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NOTES ON THE CELL

Acknowledgments: former NYPD detective Tom Corrigan, and agents/detectives Lou Napoli,
Ken Maxwell, Frank Pellegrino, and Chuck Stern.

Prologue:

investigators repeatedly waived off right trail because of risk-averse bosses and poor information
sharing. In 1988 UBL predicted the end of the US

Ch.l:

account of Sept. 11 itself

Ch.2:

Neil Herman was chief of domestic terror in NY FBI office for most of 1990s. Louis Napoli and
Tommy Corrigan also NY JTTF veterans. (Presents them as heroes unable to make others in
USG appreciate UBL threat.)

New cycle of terror began with assassination of Kahane. Int'l conglomerate with spokes all over
the world. "Invesgiations that ate up years took out only a spoke at a time, and when the true
shape of this adversary became clear, the guys doing the investigations realized they were trying
to bring down an entrenched global army with nothing but their badges and a pile of court
papers." (36)

Ch. 3, The First Terrorist:

- Kahane assassination: Nosair and accomplice Bilall Alkaisi there to kill Kahane. Alkaisi left
the meeting hall right before Nosair went up and murdered Kahane. Mahmoud Abouhalima (red-
haired Egyptian) supposed to be in getaway taxi, but had been shooed from the entrance. Alkaisi
finds Mohammed Salameh, who had driven Nosair's car, and they tear off. (38-40)

- NYPD detectives go to "Nosair's apartment" (in Jersey City, see p. 48), find Abouhalima and
Salameh. "Both admitted not only that they knew Nosair, who no longer lived in the building,
but also that they had been at the hotel when the murder occurred." Brought in for questioning.
NYPD Lt. Norris says this is group killing, but overridden by NYPD Chief of Detectives Borelli,
who instructs Norris to let Abouhalima and Salameh go, and announces that the murder appeared
to be work of "lone, deranged gunman." (43-44)

- Norr's detectives found Nosair's true address in Cliffside Park NJ, and JTTF carts out 16 boxes
of files, incl. training manuals from Fort Bragg, teletypes to Sec. of Army and Jt. Chiefs, bomb-
making manuals, maps of landmark locations, names of Jewish leaders and politicians who
supported Israel, manifesto callingjo topplej^the tall buildings," tapes of conversations between
Nosair and Abdul-Rahman (see 50). FBI took the 16 boxes from the NYPD, says it gave them to
Manhattan DA. Incredibly, "the bulk of the material remained untranslated and unread for nearly
three years." (45-46)

- In mid to late 1980s, Nosair worshipped at radical mosque in Jersey City and became a fixture
at al-Kifah Refugee Services Center, which was main US branch of Pakistan-based Office of
Services. Throughout 1980s, al-Kifah worked mostly to get Soviets out of Afghanistan. Located
on ground floor of al-Farooq mosque. Hotbed of radicalism.

- Nosair came under spell of al-Kifah founder Abdullah Azzam. He frequently traveled to US to
raise $ and preach global jihad, e.g., Palestine. "The jihad is not limited to Aftghanistan." "First
Conference of Jihad" held at al-Farooq in 1988.

-Nosair started training to wage jihad in US back in 1987 with Abouhalim, Salameh, Alkaisi.
Weekend paramilitary camps, trips to rifle ranges, survival and surveillance courses with Army
Special Forces instructor (presumably AH Mohammed). Some of the men had already been to
Afghanistan, including Alkaisi, who served as a trainer in UBL's camps. (50)

- By 1989, Nosair in regular contact with Abdul-Rahman, arguably most influential radical cleric
in the world. Tapes of their conversations (taped by Nosair) suggest that Nosair had been
assembling a terror cell with Abdel-Rahman's belssing. (50-51)

- In 1989, FBI was following Shalabi, who ran al-Kifah, and observed and photographed Nosair
and a dozen others from al-Kifah doing shooting on 4 successive weekends. But this was
discounted as related to Afghanistan.

- Nosair tried to throw explosive at Gorbachev, planted bomb in gay bar. Then Abdul-Rahman
arrived in NY (53)

- Rahman visited Afgahnistan in 1985 and, thru Hekmatyer, met US intelligence officials,
[true??] Thru Azzam, he also met UBL. Raised money for Afghan jihad all over the world, and
immigrated to US in May 1990 from Sudan. Visa signed by a CIA officer at Sudanese consulate
[true?] - was letting him in a screwup, or did CIA sponsor his immigration?

- Shalabi arranged things for Rahman in US, but then they had a falling out, and Abdel-Rahman
moved to NJ, where Nosair, also fueding with Shalabi, had set up his own Refugees Center,
[what do we know about latter?]

Ch. 4, Origins of a Terrorist Cell:

- photos of men who had joined Nosair for 1989 training sessions included Arabs as well as 2
blacks that served as instructors. One was Richard Smith, a Black Muslim. Another black
Muslim named "Dr. Rashid" would turn out to be a pivotal figure in later plots. (57-63)

- Abdul-Rahman issued fatwa calling for bank robberies and to kill Jews anywhere. (63)
— JTTF learned in 1991 about rift between Shalabi and Rahman. Shalabi had alienated many of
the other radicals. Furthermore, Shalabi wanted to continue spending on Afghanistan, while
Abdul-Rahman and others said that money should go to new causes, e.g., jihad in Egypt. This
mirrored fight between Azzarn and UBL in Afghanistan. Azzam killed by car bomb in Nov.
1989. Shalabi murdered in Feb./March 1991, succeeded by Abdul Wali Zindani.. [Note that
Wadih El-Hage had come up to NY at this time, according to other sources.] Alkaisi and
Salameh are prime suspects in Shalabi's murder. (63-64)

- Nosair became hero to extremists around the world, and UBL contributed $20,000 to his
defense fund after meeting cousin el Gabrowny. Ludicrous split verdict in Dec. 1991 showed
extremists that US was spineless and ready for jihad.

Ch. 5, Salem, Yousef, and WTC 1:

- Emad Salem served in Egyptian Army, immigrated to US in late 1980s, became FBI informant
on unrelated matters. Napoli met him in mid- to late 1991. Salem started visiting radical
mosques, got into circle. El Gabrowny told him that he and friends were assembling bomb
material.

- FBI supervisor Dunbar did not like Salem for various reasons, but authorized his use. (70-72)
After Nosair's acquittal, Abdel-Rahman told Salem to assassinate Mubarak. Nosair continued to
play active role from prison, suggesting targets for assassination. El-Gabrowny, Nosair, and Ali
el-Shinawy wanted to bomb 12 "Jewish locations." Turned to "Dr. Rashid" for weapons/bombs.
But then Napoli forced to fire Salem in July 1991, per Dunbar, when Salem refused to wear wire.
(73-75).

- Jewish location plot didn't go anywhere. Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, and Alkaisi started
stockpiling chemicals, but couldn't agree on target or who would be leader. Alkaisi left — and
Ramzi Yousef came. (76).

- Yousef was expert bomb maker. He arrived on Sept. 1, 1992 (a month before Alkaisi left) with
Ajaj. Ajaj stopped at border with fake passports (including one of Yousef s), bomb making
manuals, videos on weapons. Convicted of passport fraud. Yousef claimed asylum, released and
given hearing date because not enuf room in INS lockup (!)

- Yousef immediately met Abouhalima, and then the others in the circle, including Abdel-
Rahman. Yousef shared Salameh's Jersey City apt. Real name appears to be Abdul Basir
Karim. Spent several months in 1988 doing bomb-making training in UBL's camps.

- Mylroie says Iraq behind Yousef. Evidence is involvement of Iraqi Yassin; latter's flight to
Bagdhad after bombing; and Yousef s getting passport while in NY by using ID of man who
disappeared from Kuwait during Iraq's occupation.

- But others see UBL. Abouhalima, Yousef, and others trained in UBL camps; UBL gave
$20,000 to Nosair defense fund, perhaps for bomb-making materials; AQ had already started
issuing anti-US fatwas, bombed US target in Yemen in Dec. 1992 (US troops on way to
Somalia), and training anti-US Somalis.

- Corrigan says plot homegrown, but then help sought overseas after Salameh-Alkaisi rift.

- Yousef professionalized the operation and made it much more massive - to bring down the
WTC. (80).

Ch. 6, Foiled Again:

- Dr. Rashid identified as Clement Hampton-El in late 1992, when he sought detonators, guns,
and jihad training from FBI informant (allegedly for Bosnia). (83)

~ In Dec. 1992, Yousef and fellow plotters looking for detonators, had already purchased
components of main charge. Salameh became Yousef s chief aide, and Ayyad and Abouhalima
played key roles as well. Abdul Rahman Yasin, Iraqi govt. employee, ran errands. El-Gabrowny
mediated disputes and provided Brooklyn meeting place and mail drop. Chemicals stored in
storage shed in Jersey City.

- FBI informant provided 3 associates of Hampton-El with some equipment in Jan. 1993 inNJ.
One went to al-Kifah, other two went to Abdul-Rahman's apt. But FBI brass shut down follow-
up activities too soon [Not clear how significant this is.]

- On Dec. 29, Yousef reached Ajaj in INS jail thru Ajaj 's lawyer. Ajaj called Ismail Najim -
boyhood friend of Yousef s in Texas, and Najim connected them - Yousef asked for the bomb-
making manuals that had been in Ajaj's luggage. Call taped by prison recording system but not
reviewed at the time (!).

- In Jan. 1993, Yousef and Salameh move to new Jersey City apt., maintain close contact with
others in plot including Abdul-Rahman. Rahman publicly praised terrorism against US at
Islamic conference in Brooklyn. Yousef continues calling for chemicals from hospital bed after
car accident. Bomb constructed at Yousef/Salameh apt., and Salameh scouted WTC. On Feb.
23, 1993, Salameh rents van, and bomb assembly completed Feb. 25. Salameh reports the van
stolen, but gives wrong license plate number. Van loaded with 1500 Ib. Bomb. Yousef and
Njim spend night in Brooklyn.

Ch. 7, WTC I:

- blast goes off on Feb. 26, 1993, creating a crater that encompassess several floors. Six dead.
Bomb was mix of fuel oil, fertilizier, and nitroglycerin booster. Aim was to collapse the Towers.
(95)

- VIN number of vehicle found in wreckage, belonging to Ryder rental van reported stolen on the
25 by Salameh. Detectives recognized address Salameh had given, belonging to el-Gabrowny,
Nosair's cousin who had told Salem about plot to bomb Jewish locations.(104)
- FBI sent agent to Ryder place posing a sales agent. Salameh came to claim deposit, was asked
to fill out form, which he did, claiming van was stolen from supermarket. Arrested that day,
March 4, 1993.

- business card for Ayyad found in his wallet. In Salameh's Jersey City apartment, agents find
Ahmed Yassin, who feigned shock that Salameh was involved, led agents to address in which
bomb was built. [Agents failed to arrest or apparently surveil Yassin - huge blunder].

- El-Gabrowny arrestred, found with false passports for Nosair and family, plus guns.
Apparently planning jail break for Nosair. [Was this purpose of jihad training sought by
Hampton-El?] Charged with fraud and resisting arrest.

- In Salameh's apartment and/or safe house in which bomb was made, detectives found letter
from lawyers for Ajaj, and found how he and Yousef had arrived together. They later discovered
that Ajaj had successfully sued in federal court to get his reading material (e.g., bomb making
manuals) back, so he could give them to Ramzi Yousef

- Ayyad arrested March 10. Abouhalima tracked down in Egypt (based on info, from Salem, see
110), then rendered to FBI. He asked if agents had captured Yousef. Abouhalima's brother
Mohammed arrested for facilitating escape from US. But Yassin fled to Iraq, and Yousef
missing.

- Some agents saw Iraqi govt. plot; others saw homegrown plot inspired by Abel-Rahman.
(110).

- Salem re-recruited as informant, and he agreed to wear wire. Meanwhile, Egyptian intelligence
reports that cell affiliated with Rahman planned to assassinate Mubarak in NY in April.
Egyptians had Abdo Haggag, Rahman's speechwriter, as their informant (unbeknownst to FBI).
Mubarak trip to NY cancelled (113).

- In April, Hampton-el's aide Yaya Abu Ubaidah picked up $100,000 cash in Vienna for
Hampton-El's jihad group from Third World Relief Agency, European counterpart to Brooklyn's
Afghan Services Office said to be backed by UBL. [this may bear further inquiry.]

- Rahman's translator, Siddig Siddig-Ali, approached Salem, told Salem he was planning
bombings and that Sheik had recommended Salem. Landmarks plot: tunnels, UN, and NY
offices of FBI. (TERRSTOP). Siddig-Ali told Salem that friends in Sudanese Embassy had
approved the plan, would provide diplomatic plates, and that he had safe houses in Sudan for
post-attack. [Note evidence of state sponsorship, and that UBL in Sudan]

- Salem rented garage to build the bombs, FBI installed cameras. Hampton-El provided
logistical support; Nosair, el-Gabrowny involved. Sheik hard to pin down, but Siddig-Ali said
Sheik had issued fatwa for these targets. Additional plans to assassinate political figures
sympatehtic to Israel. Mohamed Saleh supplied fuel oil. On June 24, 1993, 8 men arrested, total
of 13 charged.
- WTC trial against Salameh, Ayad, Abouhalima, and Ajaj begins Sept. 1993, ends with 240 year
sentences.

Ch. 8: The Hunt for Ramzi Yousef:

— Dec. 11, 1994: Ramzi Yousef, traveling on false passport, carries bomb components onto
Phillippines Air Flight 434 (liquid nitroglycerin in contact-lens case and 9 volt battery),
assembles device in bathroom, then conceals it. It explodes 2 hours later on next leg of flight,
from Cebu to Tokyo. Herman had feeling that this was Yousef and only a test

- Despite manhunt after WTC, Yousef kept on planning and executing operations and moving
around the globe with seeming ease.

- After WTC bombing, Yousef went to Islamabad and he and Abdul Hakim Murad tried to
assassinate Benazir Bhutto. Also reports of him trying to blow up Israeli Embassy in Bangkok
and against a Shiite shrine in Iran. (Former report of dubious validity).

- Yousef spent of 1994 on Malaysian island gfiving explosives instruction to bin-Laden backed
Abu Sayyaf group. In fall of 1994, he and KSM (Yousef s uncle) in Manila. KSM had wired
$600 into Salameh's account a few months before WTC I. Now he was bringing money and
support, "perhaps from AQ," for Yousef s Bojink plot. (122)

- Bojinka intended to blow up 12 intercontinental flights at once. Also, he and Wali Khan had
devised strategies to assassinate Pres. Clinton in Phillippines in Nov. 1994, but abandoned them.
Began working on plot to kill Pope in Jan. 1995.

- Yousef rented apartment near Pope's route, brought priest's vestments, perhaps enlisted Murak
to state an aerial attack on Popemobile. (Murad an experienced pilot). But Yousef learned that
airspace would be cordoned off that day (123)

- "According to Murad," [where did Murad say this?] Yousef hatched two other plots involving
planes, one calling for Murad to fly plane into CIA HQ, or hijacking large commercial jet and
flying it into DC landmark (123).

- Accidental fire in Jan. 1995. Murad went back to retrive laptop and is arrested. Laptop
revealed dimesnions of plot, scheduled for Jan. 21. Also discovered bombs, chemicals,
vestments, "aborted plans for phosgene gas attack on Clinton," etc.

- FBI and CIA clashed over the investigation. Later started working tegether. Herman, inter
alia, found CIA useless in finding Yousef. Prosecutor Childers persuaded CIA to back off from
the investigation. (125-127)

- CTC founded in 1986 (129)

- Criticism of CIA (125-134)


- On Jan. 11, 1995, Phillippines arrested Wali Khan Amin-Shah - he bribed his way out of
custody, but was rearrested in Malaysia and extradited to US. Shah and Murad had been
Yousef s two closest associates (135)

- On 1/23/95, Yousef summoned Istiaque Parker to the Pearl Guest House, a bin Laden hotel in
Islamabad, and outlined another scheme. Parker contacted US Embassy, and Yousef was
arrested and flown to US. On flight to US, Yousef boased about his exploits, including his hope
to kill 125,000 Americans in WTC I. Yousef blaimed failure to bring down Towers on lack of
money.

Ch. 9, Discovering Bin Laden

- clues gathering in margins of WTC and landmarks plot investigations: manifestos and Special
Forces documents in Nosair's files; UBL's $20,000 gift to Nosair's defense fund; payments by
UBL to underwrite Sheik Rahman; links to Afghanistan; many phone calls to same number at
AQ Services Office in Peshawar, and more.

- Herman realized that Yousef s world travels, additional plots — "That's when I realized he had
to have a sizeable organization behind him." AUSA Childers had similar thoughts. (137)

- UBL was best known to US intelligence as former fund raiser for Afghan war. But his name
began popping up with increasing frequency. (138). Reports that Yousef had trained Abu Sayyaf
in explosives in summer 1994. Janjalini, head of Abu Sayaf, raised money for Abu Sayaf in
Peshawar in early 1990's, and had close ties to Mohammed Khalifa, UBL's brother-in-law and
agent for UBL's Islamic "philantrophies."

- Khalifa began traveling to Phillippines in late 1980s for IIRO. UBL had begun using IIRO,
Refugee Services Center in Brooklyn, and other NGOs, as fronts. Khalifa set up two more
NGOs to set up terrorist training school and funnel $ to Abu Sayaf. (138)

- Amin-Shah was thought to have pledged bayat to UBL, was associated with Khalifa in
Phillippines, and had trained Abu Sayyaf. (139)

- Yousef s uncle, KSM, became top aide to UBL. And even in Sept. 1994, was thought to have
already had close ties to Mamdou Salim, UBL's spiritual advisor. Salim believed to have visited
Mohammed and his nephew in Manila, perhaps to issue fatwa for Bojinka. (139) But US needed
informant to really understand what was happening.

- Khalifa detained Dec. 1994 in SF for traveling under a false visa. Extradited to Jordan, where
he was eventually freed. (139-140).

- Peek into UBL thru interviews with Ali Mohamed. With landmarks case about to go to trial,
prosecutors subpoenaed Mohammed, who seems to have worked at various points for Egyptian
Army, EIJ, CIA, FBI, US Special Forces, al-Kifah, UBL, and Afghan mujahideen. He arrived in
NY for questioning in Dec. 1994. (140)
- Mohammed attracted to blind sheikh in 1970s, and became member of EIJ. Cashiered from
Egyptian Army after assassination of Sadat. In 1984, offered services to CIA, which fired him
for unauthorized contacts with Hezbollah. Despite being placed on watch list, allowed to
immigrate to US in 1986, received US citizienship, and even enlisted in US Army (late 1986).
Special Forces in Fort Bragg and lectured on Islamic culture and politics (!!)

- in 1987, Mohammed contacted Shalabi, and told US Army he intended to use 30 day leave to
train muj ahadin in Afghanistan. (143)

- Then started traveling to NJ and Brooklyn on weekends to meet Shalabi, al-Kifah group, and
Abel-Rahman. Started training future jihadis, e.g., Nosair, in self-defense and paramilitary
tactics, and gave Nosair secret US Army docs. (144). After tour was up, Mohammed remained
in Army as reservist.

- In 1990, "he seems to have tried to penetrate the FBI as an informant and double agent."
Applied to FBI offices as translator, and was turned down, but became informant. However, did
not report his hosting al-Zawahiri on two West coast fund-raising tours in early 1990s.
Mohammed also did not mention AQ, but did say that in 1991, he'd traveled to Afghanistan to
handle bin Laden's security arrangements when UBL moved to Sudan.

- However, only in 1999 did Moahmmed tell US that he had worked for UBL in a number of
capacities. In 1992, conducted military and explosives training for AQ in Afghanistan, plus
intelligence training and "how to create cell structures that could be used for operations."

- In spring 1993, AQ operative had been stopped by Candian police attempting to cross into US.
Mohammed tried to intercede, told Canadiens he worked with FBI. Canadiens contacted Bureau,
and Mohammed interviewed outside SF in May 1993. During the course of their conversation,
Mohamed gave the FBI its first glimpse of AQ. According to court papers, he told FBI Agent
Zindt that bin Laden was determined to drive US forces off the Arabian peninsula and was
building an army capable of toppling the Saudi monarchy." Zindt told DOD, but NY JTTF not
advised. (146)

- Mohammed also told agents about serving as AQ trainer in Afghanistan and Sudan. But he not
detained or monitored, and by the end of 1993 he was in Nairobi on a surveillance mission for
UBL. Subpoenaed in late 1994, AQ told him to return to US and not come back to Nairobi.

— Thanks to Fitzgerald, FBI eventually investigated and arrested Mohammed, and he became
govt. cooperator - but this took four more years. In late 1994, subpoenaed to NY on landmarks
bombing case, he was reluctant witness, and didn't volunteer much more than he had already told
SF FBI. But NY able to piece this together with other evidence about UBL: 1) Islamic extremist
with lots of $, guerilla training camps in Afghanistan, cadre of veteran muj ahadin, anti-Western
agenda, and links to Ramzi Yousef. UBL "on our charts" by late spring 1995, per AUSA
Childers. But focus was on TERRSTOP trial (146)

- In TERRSTOP (encompassing Kahane murder, WTC bombing, and landmarks plot), Abdo
Haggag, Rahman's speechwriter, and Siddig Siddig-Ali, his translator, cooperated with the govt.
Trial began in January 1995 and lasted 9 months. Salem testified. Oct. 1995 - convictions on
almost all counts, and in Jan. 1996, life sentences to all d's who hadn't pled.

- Haggag told investigators that UBL had been paying Abdul-Rahman's livings expenses in US
(148). As trial wound down, feds drew up list of names to look at, UBL near top of list.

- In Oct. 1995, FBI officially opened a case on UBL. JTTF agents found that CIA had huge
amount of material on him, but not humint who could put it all together. Also found that CIA
was conducting vigorous investigation into Wadi el-Hage, also on NY list. El-Hage had flown to
NY to manage Refugee Center during Shalabi's trip to Egypt, arriving on day of his
disappearance. But they now learned that he was key UBL operative who moved in 1992 to
Sudan to act as private secretary and business agent. More recently, per CIA files, he had moved
to Nairobi and was running NGO Help Africa People.

— But UBL still not top JTTF priority, until Nov. 1995 bombing of US training mission in Saudi.
Three of the four men executed by Saudis said they were inspired by UBL, and several had
trained in Afghan UBL camps. "Now when they thought of bin Laden, it was not merely as a
financier, but as a terrorist." (150)

- In Jan. 1996, Pres. Clinton signed a finding establishing UBL as a threat to national security
and mandating that FBI and CIA work together against him. Law enforcement approach was
main strategy. Agency set up Alec station, which included agents from FBI, dedicated to
collecting intelligence and evidence on UBL and AQ. JTTF also started a bin Laden desk in NY.

- And State started pressuring Sudan to expel him. Told Sudan to get rid of his org. and close
down his training camps. Sudan said they would give them up to Saudis or Egyptians, but they
refused to take him. Dispute about whether Sudan offered him to US. In any case, JTTF and
USAO said not evidence to indict him. (151-152).

- On May 18, 1996, UBL left Sudan and began reconstituting AQ in Afghanistan.

Ch. 10, The Terrorist Who Came in From the Cold

- In June 1996, Jamal al-Fadl came into US Embassy in Asmara, and defects. "First informant
with an intimate, comprehsive knowledge of AQ. [US officials] would spend the next five years
meticulously sifting through the information he offered them." Although not a top figure, he was
there at just about every important event in AQ's history. (154-155)

- He'd immigrated to Brooklyn after high school on a student visa, and helped Shalabi out at al-
Khifah Refugee Services office. Raised money for Afghan jihad and recurited fighters. Went
himself for training, then, at Areen Guest House, met UBL. Fought Soviets. Received more
training, and began to meet men who would form backbone of AQ, including Salim; al-
Zawahiri;al-Banshiri and Atef; and Azzam. UBL and Azzam had coufounded Afghan Service
Office/al-Kifah, had sent Shalabi to Broroklyn, and Azzam provided the inspiration and UBL the
$.
- Around Azzam's assassination, al-Fadl heard lecture by al-Banshiri in al-Farouk camp in
Afghanistan. About 40 in room. New group for jihad, men asked to swear bayat, al-Fadl was
third signatory, [this would seem to be based on al-Fadl's testimony in Embassy Bombings trial.]
UBL was emir, and under him were various councils. Al-Fadl sent to Sudan in 1990 to buy
farms for new training camps and rent houses for AQ leaders. AQ relocating.

- UBL returned to Saudi, where he was welcomed as a war hero. When Iraq invaded Kuwait,
UBL suggested use of Afghan-Arab troops. UBL outraged. But did not break with Saudis yet,
according to Turki. UBL offered to start holy war against communists in South Yemen, and was
turned down, per Turki. UBL under virtual house arreset, either "escaped" by claiming pressing
business in Pakistan, or Saudis told him that US forces in Saudi were trying to kill him and
helped him "escape." (158-159)

- By spring of 1991, UBL back in Peshawar, tried to broker peace among warring Afghan
factions, and then headed for Sudan.

- UBL and al-Turabi had similar agenda, plus he supplied military equipment and investments to
Sudan. Allowed to set up lucrative businesses and train growing army

- al-Fadl screened mujahadin coming into country. UBL's business provided cover and
infrastructure for his terrorist activities.

- By summer 1992, AQ running successful businesses, had 300 man army in Sudan and many
more contacts around the world. At this point, AQ becomes increasingly anti-US, as US does not
withdraw from Saudi. UBL and Salim say "we have to fight them."

- UBL not yet a terrorist; in mid-93, UBL shelved plan to bomb US Embassy in Riyadh because
it endangered civilians, [is this true? If so, why other terror attacks ok? See very next entry]
(161)

- In Dec. 1992, US troops land in Somalia. Fatwas issued against the US presence there, seen
thru paranoid lens as prelude to intervention in Sudan against Muslim north. Mamdu Salim says
it's ok if innocent person gets killed.

- In fall 1993, UBL sends team to retrieve Stinger missiles from AQ's stockpiles in Afgahnistan
[true that AQ had Stingers?] and transport them to Somalia. AQ to train Somalis to fight US.
AQ loaded cargo plane with military hardware. Al-Fadl told he might get sent to Somalia. Al-
Banshiri says "the snake is America and we have to cut off the head and stop them." Atef led a
team of AQ men to advise and very likely arm the Somalis. (162)

- Rapid pullout of US troops showed US paper tiger, per UBL. Pointed to Lebanon, as well.
Now, UBL announced, he would launch a holy war to drive them from Saudi.
- It would be three years before USG recognized his participation in Somalia.

- AQ media wing founded in London under al-Fawwaz, the ARC. Saudis take UBL citizenship
away in 1994 and freeze his assets, and possibly try to assasinate him (163-164)

- But UBL mostly left to operate. In Sudan, tries to establish links with other terrorist
organizations, "chiefly" EIJ and IG, and Hezbollah. Per al-Fadl, AQ sent agents to Lebanon and
maintained a guest house to cross train with Hezbollah and learn how to make "big bombs."
[note current reports of Iran- AQ links]. UBL willing to put aside differences with Shia and
secular Muslims to confront common US enemy. In 1995, al-Turabi hosts international
conference of terror groups. (164)

— UBL's search for WMD. Al-Fadl approached Sudanese army in early 1990s about
procuring/developing chemical weapons. Later, he tried to broker a deal for weapons-grade
uranium, turned out to be a hoax.

— Al-Fadl and others thought UBL favored Saudis and Egyptians. -UBL stole money, went to
Saudi authorities, but Saudis refused to deal with him; so began cooperating with CIA.

- Al-Fadl was crucial; apart from sheer mass of info., he also gave investigators first taste of AQ
size/sophistication, implacable hatred for US, and imminent threat it posed. Before his
debriefings, US intelligence had thick files on UBL, but after al-Fadl, everything fell into place.
(165).

Ch. 11, Red Herrings

- UBL was early lead suspect in Khobar (174). Grand jury in NY heard testimony from al-Fadl
about UBL's clandestine war on US. Sealed indictement was handed up indicting UBL for
conspiring to kill Americans.

Ch. 12, Meeting Bin Laden

- In early 98, per source, FBI believed that UBL was behind attacks on US military in Somalia,
had financed and supported Bojinka, and was UBL plot to kill Clinton and Pope. Some of they
this knew from Wali Khan Amin-Shah, who was cooperating with FBI and know a lot about
UBL.

[testimony/debriefs we should see: el-Fadl; Ali Mohammed; Wali Khan Amin-Shah; Kherthcou]

- In May 1998, UBL tells ABC News that he predicts the end of the US. (186)

- UBL denied knowing Ramzi Yousef before WTC I.. But talked about him and Wali Khan
being good friends. (189)

- In winter of 1997, Khan told FBI that mercury in Manila apt. was for bullets that would be used
to shoot Clinton, to poison him.

Ch. 13, Embassy Bombings:

~ In May 1998 interview, UBL had said next attack against US would be "within the next several
weeks."

- Aug. 7, 1998: bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania

- UBL had key associates in Nairobin from 1993, using Kenya as staging area for anti-US
activities in Somalia (194)

- Sometime before 1993 UBL dispatched Ali Mohamed to survey potential terror targets in
Nairobi. Mohamed showed UBL photos of, inter alia, US Embassy, and UBL drew a blue pencil
line at the rear of the Embassy indicating where a truck could enter (195)

- Kenyan cell was an important one, set up during Somali operation by al-Fawwaz and al-
Banshiri. Arranged for apartments, cars, safe houses, small businesses. When al-Fawwaz went
to London in 1994, three new cell leaders took over, Mohammed Odeh (based in Mobasssa),
Haroun Fazul, and Wadih el-Hage. Odeh claimed to have supplied rocket launchers and rifles
that killed US soldiers in Somalia, and Fazul had also trained Somali fighters. Fazul and Hage
shared Nairobi house, Hage was in charge, coming off two year stint as UBL's personal
secretary. (196-197)

- Hage is Lebanese, converted to Islam at 14, came to Louisiana to study. In 1981, he backed
mujahadin in Afghanistan, became protege of Abdullah Azzam. "By some accounts," he was
teacher/medic, and smuggled cash/supplies into Afghanistan.

- Hage returned to US in 1984, returned briefly to Pakistan in 1986, then moved to Tuscon,
which had an al-Kifah Center/Refugees office. Became US citizen in 1989, and began popping
up in the company of radical Islamic militants.

— In 1990, escorted suspect in murder of progressive imam on visit to victim's Phoenix mosque.
(197)

- In early 1991, acquired two rifles and AK-47 at request of Mahmoud Abouhalimia, although
guns never delivered. Abouhalima had met Hage a few months earlier at Oklahoma City Islamic
conference, and Abouhalima later stated that he wanted the weapons to defend al-Kifah leaders
in NY.

- El-Hage then flies up into NY the day Shalabi disappears, ostensibly to cover for Shalabi at al-
Kifah during temporary trip to Egypt. El-Hage then visits Nosair in jail.

- About a year later, while in Texas, el-Hage tells his wife that UBL needs personal
secretary/business agent in Khartoum, and accepts. "Over the next two years, el-Hage circled the
globe, opening al Qaeda bank accounts, buying asphalt, seeking markets for Sudanese sesame
seeds and corn, even purchasing a plane for transporting Stinger missies." Then transferred to
Nairobi. (198)

- identified himself as director of NGO Help Africa People. US investigators believe this served
as cover. Some of his business cards included address of Hamburg office building used by AQ
operatives linked to 9/11.

- CIA learned a lot about him based on debriefings on al-Fadl, and a decision is made to flip him
as best way to get to UBL. Begin bugging his Nairobi phone in early 1997, but he spoke in code
which only became clear in retrospect. [Note: See Embassy bombings tr., plus do we want to
look at additdional raw FISA take?] el-Hage discussed bombs as "weddings", bomb makers as
"enginners"

- El-Hage also made frequent trips to UBL's new base in Afghanistan, returning with new cash.
AQ document from Feb. 1997 describes one such trip in which el-Hage received instruction to
begin military operations in East Africa. (200)

- May 1997: UBL's chief financial officer Mandini al-Tayib received Saudi protection and told
all on UBL. But Saudis did not share this info, [mention to Dana] Still, his defection caused East
African cell to panic. El-Hage talking daily to AQ members in Afghanistan, Pakistan, London,
Germany, and Mombassa. (200)

- On Aug. 21, 1997, JTTF agents stopped el-Hage at Nairobi airports, suggested he return home
to US. Searched his home in Nairobi, confiscated his date books, diaries, and computer. El-
Hage returned to NY in Sept., and was haled before grand jury, but denied knowing anything or
anybody. Questioned by FBI in October, and lied again. (201-202)

- When el-Hage left Kenya, Haroun Fazul became leader of cell and resumed preparations for
the embassy bombings. US mistakenly thought that the East African cell was not a grave threat
because of al-Banshiri's death, al-Fawwaz' transfer to London, and el-Hage's return to US.

- Nov. 1997 walk-in to Nairobi embassy wanred of plot to bomb embassy (Mustafa Said Ahmed,
who worked for UBL company), but failed polygraph and was deemed unreliable. Also, Kenyan
Intel. Service may have warned CIA about imminent plot (205). Authors deem US too
lackadaisical; "AQ correctly presumed that a major attack could be carried out by a cell that US
agents had already uncovered." (205)

— Fazul rented a gated villa in Nairobi, explosives stored there, loaded onto Toyota cargo truck

- Mohamed Odeh was told to flee Kenya, came to Nairobi from Mombassa. Mohamed al-
Owhali, a Saudi selected by UBL for jihad operation (192), arrived in Nairobi on August 2.
Fazul drove him to a hotel. Al-Owhali and FNU Azzam were the designated suicide bombers,
and were briefed about the upcoming operation. Senior operatives, including Odeh, then left the
country. (206)
- Fazul led the way on bombing day, with al-Owhali and Azzam following. Fazul peeled away.
At the embassy, Azzam blew himself up, al-Owhali ran away. Bomb also destroyed Tanzanian
embassy.

Ch. 14, The Sleeping Giant Awakens

- US attacks on UBL training camps in Afghanistan, where we thought UBL was meeting with
top aides, plus Sudan attack. But UBL and senior people escaped, and elevated his statuture,
plus looked like paper tiger as well as bully (Sudanese plant)

- Pakistani police detained Odeh on Aug. 7, at Karachi airport, and admitted his participation in
the plot. On Aug. 12, Nairobi police found al-Owhali, and he confessed to FBI. During
following months, authorities arrested el-Fawwaz; Mamdou Salim; and el-Hage. NSA reviewed
transcripts of calls made from AQ safe house in Nairobi, and deciphered the code.

- CIA broke up cells in Uganda (US embassy there had been third target), India, and Albania.
Computer confiscated in the Albanian raid revelaed that hundreds of targets around the world
had already been surveilled and approved by AQ's leadership., [we should try to get hold of this
document(s)]. Several imminent plots, including plot to bomb US embassy in Tirana, were
stopped.

- per Sheehan, Before embassy bombings, UBL was viewed as a gnat buzzing around an
elephant's ear. No longer. But UBL had already set up strong base in Afghanistan and forged
unbreakable bond with Mullah Omar.

- after bombings, vigorous campaign against UBL, "using all the viable military and law
enforcements at their command short of declaring war on the Taliban." (216)

- Diplomatic pressure on Saudis and Pakistanis to get Taliban to give up UBL didn't work. In
absence of decisive military action, FBI continued to investigate and indict AQ's senior
operatives, and CIA to disrupt its cells around the world.

Ch. 15, Politics in Yemen, and The Cole

- New Year's 2000 - plots foiled in Jordan to blow up Radisson hotel, as well as Christian sites
(2 suspects had previously lived in US); Ahmaed Ressam caught at Canadien border; Meskini,
whose name was in Ressam's phone book, arrested in NY on Dec. 30, 1999. (222)

- UBL cells in Albania, Italy, and Germany had been taken out (223)

- Jan. 3,2000: failed attempt to blow up the USS Sullivans in Yemen

- Jan. 5,2000: AQ operatives held "regrouping" session in Malaysia. UBL's head bodyguard,
Tawfiq bin Attash, was there (later involved in Cole). So were Kahlid al-Midhar and Nawak
alHazmi, who became part of 9/11 plot. Al-Midhar also in Yemen during Cole bombing,
according to Yemen's prime minister.

- CIA knew of the Malaysia meeting in advance, thanks to a phone tap in Sana, Yemen, on a
significant AQ operative who was called by al-Owhali right after the Nairobi blast. CIA received
photos of Malyasia meeting documenting "what they would later learn was a planning session for
the Cole and the September 11 plots." Malaysia host was was Yazid Sufaat, "a former Malaysian
army captain suspected of financing terrorist operations going all the way back to Ramzi
Yousef s [Bojinka] plot." (225)

- Then, high-ranking informant in Egyptian jihad group passed along reports of AQ plot to blow
up a US warship, [who is this informant, what records are there of this?]

- al-Nashiri was leader of Sullivan/Cole operation. He was top field operations man for UBL
and founder of first AQ cell in Saudi. He directed Cole preparations mostly from UAE, and by
June Aden cell was working. Continued surveillance of US Navy ships, and boat-bomb was
reconfigured. (226). Cole exploded on Oct. 12, 2000.

- O'Neill did not rule out possibility that half-brother of Yemen's president had played a role
(high-ranking general known UBL associate). (229-230).

- Authorities found trailer and Nissan truck near launch of skiff, as well as safe house containing
evidence of the bomb. Egyptian informant (see three entries above) identified several suspects.
Jamal al-Badawi admitted training in AQ Afghan camps, fighing in Bosnia with UBL forces in
1994, and allegedly confessed to buying the skiff in Saudi and driving it down to Yemen. He'd
then hooked up with Fhad al-Quoso. [I believe these two are subjects of the Cole indictment, and
just escaped from Yemeni jail with other suspects]. Al-Nashiri was ringleader, had left Yemen
shortly before the attack [and is in US custody].

- Each of the suspects held in Yemen had admitted training in UBL's Afghan camps, and
telpephone records showed that Cole suspects had been in touch with embassy bombing suspects
(237).

- Much of chapter is on FBI's frustration with Yemeni govt. and State Dept. on the investigation

- IG and EIJ both claimed Abdel-Rahman as their spiritual leader. EIJ assassinated Sadat, and
was then revived by al-Zawahiri. (244)

- Atta goes to Gernmany to study in 1992. Becomes increasingly radicalized over the years.

Ch. 17, The Hamburg Cell

NOTE: LOOK AT ENDNOTES AND SEE WHO THEY SOURCED (MOSTLY NY JTTF, I
BELIEVE). One document worth getting would be 2/24/98 testimony by Gil Childers before US
Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism