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Zach Coughlin,Esq. f7,;{,
Nevada Bar No: 9473- f\( (/ !> ,fl .", \
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AND FILED
ZD13 SEP 26 Ppl 3 JlJ
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
MARY A. SCHOTT. CLERK
Reno, NV f E3. t/-Ir\ S:.J .
Tele: - , '<fCj I z.. ", ,.
Fax: 949-667-7402 \V.5?Tt.) *5 1 .. ;5 ",-CII v ..
Attorney Defendant Robert Keller
0+ foE-,/
IN rGRr::STti2J) of #A t-L
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
n Re:
ROBERT KELLER
Debtor.
HE CADLE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
OBERT KELLER,
Defendant.
)
) Case No.: BK 1 0-52639-gwz, Chapter 7
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Adversary Proceeding No. 10-051 04-gwz Filed
11-18-2011
BEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO CADbb
COMPANY'S MOTION TO l,U;:X ___
MJ:rOMATIC S'fA'f 'fe Rnmw fORElQ>.J
H:J{)GMENX--
Hearing Date: July 17, 2012 -\- r/z 6-) .3
Hearing Time: x:OO pm
Estimate Time for Hearing: 5 minutes
'V:e.
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",t;R E:::L.VI!J{UFILE 0' _ ctJ) t\-etl:nttJ...) ..f0/ _ Stt:'.,.....
...... . ' . MOTIONTOWITHDRAWASCOUNSfJ;
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J1 .. r..G ... .. - 1'<;:;iI7:: '" .
oJ ':-1 vOIr
22 I . "s of record, Zach Coughlin, reby.mov:; thi;' .Court@rder, .. ,
0..1 :::> . .
2:::i - lIlowing the under gned to Withdraw as Counsel of Record!in of
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Coughlin's law license entered by the Nevada Supreme Court on June 7th, 20 12 .. . Coughlin does,
however, respectfully ask this Court for an indication of whether the NVB has a position on
attorney's, in general, continuing to practice before the NVB when there law license has been
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the United States \pteqt and Tradel1)ark Office (USPTO). Coughlin would like to continue to
,.,r H cd / t/.:r/ I
submits to this Court that refusing to allow Coughlin to do so
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may unduly whom has fulfilled his end of the bargain with Coughlin by paying
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the bargained for flat fee in full, and whom stands little chance of receiving back from Coughlin any
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sort of refund anytime soon (though arguably, under a quantum meruit theory, Coughlin has made
7 substantial progress towards fulfilling his end of that bargain ... ). This motion is made and based
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upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, and upon the Points and Authorities, and declaration r
f
If.. " I
ZACHARY B. ESQ., attached hereto. All future filings shall be servfd upon
." .... d/11"A.-....
the address on file for trim in his main bankruptcy case \ '. " , t.,;'-'\ <; b i ("V< J\{ f'\.
\ -fl WI 1,1'\2",- , ,. Q J
Law C, .fCC.... I/lk/
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")
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1 3 Matters Constituting Unauthorized Practice of Law in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 32 ALR.6th 531
14 (Originally published in 2008). Revocation or suspension of state license 43A4
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43 Practicing law with federal license while state license is suspended or revoked-Held or
recognized to be unauthorized practice oflaw
44 Pra.:ticing law with federal license while state license is suspended or revoked-Held or
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recognized not to be unauthorized practice of law
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Local Rule 2014. ATTORNEYS OF RECORD
(a) Appearances. An attorney who appears in a case on behall of a party is the attorney of record for
the party for any and all purposes except adversary proceedings until an order is entered permitting
the withdrawal of the attorney or the case is closed or dismissed. (I) An attorney approved as special
counsel for the bankruptcy estate and/or the debtor under II U.S.c. 327(e) (or any other applicable
code section) is attorney of record for that special purpose only. The attorney is attorney of record for
the special purpose until an order is entered permitting the withdrawal of the attorney or the case is
closed or dismissed. (2) Unless the COUlt orders otherwise or further appearance ismade in an
adversary proceeding, an attorney who has appeared for a party only in the main bankruptcy case is
not automatically the attorney of record for the party in the adversary proceeding.
(b) Substitution of Counsel. A stipulation and order perm itting substitution of counsel may be
submitted ex parte if (i) the substitution is signed by the client,
substituting counsel; and (ii) the substituting counsel acknowledges responsibility for all pending
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MOTION TO WITHDRA W AS COUNSEL BT
( ..
1 dates and deadlines. Notwithstanding this provision, the cOUl1 may require that requests for
substitution of counsel be set on noticed hearing.
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3 ,(c) Withdrawals. See LR IA 10-6 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada.
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LR IA 10-6. APPEARANCES, SUBSTITUTIONS AND WITHDRAWALS.
(a) A party who has appeared by attorney cannot while so represented appear or act in the case.
An attorney who has appeared for a party shall be recognized by the court and all the parties as having
control of theclient's case. The court in its discretion may hear a party in open court even though the
pai-ty is represented by an attorney.
(b) No attorney may withdraw after appearing in a case except by leave ofcoui-t after notice
served on the affected client and opposing counsel.
(c) Any stipulation to substitute attorneys shall be by leave of coui-t and I bear the sionatures
_ of the attorneys and of the client represented. Except where accompanied by a request for reliefunder
subsection (e) of this rule, the signature of an attorney to a stipulation to substitute such attorney into a
case constitutes an express acceptance of all dates then set for pretrial proceedings. for tiial or hearing,
by the discovery plan, or in any court order.
(d) Discharge. withdrawal or substitution of an attorney shallilot alone be reason for delay of
pretrial proceedings. discovery. the trial , or any hearing in the case.
(e) Except for good cause shown, no withdrawal or substitution shall be approved if delay of
discovery. the trial or any hearing in the case would result. Where delay would result, the papers
seeking leave of court for the withdrawal or substitution must request specific relief from the scheduled
trial or hearing. If a trial setting has been made, an additional copy of the moving papers shall be
provided to the clerk for immediate delivery to the assigned district judge, bankruptcy judge or
magistrate judge.
44. Practicing law with federal license while state license is suspended or revoked-
Held or recognized not to be unauthorized practice of law
The courts in the following cases held or recognized that under the particular circumstances
presented, attorneys whose licenses to practice law in the situs state were suspended or
revoked did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law when they provided or offered to
provide legal services.
In U.S. v. Kirtley, 5 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
that attorneys admitted to practice before the federal bar do not engage in the unauthorized
practice of law when they represent clients in bankruptcy actions while under suspension
in the situs state. Although the cOUli upheld the revocation of a probation of an attorney
who otherwise continued to engage in the practice of law by handling a real estate transaction
as an attorney while his license was suspended by the State ofIllinois, it approved of the action
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1 taken by the U.S. District Court when it held that the attorney's bankruptcy activities did
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not constitute the unauthorized practice of law because he was still admitted in the federal bar.
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The only unauthorized practice of law committed by the attorney during the suspension period
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was his participation in unrelated real estate transactions as an attorney.
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Observation
7 Although the Seventh Circuit's decision in U.S. v. Kirtley, 5 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 1993), is not
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accompanied by an analysis of the law affecting federally licensed attorneys who aresuspenoed
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from practicing state law, the result is consistent with an earlier opinion from the circuit,
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U.S. v. Peterson, 550 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1977). In that case, the Seventh Circuit reversed a
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conviction for a claimed unauthorized practice of law v"hile holding that state statutes regarding
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the unauthorized practice of law are not applicable to the practice of law in federal courts.
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As a result, it concluded in the Peterson case that a nonattorney could not be convicted in federal
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court of unauthorized practice of law for his efforts on behalf of criminal defendant in
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earlier prosecution in a United States District Court in Wisconsin.
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In The Florida Bar v. Penn, 421 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1982), the Florida Supreme Court held
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that practicing law in a bankruptcy court as an attorney in Florida while under suspension by
20 I the Florida Supreme Court does not constitute the unauthorized practice oflaw. The court relied
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on In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222,20 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1968), while saying
that, although admission to practice before a federal court is derivative from membership in a
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state bar, suspension or disbarment by a state does not result in automatic suspension or disbarment
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by the federal court without some affirmative action by the federal court. It distinguished
The Florida Bar v. Scussel, 240 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1970), on the grounds that the individual
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in that case was neither a member of the Florida Bar nor of any federal court. It
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1 reasoned that, since the record clearly reflected that the attorney was still a member in good
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stand ing of the federal bar, he had made an appearance before a court which had authorized
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his practice of bankruptcy law.
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The court in In re Disciplinary Action Against Lallier, 555 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. 1996), upheld
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a conclusion reached by a Minnesota referee in a state disciplinary proceedings that an
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attorney did not engage in the unauthorized practice oflaw when he practiced bankruptcy law
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in a U.S. District COUli at a time when his license to practice law by the State of Minnesota
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was suspended. As observed by the court, the attorney's actions occurred at a time when his
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state license to practice law was suspended for nonpayment of attorney registration fees and at
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a time when he was on a restricted status for noncompliance with continuing legal education
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(CLE) requirements. The court also reasoned that the United States District Courts have a separate
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system for imposition of discipline and only require an attorney to report only public disciplinary
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actions. As a result, it said that the federal courts have reserved discretion to impose
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different discipline than that imposed by other jurisdictions. The court concluded that because
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the attorney had not been disciplined by the state so as to justify a suspension of his right to
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practice in the federal courts. the referee properly concluded that his practice in federal district
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couli was not unauthorized.
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45. Practicing law in violation of federal court order
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In the following authority, the issue was addressed as to whether, under the particular circumstances
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presented. an attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by continuing
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to practice law in violation of a federal court order.
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The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland in Ie re Downing. 195 B.R. 870
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(Bankr. D. Md. 1996), found an attorney to be in cdminal contempt after she continued to
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practice law in that court at a time when she was barred by a court order from doing so. As explained
by the court, at an earlier time, the court sanctioned the attorney by barring her from
acting as an attorney in any matter before the court until she purged herself in accordance with
that o r d ~ I The uncontradicted evidence from several witnesses established that she subsequently
engaged in several activities within the district including: (I) actively soliciting and
obtaining new clients for bankruptcy cases; (2) advising debtors to file for bankruptcy; (3)
drafting bankruptcy petitions which were filed pro se; and (4) accepting fees in conjunction
with matters brought before the court.
43. Practicing Jaw with federal license while state license is suspended or revoked-
Held or recognized to be unauthorized practice of law
[Cumulative Supplement]
The courts in the following cases held or recognized that under the particular circumstances
presented. attorneys whose state licenses to practice law were suspended or revoked
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when they provided. or offered to provide, legal
services.
In Lite Ray Realty Corp. v. Bernstein. 200 I WL 1223484 (S.D. N.Y. 200 I), the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York upheld a Bankruptcy Court order disqual ifying
an attorney from engaging in the practice of law before it after the attorney was suspended
from practice of law by State of New York. The District Court followed the reasoning applied
by the Bankruptcy Court in In re Lite Ray Realty Corp., 257 B.R. 150 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.
200 I), wherein that court held that the attorney could not practice bankruptcy law before it
unless the attorney associated with an attorney admitted to practice in the situs state. The court
analyzed Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966), and reasoned that
the Second Circuit interpreted the so-called "federal eXi..;eption" to the unauthorized practice
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1 of law doctrine as not being applicable where an attorney not licensed by the situs state does
2 'not limit his practice to appearing in a specific federal case and otherwise associate or collaborate
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with an attorney who is licensed by the situs state. In contrast. in the instant case, the attorney
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maintained a law office in New York, held himself out to the public as a practitioner of
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bankruptcy law, and conducted a regular and substantia! bankruptcy practice by previously
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York. The court determined that an association with a state-licensed attorney was necessary
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based on the reasoning that an attorney who advises on bankruptcy law must consider and discuss
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alternative choices,involving numerous state law issues before a bankruptcy petition is
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ever tiled on behalf of a client. Such state law issues, observed the court, can include the
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strength of the creditors' claims and any defenses, other forms of debt relief (e.g., compositions,
1 4 ,extensions), and the consequences of not choosing bankruptcy or choosing to do nothing.
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The court also reasoned that if an attorney can only practice bankruptcy law, the attorney
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might be unduly influenced to tilt legal advice toward filing for bankruptcy. In addition, the
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court determined that a federal practice exception that would allow an attorney to otherwise
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establish a law office in a state where the attorney is not admitted to practice law generally
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would be impossible to apply and enforce in the real world. ft based its determination on the
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reasoning that any proof regarding the issue of whether an attorney had exceeded the restric-
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tion ,vould inherently require an examination ofthe contc:, oflegal advice protected by the
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attorney-client privilege.
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The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado in In re Seehusen, 273 B.R. 636
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(Bankr. D. Colo. 200 I), held that when an attorney was disbarred by the state of Colorado, but
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apparently not otherwise disciplined by the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado,
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the attorney was no longer in good standing with the u.s. District Court and therefore engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law when he: (I) held himself out as being an attorney;
(2) assisted in the preparation of a bankruptcy petition and related documents; (3) determined
a debtor's exemptions; (4) gave advice regarding how to place assets beyond the reach of creditors;
and (5) utilized a software program to prepare a debtor's bankruptcy documents while
ostensibly providing "unbundled" legal services or petition preparer services. As the Bankruptcy
Court expressly said, although the individual may not have been in technical violation
of the local rule, L.B.R. 910, he violated the spirit of the rule. The court reasoned that, by application
ofD.C. Colo. LR 83.5, the attorney was not in good standing with the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado when he was disbarred by the state of Colorado and
he was therefore not in good standing with the Bankruptcy Court.
In Matter ofTrousil, 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 229, 1990 WL 180836 (Cal. State Bar Ct.
1990), the Review Department of the State Bar Court of California found that a California attorney
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when he entered into an attorney-client relationship
to represent a client in a bankruptcy matter while under suspension from the California
Bar Association for nonpayment of state bar dues.
In Matter of Thomson, 266 Ga. J 57,464 S.E.2d 818 (1996), the Supreme Court of Georgia
held that, while an attorney's license is suspended by the state bar, the attorney may not practice
bankruptcy law in a manner which would result in either screening telephone calls or
training and monitoring younger lawyers and paralegals. The court reasoned that attorneys
who are suspended from the practice of law by the state are only authorized to act on behalf of
other attorneys as subordinates while conducting legal research and drafting memoranda or
correspondence for attorneys not under suspension. It also explained that no client contact is
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permitted by an attorney whose state license issuspended.
Observation
After the Supreme COUlt of Georgia rendered its decision in Matter of Thomson, 266 Ga. 157,
464 S.E.2d 818 (1996), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in
Wilson v. State Bar of Ga., 132 F.3d 1422 (11th Cir. 1998), which indicated that it would not
be inclined to provide relief to allow attorneys to practice bankruptcy law after they have been
disbarred or had their licenses suspended by the state courts. In the Wilson case, anum,ber of
suspended and disbarred attorneys employed by practicing lawyers brought a 42 U.S.CA.
1983 action against the State Bar of Georgia. They alleged that the state bar rules prohibiting
suspended and disbarred attorneys from having client contact within their employers' firms violated
their right to fi'ee speech . The Court of Appeals, however, upheld a summary judgment
for the state bar while ruling that the state bar rules were not void for vagueness and the
plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a First Amendment challenge to the rules. As the Eleventh
Circuit observed, the state bar's motion in support of its rules made it clear that the provisions
were only drafted to insulate disbarred attorneys frol11 having contact with the public with re-
spect to legal matters and the rules did not extend to nonlegal matters. The COUlt further observed
that the Thomson case dealt with an attorney who was employed in a high-volume consumer
bankruptcy firm, but it did not otherwise indicate that it would be inclined to rule favorably
for an attorney whose license to practice state law was suspended and thereafter only
sought to handle bankruptcy matters in an incidental way.
In Matter of Perrello, 270 Ind. 390, 386 N.E.2d 174 (1979), the Indiana Supreme Court
held that its earlier order suspending an attorney from practicing law precluded the attorney
from practicing law before the federal courts within the state. As a result, it ruled that an attorney
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MOTION TO WITHDRA W AS COUNSEL BT
1 who maintained a law office and handled several matters in the U.S. District Courts for
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the Southern District ofIndiana, and counseling with clients on federal matters such as bankruptcy
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and appearing in COUIt during the sLlspension period, warranted another order to have
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the attorney incarcerated for 90 days. the Indiana Supreme Court said that it could
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neither presume to tell the federal courts who they may permit to practice before them, nor set
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the standards, qualifications, or limitations they might place on such persons, it said that the
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Indiana Constitution provides that the sole authorityand responsibility for the practice oflaw
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in Indiana is in the Supreme Court of Indiana, that the federal courts do not have a independent
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mechanism for determining who is qualified for practice before them. The Indiana Supreme
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Court cited Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889 (1958), as being analogous,
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and it ruled that the practice of law in the federal courts in Indiana is the practice of law
for the purposes of determining whether a person had engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.
Caution
The opinion in Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889 (1958), was issued by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Sperry v. State of
Fla. ex reI. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S. Ct. 1322, 10 L. Ed. 2d 428, 137 U.S.P.Q. 578
(1963). Caution also needs to be exercised when citing Matter of Perrello, 270 Ind. 390, 386
N .E.2d 174 (1979), because neither the Perrella opinion nor the Kovrak opinion analyzed or
cited Theard v. U.S., 354 U.S. 278, 77 S. Ct. 1274, I L. Ed. 2d 1342 (1957) (holding that disbarment
by federal courts does not necessarily flow from disbarment by state courts), In re
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222,20 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1968) (accord), or Selling v. Radford,
243 U.S. 46,37 S. Ct. 377,61 L. Ed. 585 (1917) (accord).
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1 In State v. Blase, 208 Kan. 969,494 P.2d 1224 (1972), the cOUIi held that an attorney who
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had been suspended frol11 the practice of law by the Kansas Supreme Court engaged in the
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unauthorized
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practice of law when he gave bankruptcy advice to clients in exchange for a fee.
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Although the suspended attorney did not make a court appearance, the court observed that he:
7 (I) discussed the bankruptcy process with the couple; (2) informed them that he would be
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their attorney but that another attorney would make court appearances with them; (3) assisted
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them with completing their schedules; (4) advised them to ignore a creditor and respond to the
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creditor by saying that they were filing bankruptcy and the creditor should contact their attorney;
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and (5) advised them that they could legally reaffirm a debt provided that they entered into
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Failing to notify a bankruptcy client of disciplinary acti0n resulting in a suspension of the
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right to practice law by the State of North Dakota, and failing to terminate an attorney--client
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relationship during the suspension period, was implicitly ruled to be the unauthorized practice
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of law when the court ordered the disbarment of an attorney in Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme
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Court of State of N.D. v. Robb, 2000 NO 194, 618 N.W.2d 721 (N.D. 2000).
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In State ex reI. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Holden, 1996 OK 88, 925 P.2d 32 (Okla. 1996), the
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COUlt implicitly ruled that an attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice oflaw when the
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attorney was suspended from practice by the Oklahoma Supreme Court and thereafter gave
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legal advice regarding bankruptcy issues while under suspension.
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In Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kells, 172 Wis. 2d 6 13, 493 N.W.2d 723
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(1993), reconsideration denied, (Mar. 23, 1993). the Wi.sconsin Supreme Court held that an attorney
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who was suspended from the practice of law in Wisconsin engaged in the unauthorized
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1 practice of law in violation of Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 22.26(2) when he drafted sophisticated bankruptcy-
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related documents for his wife in her bankruptcy proceeding. The court rejected the
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challenge to its jurisdiction while saying that the suspended attorney mistakenly framed the issue
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as involving a challenge to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's authority or jurisdiction to determine
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who is allowed to practice in federal courts in Wisconsin. The court said that although
7 lhe suspended attorney correctly asserted that the determination regarding who is allowed to
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practice in the federal courts is for the federal courts to make, the COllrt concluded that it had
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the authorityto make the ultimate determination of whether an attorney whose license is suspended
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had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Wisconsin. The court noted that,
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although the suspended attorney obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court specitically
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authorizing
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him to assist his wife (and apparently obtain an advance approval from the Bankruptcy
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Court for compensation related to subsequently performed legal services), he also
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made an inquiry with the Wisconsin Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility and its
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resolution counsel told him that he should not represent his wife as an attorney in the bankruptcy
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proceeding. The Wisconsin Board's resolution counsel apparently took the position that
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the Bankruptcy Court's order only authorized the suspended attorney to assist his wife "to the
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extent that any spouse of a pro se debtor would" and the cOUl1 reasoned that the Bankruptcy
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Court order did not supersede the prohibition of Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 22.26(2). The Wisconsin Supreme
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Court agreed with the Board's position, while concluding that the suspended attorney's
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actions exceeded the scope of the counseling provided by a spouse of a pro se debtor, in that
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he provided various legal documents for his wife which required a sophisticated knowledge of
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the law. The documents that he prepared included the bankruptcy petition, a motion for a protective
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MOTION TO WfTHDRA W AS COUNSEL BT
1 order and accompanying affidavit, a document entitled Defendant's Objection to
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Plaintiff's Amendment of the Complaint and supporting affidavit, an adversary answer to the
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amended complaint, interrogatories to the plaintiff and a motion for an order compelling the
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plaintiff to answer the interrogatories, a trial brief, and a brief seeking sanctions. The preparation
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ofthese documents, reasoned the court, with the marshalling oflegal arguments and citations
7 to state and federal law exceeded the kind of participation a pro se debtor's spouse would
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normally be permitted to undertake. The suspended attorney also conferred with opposing
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counsel, drafted letters to the court, and attended court conferences and hearings. The court
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,also thought that it was noteworthy that at the close of the bankruptcy proceeding, the attorney
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sought to recover payment for the assistance that he had given his wife. In the Bankruptcy
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Court. he submitted an affidavit to the court stating that he had provided 187.8 hours of service,
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for which he sought payment at a rate of $100 to $ 150 per hour, for a total fee of
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between $ 18,780 and $28,170. The submission of his affidavit to the Bankruptcy Court showing
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the itemized services established that he directed and controlled his wife's case as her attorney.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court also concluded that the order from the Bankruptcy
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Court which authorized the attorney's participation in his wife's bankruptcy proceeding did not
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supersede the prohibition of Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 22.26(2).
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Observation
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Tn re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hyndman, 2002 WI
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6,249 Wis. 2d 650,638 N.W.2d 293 (2002), the facts of which are more fully set out in 25,
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reiterated its position that it has the authority to determine whether a revocation ofa license to
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practice law under its jurisdiction can preclude an individual from handling bankruptcy matters
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and whether specific activities constitute the unauthorized practice of law. While reasserting
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1 its authority over activities within its geographical borders, it ultimately determined in the
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Hyndman case that the activities of an individual whose state license had been suspended did
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not engage in the unauthorized practice of law when he attended creditors' meetings on behalf
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of a non attorney employer because the individual did not violate the state rules and he made it
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clear to the attending parties that he was attending the creditors' meeting while acting only as
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Conduct of attorney, whose I icense had been suspended in advising a friend about which
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chapter to file in bankruptcy, and advising her not to exempt her house when filing for bankruptcy,
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amounted to the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of the rule of professional
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conduct prohibiting unauthorized practice of law; the advice given by suspended attorney required
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the use of legal judgment requiring legal knowledge, skill, and ability beyond those
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possessed by a layman. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 226, Rules ofProf.Conduct, Rule 5.5(a). In re
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Swisher, 179 P.3d 412 (Kan. 2008).
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suspension of Coughlin's law license entered by the Nevada Supreme Court on June 7th,
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20l2 ... Coughlin does, however, respectfully asl{ this Court for an indication of whether the
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NVB has a position on attorney's, in general, continuing to practice before the NVB when there
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law license has been suspended by the State Bar of Nevada i t(' S
vi 'h:;.;' L .>..-' '-'6-11 J il I // ! J
lilac thIS Court frOI'l'li b..
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DA TED this August 20, 2012.
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MOTION TO WITHD\{;\ W ;\S COUNSEL BT
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4 DEC LARA TION OF ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO WITHDRA W AS
COUNSEL OF RECORD
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T, Zach Coughlin, Esq., declarE under penalty of peljury pursuant to NRS 54.045 that the
following is true and correct:
I. That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada (CURRENTLY
SUSPENDED THOUGH), and thatI have personal knowledge of and am competent to testify
1 0 ,concerning the facts herein.
11 A copy of this application has been mailed to his last known address: Robert Keller
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, (
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this this date a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing, document,was
filed with the CM/ECF system, which thereby caused the above to be served electronically on all
I registered users of the CM/ECF system who have filed notices of appearance in this matter. I fUIther
certity that the foregoing was served via first class mail, postage-prepaid and addressed as follows:
(J
MICHAEL P. O' ROURKE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 6764
O'ROURKE LA W GROUP, PC
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 41 00
Seattle, Washington 98104
Telephone: (206) 477-1475
Facsimile: (206) 470-1150
orourkelawgroup@gmail.com
BRIAN 1. SMITH, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 11279
Of Counsel to O'ROURKE LAW
GROUP, PC
700 South Third Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephone: (702) 380-8248
Facsimile: (702) 382-7595
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DA TED th is August 20th 2012
.. .
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Zach C ! ghlin, Esq.
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Attorney for Dt<feIH:laMtiDebtor Kell&
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MOTI ON TO WrTHDRA W AS COUNSEL 8T