Thucydides and the Athenian Disaster in Egypt Author(s): H. D. Westlake Source: Classical Philology, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Oct., 1950), pp.

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The two principal accounts of the expedition. Thucydides. D. however. 32). OCTOBER. to prefer the account of Thucydides. Peek is a naval engagement between Greeks and Persians very probably belonging to the Athenian expedition to Egypt. 104 and 109-10) and the other by the epitomator of Ctesias' Persica (32-37).CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY Volume XLV OCTOBER 1950 Number 4 THUCYDIDES AND THE ATHENIAN DISASTER IN EGYPT H. have little in common except their brevity. considerably more than two hundred ships with the greater part of their crews. 4 Sep 2013 15:11:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . His narrative. throw a little fresh light upon the merits of the literary authorities and suggests that some reassessment of their credibility and completeness is required. on the other hand. XLV. which will be discussed below. On one important point.192.2 Ctesias evidently narrated this episode from the Persian point of view and derived his material from Persian sources. It is remarkable that Thucydides nowhere states the total extent of the losses sustained in Egypt by the Athenians and their allies. seems to imply clearly enough that the enterprise cost.fleet at the beginning of the campaign mentioned by the epitomator of the Persica (Pers. which is the growth of Athenian power.4 Nevertheless. but he seems elsewhere to have drawn freely upon his own imagination. which remains as obscure as ever. From shortly after his own time6 until the end of the nineteenth century every reader apparently accepted this implication with- scription from Samos published in 1939 by W. 19501 209 This content downloaded from 190. on the whole well-justified. the version of Ctesias is now confirmed: the naval engagement to which the Samian inscription refers is almost certainly to be identified with the crushing defeat of the Persian [CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY. It is true that he chooses to confine his narrative to the barest summary when dealing with the middle years of the Pentecontaetia and that the campaign in Egypt is not altogether relevant to the principal theme of his excursus.162. merely states that the Athenians and their allies sailed up the Nile and were in control of the river when they captured most of Memphis and began their investment of the White Castle (i. 104. however. It does. 2).' It cannot be said that the new evidence makes any substantial addition to our knowledge of the campaign.202 on Wed.5 Together with other deficiencies. the virtual omission of a major battle is not wholly explained by these considerations. it may well be due not to compression but to ignorance. from first to last.3 and there has been a tendency. WESTLAKE T HE subject of a fifth-century in. the one by Thucydides in his sketch of the Pentecontaetia (i. as it stands.

is not a true parallel. because his account of the Pentecontaetia is sketchy and incomplete. 4 Sep 2013 15:11:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and perhaps does.202 on Wed. especially as the Persians are unlikely to have understated the strength of their opponents. probably enjoying an advantage in seamanship. because he had no information of any Athenian withdrawal.14 A fleet of forty.7 More recently. On this question there have been two rival views. WESTLAKE nor with himself but with his sources. This assumption is surely unwarranted. It undoubtedly means that all.10 others believe Thucydides himself to have been at fault in omitting to mention. Eduard Meyer seems to have been the first to feel misgivings when he suggested. 112. D.210 H. and little advantage was likely to be gained by lending support to the rebels on a large scale. however. A fatal objection to the first of the two explanations mentioned above is that the meaning of the sentence in which Thucydides records the Athenian response to the appeal of Inaros. the two hundred ships operating off Cyprus were sent to Egypt. the implication of Thucydides is rejected. though not unanimously. It may be that. This statement is a valuable piece of information. The arguments whereby it has been shown that the Athenian losses can have amounted to only a fraction of the figure implied by Thueydides have been widely. but the very heavy losses sustained by the Persians. If.11 Both views involve the assumption that he possessed full information on the actions of the Athenians throughout the campaign and did not intend to create the impression that his narrative has created.12 No moderately careful historian could have written the sentence in this form if the greater part of the fleet had remained off Cyprus. Some scholars believe readers of Thucydides to have been at fault in concluding that as many as two hundred Athenian and allied ships were sent to Egypt from Cyprus . somewhat tentatively. The alleged parallel of the later expedition to Cyprus under Cimon. might well have defeated a Persian fleet of eighty. amounting to twenty ships captured and This content downloaded from 190. The Egyptian revolt had in 450 been reduced to a mere smoulder. he mistakenly believed the entire fleet of two hundred ships to have remained in Egypt throughout the six years of the campaign and thus to have been involved in the final disaster. 2-3). lie neither with his readers TCWV tv/taXcov) 71XOoV a-7rOXvlOVrEs n)v Kvi7rpov(i. accepted. that part of the fleet may have been withdrawn after its initial successes. and such is the impression that his account would undoubtedly convey if studied in vacuo. 2). in consequence of the substantial progress made in reconstructing this period. It is true that according to Ctesias the Athenian fleet assisting Inaros amounted to only forty ships (Pers. of which there is scarcely any trace. or almost all.192. that a large proportion of the Athenian fleet was withdrawn from Egypt for service elsewhere. 104. otl 4 (ETvxov yap e Ki irpov or-parevo/ievoL vavcrwc baKOOaLs aVTr v TE Kal out hesitation. is ambiguous only to those determined to find ambiguity.162. and may well be correct for most of the period of six years during which the operations in Egypt continued. several scholars have argued that losses in Egypt on a scale approximately equal to those of the Sicilian expedition cannot be fitted into the pattern of Athenian history in the middle of the fifth century.8 upon Athenian interests both in Greece and in the Delian Confederacy.9 and will not be reconsidered here. it is necessary to explain its origin. A disaster of such magnitude must have had most damaging repercussions. 32). The error could. 3 when only sixty ships from a fleet of two hundred were sent to help Amyrtaeus in Egypt (i.

indicate that the Athenian and allied fleet is more likely to have numbered about forty than two hundred. He could have written as he did if an Athenian fleet of two hundred defeated the Persians at the mouth of the Nile (Kara OaXauua'. It is true that the Nile at Memphis is not sufficiently broad for a fleet of two hundred ships to have fought an action on conventional lines there. while the Athenians sent to Egypt the whole fleet of two hundred operating off Cyprus. are more easily credited if they were inflicted by a fleet of nearly two hundred.THUTCYDIDESAND THE ATHENIAN DISASTER IN EGYPT 211 thirty destroyed according to Ctesias. and Phoenicia in a single year. Hence it is maintained that the squadron retained in Egypt and eventually blockaded at the island of Prosopitis amounted to not more than about forty ships. employed to much better effect in home waters. or at some point between them. At all stages of the Egyptian campaign it was in the interest of the Athenians to divert Persian attention from the main theatre of war.19 The narrative of Thucydides is very differently. This reconstruction of events. though by no means complete or beyond doubt. 4 Sep 2013 15:11:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . is attributed by advocates of this reconstruction to his extreme brevity in dealing with the middle years of the Pentecontaetia.202 on Wed. the figure given by Ctesias.16 and those sustained in Cyprus and Phoenicia. interpreted by those who maintain that. who records that." The failure of Thucydides to refer to the reduction of the Athenian fleet in either section of his narrative on the Egyptian expedition.'0 Large naval forces could not hasten the reduction of the White Castle." but interiecto deinde tempore post reditum suorum aucti et classe et militum roboreproelium reparant (iii. to be expected in a dedicatory epigram of this kind. they could be. they suffered a naval defeat at home. The year in which these casualties occurred is not necessarily the first year of the Egyptian expedition.162.'5 It does not. and the author evidently found difficulty in hammering his material into most uninspired verse. and somewhat more convincingly. They point to other omissions of greater or less This content downloaded from 190. Many hypotheses suggest themselves. Although the chapter in which this passage occurs bristles with the grossest blunders. which gave them the undisputed control of the Nile mentioned by Thucydides. 6. and perhapson Cyprus as well. Pers. perhaps in cooperation with land forces under Inaros. and these ships may subsequently have sailed either back to Egypt or home to Athens. 6-7). with its reference to a naval battle [M'E."7 Topographical accuracy is not.192. had pursued the fugitives upstream as far as Memphis."1It also receives a little additional support from a reference in Justin. Egypt. whch may have been very few. they withdrew some threequarters of it not long after the victory mentioned by Ctesias.]Otos a4O' /EpaT77-. Raids on the Phoenician coast. including the Samian contingent. Nor does the new inscription from Samos. may have been conducted by ships detached from the fleet in Egypt. Justin may have preserved an authentic point of some importance. while the resources of the Athenians were weakened by the despatch of a fleet to Egypt. is more consistent than the other with what is known of Athenian military history in this period. and evidently were. do not necessarily imply operations involving a considerable number of ships. point to this conclusion. all equally conjectural."8where the prizes to which he refers were secured. however. Support for the view that a large proportion of the two hundred Athenian ships did not sail to Egypt has also been sought in the Erechtheid inscription with its record of Athenian casualties in Cyprus. 32) and a section of it. however.

there is no demonstrable hiatus in his account or between its two sections.?vcaavTa KaL o6XtyoL 6aro 7roXX(-? known that most of them withdrew.the great Sicilian expedition (cf. It occur at the end of the whole tragedy but o-rpareLa after the debacle at Prosopitis.EyaXrv which he stresses their losses (i. he a4revaSTCvaav) *26 A campaign conducted would surely have written "those of the throughout most of its course by a fleet of Athenians and their allies left in Egypt" some forty ships was considerable.212 H. later by sixty. 104. which arriving in the (i. 4). i. of material in describing derstatement.lropEvouIEVOL &aTa i7s Atv1s with vii.87. 1). 110. 110. normal emphasis in a largely irrelevant In contrast to his usual practice of un. 4 Sep 2013 15:11:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . did not impress him . In the Peloponnesian War itself losses sustained by the squadron of fifty. 1). he lays great emphasis both His arrangenment upon the magnitude of the expedition the fate of the Athenians is equally sigand the magnitude of the disaster. 2-4) and against Samos (i. WESTLAKE the first Athenian intervention in Sicily. Ta /LEV OVV KaTa T-7V 2tTaXKOU oTpaTcEtav while EyEvETo).section of a highly compressed excursus. but may be found in the language and ar. 1). he begins his second section with the words oL 8' Ev the expedition of Sitalces with his huge army is not described as great (ii. not use similar language.25In recording the operations at the the fate of an Athenian squadron. which is happens that the phrase Aie-ya'Xq occurs nowhere else in his work. On the other hand. though ad. 4). O6TWS importance. OflcTctv. KaL oX&yOL aIro 7roXXwv Elr' o0'KOV ment of the White Castle (i. 1) is Kat rwZv(vy a'Xwv es the climax of the drama. 112.i v Kara Tr7v .The arrangement of this chapter may mittedly these were enterprises of much have been influenced by Greek dramatic shorter duration than the expedition to practice. 110). 2-3) and War.202 on Wed. Ta TWv'EXX?vwv lrpa-y/IaTa E4Oap-7 ly that the Athenians stayed on if he had ouTW LuEV ET ErOE /roXey. the withdrawal took place may be doubted whether ei-ther would rangement of the chapter in which he de."24 Confirmation of the view that he had with most of the crews and also part of a no knowledge of an Athenian withdrawal further squadron was serious enough.vguaxot TV1 ErE. and it is undeniable that he could have been guilty of such an oversight here. namely the invest. It is difficult to recongreatly (iii. indeed. 6. conducted initially by twenty ships. off Cyprus in 450 ing to fifty ships. all involving the employment of two pitis was surprised by the enemy and lost hundred ships by the Athenians. His nificant. and his evidently the most important episode. and lasting 'AO-rvaZot Kal ol Ai-y WrTco C about three years. 2). Yet it does not o-rparecuav 'AOrva'Lcv Alyvwrrovovrwxs reXevr-lo-Ev (i.magnitude of the disaster in Egypt is tion that he was aware of the Athenian striking: he uses terms closely parallel to withdrawal but omitted to mention it. This content downloaded from 190. 101. the fate of the Egyptian rebels expeditions anterior to the Peloponnesian and their leader Inaros (ibid. 1. and a disaster involving the whole of this fleet or "not withdrawn from Egypt.192. He those with which he ends his account of would scarcely have stated so categorical. oL 6' rXEL(rTTL aIrcoXovro fore the last event mentioned in the first section of his account.. His insistence on the cile his use of this phrase with the assump. D. but it surely suggests that the Egypt. he does a large proportion of its strength (ibid.EVOV (i. 100. To use of it here is thle more striking in that it are appended notes on two subsidiary he tends to depreciate the scale of naval episodes.have evoked from Thucydides this abscribes the end of the eampaign (i..162. The sentence quoted above in closing words are ra .mouth of the Nile after the fall of Proso17). 110. as es Kvp iv7jv is possible. amountEurymedon (i. 115. 90. 109. If. 6.

162. reading Thucydides and Ctesias together. some of the crews escaping to Cyrene. KarMm TcOXOP A'LYV7rrov OVK lo36rTEs Tr$V -yeSyoPOrTW o&ve). which was far from creditable in that the survivors had bought their safety at the price of abandoning Egypt and may even have been repudiated. or more rarely of inheriting some property. This knowledge. EK U rTi' 'A677C)VKacL rns 'aXX-s (vAl. they imply succession.E.30 There is every reason to accept the surrender as authentic: it is difficult to understand why the Persians should have invented it.29 Diodorus also refers to this surrender (xi.28 He adds that Megabyzus undertook to allow these men to return home unharmed. 4-5).34 It is."32 In the fifth and fourth centuries &63Aoxos and &La6oxI seem to have invariably con- tained the idea of taking over some function. and when the squadron of fifty was despatched. 77. The blockade of Prosopitis lasted eighteen months (i.27were far less serious than those of the fleet destroyed at Prosopitis. evidently Ephorus. E.35 In either case the situation clearly demanded that the fleet should be extricated from its present dangers. he could well have known the number of those repatriated by way of Cyrene. 34). The sentence in which Thucydides records the arrival of the fifty Athenian ships in the Nile after the fall of Prosopitis raises a further difficulty and probably contains another error (i. a figure consistent with his earlier statement that the Athenian fleet amounted to forty ships. Their chief aim was to rid themselves of the Athenians in order that they might complete the suppression of the revolt. If Thucydides had believed the latter to have consisted of only about forty ships.THUCYDIDES AND THE ATHENIAN DISASTER IN EGYPT 213 which perhaps amounted to some thirtyfive ships with their crews."' On the other hand. Despite the compression of his narrative he could scarcely have failed to mention this vital point if he had been aware of it. he would have arranged his narrative differently. oL 5e 6Xlyot aIro iro&XXc rxetarO0 a&rwXovro(i. 4. very probably the former. . which was to have then sailed home. namely six thousand. having received no news for more than a year. There is also every reason to believe that Thucydides was ignorant of the surrender.36 known or suspected. . for the two defeats would have seemed to him at least comparable in their cost to Athens. the Athenians must either have known that their troops had been defeated and were being invested or. however.202 on Wed. from another. and omitted it as a detail of subsidiary importance. would lead him to infer a loss of more than thirty thousand men and thus to write w. 1). 4 Sep 2013 15:11:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 110. Some information provided by Ctesias perhaps explains how Thucydides came to overestimate the extent of the disaster. 109. not assistance and cooperation.192. and their action may mark a first step towards the Peace of Callias. the fleet operating in Egypt. concluded that all the survivors from the two hundred ships originally sent to Egypt were permitted by agreement with the Persians to reach Cyrene in safety. combined with ignorance that the Athenian fleet had long before been reduced from two hundred to about forty. an This content downloaded from'Sos 3LaWoXoL Ir?4ovuaT es ?rEvTrfKOY Tarpolpas r6 MEVCJTLOv Kepas.TcG?7oTav.33 Thucydides thus means that the squadron of fifty ships was sent to replace part of. difficult to believe that the Ecclesia can have voted such a replacement at this stage. have felt serious anxiety for their safety. They probably had no wish to provoke reprisals. The epitomator states that more than six thousand Athenians surrendered to the Persians (Pers. and not that any part of it should be replaced. . Their decision was surely the outcome of bad news or no news. There is no doubt that &A'SoXoLmeans "relief" or "substitute" and not "reinforcement. possibly all. 110. 4).

while he was absent from less than four points of substance Thucyd. During the siege of the White Castle reliefs may perhaps have been sent to replace ships no longer fit for active service. If.the Philaidae.41 and he is likely to have contaetia occupies an intermediate stage been brought up in a family circle where to which he does not happen to refer in his the seriousness of the Athenian losses was introduction. ignorant of the sur. to reconstruct ra nificance for himself. great as those of Herodotus in collecting The consternation with which it was rematerial on the invasion of Xerxes. undertaken and conducted by the poBoth in quantity and in quality the avail. 4 Sep 2013 15:11:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . He was probably oral or documentary. To ob. WESTLAKE of potential informants and increased the risk of distortion on their part. though he does remark later overrated because the expedition had been that it was a neglected period (i. He could have reignorant of the naval victory won at the vised it after his return. 22. however. but there is good outset.recollections. as was once generally agreed and is still believed by many scholars. 2). In the critical period after the victory of Megabyzus. the passage of time had thinned the ranks UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER operation likely to be hazardous and unlikely to be profitable.handicap perhaps was that he was here render by the survivors of the blockade without the immense advantage.reason to believe that he was related to possible (i. ignorant of the subsequent with.192. which at Prosopitis and misinformed on the sail. The question when and where he wrote the sketch of the Pentecontaetia is a particularly controversial part of a controversial issue.162. D. only assistance and reinforcement can have been contemplated. They were probably at least as the disaster in Egypt reached Athens. 97.214 H.38If. which lies outside the scope of this paper.reason for believing that it never received drawal involving a substantial reduction a thorough revision. he added it after his return from exile. 3 and 20.added to the probable inadequacy of his ponnesian War: to a much greater extent information.litical opponents of Cimon. This content downloaded from 190. doubtless making a deep ponnesian War was. There is also good iraXata with any certainty was almost im. just as in the Sicilian campaign after the Syracusans had gained the initiative. as has been recently maintained and As has been suggested in the foregoing seems very probable. 3). The War.he mentions among his principal qualificaing orders Issued to the squadron of fifty tions for writing on the Peloponnesian sent out at the end of the campaign.Athens. there is reason to believe that on no after 424. very few survivors of the Egyptian expedition can have then been alive.39he can hardly have had the opides' account of the Athenian expedition portunity of consulting Athenian sources. 1. 1). Here again Thucydides seems to have been misled by faulty information.ceived may have been among his earliest tain accurate information on the Pelo. of having lived through the period I40 deficiency of his information is not at all ataavs CEvoS'rp 7X4Kd^ Thucydides was probably not more surprising if his difficulties in collecting material on this period are fully appreci.than about six years old when the news of ated.37 The Pente. Yet his greatest of the Athenian fleet. as he points out.42Hence a misable material must have been even less taken preconception may have been adequate than for the events of the Pelo. to Egypt is defective. a impression upon him at a time when he laborious task because eyewitnesses were was far too young to 4ssess its true siguntrustworthy (i.202 on Wed. he wrote it not long pages.

draws attention to the similarity of the language used in these two passages. cisms and suggestions.THUCYDIDES AND THE ATHENIAN DISASTER IN EGYPT 215 NOTES known that when Megabyzus invaded Egypt the 1. who himself expresses a cautious acperhaps derived from the unabridged Persica of ceptance of this view (ibid.G. cf. 1). It was not imply that much more than half the squadron was unusual for the Athenians to renew a command several lost. L. 10. p. it battle of Tanagra in the following year (i. wroXX@v lorWav (the Ambraciot disaster at Idomene). In 28. 12. d. IV2. cit. 1 where Iphicrates planned to sail up the Nile to at3. p. But Inaros apparently had no the victory of Inaros at Papremis. 570. 198-201. 77. loc. n. 21. op. 2) and Aristodemus (F. 86 (the whole of this passage seems to prevent the Athenians from establishing contact to be founded upon a casual study of Thucydides). who must have chosen to omit which Inaros was the leader. 11. 32).192. Meiggs. n. 33. 289-306. "the general sketchithe opinion Tjv oTpaT7eav ness of the Pentakontaetia must account for it" (cf. n. cit. cit. Schol. Plut. op. 199. vii. untrustworthy (cf. 929. Historical Com25. Ge8ch. 13. 74-75 and 17. I am also indebted to him for having read a flrst 15. said to have II2. Kal ol Z&A#aXoL in i. of known to Thucydides. Gr. Cloch6. 220). Peek. Isocr. 2. Phil. but concluded that it must have been almost negliop. Ephorus (Diod. 25. with him. cit. I.202 on Wed. i. op. that some of tion). The Athenian commander was an otherwise have magnifled the losses of this squadron. Momigliano. but the Photian 19. xi. 12. It is mentioned by ships. however. 110. 1. cit. 3. draft of this paper and for having made valuable criti16. op. Klio. Adcock that I have been able to see a copy. 311 and 412. 7. n.. 322. does not. cit. 4. "a relieving squadmand some four years later when Megabyzus deron . 48. . would not have proceeded northwards leaving the 5. Apparently the Corinthian victory at Halieis or widespread. It has a little independent authority numbered 300 (Pers. Wallace. 3. 43. 7) and was probably battle resulted in a victory for the rebel cause.. p. his long list of omissions. Cary. Peek. This content downloaded from 190. 331. 257 and Gomme. followed by Peek. 1 (III. points 8. 5 and xiii.. xv. Gomme. times unless the holder were a well-known flgure. Op.. 4... Soc." Thucydides does feated the Athenians and Egyptians (ibid. TAPA. 6). 259. cit. Cary. A. Cf. 12. 191. 4-5. For example.. The longer account by Diodorus (xi. n. 219. As his text stands. 3. fessor F.ntly gave an account of the Egyptian (1936). 299. . Meiggs. The suggestion of Meyer. The article is not easily obtainable in this under the same commander defeated the Persians at country. 3). 41. 112. 104. 77. n.. p. points out that a Ctesias. 552. p. op. LXIII (1943). Henoe Ctesias or his epitomator may well have citizens and non-citizens. Gomme. op. Adcock. The restoration [Me]ALos&XA'ipaTis in the second line is conAthenian fleet consisted of 40 ships under Charitimides and have mistakenly assumed that the same fleet vincing. n. 29. 1). 1 are surely identical with 301-2. cit. Pearson.. Adcock. op. apparently because Ephorus must have read the Persica undid..V A. 1. cf. 24. 1. op.. 1).. Some of this unrest may. 104. but sumes that this figure includes Athenian citizens only. 1. cit. Both ancient and modern scholars 14. cit. whose epitome probably does him less than justice. Cary. however. 258. op. Artax. n. &KEIV17V JAeYtffTI7.. Aegyptus. Gesch. op.. Wallace. 199-200. 1926. J. 3. loc. It is by no means impossible that the entire reconcile the accounts of Thucydides and Ctesias fleet may have sailed as far as Memphis (cf. Gr... I. ol f' Tn Al-ybTTrO 'AOqva7ot 10.. L. p. others appear to have ignored it. cit. 40. 6Xotyot Jacoby) interpreted this passage as meaning that the &irb whole fleet operating off Cyprus sailed to Egypt.. A much less serious omission by Thucydides is enemy in the rear. unknown Charitimides (Pers.. communications with Athens must have remained but surely the Persians. Athenian honour at all costs.. Thuc. 1-5) is founded upon an attempt by Ephorus to 18. 11.Lviv Of T&v v0v (i. xi. 2). i. The Persian fleet of Megabyzus. 105. Peek. would have drawn no distinction between Castle. 5). cit. 74. he was still in comad loc. 301. 4.. as he suggests.. gible. cit. 2. had rather the fleet was withdrawn has been developed by Adearlier mentioned the possibility of such a reduction cock. 173. and not necessarily that it because it took place before the arrival of the Athehe was present. was almost wiped out. flnds eviout that the Athenians had to use the "oldest and dence of disaffection. X (1929). (Thuc. that the Persians should send their fleet downstream 6. especially in Ionia. JHS. XXXII (1939). op. argues that Inaros. 23. 109. 21-34. cf. preceding 450. Beloch. p. E.. 3-4) and yet could muster a large army for the have been encouraged by the disaster in Egypt. Busolt. op. p. 365-69). cit. p. also iii. 3-5.. p. he was. 2. p. cit. 71. loc. Wallace. (Meyer. 3. 32). few have rejected it. 1. 26.162. op. Cf. and Persian fleets sent to operate in Egypt in the abridged. IV2. xvi. TAPA. 42. XetroJt.yvEor6at T&v irp6 avTis. 4). 24. CQ. Trogus (Prol. 33). 252-60. p. cit. 4. 27. Of the expedition against Troy he expresses mentary on Thucydides. 9. 105. It was natural that he should remain nian fleet (Diod. cit. and Wallace. VII (1913). Busolt.. op. and it is only through the kindness of Prothe beginning of the campaign. LXVII by Justin appare. 322. viii. those whose achievements are described in i. 1-4. 8. 3-4. 1. cit. 606 in the flrst edi20. 107. cf. XI revolt recorded from the Persian point of view and (1942). and Ctesias surely means only that the naval Herodotus (iii. p. III. Adcock. asthis case the fleet was operating far from home. participation in the battle is implied by Ctesias (Pers. xi. 74. I. far too eager to defend fourth century were very large (Diod. in the years youngest" to defend the Megarid in 458 (Thuc. pp. G. L'antiquite classique. Cary. Proc.. appear to have been very serious 22. Diod. 4 Sep 2013 15:11:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . cit. LXXVIII (1947). iii) in the book here epitomised Camb. 3 is palpably mistaken on this in the neighbourhood of Memphis and equally natural point). from whom Ctesias derived uninterrupted throughout the siege of the White his material. Antiquity considered Ctesias to be thoroughly tack Memphis.

xix. 1) and ota5oxii (ii. 1. and there is no indication whether Thucydides approved of his policy before 445 (cf. ii. 302. 3 and 28. 34. 26. They would not be protected by the local agreement made with Megabyzus by the commanders of the other Athenian fleet. 35-36). Thucydides deems worthy of mention the fact that its commanders chose the Mendesian arm of the Nile. It is much easier to accept an early date for the account of Pausanias and Themistocles (i. with other excursuses. pp. 1912. 41. Each excursus surely presents a separate problem. The mention of this surrender by Diodorus is surely fatal to the view of Momigliano.. One reason why he describes the Samian revolt at greater length than earlier episodes of no less importance may be that he was probably passing from boyhood to manhood when it occurred. can scarcely have been originally intended by Thucydides. 154. I. XXV (1946-47). 2) occur all point to this interpretation. op. In both these passages he appears to refer to all Greek history before the Peloponnesian War.. Rh.202 on Wed. cf. a substantial reduction was intended). surrounded by superior forces at a point many miles from the open sea. requires Grecs avec lE'gypte. 2-3) describes how at Plataea an Athenian force of 300 relieved a Megarian force of 3. 30. In the legal sense Isocrates (xix. Gomme. Finley. n. in the singular only. even if they felt confldent of being able to evade the Persian land forces whenever they chose. He could mean (and whether he was right or not is immaterial) either that the relieving force of 50 was sent to replace part of a fleet of 200 or that the relieving force of 50 was sent to replace the whole of a fleet of 200 (i. op. loc. i. 9. (cf.. i.192. Thucydides. much more convincing than that of Ziegler. Pericle 122. Isaeus vii. vii. in time to concentrate large forces against them. 3). 27. but the words used here by Thucydides surely admit of two other interpretations. to form part of the same general history of the past. Peek. The attitude of Pericles towards the expedition is unknown. Schmid.. LXXVIII (1929). griech. His story that the Athenian prisoners were taken with Inaros to the Persian court where 50 of them were executed (Pers. 38-39). who dates the sketch of the Pentecontaetia.. Almost all problems connected with the work of Thucydides are in some degree affected by the major problem of its origin and growth (Romilly. D. Mus. Camb. but scholars have doubted with good reason whether he intends to include the Pentecontaetia in either case. 31. cit. the very brief summary in Proc. 36. cit. the likelihood of an encounter with the Phoenician fleet mentioned by Thucydides. were in a very dangerous situation. possibly from a captured despatch. Even the large forces of Megabyzus can scarcely have maintained a complete blockade of Prosopitis (Mallet. 15. 10). op. 5). Hammond. WESTLAKE one of the three major branches. III. It is difficult to understand why Cloche. d. There are many similar examples in fourth-century prose. Peek. p.216 H. their purpose may have been to evade the Persian fleet and reach Prosopitis without being intercepted. cit. believes that the blockade was considered at Athens to be "sans peril grave. and the Athenians could hardly have continued their resistance so long unless they had been able to replenish their stocks of food. that a surrender is not incompatible with his account. 4 Sep 2013 15:11:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Soc. 110. vii. 5). Les rapports des 67. Gesch. Adcock. 14 and Isocr. iv. I. This early dating of the excursuses. Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire. 29. v. cit. could not be ignored. 149. 4. 146-52. 85. cit. p. 115. The island was of considerable extent (Hdt. the plural occurs twice in a passage where Herodotus (ix. 6). This content downloaded from 190. Thucydide et l'imperialisme ath6nien. loc. is dismissed as false or grossly exaggerated. The other passages of Thucydides in which &&Aoxos (iii. and these two excursuses.) &tA&oXot wrXkovuar iS A&-yv7-Tov contains a hint that the Athenian fleet in Egypt at this time amounted to only about 50 ships. 9. it must have been obvious that their troops. is hardly credible unless the statement of Thucydides that their forces were blockaded and besieged. According to Adcock. but Elsewhere he uses 5&&Aoxos approximate equality of function appears to be a much stronger ingredient in this word than approximate equality of numbers. the relieving force of 50 being sent to replace a force of approximately equal size... and the text of the first passage may be defective (Gomme. viii." Even though the information available to the Athenians may have been incomplete. 36. This view is. 37. 33. pp. 58-67. 43) uses bta5Xovs Tis KxX7povoAlias where several persons are to succeed to the estate of one man. cit. if it has any foundation. of a paper by Harrison). ii. op. 4. very early (cf. XXXIV (1940). 199205. 5. 1. what matters is that he can use btAboxot despite the disparity of numbers. 28. 32. 43 illustrate the legal sense. I. Literatur. With most of Egypt iIn sympathy with the Athenians single messengers can have had little difficulty in evading the Persians. probably refers to men from the squadron surprised in the Nile.162. The complacency ascribed to the Athenian commanders by De Sanctis. as Ziegler apparently believes. op. op. 65.. which was not more detailed exposition than it has received. 38. 4. 1. CQ.000 (ibid. 362-63.. 5. 2. 41. that Ephorus did not use the Persica. 21. The ignorance that caused the squadron of 50 to be surprised by the enemy (OVK et56Tes Trav -7yOP6Trw ob5VO)was surely not of the blockade at Prosopitis but of the final disaster there. which has not been widely accepted (Gomme. 1. Phil. Very probably the fleet in Egypt did not exceed this figure at the end of the campaign. 331. cit. 40. 8. 9-10 and 29. it is difficult to understand the view of Busolt. 39. in my opinion. 128-38) than for the sketch of the Pentecontaetia. op. 1.. For example. 109. cit. n. but the Persians learned of their approach. p. although his account is not above suspicion. n. 91-92 and 135-36).e. cit. Although he does not expressly deny that any Athenians surrendered.. I. which overlap one another considerably. 35. 42.

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