SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE UNDERGROUND STORAGE INDUSTRY - THE BERLIN GAS STORAGE

Armin Schneider, GASAG Berliner Gaswerke Aktiengesellschaft

1 INTRODUCTION
Berlin, the capital city today of the Federal Republic of Germany, which was divided up to the end of 1989, looks back on a turbulent political history that also had a decisive influence on the gas supply of the city. Looking at the political and supply-related island situation of the city at that time, there was initially pressure for proprietary production with regard to the gas supply, i.e., for the production of gas based on energy sources such as light gasoline and methanol, that were delivered via rail or water. It took several years to achieve a connection to the German or European integrated energy system, i.e. in particular a natural-gas transport line through the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. The German-Soviet large-pipe transactions with the gas-delivery treaty that was associated with that at the start of the 1980s, as well as the subsequent follow-up meetings, first opened up the opportunity for the connection of Berlin (West) to the natural-gas supply in the first half of the 1980s. As a general rule, it was clear to all of the decision-makers in the process that the feasibility and realization of an underground natural-gas storage were indispensable prerequisites for naturalgas acquisition by Berlin. The attitude of the Allied protection forces had significant weight here; they had specified that a year's supply of natural gas be held in reserve . The area in which the Berlin natural-gas storage was built is in a district of the city that is characterized by a medium to high building density, by sport and recreation areas and by nature and water conservation areas, in addition to having various other problematic issues. Besides authorization procedures, intensive technical and cost-related administrative conditions that refer to the system safety, as well as industrial safety, health protection and environmental protection, result from this. The following protection goals, which are also documented in a safety analysis from 1990, or documented today in a safety report required in accordance with the amended Major Accidents Act (German law), were used as a basis for the construction and the operation of the natural-gas storage including all of its technical equipment and structural facilities: Protection of the facility and of the employees working in the facility against improper operation conditions and malfunctions, as well as their effects. Protection of life and health, as well as of physical property, in the environment of the facility. This aspect is of particular importance given the special local conditions in Berlin, with a high density of residential buildings at a distance of approx. 110 m. from the property limits of the storage operating site. Protection of the environment. The operating facilities of the natural-gas storage are located in part in a water conservation area and in a nature conservation area. Preventative technical and safety-related equipment was installed to achieve the protection goals. The Berlin natural gas storage was originally designed to be a reserve storage unit, i.e. for limited seasonal quantity equalization between the gas that was acquired and the gas that was needed, due to the regional and political island situation of Berlin and the restrictions associated with that. It was provided with substantial redundancies in the surface facilities for reasons of supply reliability. The storage is now used to equalize the differences in quantity between the gas acquisition and the need for gas, and the redundancies have been given up. The operational mode of the storage is oriented towards clipping off the demand peaks in the supply area, or purchasing quantities of gas that are cheaper, i.e. the saving of costs when acquiring gas and thereby the improvement of the profit situation of the company. The requirements in the gas industry are realized with the Berlin natural gas storage system. The protection goals have to also be achieved to the same degree a basic prerequisite for the existence of the storage system at a location of this type. These requirements not only call for technology for their realization, but also a methodical system in the organization and process structure, or with regard to the necessary functions and tools for management; not just to be able to adequately cope with the circumstances, but to also ensure continuous improvement, as well as the capability to quickly and flexibly react to changing requirements.

2 KEY DATA ON THE BERLIN NATURAL GAS STORAGE

2.1 Gas Supply Situation in the State of Berlin The company GASAG ensures an entire year's supply of the energy source of natural gas for more than 700,000 Berlin customers with a network of pipelines having a length of a good 6590 km, five transfer stations and the Berlin natural gas storage with a storage capacity of 1085 * 106 m (Vn). The Berlin gas storage serves here to provide equalization between the acquisition and need structures. The Berlin gas storage is directly connected to an internal-city, 40-bar natural-gas transport line of GASAG. This natural-gas transport line first connects, in the form of a half-ring, the Buckow transfer station in the south of Berlin to the southern high-pressure distribution node, the Mariendorf distribution station, and then to the storage operating site in the Glockenturmstrasse and finally to the northern high-pressure distribution node, the Charlottenburg reduction and distribution station. The feed into the remaining high-pressure and medium-pressure system, which is designed to be lower in terms of pressure levels, is provided through it, apart from the supply of consumers who are connected to the transport line in a less direct way. The existing network geometry also makes it possible to use the storage to cover the winter demand peaks of the entire city, among other things.

Fig. 1: Gas supply situation in Berlin The Berlin gas storage was built from the standpoint of a politically-necessary crisis supply for West Berlin and was only secondarily designed to be a storage facility for seasonal equalization. The tasks of the storage were changed considerably after the fall of the Wall and the reunification of Germany in 1990. The high storage capacity of 1085 * 106 m (Vn) with a supply quantity for approx. 1 year was no longer the decisive factor for the requirements of Gasag with an expanding supply network; the decisive factor was instead the optimization of gas acquisition and thereby the dependable supply of its customers with natural gas at economical prices. 2.2 Geology and Reservoir Engineering A great deal of attention was paid to the placement of the wells during the development of the aquifer gas storage. The Berlin gas storage stands out because of the complicated tectonics. The

reservoir can be divided up into at least 8 areas that communicate more or less with each other. They involve 2 areas each east and west of a large Graben fault, which still have to be divided up into the upper and lower Detfurth layers. Furthermore, sand layers above the main storage horizons participate in the storage behaviour, if only to a small extent. In a lithological sense, the sand types of the upper and lower Detfurth layer also have major differences. The lower layer involves sandstone that is a little compacted with a high matrix permeability, whereas the upper layer is heavily cemented with a significantly lower matrix permeability and thickness. The upper layer has a high degree of fractures in the central part of the structure, however; relatively high production rates can be realized because of this. The location of the operating sites and wells is presented in Fig. 2. The topography is provided and the course of the important faults are presented for orientation. The storage horizons are the lower and upper Detfurth layers in the Buntsandstein (Bunter) at a depth of approx. 800 m below sea level at the top of the storage. The gas-storage layers are covered with layers of clay stone, anhydrite and rock salt that are approx. 200 meters thick . The tightness of the cap rock layers was investigated and verified before the construction of the underground storage. The confirmation of the suitability of the Bunter structure in Berlin for the construction of an underground natural-gas storage was provided in 1992 in the form of a conclusive report on behalf of the mining authorities for the state of Berlin.

Fig. 2: Berlin natural gas storage Location of the operating sites and wells 2.3 Storage Wells Twelve wells that have been drilled in from 3 sites (B, C, D) are available for the storage operation. Four of the total of 16 wells can only be used in a limited way. The varying formations of the storage sand types also require different methods of completion of the wells. In the lower layer the wells are equipped with a sand filter and a gravel pack, whereas a simple completion is adequate in the upper layer. The wells also have major differences in their produktion behavior. The wells are equipped for the most part with 5 1/2 tubings; a few of the older wells are only equipped with 4 tubings, however.

The wells are drilled from 4 sites, 3 of which are in operation; Site A with the wells B2 and B3 is not connected. In the well B2 the gas saturation ist still very low, well B3 has gas saturation in the upper layer and at the top of the lower layer. A storage production rate of of 450,000 m (Vn)/h can be achieved with the storage wells and the existing surface facilities. 2.4 Storage Facilities and Well Sites The surface storage-facilities are distributed over three of the four well sites (A, B, C, D) (Fig. 3). The construction of the storage plant was established using the four drilling sites that were developed in the course of the exploration; the sites were converted and expanded into gas production sites. Finding other drilling sites with a better structural situation was impossible due to the buildings in the city and the water and nature conservation area in the development area of the storage. The 16 storage wells and the water disposal wells had to therefore be concentrated at four sites and run down with a strong deviation from there. All of the facilities are housed in buildings due to the location requirements, or for reasons of emission protection.

Fig. 3 Facility schematic, Berlin natural gas storage The well heads of the storage wells and of the water disposal wells are housed in 5.15-meterdeep cellars that are covered with concrete plates. The cellar covers can be removed if necessary. There are special steel covers over the well heads in each case for wireline jobs. A solution that was even more expensive and technically-complicated had to be chosen at well Site B due to the even more cramped situation there. Besides the well heads of the storage wells and the water disposal wells, all of the process-related facilities, as well as the supply and ancillary equipment, are also housed underground there in a 2500 m cellar. The heating of the regeneration system has to be done electrically due to the accommodations in the cellar. The reciprocated compressors are located at the main operating site (Site D) in the Glockenturmstrae in noise-insulated buildings. The gas is centrally distributed to the well sites from there via a field line system for storage. The compressors are likewise driven electrically for emissionprotection reasons.

The well sites A, B and D are in the Tiefwerder water conservation area of Zone III. The requirement for decentralized drying of the gas came about due to this. The water that accumulates in the process is disposed into the Rdersdorf porous lime stone from ever site on a decentralized basis. The entire electrical-power supply for the facilities is provided via several 10 kV and 400 V transfer stations. In addition, emergency-power systems including a no-break power supply are installed at every site. The pipeline system of the facility has a length of approx. 4 km. The processcontrol system includes approx. 12,000 control, measurement and regulation points with approx. 20,000 process variables. In total, the storage has seven buildings and 2 cellar structures that are supplied with extensive heating, air-conditioning and ventilation systems.

3 DETERMINATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGERS REGARDING SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The new obligation to prepare a safety report that is arising for the operators of underground storage because of the amendment of the Federal Immission Protection Act (BimSchG, German law) and the Major Accidents Act in Germany, triggered by the SEVESO II guideline, is coming up against the special set of circumstances at GASAG Berliner Gaswerke Aktiengesellschaft that a safety analysis already exists due to the origins of the Berlin natural gas storage. The safety analysis was arranged for through the resolution of the Berlin parliament with regard to safety investigations that were to be presented. The safety analysis was prepared in 1986 and updated in 1990. It essentially consisted of two parts that concerned themselves with the surface area and the sub-surface area. Furthermore, technical measures for the storage operation (both normal operation mode and special operating measures such as workovers, for instance) were also noted and evaluated. The further construction since 1990 and the operation of the Berlin natural gas storage, as well as all of the measures associated with that, were carried out based on the mining-law authorization process, so there was an update of the safety analysis of 1990 based on the mining-law documents. In the process, the safety plan presented in the safety analysis was pursued further. The safety report that is necessary due to the requirements of the amended Major Accidents Act takes the safety analysis of 1990 into consideration, as well as measures that were taken in the meanwhile, and represents as a result the update of the safety analysis of 1990; the new policies of the amended Major Accidents Act of April 26, 2000, were taken into account on a formal basis. The relevant facility areas that were identified in the safety analysis at that time are also given consideration in an analog fashion in the safety report. This means that there was a division of the facility areas into associated, but demarcated, individual facilities for the safety report. The list of dangers that was prepared at that time, in which the dangerous events, the conditions for the danger to become active, and the direct and escalating consequences of the danger were noted for each identified danger, was checked and included in the same way. The determination of dangers was done by applying the list of dangers to the facility areas or to the individual facilities, as the case may be. After possible dangers were identified, there was a risk assessment, followed by an evaluation of the remaining risk. If the risk assessment comes up with a risk that is not reasonable, the process is carried out again after additional protective measures are determined (process following DIN EN 1050). Two methods are used for determining environmental influences / environmental effects. On the one hand, the "effect - cause method", which is usually used, and on the other hand, the "cause effect method". In the effect-cause method, the environmental influences / environmental effects (e.g. emissions, waste or waste water) are to be determined, quantified and assigned to the activities, services and products that cause them. The environmental influences / environmental effects are to be evaluated. Measures for reducing the environmental influences / environmental effects are to be established, and the result of the measure is to be determined. Finally, the environmental influence is to be evaluated again. The evaluation of the environmental influences / environmental effects is done according to the ABC analysis (A - small effect, B - medium-sized effect, C - strong effect). In the cause-effect method, the activities, products and services are systematically investigated with regard to environmental influences / environmental effects that arise. The subsequent evaluation and establishment of measures are done as they are in the effect-cause method. The Berlin natural gas storage consists of facility sections and places that are visited with varying degrees of frequency and duration by employees for activities. These locations are viewed as being

work places. The work places are evaluated on the basis of a list of dangers. DIN EN 1050 is used as an instrument for the process of assessing the risk. Particular attention was paid to only using methods that were already used in comparable facilities with good operating experience in the selection of the technical measures for ensuring the protection goals. Completely new technical developments that involve the "essential features of the procedure" were not used to rule out from the outset the risk of using systems that are not technically mature. The residual risk that remains when the set of technical rules is adhered to, which is normally considered to be acceptable, was further reduced through other safety-related equipment and measures, above and beyond the requirements of the relevant set of technical rules. The local circumstances of the facility were taken into consideration here to a great extent. Operational measures also serve to achieve the protection goals, in addition to preventative technical installations.

4 SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE TECHNICAL CONSTRUCTION DESIGN OF THE BERLIN NATURAL GAS STORAGE
4.1 Buildings The facilities of the Berlin gas storage are in a water conservation area. This had to be taken into account on a technical basis with regard to the operation, as well as in view of later assembly work. All of the facilities that contain substances that could endanger water are therefore set up within fluid-tight concrete enclosures with a size of up to 8,500 m. The buildings that are not located within the enclosures have their own, water-tight concrete enclosures if fluids that could endanger water are in the buildings. All of the facilities, especially the compressor equipment, were set up in buildings or cellars that are equipped with ventilation and smoke-removal systems for reasons involving emission protection. Large-volume foundations with an anchoring to the ground that extends for up to 14 m below ground ensure that a minimum of vibration will occur when the compressor is operated. Extensive drainage and waste-water systems with silt traps and oil and gasoline separators are installed so that no pollutants will get into the public sewage system. Sunken concrete areas with drainage systems serve as deployment areas for tank trucks. All of the operating sites of the Berlin natural gas storage are fenced in; it can only be entered through the reception area, which is designed in the form of an interlock gate. Furthermore, the fencing is monitored with television cameras with motion sensors; doors and gates are automatically monitored by contacts for unauthorized entry. Messages regarding unauthorized entry are visually and acoustically signaled in the operations center, which is occupied at all times. 4.2 Facilities for Fire and Explosion Protection 4.2.1 Explosion Protection The areas that are subject to a danger of explosion are established in accordance with the guidelines and acts applicable for facilities of this type. All rooms with system components that transport gas were defined as areas in danger of an explosion. This goes above and beyond the requirements of the specified regulations to be applied and takes the high safety requirements of the gas storage into consideration to a special degree. Air intake and outlet openings of rooms are not in areas in danger of an explosion, so there is no delay of danger. All of the rooms in which gas could accumulate are monitored with gas measurement sensors (remote diffusion measurement sensors) that issue a preliminary gas alarm when a certain gas concentration (25% of the lower explosion limit, LEL) is reached. When the first alarm threshold is reached, 25% LEL, a visual and acoustical signal is triggered on site in the gas control center and in the measurement center. Automatic ventilation equipment is started up, in order to prevent a further increase in the gas concentration, or to reduce the proportion of gas in the air again. If the gas concentration continues to increase despite this countermeasure, a further alarm is given when 50% LEL is reached. The relevant facility is shut off via the EMERGENCY STOP system when the second alarm level is reached in a compressor section. The shut-off valves on the inlet and outlet sides close in the process in accordance with the operations. The ventilation equipment remains in operation.

Gas accumulations in the well head cellars lead to a startup of the ventilation equipment if it is not yet in operation. Decisions on further measures are to be made by the operating personnel. There is no automatic shutoff of system sections in the well cellar. The separator cellar, the boiler room, the laboratory, and the calorimeter and gas-measurement room are only monitored for gas. If gas concentrations accumulate in these rooms, the operating personnel is given an alarm; they have to make a decision on further measures. There are no automatic, forced shutoffs. 4.2.2 Fire Protection Fires are automatically recognized via ionization smoke detectors and optical smoke detectors, as well as UV flame detectors. When one or more ionization smoke detectors of a detector line in the two-line system responds, a signal arrives in the central fire alarm system that is evaluated as a fire alarm and a preliminary alarm is triggered. The fire-protection section in which the alarm was triggered is visually and acoustically displayed in the central fire alarm system. Fire-protection doors, gates and flaps are closed; the ventilation is shut off. An EMERGENCY STOP also takes place for the compressor facility(ies) when a line responds. If the fire is detected by a second alarm line, an alarm is automatically sent through to the fire department. There is simultaneously a site EMERGENCY STOP. A site EMERGENCY STOP means an EMERGENCY STOP over the entire operating site, and thus at the compressor section as well. Additional alarm lines with UV flame detectors are also installed for the quickest possible recognition of open fires and for the quickest possible alarm. When there is visual recognition of fires in fire-protected rooms, alarms can be pressed outside of the room in direct proximity to the escape doors. The same sequence takes place as if two alarm lines had triggered a fire alarm. Fires in outside facilities or in rooms that are not protected against fire, e.g. the staircase, hallway, basement floor etc. can also be reported with a pushbutton fire alarm in the same way. Every gas or fire alarm that is triggered is visually and acoustically displayed in the operating center. The fire alarm to the public fire department is automatically sent via the main fire alarm line. 4.2.3 Extinguishing Agent Supply Street hydrants are available to the fire department for extinguishing fires in outside facilities. The hydrants serve as the initial connecting point for the fire department for general fires. The minimum water quantity of 3,200 l./min. is provided by two hydrants in each case (1600 l./min. each) with a flow pressure (i.e. at a flow rate of 1600 l./min.) of 2.2 bar (0.22 Mpa). The extinguishing water lines were designed to have a nominal width of 250 mm and a pressure level of 16 bar. Continuing to supply the remaining system with water is possible by shutting off a damaged line section when there is a rupture in the ring line. The hydrants for fire-extinguishing purposes were positioned next to travel areas for firedepartment vehicles in such a way that it is possible to create a connection without problems from the vehicle to the hydrant pipe with a pressure hose that is only 5 m long and vehicle traffic traveling by a fire truck that is involved is not obstructed by hoses that are laid out. This hydrant arrangement was set up according to fire-department specifications, as the case may be. The line equipment (connection lines, water-meter equipment, consumption lines and shutoff valves) that is necessary for the hydrants on the site have been installed with the recognized rules of current technology. The line equipment has been laid in the soil so as to be protected against frost. The required extinguishing-water quantity is adequate to also supply additional equipment, such as a sprinkler system, fire-extinguishing hose connection equipment (wall hydrants) or other consumption units, with water. A separate extinguishing system is available for combating a fire in the area of the production wells. It essentially consists of a fire-extinguishing basin with a volume of 400 m3 with an inlet from the public network (max. 1,800 m3/h), two pumps with a pump output of 900 m3/h each at 7 bar and an extinguishing ring with 13 connection points for mobile or fixed fire-extinguishing monitors. This system is provided for the hypothetical case of a blowout with an ignited gas flow and serves to extinguish the flame or to provide cooling in the impacted well area. It is assumed, in the case that the system is used, that approx. 80% of the water amount that is pumped will flow back into the extinguishing-water basin via the well site area that is set on edge.

The power supply of the pumps, each with 300 kW of power requirements, is provided via the public electrical-power network and protection is provided via emergency-power units. Every well cellar is equipped with a line ring with 6 nozzles, each at 16 m3/h. This nozzle system serves, in the case of a blowout, to flood the impacted cellar, on the one hand, and to spray water into the "cold" gas flow that is escaping, on the other hand. A preventative system that was built for the hypothetical case of an uncontrolled escape of gas is involved here. When there is a blowout, water is sprayed into the gas for cooling, in order to prevent ignition of the "cold" flow of gas (Red Adair recommendation). The firefighting in buildings is done with water. Wall hydrants, from which the extinguishing water can be taken, are installed on every floor. A facade sprinkling system was installed for the rear of the building, and a line system for water accumulation on the roof area with a 5-cm water level was installed for the roof, to protect the operating and control equipment in the operating building. Heat development in and on the operating building is to be reduced in the case of a blowout. The rear therefore essentially consists of a back-ventilated shell with no windows made of brick or limestone walling with insulation and aluminum sheets that are screwed in front and joined in each other in such a way that a flawless, even and complete wetting of the facade surface is ensured. The quantity of water introduced over the sheet facade is provided by a pipeline in the area of the edge of the roof that extends over the entire length of the building. A separate pipeline with water-outlet openings has been laid behind the facade in the clinkered area. The layout of the sprinkler system follows DIN 14 495. Fire extinguishers are attached in all of the rooms and outside facilities, in accordance with the regulatory construction specifications. 4.3 Process Monitoring and Control A programmable-logic process control system with a decentralized structure has been installed for the functional areas of measurement, control, regulation and monitoring. A central control station (operating center) takes care of the general monitoring and the operation of the individual stations. All of the equipment that is important for the storage operation is controlled and monitored from there. The burden has been taken off the operating personnel in their work to a great extent because of the high level of automation; they observe and control the processes and only need to intervene when there are malfunctions. The process control system, with central processing units and automated equipment that works on a decentralized basis, makes safe storage operation possible due to its redundant structure and the safety-oriented control. It is to also be pointed out that all of the fittings that are electrically, pneumatically or hydraulically driven are equipped with manual wheels or other mechanical controls so that functioning is always insured when the fitting is intact. A mechanical failure of individual measurement, control, regulation and monitoring equipment, or of fittings, is avoided via the testing and servicing that are carried out on a regular basis and, in the case of equipment relevant for safety, via the redundant design that has already been mentioned. 4.4 Safety-Oriented Control Units A control unit that acts as protective equipment and puts the system into a secure state when there is a deviation of the operating status from certain specified data, or in the case of a fire alarm, gas alarm, line break or after triggering of the manual EMERGENCY STOP switch, is used for safe operation of the storage. A safety-oriented control device that consists of several units is used in order to prevent the dangerous effects of internal system malfunctions towards the outside to persons and facility areas. These units are built up with their own equipment so as to be independent of the process control system and are connected with each other between the facility sections and well sites via two separate remote-message cables. All of the equipment has a self-monitoring, failsafe design, and this ensures that malfunctions that arise in the individual system are immediately reported and that they always have effects on the system that are not dangerous. The equipment is subjected to a prototype test by the Technical Monitoring Board in Germany and authorized for use in systems with safety functions. All of the components of the safety equipment work in accordance with the closed-circuit current principle. The transmitter connection lines (activation channels) are monitored by the system in such a way that interference with safety does not arise due to short circuits or a line break in the connection lines.

Depending on the triggering criterion, the individual units, facility portions, or the entire facility will be shut down when this safety equipment triggers. 4.5 Storage Wells The individual pipe strings of the casing were cemented up to the surface. All of the anulli behind these pipes are fully sealed because of this. The tubings are sealed with packers in the production casing, and the anullus is filled with inhibited water. The cementing of a casing string up to the surface prevents a gas migration through the cemented anulli. The production casing of the storage wells gets two external casing packers in each case as an additional sealing element. They are packers with an external, armored rubber sealing ring that is pumped up with hole fluid until there is contact with the drill-hole wall directly after the cementing process. The hole fluid remains enclosed in a latching system. The packers are positioned in such a way that the lower one is between the lower Detfurth layer and the upper Detfurth layer, and the upper one is between the upper Detfurth layer and the Hardegsen or Solling sandstone, thereby sealing the storage horizon for the cement. The cementing was done before the filling of the storage with gas, so gas absorption during the setting of the cement and an increased permeability because of this can be ruled out. The quality of the casing cement was checked via a cement-bond log. The anullus was opened via perforation, and there was a supplemental cementing process, when there were indications of poor cementing. The tightness of the cementing is monitored with a permanent check of the pressure in all of the anulli. Provisions were made for the installation of sand filters to prevent erosion and corrosion associated with that. These sand filters (gravel packs) were designed in such a way that the transport from the formation sand into the filter is reliably prevented from the start. Co-transport of sand can therefore be ruled out when there is a filter installation meeting the quality requirements. The sand transfer is also prevented when there are very high flow rates, even in the case of a hypothetical blowout. The filter fittings for salt water with a high proportion of chloride ions were designed to counteract corrosion. 4.6. Permanent Shear Preventer This permanently-installed shear preventer can shut off the well, which is under gas pressure, under the X-mas tree (to the gas line connection) in any situation so as to be gas-tight. This shearpreventer is always available in the case of a workover that has become necessary after a fairly long operating period as an additional safety shutoff device that is always ready to be used and that is integrated into the well head. The extension pipe (shear joint) that is located above the tubing suspension unit is sheared through by the closing process of the shear preventer, and the well is closed up beneath the shearing jaw so as to be gas-tight. All of the shutoff valves on the well head except for the shear preventer - and the underground safety valve have to be replaced by the workover prevention system for most of the workover operations. The shear preventer represents an additional piece of safety equipment that has not been stipulated, especially in the case of this measure (Fig. 4).

Fig. 4 Well head with shear preventer 4.7. Line-Break-Control-System (LBCS) Clear criteria for registering a rupture have been determined via numerical simulation of the flow events when there is a rupture in a field line of the Berlin gas storage. The operating conditions that were investigated can be divided up into the injection process and the withdrawl process. During the injection process, a flow inversion comes about at the respective well site after a rupture in a field line. This flow condition, which is easy to check, can be determined after a time delay that depends on the distance of the rupture point to the well site. The influence of these variables on the flow development was investigated by varying the operating parameters during the withdrawl process and the distance of the rupture point to the well site. It was discovered that the maximum mass flow that is released is determined by the operating pressure. The number of wells that are open and the maximum mass flow that is thereby triggered in the field lines, as well as the distance of the rupture point to the tap sites, only influence the chronological development of the flow. The flow inversion is detected by so-called Anubar sensors. The sensors are (redundantly) equipped with two differential-pressure transmitters for each flow direction. If the remote operation monitor for "injection" (differential-pressure transmitter for the injection flow direction) responds during the storage withdrawl process at the operating site and the remote operation monitor for "storage withdrawl" simultaneously registers no values, the remote operation monitor assessment of an overall EMERGENCY STOP is triggered. If the remote operation monitor for "storage withdrawl" (differentialpressure transmitter for the storage withdrawl flow direction) responds during the injection process at a well site and the remote operation monitor for "injection" simultaneously registers no values, the remote operation monitor assessment of an overall EMERGENCY STOP is likewise triggered. All of the valves and fittings are directly closed through the safety-oriented control unit via the "overall EMERGENCY STOP"; the compressors are additionally shut off when the storage process is involved, and all of the facility areas (storage withdrawl) are shut down via the control program. The hydraulic valves are installed in the field lines in the form of quick-closing shutoff valves for the case of a line break.

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4.8. Gas Displacement System and Residual Gas Compressor The gas displacement system has the task of collecting gas that accumulates during the injection and withdrawl and to pump it into the main gas lines. The residual gases involve exhaust gas, strip gas, leakage gas of the compressor lines and gas that accumulates when the facility pressure is relieved. Gas release from the quantities of driving-apparatus oil that accumulates during oil changes is also a part of the residual gases. All of the residual gases are fed into a collection tank. The residual gases are sucked out of the collection tank and compressed to the pressure of the main gas line with the aid of the residual gas compressor. The removal of the residual gases from the collection tank is done while the tank pressure is regulated. The system is designed in such a way that the frequency at which the residual gas compressor is switched on is not greater than approx. every 4 hours (permitted load alternation frequency of the pipelines and tanks). The lacking gas volume is fed in from the system's own gas supply when sufficient amounts of residual gas are not available. The excess gas pressure of at least 20 mbar (20 hPa) is monitored and provided with alarm equipment.

5 MANAGEMENT
5.1 Organizational/Process-Structure Measures The economic obligations, but also all of the obligations under public law to protect people, the environment and physical property, have to be met. This requires a systematic approach to the organization or process structure for the management, not only to properly handle the existing circumstances, but also to ensure continuous improvement and to be able to react on short notice to changes. The following premises applied to the structuring of the organizational units: Awarding outside contracts for services, as well as the concentration of core tasks to teams and functional areas. Obtaining know-how, i.e. obtaining the expert knowledge that is necessary anyway under mining law for the implementation of the requirements. An integrated management system has been introduced and certified according to the standards DIN EN ISO 9001 and DIN EN ISO 14001 to ensure that the obligations are met and that a continuous improvement process is ensured; the management system includes in a comprehensive way the requirements, as well as industrial safety and health protection, environmental protection and plant safety. The processes of the Berlin natural gas storage have been displayed for simplified understanding as a process landscape, which presents both the sequence and the interaction of the processes between each other (Fig. 5).

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Internal audits Continous improvement Management review

Check of the orientation towards the policies and goals of the company GASAG

Instructions

Human resource development

Control of documents

Policies and strategies of the company GASAG

Policies and goals of the Berlin gas storage

Determination of customer satisfaction

Meeting the customer requirements

Leadership and communication

Determination of the customer requirements

Management of resources

Planning, construction
Storage and withdrawl planning

Operation of the facilities in accordance with regulations

Maintenance

Fig. 5: Process landscape of the Berlin natural gas storage The foundation of the management system is the differentiation of the operating processes into the core process and support processes. The core process is the "proper operation in accordance with the regulations" of the Berlin natural gas storage, which is followed by the implementation of the customer requirements as a management process, i.e. the provision of the required services and quantities. The processes are backed by process instructions that present the processes in their sequences. Quality primarily means meeting the customer requirements for the natural-gas storage. The safety and health of people, safety for the environment and the systems, as well as economic success for the Berlin natural gas storage, have an equally high level of importance when meeting the customer requirements. A component of the policies for the Berlin natural gas storage is to continually improve, and improve with lasting effect, the industrial safety, environmental protection and facility safety. The adherence to the relevant legal regulations and the official regulatory conditions is also a prerequisite for this, as is the provision of the required resources by the management of GASAG. All of the employees of the Berlin natural gas storage commit themselves: To meet the customer expectations and to orient their actions, as the uppermost goal, towards anticipating and exceeding the customer expectations. To protect the safety and health of all of the employees of the Berlin natural gas storage and third-parties. To improve environmental protection with lasting effect. To safely operate the facilities. To continuously improve the integrated management system. 5.2 Automated System and Storage-Site Monitoring The production and pressure data of the storage sensors and of the gas facilities are directly obtained from the process control system, processed and stored in a central database. The numerical reservoir simulation model can be updated on a daily basis because of this. The results of the simulation are available on-line. The required data are obtained and organized in the course of the execution of the core process. Production, log and test data flow into various sub-processes of the storage-site operations.

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5.3 Simulation Models 5.3.1 Geo-Simulation The best-possible information regarding the geological conditions is necessary for the safe operation of the storage. One difficulty involved in building up a reservoir model based on seismic data is the low resolution of the seismic data in the area of the reservoir sand. An improvement of the resolution became possible through a combination of the seismic data with drill-hole data and a conversion of the seismic profiles to impedance profiles (seismic inversion). Other basic characteristics such as density and porosity, for instance, were derived from the impedance. The seismic data acquired during the exploration phase were reprocessed and reinterpreted in accordance with the improved evaluation processes and computer technology. An improved geological 3-D model was prepared with this and with the data from the drill holes. Not only the storage-site simulation was able to be supplemented with this model; it was also used as a starting point for rock mechanics calculations, in order to provide further assurance for the maximum authorized storage pressure and the seal tightness of the cap rock layers. 5.3.2 Storage-Site Simulation The storage reservoir, storage wells and the entire surface facility are depicted in a simulation model in which the gas-industry requirements were added. The history match was calibrated with the well head pressures, the down-hole pressures and the water cut, and with the aid of the vertical and cross-sectional gas distribution. PLT logs and pulsedneutron measurements were also used for the vertical sectioning of the block model and the corresponding assignment of permeability and porosity. Furthermore, pressure build-up measurements were utilized, in particular during the development phase, for the listing of relative permeabilities and for a check of the gas distribution. The planning, filling and operation of the storage were guided with the help of the simulation model. The simulation is an important aid for evaluating the distribution of gas in the reservoir and also for calculating possible gas transfers in the Hardegsen and Solling sand lying between the storage horizons and the cap rock. The simulation thereby serves, on the one hand, to control and optimize the storage operation from the point of view of production-related aspects and, on the other hand, to ensure and monitor the mining safety (Fig. 6).

Fig. 6 Simulation history match of the head pressure of a well The storage monitoring is done with a comparison to the simulation model and regular gassaturation measurements through pulsed-neutron logging.

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The geological and storage-site work can never be viewed as being complete. Results from the observation of the storage make it necessary to work on a more detailed basis, time and time again. This is then helpful for better development of the individual storage areas or the planning of workover tasks. The precise description of the reservoir behavior is also, in addition to the mining safety, an important prerequisite for optimizing the storage behavior. The geological risk in the case of refinishing work or new drilling, for example, can be substantially reduced in this way. Only then are the forecasts of the storage behavior for long-term, medium-term and short-term planning possible. 5.3.3 Maintenance The well and storage-site facilities are monitored automatically to a great extent. The goal of the on-line status monitoring is to get information on the status based on ongoing measurements of various quantities and their analysis. The following improvements were achieved through the use of the on-line status diagnosis system:

Doing a clearer diagnosis of operating conditions and thereby improving the facility safety
Achieving an increase in the facility and tap availability Monitoring of the efficiency (economic efficiency) and Carrying out status-dependent maintenance and tap treatments

The maintenance of the storage wells is done on the basis of a target/actual comparison of the theoretical drill-hole capacities with the current values. There is a side-by-side comparison of the theoretical tap capacity (target value) and the actual well capacity (actual value) for every storage well. The comparison is done in the form of a table. Deviates from the target value are emphasized in a suitable form. The target value is calculated according to the C&n equation. The calculations are done with head C&n values of the last multi-rate test that have been stored in the system. A static head pressure that is representative of the well at the point in time of the calculation is used from the simulation, which is updated daily, as the confinement pressure. The current daily values of the well from the database are used for the flow pressure and flow rate. If no current values are available (the well is not in operation), the reading of the last operating day is used as a basis and it is appropriately marked. Furthermore, the static well head pressure that is measured in the case of wells that are not in operation is compared with the simulated static well pressure for quality control. An appropriate message is sent to the control system when there are deviations. If deviations from the target status are discovered during the target/actual comparison of the well capacities, further investigation is done to determine the cause (drill-hole measurements, pressure build-up measurements). Suitable maintenance measures are taken depending on the results of the investigation. A status-monitoring system (PROGNOST-NT), which is specially designed for the requirements involved in the monitoring, evaluation and diagnosis of piston machines, is used for the on-line status monitoring of the piston compressors (Fig. 7).

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Fig. 7. Diagram of the principle of on-line monitoring of a piston compressor The valves are among the main wearing parts in piston compressors. Special importance is attached to the early recognition and precise determination of a defective valve for this reason. The situation in the interior of the compression area can be directly evaluated through the permanent measurement of the cylinder chamber pressure. The chronological progression of the pressure that is measured is also presented as a p-V diagram (indicator diagram). Various characteristic values that are each monitored with their own limit value can be calculated from the p-V diagram. The vibrations measured at the cylinders, which are analyzed in 36 segments per 10 of crank angle and monitored with limit values, provide additional status information on the valves. One method for determining the piston-ring wear is the piston-rod position or rod-drop analysis. The lowering of the piston rod is continuously measured here in operation with a proximity sensor. A measurable lowering of the piston rod comes about in the course of the operating life because of the abrasion on the piston rings. The monitoring and control of the maintenance, under public law, as well as in business-technical terms, are done through the program SAP R3-PM. The entire storage facility, including the storage wells, is portrayed in a way that is oriented towards maintenance in this system. The existing facility identification system forms the basis for the structuring. Furthermore, the program permits work sequences for maintenance measures to be stored. The handling of malfunction messages, i.e. the initiation of repair measures, is to be done without paper in the future. Two possibilities will be available to generate malfunction messages in the SAP system. On the one hand, through an input form of the process control system; the data are then transferred to the SAP system and the message, as well as the work order resulting from that, is automatically generated. Or, a message can be directly set up via a SAP work station. The work is then carried out, controlled by priorities, after the messages are analyzed by authorized employees.

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References
1. Schneider, A.,Stark M., Littmann, W. (2002). Erdgasspeicher Berlin-Methoden der Betriebsfhrung. [Berlin Natural Gas Storage - Methods of Management.] Erdl Erdgas Kohle, 118 S XXX 2. Schneider, A., Stark, M., Littmann, W. (2001). Erdgasspeicher Berlin-Betriebsfhrung. [Berlin Natural Gas Storage - Management.] DGMK-Tagungsbericht 2001-2, S. 415 3. Burkowsky, M., Krekler, G. (1999). Erdgasspeicher Berlin. [Berlin Natural Gas Storage.] GasErdgas gwf, 140 S.782. 4. Schmitz, J., Schneider, A. (1998). Erdgasspeicher Berlin. [Berlin Natural Gas Storage.] GEO Berlin 98, Exkursionsfhrer, Terra Nostra, Schriften der Alfred Wegener Stiftung 98/4 5. Krekler, G., Burkowsky, M. (1985). Erkundung der geologischen und lagerstttentechnischen Gegebenheiten des Erdgas-Aquiferspeichers Berlin. [Exploration of the Geological and Storage-Site Circumstances of the Berlin Natural Gas Aquifer Storage.] Gas-Erdgas gwf, 126 S. 151 6. Restin, K. 1984. Erdgas fr Berlin. Gas-Erdgas gwf, 125 S. 914

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