This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
A. Police as Community Caretakers i. way of entering premise when otherwise wouldn't be able to Dube (baby diapers) ORS § 133.033 ii. way to engage citizens without reasonable suspicion or probable cause Lovegren (passed out in car) a. objective, specific, articulable facts from which an experienced officer would suspect a citizen is: i. in need of help ii. in peril b. which allows an officer to take appropriate action c. but beyond citizen's need, 4th Amend comes into play B. Police Enforcement of Civility i. higher standard for police taking verbal abuse than ordinary citizen Janisczak (yelling at cops during arrest, order to stop, "fuck you") excuse to give citizens a "ride" if you can't give them "time" C. Control of Gangs and Kids i. Gangs Morales - ordinances giving police powers must be specific to be constitutional ii. Kids - Curfews Allow for exceptions, generally enforceable D. Traditional and Community Policing i. Traditional: only crime investigation, "just the facts" ii. Community: shifts resources from central police command and moves power more into joint effort between community and the police (Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action - p.34)
2. Brief Searches and Stops
A. Brief Investigative Stops of Suspects - a stop, generally, when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave Key Cases: 1. Katz v. United States: changes interpretation of 4th Amend: now, a. did the person exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy; b. is that an expectation that society can recognize as reasonable? 2. Terry v. Ohio: a "terry search" - frisk OK when afraid of a weapon i. Consensual Encounters and "Stops" Mendenhall (airport, DEA) -- it was never a stop! She agreed to everything. Wilson (arsonist) -- asking for ID not a stop; ordering to wait a stop -- a stop happened when Wilson didn't feel free to leave -- evidenced by him not leaving ii. Grounds for Stops: Articulable, Individualized, Reasonable Suspicion Remember: One factor alone is almost never enough to establish reasonable suspicion!! Arkansas Stat. § 16-81-203, 14 things that can contribute to R.S.:
1 of 16
or imminently will occur. needs active work by department to avoid--federal minimum is not enough (persuasive authority) v. then driving): R. knowledge of suspect's background or character c. incidence of crime in the neighborhood k. manner of dress e. Balancing of state interest vs. => stop justified when "officer has an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct has taken place.suspect fleeing an area.. Wardlow (running): special case of flight. can also be used for just checking licenses. Verniero Report: profiling happens. apparent effort to avoid confrontation or identification by police 2. wrong time): R. Gathering Information Without Searching i. Edmond: administrative stops cannot be for the purpose of general crime control. information from 3d persons i. is occurring. says they're OK 2. Nelson (drinking in truck. Dean (driving in wrong neighborhood. etc. whatever suspect is carrying d. contributes to RS with some other articulable fact iii. intrusion. Sup. gait and manner b. dui. Bond (bag on bus -. Ct. Plain View/Plain Feel Doctrine: anything officer can see without using extra instruments to gain the view when they have a legal authority to be in that point of view is admissible… Katz is the general standard -. but are not enough by themselves to establish the grounds for a stop. Abandoned Property (Trash) 2 of 16 Gregory Schneider . as long as not too low and no disturbance to property ii." 3. Bobic (looking through peephole in adjacent storage unit) b. registration.S.requires NO reasonable suspicion or probable cause 1. that seizure does not violate the 4th Amendment. time of the day or night f.S. consorting with others whose conduct is "reasonably suspect" j. apparent effort to conceal something l. etc. and the officer's assessment of the existence of specific and articulable facts sufficient to warrant the stop is objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. particular streets h. Brief Administrative Stops -. area. Frank Robinson) iv. Profiles & Race 1.S.a "reasonable expectation of privacy" a. running away from police is out of the ordinary. even though the underlying reason for the stop might have been to investigate some other matter. Quarles: profiles can contribute to R. B.where a police officer has probable cause to detain a person temporarily for a traffic violation. reports of vandalism 4. based on time of day. demeanor a. Pretextual Stops: Whren established -. overheard conversation g. favored for "exigent circumstances" . Note: view gained by flying over head generally admissible.reasonable expectation of privacy to not have exploratory tactile searches) c. (People v..
Terry: as long as officer reasonably suspects person has a weapon. Moran . Brief Searches of Individuals i. only to search for weapons. request for identification is reasonable within scope of Terry stop 3. Confidential Informants 1. but any contraband within "plain feel" is admissible (very ambiguous. Barton (federal): PC can come from confidential informant when the "totality of the circumstances" gives rise to it… (Gates test) 2. when officer reasonably has fear of weapons 3. Entick: great distrust of broad. facts demonstrating basis of informant's knowledge ii.but how much? 3 of 16 Gregory Schneider . as long as it is collected in a reasonable way b.a. less than Certainty) e.see chart p. quality of evidence => (evidence = reliable) f. two part test to validate probable cause to issue warrant based on confidential informant -. reasonable to whom? => reasonable person. Scope of a Terry Search (Commonwealth v. Utterback (state minority): requires more than vague totality. Defining Probable Cause a. Wilson) 1." b. Anonymous Sources 1. Frisks for Weapons a.no expectation of privacy for trash on curb. strength of inference => sufficient basis for the belief d. establish the informant's credibility OR independently corroborate information b. Requires some amount of independent corroboration -. very arguable) 2. Sources of Information to Support Probable Cause a. Probable Cause i. States vary on what the standard of probable cause is -.the Aguilar-Spinelli test: i. Full Searches of People & Places A. unparticularized search warrants -establishes basis for 4th amendment requirement B. pat frisk is OK b. reasonable police officer (varies) c. States divide on this issue C. 150 ii. General Search Warrants a. can search a car for weapons when officer stops a car. Brinegar: "Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. comparison to other standards => (greater than RS. Origins of 4th Amendment i.
Administrative Warrants 1. "triggering condition" need not be in warrant itself b. but they cannot be artificially created by the police 2. must be done in reasonable manner v. supported by oath or affirmation iv. 1. specifically applied for it in the warrant b. but no-knock entry can be allowed if.2. lack of education 3. Camara . but being married to chief of police alone not sufficient to void warrant 2. must be executed in appropriate time frame (varies by state) c. 3 Occasions Where Exigent Circumstances Arise i. Bustamonte: voluntariness depends on whether or not you were coerced. Four Corners Rule: only information used in applying for the warrant may be used to establish probable cause. etc vi. Anticipatory Warrants 1. Anyan: 4th amendment requires knock and announce.no family connection allowed. The Warrant Requirement and Exigent Circumstances 1. danger to police iii. and can look at the totality of the circs to determine if you were. exigent circumstances 2. Mann: exigent circumstances can excuse the requirement for a warrant. futility of announcing 3.license plate numbers associated with known drug dealers sufficient iii. but public codes can require consent to issue business permits. Schneckloth v. no new information may be supplemented after the fact C.warrants required if private citizen won't consent to search 2. Rayvedts: corroboration of some details of crime -. in writing (maybe) 3.. Dietrick: "Judge Boober" case-. Neutral and Detached Magistrate i. Requirements for Obtaining Warrants 1. risk of destruction/removal of evidence ii. Particularity i.. low intelligence 4 of 16 Gregory Schneider . description of the place to be searched ii. Consensual Searches i. description of things/people iii. Youth 2. Grubbs . including: 1. "hot pursuit" b. Execution of Warrants a. Probable Cause! iv. Warrants a. Components of a Voluntary Choice a. Other Types of Warrants a.anticipatory warrants allowed as long as the supporting affidavit meets requirement of probable cause.
take place in clean. Searches in Recurring Contexts A. California: i.People v. private surrounding 2.4. often requires more than probable cause 3. need to find relevant evidence before it is destroyed ii. the third party "assumes the risk" that another person with access to the property will consent to a search 4.need to discover weapons 2. length of detention 6. federal standard established in Schmerber v. Third-Party Consent a. any postarrest movement by the arrestee c. highly regulated by statute 2. must be conducted in a "reasonable manner" Gregory Schneider 5 of 16 . the person saying "NO" wins 1. California b. whether there are confederates of the suspect nearby who might destroy evidence 3. note: easy to isolate the person who wants to give consent c. use of physical punishment b. Maristany b. Justification court gives to allow the searches: 1. Absence of knowledge of a choice is NOT a basis to show coercion!!! ii. whether the officers have control over the area or object to be searched 5. basic requirements of a strip search 1. More (forced cavity search incident to arrest) a. as soon as person is arrested. Intrusive Body Searches -. whether the officers are between the suspect and the area or object to be searched 4. repeated and prolonged nature of questioning 7. police can conduct search "incident" to the arrest of the area within the "immediate control" of the arrestee (where an arrestee could reach a weapon or destroy evidence) Chimel v. officer safety . Factors to consider when assessing validity of the search: 1.body cavity 1. when two parties present have power to consent. "Persons" i. searcher must be same sex as searchee b. whether there are multiple Δ's 2. more intrusive searches . Searches Incident to Arrest a. procedure of search must be "commonplace" and involve no risk of trauma iii. lack of advice about constitutional rights 5. "clear indication" that search will produce evidence of a crime ii. the third party must have at least the apparent authority to consent to the search 1.
The Outer Boundaries of Houses a. Schools and Prisons a. Dunn. NB: strip searches are categorically different and require more justification than a regular search: some indication of danger 6 of 16 Gregory Schneider . Dixson . the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home 2. manner is reasonably related to the objectives of the search ii. whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home 3. protection. despite little to no expectation of privacy from their employer b. generally. warrants almost always required B. cannot be excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the incident 5. must be analyzed on a case by case basis c. 1.if a person takes reasonable means to express the expectation of privacy. they become an agent of the gov't and the 4th Am. then police need a warrant to enter. the scope of the search must -. Traditionally no 4th Am. can be determined by examining: 1. reasonable suspicion is the standard for conducting a search of a student in school 4. school officials granted tremendous leeway in determining what is necessary to keep the school running efficiently and safely 2. Schools 1. investigate work-related misconduct iii. the nature of the uses to which the area is put 4.(Safford Unifed School District v. cannot be justified simply by search incident to arrest -.can conduct any sort of search they want… BUT! if they conduct a search at the behest of a government person. Redding) i. Workplaces -. walls not necessary: homeless person who exhibits reasonable expectation of privacy with their belongings entitled to same protections as person in home ii. there is a presumption of the school rules' legitimacy 3. as long as it is not exposed to or accessible by the public. does not diminish an employee's privacy interest c. but some states grant more. employees not in a gov't office entitled to reasonable expectation of privacy from government intrusion.areas beyond the curtilage. perform noninvestigatory work-related search (retrieving a file) 2.must be a "clear indication that desired evidence will be found" d. Government employers: do not need warrant or PC to 1.defined in States v. employee must have some control over access to the area d.c. Applies e. absent an emergency. surveillance cameras) a. a surveillance system. Note: employers are not bound by 4th Amendment -.Galvadon (liquor store. the "curtilage" -. "open fields" -. steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by b. "Houses" and other places i.
instead we now have the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard from Katz ii.S. arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search 2. or vandalized property and to guard the police from danger 3. Rodney Gant a. Drug Testing -. not as a pretext for an investigatory search c. content of suspicion should match the degree of intrusion b. "Papers" -. Ct.Arizona v. "private papers" -.Boyd v. open and closed. search of a person's documents does not amount to "compelled testimony" anymore iii. c. no expectation of privacy for bank records D. stolen. applies to passengers in cars iii. Cars and Containers -. Must use a two part test (Gant) to determine if police can conduct search of compartment of car incident to arrest: 1. nature and immediacy of govt's concerns and efficacy of the policy in meeting them c. U. but business records are allowed a. for searches of closed containers to be valid d. rules must address the proper handling of containers.Board of Education… v. must consider the nature of the privacy interest compromised + 3. the search must be conducted in good faith pursuant to reasonable standardized police procedures. individualized suspicion not necessary 2. i. "Effects" i. little distinction between pretrial detainees and convicted offenders -same security concerns apply C. the original impoundment of the vehicle must be lawful 2. Prisons 1. but 3 elements must be met 1.6. Gipson a. no warrant required. requires more particularity in the warrant b.People v. Sup.still vague about diaries. Palmer that the 4th Am. the officer has reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. allowed for "administrative caretaking functions" -. the purpose of the inventory search must be to protect the owner's property or to protect the police from claims of lost.protecting against property damage claims and protecting police from dangerous items b. Inventory Searches -. the "automobile exception" to warrants 7 of 16 Gregory Schneider . great latitude given to administrators of prisons to conduct searches of cells to maintain order 2. does not place any limits on a prison guard's search of the prison cell of a convicted offender 3. Searches of cars incident to arrest b. they apply to objects carried by persons arrested and placed in detention ii. character of the intrusion + 4. held in Hudson v. Earls 1. no longer a property interest .
the location of the suspect (including distance travelled) 4. officer needs PC to stop the person b. a. federal rule: no warrant required for arrest in a public place b. reason to believe the suspect is within (Payton v. justified by 2 reasons: 1. even to obtain the VIN Mobile homes. police do not need a warrant to search cars as long as they have probable cause to believe the car. what the police officers say B. she can search in the passenger compartment anywhere that could contain a weapon There is almost never a requirement to get a warrant before searching a car. amount of time the detention lasts (very important) 2. at that point if officer has reasonable suspicion that weapons are in the car. 5. most arrests take place without a warrant a. car owners have lower reasonable expectations of privacy Terry searches in cars a.no exigent circumstances are required b. warrants are much more important in the home . vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction 2. Differentiating Between Stops (In re M. v. Thomas. holds contraband or evidence -. cars are subject to public view and to pervasive state regulation. probable cause can be achieved by "collective knowledge" -. anything that the container could be in as well) c. fall under the "automobile exception" category. required for entry into a 3d party home except when… (State v. warrant to justify entry into suspect's home 2.) i. not just the arresting officer. if the police only have probable cause that a container within the car contains contraband. even when it would clearly be possible to obtain one viewing the outside of a car requires almost no justification."when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave" a. techniques (like handcuffs) used to restrain the suspect 3. note: containers outside of cars still require a warrant or exigent circumstances to search. State v. knows at the time of arrest. or a container within it. requires probable cause a. vi. can then order anyone out of the car c.B. ii. but as soon as it's placed in a car… only need probable cause d. objective test . consent 8 of 16 Gregory Schneider .iv.E.everything the entire police dept. Kiper) a. they may only search that container (arguably. Arrest Warrants i.fed requires 1. New York) ii. Factors to consider 1. Arrests A. vii. even those mounted on blocks and without wheels.
Iowa) ii. study showed strong reduction in domestic violence after an arrest. strong reasons to believe that the suspect is in the premises 5. anything in plain view is admissible C. Old common law rule: police officers cannot arrest for misdemeanors that did not occur in front of them. City of Lago Vista . the peaceful circumstances of entry 7. citations may not be used in lieu of an arrest to conduct a search incident to arrest (Knowles v. making arrests possible even when the officer has not witnessed the misdemeanor D. police generally decide "in the moment" or "on the scene" when to arrest someone. Cahan a. Dissenting opinion: no arrests allowed for "fine-only offenses" 6. most states had not adopted a similar rule before the Weeks case. whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed 3. and as long as it's in a public place there is no requirement for a warrant.b. Now: statutes and case law change this. Remedies A. Once validly in a house to arrest someone.soccer mom arrested for no seat belt) a. Police Discretion in Arrest i. ii. weighed by 1. warrantless arrests are allowed for even minor criminal offenses. a state case that leads to the SCOTUS adoption of the exclusionary rule for all courts 9 of 16 Gregory Schneider . study about how arrests in domestic dispute calls lower repeat offenses: The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment. "hot pursuit" 9. one small scale study that changes the landscape of domestic dispute calls: now arrests standard procedure in most states. gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is charged 2. and after the case most states rejected it ii. exigent circumstances . a clear showing of probable cause 4. iv. even if they had probable cause to believe the suspect committed the crime. Origins of the Exclusionary Rule: i. Lawrence Sherman and Richard Berk a. and even when they do have the warrant they must have probable cause to believe the suspect is inside! iii. iii. possible destruction of evidence 8. People v. adopted the exclusionary rule for federal cases b.no dispositive element. "Paper Arrests": Citations i. police must obtain a warrant before entering the home. Weeks v. a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended 6. threat to safety of suspect or others NB: Absent these circumstances. regardless of how certain they are the suspect is inside. where ordinarily a citation or verbal warning would suffice (Atwater v. United States a.
Mapp v. Havens) ii. When does the exclusionary rule not apply? 1. The idea of judicial integrity has dropped out of the Court's reasoning for the exclusionary rule. grand jury proceedings 3. Ex: affidavit in support of a warrant includes information obtained illegally as well as legally. which did not require states to apply the rule iv. Causation Limits a. Independent Source (State v. impeachment: proving a witness is lying on the stand (United States v. Evidence obtained in "Good Faith" . 10 of 16 Gregory Schneider . overturns Wolf v. some state positions: good faith exception undermines state constitutions. some states have passed statutes codifying the exclusionary rule e. exclusionary rule still applies (Commonwealth v. objective good faith fails when: 1. the state must show that the evidence would have been obtained by lawful means anyway b. the affidavit is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" that it would be "entirely unreasonable" for a well-trained officer to believe probable cause existed 4. civil proceedings 2. Leon a. “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine: police cannot use evidence that stems from evidence obtained illegally—but how far that chain of causation goes is up for dispute 2. in order to prove inevitable discovery. notable for explicitly saying there is not a precedent/constitutional basis for adopting the rule. federal incorporation of the exclusionary rule under the 4th/14th amendments to apply to state courts b. Edmunds) d. parole hearings 4.United States v. Colorado. Ohio a. v. Rabon): when evidence was gained through an independent source in addition to the illegal source. B. they now only talk about it in terms of deterrence. the magistrate "wholly abandons the judicial role" 3. but it may be the only workable remedy to deter unreasonable police searches and preserve "judicial integrity" iii. an independent source exception applies. Michigan): when the police would have discovered the evidence even without the illegal search 1. Limitations to the Exclusionary Rule i. the warrant is so facially deficient that the officer could not reasonably believe it is valid c. officer gives the magistrate information that the officer knew or should have known was false 2. the evidence may be admitted so long as the police relied on the warrant in objectively reasonable "good faith" b. 1.b. If the warrant could have been issued anyway without the illegal information. federal position: if police conduct a search in reliance on a constitutionally defective warrant. and a warrant was issued. There is little empirical evidence to show that the exclusionary rule actually deters police from conducting unreasonable searches. Inevitable Discovery (Hudson v.
b. even if that information is derived from "off-the-wall" readings b.iii. becomes more common place. that expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable" (Katz v. dogs are not "sense enhancing technology" -. Place) a. cannot have expectation of privacy of illegal substance 2. tension between technology and expectation of privacy: as tech. Federal standard (and majority of states): if the person does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy for the place/premises searched. Technology & Privacy A. Dog Sniffs (Fitzgerald v.Kyllo v.United States v. intimate details of the home (lady of the house's daily sauna and bath) violates the 4th Amendment. state position: dog sniff is a search but requires reasonable suspicion and lawful presence in a particular place (State v. United States a. does not reveal anything other than illegal substances. technology that reveals non-criminal activity. The Great Shift: A Movement Away from a "Property" Privacy Interest to a "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" -. will society recognize it as reasonable? iii. reason: no expectation of privacy on public thoroughfare. (United States v. possessory. Minority. Minority of states position: if the police were not legitimately on the premises. Enhancement of the Senses i. technology that sees into a place where a person has exhibited an expectation of privacy violates that expectation ii. Some notes: no certain technology makes it a search. person exhibits an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy b. United States) c. Tackitt) v. the evidence is not admissible if the accused has a “proprietary. amount of effort a government agent expends in obtaining a "plain" view 11 of 16 Gregory Schneider . possible return to property expectation of privacy? => bright line at the entrance of the home d. Knotts a. Federal position: non-search when dog is in a lawful position. Karo) c. even when the dog is sniffing inside a home/apartment 1.they are man's best friend! (haha) i. but the courts will weigh a. Bruns): two general positions: a.the new standard: a. no seizure/search to apply beeper to property before it is picked up to track where a vehicle is going. Standing to Challenge Illegal Searches & Seizures (State v. Thermal Imaging . or participatory interest” 7. less reasonable to expect privacy? even if someone does exhibit expectation of privacy. Beepers . BUT it violates 4th Amendment to track movements inside the house. the evidence is admissible b. dissent: anything discernable from "off the wall" should be acceptable c. State. iv. United States v.
11 i.b. no reasonable expectation of privacy for a consensual conversation -the person "assumes the risk" that the other will not tell anyone else 2. minority of states position: does require warrant. educated people much less likely g. Interrogations A.food. Reeves. and legal counsel d. outside the territory of the US iii. the more likely a confession. and public familiarity with the device B.but the length of time deprived is critical. Federal: McNabb-Mallory rule requires suspect to be presented before an officer of the court within a set time period. friends. United States v. Wiretapping i. they must be voluntary c. using pain. 1. Mississippi) a. some physical deprivations are still tolerable . 3d degree has mostly disappeared. presentment before judicial officer: 1. but some particular tactics can invalidate confessions (see below) ii. Wickersham Commission Report: the 3d degree 1. minors. confessions usually weighed under the "totality of the circumstances" to determine voluntariness. Physical Abuse and Deprivations (Brown v. no warrant required b. mature. mental anguish as means of interrogation 2. much more likely to succeed in claiming involuntariness 2. however. most do not require automatic suppression . they use it as part of the "totality of the circumstances test" to see if a confession was involuntary f. but courts very critical of extended deprivation from family. Voluntariness and Confessions i. federal position: recording consensual conversation with bug on agent does not violate the 4th Am. base this position on quirk of state constitutional language 8. Any violation results in suppression of a confession. nature of the location observed c. Promises and Threats (State v. Vulnerability 1. the more likely it is to be involuntary e. the longer the interrogation. uneducated people. 2. no criminal charges pressed ii. Bugs on Agents (State v. is reason to exclude confession b. the place from which the observation is made d. someone suffering from an illness or an injury. confessions may not be coerced. But investigators tread a foggy line. many contemplated when it might be appropriate after September. when time is absolutely critical iii. sleep . Length of an interrogation is critical: the longer an interrogation. Torture & Terrorism 1. State: states set different timelines. Swanigan) 12 of 16 Gregory Schneider .rather. White) a.
f. and even during many non-accusatory interrogations. promises to seek more or less serious punishment for the crime c. promise to inform prosecutor about cooperation 2. have prosecutor discuss lesser charges 3. Miranda Warnings (Miranda v. who is a friend of the defendant. lies extrinsic to the facts of the alleged offense. United States) promises and threats of "any sort" are prohibited and render a confession involuntary b. invalidate a confession per se.a. special case of juveniles: courts much more cautious about making promises/threats to juveniles. promises to reduce (or decline to file) charges 2. promise to arrange for treatment program or other activities 4. that failure to confess will get the officer/officer's family in trouble ii. lies about intrinsic facts are only to be considered under the "totality of the circumstances" test. The Revolution: before Miranda. threats to file more serious charges 3. The government carries the burden of proving that a confession was voluntary. Some examples: placement of the Δ's vehicle at the crime scene physical evidence linked to the victim found in the Δ's car discovery of the murder weapon a caim that the murder victim is alive presence of the Δ's fingerprints on the getaway car or at the crime scene positive ID of the Δ by reliable witnesses discovery of a nonexistent witness B. but do find automatic involuntariness when: 1. Federal position (Bram v. most states don't take this literally. which are of the type reasonably likely to produce a false confession of guilt. threats and promises that don't invalidate voluntariness: 1. no warning of rights necessary in most situations. Kelekolio) 1. State only had 13 of 16 Gregory Schneider . Police lies (State v. majority position: i. and the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. Some examples: assurances of divine salvation upon confession promises of mental health treatment in exchange for a confession assurances of treatment in a nice hospital promises of more favorable treatment in the event of a confession misrepresentation of legal principles misrepresentations by an interrogating police officer. encouraging suspect to "tell the truth" d. more likely to prove involuntariness in absence of parent e. Arizona) i.
NB: There is a 5th right. intelligent 4. the right not to be interrogated. voluntary. Perkins) ii. direct questioning or ii. Innis) 1. NB: confessions made without warnings are per se inadmissible 5. purpose of interrogation iii. none dispositive: i. Exceptions i. Quarles) About half the states follow this federally allowed exception. Refined in Innis: whenever a person in custody is subjected to i. public safety: "need for answers in a situation posing a threat to public safety outweighs the need for prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination" (New york v. AND interrogation (Rhode Island v. NB: waiver of rights may be revoked at any time iii. extent confronted with evidence of guilt vi. any statement he makes can and will be used as evidence against him c." Miranda changes the requirements of criminal investigation to require that a suspect in custody and being interrogated must be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that… a. Form of Warnings 14 of 16 Gregory Schneider . manner of interrogation v. how suspect was summoned ii. c. free to leave? b. standard booking questions do not count as interrogations (State v. place of interrogation iv. McCarty) 1. that the police do not have to inform the suspect of! ii. knowing. but words or actions the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect 3. Berkemer v. if can't afford an attorney. one will be appointed e. Miranda definition: questioning initiated by police after a person has been taken into custody 2.to show that the confession was "voluntary. When Warning Must Occur a. Goseland) iii. right to remain silent b. its functional equivalent -. in custody (State v. right to presence of an attorney d. 2.not necessarily direct questions. Requirements for Waiver of Rights 1. Smith. AND 3. evaluated by an objective reasonable person test under the totality of the circumstances: would a reasonable person in the same/similar circumstances believe he was in custody? some factors to consider. federal position: conversations with undercover agents that the suspect does not know are police officers do NOT count as interrogations (Illinois v.
Mosley) as long as the right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored". considering elements like experience with criminal justice system. ii. vocabulary and literacy. there is no need to inform suspects of the 5th right: the right not to be questioned c. state positions: 1. Williams) a. juveniles: young age can be important for considering capacity to waive i. conduct of police 3. Factors to consider whether or not right was honored (none dispositive -. state of intoxication (rarely makes waiver invalid). suspect who doesn't understand English must be given warnings in her native language C. Butler) 1. State): 1. Effect of Asserting Miranda Rights i. federal position: unambiguous or unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent required to invoke Miranda protections (Davis v. police can still initiate later conversations (Michigan v. intelligent waiver of Miranda rights occurred by a preponderance of the evidence (Colorado v. mental illness. proof of waiver: the government must show that a knowing. Connelly) 2. Burbine) 2.Globe v. does not require an explicit waiver . Reed) b.a. different location of questioning? 5. Waiver of rights occurs in at least 3/4 of all custodial interrogations. invoking the rights (State v. majority of states: yes. any statement interpretable as an assertion of rights ends interrogation 2. most states follow "totality of the circumstances" rule ii. Invocation and Waiver of Miranda Rights i. adopt federal position c. ambiguous assertions require clarification about the statement 3.it can be found implicitly through conduct (North Carolina v. emotional state. involve the same crime? ii. federal position: after invocation. must inform (State v. capacity to waive: evaluated on a case by case basis. do police need to inform suspect of an attorney who is present? 1. significant time lapse between the interrogations? 4. however. Right to Counsel 15 of 16 Gregory Schneider . United States) b.. interrogation ceased immediately on invocation of right? 3. not required (Moran v. a few states require consultation with an interested adult before a waiver is valid D. waiving Miranda rights. Miranda warnings given? 2. Right to Silence a. Δ's intelligence and education. federal position: no.
federal position: after invocation. knowing waiver of right? if yes. 16 of 16 Gregory Schneider . 2. at least until person has met with a lawyer. Arizona) 1. then don't. unless the suspect initiates (Edwards v. when are further statements admissible? (Oregon v. then. invalid. Bradshaw) 1. if no.a. then admit. Mississippi: protection from police initiated questioning continues even after the accused has met with her attorney multiple times b. police cannot continue interrogation.. after invocation of right to counsel. who initiated? if police did. if suspect did. refined again in Minnick v.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
We've moved you to where you read on your other device.
Get the full title to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.