1Error! Reference source not found.; the data previously presented is given in Table II.1 to Table II.9 for reference but should be regarded as illustrative and checked against one of the current sources listed in Table 2.1. Table II.1 Typical failure rates for fire protection system s
Equipment Type Firewater system Water supply - diesel engine driven pumpset Water supply - electric motor driven pumpset Deluge system Sprinkler system Foam mixing system Foam supply system Halon system CO2 system 87.0 8.0 Failures (per 10 hrs) 9.7
6

Failures (per demand) 0.01 0.025 0.004 0.015 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02

Table II.2 Failure rates for pum ps (source 1, oil and gas industry)
Pump type Failures per demand 0.0033 0.043 0.023 0.019 25808 185 Failures 6 per 10 hrs operating 4719 Failures 6 per 10 hrs calendar 56

Electric motor (offshore) (process industry) Diesel engine (offshore) (process industry)

Table II.3 Failure rates for pum ps


Pump type Failure mode Failures 6 per 10 calendar hrs 22 1.9 1.9 99 Failures per demand 0.094 0.019 0.033

Positive displacement Centrifugal

All While running Fail to start All

OGP

RADD Appendix 1

Table II.4 Failure rates for firewater distribution valves


Type Failures per demand 0.0003 0.001 0.001 Failures 6 per 10 operating hrs 10 10 10 50 2.3

Air/hydraulic Motorised Solenoid Pressure regulating Pressure relief

Table II.5 Failure rates for firewater distribution m ains


Equipment type Fire main Joint (>2 in ND) Joint (<2 in ND) Valve (>2 in ND) Valve (<2 in ND) Pipe (>2 in ND) 0.014 0.0015 0.009 0.001 0.0015/100 m 0.0002/100 m Leaks per 10 hrs Medium Serious 0.04/m Large 0.0015 0.001
6

Table II.6 Failure rates for sprinklers


Equipment type System Control valve Automatic head Failure per demand 0.005 0.001 0.001 Failures per 10 hrs 10
6

Table II.7 Failure rates for deluge sets


Equipment type System Butterfly valve Swing type valve Pneumatic valve Failure per demand 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.0099 Failures per 10 hrs 10 10 21
6

OGP

RADD Appendix 1

Table II.8 Failure rates for foam supply system s


Equipment type Foam compound supply Centrifugal electric pump Pelton wheel motor Supply system Foam compound proportioning In-line proportioner Nozzle eductor Metered proportioner Pressure proportioning tank Around-the-pump proportioner Foam generation Low expansion foam maker High back-pressure foam maker 0.005 0.005 negligible negligible 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.02 200 200 negligible negligible negligible negligible negligible negligible Failure per demand Failure per 10 hrs
6

Table II.9 Failure rates for gaseous system s


Equipment type Halon System Discharge nozzle CO2 System * 2 values quoted from different sources Failure per demand 0.0004* 0.02* Failure per 10 hrs 87 0.27 8
6

OGP

RADD Appendix 1

Appendix III Data Presented in 1996 Datasheet: Fire and Gas Detection
This Appendix presents data previously given in the OGP (then E&P Forum) QRA datasheet Fire and Gas Detection. The current data is copyright, as stated in Section 2.1; the data previously presented is given in Table III.1 for reference but should be regarded as illustrative and checked against one of the current sources listed in Table 2.1. Table III.1 Typical failure rates for fire and gas detection system s
Component crit 6 per 10 hrs 5.5 Coverage c 50% Failure rate per 10 hrs det 3.0 SO 1.0
6

FTO 1.5

TIF (Test Independent Failures) 3 10 - 0.1


-4

Gas detector, conventional catalytic Gas detector, conventional IR Gas detector, beam Smoke detector Heat detector Flame detector ESD push button FGD node (single PLC system) Field bus coupler Field bus CPU/ Communications unit crit =

4.0 7 4.0 2.5 7.0 1.0 80.0 0.2 0.2

70% 70% 40% 40% 40% 20% 90% 90% 90%

2.9 5 1.5 1.0 2.5 0.2 72.0 0.18 0.18

0.1 1 2.0 1.0 3.0 0.6 6.0 0.02 0.02

1.0 1 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.2 2.0 0.001 0.001

3 10 to 0.1 3 10 to 0.1 10 to 0.05 0.05 to 0.5 3 10 to 0.5 10 -5 -4 5 10 to 5 10 10 -5 10


-5 -5 -4 -3 -4

-4

Total critical failure rate of the component. Rate of failures that will cause either trip or unavailability of safety function (unless detected and prevented from causing such failure). Rate of critical failure which will be detected by automatic self-test or by control room monitoring. The effect of these failures on the Spurious Trip Rate (STR) depends on the operational philosophy of the system. det / crit = Coverage of the automatic self-test + control room operator. Rate of Spurious Operation (SO) failures, undetectable by automatic self-test. The rate of Spurious Operation (SO) failures of a component contributes to the STR of the system (independent of operation philosophy). Rate of failures causing Fail-To-Operate (FTO) failures, undetectable by automatic self-test. The FTO failures contribute to the Critical Safety Unavailability (CSU) of the component/system. Test Independent Failures. The probability that a component which has just been functionally tested will fail on demand (applies for FTO failures only). The TIF probability is the probability that a component which has just been tested will fail on demand. This will include failures caused by for example improper location or inadequate design (software error or inadequate detection principle). An imperfect functional testing procedure will also contribute. Finally, the

det

c SO

= =

FTO

TIF

OGP

RADD Appendix 1

possibility that the maintenance crew perform an erroneous functional test or fail to return the component to a working state (which is usually not detected before the next test) also contributes to the TIF probability.

OGP

RADD Appendix 1

Appendix IV Data Presented in 1996 Datasheet: Blowout Prevention Equipment


This Appendix presents data previously given in the OGP (then E&P Forum) QRA datasheet Blowout Prevention Equipment. The current data is copyright, as stated in Section 2.1; the data previously presented is given in Table IV.1 to Table IV.5 for reference but should be regarded as illustrative and checked against one of the current sources listed in Table 2.1. Table IV.1 Subsea BOP item specific average downtim e
BOP item No of failures 0 8 4 6 2 19 28 7 74 Total down-time (hrs) 534.5 146.5 111.5 67.0 627.0 521.5 134.0 2142.0 Average downtime (hrs) per BOP-day 0.203 0.056 0.042 0.025 0.238 0.198 0.051 0.813 per rig-day 0.177 0.048 0.037 0.022 0.207 0.173 0.044 0.708

Flexible joints Annular preventers Ram preventers Hydraulic connectors Failsafe valves Choke and kill lines Hydraulic control system Acoustic control system Total Notes:

1. BOP-days are all days from the time the BOP is first landed on the wellhead, until it is
pulled the last time.

2. Rig-days is the time from when the rig arrives on location and drops the anchors, until the
last anchor is pulled prior to leaving the location.

OGP

RADD Appendix 1

Table IV.2 Subsea BOP item specific failure rate with 90% confidence lim its
BOP item Failure mode Failure rate per 10 hours Lower limit Flexible joints Annular preventers 0.0 Failed to open fully Hydraulic leakage Unknown Total Ram type preventers Internal leakage (seal failures) Internal leakage (seal and blade failure) External leakage (door seal) Failed to fully open Hydraulic connectors Total External leakage Failed to unlock Hydraulic failure in locking device (minor) Total Failsafe valves Internal leakage External leakage Unknown leakage Choke and kill lines Total Leakage to environment Plugged line (ice) Unknown Total riser related failures Total flexible jumper hose failures Total BOP flexible hose failures Total choke kill line system Hydraulic control system Spurious activation of BOP function Loss of all functions one pod Loss of several functions one pod Loss of one function both pods Loss of one function one pod Loss of one topside panel Loss of one function topside panel Topside minor failures Other Unknown Total 23.6 0.5 0.5 35.9 1.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 5.4 10.8 0.4 0.4 20.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.9 85.6 0.4 0.4 54.7 20.7 0.4 98.3 0.8 41.3 5.6 5.6 85.8 0.8 0.8 5.6 0.8 5.6 314.6 Estimate 0.0 54.1 9.0 9.0 72.1 7.9 4.0 0.0 4.0 15.8 31.6 7.9 7.9 47.4 2.6 0.0 2.6 5.3 134.4 7.9 7.9 94.8 47.4 7.9 150.2 15.8 94.8 31.6 31.6 158.1 15.8 15.8 31.6 15.8 31.6 442.6 Upper limit 36.4 94.8 27.0 27.0 118.5 18.7 11.8 9.1 11.8 30.6 61.3 23.7 23.7 83.1 7.9 6.1 7.9 12.5 192.1 23.7 23.7 143.9 83.1 23.7 211.0 47.4 166.2 75.0 75.0 248.2 47.4 47.4 75.0 47.4 75.0 588.6
6

OGP

RADD Appendix 1

BOP item

Failure mode

Failure rate per 10 hours Lower limit 5.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 51.9 955.4 Estimate 31.6 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 110.6 1169.7 Upper limit 75.0 47.4 47.4 47.4 47.4 47.4 187.2 1402.5

Acoustic control system

Failed to operate BOP Spurious operation one BOP function One subsea transponder failed to function Portable unit failed Function failure LMRP function Transducer arm failed Total

Total subsea BOP system

Table IV.3 Detection of subsea BOP failures


BOP Item Total Activity when failure detected BOP on rig 0 1 3 1 1 4 0 10 Running BOP 0 0 0 0 5 3 1 9 Installation test 1 3 1 1 1 9 5 21 Regular tests/ drilling 7 0 2 0 12 12 1 34

Flexible joints Annular preventers Ram preventers Hydraulic connectors Failsafe valves Choke and kill lines Hydraulic. Control system Acoustic control system Total

0 8 4 6 2 19 28 7 74

OGP

RADD Appendix 1

Table IV.4 Overview of surface BOP item specific num ber of failures and down tim es
BOP item Pressure class Days in servic e Number of failures Installation Operation Total Total down time (hrs) Averag e down time per day (hrs) 0.013 0.027 0.024 0.001 0.033 0.027 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.027 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.017 0.021 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.011 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.104 0.132 0.126

Annular preventers

Low pressure High pressure Total Low pressure High pressure Total Low pressure High pressure

473 1891 2364 473 1891 2364 401 3782 4183 473 1891 2364 473 1891 2364 473 1891 2364 5994 473 1891 2364 473 1891 2364 473 1891 2364

1 6 7 1 1 2 0 2 2 7 7 14 2 5 7 1 6 7 5 2 0 2 1 1 2 17 31 48

5 9 14 0 7 7 0 1 1 1 12 13 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 33 39

6 15 21 1 8 9 0 3 3 8 19 27 2 5 7 1 7 8 8 2 0 2 1 1 2 23 64 87

6 50.5 56.5 0.5 62.5 63 10 10 13 66.5 79.5 16.5 32.5 49 1 10.5 11.5 20 5 5 3.5 0 3.5 49 249 298

Shear/blind rams

Pipe rams

Control system

Total Low pressure High pressure

BOP to high pressure riser connection Riser conns. and wellhead connections Failsafe valves BOP stack clamps

Total Low pressure High pressure Total Low pressure High pressure Total Total Low pressure High pressure Total Low pressure High pressure Total Low pressure High pressure Total

Choke/kill lines

Total BOP system

10

OGP

RADD Appendix 1

Table IV.5 Surface BOP item specific failure m odes and frequencies with 90% confidence lim its (all failures included)
BOP Item Failure mode

Failure rate per 10 6 hours


Lower limit 149.18 46.06 0.90 0.90 46.06 0.90 0.90 3.54 0.51 34.72 70.16 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 34.72 14.41 6.26 57.91 Estimate 246.76 105.75 17.63 17.63 105.75 17.63 17.63 19.92 9.96 88.13 141.00 17.63 17.63 17.63 17.63 88.13 52.88 35.25 123.38 Upper limit 364.29 185.30 52.80 52.80 185.30 52.80 52.80 47.25 29.84 161.34 231.74 52.80 52.80 52.80 52.80 161.34 110.97 83.61 208.73

Annular preventers

Failed to fully open Leakage in closed position Hydraulic leakage adapter ring (degraded) External leakage Leakage in closed position Premature partly closure shear ram Unknown

Shear/blind rams

Pipe rams Hydraulic control systems

Leakage in closed position Failed to fully open Failed to operate BOP Failed to operate one BOP function Failed to operate BOP from remote panels Spurious activation of BOP functions Failed to operate rams from remote panels Failed to operate rams from remote panels Hydraulic leakage Unknown Incipient

BOP to high pressure riser connections Riser & wellhead connections Failsafe valves

External leakage

External leakage

70.16

141.00

231.74

External leakage External hydraulic leakage Failed to operate valve Leakage in closed position Failed to fully open Unknown

0.36 0.36 0.36 5.68 0.36 0.36 6.26 6.26 1273.39

6.95 6.95 6.95 20.85 6.95 6.95 35.25 35.25 1533.42

20.82 20.82 20.82 43.76 20.82 20.82 83.61 83.61 1813.47

BOP stack clamps Choke/kill lines Total BOP system

External leakage External leakage

OGP

11

RADD Appendix 1

Table IV.6 Overall failure categories for SCSSVs (production and injection wells)
Valve type Years in service

No. of failures per category


Total SCSSV 39 36 75 26 4 30 105 Other 54 42 96 22 1 23 119 Unknow n 31 6 37 6 0 6 43

Failure rate per 106 hours


Total 11.9 18.7 13.9 5.7 10.9 5.9 10.8 SCSSV 3.7 8.1 5.1 2.7 8.6 3.0 4.2

Wireline Retrievable Flapper Wireline Retrievable Ball All Wireline Retrievables Tubing Retrievable Flapper Tubing Retrievable Ball All Tubing Retrievables Total, all valves

1189.7 508.9 1698.6 1088.2 52.7 1140.9 2839.5

124 84 208 54 5 59 267

Note: When SCSSV is stated, the valve itself failed mechanically. Other may typically be control line failure or scale in the well.

12

OGP

For further information and publications, please visit our website at

www.ogp.org.uk

209-215 Blackfriars Road London SE1 8NL United Kingdom Telephone: +44 (0)20 7633 0272 Fax: +44 (0)20 7633 2350 165 Bd du Souverain 4th Floor B-1160 Brussels, Belgium Telephone: +32 (0)2 566 9150 Fax: +32 (0)2 566 9159 Internet site: www.ogp.org.uk e-mail: reception@ogp.org.uk