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Catherine Malabou Article first published online: 28 FEB 2007
Volume 17, Issue 1, pages 16–25, February 2007
To what extent can the visibility of a thought be questioned when that thought is still in process? How does an idea appear? How does an idea communicate or signal its presence to the mind when it does not yet exist in the objectivized form of a work? Even in this larval stage, an idea does have a concrete existence: It manifests itself in the form of an eye that stares at the one who is thinking it. The birth of an idea is thus the birth of a gaze. This gaze is none other than language itself, which, when it gives itself in the emergence of an idea, is shared between a signifying face and a plastic face—between discourse and figure, to cite the title of Jean-François Lyotard’s principal text. Through the idea, the eye of language looks at us and settles “at the edge of discourse.”
If one looks at the etymology, one finds that to denote directed vision French resorts to the word regard [gaze], whose root originally referred not to the act of seeing but to expectation, concern, watchfulness, consideration, and safeguard, made emphatic by the addition of a prefix expressing a redoubling or return. Regarder [to look at, to gaze upon] is a movement that aims to recapture, reprendre sous garde, [to place in safekeeping once again]. Starobinski (1961/1989, p. 2) I’d like to talk about a strange state of vision: the vision of thought. What is it to see a thought? To see a thought coming? To be present at its emergence, at the moment when it is still no more than a promise, plan, or sketch, but is already strong enough to live? What is it to see before writing, when a brand-new thought can already be apprehended sensibly, sensually, like a body? How should we approach that strange state of half-carnal, half-intelligible vision that oversees the torments of the text even as it establishes the suspended spatial presence of the text? I am interested in the schema of discourse, where schema is understood in terms of the famous meaning Kant gave it as “a general procedure of the imagination for procuring an image for a concept” (1781/1965, p. 183). What I want to explore first of all are the processes by which a thought, an idea, or an intellectual motive allows itself to be figured before adhering to a definitive form. The second objective of this analysis is to explore these processes in the light of a philosophical fracture prevalent throughout the 20th century among thinkers who questioned a particular conception of the connection between the idea and the sensible, between idealization and writing, or between concept and text.
to be able to see what one loses. However. In fact. The eye that borders discourse does see something other than discourse. then to see another thought must designate one of the ways in which language both sees and schematizes itself. Deleuze. to draw a distinction between them. nor is it yours. other elements of the analysis are required: What is it to see a thought? How does a thought announce itself sensibly? To start with. even as they redefine the notion of intellectual visibility. while also naming the absence. creating. Its demiurgical powers are not of this order. Instead. . it is not the prelinguistic gap regulating the relation of word to thing outside of language and without it. language begins by making things disappear since to speak is to reveal the possibility of naming things in their absence. The “world-function” of discourse. is faced with a radical challenge? What happens when the visibility of thought is no longer ontologically guaranteed by the transcendence of the object? What happens when vision is enclosed by the limits of discourse and writing. In the traditional conception of thought. consider the question of the space and time of thought. The question is then that of knowing how—and here we grasp the full meaning of Lyotard’s title Discours. In the philosophical tradition. as well as the sensibility of the idea. to cite only a few. This is another way of saying that language actually opens and founds that from which all too often it is thought to derive: namely. as a thick object to synthesize. figure (1985/2006. the visibility of thought is defined in terms of transcendence: The Idea is visible because it comes from elsewhere to impose itself on the mind as a phenomenon that the mind must welcome. p. to be able to lose is also to be able to see. p. p. with no real outside? How does thought figure itself when the figurable and thinkable. from the outset. not a distance prior to language. referentiality. Thus. This eye is not mine.French philosophers such as Lyotard. therefore. “The world is a function of language (…) all speech constitutes that which it designates in the world. 129.” to borrow an expression from Jean-François Lyotard’s book. The distance is in fact given with language. which implies that the ideal object is given as an absolute referent outside the intellect. To speak is to lose. as an object to decode” (1985. Discours. it is not the eye of a subject or of a subject able to see herself2 think. is thus precisely what Lyotard means by the “distance where the eye settles at the edge of discourse” (1985. and make its own. 129. and Levinas. p. an optical arrangement that language brings up to its edge through its structure. “Language is not a homogenous milieu. as central to their work. Derrida. by definition. or forming it. as well as writers such as Blanchot. and to be able to say that one sees it. 38). Before returning to our topic. my translation). 83. receives it without ever inventing. it is worth noting that if the eye that settles at the edge of discourse comes from discourse. But in this instance. this is not to say that language has the power to make things exist. to see thought designates the actual act of contemplation. my translation). are nonetheless coalescent?1 We must assume that there is “an eye at the edge of discourse. so that talking gives birth to the visibility of its subject matter. which ensures the constancy and possible evanescence of the world itself. The distance that both separates and brings together language and subject matter is. This is the Platonic meaning of theoria: The idea. but this “other thing” can only be envisaged as a function of discourse. the eye is the eye of discourse itself. The word that destines saying and seeing to each another is inscribed originally in their regard for each other. interiorize. What happens to the possibility of seeing thought when this conception of transcendence. it is divisive because it exteriorizes the sensible opposite itself” (1985. is that which allows itself to be seen as an image (eidos) and the soul is the eye that apprehends it—in other words. my translation). as Lyotard claims.
and sound out the power of the eye. 37). p. the mirroring is breached.3 To see a thought is thus to specify it in the figural. Language involves a necessary spatial manifestation. But just as there is an irreducible distortion in language between discourse and figure. “an exteriority that cannot be interiorized as signification” (Lyotard. and how it unfolds in both linguistic and figural space. as I explained above. and volume. and idea and flesh. In Difference and Repetition. 9. This exteriority. 37) “The [artistic] figure is a deformation that imposes another form on the arrangement of linguistic units” (1985. Nevertheless. From the opening lines of his book. without being one more than the other. inasmuch as it is never more than another mode of being of the idea. If one sticks to the presence of the idea in writing.” we must examine the distortion between the sayable as a gaping tear. To see a thought rise. one might then wonder how. p. there is a breach of reflexivity. my translation). there is also an irreducible distortion between thought and form. when we ask what it means “to see a thought. it is always revealed as unrecognizable. unknowable. fiction. which is the thickness of the figural. causing an irremissible schism between discourse and figure. taking the form of an outsider whose face is not an immediately identifiable reflection. foreign external eye—that what is irreducibly given is the heterogeneity (call it different nature. a dramatization. therefore. Far from it. Instead. to an opening of the eye twice by attempting to localize the eye of discourse. Given this. p.Deleuze (1968/1984) presents this figuring as a mise-en-scène. to see a thought is really to face a mirror game in which the relation between seeing and seen moves very quickly. p. even though it is visible. he shows that to recognize the presence of an eye in discourse in no way implies that “the given [is] a text” (1985. Lyotard says that art generally goes “from the interior of discourse […] into the figure” (1985/2006. Thus. Essentially. p. which crumples and creases the text and makes a work from it” (1985/2006. but Lyotard says that this “cannot incorporate without being shaken” (1985/2006. Its very dependence makes it autonomous in relation to discourse. rent at the edge of language. p.figure—language renders itself both discourse and figure. is the sensible. Blanchot (1955/1982) describes this movement as the opening of the realm of fascination. my translation) or that the world is a book that can be reduced to linguistic units simply awaiting decoding. he says that the schema is a “dramatization of the Idea” whose goal is to “specify” and “incarnate” it (1968/1984. sense and sensible. to the point that when thought allows itself to be seen. 37). If the figure is not outside discourse. which is both language and look. p. there is neither speculation nor reflection between the two. In The Space of Literature. 39). by envisaging itself. In other words. poetry. to stand at the edge of its creation. the sensible reflection of ideality. 218). 1985/2006. The figural never offers itself as a simple signifier. opaque expanse in which thought is formed. 61. There is. and pure energy. Lyotard insists that it is a matter of unfolding. hence the invariable angst of writing. it nevertheless constitutes the other of discourse within discourse. an originary violence at work in language. It is true that when thought allows . Lyotard shows that this other form is expressed in an infinite variety of forms in painting. saying and form. thought can figure its own gaze. to watch the figure of a new idea necessarily amounts to an intensification of the originary spectacle of language. in the transcendent sense referred to above. if you like) of discourse and figure. “which folds. writing. to give it form—the form of style. The claim that language renders visible that to which it refers implies—and this is the function of this strange.
[…] the gaze coagulates into light. the staring idée fixe deconstitutes the subject. indissociable from figurability. in this present. Someone is there. Thus. but to the indeterminate milieu of fascination” (1955/1982. that the eye. “Of whoever is fascinated it can be said that he doesn’t perceive any real object. this speculative dissymmetry. pp. or the time we share in common. any real figure. (Blanchot. [and] light is the abso lute gleam of an eye one doesn’t see but which one doesn’t cease to see” precisely because it is “the mirror image of one’s own look” (1955/1982. 129–137) would say—inverts the seeing and the seen. Someone is what is still present when there is no one. What does this mean? One might think that the original question. The space between our eye and what it sees—in other words. consists in nothing more than this fascinating materialization of absence. the very process of thought. p. “points us constantly back to the presence of absence […] to absence as its own affirmation” (1955/1982. In Difference and Repetition. that is. 24) Idealization appears as presence. where the eye is not pointed back to something. it has the power to deform or deface us. describing a thought’ movement of maturation. which gives the impression that when one is thinking. 32).” (1955/1982. to figuring absence. because a thought. The fact of being alone is my belonging to this dead time which is not my time. 1955/1982. Perhaps then the idea. 23). to the impossibility of the face—caricature. this someone. Scrutinized by the idea. this presence. as it deconstitutes the subject instead of constituting it. presubjective state through the very activity of thinking or creating. but. which is why it stares at us. But it is not clear that this spying scenario translates so easily. once again. I am already returning to myself in the form of Someone. someone is there.e. thus reflecting itself. Deleuze claims that . to see a thought amounts to seeing. but instead is pointed to its own mirage. for what he sees does not belong to the world of reality. What the eye sees at the edge of discourse is the essence of solitude. it is precisely “the mirror image” grasping “one’s own look. namely a gaze fascinated by the fact of being captured by itself alone. In some respects. between our eye and itself—is the milieu of fascination. p.. sees someone’s face: When I am alone. even when we think that we are modeling it. as much as it is to see no one. 32) and thus “a vision that never comes to an end.”“what one sees seizes sight and renders it interminable. in solitude. i. thereby introducing into the narcissistic loop the sharp edge of a blade that threatens to take out the subject’s eyes. the eye of discourse catches sight of itself between word and figure. In the end. Consequently. we unfurl ourselves before it. But in fact it all looks as if even as the thought is born. returning to a liminal. as Blanchot puts it. it is also to touch the limits of the figurable.itself to be seen. 32–33). “what is it to see a thought?” implies analyzing a process of becoming. of solitude. p. where I am alone. As Blanchot says. how do we know that it is not the idea that gazes upon us at the very moment we think we see it? Could we write without feeling gazed upon? The staring function of thought could be called the superego. is a paradoxical figure of anonymity and impersonality. embryonic. To see thought as someone is to see absence in person. at the edge of discourse. it was always more mature than us. p. How can we have ideas without satisfying the demands of the ideal self? A psychic function could be assigned to this searching power of the idea through which the eye of discourse in some senses turns back against its subject. Levinas (1995. but Someone’ time. Furthermore. At the same time. pp. I am not alone. or yours.
an arch. even if it is maternal. starting from the possibility of her disappearance. Her anxious face appears behind the “multicolored” marble balusters. a sight taken of the becoming of one who thinks. the moment of these identity limbos to which the idea binds us with its stare. for we are always as afraid of losing an idea as we are of losing our mother. that if the mother exerts this fascinating attraction it is because. for we are never fixed at a moment or in a given state but always fixed by an Idea as though in the glimmer of a look. or rather. the idea always threatens us with its disappointment. and from the balcony she sees him returning from a walk. and one might say then. the immense.It is true that every Idea turns us into larvae. the face of the idea is no less impersonal: “Whoever is fascinated doesn’t see. properly speaking. what he sees. as if framed by a window. Perhaps also. His mother’ eyes harbor tenderness and disappointment at once. from the bottom of her heart. When the hero sees his mother looking at him like this. Like my mother. a love which stopped only where there was no longer any corporeal matter to sustain it. The hero is in Venice with his mother. that is. She is waiting for him at the hotel. or arrestation of development. to the indeterminate They. Rather. it seizes and ceaselessly draws him close. Disappointment: “Of this sort was the window in our hotel behind the balusters of which my mother sat waiting for me. 219) The stare of the idea is. she concentrates in herself all the powers of enchantment. There is so much to say about this moment before the subject. it touches him in an immediate proximity. 27) The figure of the mother in the idea is always the photograph of an absence. falling back into childhood. (1968/1984. gazing at the canal with a patience which she would not have . pp. It is because the child is fascinated that the mother is fascinating.”(1955/1982. always fixed in a movement that is under way. p. like a mother. Fascination is fundamentally linked to neutral. therefore. 1954/1993. 1919/2002) comes to mind. it is even less a superego. 847). p. This is badly described as a matter of regression. not only a gaze but is truly a process of fixing. 26–27) Blanchot describes the bond connecting the fascination of childhood with the fascination of writing. on the surface of her impassioned gaze which she brought as close to me as possible” (Proust. she sent out to me. Tenderness: “[A]s soon as I called to her from the gondola. When we feel her harsh stare and regress before it. isn’t that because we are as afraid of disappointing our idea as we were and will always be of disappointing our mother? A passage from In Search of Lost Time (Proust. without giving it the possibility of saying I or me. p.” (1955/1982. even though it leaves him absolutely at a distance. Inevitably. impersonal presence. which is also to return to the impossibility of writing. faceless Someone. appearing when the child lives altogether in fascination’s gaze. Doesn’t one always feel infantilized on seeing a thought? Doesn’t one always feel unmasked as the child one always was? And doesn’t the idea always have our mother’s eyes? Blanchot writes Perhaps the force of the maternal figure receives its intensity from the very force of fascination. he is taken back to his childhood. fixation. it evokes childhood. having put aside the identity of the I along with the resemblance of the self. the idea gazes at me. a sight that momentarily fixes the thinker in an identity without simultaneously sending it back a self-image. and that is also why all the impressions of early childhood have a kind of fixity which comes from fascination.
as the revelation does not exhaust and cannot dry up the mystery of the eye that looks. the desire to figure the eye that sees him. Nowadays she was well aware that an apparent coldness on her part would alter nothing. writing also keeps the secret. All confessions assume that the Other. into action—by the secret of her own work. is therefore that which is both closest and farthest from the one who tries to see the thought or to see herself think. but without this cruelty it is impossible to write. someone. Augustine’s question shows that although God is watching me. Orpheus is also the one who cannot not turn back. I am and remain a child. at my back. responsibility is born. because as we know since Hegel. The attempt to see thought can also be seen as leading to the figuration of a secret. made manifest.” The secret of the eye at the edge of discourse. so to speak. the secret that the eye jealously guards by giving it form. cherishing hopes for my future which had never been realised. etymologically. pp. Augustine: Why should I confess to God if he already knows everything? St. This explains why Blanchot describes the writer as Orpheus. whose form and paradox was expressed so powerfully by St. and it is this specular weakness that kills him. as the one who cannot turn back.” Yet. therefore. which skins it. In the night of hell. stripped naked by a gaze. Derrida devoted some essential analyses to the problem of the secret. 845–846). To keep and to reveal a secret is always to respond: . is the confession. All imaginative writing processes must therefore take the form of blind figuration. There is no speculation. The idea stares hard at us. This ravishing. in its ideality as well as in its figurability. yet. The idea watches me from behind. from this nonvision or lack of foresight. and the affection she lavished upon me was like those forbidden foods which are no longer withheld from invalids when it is certain that they are past recovery” (Proust. also results from the fact that even as she feels herself gazed at by that which she tries to see and figure. It reveals the secret because one can only write under its dictation. the more it is kept—in the same way that a criminal or suspect feels protected in the public space of a crowd. which is why I confess to him. already knows what I am going to say and that I am egged on to say it. and the desire to stand face-to-face with him. The more the secret is revealed. she was unwilling to let me see how much she loved me. without being able to turn round. inevitably raises the ethical question of responsibility. Essentially fallible. one might say. the principle behind all writing. but that one cannot see. Thus. I do not see him looking at me. no reflection between them. The inherent. I see nothing. in which he suggests that the writer or thinker is carried—put into gear. Yet. to simultaneously revealing and keeping the secret.”“withdrawn. in the strict sense of the possibility of responding. which is both unknown and unknowable to her. our plans—actually become secret. that is. One can only write once that which is our most personal possession—our ideas. Let us start again from the impossible face-to-face encounter between the eye on the edge of discourse that looks and one that tries to look to see the thought. the impossibility of turning round renders “distance sensible. well-known paradox of the secret. all conscience is constituted and deconstituted precisely by this a tergo perspective. at a time when. in the end. this capturing of the I. secret means “separated.”“hidden from sight. that one is never better hidden than by the visible. that of a blind person who cannot see what is staring at her even as she feels stripped naked by a gaze. with the cruelty of disappointed love. and why. It is worth recalling that. 1954/1993. For it is impossible to think without feeling helpless. hidden from ourselves. the child subject does not really see that which looks at her. To write always amounts.displayed in the old days at Combray. he gives in exactly to the temptation of the desire to see that which fascinates him.
or presence of the Other. discourse separates itself from thought in an absolute manner. as if I had to hand it in. 1965/1969. It reveals itself but prohibits the face-toface encounter or symmetry. 195). yet looks at me and calls me to the highest responsibility: “the . thus allowing thought to see itself. it is always that of another. Its own face. This gaze of the idea makes me responsible for the idea at the very moment that the gaze frees me of responsibility as this eye is not mine. This.to answer it by revealing it. and which scrutinizes everything even as it hides itself? As we know. is my responsibility. But in separating itself in this manner. which starts to live. which is no longer its own. I must keep it as my own. with the double meaning of the genitive: the idea watched and the idea watching. it is not my own. but that of an other. Analyzing the structure of compassion. in other words. Thus is instituted or revealed the “it concerns me” or “it’s my lookout [ça me regarde] that leads me to say. of the Other.’” (1992/1995. thus. (1992/1995. p. that of the Other. 91) So. my affair […] that will nevertheless be mine and which I alone will have to answer for. this gaze that is the gaze of the idea. therefore. ‘it is my business. return it to the Other. Its own epiphany or revelation is a face. To try to see the thought. at the very moment when I am trying to see it. On this basis. discourse relates with what remains essentially transcendent” (Levinas. the face. Derrida asks How can another see into me. Derrida writes [An eye] looks at me and I don’t see him and it is on the basis of this gaze that singles me out [ce regard qui me regarde] that my responsibility comes into being. Thought. to the wholly other. to answer for it by keeping it. inconceivable in terms of formal logic. as a treasure in transit. Language accomplishes a relation between terms that breaks up the unity of a genus” (Levinas. p. then my thought is not mine. because it is not mine. 1965/1969. that I will never know or experience or possess as my own. Discourse puts thought outside itself. yet exceeds any image. is established only by language. On the one hand. as for Lyotard. Levinas (1965/1969) calls this strange presence of absence. it also loses itself. one cannot grasp it. as if it were objectivizing itself. It is a phenomenon. by throwing thought out. p. it succeeds in putting itself at a distance. It refuses to be possessed. At the same time. that which can be revealed only to the other. always results in seeing the structure of responsibility. 195). discourse shows and thereby shows itself:“Better than comprehension. It escapes my vision. “it’s my concern. if the eye stares at me although I am unable to envisage it. sees itself as another. into my most secret self. give it back before leaving. then. p. in its very invisibility. to God if you wish. as a thinker. The face appears. yet. I’ll conclude by asking again: What is it to see a thought? What should I call this embryo of form. which exists without existing. without my being able to see in there myself and without my being able to see him in me? And if my secret self. is a secret that I will never reflect on. because it belongs to the Other. make it public. At the same time. The meaning he gives this concept enables the joining of the two axes I have shown in relation to the vision of thought. but also thereby necessarily a face staring at it. 92) Indeed. For Levinas in Totality and Infinity. it is the speaking being. digging an irreducible distance between thought and that which it figures in the distance: “Absolute difference. then what sense is there in saying that it is “my” secret. who sees what he thinks starting from an eye at the edge of discourse.” This gaze that gazes at me without my knowing what it sees.
is a particular figure. which is someone. “[T]he face […] breaks through the form that nevertheless delimits it” (1965/1969. yet which is in the world. for example). 395). 1965/1969. 2 Note from the translator: An intentional choice was made to use herself rather than the gender-neutral himself or herself. To formulate my question. But even in the introduction to his book. In other words. 1994. p. Donation has the character of disempowering us. discourse-face—as if they were one and the same. yet is no one. Before concluding. an official of the event. I ask myself.“to grow with. not to want to figure or not to want to take the Other in form amounts to missing the Other. Notes 1 Coalescence: from the Latin coalescere. my own thought. pretentiously. which imagines and stares.” that is. it appears as a pure event without a contour and hence in the end without materiality. however. which is secret and public. figure: “To want to make oneself a partisan of the event. The answer to my opening question is now clear: What the eye of discourse sees. As Lyotard says in the opening section of Discourse. as it is no doubt too early to do so—for I have only just begun to be able to see myself think. furthermore. which refers to both the formation of the figure and the explosion of all form. to try to see thought in the process of grasping itself? This is an open-ended question. Contraction of two or more phonic elements in a single element (Le Robert Dictionary. Levinas says. we cannot appoint ourselves to this disempowering” (1985. This is a political move. The face “explodes form. p. I began by unfolding discourse and figure. For Lyotard. or does it just see something that starts from the explosion of all form? I have not spoken about what I might name. The figure is the face of alterity. I only mention it in conclusion. This led me to understand their proximity and distance within face. A state of liquid particles in suspension joined in larger droplets. the face as defined by Levinas lacks form. 198). Does the eye that sees thought see a figure or a face? The development of this single question has led me to posit the apparently irreconcilable difference between the two concepts. the contours of figure and face that we usually take as synonymous with it. What is at stake is the meaning of form. It calls me to answer. In Totality and Infinity. It is a complex figure. do figure and face4 designate the same thing? I have shifted between one and the other— discourse-figure. p. then it is possible that it sees nothing and that in the end all thought dissipates. namely a face. p. Does the eye of thought see a form. two lips of a wound). if they are indeed two concepts. given the personal voice of the . 23). which is both me and other. I am working on the concept of plasticity. intended to inscribe both author and translator as women in the text.” The knitting of two tissue surfaces that are in contact (for instance. which withdraws (to hell. Levinas concludes that this structure of visibility–invisibility is the very structure of ethics.other absolutely other—the Other—[calls for] responsibility” (Levinas. 197). If indeed the face sees the eye of discourse when it tries to look at thought. to which I shall not respond. is again an ethical illusion. what it sees of thought. Levinas too is careful to draw a rigorous distinction between figure and face. Lyotard (1985) differentiates the concept of figure from the concept of face. Nor shall I talk about it. Should we not turn to this concept to attempt to think through figure and face together.
Martin’s Press.). Trans. In P. In search of lost time (C.Sinclair. (Original work published 1968) Derrida. Lyotard. New York: Bedford/St.Scott Moncrieff & T.Williams (Eds. Altérité et transcendance. J. more shaped (as in painting). (Original work published in 1781) Le Robert Dictionary.). K.Smock. figure and visage have the same general meaning. London: Allen Lane.Lingis. The living eye (A. without actors and without subjects” (1968/1984.Wills.). E. The fugitive (C. (1993). Trans. (Original work published 1965) Web of Science® Times Cited: 2 Levinas. (1985).). Difference and repetition (P.Hayat (Ed. (1994). Trans. G. Totality and infinity (A. The gift of death (D. This is why Levinas always uses face and never figure. Critique of pure reason (unabridged edition.Smith. Trans. J.Goldhammer. The space of literature (A. Discours.article. J. M. (1995). (Original work published 1954) Proust. Cambridge. 219). The Lyotard reader and guide. figure.-F. J. New York: Columbia University Press.).). Montpellier. (Original work published 1955) Deleuze. Pittsburgh. Paris: Klincksieck. N.Crome & J. 4 In French. (2006). (Original work published 1961) . PA: Duquesne University Press. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. (1965).Kilmartin. Levinas.Patton. this choice also made stylistic sense. (1969). References Blanchot. (2002). I. than does face. Trans. 3 Deleuze explains further that it is “a pure staging without author. (1984). M. p. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Web of Science® Lyotard. (Original work published 1992) Kant. M. Trans. (Original work published 1919) Starobinski. Trans. E.Prendergast. (1995). Proust. but face is less “plastic” than figure.). (1989). (1982). Ed.). MA: Harvard University Press. New York: The Modern Library. which means something more designed. Taking the side of the figural (M.). In K.). Interdit de la représentation et “Droits de l’homme”. Paris: Le Dictionnaire Robert SNL.). France: Fata Morgana.-F. Trans. New York: Columbia University Press. K.
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