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Index of Subjects
1- Intelligence Definition........................................................................................................... 3 What is Intelligence?............................................................................................................... 3 What Should Intelligence Do? ................................................................................................ 4 2- Types of Intelligence Services............................................................................................. 5 Types of Intelligence Services ................................................................................................ 5 3- The Intelligence Cycle .......................................................................................................... 9 How Is Intelligence Produced? ............................................................................................... 9 The Intelligence Cycle, summing up:.................................................................................... 14 4- Intelligence Collection........................................................................................................ 15 Intelligence Collection Management..................................................................................... 16 Collection Priorities ............................................................................................................... 17 5- Human Intelligence (HUMINT)............................................................................................ 19 What is an agent? ................................................................................................................. 19 6- Imagery Intelligence - IMINT .............................................................................................. 24 Geospatial Intelligence - GEOINT ........................................................................................ 25 7- Measurement and Signatures Intelligence - MASINT...................................................... 27 8- Signals Intelligence - SIGINT ............................................................................................. 28 9- Intelligence Categories....................................................................................................... 30 Biographic Intelligence.......................................................................................................... 32 Economic Intelligence ........................................................................................................... 33 Sociological Intelligence........................................................................................................ 34 Transportation and Telecommunications Intelligence .......................................................... 34 Military Geographic Intelligence............................................................................................ 34 Armed Forces Intelligence .................................................................................................... 34 Political Intelligence .............................................................................................................. 35 Scientific and Technical Intelligence..................................................................................... 35 10- Military Intelligence........................................................................................................... 35 Military Intelligence Analysis ................................................................................................. 37 11- Open Source Intelligence - OSINT................................................................................... 38 12- Intelligence Analysis ........................................................................................................ 41 Improving Analysis................................................................................................................ 42 Analysis that Fits the New Environment ............................................................................... 44 The Old Analysis vs XXI Century Analysis ........................................................................... 46 13- Counterintelligence .......................................................................................................... 47 Security ................................................................................................................................. 48 Counter-espionage ............................................................................................................... 49 Deception and Counter-deception ........................................................................................ 51 14- Covert Action..................................................................................................................... 52 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 52 Covert Action tradecraft ........................................................................................................ 52 15- The U.S. Intelligence Community .................................................................................... 58 The Intelligence Community: Rising up to the Challenge..................................................... 61 16- Measuring Intelligence Results ....................................................................................... 63 Metrics: How will we know we’re headed in the right direction?........................................... 65 17- Reasons for Intelligence Failure...................................................................................... 67 18- The New Threats ............................................................................................................... 68 The New Threats .................................................................................................................. 69 Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)................................................................................. 71 Proliferation of WMD............................................................................................................. 71 Transnational Terrorism........................................................................................................ 73 Cyberterrorism ...................................................................................................................... 74 19- The New Intelligence Paradigm ....................................................................................... 75 The New Paradigm: Collaborative Intelligence..................................................................... 76 Building an agile intelligence community .............................................................................. 80 The Need for New Approaches to Intelligence ..................................................................... 81 Problems and Limits of Intelligence ...................................................................................... 84 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 88
1- Intelligence Definition
What is Intelligence?
The simplest and clearest definition is: information plus analysis equals intelligence. It clarifies the distinction between collected information and produced intelligence, namely: Without analysis, there is no intelligence. Intelligence is not what is collected; it is what is produced after collected data and information is evaluated and analysed. More precisely, intelligence is data and information that has been subjected to the intelligence process of collection, collation, evaluation, analysis and assessment with the aim to produce the knowledge needed for national decision-making on security policy and strategy. What makes intelligence unique is its use of information that is collected secretly and prepared in a timely manner to meet the needs of policymakers. In more general usage, intelligence can be seen as an umbrella term denoting five things: • A particular knowledge. • The organisation producing that knowledge. • The activities pursued by this organisation. • The process guiding these activities. • The products resulting from these activities and processes. The purpose of intelligence is to inform government: telling best truth unto power providing knowledge and understanding upon which national decisions can be made. Intelligence produces that particular knowledge that a state must possess regarding the strategic environment, other states and hostile non-state actors to assure itself that its cause will not suffer nor its undertakings fail because its statesmen and the organisations and means for implementing security policy plan, decide and act in ignorance. Intelligence is production of – in theory – unbiased information about risks, dangers and threats to the national vision, the state and its population, as well as chances and opportunities for the advancement of national interests.
The more accurate and timely the intelligence, the more it will allow for limited resources to be applied efficiently towards national security goals and policies. The lion's share of the financial and human resources devoted to intelligence comes under Defense Department programs devoted to intelligence collection in general and support for military operations in particular. We can say now that intelligence is: • Dependent upon confidential sources and methods for full effectiveness. • Performed by officers of the state for state purposes (this implies that those officers receive direction from the state's civilian and military leaders). • Focused on foreigners—usually other states, but often foreign subjects, corporations, or groups (if its objects are domestic citizens, then the activity becomes a branch of either law enforcement or governance). • Linked to the production and dissemination of information. • Involved in influencing foreign entities by means that are inattributable to the acting government (if the activities are open and declared, they are the province of diplomacy; if they utilize uniformed members of the armed forces, they belong to the military).
What Should Intelligence Do?
Missions for intelligence are listed below: ⇒ Identify points of opportunity for intervention that might change the state of affairs in some way, especially before a conflict (in fact, if a military solution ensues, that often indicates an intelligence failure). ⇒ Help states attain a comparative advantage in decision-making, thus the term actionable intelligence. ⇒ Protect the state and its citizens to maximize security. ⇒ Optimize resources. ⇒ Integrate information to enhance understanding. The goals of intelligence are heavily dependent on the foreign policy objectives of a country, which vary from the broad commitments of the United States to the narrow focus of New Zealand.
Covert action. analyse and produce intelligence relevant to external security and for warning purposes. 2) Ensure early warning. non-state groups and their agents that represent actual or potential threats to the state and its national interests. in disruptive actions by the police. domestic. dangers. as is increasingly the case also domestically. all intelligence services have three basic functions: Collection. 7) Maintain and protect secrets. of the possibilities and probabilities of developments and the likelihood of events and outcomes. opportunities and chances. the more occasional fourth function. military operations. 3) Assist good governance. 6) Support national defence and. military and. more recently in some countries.2. organisations. analysis and counterintelligence. criminal intelligence: • Foreign or External Intelligence Services ⇒ Collect. in case of conflict or war. 4) Provide long term expertise.and policymaking process. 5 . ⇒ Intelligence is therefore needed on intentions. 5) Support national and international crisis management. Also. threats. capabilities and activities of foreign powers. may be performed by external intelligence services or. Types of Intelligence Services Four different categories of intelligence can be distinguished that have spawned separate intelligence services or agencies: Foreign. plans. ⇒ Protection of external security requires knowledge of the risks.Types of Intelligence Services Intelligence services exist to: 1) Support the national decision.
and weaponry performance in order to shape the size. analyse and produce intelligence on TOC groups. • Criminal Intelligences Services ⇒ A more recent institutional development in response to the growth of organised crime since the end of the Cold War – collect. The US NSA. society and people against malicious acts and hostile activities. the successor organisation of FAPSI in Russia. human. espionage. and to enable through network-centric and effects-based operation decision dominance and the achievement of strategic and operational objectives. tactics. signals and cryptology intelligence agencies. the Security Agency. NGA. and dissemination of pornography. • Military or Defence Intelligence Services ⇒ Collect. order-of-battle. to ensure transparency of the battle space. ⇒ Support to military operations encompasses intelligence for force projection and targeting support. ⇒ Internal security aims to protect the state.Uncovering terrorism. etc. and NAO. operational concepts. analyse and produce intelligence relevant to internal security and for warning. localising the centres of gravity and decisive points. • • Such entities include imagery. the Military and Defence Intelligence Services 6 . are the biggest and most expensive of their intelligence agencies. the armed forces and support of military operations. illegal immigration. hacking and data theft. arms. for example. money faking and laundering. narcotics production and trafficking. types and deployments of the armed forces. critical infrastructure. sovereignty. vulnerabilities. electronic and cyberattacks.• Domestic or Internal Intelligence Services ⇒ Often called Security Services. sabotage. Different collection methods with sophisticated technical means can give rise to more specialised intelligence agencies. corruption and criminal activities with the aim to prosecution. the British GCHQ and the Canadian CSE. organised crime. depending on the situation with different priorities: . ⇒ What Foreign Intelligence covers externally Domestic Intelligence does internally. NRO. ⇒ Support to defence planning entails intelligence on foreign military capabilities. contraband and other smuggling. the Domestic or Internal Intelligence Service. collect. ethnic and religious extremism. territory. proliferation of WMD. Together with the Foreign or External Intelligence Service. illegal arms dealing. to guide military R&D and future defence acquisitions. political. the Australian DSD and DIGO. subversion. analyse and produce intelligence relevant for defence planning. doctrines.
Australia: • • Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) responsible for SIGINT. Russia: • UK: • Government Communications Headquarter (GCHQ) responsible for SIGINT. the National Counterintelligence Executive. Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) responsible for IMINT. US: • • • • National Security Agency (NSA) responsible for SIGINT and CRYPINT. and the Office of National Assessments in Australia. the National Cybersecurity Center. together with GRU 6th Directorate responsible for SIGINT and communications. ever more intelligence is collected by the different services on the same subjects. Successor organisation of FAPSI.and the Criminal Intelligence Service. Canada: • Communications Security Establishment (CSE). • • There are states with a single agency having both internal and external roles. and the National Intelligence Council in the US. communications and computer security. IMINT and other reconnaissance satellites. together with the Canadian Forces Supplementary Radio System (SRS) responsible for SIGINT. The distinction between internal and external intelligence services has never been absolute. National Applications Office (NAO) within the Department for Homeland Security. 7 . impact and consequences. responsible for centralising and sharing of imagery for domestic purposes. such as the National Counterterrorism Center. National Geospatial Agency (NGA) responsible for earth information. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) responsible for operating SIGINT. the National Center for Medical Intelligence. they constitute the national intelligence community. Since risks. dangers and threats are of expanding transnational reach. IMINT and mapping. the National Counterproliferation Center. the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre and the Joint Intelligence Committee in the UK. Countries with larger intelligence communities often have some additional central or functional bodies for coordinating assessments or – a post-9/11 development – for the fusion of intelligence.
liaison. and it alleviates control and oversight of intelligence. better regulated access to each other’s information and assurance of the production of joint assessments and estimates. The result is that the intelligence services can no longer do everything at once and do it all well. the separation of external and internal intelligence services is becoming more artificial and thus questionable. It avoids wasting efforts. internal and also criminal intelligence are becoming increasingly blurred. Missions and objectives overlap. notably in countering the pre-eminent threats of transnational terrorism. simplifies contacts. solves the risk of unhealthy competition and rivalry between the different agencies. information exchange and cooperation with intelligence services of other countries. and this ever more speedily. it requires an ever greater effort of coordination and control. resources and time. facilitates high subordination of intelligence in the state’s hierarchy and also cooperation and coordination with other ministries and agencies. the tasks assigned to intelligence services have become more complex. This is why smaller countries with fewer resources might prefer to have just one intelligence service. Because of the expanding need to serve a much broader range of government and other clients with a growing variety of requirements. • • • • Today. While separation might still be the best practicable solution for great powers like the US with 16 huge intelligence bureaucracies. Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and proliferation of WMD. 8 . Hence.• The traditional limits between external. enhancing the opportunities for misunderstandings and rivalries. intelligence services have become too demand-driven. There is convergence. more volatile and more numerous than they ever have been in the past.
planning and direction. 5) Dissemination of finished intelligence products. and by which intelligence services respond to these needs in six steps of activities of the intelligence cycle: (or Intelligence Process). from identifying the need for data to delivering an intelligence product to a consumer. Deciding which states or non-state actors warrant intelligence surveillance and collection. 4) Analysis and production. The identification of the need for data that is derived from the threat assessment or from the priority listing of unsolved strategy and policy issues. How Is Intelligence Produced? Intelligence is produced in a process by which the government.3. 3) Processing and exploitation. other agencies and customers request the intelligence needed. the military leadership. 2) Collection.The Intelligence Cycle Intelligence Cycle. 1) Defining the needs. * Requirements 9 . planning and direction: Involves the management of the entire intelligence production effort. 1) Defining the needs. 6) Feedback. from initiation by requests or requirements* for intelligence on subjects based on the needs of decision of policymakers.
• Things we need to know. visible light and electro optics. travellers. a Commander requirements are sometimes called Essential Elements of Intelligence . high-definition TV or radar by satellites. ships. hyper.(100-1. or elicited from diplomats. interrogation.(2-100 bands). • Measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) – is straddling both IMINT and SIGINT. In the Federal Government of the United States. • Signals intelligence (SIGINT) – is data and information collected through intercepts. walk-ins. plans. ultraviolet. journals and printed news sources.000 + bands) data 10 . • In NATO. turncoats. from Internet search and conversations. • In practice. as well as facts and forecast from businessmen. questions to which policy makers need answers. gleaned from defectors. It is imagery and satellite signals – data streams captured and reconstructed as images from the reflections of several bands. radar and other electromagnetic emission. multi. grey literature. aircraft. television. monitoring and localising of radio. agents. microwave. the military leadership. or resulting from counterintelligence operations. film. businessmen. 2) Collection: Is the procurement of data and information pertinent to decision and policymakers. all generally recording and reporting what has happened. travellers. insiders or informers. • Imagery intelligence (IMINT) – data and information collected via photography (PHOTINT). submarines. academics. video. Collection management systems of a variety of methods and means are used in the following intelligence collection disciplines: • Open source intelligence (OSINT) – is the assembling of all openly available data and information from radio. requirements can be issued from the White House or the Congress. UAVs or satellites. including infrared. intel collectors in the field usually know what the requirements are without much guidance. • Human intelligence (HUMINT) – is information collected by humans: From spies. Cartography and mapping have come to depend ever more heavily on IMINT. other agencies or intelligence customers. from discussions with foreign personnel. official reporting. universities. books. UAVs and ships. as well as information gained by debriefings. aircraft. the deep web. studies. including laser. infrared. etc. SIGINT can provide data on intentions.000 bands) and ultra-spectral (1. etc.EEIs -. think tanks. activities or events related to threats as well as on the characteristics of materials and weapon systems. using visible light. ultraviolet or other image-capturing technologies – all more often recording and telling what may happen. gathered by overt or clandestine ground sites.
the State Dept’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. 3) Processing and Exploitation Its the conversion of data and information collected into a more suitable form for analysis and production of intelligence. as well as data reduction – interpretation of the information stored on film or tape through use of highly refined photographic and electronic processes. and all collection agencies in the IC are engaged in it to a significant degree. Analysis establishes the significance and implications of processed intelligence. acoustics of mechanical sound. decryption. It is done in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence. water. integration. shockwaves. integrates it by combining disparate pieces of information to identify collateral information and patterns. brightness. *Exploiting imagery. Drawing mostly on open source material. as well as materials sampling of soil. vibration or motion. correlation. analysis and evaluation of all available data and its transformation into a variety of intelligence products.derived from spectral analysis of reflections across the spectrum of light and exploitation of physical or magnetic properties. preparing information for computer processing storage and retrieval. material composition. it comprises collation. these are all processing tasks. sorted and made available for rapid computer retrieval. requiring the human mind and specialists to give it meaning and significance. and air. reducing telemetry to meaningful measures. It enables one to detect the shape. then interprets the significance of any newly developed knowledge. decoding messages and translating broadcasts. movement and chemical composition of objects. drawing upon a blend of public knowledge and secrets purloined from adversaries. Processing also refers to sorting by subject matter. emitted and reflected energy of radio frequencies. 4) Analysis and production Evaluation and interpretation of raw intelligence and the conversion of data and information into finished intelligence products. 11 . Data and information collected are frequently fragmentary and at times contradictory. Examples * Data and information not directly analysed is tagged. amongst other places in the US Intelligence Community. such as language translation. rendering texts readable and translating film or digital signals into visible imagery. placing human-source reports into a form and context to make them more comprehensible. density. temperature. Good analysis depends upon assembling the best brains possible to evaluate events and conditions. lasers. the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (photo interpretation).
. disinformation. to warn of their near-term consequences.g.g. Five categories of finished intelligence are available to the consumer:** 1) Current intelligence • Addresses day-to-day events. or ad hoc studies and papers. while ensuring that it highlights the limitations of the intelligence to answer the questions adequately. what drives the judgments – linchpin assumptions. and some monthly publications. economic. • Like all kinds of intelligence. possible and probable future developments. weekly. to the customer or policymakers whose needs triggered the intelligence cycle. events and activities. even the unknowable. a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. 12 . geographic. 2) Estimative intelligence • Looks forward to assess potential developments that could affect US national security. A product must have four essential characteristics for it to be useful: • Relevance. to assess their significance. the President’s Daily Brief. different regions and problems. Policy makers need to treat raw intelligence far more cautiously than finished intelligence. • Timeliness. capabilities and vulnerabilities. 5) Dissemination Involves the distribution of the finished intelligence product**. • Current intelligence is presented in daily.The subjects involved may concern intentions. and to signal potentially dangerous situations in the near future. The products should contain what is known – the facts. both in content and presentation. e. estimative intelligence starts with the available facts. processed and analysed information in a manner which meets the requirements of the customer. terrorist threat reports. seeking to apprise consumers of new developments and related background. and frequently in ad hoc written memorandums and oral briefings to senior officials. • Purity – meaning that it is free of political spin. scientific. • Accuracy. military or biographic. etc. e. deception. Raw intelligence is also disseminated. The key issue for intelligence services is how to present the collected. and personalities in various contexts – political. and what remains unknown. Analysis draws on the collection disciplines to provide data and information for evaluation and the tailoring of the products precisely for the users’ needs. propaganda. but then explores the unknown. how it is known – the sources where possible. the impact if the drivers change – alternative outcomes.
DIA manages the Defense Indications and Warning System (DIWS) to provide accurate and timely warning of developing threats to US and Allied military interests. • All agencies and intelligence staffs have designated warning components. focused. demographic.NSA maintains the worldwide CRITIC system for the simultaneous alerting of US officials within minutes of situations that may affect US security. • National Intelligence Estimates. or those that would have a sudden and deleterious effect on US foreign policy concerns (for example. . 13 . and rapidly produced for planners and operators. scientific and technical. • The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Warning serves as the DCI's and the IC's principal adviser on warning. which are estimative reports produced by the National Intelligence Council. and the Directorate for Analysis in DIA are major producers of this material. and. Research underpins both current and estimative intelligence. • Warning analysis involves exploring alternative futures and low probability/high impact scenarios. handbooks. and political data on foreign countries. 5) Scientific and technical intelligence • Includes information on technical developments and characteristics. estimative. coups. performance. there are also two specialized subcategories of research intelligence: ⇒ Basic intelligence: Consists primarily of the structured compilation of geographic. it is tailored.• Estimative intelligence helps policymakers to think strategically about long-term threats by discussing the implications of a range of possible outcomes and alternative scenarios. on occasion. This material is presented in the form of maps. 3) Warning intelligence • • Sounds an alarm or gives notice to policymakers. It connotes urgency and implies the potential need for policy action in response. ⇒ Intelligence for operational support: Incorporates all types of intelligence production-current. warning. social. force summaries. military. refugee situations). and some have specific warning responsibilities: . research. Warning includes identifying or forecasting events that could cause the engagement of US military forces. and capabilities of foreign technologies including weapon systems or subsystems. NGA. third-party wars. The Directorate of Intelligence in CIA. atlases. 4) Research intelligence • Is presented in monographs and in-depth studies by virtually all agencies. sand table models of terrain. are the DCI's most authoritative written assessments of national security issues.
14 . who should in turn provide more and better intelligence. and automated databases. detailed system handbooks. The whole process depends on guidance from public officials. Feedback may also be used to guide new areas of inquiry. or military operations. Policymakers -. focused assessments and briefs. the nature of intelligence is such that the several elements of intelligence are parts of a single unified system whose success depends on all parts working effectively. neutralised and exploited by adversaries. summing up: Through planning and direction by both collection and production managers. executive summaries. Issue coordinators interact with these public officials to establish their core concerns and related information requirements. These needs are then used to guide collection strategies and the production of appropriate intelligence products. • • 6) Feedback Its what the customers must provide. Thus. A substantial portion of US intelligence resources is devoted to processing and exploitation the synthesis of raw data into a form usable by the intelligence analyst or other consumers and to the secure telecommunications networks that carry these data. and other consumers. and other major departments and agencies of government -. such technical analysis and reporting responds to specific national requirements derived from the weapons acquisition process. a successful programme of covert action must be grounded in effective collection. weapon systems. The Intelligence Cycle. Generally. Collection of intelligence cannot be done effectively without analysis that provides guidance or tasking to collectors. Similarly. The user of intelligence then ideally provides additional direction to the collectors and intelligence producers. military commanders. the process converts acquired information into intelligence and makes it available to policymakers.the President. the National Security Council. and integrated operations. arms control negotiations. It covers the entire spectrum of sciences. expressing satisfaction or discontent and convey new requirements for answers to new questions. Counterintelligence is necessary to protect collectors from becoming known. This type of intelligence is provided to consumers via in-depth studies.• • This information is derived from analysis of all-source data.initiate requests for intelligence. technologies. analysis and counterintelligence. to identify gaps in information. his aides. and to adjust priorities or emphasis. including technical measurements.
infrared sources and electro-optics. the National Security Agency (NSA) is responsible for SIGINT collection and reporting. as well as a number of secret technical collection disciplines using a variety of collection methods and means. Involves the representation of objects reproduced by optically or by electronic means from a variety of sources including radar. Without collection. who provide information that is obtainable in no other way. intelligence is little more than guesswork.4. • Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT): • Involves a highly technical. or collection disciplines: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): • • The interception of communications and other signals. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is responsible for all imagery intelligence collection activities. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT): • • Satellite photography or imagery. multi-disciplinary approach to intelligence collection to provide detailed characteristics of targets including radar 15 .Intelligence Collection Collection is the bedrock of intelligence: The acquisition of data and information that forms the basis for refined intelligence and knowledge creation. There are six basic intelligence sources. The collection process involves open and secret sources. Involves intercepted signals from communications and electronic emissions.
intelligence collection management helps ensure that the people and processes involved in these national security efforts are effective and germane. analytic tradecraft and intelligence operations. to preparing candidates for the effective management of intelligence professionals. While other government agencies (ex: CIA) deal primarily with intelligence analysis.signatures of aircraft and telemetry of missiles and enhancing understanding of physical attributes of intelligence targets. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT): • • Involves the collection of information related to the earth from imagery. The National Geospatial Agency (NGA) is responsible for geospatial intelligence collection management. Human-Source Intelligence (HUMINT): • • Reports from human sources. To become an adept intelligence collection manager. analytic or operational tradecraft objectives. 16 . to name a few. Involves people on the ground. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT): • • Information gathered from non-classified. From understanding the broad disciplines of clandestine or covert operation activity. non-secret sources including news media. the internet and commercial databases. typically overseas. you need to develop a deep understanding of intelligence studies and analytic tradecraft in addition to intelligence operations. imagery intelligence. a valuable collection manager focuses on developing and using a broad understanding of intelligence studies. The National Clandestine Service (NCS) is responsible for coordination and deconfliction of clandestine HUMINT operations across the Intelligence Community. and geospatial information. Intelligence Collection Management The process of managing and organizing one or more of the six intelligence disciplines above is called Intelligence Collection Management. The Open Source Center (OSC) in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) are the major collectors of open-source intelligence. gathering information from human sources. Collection Management is the art and science of managing and organizing the collection or employment of tactical. • The Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection (DT) at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is responsible for MASINT.
Iran. collection priorities must not only be those subjects that are policy-relevant but also involve information that the intelligence community can best (or uniquely) ascertain. Throughout most periods of the Cold War. national interests anywhere in the world. Precise methods of collection management and analytic tradecraft are continually reviewed by all intelligence agencies to counter terrorism and related illicit networks. are the higher priorities likely to be for intelligence collection in the foreseeable future? • The status of nuclear weapons and materials throughout the former Soviet Union. you need to deepen your knowledge of intelligence collection and its role within the intelligence process. To expand your understanding of intelligence operations and demonstrate your capabilities as an intelligence student or intelligence professional. The above emphasis was both understandable and necessary given the nuclear and conventional military strength of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies and their ability to threaten the United States and vital U. and military . In short. 17 . one in which power in all its forms economic. the intelligence community had the responsibility (one might almost say luxury) of focusing the bulk of its resources and efforts on collecting and analyzing information related to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. political. need to be based on other considerations: • First. In the post-Cold War world. • Political and military developments in Afghanistan. then.The threat posed by non-state actors and terrorist groups has challenged world intelligence agencies to organize and respond effectively. the intelligence community will need to adjust to the reality that the United States faces a less structured world. What. Iraq. Intelligence collection priorities. there must be a demonstrated inadequacy of alternative sources. while reflecting both national interests and broader policy priorities. Collection Priorities Collection Priorities are not the same as vital national interests or even priorities for national security policy. the intelligence community does not need to confirm through intelligence what is already readily available. • Second. Any successful intelligence operation requires. devoting resources to intelligence can be justified more easily when the efforts of the intelligence community are likely to produce a specific benefit or result for the policymaker or consumer. among many other critical elements.S. except in rare circumstances. the support of intelligence analysts trained in operational concepts and planning. and North Korea. It will also have to contend with a world that not only is more open and transparent than ever but also one that contains large and important areas that remain virtually closed to those dependent on normal means of transportation and communication.is more diffuse.
The above list (or any such list) is necessarily illustrative. provide reports. • Developments affecting Middle East peace negotiations. targets in the continental United States and overseas. Instead. 18 . leave high-priority targets with inadequate coverage. Such a corps could consist of former intelligence professionals. • Unconventional weapons proliferation. and still not be enough given the unlimited potential for the unexpected. where open sources are normally sufficient. • Mexican stability. and be available to work full time if a crisis suddenly developed in their area and if their expertise were required. Recent experience has shown that unexpected developments in areas of low inherent significance to U.S. The correct response to such cases is not to expect the intelligence community to be prepared for everything. as near-term priorities can change at any moment. population growth. and others with particular geographic and functional expertise. • The stability of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. • The activities of international criminal organizations. they would be asked to collect data.• Potential terrorism against U. national security can suddenly assume considerable but still temporary importance to policymakers. the President and the DNI should consider creating a formal intelligence reserve corps for dealing with so-called "pop-up" issues.S. academics. Working with a point of contact in the intelligence community. • Political-military developments in China. We would not include on this list such subjects as environmental protection. • Indo-Pakistani relations. or general political and economic developments. everywhere. • Political developments in Russia and relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics. This would waste resources.
Debriefing of foreign nationals and US citizens who travel abroad. however.Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Human intelligence (HUMINT) is derived from human sources. Types of Agents: i. and until the technical revolution of the mid to late twentieth century. terrorist cell) who clandestinely passes secrets to the USG (United States Government). HUMINT Collection includes: Clandestine acquisition of photography. Overt collection by personnel in diplomatic and consular posts. The CIA is the primary collector of humint. Human intelligence can also help shed light on intentions as well as capabilities. but the Defense Department also has responsibilities filled by defense attaches at embassies around the world and by other agents working on behalf of theater commanders.. documents. What is an agent? An agent is a member of a target organization (e. foreign government.5.g. Walk-in 19 . Classic recruitment • Case officer convinces person to commit espionage. HUMINT remains synonymous with espionage and clandestine activities. To the public. the agent is a traitor. Official contacts with foreign governments. Such knowledge is likely to prove crucial in tracking the activities of terrorists and in determining the status of unconventional weapons programs. It is the oldest method for collecting information. and other material. ii. most of this collection is performed by overt collectors such as diplomats and military attaches. The agent is recruited and handled by a case officer. Protection of the agent’s identity is crucial. In the eyes of the target organization. it was the primary source of intelligence.
Access agent • Does not have access to intel. Aldrich Ames (Soviet agent). Is often a channel for disinformation. meetings. e.g. Important against terrorist targets. Covert Action agent • E. foreign journalist who can do press placements. Lonely? Looking for a friend? Low salary? Needs money to send children to school? Ideological motivation? Hates his system. John Walker (Soviet agent). his exploitable vulnerabilities and motivations are scrutinized. admires ours? Passed over for a promotion? Not appreciated by peers and superiors? Seeking praise and recognition? Egomaniac? Wants to prove he can get away with it? ⇒ Problem: What can you exploit with an al Qa'ida terrorist? 20 . attending conferences.• Shows up and offers his services. Support agent • E. safehouse keeper vi..g. Oleg Penkovsky (British/US agent). ⇒ Problem: Where do you go to spot al Qa'ida affiliates? Step 2: Assess ⇒ Once a potential spy is identified. Jonathan Pollard (Israeli agent). Double agent • Side A thinks the agent is a penetration of side B. Agent of Influence • Someone who can affect policy of a foreign entity. but agent is really a penetration of side A working for side B (or even side C). classically the diplomatic circuit. Has limitations when used against Islamist terrorist organizations like al Qa'ida. Step 1: Spot ⇒ Looking for people with access to information of interest. Techniques: Mixing in target-rich environments. iii.. v. Historically some of the best agents were in this category. professional functions. Used by intelligence services around the world. but knows others who do. surveillance. Agent Recruitment: • Classic steps one goes through to recruit a spy.g. iv. vii.
escape and evasion.g. with his behind the scenes commentary thrown in? ⇒ Check information for internal coherence — it’s much harder to lie than to tell the truth. even decades. the case officer builds trust and solves problems for the developmental.: Impersonal communication. Regular salary. Even with the most sensitive agents. ⇒ Tradecraft. ⇒ Case officer is building psychological control. radio and computer devices. When the time is right. Drawing on his knowledge of the developmental’s vulnerabilities.: Subminiature cameras. dead drop. ⇒ Case officer moves the developmental toward treason. Starts by asking for innocent information. ⇒ Problem: With little internal knowledge of terrorist organizations.: Does agent’s reporting contradict other intelligence accepted as true? Do the verifiable portions seem to have appeared in the open press? Does much of the agent’s reporting focus on past events. offering cash in return for an unambiguous espionage relationship. occasional personal meetings are important in maintaining psychological control. surveillance detection. both secret and overt. the case officer ‘pitches’ the developmental. who at this stage is called a developmental.Step 3: Recruit ⇒ Case officer builds a relationship with potential agent. concealment devices. signalling for clandestine meeting. e. Step 5: Train ⇒ Ideally done in a safehouse somewhere outside the agent’s home country.g. car toss. testing is problematic. Pay special attention to predictions. ⇒ Problem: How does a member of a terrorist cell find an excuse to go abroad for training without arousing suspicion? Step 6: Handle ⇒ Good agent can run for years. helping the developmental justify to himself his treasonous behaviour. e. Possible use of the polygraph. 21 . ⇒ May request documents — open source at first. Case officer moves the meetings into more private settings. Step 4: Test ⇒ Compare agent’s information to known facts.g. gradually moving into more sensitive and confidential areas. e. then classified. ⇒ Problem: Social environment of an al Qa'ida developmental makes this phase difficult. secret writing. Watch for red flags. Psychological rewards are also important. Spy gear.
and their communications may be carefully limited. Intelligence agency officials working under cover as diplomats could approach potential contacts at receptions or in the context of routine embassy business. Humint regarding such sources can be especially important as there may be little evidence of activities or intentions that can be gathered from imagery. targets of U. Today. these criticisms reflect the changing nature of the international environment.S. Cold War efforts required a supply of linguists in a relatively finite set of foreign languages. and this can complicate termination. ⇒ Pass the agent to new case officer.⇒ ‘Guarantee’ safety of the agent and family. The responsibilities of operatives under non-official cover to the parent intelligence agency have to be reconciled with those to private employers.S. Prime goal is to ensure the agent’s espionage never becomes public. Any involvement with terrorist groups or smugglers has a potential for major embarrassment to the U. 22 . In part. humint collection were government officials and military leaders. Many observers have argued that inadequate humint has been a systemic problem and contributed to the inability to gain prior knowledge of the 9/11 plots. Use of termination bonuses. sometimes even retirement programs. Placing U. intelligence officials in foreign countries under nonofficial cover (NOC) in businesses or other private capacities is possible. Various approaches have been considered: Use of civilian contract personnel. and substantial bonuses for agency personnel who maintain their proficiency. however. A major constraint on humint collection is the availability of personnel trained in appropriate languages. Step 7: Terminate ⇒ All good things must come to an end. Spies often have psychological or emotional problems.S. agencies. the need is to seek information from clandestine terrorist groups or narcotics traffickers who do not appear at embassy social gatherings. military reservists with language qualifications.S. physical danger to those immediately involved. During the Cold War. of course. but the Intelligence Community now needs experts in a wider range of more obscure languages and dialects. and there is an unavoidable potential for many conflicts of interest or even corruption. government and. but it presents significant challenges to U. ⇒ Problem: Risk of detection makes personal meetings with terrorist agents difficult. Contacts with individuals or groups who may have knowledge about terrorist plots present many challenges. ⇒ Psychology of control — agent must respond to direction.
if they can be developed at all . and interagency agreements. and guidelines for training. This individual is and will remain an undercover officer. The Director of the CIA has become the National HUMINT Manager. and evaluation of clandestine HUMINT operations across the Intelligence Community. coordination and de-confliction of clandestine HUMINT across the Community.but it holds the often unique potential to provide an integrated look at a subject's thinking and capability. The DD/NCS/CIA is responsible for managing CIA's clandestine service. consistent with existing laws. both abroad and inside the United States. the CIA. The D/NCS is assisted by a Deputy Director of the NCS (DD/NCS/CIA). While the ODNI establishes policy related to clandestine HUMINT. the DD/NCS/CH is empowered to implement community-wide authorities and. a Deputy Director of NCS for Community HUMINT (DD/NCS/CH). executive orders. drafts standards. To improve HUMINT throughout the IC in response to the recommendations made by the WMD Commission. 23 . tradecraft. de-confliction. and general conduct of clandestine HUMINT operations.contacts and networks take years to develop. and has appointed the current Deputy Director for Operations at CIA to be the first D/NCS. and an Associate Deputy Director of the NCS for Technology (ADD/NCS/T). the NCS executes and implements that policy across the IC. He has delegated his day-to-day responsibilities in this role to the Director of the NCS (D/NCS). In coordination with the ODNI. The DD/NCS/CH is responsible for facilitation. in conjunction with CIA's NCS and IC partners. working closely with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) established the National Clandestine Service (NCS): The NCS serves as the national authority for coordination. doctrine.Human intelligence is no panacea . The ADD/NCS/T is responsible for managing use of advanced technologies related to clandestine HUMINT.
6- Imagery Intelligence - IMINT
Imagery Intelligence or IMINT includes representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Imagery can be derived from visual photography, radar sensors, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was established in 1996 to manage imagery processing and dissemination previously undertaken by a number of separate agencies. NIMA was renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) by the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136). The goal of NGA is, according to the agency, to use imagery and other geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. NGA is the manager for all imagery intelligence activities, both classified and unclassified, within the government, including requirements, collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination, archiving, and retrieval. Imagery, is facing profound changes, which will be detailed below. Imagery is collected in essentially three ways: Satellites, manned aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Global Hawk, which provide surveillance capabilities that overlap those of satellites. ⇒ Cold War was heyday for manned recon (SR-71, U-2), but most of today’s are Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). ⇒ Technical systems were built for Cold War, designed for use against big, slow-moving, relatively visible targets; e.g., armies, military bases, government ministries; not designed for use against small units, terrorist cells. The satellite program that covered the Soviet Union and acquired highly accurate intelligence concerning submarines, missiles, bombers, and other military targets is perhaps the greatest achievement of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
Subsequent experience has demonstrated that there are now a greater number of collection targets than the ones that existed during the Cold War and that more satellites are required, especially those that can be maneuvered to collect information about a variety of targets. The availability of high-quality commercial satellite imagery and its widespread use by federal agencies has raised questions about the extent to which coverage from the private sector can meet the requirements of intelligence agencies.
Geospatial Intelligence - GEOINT
⇒ This is the analysis and visual representation of security related activities on the earth. It is produced through an integration of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. ⇒ The NGA defines GEOINT as information about any object – natural or man-made – that can be observed or referenced to the Earth, and has national security implications. ⇒ For example, an image of a city includes natural objects (rivers, lakes, and so on) and man-made objects (buildings, roads, bridges, and so on) and can have overlaid on it utility lines, transport lines, and so on. ⇒ It may also include terrain or geodetic data. Thus, a more complete picture is drawn that may be of greater intelligence value. The war against terrorism led to three major developments in the use of imagery: First, the government greatly expanded its use of commercial imagery. In October 2001, NGA (then known as NIMA) bought exclusive and perpetual rights to all imagery of Afghanistan taken by the IKONOS satellite, operated by the Space Imaging Company. This satellite has a resolution of 0.8 meter (approximately 31.5 inches). The agency’s actions expanded the overall collection capability of the United States and allowed it to reserve more sophisticated imagery capabilities for those areas where they were most needed, while IKONOS took up other collection tasks. The use of this commercial imagery makes it easier for the United States to share imagery with other nations or the public without revealing classified capabilities. At the same time, foreign governments that may be hostile to the United States or may see the Afghanistan campaign as a means of gauging U.S. military capabilities were denied access to imagery. A second major imagery development has centered on UAVs. The use of pilotless drones for imagery is not new, but their role and capability have expanded greatly. UAVs offer two clear advantages over satellites and manned aircraft:
• First, unlike satellites, they can fly closer to areas of interest and loiter over them instead of making a high-altitude orbital pass. • Second, unlike manned aircraft, UAVs do not put lives at risk, particularly from surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Not only are UAVs unmanned, but operators also can be safely located great distances (even thousands of miles) from the area of operation, linked to the UAV by satellite. A third advantage is that the UAVs produce real-time images – they carry high definition television and infrared cameras – that is, video images are immediately available for use instead of having to be processed and exploited first. This capability helps obviate the snapshot problem. In 2006, the Senate Intelligence Committee stated that it wanted NGA to be able to provide video and images to troops via laptop computers, thus increasing tactical imagery support. The United States currently relies on two UAVs, the Predator and the Global Hawk. The Predator operates at up to twenty-five thousand feet, flying at the relatively slow speeds of 84 to 140 miles per hour. It can be based as far as 450 miles from a target and operate over the target for sixteen to twenty-four hours. It provides real-time imagery and has been mated with air-to-ground missiles, allowing immediate attacks on identified targets instead of having to relay the information to nearby air or ground units. In the war on terrorism, Predators have been armed with Hellfire missiles, which are guided to the target by a laser. Global Hawk operates at up to sixty-five thousand feet at a speed of up to four hundred miles per hour. It can be based three thousand miles from the target and can operate over the target for twenty-four hours. Global Hawk is designed to conduct both broad area and continuous spot coverage. In 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld talked about building fifteen Predator squadrons (twelve UAVs per squadron) over the next five years, emphasizing both the intelligence collection and the hunter killer missions in which the UAVs carry missiles as well. The third major imagery development related to the war on terrorism has been the use of NGA imagery platforms on potential terrorist targets within the United States. These have included the 2002 Olympics in Utah, the 2004 political conventions, and other public events that would attract large crowds or locations (such as nuclear power plants) that might be targets.
7- Measurement and Signatures Intelligence - MASINT
Measurement and Signatures Intelligence is technically derived intelligence data other than imagery and SIGINT. The data results in intelligence that locates, identifies, or describes distinctive characteristics of targets. This type of Intelligence is obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying distinctive features. Metric data can provide information on the dynamic capabilities of targets and the tactics for their use. Signature data allows the unique identification of targets. Examples of this might be the distinctive radar signatures of specific aircraft systems or the chemical composition of air and water samples. Measurement and signatures analysis has received greater emphasis in recent years. A highly technical discipline, MASINT involves the application of complicated analytical refinements to information collected by SIGINT and IMINT sensors. It also includes spectral imaging by which the identities and characteristics of objects can be identified on the basis of their reflection and absorption of light. It employs a broad group of disciplines including nuclear, optical, radio frequency, acoustics, seismic, and materials sciences. A key problem has been retaining personnel with expertise in MASINT systems that are offered more remunerative positions in private industry. MASINT practitioners think of their INT has having six disciplines: Electro-optical: the properties of emitted or reflected energy in the infrared to ultraviolet part of the spectrum, including lasers and various types of light infrared, polarized, spectral, ultraviolet, and visible. Geophysical: the disturbance and anomalies of various physical fields at, or near, the surface of Earth, such as acoustic, gravity, magnetic, and seismic. Materials: the composition and identification of gases, liquids, or solids, including chemical-, biological, and nuclear-related material samples. Nuclear Radiation: the qualities of gamma rays, neutrons, and x-rays. Radar: the properties of radio waves reflected from a target or objects, including various types of radars such as line-of-sight and over-the-horizon and synthetic apertures.
pattern and other characteristics of communications like burst. space activities. At present. frequency or scale of occurrence. and denial and deception practices. Others. either narrow. frequency hopping. Communications intelligence (COMINT) – is data and information collected through intercepts of communications. patterns. do not believe this INT needs the panoply of a full agency. generally referred to as signals. Often analysts or policy makers look at a MASINT product without knowing it. weapons developments. sequences. spread spectrum. ii.or wide band. etc. Some of its advocates believe that MASINT will never make a full contribution until it has more bureaucratic clout. including WMD development and proliferation. relationships. modes. direction finding. environmental issues. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) – is electromagnetic pickup and signals monitoring of electronic emissions of events. Responsibility for MASINT is shared by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and NGA. it is not a separate agency. traffic analysis and monitoring of the changes in volume. policy makers are less familiar – and probably less comfortable – with it than they are with GEOINT or SIGINT. MASINT has suffered as a collection discipline because of its relative novelty and its dependence on the other technical INTs for its products. narcotics. It is also more arcane and requires analysts with more technical training to be able to use is fully. 8. signatures as well as content. MASINT is a potentially important INT still struggling for recognition.SIGINT Signals intelligence – SIGINT – is the generic term given to the process of deriving intelligence from intercepted electromagnetic waves.Radio frequency: the electromagnetic signals generated by an object. or intercepts of emissions 28 . arms control.Signals Intelligence . activities. even some sympathetic to MASINT. SIGINT has five subsets of collection disciplines: i. MASINT can be used against a wide array of intelligence issues.
radar and weapons systems for gauging their capabilities such as frequencies and the range on which they operate. During the Cold War they were the cutting edge of technological developments in cryptography. etc. at Fort Meade. Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT) – is the pickup and monitoring of data relayed by weapons or beacons and video links. these services have now been enlisted in the surveillance of other more 29 . but there is little doubt that the need for intelligence on a growing variety of nations and groups that are increasingly using sophisticated and rapidly changing encryption systems requires a far different SIGINT effort than the one prevailing during the Cold War. Cryptology intelligence (CRYPINT) – is code-breaking and decryption of ciphered messages. both have offensive and defensive functions: ⇒ Offensive: The interception of the communications of others (states. those two agencies developed out of code-breaking efforts in wartime. iv. companies. Currently they face major problems. ⇒ Defensive: Has to do with information assurance – protecting the state’s own communications from interception and disruption by others. NSA. and reporting SIGINT. and the DNI on SIGINT policy issues and manages the SIGINT requirements system. iii. such as the huge increase in the volume of communications overloads the ability of the agencies to process information despite the development of sophisticated technology for selecting messages of interest. during the Cold War the agencies had one central target . computer intrusion and penetration of databanks. Non-imaging radar can detect and track missile launches and gather data on missile characteristics. Maryland is responsible for collecting. etc). Since the late 1990s a process of change in NSA’s culture and methods of operations has been initiated.Soviet military capabilities -. SIGINT operations are classified. fibre optics and commercial encryption make interception harder. Also digitization. processing. a change required by the need to target terrorist groups and affected by the proliferation of communications technologies and inexpensive encryption systems. v. In fact.from tracking. mail and messages interception. enabling the performance of missiles to be evaluated. The National SIGINT Committee within NSA advises the Director. One category therein is telemetry intelligence (TELINT) – data obtained from intercepting the signals transmitted during missile tests. Computer network exploitation (CNE) – is data and information collected from network and traffic analysis or by monitoring. Historically. The NSA. which requires supercomputers and mathematicians. The US National Security Agency – NSA – and the GCHQ – Government Communications Headquarters – Britain. armies.
A competitor’s economic resources. education and health of its people. political alignments. so intelligence producers and customers should examine potential adversaries and competitive situations from as many relevant viewpoints as possible. the number. tells us that intelligence products may be described both in terms of their subject content and their intended use. and apparent objectives are all important in determining the ability of a country or a business to exert influence on others. 9.Intelligence Categories Liza Krizan in her study Intelligence essentials for everyone. WMD proliferation and Transnational Organized Crime. 30 .mobile security threats: Terrorism. A nation’s power or a firm’s success results from a combination of factors.
or assess the range and likelihood of possible outcomes in a threat or opportunity scenario. smuggling. terrorism and the like. Characterization of intelligence by intended use applies to both government and enterprise. Blair Seaborn. and the like.g. processes. How government and business leaders define their needs for these types of intelligence affects the intelligence service’s organization and operating procedures. in his paper Intelligence and Policy: What Is Constant? What Is Changing? divides intelligence into the following categories: Commercial intelligence: • Related to the capabilities and intentions of one's commercial rivals and competitors. often to the acquisition of confidential or proprietary information about their strategies. e. it may help policymakers fill in gaps between available facts. The production of basic research intelligence yields structured summaries of topics such as geographic. but is produced in a tailored. Scientific and Technical intelligence typically comes to life in in-depth. extortion.. to the basic security of a state and to the integrity of the state system. and political studies. Warning intelligence sounds an alarm. events. focused assessments stemming from detailed physical or functional examination of objects. but they are not mutually exclusive. presented in handbooks.or strategic. on the other hand. connoting urgency. maps. and implies the potential need for policy action in response. it should not become a rigid formula. and the categories again are exhaustive. Estimative intelligence deals with what might be or what might happen. finances or markets. Military intelligence • Could be either tactical-relating to the disposition of the enemy's troops and equipment in the field . Security intelligence applied to threats both from within and without. Operational support intelligence incorporates all types of intelligence by use. bid information. Current intelligence addresses day-to-day events to appraise decisionmakers of new developments and assess their significance. or processes. demographic. relating to longer-term capabilities in the light of total military strength and the capacity to maintain it. charts. focused. Although dividing intelligence into subject areas is useful for analyzing information and administering production. 31 . and timely manner for planners and operators of the supported activity. but not mutually exclusive.The eight subject categories of intelligence are exhaustive. such as equipment manufacturing techniques. Criminal intelligence • Applied to that which the police should know in order to counter and apprehend those engaged in organized crime.
An easy way to remember these components is through the use of the acronym BEST MAPS: B -. Each of these components can further subcomponents.including civilian and military backgrounds of individuals. in that it related to the defence of a country and the conduct of its foreign affairs in the widest sense.notable accomplishments of an individual in professional or private life. S -. Position. Individual accomplishment . and potential present and future positions of power or influence. be divided into a subcomponents are approach is merely information included number of neither alla means to in strategic Biographic Intelligence Biographic intelligence is the study of individuals of actual or potential importance through knowledge of their personalities and backgrounds. Idiosyncrasies and habits .Political intelligence.Foreign intelligence was probably the broadest category. S -. Attitudes and hobbies – significant interests that may affect the individual’s accessibility. the Field Manual 34-52 details the Components of Strategic Intelligence: Information gathered as strategic intelligence may be categorized into eight components. 32 . P -. This component can be divided into a number of subcomponents: • • • • • Educational and occupational history .Military geographical intelligence. influence.Transportation and telecommunications intelligence M -. A -. These components and encompassing nor mutually exclusive. This enhance familiarization with the types of intelligence.including mannerisms and unusual life styles. Finally.Scientific and technical intelligence.Sociological intelligence T -.Armed forces intelligence.Economic intelligence.Biographic intelligence E -.
firm with a narrow commercial purpose. that is. Economic intelligence should not be used offensively. or the policies of major economic actors. But it is appropriate for intelligence to be used defensively so that policymakers can act if bribes or other unfair practices are being used against an American firm. and virtually any aspect of another country's economic policy and practices and those of its major corporations. the availability of natural resources and agricultural commodities. in rare cases through imagery . There is no need for the intelligence community to replicate what is already done by the private sector or other government agencies in the accumulation of statistics and other forms of basic information. facilities. • • • Collection of secret economic information can be by several means -mostly SIGINT and HUMINT. markets. and so forth.Economic Intelligence Economic intelligence studies the economic strengths and weaknesses of a country. Manufacturing: Information on manufacturing processes. such as winning a contract against foreign competition.and involve such questions as trade policy. Source of economic capability: Any means a country has to sustain its economy. Its subcomponents are: • Economic warfare: Information on the diplomatic or financial steps a country may take to induce neutral countries to cease trading with its enemies. Levelling the playing field is acceptable. money laundering. 33 .S. Analysis can be used to support specific negotiations and to understand better what might be termed strategic or political-economic trends involving emerging technologies. to help a particular U. logistics. Economic vulnerabilities: The degree to which a country's military would be hampered by the loss of materials or facilities. foreign exchange reserves.
location. Manpower .analysis of all military materiel.military deployments and operations doctrine. Training . or migrations. Logistics . behaviors. Armed Forces Intelligence Armed forces intelligence is the integrated study of the ground. economics. Organization . politics. customs. and welfare. sea. weapons. and institutions. It is concerned with: • • • • • • • • Strategy . subcomponents are: • • • • • Population-rates of increase. Public information-information services within the country. studies the role of transportation and telecommunications systems during military emergencies and during peacetime. and so forth. Military Geographic Intelligence Military geographic intelligence studies all geographic factors (physical and cultural). and air forces of a country-often referred to as OB. storage. 34 .available resources and their conditioning.Sociological Intelligence Sociological intelligence deals with people.military alternatives in terms of position.as carried out at all echelons to support doctrine. organization. Equipment . Its Transportation and Telecommunications Intelligence Transportation and telecommunications intelligence. education. Tactics . and distribution.procurement. Social characteristics-customs. decrease. Manpower-divisions and distribution within the workforce. Health. strengths. and values. OB . mores. terrain.detailed analysis of command structures.
subversive acts sponsored by the government. National policies .Military Intelligence Information is the key commodity in the battlefield. Subversion . Research and development systems. 10.government views and reactions to events. Basic applied science. equipment. The subcomponents are: • Weapons and weapon systems.government actions and decisions. Its subcomponents are: • • • • • • Government structure . Policy and intelligence services . near-space.organizations and functions.information and disinformation programs. The United States Department of Defense defines intelligence as: 35 .organization of departments and ministries. Political dynamics . Nuclear energy and weapons technology.Political Intelligence Political intelligence studies all political aspects which may affect military operations. • • • • • Missile and space program. Scientific and Technical Intelligence Scientific and technical intelligence studies the country's potential and capability to support objectives through development of new processes. weapons systems. Some forms of intelligence are obtained through space. NBC developments. so useful that it can even lift the fog of war. Propaganda . and ground-based sensing technologies. and so forth.
or tactics. that can have the most decisive impact on how forces are employed and how success is achieved in wartime operations. analysis. Therefore.Information and knowledge obtained through observation. The primary function of military intelligence officers is the collection. Such intelligence can be a force multiplier. technology. and more lethal — also depends on rapid. precise. investigation. in all probability. the Naval Doctrinal Publication points out. considering the value of force employment. faster. or understanding. Successful employment of modern weapons systems. when it provides information on the adversary’s capabilities and vulnerabilities — the intelligence preparation of the battlespace concept. accurate. and dissemination of intelligence at both the tactical and strategic levels: • Through the deployment of intelligence collection assets. History repeatedly has demonstrated that numerically inferior forces. Intelligence reduces the unknowns that planners must face and forms the basis for both deliberate and crisis action planning. and mass without placing a corresponding value on intelligence is a mistake. Intelligence gives commanders the knowledge of the battlefield (battlespace awareness) and the understanding of their foe to focus their forces at the right place and time to win when. Decisions about a response are made in Washington within minutes. and innovative combat techniques — particularly those involving forces that are lighter. Intelligence can help lead to victory also through clandestine intelligence operations designed to provide indications and warning information of impending attacks or operations. armed with less capable technologies. Information about a new development in Baghdad is known in Washington within minutes. not necessarily numbers. production. 36 . • Coordination of aerial and ground surveillance. technology. It is operational and tactical intelligence. Another way is through the support intelligence gives to planning. • Combination and preparation of all-source intelligence estimates. can win when leaders are armed with accurate intelligence they believe they can act upon. The total intelligence-decisionimplementation cycle time can be as short as 15 minutes. analysis. new operational concepts. they should have been defeated. more agile. These decisions are implemented in Baghdad within minutes. • Preparation of intelligence plans in support of combat operations. Surveillance and reconnaissance refer to the means by which the information is observed. and detailed intelligence.
led by strong leadership willing to use force against a clear objective. outstanding in the Six-Day War. The third principle maintains that intelligence is essential to the defense but not to the offense. employing it correctly. The attacker imposes his will on the defender. But it also requires foresight. Tet. for that matter. A commander must know an enemy will attack in order to defend. and so his need for information. the Defense intelligence agencies and Service intelligence organizations produce and maintain a specific array of standard finished intelligence products and electronic databases. Military Intelligence Analysis Military intelligence analysis produces numerous categories of finished intelligence for the different levels of operations. Logically. and Operational Forces in near real time. When commanders do not have enough intelligence. factor in war. the Combatant Commands. 37 . It is indeed a force multiplier and facilitator of command. Success in the physical act of battle requires well-trained soldiers who are properly equipped. the attacks of September 11th. It demonstrated how strategic intelligence can be used in conjunction with operational intelligence to provide senior decisionmakers information necessary to make wellinformed national security decisions and to give leaders opportunities to mitigate the numerical superiority of an adversary. and the development of a playbook on how to win — it takes intelligence. indeed. three intelligence principles can be put forward: The first combines steadying command and magnifying strength by optimizing resources. having superior forces equipped with better technology is no insurance for victory when opposing an enemy that invests in intelligence. the implication of insufficient intelligence is enemy surprise. Employment of force is hollow without an understanding of where. In the present. they must replace it with their own forces and their will. Intelligence failures too. analysis. Pearl Harbor. and sacrificing when necessary. or.As an example. reducing the attacker’s uncertainty. which they must be able to disseminate in electronic or computerized formats to DOD elements. The second principle holds that intelligence is an auxiliary. and against whom to employ force. For each level. do not diminish the importance of intelligence but rather demonstrate the impact of not placing sufficient emphasis on it. but it cannot always make up for insufficient strength or inadequate leadership. tell of the significance intelligence plays. Here is a list of some of those products: Current Intelligence reports on recent world events. Israeli intelligence was. Therefore. in what conditions and geography. not a primary. eyes and ears. just as Keegan correctly states that Knowledge of what the enemy can do and of what he intends is never enough to ensure security so too.
⇒ Military equipment. ⇒ Critical military technologies. Prisoner of war and missing in action assessments. Scientific and technological assessments and forecasts of: ⇒ Enemy weapon systems. Analyses of enemy military budgets and economic resources. Biographies of foreign military personnel. and analyses derived primarily technical systems. The Order-of-Battle data on all major foreign armies.OSINT 38 .Open Source Intelligence .Basic Intelligence studies on the geography. plans. topography. military bases. economic resources. communications systems. weather conditions. and lines of communication of potential adversaries. ⇒ Analyses of enemy C4 systems and networks. and capabilities. Estimates of enemy military strategy. 11. Counterintelligence and counterterrorism threat assessments. ⇒ Physical vulnerability assessments of enemy surface and underground facilities. Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) data. from Target intelligence on all categories of enemy military and civilian objectives and infrastructure.
newspapers. This category of information. but what to do with the mass amount that is available. and drawings. etc. television. booksellers. allowing for faster and cheaper collection and analysis. cataloged. journals. requirements for translation. The IT revolution has dramatically increased the access to and value of open sources. Internet Based Distance Learning Centers. analysis. working papers. It is estimated that roughly 90% of valuable intelligence comes from open sources. the major collectors are the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC). Many observers believe that intelligence agencies should be more aggressive in using OSINT. and formatted. The process of creating OSINT products is similar yet distinct from the production of other methods of intelligence. OSINT also relies on grey literature and information. encompassing all legally and ethically available information that is obtained through specialized channels and is not controlled by commercial publishers. data sets. the Internet. is increasingly important given requirements for information about many regions and topics (instead of the former concentration on political and military issues affecting a few countries).g. graphics. conference summaries. the availability of OSINT raises questions regarding the need for intelligence agencies to undertake collection. or subscription agencies. and videos. In effect the problem is no longer how to get information. and relies on four key elements to create consumer oriented products: Reports. and dissemination of information that could be directly obtained by user agencies. white papers. and must then be assembled through an editing process to filter and validate.Open-Source Intelligence is publicly available information appearing in print or electronic form including radio. 39 . e. At the same time. The new environment is one in which an analyst is faced with an abundance of information that can be obtained quickly and cheaply. and the use of Expert Forums. open source information. and systematic analysis have increased. some believe that the availability of OSINT may even reduce the need for certain collection efforts. The process begins with open source data (OSD). While open-source collection responsibilities are broadly distributed through the Intelligence Community. Commercial online premium sources offer access to edited information that has been at least partially validated. dissemination. the raw information from the primary source. technical reports. Link Tables. commercial databases. given the multitude of different areas and the volume of materials. In fact.
We must put to rest the notion that the private sector is the preferred OSINT agent. Information hidden behind walls of classification and special access programs may prove no more than equal in value to material available to the public. proliferation. A network of human sources not limited by classification is huge. and analyzing the take. The real revolution in OSINT and IT is the networks of experts that can be developed. and local knowledge. The CIA includes an OSINT service that produces the lion’s share of its intelligence. case officers are in short supply. 40 . do allow us to understand the terrorist agenda and act thereby to address grievances or launch competing campaigns for hearts and minds. OSINT’s share of the overall intelligence budget has been estimated at roughly one percent. experts. Open sources. and even amateurs can result in a product that is superior to one prepared by a security cleared analyst. Most resources in the Intelligence Community go to such IMINT and SIGINT activities as developing reconnaissance satellites. As images become available. The Intelligence Community (IC) needs to assign greater resources to open sources. external experts. and counterintelligence. The rapid growth of the commercial satellite imagery industry has to some extent been so successful as to endanger the discipline of overhead imagery intelligence – IMINT – as a covert entity. collecting signals. while they may not tell us where the next bomb will explode. states that previously did not have the technical means to launch satellites are able to gain access to imagery. The human contribution to OSINT is separated into three levels: internal experts.Perhaps the OSINT source with the broadest application is the commercial imagery industry. Too many policymakers and intelligence officers mistake secrecy for intelligence and assume that information covertly acquired is superior to that obtained openly. as well as various nongovernmental organizations. The separate pieces of information that can be gathered through a network of observers. Open sources often equal or surpass classified information in monitoring and analyzing such pressing problems as terrorism.
and analysis of all available data and the preparation of a variety of intelligence products.12. While analysts must prove their capability to connect the dots. the Department of Energy (DOE). action or trend which may be hidden within a mass of confusing and contradictory information. the overarching goal of analysis is to minimise uncertainty with which policymakers must grapple in making decisions about national security and foreign policy. For example. finished intelligence studies. forwarding. Intelligence analysis reflects conclusions or judgments reached by individuals with access to information from many sources. single-source. the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the State Department. Assessment is the final step in the analytical process. the analysis probably would involve technical experts and country specialists from several agencies. If collection is dominated by smart technology. and processing systems. produce an assessment of the current state of affairs within an assigned field or substantive area. if the nuclear program of a country was being assessed. The analyst also develops requirements for collection of new information. No amount of data and information can substitute for an insightful analyst able to discern the critical policy or operational significance of an event. including timely. Analysts are encouraged to include alternative futures in their assessments and to look for opportunities to warn about possible developments abroad that could either threaten or provide opportunities for US security and policy interests. 41 . and strategic assessment is the final all-source intelligence product of actionable knowledge provided to government to anticipate risks and reduce uncertainty in its pursuit of furthering or protecting national political. Analysts absorb incoming information. Analysts obtain information from all sources pertinent to their areas of responsibility through the collection. including the CIA.Intelligence Analysis Intelligence analysis is the Integration. evaluation. DIA. of which secret information made available by the intelligence community collection systems is only part. all-source. and perhaps others. evaluate it. analyses still reflect the perspicacity of the human mind. Most intelligence organizations assign analysts to a particular geographic or functional specialty. event-oriented reports and longer term. economic and security objectives. and then forecast future trends or outcomes.
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Here it helps to think of the challenge as one of improving both the stock and the flow of personnel. Non-proliferation and Arms Control Center (WINP AC). Counterintelligence and counterterrorism analyses provide strategic assessments of foreign intelligence and terrorist groups and prepare tactical options for ongoing operations and investigations. other elements of the federal government. and Homeland Security. more intractable intelligence challenges are addressed by grouping analytic and operational personnel from concerned agencies into closely-knit functional units. One of the most important functions of various components of the intelligence community is to provide analysis gleaned from all sources. government or even nongovernmental actors. DCI Crime and Narcotics Center. Certain career personnel need to be encouraged to specialize in a geographical area or function and rewarded for excellence. it is called finished intelligence. but foremost what is relevant to the decision . The DCI Weapons Intelligence.Furthermore. and both intelligence consumers and producers often share a frustration over its perceived lack of utility and impact. Longer range. 42 . When information has been reviewed and correlated with information available from other sources. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established in accordance with Presidential guidance as the federal government's focal point for analyzing and integrating all available information on terrorist threats to our Nation and providing that information to the senior leadership of the Nation. and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). and state and local officials through its mission partners. analysts check information to see how it relates to other information they have received.S. They evaluate the information and make comments. The best way to ensure high-quality analysis is to bring high quality analysts into the process. Improving Analysis Many current and former policymakers are critical of the analysis they receive. usually by electronic means. Some intelligence information is sent directly to consumers. The CIA in particular needs to place much more emphasis on formal management and leadership training as well as demonstrated competence as a prerequisite for promotion for those headed for senior levels. The importance thereby is not only to determine what is accurate. and Counterintelligence Center all provide assessments and support for the policy and enforcement communities. NCTC partners include Departments of Defense (DoD). analysis must help to make sense of complex issues and to call attention to emerging problems or threats to national interests. and to package it in a timely and useful manner to policymakers and other U. More often.and policymaker’s needs. open and secret. State. because it is self-explanatory.
and defend anyone who comes under criticism for doing so. The challenge is to develop reasonable safeguards while permitting intelligence producers and policymaking consumers to interact. senior officials involved in national security. who are inevitably busy and inundated with more demands on their time and attention than they can possibly meet. All this suggests that the emphasis placed on such estimates should be reduced. It is also necessary to change the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers. Intelligence professionals must understand the needs of policymakers and vice versa. This is especially true in the case of any early-warning or intelligence-related development that has potentially significant consequences Another serious problem to be avoided is mindset or groupthink. they ought to be concise. and the CIA or any intelligence agency is no exception. Perhaps most important. One way to do so is through regular rotation of career intelligence officers into positions in the policymaking departments (State. and Congress can help guard against politicization . written by individuals.) and the NSC. Treasury. who must focus on the immediate. the balance between current intelligence and long-term estimates. has favored the latter. To the extent long-term estimates are produced.though they too can try to politicize intelligence. In this way the intelligence community could attract and exploit some of the best minds from academia and other sections of society that would otherwise not be available. Any organization. can fall into the trap of not questioning basic assumptions that affect much subsequent analysis. Intelligence officials must draw attention to their product and market their ideas. Intelligence analysis rarely impresses itself upon policymakers.But better analysis will also require reducing the isolation of the intelligence community. If the project is a group effort. 43 . and sources justifying conclusions ought to be shown as they would in any academic work. differences among participants ought to be sharpened and prominently acknowledged. It is essential that competitive or redundant analysis be encouraged. the leadership of the intelligence community should reinforce the ethic that speaking the truth to those in power is required . in particular that of the CIA. For years the culture of the intelligence community. Greater provision ought to be made for lateral and mid-career entry as well as for shortterm entry (measured in weeks. Many estimates are likely to be less relevant to busy policymakers. One other aspect of analysis merits mention. shortduration project. namely. The danger of politicization .the potential for the intelligence community to distort information or judgment in order to please political authorities . The same logic argues for assigning careerists normally in the policymaking realm to periodic tours inside the intelligence community. months. Defense. A greater flow of talented people into the agency from academia and business is essential. or years) or even for just a single. Only the president. etc.is real.
• Analysts today have to dig deep to surpass the analytic abilities of their customers.CIA Directorate of Intelligence . Assumption -2: Policymakers frequently understand the direct consequences of events and their immediate significance. How would the practice of intelligence analysis change? Analysts must focus on the customer. how does the DI. The policymaker.4: Policymakers need the greatest help understanding nontraditional intelligence issues. we need new assumptions: Assumption -1: Most of the time. Policymakers today also read raw intelligence reports on a regular basis. policymakers often read the raw traffic at the same time as. has many more ways of staying informed about recent developments. • For many analysts. Assumption -3: The CIA .Analysis that Fits the New Environment • Analysts today have to add value in an era of information abundance. if not before. an intelligence consumer. 44 . Twenty to thirty years ago. or anyone. intelligence-related or not. Today. and non traditional issues? First. analysts. an area in which it is particularly hard to provide value to policymakers. Assumption . especially in the political and economic spheres.and particularly the Directorate of Intelligence DI . particularly those involved in political work. the focus would shift from tracking developments in their particular accounts to addressing the specific. There is still a market for political analysis and certainly for related leadership analysis. analysts in the DI . Raw intelligence is ubiquitous and can get to policymakers before it reaches the analysts. So. but to be successful in traditional areas the DI must generate unique insights into relatively well-understood problems. • Analysts today have to reach beyond political analysis. hard questions of policymakers.often lacks unique information about developments. do intelligence analysis in an era of information abundance. well connected policymakers.had the fastest access to incoming intelligence information and could count on seeing particularly critical cables before policymakers. policymakers have a good sense of what is going on in their areas of concern. thanks to information technology.
Quick answers to specific questions. • Analysts must think beyond finished intelligence. officially reviewed. such as: Annotated raw intelligence. In many substantive fields. • • Policymakers do in fact often need help deciphering technical reports on such issues as proliferation and information warfare.• An analyst. not intelligence. 45 . instead of first reading the morning traffic. Too many intelligence analysts and managers remain fixated on formal products even as policymakers move further away from them in their own work. the DI or any other similar structure will need keen critical thinkers open to unconventional ideas. • Analysts are schooled in the need to produce validated. for example. the analyst can best serve the policymaker by tackling the hard questions and trying to develop more reliable ways of identifying and understanding emerging issues. would often start the day by reviewing feedback and tasking from customers. meaning that it has been carefully considered. and sent out under official cover. • Analysts must concentrate on ideas. Memoranda of conversation. DI officers who deal frequently with customers — including those who carry the President’s Daily Brief to the most senior officials — report that many products short of finished intelligence often satisfy the needs of policymakers. coordinated with colleagues. finished intelligence — finished. Informal trip reports. We need to use technology and a network of high-caliber representatives at policy agencies to create stronger links between analysts and customers. To do this kind of work well. perhaps even more than it will need regional experts.
There is a lack of satisfactory capability to analyze a substantial body of material on: Foreign and security policy. Any systemic attack on sophisticated command. therefore. Space and Aerospace technology. Advanced Materials. has proven to require much more than nominal name checks and border watches. logistic.The Old Analysis vs XXI Century Analysis To really help smart policymakers. The strategic pursuit and elimination of terrorists. Crime and Corruption. Resources. The daily demand to support immediate policy needs exceeds existing analytic capabilities. and new ways of communicating analysis There must be an increase of investment in analysis. new habits of thinking. and financial support structures requires at least as sophisticated and intense analytic support. Domestic policy. analysts are not developing core skills and in-depth familiarity. Long-term analysis and basic research is in decline. for example. are unavailable for the long-term analysis required for the accumulation of substantive capital. Absent long-term analytic programs. control. 46 . there is the need to adopt new practices.
as well as agents and defectors). and surveillance activities to detect and neutralise the foreign intelligence service’ presence. Counterintelligence is about the multi-disciplinary effort to penetrate the many different disciplines of the adversary. knowledge of culture. Military Doctrine and Strategy. recruiting agents. Similarly. In resource terms. and initiating operations to 47 . Inadequate American foreign language skills are a mismatch for the exponential growth in foreign language materials. counterintelligence in this wide sense has always been small in the West. Counterintelligence consists of offensive and defensive measures of protection: • Defensively by inquiries and vetting of civil servants and employees. Soviet espionage later in the Cold War penetrated Western SIGINT. history. while penetration of Western intelligence was always the highest Soviet priority. subversion. and language will be even more critical as the amount of open-source material increases. monitoring of known or suspected agents. In the future. 13. sabotage and terrorism. through investigations.Biographic Information. Counterintelligence is intelligence on foreign intelligence: Getting information on all foreign intelligence threats – not just espionage ones – by any means (SIGINT and other sources. but its penetration of the KGB and GRU was a key activity in the Cold War. • Offensively through the collation of information about foreign intelligence services and their modus operandi. It was SIGINT’s breaking of enciphered intelligence messages that provided the essential leads into high-level Soviet espionage in Britain and the United States in the late 1940s.Counterintelligence Counterintelligence is intelligence designed to uncover hostile operations against the nation – the national effort to prevent foreign intelligence services and foreign-controlled political movements or groups from infiltrating the state’s institutions at home and abroad in order to engage in espionage.
⇒ For a number of reasons. the screening investigation determines whether an individual is to be granted a security clearance – that is. Personnel Security Personnel security involves procedures for screening potential employees before hiring them for jobs that give access to information a hostile intelligence service might wish to collect. however. commonly known as the lie detector. deceive and manipulate these services and related organisations to own advantages. background investigations of this sort are probably not very effective in ascertaining the loyalty and character of personnel to be granted access to classified information. ⇒ One method of augmenting the background investigation as a protection against unsuitable personnel is the use of the polygraph machine. ⇒ This technique has been used primarily by U. communications. disrupt. the CIA has placed the greatest emphasis on the polygraph. • Investigations ⇒ In the United States. ⇒ Within the United States. authorized access to classified information. documents. Results are not generally produced in the short term.penetrate. they constitute the wall surrounding classified information. or operations to gain important information. ⇒ Perhaps the strongest publicly available evidence of the inadequacy of the polygraph comes from the case of Aldrich Ames. and counterintelligence investigations cannot be limited to arbitrary time periods. Counterintelligence is. Security Security measures are steps taken to obstruct a hostile intelligence service’s ability to collect intelligence. moreover.S. The agency requires that any candidate for employment take a polygraph test and that all personnel be subject to periodic retesting as a condition of continued employment. On two occasions he passed polygraph examinations. 48 . Such measures are designed to prevent a hostile intelligence service from either gaining access or exploiting any access it may have to personnel. and for ensuring that current employees continue to meet the standards for access to such information. intelligence agencies. neither other Western intelligence services nor non-Western ones place as much faith in it. It differs from intelligence collection in that it exists to counter a threat and is to some degree reactive. an integral part of the entire intelligence process: to make sure that what is collected is genuine through continuous evaluation of the reliability of sources and the credibility of information.
However physical security seeks to safeguard not only the material objects.S. such as documents that contain information but also the information itself. Counter-espionage Counterespionage has to do with more active measures that try to understand how a hostile intelligence service works in order to frustrate or disrupt its activities and ultimately to turn those activities to one’s own advantage. This in turn leads to the development of less detectable systems for monitoring conversations. It deals with such matters as the strength of safes in which classified information is kept. a succession of espionage cases involved employees of U. government agencies or contractors. ⇒ In these cases. the motivation has been primarily financial.• The Changing Nature of the Threat ⇒ Since the mid-1970s.e. So. ⇒ Physical Security Physical security refers to the steps taken to prevent foreign intelligence agents from gaining physical access to classified information. 49 . Surveillance Operations An obvious way to learn about the activities of a hostile intelligence service is to mount surveillance operations against its officers (keep them under constant observation) wherever they operate. and the features of alarm systems to detect unauthorized intrusion into the areas in which officials deal with classified information and sophisticated systems involving passwords to protect classified data kept in computers. since an intruder can quickly and unobtrusively implant a bugging device that would give a hostile intelligence service access to what was being said within the classified work area. This requires much stricter controls on access to the relevant areas and the equipment used there.g. it is important to have some means of “sweeping” an area to detect any bugging devices so they can be removed. ⇒ These cases differ markedly in this respect from the famous American and British espionage cases of the 1940s and 1950s . such as developing detailed psychological profiles and instituting a system for alerting security officials when individuals with access to classified information either run into financial difficulties or appear to be living beyond their means of support. occasionally associated with emotional instability. ⇒ This pattern suggests additional steps that could be taken to improve personnel security. in which the motivation was primarily ideological -. the Rosenberg’s and Kim Philby).
a former employee of the NSA. As this and other examples suggest. The more learned about that service and the way it operates. the Ukraine. and the indictment of Edward Lee Howard. and employees of international organizations such as the UN. Although he did not know their real names. They are agents who. while pretending to spy for a hostile service. Because this sort of surveillance is cumbersome and expensive. A prominent example was Vitaliy Yurchenko. the deputy chief of the KGB department responsible for espionage against the United States and Canada. these contacts can then be used as leads for further investigation. was able to provide his KGB handlers timely information on U. The problem is to determine which individuals holding these sorts of positions are really intelligence officers. double agents may be able to determine the identities of hostile intelligence officers.Such surveillance tries to determine where the officers go and with whom they communicate or are in contact. journalists working for government-owned media.S. the United States and other western countries relied heavily on defectors from Soviet intelligence services for counterespionage information. when the employees are selected by their own government. consular officials. or other institutions. it is important to target it against actual intelligence officers. Or they may be dangles. working within MI6. Russia. Soviet agent Kim Philby. agents who pretend to volunteer to spy for the hostile intelligence service but in fact remain loyal to their country. and Albania. 50 . After defecting in the summer of 1985. however. are actually under the control of the country on which they are supposed to be spying. in the years immediately following World War II. its target. trade representatives. he provided information about Soviet espionage successes against the United States. report the recruitment attempt to their own countries´ authorities and are encouraged by them to play along. would be the adversary’s intelligence service rather than the governmental leadership. Finally. counterintelligence does not is this respect differ much from intelligence collection in general. the more effectively surveillance can be targeted. or converted into agents of the country that caught them. For example. Intelligence Collection The most direct way to achieve counter-espionage’s goals is to collect intelligence directly from the hostile service. a former CIA employee. and British covert operations in the Baltic states. having been approached by a hostile intelligence service. The other major method of conducting counterespionage is through double agents. either by human or technical means. One place to look is at the kinds of official cover positions available to the hostile intelligence service: diplomats. In between would be individuals who. Such agents may have originally been real spies who upon being detected were “turned”. personal and operational details he provided led to the arrest of Ronal Pelton. armed forces. Defectors and Double Agents In the past.
with the result that. one might whish to launch a surprise attack on the enemy. As an example. these operations also enable counterintelligence officers to learn their adversaries´ operational methods. the enemy fully expects to be attacked. As a result surveillance can be concentrated on the actual intelligence officers. in which case the deception would be devoted to convincing him that no attack is on the way. during the 1950s and early 1960s. one can try to counter the adversary’s intelligence operations more ambitiously by targeting his intelligence analysis capability – that is. The reverse. Sometimes. by taking steps to mislead him. in a place. trade officials. In wartime. Counter-deception Experience shows that defeating every attempt an adversary might make at deception is very difficult. they allow the counterintelligence organization to penetrate the adversary’s cover mechanisms and identify officers of the hostile intelligence service engaged in running agents. while less attention need be paid to the other officials who really are the diplomats. need not be true. he is led to act in a way that advances one’s interests rather than his own. or economic situation he faces. In such a case. as in the case of the Normandy D-day landings. even as they were running Double-Cross. the Soviet Union engaged in deception operations to convince the United States that the USSR possessed larger offensive strategic nuclear forces than it actually did. however. and it is unlikely one could convince him otherwise. What is Deception? Deception is the attempt to mislead an adversary’s intelligence analysis concerning the political. Indeed. 51 . of course. or in a manner other than what is actually planned. Deception and intelligence failure are related concepts. having formed a false picture of the situation. the British were being similarly tricked by the Germans with respect to their intelligence and guerrilla-type operations in the Netherlands. For example.These types of double agent operations all serve the same counterintelligence purposes. At the simplest level. the deception tries to convince him that the attack is coming at a time. for example. and so on. The content of deception – the false view one wishes one’s adversary to adopt – obviously depends on the situation and on how one wishes one’s adversary to react. one side’s successful deception implies the other side’s intelligence failure. that they appear to be. In addition to identifying the hostile intelligence officers. Deception and Counter-deception As the treatment of double agent operations has indicated. military.
S. covert actions are often carried out in conjunction with other tools of statecraft or. may make one vulnerable to being deceived. These may consist of propaganda measures. military or economic conditions. For example. media placements. and paramilitary support. Covert action is an option short of military action to achieve objectives which diplomacy and other means of security policy alone cannot.be it to frustrate a terrorist action. One is particularly vulnerable to deception when one is dependent on a small number of channels of information and when the adversary is aware. at least in general terms.Covert Action Introduction Covert action is fundamentally different from intelligence collection and analysis. support to political or military factions within a specific country. in disruptive actions by law enforcement or the police. So. thus comprising activities to influence political. A limited policy tool. broadcasting. domestically. interests . organised crime or narcotics trafficking. by understanding the factors that facilitate deception. situations and developments abroad. one can at least be alert to the possibility of deception and recognize some warning signs.constitutes an important national security tool. 14. forgery and black propaganda. where it is intended that the role of the government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. covert action has included such activities as channeling funds to selected individuals. proliferation. 52 .In any case. movements or political parties. whose identities and orbits most likely will become known to those whom they are photographing. or actions to disrupt illicit activities that threaten the own national interests or security such as terrorism. of the nature of these channels and their mode of operation. a heavy dependence on photographic reconnaissance satellites. economic. Its actions seek to influence the political. intercept some technology or equipment that would help a rogue state or group build a nuclear device. or assist some group trying to overthrow a leadership whose actions threaten U. It is intelligence used as an instrument of foreign policy. Historically. the capability to undertake such tasks . covert political finance and media operations of all kinds. Covert Action tradecraft At the soft end of the covert action spectrum are agents of influence. understanding deception is the first step toward figuring out how to avoid being deceived. technical and logistical assistance to foreign governments to deal with problems within their countries. or military situation in a foreign country.
analysis. events. In the Second World War British covert action was under the separate Special Operations Executive. Some paramilitary operations such as the attempt to rescue the US embassy hostages from Iran came under straightforward military control.On the hard end are covert support for opposition groups. Covert Action usually involves only a small part of the Humint agencies. Soviet intelligence in the 1930’s and 1940’s ran a number of agents who worked for the U. independently of its government’s actions and often against its government’s wishes. In this instance. resistance forces. Among the most important of these was Harry Dexter White at the Department of the Treasury. Humint agencies with their secret skills and contacts tend to be natural organizers.an agent whose task is to influence directly government policy rather than to collect information. All governments need to do some things in peacetime that fall outside diplomatic and other official channels.S. The ultimate goal is to influence the government’s policy or to create the conditions for a change of government. Whether covert action is an inherent part of intelligence can be regarded as a matter of semantics. as in the successful western operation with Pakistani military intelligence tom supply military assistance to the Mujaheddin resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. or circumstances to further one’s interests. It does not have to be done by intelligence. Examples of Covert Action • Covert Support of a Friendly Government: ⇒ In many cases. • Influencing Perceptions of a Foreign Government: ⇒ The more common and characteristic covert action tries to influence perceptions so as to change foreign behaviour. insurgents and terrorists. covert action can be limited to such un-sensational activities as secretly assisting the allied nation with personal security for its leader or equipment for secure (encrypted) communications. 53 . In the mid-1980s the US Administration deliberately kept the Iran-Contra affair out of CIA to evade Congressional oversight. For example. or groups or sectors of it. US writers have argued that collection. covert action is carried out through a tacit alliance with individuals or groups with whom one shares common objectives ⇒ It is least difficult to do this when the ally in question is a friendly government. government. and covert propaganda under the Political Warfare Executive. counterintelligence and covert action are intelligence’s four major interrelated elements. not Intelligence as a whole. ⇒ This is done either by influencing the foreign government’s actions or by influencing the foreign society. and the active conduct of sabotage and other paramilitary operations. ⇒ Agents of Influence The simplest and most direct method of affecting a foreign government’s actions is to use an agent of influence .
In time. This resulted in as many as two hundred executions and the closing down of the communist Tudeh party which dealt a major blow to KGB operations and Soviet influence in Iran. In addition to supplying Soviet intelligence with Information and secrets. left lying around for its intelligence services to discover. who receives and executes precise orders and who would normally be compensated financially. ⇒ This is a more amorphous task. This sort of disinformation effort may be directed specifically against the target’s intelligence service rather than the government as a whole. is. which is a forged document that is passed privately to a foreign government but is not made available to the media. In this case. He may be contrasted with a controlled agent.that is. First. At the other end of the spectrum would be someone who is manipulated (for example. for example. Using categories devised by the intelligence and international departments of the former Soviet Union as a general guide. via aides or his social contacts) to act in a way that serves the foreign government’s interests but is unaware of this manipulation. and it is harder to measure what effect some of these techniques have in any given case. ⇒ Agents of Influence 54 . Another technique for propagating misinformation is called silent forgery. White rose to become assistant secretary of the Treasury. there is the trusted contact . someone who is willing to work with a foreign government to advance goals he shares with it but who is not receptive to detailed instruction and would typically not be paid. the department’s second-highest position. White acted as an agent of influence. ⇒ Use of Information and Disinformation Another method of influencing a government’s actions is by providing it with bits of information (or misinformation) designed to induce it to act in a desired manner. An example of this is the reported case in which the United States in 1983 passed to Ayatollah Khomeini specific information about Soviet agents and collaborators operating in Iran. instead of being given to the target. so to speak. deliberately misleading conversations may be held over telephone lines the target government’s intelligence is known to have tapped. one can distinguish the different kinds of agents of influence by measuring the degree and type of control exercised by the intelligence service. the misinformation. • Influencing Perceptions in a Foreign Society ⇒ The techniques discussed below are predominantly directed at influencing currents of thought within a foreign society rather than its government.
One of the most famous CIA activities of this sort was the publication in various non-U. A second reason for using black propaganda mechanisms is that for diplomatic reasons. implicitly approved it and sought to inflame anti-American opinion in Iran. a KGB major who defected to the United States in 1979. the target audience may be more disposed to believe the propaganda if its origin is disguised and the ulterior motive of the propagandist is not evident. a government may not wish to be associated with certain opinions it nevertheless wishes to propagate to a given audience. the National Voice of Iran. a government may wish not to be officially associated with the material contained in its propaganda. it may put certain opinions or facts into circulation in a manner that does not make their origin apparent. nations with active foreign policies usually have radio stations (such as the Voice of America.were journalists or involved with the press. or by means of media that appear to the public to be independent but that are in fact controlled by the government. 55 .Agents whose main task is to affect a foreign country’s public opinion. however. For example. For example.S. while its black radio station. the Soviet government took a diplomatically correct position by condemning the hostage-taking at the UN. There are two major reasons a government might resort to such unattributed or black propaganda: First. much as newspaper editorials express the views of the newspaper’s editor or publisher. and so forth) that openly express their views on international questions. Radio Moscow. newspapers of a CIA-supplied copy of Khruschev’s 1956 secret speech attacking Stalin’s cult of personality. information. or misinformation through the available media – that is by propaganda (as it is pejoratively called. has recounted several examples of the Soviet use of agents of influence to affect the Japanese media and politics. ⇒ Unattributed Propaganda One of the more direct ways of attempting to influence a society is by disseminating opinions.. Stanislav Levchenko. In these cases. At times. According to a former KGB officer. Another method of conducting propaganda in an unattributed fashion involves planting stories in independent news media or arranging for books to be written and published by authors and publishing houses that have no visible connections with the government or its intelligence agencies. France was an especially fertile ground for these types of activities: A majority of the most highly rated French agents in the mid-1970s…. during the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-81. This may be accomplished either by planting them in news media it does not own or control.
⇒ While this can be. 56 . civic groups. and media.⇒ Forgeries Another technique for putting material into circulation without taking any responsibility for it is the preparation and circulation of forged documents. As with those discussed above. and circumstances in foreign countries. Working in conjunction with the Catholic Church and American labor. government developed a program intended to help keep the labor organization and Poland’s democratic movement alive after Poland’s communist government declared martial law in December of 1981. the U. such as political parties. labour unions. ⇒ A more controversial U. events. or the text of the forgery – must be plausible to those whom one is attempting to influence. the content of the propaganda. there are also techniques that involve the supporting or use of violence. and Freedom Fighters: Support for political groups need not to be limited to the peaceful opponents of a foreign government but can be extended to groups that seek either to influence that government’s policy through violent means or to overthrow it. this technique serves the same general purpose: to influence a target audience’s perceptions so it will take desired actions.S. and sometimes is. ⇒ This was the case with American covert assistance to the independent Polish labor union Solidarity in the 1980s. in addition to these activities. since it is less likely to lead to politically damaging charges of foreign interference in the target country’s internal affairs. Wars of National Liberation. attributed or unattributed. covert aid may be more palatable to the recipient groups. The material used to do this – the arguments advanced by an agent of influence. ⇒ But. • Support for Friendly Political Forces ⇒ Another way of influencing events in foreign countries is the provision of material support to friendly political forces. This program was designed to provide opposition political parties and media with the financial resources to survive the country’s economic chaos and hostile regulatory action by the government. Among the kinds of support secretly provided Solidarity were money. done openly. which make up the vast majority of covert action operations. and clandestine communication equipment. ⇒ Support for Coups. printing presses. • Influencing Political Events by Violent Means ⇒ As we have seen so far many nonviolent techniques can be covertly employed to influence political behaviour.S. program was conducted in Chile following the inauguration of the Marxist Salvador Allende as president in 1970.
owned by the Greenpeace. Wet affairs. The two large. covert action can take the form of specific acts of violence. whether for collection of foreign intelligence. as well as its involvement with the political forces responsible for assassinating Patrice Lumumba of the Congo and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. at various times. either alone or in alliance with similar groups or indigenous forces. ⇒ Paramilitary At the borderline between real covert action and military action are cases in which a government uses irregular (or volunteer) forces in a military conflict. including Assassination Finally. by French intelligence agents. were. key political figures. or covert action.This could involve the support of an existing group or the creation of a puppet group to carry out these activities. For the U. creating and nurturing such capabilities ought to be a high priority of the intelligence community given the importance of targets that otherwise cannot be reached. in 1985. a regular element in Soviet intelligence operations. 57 . counterintelligence. covert actions undertaken by the United States during the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations (support for the guerrilla struggle against the Soviet-supported Afghan regime and support for the Contra resistance in Nicaragua) exemplify this type of covert action. will often require associating with individuals of unsavory reputations who in some instances may have committed crimes. a euphemism for assassination and sabotage. ⇒ Specific Acts of Destruction or Violence. Perhaps the most famous instance was the murder of Leon Trotsky in Mexico in 1940. Clandestine operations. basically overt. Maintaining and enhancing clandestine capabilities takes time and resources. part we could mention the numerous CIA’s attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. directed against individuals (such as the assassination of foreign government officials. Clandestine operations for whatever purpose currently are circumscribed by a number of legal and policy constraints. of the ship Rainbow Warrior.S. or terrorists) or property. One of the better-known covert actions involving violence against property was the blowing up.
• Marine Corps Intelligence.S. • Coast Guard (CG). Department of State (INR). • Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). • Navy Intelligence. • Department of Homeland Security (DHS).The U. • National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). Intelligence Community The Intelligence Community has been built around major agencies responsible for specific intelligence collection systems known as disciplines.15. The U. and human intelligence (HUMINT) — provide the most important information for analysts and absorb the bulk of the intelligence budget. • Bureau of Intelligence and Research. • Energy Department. • Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). • Treasury Department. 58 . Three major intelligence disciplines or INTs — signals intelligence (SIGINT). imagery intelligence (IMINT).S. • Air Force Intelligence. Intelligence Community consists of the following: • Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). • National Security Agency (NSA). • National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). • Army Intelligence.
borders. both to meet their own organizations' missions and to satisfy overall Community objectives. The CIA remains the keystone of the Intelligence Community. • functions of the FBI relate to counterterrorism and The former mission has grown enormously in importance since September 2001. The NGA focuses on geospatial intelligence processing — ranging from maps and charts to sophisticated computerized databases — necessary for targeting in an era dependent upon precision guided weapons. INR is strictly an analytical agency. The key intelligence counterintelligence. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is one of the smaller components of the Intelligence Community but is widely recognized for the high quality of its analysis. It has all-source analytical capabilities that cover the whole world outside U. Most importantly. the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). • The intelligence organizations of the four military services concentrate largely on concerns related to their specific missions. In addition to these three agencies. and the FBI has been reorganized in an attempt to ensure that intelligence functions are not subordinated to traditional law enforcement efforts. Three major intelligence agencies in DOD — the National Security Agency (NSA). shared information technology resources. undertakes covert actions at the direction of the President. builds and operates the nation's reconnaissance satellites. The CIA also collects intelligence with human sources and. intelligence offices or agencies are components of cabinet departments with other roles and missions. The NSA is responsible for signals intelligence and has collection sites throughout the world. many new analysts have been hired. on occasion. the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is responsible for defense attaches and for providing DOD with a variety of intelligence products. and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) — absorb the larger part of the national intelligence budget. Their analytical products.S. Each of the members of the IC works internally at the business of intelligence and each has its own area of expertise and responsibility. including electronic communication from desk to desk. law enforcement information is now expected to be forwarded to other intelligence agencies for use in all-source products. Except for the CIA.• Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). It produces a range of studies that cover virtually any topic of interest to national security policymakers. The NRO designs. and setterm task forces composed of personnel from multiple agencies. ad-hoc joint working meetings. along with those of 59 . This collaboration takes many forms. Personnel from the IC member organizations also collaborate together extensively.
⇒ Personnel from organizations across the IC staff these Centers. is changing rapidly in ways we cannot predict. security systems) that exhibit the characteristics described by Complexity Theory and are known as complex adaptive systems. and a long-term perspective. now part of DHS. by its nature. By and large. The Treasury Department collects and processes information that may affect U. creative thinking. Treasury also covers the terrorist financing issue.L. along with the FBI. In most cases they are physically located together in specially designated Center facilities. social. created to address specific non-traditional threats. supplement the work of CIA analysts and provide greater depth on key technical issues. It also has a robust counterintelligence effort. on a long-term basis. but also with an extended family of outside experts. 60 . The US national security community— and the Intelligence Community (IC) within it—is faced with the question of how to operate in a security environment that. and the long-term strategic environment. studies.S. The Homeland Security Act (P. economic. deals with information relating to maritime security and homeland defense. Coalitions of very senior expertise enable the group to address complex issues of broad scope such as regional security dynamics. This organization collaborates not only with professionals selected from IC member ranks. The National Centers ⇒ More permanent collaborative structures are the National Centers. fiscal and monetary policies. the global economy. and reports of national importance. All major restructurings are based on the assumption that we can take the recent past and predict the future. Such assumptions may have been reasonable in previous centuries. The Strategic Assessment Group at CIA is a case in point. the IC provides senior US policymakers broad vision. • The Energy Department analyzes foreign nuclear weapons programs as well as nuclear non-proliferation and energy-security issues. has focused on ensuring that state and local law enforcement officials receive information on terrorist threats from national-level intelligence agencies. Through external collaboration of this sort. foreign military strategy and innovation. The Coast Guard. 107-296) provided DHS responsibilities for fusing law enforcement and intelligence information relating to terrorist threats to the homeland. But the IC often reaches out to industry and academia for assistance on joint projects.DIA. but not in this one. together with substantive operational personnel. the IC has to deal with environmental systems (political. • The Office of Information Analysis in DHS participates in the inter-agency counterterrorism efforts and. All members of the IC work together in operations.
Now. In a system “left on automatic. emergence. The intelligence community has not been able to keep pace with the commercial sector in the Web 2. The community also is better at collecting information. that approach narrows collection in areas that are related to that topic. and the community now is better at coordinating collection than before. which was signed by President Ronald Reagan in late 1981. new methodologies have generated processes for challenging hypotheses. Analysis quality has improved. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 established the current intelligence structure. ⇒ Intelligence officers must receive more feedback from the national security environment. governs the community. ⇒ Intelligence managers must be more persuasive about strategic objectives. adaptability. conducting alternative analysis and red-teaming results. Broader collection benefits all users.0 revolution. ⇒ Intelligence officers must share much more information. In addition to increased sharing. The Intelligence Community: Rising up to the Challenge The IC must promote willing cooperation and collaboration across a community that has departmental responsibilities as its first priorities. The community has improved in many key areas. The intelligence community’s attempts to ride that wave are stymied by two challenges. A significant achievement was to attain an agreement on joint duty. relationships. using academic standards for training.” everyone wants to know about the same subject at the same time. and that is why it is taking a long time. non-Linearity.The six critical components of a complex adaptive system are: . 61 . However. Another effort entails bringing the entire community into the post-Cold-War era. feedback. This helps breed appreciation for other elements of the community and enhances engagement among intelligence organizations. This is a huge cultural change. including information sharing across boundaries.Self-organization. Complexity Theory tells us that we can only achieve this objective if several conditions exist: ⇒ Intelligence officers must be enabled to act more on their own. We must transform the Intelligence Community into a community that dynamically reinvents itself by continuously learning and adapting as the national security environment changes. ⇒ Intelligence officers must be more expert in tradecraft. Executive Order 12333. Updating this Cold War document is the goal of an interagency process to generate recommendations for its modernization. senior leaders in intelligence agencies must serve a tour of duty outside of their parent organizations.
These new realities all increase significantly our need for a larger. are small and physically dispersed. What we can do. but have tight. Virtually all the technical capabilities developed over the last several decades are now public knowledge. These people also will receive credit for joint duty under the new doctrine. values and experiences. convinced that they can do a better job and provide necessary services to a wider customer base. They are demanding and receiving the best tools possible. In stations like Baghdad. commitment. Satellite imagery is now commonly understood. almost family-like cohesion. broadly deployed. Today. Commercial interests. The scattered and episodic nature of today's threats. We must recruit in more places and against more targets. which will give them an advantage in rising through the ranks of the intelligence community. The same for protecting sources and sharing information. If the community becomes fully connected. interactive and integrated. Sources and methods must be protected in any type of collaborative environment. our needs are more disparate and numerous. But now. requires much more precise and constant monitoring. The increasingly multi-polar nature of international affairs and the ability of minor actors to have major impact place a premium on detailed understanding as well as actionable intelligence. and they must know both their sources and their customers. half of the intelligence community joined after 9/11. where the community must capture their lessons. Signals and communications intercept capabilities have been degraded by the digital and fiber optic revolution and the marked increase in commercially available and effective encryption. Traditionally. Terrorist groups. that will introduce a vulnerability and a set of counterintelligence concerns that must be addressed. and well supported clandestine service.One is security. However. is effectively in the public domain. the community would default to source protection. They will reach senior levels more quickly. and the underlying philosophy was need-to-know. Those young people will be returning to the United States. community analysts have a responsibility to provide information. enthusiasm. highly motivated and integrated across agency lines. They must be credited with many of the successes achieved in their assigned countries. Any organization with mature personnel tends to be resistant to rapid change. Both sides of this equation have now changed. US intelligence has relied upon our possession of advanced technology and our opponents' ignorance of our actual capabilities. two of our most important collection capabilities have been seriously affected. where they will apply their new approaches to the cultural change underway. and how we do it. Already. have increasingly challenged the government's traditional dominance of imagery. many of the people there are young. The other challenge is cultural. 62 . in particular. Kabul and Islamabad.
chemical. Potential applications include labs on a chip to provide long-term detection of biological. commercial. The second is the bureaucratic and organizational dimension: 63 . • 2. and others. and miniature cameras for real-time video used in precision targeting. The first is a policy dimension: • • Success here is measured in the Intelligence Community’s ability to support policy and avoid surprise. 16.The public availability of secure communications means that security is now affordable and accessible to terrorists. intelligence could optimize resources to meet these priorities. atomic. identify the function of underground facilities. off-the-shelf tools. and other signatures. ⇒ Nanotechnology offers new ways to get closer to targets. or other weapons of mass destruction. for example. Properly used. or nuclear weapons. Undetected penetration of a terrorist camp. nor a handy set of measures of effectiveness. organized criminals. but even greater danger if developed and used by others: ⇒ Parallel processing and quantum computing have tremendous implications for cryptography. there are neither lists of policies and priorities. real-time translation. biological.Measuring Intelligence Results Three dimensions can be used for measuring success: 1. With a list of policy priorities. however. as the rest of the world gains greater access to technology through advanced. Three technologies offer potentially high rewards for intelligence. and transcription of intercepted communications. Our ability to maintain advantages in intelligence collection systems will diminish. and then determine whether or not those objectives could have been achieved. Unfortunately. and find chemical. radiological. enables both collection and attack. it may be possible to look through camouflage. ⇒ Maxwell's Rainbow — referring to the spectrum beyond the visual and electromagnetic bands — provides thermal.
Again. was Clinton policy successful on the WMD issue? Was it possible for analysts in the Bush administration to conclude that a Democratic administration had managed to cobble together policies that curtailed Iraq’s WMD programs? Could that type of analysis be accepted in current policy circles? • Metrics can be developed for operational and tactical intelligence. For example. A theory that predicts nine of ten events is a very good theory. however. will books get cooked to provide measures of effectiveness to justify current or increased budget requests? • • 3. Intelligence Community be too effective? Does the American public really want a highly effective Intelligence Community? Politicization will become an issue. what happens to the budget of an organization? Will more funds be appropriated for success or will achievement result in reduced budgets? Moreover. The main issue here is that if success can be measured and found. The third is a political dimension.S. some candidates might be: • Customer satisfaction — was intelligence timely and/or was the level of detail adequate? • What was the impact of intelligence? Did it lead to significant changes in or re-evaluation of policy? • How well is the information flowing through the system? 64 . were targets identified by military planners the right ones? Were they hit and destroyed? Beyond that. measuring success is difficult. For those who believe that metrics have some utility in evaluating intelligence. Imagine trying to establish metrics for academia! Theories are critical for metrics because intelligence failures are a result of failed theories. have an oversight that can address accountability and effectiveness? What would be the political backlash that might result from out of control spies? Can the U. But the one failure may be significant.S.• Setting government priorities produces some winners and some losers. related to accountability and effectiveness: • • • • • • Does the U. if funding changes based on success.
but one that did not go far enough. Professionals in the counterterrorist community who work in different buildings. A connected community will be one that knows immediately where to find the specialized bit of expertise or the arcane fact that makes the difference in a piece of analysis or in a clandestine collection program. 3) Individual initiative reigns supreme. One indicator is the development of strong ties between intelligence community entities working on counterterrorism issues. Its mission was almost solely intended to augment the collection of human source intelligence — not to deepen expertise and produce breakthroughs in intellectual capital that might enable us to outwit the adversary. capitalization. 1) Progress Improving Connectivity The successful intelligence enterprise. will be networked and agile. three broad metrics should suggest progress: 1) Connectivity is well established. The mid-1980s creation of the Counterterrorist Center as the critical first innovation in the fight against terrorism was an improvement. and different agencies and on different local computer networks will have the ability to create their own collaborative ties. In the medium term. 65 . 2) Multidisciplinary analysis is diverse and prospering. different cities. Any metric the intelligence community employs to gauge progress — and it must use metrics — needs to make room for intelligent risk taking. The intelligence community needs a more risk-taking and failure-tolerant management approach. In fact. like its adversary. An adversary intent on surprising us will be comfortable with long lulls in its fight against the United States. the Northern Alliance. competition.• What level of access does the IC have to policymakers and are they listening (a credibility measurement)? • Has risk been reduced for decisionmakers? Metrics: How will we know we’re headed in the right direction? The United States must resist the temptation to interpret certain tactical victories. especially those enabled by a convenient but perhaps unique ally like. and consolidation. management. the keys to any successful business community revolution are experimentation. as evidence that it has solved the problem.
games. The output would be reports and briefings based on research. it is riddled with layers of management designed to provide redundancy in an effort to avoid mistakes. the more creative approaches to analysis will be well staffed. clever approaches must produce both actionable products and new intellectual capital. If developments are moving along the right track. which would be shared within the community at large. Senior intelligence community leaders need to engage in creative delegation and promote initiative and creative thinking (including the so-called out of the box thinking) by the workforce. Although there has been an effort to streamline the review process in recent years. and they will take time to establish and capitalize intellectually. Eventually. and institutionalized within the counterterrorism community. Another reason to empower individuals is the efficiency gains produced by reducing layers of supervision. there remain abundant economies to be realized by placing the individual analyst closer to the decisionmakers who are the end users of the product and relying on individual accountability to ensure quality. No approach would remain untested for its applicability to the counterterrorism problem. 2) Strengthening Multidisciplinary Analysis Multidisciplinary analytic approaches to counterterrorism are new. conferences. Intelligence community senior leaders are accustomed to being the authors of new initiatives rather than their enablers. reasonably funded. red teams. The tendency to confine risk taking to the top and to constrain individual initiative because it might lead to a mistake is one of the things that must change if the fight against terrorism is to succeed.One critical step is integrating the Office of Homeland Security into the intelligence community’s information networks. The intelligence community is not only stovepiped. Emphasis on the individual would represent a sharp break with the past. Perhaps the most telling measure of the health of the intelligence analysis function will be how the transition from the current war to the longer-term fight is handled and whether analysts are given the chance to take the time to dig deep and think creatively. it is driven largely by individual initiative rather than commanded entirely from the top. If all goes well. managers of counterterrorism analysis will make room for research and teamwork under the press of daily deadlines. workshops. like its adversary. the terrorist network. advanced data processing. 66 . advanced analytic software. and collaboration across agencies and institutions — not to mention the improved collection of raw intelligence that all of this may help to make possible. 3) Fostering Individual Initiative The successful intelligence enterprise can be sufficiently agile if.
this is perhaps the most common reason for failure. although some discussions talk about a related error. Examples include the long Cold War period in which the U. but have never been sufficiently investigated. and isolation of intelligence providers and consumers. 6. can lead to the continuation of error for a long time. 3. Subordination of Intelligence to Policy -.this occurs when intelligence or political leadership seems unwilling to be receptive to warnings. Overestimation -.S.S. Underestimation -. insufficient use of outside sources. consistently overestimated the missile gap between the U. Unavailability of Information -. Received Opinion -. A classic example is Stalin in 1941.the lack of a centralized fusion office often creates this problem. 67 . or completely misread the enemy's intentions. 5.this happens when judgments are made to produce results that superiors want to hear instead of what the evidence indicates.17.Reasons for Intelligence Failure After looking at a series of apparent analytic failures to foresee events such as the Aum Shinrikyo nerve gas attack in 1995.this is also called conventional wisdom and consists of assertions and opinions that are generally regarded in a favorable light. or the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000. Bruce Berkowitz concluded that the intelligence analytical community showed organizational rigidity. and Soviet Union.regulations and bureaucratic jealousies are sometimes the cause of this. Lack of communication -. North Korea’ s ballistic missile test in 1999. 4. Critics of the Iraq War say this was the main kind of error that happened in estimating Saddam Hussein's capabilities. poor planning. who didn't want to hear about the possibility of Hitler invading Russia. even thought the British and Americans tried to tip him off. but it more typically results from when you have different officials from different agencies with different rules. and different procedures on who and how they communicate. bias. if uncorrected. It is the most widely discussed and analyzed type of intelligence failure. and one which. 2. different security clearances. Ten Reasons for Intelligence Failure: 1. but the most common problem involves restrictions on the circulation of sensitive information.
7.this occurs when one side is so confident of its ability that it projects its reasoning onto the other side and believes that since it would not do something itself.this happens when you know the enemy might do something. The world is now confronted with a host of border-spanning trends that challenge our traditional intelligence and law enforcement practices: • • • International organized crime. 10. though you are not sure what or when. and is perhaps the main cause behind how the 9/11 attacks caught American officials by surprise.this occurs when the connections between bits of intelligence are not put together to make a coherent whole. Narcotics trafficking. 18.The New Threats The following developments dramatically enhanced the number and diversity of risks.Sometimes the people in a bureaucracy are forced to make best guesses on the basis of limited information. and yet you do nothing anyway.this is technically defined as the judging of unfamiliar situations on the basis of familiar ones. neither will the other side. It is also the problem of having too many area specialists. Accelerating technological innovation. 8. Failure to connect the dots -. Illicit sales of weapons — WMD as well as conventional —. Over-confidence -. The classic case is the Yom Kippur war of October 1973. Mirror-Imaging -. but most often involves assessing a threat by analogy to what you (your government or a similar government) would do in a similar position. Complacency -. 9. It is most easily observed in hindsight. Vulnerability of modern states. The classic example is the British who did nothing in the weeks leading up to the Falkland War of 1982. dangers and threats: • • • • Globalisation. Growing interdependence. 68 .
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and transnational organised crime (TOC) that have become the pre-eminent security challenges confronting the world and the new intelligence priorities. The New Threats The threats of “yesterday” were predominantly of the symmetric type: • • • • Static. have the most to gain from globalization.• • • The spread of disease. and between the strategic. The more diffuse and unpredictable the situation and the threat perception. Homogeneous. More than ever before intelligence is the pre-requisite for all measures that aim at the effective prevention. operational or tactical levels of risks and dangers. Predictable. The more the international order is threatened by asymmetric warfare of Islamist terror networks. This requires a paradigm shift in national security strategy that not only entails a whole of government approach and multilateral engagement. pre-empted and prevented when the operations of all security sector organisations that are mandated to deal with them are intelligence-driven or intelligence-led. the more the threat perception will become multifaceted and chaotic if more actors can acquire WMD. geographic reach and profitability. Internet-driven jihadist and other militant forms of radicalization. with it. These developments not only diminish the predictability of risks and dangers. Growth and spread of TOC increase the risks of proliferation of WMD and. 69 . This is particularly true for the unholy trinity of transnational terrorism. interaction and information exchange by these organisations with the agencies of the intelligence community. the more difficult it will become to clearly distinguish between external and internal. These threats can only be effectively counteracted. civilian and military threats to a country. Hierarchical. The geo-political implications of climate change. disruption and suppression of these threats. But countering the preeminent threats from multiplying non-state actors that operate clandestinely requires more than just intelligence services. disrupted. but a radical new approach with more intensive collaboration. TOC is growing in volume. in many ways. men and materials around the globe. and is well positioned for further growth because it does. of catastrophic transnational terrorism as proliferants and terrorists collude ever more symbiotically with TOC groups to move money.
Old concepts of threat analysis have to be supplemented by risk analysis and vulnerability analysis. Threats are measured in terms of the likelihood and severity of the consequences. But for the government officials chasing them. frontiers create opportunities and convenient shields. proliferants and criminals. governments are systematically losing – everywhere. borders still too often represent obstacles. which served states relatively well in terms of ensuring national security against predictable state adversaries no longer works. but at the same time weakened the agencies in charge of fighting them.• Rigid and resistant to change. and reconfiguring power in international politics and economics. it is also no longer adequate against the threats posed by the growing number of less predictable. Less predictable. proliferants and TOC thrive on international mobility and their ability to take advantage of the opportunities that flow from sanctuaries and separate marketplaces into sovereign states with borders. 70 . Fluid. The networks of transnational terrorists. The changes in the last decade of the 20th century not only empowered terrorists. The new threats are more of the asymmetric type: • • • • • • Dynamic. For terrorists. Risk avoidance is no longer financially affordable. creating new players. Self-organising. Constantly adapting and evolving. Networked. This means that resources for ensuring national security are now allocated on the basis of threats or risks and national vulnerabilities. while risk is accepted as equalling threat divided by vulnerability. more evasive and clandestinely operating non-state actors. Because of this asymmetry in the global clash between governments. transnational terrorists. The old strategic approach of risk avoidance. proliferators and TOC. The privileges of national sovereignty are turning into burdens and constraints on governments. upending the rules. The activities of the unholy trinity of the new threats are transforming the international system. proliferators and TOC.
drains national assets and inhibits the development of stable societies. the commodities and securities markets as well as cyberspace. and not to WMD as a whole. It is a process in which a new type of weaponry is introduced into an area where it was previously not available. pornography. sex exploitation. and the peace dividend that has enabled the rapid drawdown of military and security forces. coercion. What makes it more dangerous than other criminality is its highly organised or entrepreneurial method in the following widely varying activities: ⇒ Corruption. robbery. For TOC. international law has been used with respect to the specific categories within WMD. piracy. Proliferation of WMD Proliferation refers to the diffusion of weaponry and technology. TOC disrupts free markets. TOC undermines civil society. Some years ago radiological weapons have been added. political independence. biological and chemical weapons. theft. intimidation. intelligence. this influx of professional security. irrespective of particular characteristics. the environment. TOC hinders the progress of. drug trafficking. political systems and the sovereignty of states by normalizing violence. Instead. When it escalates. arms trafficking. as well as human and global security are all threatened. The term WMD is customarily used to embrace all nuclear. TOC poses strategic threats that can affect or destabilise strategically important states. There is no treaty or customary international law that contains an authoritative definition of WMD. 71 . counterfeiting. The most dangerous is the proliferation of WMD. kidnapping. and foreign investments in. bribery. economic development. economies in transition and developing countries. the rule of law and human rights. TOC undermines the integrity of the banking and financial systems. TOC poses a threat to all nations and is a fundamental threat to democracy. and so on. smuggling. It degrades environmental systems through the evasion of environmental safeguards and regulations. labour racketeering. police and military know-how has meant a quantum jump in sophistication. has driven many former members of security and intelligence services and of specialists in the armed forces into the TOC business. The decline in totalitarian states. graft.Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) is the most organised. potency and possible application. illicit telemarketing. and by introducing a corruptive cancer into political structures. It burdens societies with the enormous social and economic costs of illegal drugs.
radiological or fissile materials and means of delivery adds a new critical dimension to this threat. 72 . either directly from state to state. weapons and missile programmes. in view of their tremendous destructive potential. a number of states and non-state actors have sought or are seeking to develop such weapons. the major concern was the movement of material and expertise from Russia’s cooperation in the development of Iran’s nuclear. from state to non-state actor. chemical and biological weapons. A related concern is that a state might decide to share its biological weapon capabilities with non-state actors. such as their potential to provide cover for the illegal development or maintenance of biological weapons-related expertise. aflatoxin and botulinum toxin. though not all countries have signed and ratified them. The development and use of WMD is governed by international conventions and treaties. are in a class all to themselves. Until recently.But there are important differences among these weapons. and China’s sale of missiles to Pakistan and Iran. the most immediate concerns are North Korea’s sales and Iranian delivery of missiles and related technology.35 the ‘father’ of the Pakistani nuclear bomb. While the international treaty regimes and export controls arrangements have slowed down the spread of WMD and delivery systems. since nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon designs and related technology can spread from one country to another. or through clandestine or criminal supplier networks – such as the notorious activities of Abdul Qader Khan. apart from Russia. Concern also arises from the possible misuse or negative impact of biodefense programmes. and the governments of powers known to sell missiles and related materials. Opportunities for mass-casualty terrorist attacks using chemical. Inspectors from UNSCOM uncovered sufficient evidence of a covert bio-weapon programme to compel Iraq to admit that it had produced and weaponised biological agents – anthrax. from non-state actor to state. So much so that lumping together all of these weapons in one category of WMD is misleading. the activities of shipping companies that might be transporting weapons parts or fissionable materials. However. The risk that terrorists will acquire nuclear. biological or nuclear weapons will increase as technology diffuses and weapons programmes expand. US intelligence assessments have highlighted biological weapons proliferation concerns about such nations as North Korea and Syria. The proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery such as ballistic missiles constitute a threat to international peace and security and a growing danger to all states. who was at the centre of two illicit supplier networks Other concerns challenging the intelligence services are the buyers of uranium ore. Iraq is the only other country confirmed in recent years to have had an offensive biological weapons programme. Today.
London and other recent attacks. Hundreds of plutonium. and in some cases the lack of control over the circulation. religious extremism is converging with three other factors: 73 . This reflects a shift in the goals of the new terrorists from trying to make a political statement through violence to maximising damage to the target as an end in itself. So far. While nuclear waste is a less likely proliferation option for weapon source material. often with few traits in common. Because such groups perceive violence to be part of an all-encompassing struggle between good and evil. Previously. A few countries have pursued the development of radiological military weapons. nutritive media. Of all the terrorist groups. dual-use equipment. has become more international and global in reach. more ideological and more strategic in its objectives. Madrid. religiously motivated ones are the most likely to resort to mass-destructive terrorism. Now we face a terrorist threat quite different from anything experienced in the past. and technological information. Chechen militants are the only known group that has attempted to use a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD). and many are so different from those of the past and from each other that the term terrorism no longer fits some of them. With the advent of 4th generation terrorism we witnessed with 9/11. the release of prisoners or political concessions. There are an estimated 10 million radioactive sources in existence around the world. terrorism operated within limits and usually had easily identifiable ends: territory. In all too many cases they are not used frequently. But in practice. terrorism began to outgrow its former national and regional dimensions. potential radiological weapons materials exist in hundreds of thousands of locations worldwide.Yet another risk of biological weapons proliferation is occasioned by the prevalence. Transnational Terrorism There is not just one form of terrorism but many. the Bali. Continued terrorist acts have compelled individual states to develop their own definitions for the purpose of enacting legislation to counter the terrorist threat. the aim is to maximise the number of casualties. There are more varieties today than existed some 30 years ago. resulting in the risk that attention to their security will diminish over time. Since the beginning of 1990s. americium and other radioactive sources are stored in dangerously large quantities in university laboratories and other facilities. the attempts have neither amounted to an internationally recognised classification nor to a coherent legal definition. The politically charged term of terrorism has been used to describe a variety of acts and methods of violence. only to abandon these efforts in favour of more practical and effective weapons. trade and transfer of components for acquiring these weapons – strains of causative agents of dangerous infectious diseases.
⇒ The deliberate quest to acquire or develop WMD. Transnational terrorism has manifold dimensions: security. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) containing a chemical agent can be detonated. This is also the desire of various other terrorist groups. Mass-transit rail and subway systems in major cities remain vulnerable to Madrid style attacks with chemical weapons. ⇒ A perception that the only ‘audience’ of worth is that of a deity – with the result that jihadist groups. lack the moderating influence of an external ‘audience’ or constituency. ⇒ A willingness to accept martyrdom. this can change dramatically if transnational terrorists obtain and use WMD. dispersing toxic chemicals causing mass casualties. Cyberterrorism The advent of the computer age has opened up possibilities of yet another kind of massdisruption: information. spent nuclear fuel or attack nuclear materials in transit. What they want is to destroy the way of life and the social fabric of the target society. political. and they will not compromise over their goals. It signals a new era of conflict. and have demonstrated the will to carry out attacks with WMD. environmental and others that can affect the future of the planet. the new terrorists are not interested in extracting concessions from victims or negotiating with governments. provoking a nuclear incident. Also.or cyberterrorism. terrorists may find it easier to gain access to radioactive materials in order to build a dirty bomb. successfully causing a large release of radiation through a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant requires knowledge of the plant’s physical design and layout. It deliberately targets the non-combatant civilian population. However. Senior Al Qaeda members have threatened to use. A further danger remains: terrorists could attack nuclear facilities. icons and other symbols associated with the state. But it is a type which. The new terrorism in its various forms wants to convince a target population and its leadership that the stakes of a conflict are not worth the current and potential future costs. Today. calling for high standards of physical protection. or use hazardous radioactive materials. transnational terrorism is being perpetrated in the name of an extremist Muslim cause. in particular. which is a serious problem. Limitless in the scale of their ambitions. in a future world order. are more detached from ‘moral norms’ and other social constraints. and more difficult to deter. economic. Thus. could be applied by others. thus are less constrained in using WMD. Generally. the ruling government’s power base or the critical national infrastructure. cyberterrorism is a result of the convergence of technology and terrorism. While the numbers of lives lost due to terrorist acts in the recent past have been small by comparison to the lives lost from other causes. and consists of two mutually dependent elements: 74 . security measures and weaknesses.
Computers seized from Al Qaeda indicate that its members are becoming more familiar with hacker tools and services that are available over the Internet. 19. A terrorist cyberattack could actually prove more damaging because it could involve disruptive technology that might generate unpredictable consequences that give terrorists unexpected advantages. intent.The New Intelligence Paradigm The opportunity now exists to tap into a vastly larger amount of expertise than was previously available to US intelligence. or the political motivations of an attacker. this will require working from a very different paradigm from that which characterized much of our Cold War history. from almost any point on earth by very few terrorists. However. cybercrime and cyberterrorism. the armed forces and the critical national infrastructures of a country.(1) It refers to attacks against computers. What makes cyberterrorism different is the ease with which an immense amount of damage can be inflicted on IT systems of government. networks and the information stored within them. or at least causes enough harm to generate fear. achieve strategic goals. for the purpose of intimidating or influencing a government or society to further political or social objectives. Cybercrime and cyberattack services are now available for hire from TOC groups are a growing threat to national security as well as to the economy. labelling a cyberattack as cybercrime or cyberterrorism is problematic because of the difficulty in determining with any certainty the identity. cyberterrorists would probably need to attack multiple targets simultaneously for longer periods of time to gradually create terror. However. Hence. It is more likely that any severe cyberattacks that take place in the near future will be used by terrorist groups to simply supplement the more traditional physical terrorist attacks. at low personal risk and costs. (2) The attack results in violence against persons or property. Progress in computer networking technology has blurred the boundaries between cyberwarfare. or to have any noticeable effects. 75 .
This new collaborative paradigm is more than simply an open source collection model. and other insights. business. will focus on “open source” information and reach out to a wide variety of experts who are non-intelligence professionals drawn from different sectors and often non-Americans. Classified channels of information flows. • • The new paradigm. it surely can complement it and build knowledge that can be used by those still working largely within the traditional secretsdriven paradigm. the collaborative model is scanning for interesting interconnections among issues. While the traditional paradigm would focus on specific hard targets for specific facts (also known as plans. which in the traditional paradigm would be considered irrelevant or too unconventional to be of use. in contrast. A focus on a few hard targets (e. their military forces and technologies and other observables).The New Paradigm: Collaborative Intelligence The key features of the traditional paradigm were: • • • Secrets. anomalies from what experts might normally expect to see. the objective is to scan the horizon for emergent issues and so-called weak signals that are harbingers of futures for which few governments have begun preparing. Indeed.. Very limited contact with outside experts who were almost always US citizens. As the 21st century is expected to be far less predictable and dynamic. While it cannot begin to replace the old model. and other private sectors with government expertise. intentions and capabilities).g. 76 . the Soviet Union. Focus on key facts and finished intelligence products. other so-called “denied area” Communist Bloc countries. it is an approach that attempts to synthesize knowledge found in various academic.
comprehension. or misconceptions. The traditional intelligence systems have displayed.The world has changed and with it the meaning and content of security. Is there a revolution in intelligence affairs? So far the answer is no. in intelligence that must be put in question and perhaps overturned: This diagnosis leads to three propositions: 1. when circumstances will make drastic changes in the concepts and conduct of intelligence unavoidable. an inability to deliver in terms of warning. Part of the problem — the fact that intelligence systems as we know them are based on WWII and the Cold War — is very difficult to do anything about. Abolish the intelligence cycle as the fundamental model for thinking about intelligence and constructing intelligence systems. are part of a string of similar. known and unknown. symptoms of an existing and possibly growing intelligence crisis. and management support. after the cold war. Still more basic. however. rather. However. The tsunami disaster in 2004 and the September 11 attacks are not isolated events but. there is a crisis. are the dominating concepts. something that could be described as an approaching revolutionary situation. We have become vulnerable in new and often unforeseen ways. 77 .
are simply wrong: • First. but rather a master to be served. intelligence could learn a lot from other fields of enquiry in society. ⇒ This assumption is important because it implies that the most important information about our adversaries is secret and must be stolen.2. a prototype of the Nazi’s famous encryption device. if the Japanese had been collecting open source information during WWII. ⇒ Business is ahead of government in understanding the importance of using theory to improve intelligence and thus enhance profits. intelligence theory done by academics can provide important insights about the strength and weaknesses of intelligence systems. ⇒ For example. This is wrongheaded. ⇒ The implication here is that the decision-maker is not part of the process. which are regarded as more mundane and thus less critical to the enterprise. A number of key assumptions. the Enigma machine. 78 . 3. intelligence is a service. After all. was first exhibited at an open trade show in Germany. academics cannot help. • Third. ⇒ Assuming that good intelligence involves information collected principally through secret means renders the United States particularly vulnerable to manipulation and deception. • Second. ⇒ As another example. ⇒ Focusing on clandestine collection diminishes the perceived value of technologies related to processing and exploitation. the “better” and thus the weightier it is assumed to be. widely accepted as conventional wisdom among intelligence reformers. does not necessarily correlate with the quality of the product. They may not be securing information about their greatest assets and vulnerabilities. The more secret some piece of information is. In this regard. ⇒ Actually. what is harder to get must have been more “hidden” by the adversary and thus more crucial to understanding the threat. ⇒ In fact. a key determinant of classification. The prime task of qualified national and international intelligence bodies should be defined not in terms of production but rather of innovation. The sensitivity of the collection method. Analysis and collection are not two different activities but two names for the same search for knowledge. intelligence necessarily involves secrecy. that may give them too much credit. ⇒ There is also an analytical bias toward intelligence that comes with higher classification. they would have learned from American newspapers that their code was broken before Midway and changed their encryption methods.
translation of foreign language. and the intellectualism associated with analysis. bureaucracy should be recognized as crucial to intelligence accountability in the United States. which has been criticized for groupthink. recognizing that cognitive biases exist in any human appreciation of events — including their own. useful intelligence will be somewhat subjective. ⇒ The process is best understood as a matter of adjustment in perceptions and a deepening of knowledge among all those involved. To this extent. striving for relevance. ⇒ The notion that intelligence holds “the truth” (and policymakers do not) undermines the process of intelligence support. provide feedback on where intelligence is helping and where it needs improvement. that intelligence analysts. 79 . also they must be educated to their role in the intelligence process and assume their share of responsibility for both its successes and failures. ⇒ Instead of thinking that they speak truth to power. should seek to encourage diversity and a cross-agency appreciation of that diversity — not to shed it or deny its worth. even as managers seek to streamline and make it more efficient. ⇒ Recruiting for and reinforcing the qualities that contribute to these different skills reinforces those cultures. bureaucracy and bureaucratic culture are bad. few intelligence professionals believe case officers should act and think like intelligence analysts. intelligence analysts should help policymakers improve their understanding of reality. • Fourth. should refrain from examining past assumptions. the mathematics of encryption. ⇒ At the same time. decisionmakers must play a role in identifying critical policy decisions that require intelligence support. ⇒ Intelligence bureaucracies reasonably adopt cultures that reflect their businesses — espionage operations. ⇒ The Intelligence Community.⇒ In fact. ⇒ This does not mean. however. ⇒ In fact. ⇒ They should simply retain a degree of humility with respect to ownership of truth. inform collectors of the pace of policy and requirements for timeliness. ⇒ Policy decisions by their very nature exclude some options and thus involve narrowing the set of helpful and relevant information for the next decision.
and what is different and novel about the challenge at hand should be considered. and tied to the existence of failed states and the battle for the soul of Islam. Important Questions to be asked: • • • Has the U. Metrics will be needed for measuring progress in the effort. Building an agile intelligence capability will require: • • • That internal communications improve. For example.S. terrorists are seeking out “softer” targets that provide opportunities for mass casualties. as we have increased security around government and military facilities. The likelihood is that terrorist threats against the United States will be here for a generation or more. structures that connect the intelligence community to the best and the brightest outside the world of intelligence. and it is almost impossible to unearth all of them. Rather. intelligence community yet imagined the full range of models of weapons development that the adversary may employ? Is it sensitive to the right signals of the alternative development paths as they may appear in raw intelligence reporting over the next several years? Does this analytic challenge — and others that demand similarly unconventional imagination — reside only on the drawing board of the intelligence community. That a genuine multidisciplinary analytic effort blossom and achieve a creative flair that is not typical of bureaucratic enterprises. They should include measures of improved communication within the intelligence community. which has been in gradual decline for two decades.Building an agile intelligence community The intelligence community must at last dispense with the internal barriers that stifle communications and collaboration. That challenge is considerable. selfgenerating. and it took him two decades to achieve his present notoriety. Osama bin Laden founded the structure that became al-Qaeda during the Afghan war against the Soviets. That robust and perhaps formal alliances with external centers of expertise be constructed. and if so why? 80 . and indicators of true analytic innovation. Terrorists are also becoming more operationally adept and more technically sophisticated in order to defeat counterterrorism measures. What we are seeing is not the more familiar state-supported terrorism. the terrorism we face is decentralized. The devil is partly in the details: it is impossible to pre-empt a threat without knowledge of the specific plot or plots.
⇒ The intelligence community’s electronic connectivity in addressing the non-statesponsored terrorist threat is ironically held hostage to counterintelligence concerns that emanate from threats from state actors — who. highly adaptable. but it will also remain insufficient against an adversary that is a dynamic. by interesting contrast. of course. we need to counter the adaptable adversary with our own adaptation. In addition to gathering even more raw intelligence. or has the responsibility for designing. The intelligence community will win small battles against terrorism. ⇒ Stovepipes have persisted for years and prevent many of the people working against terrorist targets from effectively communicating with each other. Hierarchies are handicapped when confronted by flexible. At times. but the tradeoff between protecting security and promoting collegiality certainly bears recalibration. ⇒ It is no coincidence that most multidisciplinary intelligence analysts and collectors function in largely separate electronic compartments. cannot be jettisoned entirely.S. ensure that al-Qaeda and its follow-on movements will demand innovations in U. apparently sees the value in making unprecedented investments in getting connected (connectivity). intelligence. ⇒ The need to know principle. the stovepipes even prevent organizations from becoming aware of each other’s existence. The collection of raw intelligence will remain critical. unlike al-Qaeda. have ample budgets to staff their own intelligence apparatus and target it against Washington. but it is still at risk of losing far larger ones. Breaking Down Barriers ⇒ The U. 81 . intelligence community remains handicapped by internal barriers and walls meant to protect intelligence sources and methods — at a time the outside world. future operations against our interests.The Need for New Approaches to Intelligence The magnitude of the threat and the fact that the new terrorist groups bear little resemblance to either conventional armies or state sponsored terrorist organizations. Changes in the intelligence craft must go beyond redrawing the intelligence organizational chart and redesigning its chain of command.S. ⇒ U. No central authority within the network of terrorist organizations can control. and networked enemies.S. they should not be forced to deal with a maze of bureaucratic and security-derived obstacles. intelligence components working against terrorist targets need the ability to share data and analyses spontaneously (as academic experts do when communicating routinely over the Internet). evolving force.
perhaps replicating. there is considerable room for more creative approaches. can have a monopoly on expertise — especially on a subject as complex as the Islamic Reformation. thus capitalizing on expertise in politics. ⇒ The intelligence community needs an analytic effort that carries great prestige rather than one subordinated to supporting operational planning and covert action. intelligence must integrate operational intelligence (intelligence that supports operational planning and covert action). In recent years the intelligence community has improved analysts’ access to all of the resources made available by the information revolution. These approaches include assembling red teams whose purpose is to simulate adversary strategy and doctrine. ⇒ Good academics invest considerable energy in finding out about the research efforts of their colleagues in other institutions. some of those prospective relationships even deserve to be formal.S. academics. ⇒ The intelligence community needs and deserves an unparalleled center of excellence on the roots and substance of terrorism — one that makes the time to do its own research while routinely exchanging insights with a well-developed network of allies on the outside. ⇒ It is safe to say that intelligence community data systems are unparalleled. to the extent feasible. ⇒ The people fighting terrorism need to break down barriers to their ability to form alliances with external centers of expertise. No organization.⇒ The current stovepipe approach — which erects barriers to lateral collaboration by restricting communications and rewarding only bureaucratic loyalty within the organization — makes it possible for unrelated intelligence components in different institutions to do essentially the same work against terrorist targets — wasting resources and preventing many professionals from leveraging the efforts of counterparts who remain outside their immediate circle. ⇒ In the course of bolstering analysis. and culture. Bolstering In-House Analysis ⇒ U. ⇒ Creative alliances with think tanks. demographics. intelligence community professionals would reap dividends from similar efforts that at least match those of their academic counterparts. Some elements of the analytic community have created outreach programs to get beyond the walls protecting classified data. economics. Intelligence community business practices should promote rather than impede informal and mutually beneficial contact between the analyst and the business community. institutionalized partnerships. not even one large and deep. ⇒ But more needs to be done to create connections with substantive experts who do not yet have all the security clearances. with true multidisciplinary expertise. With the stakes as high as they are. the decentralized nature of the threat. and other centers of expertise should be a force multiplier. 82 .
imagery. thus better focusing human source intelligence. ⇒ Other measures are targeted at institutionalizing alliances between experts in and outside the intelligence community and at fostering creative analytic approaches. Denial and deception analysis is a relatively new element in the intelligence tool kit and refers to measures to counteract the efforts of U. Their strategy may depend on how much the terrorists have learned from the strikes against the United States and the war in Afghanistan.S. spontaneous organization of social networks that we observe in the formation of political movements and in the world of terrorism. The intelligence community should continue to counter denial and deception efforts by terrorist networks. ⇒ As agent-based modelling shows. ⇒ Still other steps are meant to sharpen the collection of raw intelligence by taking advantage of deeper analytic expertise.⇒ The intelligence community should be practiced at exploring adversary strategy. intelligence by generating data that point in the wrong direction. and other intelligence collection systems. ⇒ The intelligence community should prod DoD to create new warfare models that go beyond evaluating conventional weapons systems. synthetic adversary networks can be built in digital space and their evolution simulated harmlessly. adversaries to escape detection by U. signals. with recent advances in computing power and software.S. as well as measures to counteract adversary efforts to purposefully mislead U.S. ⇒ The intelligence community should routinely adopt the best practices of DoD and the private sector for modeling and simulation. 83 . adapting enemy whose future stratagems are not yet on the drawing board. ⇒ Agent-based modeling. A properly framed game can shed light on the calculations of both adversaries and coalition partners. Modelling and Simulation ⇒ The intelligence community should develop new software tools to support both data processing and analysis. ⇒ Those techniques might illuminate many examples of adversary strategy that could surprise us next time. The intelligence community must determine the magnitude of the threat to the economy and the strategies likely to be used in an attack aimed solely at economic destruction. focuses on bottom-up computer simulation of human interaction and generates exactly the form of decentralized. ⇒ The art of analytic gaming remains a uniquely effective tool for assessing the interplay of competing strategies. ⇒ The intelligence community should be using new techniques to explore the evolution of terrorist networks and their adaptability. especially that of an evolving. intelligence satellites and other collection means.
even with more data the intelligence community is likely to be frustrated by its failure to prevent every attack on U. This kind of initiative in analytic methodology holds promise. the intelligence community was not in the traditional multidisciplinary analysis business. and what they are up to. by using paid informants or through eavesdropping. Toward these ends. quality is valued. Collection needs to be sharp and focused on what counts rather than too broad. There are still important but hard to learn facts about targets . poor intelligence frequently contributes to policy failure. but the creation of the Office of Terrorism Analysis within the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center changed that. It will fall upon current and future senior officials of the intelligence community to make the development of management skills a priority and promote a culture in which excellence is rewarded. and respect for the law is unquestioned.Until shortly after September 11. In the long run. Controls on financial transactions can be used to discourage money laundering and transfers of illicit funds. legitimate risk-taking is encouraged. The adaptable adversaries who will make up the future terrorist threat will have the incentives and the means to “game” Western intelligence collection systems. interests.that can only be identified. and the disposition of potentially hostile military forces . one of the most important functions of the intelligence community is to provide analysis gleaned from all sources (open and secret) and to package it in a timely and useful manner. While good intelligence cannot guarantee good policy. Although more resources would help. 84 . and efforts to reinvigorate the long-term effort to generate more creative raw intelligence collection are in the works. monitored. The United States will have to continue to devote significant resources if it desires a significant capability. it is the job of the intelligence community to develop both analytic expertise and classified data sources on issues of interest to the national security community. Problems and Limits of Intelligence The nature of modern terrorism makes it difficult to defeat. talent is developed.including the intentions and capabilities of rogue states and terrorists.S. the proliferation of unconventional weapons. Only the intelligence community performs this essential integrative function. The intelligence community must give priority to collecting the information that the policymakers most need and want. This can be done by agents that infiltrate terrorist groups. surveillance and communications monitoring. No amount of redesign or regulation can compensate for poor leadership. and it may do so for a generation or more. and measured through dedicated intelligence assets. The first line of defence against terrorists is the attempt to find out who they are. The war on terrorism will place intense pressure on all intelligence collection systems.
Intelligence collection on proliferation may require less transformation of intelligence services as is the case with TOC and terrorism. Though they might get help from others. The track record of intelligence is a mixed one. international organisations. Thus. These limits are permanent and cannot be eradicated. Only a few of the conspirators know the intentions. Since 2003. the bull’s-eye of this intelligence target – an individual terrorist plot – lacks the size and signatures of most other targets. biological and chemical weapons. Efforts are needed to more comprehensively reunite. which was the case of the Semtex that Libya had acquired and passed to the IRA. Hence. integrate and fuse the disparate intelligence disciplines of analysis of WMD and proliferation. and any preparations that cannot be done behind closed doors are done as part of those movements. nobody whom they cannot trust completely is informed about their plot. Though the safeguards against non-proliferation are weaker today than 15 years ago.But the most important limits to collecting information on terrorists are inherent to the subject and the way they operate. Proliferation from state to state dominates. 85 . and agencies engaged in proliferation issues. The conspirators may not have had any prior involvement in terrorism or be members of a previously known terrorist group. there were long-standing concerns about the capabilities of intelligence services to track WMD programs and identify required reforms. as does that from state to non-state actor. Plans are no longer communicated in a form that can be easily intercepted and interpreted. while concomitantly striving to cooperate much more intimately with those engaged in combating terrorism and TOC. which Iran and Syria have provided. They do not purchase. the target for intelligence is anyone who might commit terrorism in the future. and the rockets fired against Israel by Hezbollah in the Lebanon conflict of 2006. Even before the serious questions raised by the Iraq experience. there continue to be large gaps in knowledge and understanding of both suspect programmes and technology trends. Terrorists do not expose any materials that would betray their intentions to others. They live and move inconspicuously. procure or build anything that is suspicious. a number of western intelligence communities began conducting gap attacks that focus attention on the most serious and difficult of these intelligence deficits. In key areas related to nuclear. There can be no guarantee that intelligence services can provide a foolproof warning of an impending terrorist attack so that it can either be avoided or adequate preparations made. Moreover. intelligence coverage of proliferation is still somewhat easier than that of transnational organized crime (TOC) and transnational terrorism. It is obvious that there are limitations in intelligence on WMD. the monitoring of treaties. terrorism is a fundamentally different and more difficult object than the great majority of other topics the intelligence community is asked to cover.
As they work to reduce uncertainty. The latter is of increasing significance. Additionally. TOC is becoming ever more adept at concealment and disguise and exhibits a degree of flexibility and adaptability in methods and modes that pose an increasing challenge to law enforcement and society at large. these new threats. for example. the intelligence services must sharpen their focus on the softer elements of the proliferation problem – people. the degree of occurrence of violence. intelligence organisations responsible for setting strategic direction and coordinating community-wide efforts. intelligence services must continue to transition from simply reporting on proliferation to sustained engagement in the proactive fight against WMD. however. TOC is embedded within economies in ways that proliferation and terrorism are not. Police resources will hardly ever be such that they can do more than investigate a small proportion of TOC. or the degree of political corruption existing or suspected? There is always the dilemma of whether to continue surveillance in order to develop intelligence or to act to disrupt TOC activities and to arrest the actors. intelligence is the prerequisite and most important tool for the prevention of. in particular. and timely counteraction against. The process of determining targets and priorities is therefore crucial to the intelligence process. plans. To some degree. Countering TOC is qualitatively different from fighting proliferation and terrorism. capabilities and activities and engage in disinformation. Policymakers. Finally. Unlike the traditional threats to national security from rival nation-states. Far too much of intelligence’s intellectual and financial resources remain targeted against the harder elements of facilities. denial and deception operations 86 . innovations in money laundering. the measures they are taking to counter law enforcement operations. uncertainty will always outweigh certainty. important to have realistic expectations. their operational methods for moving various forms of contraband. A number of problems make this no easy task. proliferants and TOC groups seek to hide their intentions. while intelligence services are challenged to improve their ability to convey uncertainty in ways that policymakers can understand and apply. adaptive proliferators skilled at deception and denial will find ways to conceal at least some of their activities from even a greatly improved WMD intelligence enterprise. Determined. the threats posed by non-state actors are more difficult to anticipate. assess and combat. therefore. plans and intentions. must accept that there are inherent limits to WMD intelligence. the development of new markets and.It is. should TOC groups be targeted based on the suspected sums of money involved. must work more closely with the operational communities to ensure that collection and analysis directly support planning and execution of counterproliferation missions. Clandestinely operating conspiratorial groups of often unknown non-state actors make intelligence services central to the security of the state. because eluding national law enforcement control is the most important working principle of criminal groups. More and sustained intelligence efforts are needed for anticipating major activities of TOC groups. technology and systems. More than ever. The fact that terrorists.
providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with substantial authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The new DNI will have substantial statutory authorities to address these issues. There are five basic principles all organisations that engage in intelligence collection and conduct the so called intelligence-led operations must follow: 1) To provide effective intelligence essential to the security of the nation.S. intelligence services are a key factor for combating the new threats and have become the first line of defence. 5) To be open to internal and external review. U. In December 2004. Techniques for acquiring and analyzing information on small groups of plotters differ significantly from those used to evaluate the military capabilities of other countries. 3) To have an effective management and tasking system. supervision and control. 87 . effective presents substantial leadership and managerial The needs of intelligence consumers — ranging from the White House to cabinet agencies to military commanders — must all be met. The legislation calls for a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such knowledge cannot be acquired better. continues to be a challenge for senior policymakers and Members of Congress. and to parliamentary oversight.to mislead the authorities. Making cooperation challenges. especially for Defense Department agencies. more safely or more cheaply by any other organisation or means. the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P. creates a need for a national organisation with secret and covert capacities.L. 4) To be effectively accountable.S. Intelligence collection systems are expensive and some critics suggest there have been elements of waste and unneeded duplication of effort while some intelligence targets have been neglected. but the organizational relationships will remain complex. congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. Intelligence Community in the 21st century. using the same systems and personnel. intelligence efforts are complicated by unfilled requirements for foreign language expertise. 2) To have an adequate legal framework. To address the challenges facing the U. 108-458) was signed. Thus. Breaking down agency stovepipes that keep information from consumers who legitimately need it.
S. Ackerman. The Intelligence Community: 2001-2015 Daunting Challenges. Seth G. Michael. Jones.The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis.. • • 88 . Pappas. Robert K. The Homeland Security Act (P. Hard Decisions. 107-296) and the subsequent creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) established offices charged with combining information from both types of sources. Gregory F.. while difficult to mandate.L. Intelligence support to military operations continues to be a major responsibility of intelligence agencies. George. Aris A. James W. Section 1021 of the Intelligence Reform Act made the new National Counterterrorism Center specifically responsible for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. Better human intelligence is also essential. RAND CF 219: Toward a Theory of Intelligence. James M. which made it possible to share law enforcement information with analysts in intelligence agencies. Phillip. Building Leverage in the Long War . realtime targeting data. Treverton. Medina.L.Ensuring Intelligence Community Creativity in the Fight against Terrorism..Improved analysis. Carmen A.. These barriers derived from the different uses of information collected by the two sets of agencies — foreign intelligence used for policymaking and military operations and law enforcement information to be used in judicial proceedings in the U. Counterterrorism requires the close coordination of intelligence and law enforcement agencies including the Department of Homeland Security. but long-established practices have not been completely overcome. The use of precision guided munitions depends on accurate.S. Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive .Winning with Intelligence.. integrating intelligence data into military operations will require changes in organizational relationships as well as acquiring the necessary technologies.. Lipscy. Simon Jr. Another problem has been barriers between foreign intelligence and law enforcement information. 107-56). Steven..Understanding Our Craft. Future Threats Drive U. Elder. remains a key goal. Finally. Intelligence. April 2008. Harris. Bibliography • • • • • • Warner. Meeting 21st Century Transnational Challenges: Building a Global Intelligence Paradigm. Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence . Gregory. Roger Z. A large part of the statutory basis for the “wall” between law enforcement and intelligence information was removed with passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P. What To Do When Traditional Models Fail . Boraz.
Intelligence in an insecure world. Michael. James B.• • • • • • • • • • Schreier.. Obstacles and Innovations. Schmitt. Gil.. Fighting the Pre-eminent Threats with Intelligence-led Operations. Silent Warfare – Understanding the world of Intelligence. Liza. Blair. 89 .. Gary J. Herman. Richard A. Chapter 7. Seaborn. Abram N. Jr.. Phytian. Peter. Fred. Defense. Intelligence Essentials for Everyone. Best. Mark M. George. Strategic Debriefing. 45: Intelligence and Policy: What Is Constant? What Is Changing? Field Manual 34-52.. Bruces. Analyzing Intelligence – Origins. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Shulsky. Lowenthal. Mark. Krizan. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Roger Z. Intelligence Issues for Congress Foreign Affairs. and Trade Division. Commentary No.
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