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January 66

Maj Gen Harrg J. Ledeg, Jr.

Col Jack A. Boulger

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

SocialSciences . . . , . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . / . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . Lt Col William M. Hartness,USAR, Ret . . . . . . , . . . . . VyacheslavP. Artemiev . . . . . Leo Heiman 3 11 15 23 30
SovietMilitaryInstitutions . last Cavalry Charge . .

InternationalDisarmament WinItsMeaning . Victoryand Morality .

Curt Gasteyger

Cot Leilyn M.Young,USA

Maj Clinton E. Granger,Jr.,USA . fvfajWilliam E. Odom, USA

Output Measurement . Men and Equipment .

Brig C. N. Barclay,British Army, Ret . . ., . . Davis B. Bobrow

Chineseand Escalation . Decision of Paddy ORorke PeoplesWar . .. . . . . . .

Lt Cot Harry J. Maihafer,USA

MarshalLin Piao,Red ChineseArmy Col David M. Ramsey,Jr.,USA, Ret Maj Robert M. Springer,Jr.,USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PeopleDiplomacy . CommunicationsTask MilitaryNotes MilitaryBooks . . . .


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The Military Review, a publication of the UNITED STATESARMY, provides a forum for the expression of military thought with emphasis on doctrine concerning the division and higher levels of command. The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORk and not necessarily those of the US Army or the Command and General Staff College.

Edito; in Chief Col Donald J. Delaney

Associate Editor Col Algin J. Hughes Army War College

Assistant Editor Lt Cot A. Leroy Covay

Featurea EdNor
Maj Robert L. Burke Layout EWr Capt John A. Maclntyre, SpatrIsh.Amarican Editor Maj Ren6 Ramos


Brazilian Editor Lt Col Luiz de A, Araripa Protluation Officer Maj Norman C. Murray staff Artist Charlas A. Moors

MILITARY REVISW-Publishad monthly by the U. S. Arnr Command and General Staff Collaga, Fort Leav enwmfh, Kansas, in En Iish, Spanish, and Portuguese. i ae of funds for printing of this publication has been approved by Had quarters, rfment of She ArmY, 2S Afay 19SS. ~ ~d- at?% Le*en worth, Kansas. Subscription rates $3.50 (US currency] a Sacond-slees postage year in tha Umted States, nited States mihtary peat o~ces, and thoee countries which are members of the Pan-American Postal Union tinoludirr Spain); $4.50 a year in all other coontwes. Addrees subscri K. tion mail to the Scok Oeparfrrrant, U. ! Army Command and Genarel Staff College, Fort Leavenworth Kansas 6S027.

With this issue the Military Review completes 44 years of publication as the Armys senior professional journal. The year was one of achievement and change. Circulation increased, our articles were more widely re printed than ever before, new ideas were advanced, and old solutions were debated.

Once again, you, our readers and authors, have given us your wholehearted support and cooperation. Your vol untary contributions for publication reached a new high in both number and professional character, and your nu merous expressions of confidence in our objectives and editorial standards have been a source of inspiration and satisfaction. We would like to say our public farewells to Briga dier General E. C. Townsend, Assistant Commandant from April 1963 to December 1965, who has been reas signed as Commanding General, US Army Intelligence Command, with headquarters at Fort Holabird, Mary land, and to six valuable members of our editorial staff who departed during the past yearyLleutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, Assistant Editor; Lieutenant Colonel J050 H. Fac6, Editor of the Brazilian Edition; Major Rob ert L. Burke, Features Editor; Major James N. Hale, Ex ecutive. Officer; Captain John A. MacIntyre and First Lieutenant Robert K. Lindgren, Layout Editors. We wish them euccess in their new assignments. With your continued support, we will endeavor to bring you in the coming year the best in military thought and evolving military doctrine.


U. S. Army Command
and General Staff College

Editoriul Staff, the MImrAR~ REVIEW

Social and Behavioral Sciences

in Counterinsurgency
Lieutenant CMonel WilIiam M. Hartnea.% United States Armu Reserve, Retired

N MARCH 1962 the Chief of Research and Development, Depart ment of the Army,. sponsored a sym posium on The US Armys Limited War Mission and Social Science Re search. As a result of this sympo sium, attended by some of the fore most social scientists in the United January1366

States, two salient points were agreed upon. First, insurgency and counter insurgency, although two opposing ac tivities, have as their common ohjac tive the winning of paoples minds and support. In attaining thh objecthe, the social sciences have a major role to play. Second, the development of

SOCIAL SCIEN&S the social sciences lags considerably behind that of the pbyeical sciences. Information A~ifable Since this symposium, social and be havioral science research in peycholOgy, sociology, anthropology, political science, h]etory, economics, and inter national relations has heen delving deeply into the rationale re@ired for relating general smial science to coun terinsurgency requirements. We now have readily available more informa tion about the behavioral patterna and focal concerns of people in remote areas of the world than ever before. We have gone a long way in deter mining and defining how the over-all culture of a &a&lcular group or 80 ciety can be translated into predict able forms of onduct. + In ehort, we have made a concerted effort to study those newly emerging nations most susceptible to insurgency, accumulating a vast reservoir of data on population sise and distribution, basic racial stock and cbaracteriatiee, ethnic and minority groups, social structur% and culture. These and many other sociological fields have been re searched in order to find out how these factors interrelate and cause various groups to thi~ and act se they do. Unfortunately, much of this veluLieutcmwct Colonel William M. Hartncse, United Statee Amnu Re serve, Retired, is a C%ufitert%eurgenov Consultant wtth the US Arnw Combat Dsvelopmente Command Special War fare Agsncy at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Prior to his retirement, he WU8 Chief. Coanterkwwgenoy Com mittee, US Acvnv InteUigence School at Fort Holabird, Marplawd. He ie the recipiat of the Central InteUigcnoe Agenqfe 196$ annual awacd for out standing wntributione to intelligmcee through litiwature for his reaenrch in wwnteritwurgenelt inteUigwwe. 4. able data eits unread on the ehelves of reference libraries, Or, if read, it is in many instances relegated to background information in tlie mind of the reader, To be truly effective, the information must be extracted from the many written works avail able and adapted and applied in come definitive manner to counterinsur gency. In the type of environment in which insurgency flourishes, technicsl devel opment ie highly dependent upon the eocial and behavioral sciencee for suc cess. It ia no longer efficient to pos seee only the technical know-how for improving the health, standard of liv ing, and internal security of an emerg ing nation. Technical projects have failed, not because of lack of ekill and equipment, but because of sociological factors. Yet the information which, if applied, could have meant success ineteed of failure was readily avail able. Applicationof Oata We must now develop waye and means by whkh social and behavioral data can be practically applied in the counterinsurgency arena. If the prin cipal objective of counterinsurgency is, indeed, to gain control over the minde and emotions of a people and win their suppprt, then the role of the eocial and behavioral sciences is in valuable. 05iciaUy defined, insurgency is: . . . a condition reewlting from a revolt or ineckrrection againet G con stituted government which fcdb ehort of civit war. In the ocwwnt contezt, 8WbVW8iVt? irwurgcnql ia prhnurily Communist impired, ez@ported, or ex ploited. ActuaUy, the term (insurgency is probably one of the most misunder stood words in common use today. It
Military Review

is generally reaJized that the scope of insurgency embracee more than guerrilla warfare, that somewhere in the picture economic, poJitieal, and , other sociological feetore are involved. But the exact role of theee factors how they are applied in the i~sur gency process-is understood by few. The broad conceDt of insurxencv

throughout the entire insurgency procees, juet as guerrilla warfare, once introduced, continues on and supports the tlnal conventional-type warfare phaee. Subversion lays the groundwork for insurgency, and, without thk+ subver sion, which is designed to cond]tion the minds of a ueenle asrainet their

,. A?WW New. Fe.ztuves Sick Call conducted by the US-spens&d Medical Civil Actien Program and the Vietnamese Government has treated ever 100,000patients in rural Vietnam
might be better understood if we re fer to it as a three-phase process of insurrection beginning with subver sion which progresses into guerrilla warfare and which, if not stemmed, may lead into a war of movement employing conventionally organized forces. These three phaees of insur gency are not rigidly delineated or fitted into specific periods of time. They overlap. Subversion continues
Jmuzry 1965

government, guerrilla warfare cannot be successful. The hard-core guerrilla force in an insu~gency movement nor mally doee not exceed one percent of the total population in a country, and cannot long exist without the. support of a sizable eegtnent of the population. During pbaee I, Communist doctrine prescribes tbbomplisbment of five progressive activities: Eetabliehingan inteUigencebase 5

1 SOCIAL sCiENm throughout all sectors of the target government and society.. Covertly and clandestinely e.ub verting the population or a sizable eegment of. the people. . Organizing that portion of the population which has been subverted into both militant (guerrilla) and nonmilitant (intelligence and support) groups. Training these groups so that they know their exact roles and are prepared to execute them in the pend ing struggle. Preparing forthestruggle which involves tactical planning and a rigid tightening of eeeurity. Trial-artri+rror Process It is during phaee I that the Com munists employ the social sciences with greateat skill and ingenuity. Their skill in applying the eocial eei encee to insurgency hae developed gradually over the years of commu niems existence by a trial-and-error proceee. However, the Communiete early reslizad the importance of ap plied eoeiology in an insurgent move ment, and sociological research has for many yezrs been afforded high the Kremlin. The effectiveneee of Communiet so cietal manipulation for insurgency purposes has been demonstrated in many parts of the world. For example, as early as 1926. the Communist in troduced into Vietnam six indigenous subversive agents whose backgrounds and training well qualified them for infiltration into influential *sitions in both the governmental and societal structure of that country. By the time Ho Chi-minh assumed power under the banner of nationalism in 1945, the activities and influence of these original six subversivea had remdted in the unification of all youth groups into the Vietnam Youth Group. This group later became an affiliate of tbe World Federation of Democratic Youth, an international Communist front organiaztion. The workers had been organized into the Confederation of Workers, affiliated to the Commu nist World Federation of Trade Unions. An ostensibly nationalistic mass organization of women had been created called the Vietnam Womens . Union. This group later became the Vietnam affiliate of the international Communist front known as the Wom ens International Federation. &roundwork Is laid By 1947, the year of the formation of the Communist Inforpatfon Bureau (Cominform), the groundwork had been fully laid for the Vietnamese apparatus to be geared into the ma chinery of world communiem. Phase I, the subversive phase, had been well laid in prepsration for phase 11, guer rilla warfare, in Vietnam. Most of this had been accomplished through ~PPli~tiOn Of the social and behav ioral sciences. Since the Communists have over the years established sociological subver sive bases in many countriee consid ered insurgency prone, it is obvious that the social and behavioral science fqrces supporting counterinsurgency programs are at an initial disadvan tage. Communists for years have been attempting to mold the minds ,of peo ple in these conntries toward the at tainment of Communist objectives. The issues they exploit are so wide in range of scope and diversity that it is most difficult to meet head on any single issue without considering others. In order to meet counterinsurgency objectkes, the social and behavioral sciences must develop procedures to: Military Review

Motivate the population into sup porting their legal government; this may range from national governing groups to tribal chiefs. Identify the sociological subver sive activities and relate them to in surgency. . Counter sociological subversive activities. Ensure that counterinsurgency activities do not result in a further alienation of the population.

Combat Initial Phase Admittedly, the accomplishment of theee objectives is a major task which embraces all the disciplines that influ ence hdman behavior. In counterin. surgency, the psychologist, historian, economist, and other social and be. havioral scientists are as important ae the milit$wy general. If their ef forts are effective in combating the initial subversive phase of insurgency, the guerrilla stage wili never be reached; if it is, without population support it can never be successful. A word of caution is in order here. The over-all culture of a group is com posed of a cluster of complex and in. terrelated traits or subcultures which affect the behavior of the group. These include such elements as moral codes, occupations, institutions, and power structures. Care must be exercised in counterinsurgency so that attempts to manipulate or influence one subculture do not cause a radical and unpredict able change in the over-all culture which precipitates adverse reactions toward those responsible. The social sciencee can be of great value in identifying indicators of insurgency which predict impending guerrilla operations. Usually, guerrilla warfare has been initiated withh a country before the United States hae become actively in Janumy19SS

volved. The insurgent forces have al ready become well organized, trained, and have so tightened their internal security that intelligence ie either de nied our counterinsurgency forces or is extremely difficult to procure. Before the outbreak of actual fight ing, Communist insurgents try not to alert the target country. They work Quietly and have been so successful that in many instances the entire sub versive groundwork has been thor bughly laid before any overt guerrilIa activity hae manifested itself. In many countries, Communist insurgency has been allowed to develop unrecognized into organized guerrilla warfare. Ap parent unorganized and unrelated acts of violence, for example, have often been assessed eimply as actions con ducted by renegades or bill bandit%. ~ Racognize Overt Signs What is required is a process by which certain overt signs or manifes tations of covert subversive activity can be recognized and related to insur gency and impending guerrilla war fare. It stands to reason that anything the insurgents do that can influence a society toward revolution has to be reflected by some ov.s!rtoccurrence or indicator, no matter how subtle the covert action. The development of these indicators of insurgency is based on the fact that insurgents require baees within the target country to organize and train their guerrilla forces. Security and logistics demand that they have the support of the native population in those remote areas where their bases have been established. One way in which they gain this support is by selecthmly eliminating unfriendly or uncooperative tribal or village chlefe and by continuing tbh elimination un til one is found who is easily intimi 7

, SOCIAL SCIENCES dated or sympathetic to the rebel cause. Certsdn overt manifestations of Communist covert subversive activity have been identified and related to in surgences wbicb took place in Viet nam, Greece, Melaya, and the Philip pines. These indicators were present in all of these countries one to two yeare before the outbreak of guer rills warfare, but they were not re lated to an impending outbreak of organized violence and were ignored. By historical research into early insurgency operation in these four countries, guerrilla bases and strong holds were identified and plotted on a map. A study was then made to de
termine what overt indicators existed before the outbreak of guerrilla activ ities which might have identified these seeret locationa,

The reasons why these activities had occurred were not determined, al though in retrospect they can now, perhaps, he rationally explained. Tax collections may have fallen off because the local population, by their support of the insurgents, may have believed they would be afforded a degree of protection from government tax col lectors. It is also possible that the tax collectors themselves may have been intimidated or by other means re. cruited to the rebel cause. Undoubt edly, a cetiln amount of the tax rev enue due the government was diverted into the coffers of the insurgents. Education a Weapon Reduced school attendance and teacher recruitment is understandable because education in newly emerging countries is one of the most dynamic weapona which can be used in defeat ing insurgency. It is an activity which no insurgent movement will tolerate unless it can control. Further, local youths, by proximity to guerrilla or ganization and training centers, would be more susceptible to recruitment. The drop in agricultural exports can he explained by the fact that the in surgents depend on the local economy for subsistence .support and large stockpiles must be accumulated before commencement, of organized guerrilla warfare. While this type of rationalization may well assist in isolating indicators of insurgency, the point stressed is that it ie not necessary to know partic ularly the cause in order to recognize the effect. Regardless of what trans pired behind the scenes, indicators of the subversive activity were available from open sources of information. It is acknowledged that the five indicators-turnover of key personnel and decreases in tax collections, schooI
Militely Review

Ksy Psrsorrnel Turnover It wes found, for example, that newapaperz in these countries con tained sufficient information to reveal areas where the political turnover or violent deaths of key officials had oc curred with abnormal frequency. Even the obituary columns of newspapers in the capital cities reflected tbe as sassinations of or unfortunate acci dente to functionaries in remote areas of the country. Armed with this in formation, a concentrated etudy of the areas of these abnormal number of unexplainql deaths led directly to the already plotted gaerrilla bases and strongholds. . Checks of the public records in all four countries revealed, in addition, that tax collections, eehord attendance, teacher recruitment, and agricultural exports had fallen off greatly. 5&nifi cantly, these incidents had not simul taneously eccurred in other areas not insurgent dominatad. 8

SOCIAL SCIENCES attendance, teacher recruitment, and agricultural exports-csnnot, in them selves, always be considered reliable indicates of impend]ng guerrilla war fare. Coincidence, for example, is al waya a possibility. Certainly, reliable estimates of the pre~ence of subver sive insurgency will depend on the accumulation of many more similar indicators which reflect changes in the way of life of the people affected. Espertise Required ,?l.zpertk?e in the various secial and behavioral science disciplines is re quired to develop these indicators. For example,, a qualified theologian might well note overt signs, escaping the lay man, which result from tbe tampering or manipulation of the religion of a particular group. These signs might range anywhere from increased or de creased attendance at religious cere monies to modification in theological doctrine, the latter propounded, per haps, by religious leaders who have been brought under control of the in surgents. If a definitive list of indicator com mon to all past insurgences can be developed, it would be a major contri bution to our national counterinsur gency effort. US military attach6e and civilian officials serving in a foreign. country could be provided with a list of proved indicators of insurgency which could be gathered from news papers, periodicals, and public records. A rating scale might even be devel oped which could reflect the possi bility, probability, or, indeed, the certainty of etibversive insurgency ac tivity based u,wn the number of indi cakora present. It might thereby be possible to gain an additional one or two-year leadtime in which to prevent or prepare for advanced insurgency in a cdtmtry wbicb the United States JmuarY 19SS is obligated to assist in such an even tuality. Since insurgency is rarely contsdned in one country, similar indkatora might be compiled and related by US officials in contiguous countries. These might well provide advance informa tion as to adjacent third-country sanc tuaries, training bases, and logistic supply storage sites. Identifying insurgency in its sub versive phase is but one of many pos sible applications of the social and be havioral sciences. With imagination and ingenuity they can also be used effectively to counter the subversive activities of Communist insurgents. They must be used if the people in an area tbrestened by insurgency are to be rallied and motivated into support ing their legal government instead of the rebels. Militsry Action Military action in advanced insur gency is, of course, vital to the sur vival of the country involved. It pro vides time to win back the loyalty of those people who have defected or are syrnpath~tic to the insurgent cause. It strengthens the resolve of the loyal population and protects them from the ravages and reprisals of the insur gence. Yet armed force alone cannot win against insurgency. Concurrent with military action, an integrated pro gram for winning over the pOpulatiOn muet be launched.. In many inetances, the manner in which thk program is accomplished is as important as the meaeures employed. The eocial and be havioral sciences must participate in the effort to win the peoples confi dence in their government. Success in counterinsurgency can not be reliably gauged by the number of guerrillas captured or killed. An e

r SOCIAL SCIENCSS increasing resolveeon the part of the people to support their government rather than the insurgenta and an in creasing number of defectors from tbe insurgent movement are true signs of succees in counterinsurgency. Time is required to educate and convince tbe people that the attainment of their hopes, aspirations, and dreams lies in siding with their legal government and the Free World rather than the insurgents whose promises, while emotionally appealing now, are actu ally empty and meaningless. This is tbe big challenge facing the social and behavioral sciences today.

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Militefy Revlaw

Soviet Military
Educational Institutions

Vyacheslav P. Artemiev

ESPONSIBILITY for officer ed ucation in the Soviet armed forces is centered at the Ministry of Defense in the training institution di rectorate for each of the five branches of the Soviet armed forcesground, naval, air, strategic rocket, and air defense, Control over military training in stitutes is centralized through a sye hnumy 1586

tern of complete subordination to Mm COW.Local administrative and territorial agencies of the military command have no jurisdiction over the operations of military training institutiona. Military educational institutions ex iet on vbrioue levels and can be broken down rnto five main groups: Suvorov military and Nakhimov



naval schools. Named for famous Rus sian military leeders, these schwds provide preliminary training for boys from the ages of 14 or 15 wbo intend to become army or navy officers. After a three-year course they go on to study at medium and uppar level military and naval schoole. Military schools provide courses of three to five yeers, according to brancb of service and specialty. Stu dents enter between 17 and 25 years of age and graduate as lieutenants. Advanced schools for officers of fer one-year courees to updata and im prove officer qualifications in midca reer. Military academies and insti tutes train medium-level and senior officers in three to five-year courses depending on the brancb. The General Staff Academy and the Advanced Naval Academy offer the highest level of military education for senior command and staff officers selected by the Ministry of Defense to attend tbe one-year course. Entrance Requiramenta Attendance at a lower echool is not neeaasarily a prerequisite for tbe next school in line. For example, a young man who haa the necessary prepara tion can entar a military eehml with out having attended tbe Suvorov sec ondary scheol. An officer with the requisite service experience may enter V@cheslav P. Artemiev is a free lance writer residing in Gerrnan#. He is a former ofier of the Mute Seeu mtg 2roop8 of the USSR, a graduate of the Soviet War CoUsge (Frunze Militmyt Academy), and has mtten ezterwivelg on the Sonet armed forces. He is the author of Party Politird Work in the So@et Armed Forces? which appeared in the March 1964 ia ewe of the MILITARY REVIEW. 12 a military academy even if he bas not been to the advanced school for officers. Admiesion to a military academy does require some previous military education, and admiesion to the Gen eral Staff and Advanced Naval Acade mies is restricted to graduates of mil itary or naval academies. Military schools offer extension courses to regular ar@y sergeants who are commissioned upon graduation. The Suvorov and Nakbimov echools were established during World War II for orphans who had lost their par enta in tbe war, for the sons of ds ceased officers and partisans, for the sons of party government employees, and othars who had distinguished themselves in the war. Under current law, the sons of reg ular and reserve officers are accepted. The most capable and quaiified sons of other Soviet citizens are also legally eligible for admission, Selection is by competitive examination, although preference is given to children of high governmental and party officials. Entrants must be physically tit and must have completed seven classes 10 or 11 grades in the US system in civilian schools. Their parenta are checked for political reliability, Curriculum The curriculum covers the normal secondary school program as well as political and military training. Stu dents are organised into companies and battalions with regular officers as commanders. Suvorov cadete spend smnmere in field training and the Nakidmov cadets serve with the fleet. Great etress ie placed on physical adu cation, eporta, shooting, and military bearing. Occasional leevea are granted and students whose homes are in tbe same city as tbe school may spend tbe waekMilitary Rwiow

EOUCATAONAL lSSTITUliONS end at home. Once antared, students may drop out of the course only for certain specified reeeone. Upon grad uation they are obligated to enter a military or naval s$hool le.adbig to a commieeion. There are now about 25 Suvorov schools an~ two Nakldmov naval schools in the Soviet Union. Army and Navy Schools At the next higher level in the So viet educational ayetem are the mili tary schools of the army and navy. These schools provide both a second ary school course of three years and a college-level course of four or five years. Military and technical branch training ie identical in each course, and qualifies the graduate of either
course for a commission. Students from 17 to 22 yezra of age schools from entering the military civilian life must have completed aee

Advanced officers schools for the various branches and services offer 10-month courses to officers selected for attendance by unit and higher ele. ment commanders. Quotas are estab lished for ez~h military district and are albmeted to aubordlnate units by ke dktriet commander: An officer re SOVIET MILITARY ACAOEMIES Frunca Combbwd Arms Lenin .Militzry-Politiezl Artillery Command Atilllery Engineers Artillery Radio Technical Armored Tank Forces Mechaniaetion and Motorization Combat Engineers Military Technical Combat Entineers CommunicetiOns Chemical Defense Rear and Traneport Miiitary Medical Military Juridical Naval Naval Shipbuilding and Armament Naval Medicine Air Force Air Force Command and Navigation Personnel Air Force Engineering Air Defense maine aeeigned to his perent unit while attending the course-and returna to his unit upen completion. Admission to one of the 40 ad vanced schools is besed on perform ance in the officere previous aasign menta, and most Soviet officers attend at some time in their careers. En trance examinations are not required. All studenta iive in barrackz. Fami lies of married officers usually remain in bSlete provided at the officers per manent station. 1s

ondary education, be politically relia ble, physically lit, and have suwcss fully passed the entrance examination. Enlisted men up to age 25, who other wise qualify, may be accepted without a complete secondary school education. Students are. organized into com panies and battalions, and iiving con ditions are similar to those of regular truom. Summers are suent in the field or &h the fleet, and mdets entering their senior year are given practice in command of small formations. School attendance is counted in com puting pay and retirement benefits. More than 130 of these army and navy schools are in existence, each specializing in a branch or skill. There are, for example, achoela in combined arps, artiliery, communications, mu sic, submarines, pilot training, and political subjects. Two years of service as an officer following graduation quah%e an in dividual for advanced schooling. Jamafy1s66

EOUCATIOHAL Irwlllllioms
The military academies and military institutes train officers for idgher level staff and command positions in courses ranging from three to five years. The academies are of two types -combined arms academies which prepare officers for duty in the cen tral army and navy eatablisbment and in major commands of the services; and special academies which prepare
officers with advanced special and roil. itary technical education. The com bined arms courses are three years in

length and the special courses five years. Selection is by application from of ficers who have had previous military education and who have eatahlished excellent records. Applications are submitted through the unit com mander and each succeeding echelon to military district heedquarters. An application may he disapproved at any echelon with no reason given the officer. Applicants who survive this proce dure are summoned to district head quarters for preliminary examinations in the autumn. Those who pass are officially declared candidates for the military academy, and arc returned to their unite until the following year when they take the entrance exami nations given at the academies. OWL cers who fail either examination are permitted to make two additional ah tempts at Least one year apart. Failure on the third try or upon reeching age 39 terminates the officers eligibility, although correspondence course etu denta are accepted to 8ge 45. Successful entrants are transferred from their parent organisetione and

are reassigned after completion of the course. Bachelor and family quarters are provided, and officers spend their summers in training in the field or with the fleet. The military academics offer cor respondence courses, and each acad emy has a night school where officers stationed in a city which has an acad emy may enroll for instruction dur ing his offduty time. There are at present approximately 21 military academies in the Soviet Union. Military institutes differ from the academies in that they teach special ties which are not exclusively military for instance, foreign languages, band direction, physical culture, and teacher training. There are, in addi tion, military departments in certain subjects at civilian universities. Courses at the institutes are three Years in length, and admission is somewhat simpler than the procedure for the academies. Both the academies and the institutes prepare graduata students for more advanced scientific and technical education. Selected offi cers from the other Warsaw Pact na tions attend the academies and insti tutes. The highest level of Soviet militery education is represented by the Mili tary Academy of the General Staff and the Advanced Naval Academy. One yeer courses are attended by senior officers, generals, and admirals chosen personally by the bfhister of Defense and confirmed by the Central Com mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Warsaw Pact countries also send officers to these institution.

Militwy Rwiew

77zeLast Cavalry Charge

Rafael Lubotnik as told te
Leo Heiman

HERE seerhs to be some con-, fusion among military historians concerning the time, place, and circumstances of historys last cavalry charge. I have read articles claiming the last cavalry attack had taken place in Mexico in 1916 (US Cavalry): in northern Greece in 1918 (British Cavalry); or eastern Poland in 1920 (Soviet and Polish Cavalry). Most hletomiana state emphatically that no cavalry charges occurred in World War II.

They are wrong. The worlds last cavalry charge took place 22 years ago on 31 January 1944. I led it at J#mIy W5

the head of my squadron of Kuban Cossacks, But before describing it, let us define what constitutes a cav alry charge. Cavalrymen can dismount from their horses and fight on foot with carblnee and automatic firearms. They can ride and fire their weapons from the saddle. But only an organized at tack by horsemen who utilize the saber as their main close+ombat weapon-and who overwhebn the enetiy by the impact of men, horaee, and cold steel-can be classified as a reel cavalry charge. 15

LAW CAVALRY UlMt6E I had been wounded in the battle of the Dnieper Elver in October 194S, and spent about three months in mili tary hospitals. I had been a StamMna
(sergeant major) in Lieutenant Cen eral Ivan Plievs 4th Cossack Cavalry Corps, and I had hoped to go beek to

my outtit. Pliev% Cossacks were a tough and villainous lot, but they were the best tlghters I have ever seen. If one survived tbe firet two or three months and learned how to live and fight with them, they could be trested and loyal comrades, too. Later, Pliev% corps slaehed ite way halfway across Europe to Hungary and Austria, where the tough Cossacks are still remembered with nightmarelike shud ders by the local populace. Punishment Battalion But the Red Army had a system during World War II under which no wounded men returned to their own units after being discharged from mil itary hospitals. Some noncommissioned officers took the risk of escaping from hospitals before thefr wounds healed, and making their way across the warravaged Soviet Union and the Ukraine to the frontlinee. Traveling without proper documents and orders, they were broken down to the ranks if caught by the military police and sent to dle in the punishment battalion. Bnt those who got through to their units were safe. I liked Plievs outfit, but not enough Rafael Lubotnik, now rssio%tg in Israel, served fer 19 gear8 with So viet cavahy units, including five ycnre drwing World War II. Leo, an Israeli foreign preee correependt?nt, i8 a fr8quent contnb wtor to the MXLmAUY REVIEW.H8 ie the author of Organized Loothtg The Bg.eie of Part&an Warfare: which appeared in the Febnaaiqt 1965 time. 16

to rick certain death in a punishment battalion, With other convalescent eel. diers, I was assigned to a Zapa.cnoi Polk (replacement regiment) in Zhit omir on 10 January 1944. There were about 4,000, of ua, and we had to pa rade three timee a day fof the benefit of manpower-utilisation officers from varioue headquarters. They inspected ue like old-fashioned elave buyers, and chose the men they needed for their unite. It was a wasteful and cruel system which could take a trained artillery man and assign him to a combat-en gineer battalion. But the Soviet in fantry had suffered staggering losses in the battles of Zhitomir, Korosten, and Koraun, and most of the men in our Zapuanoi Potk were sent as can non fodder to the frontline rifle divi eions. Kubanka Headgear I was lucky, I gue&. I etill wore my old Kubanka, the dhtinctive, flat fur hat with a bright silk top. Kuban Cossacks, recruited from the Kuban-Kraenodar-Terek ares of the north Caucssue, wore black fur hate with blue eilk tops crisscrossed by eilver etripes. The Don Cossacks, from the Rostov-Stelingrad region, eported gray fnr ha~ with red tops and gold crosses. The Kubanka headgear was prohibited for frontline use by the General Inapectorate of Cavalry hecause the gay colors of red and blue eilk tops were a dead giveaway to the enemy oheervers. These hate made efficient camouflage impossible, and they helped German reconnaissance aircraft identify Cosesck unite on the march. Since the Coesack corps were used on breakthrough attacks and long-range penetration raids, the mo ment Naci pilots epetted the Kubanlm hate, their intelligence 05cers knew MlliteIY ReviIw

LAS CAVALRY CSAR6E what to expect on their front sectors. But most of us disregarded the order and kept our fur hate on, sum mer and winter. They had already taken away our crimson velvet coats with gold and silver braid, and they had forbidden us to .wezm the black fur cloaks which spread out fike an eagles wings in flight when the horses galloped during an att&k. The fur hata were our last and only distinc tive p)ece of traditional Cossack uni foti, afid the es~t de corps created by wearing them was well worth the 10ss of camouflage. Slave Buyers In any eaee, I still sported my black blue-silver Kubanka in the !ZMtomir replacement regiment when a delega tion of slave buyera arrived from Lieutenant General Vladimir Bara novs let Cavalry Corps. They apotted me right away, and I was appointed a temporary squadron leader in the Baikal Brigade. Captain Grigori Voro nov, the 2d Squadron commanding of ficer, was wounded in his right shoul der. He refused to go to the hospital, however, because he feared he would not be able to rejoin his unit later on. He traveled in a peasant horee cart requisitioned by the brigade medical unit, and reeupernted on the march. , The 1st Cavalry Corps wae origi nally composed of units smashed by the German invasion in 1941. In 1942 two Siberian Coesaek BrigadesBai kal and Uralwere asaigned to the lat Cavalry Corps, and in January 1944 General Baranov had approximately 20,000 men under his command. The main unite were the Baikel, Ural, and Volga Brigades. The latter was not a reel, Coeeack outdt, but composed of wild Tartar and Buriat horsemen and some Soviet volunteers from the C?lmvash district. In addition, we had
Jenuery 1866

four regiments of artille& and one battalion of armored care. The corps aleo had a motorized infantry regi ment, a battalion of combat engineere, and three mobSe supply cobmme of 500 requieitioned peasant horse carte each. Our corps on the march looked like a nomad caravan or gypsy mob, but appcarancee were deceptive. Behhd the motley crowd of emaciated horses, plodding ox teams, peeeant carte, and bearded ridera wee a crack fighting force. Until the end of World War II the Red Army maintained seven cavalry corpe, of which five took part in the final invasion of Germany and Aus tria. The Soviet High Command did not regard mounted horse cavalry aa an anachronism in modern warfare. The cavalry battlea of January-Feb ruary 1944, when our horsemen routed German armored formation, ahowed the Soviet atrategista that cavalry hae a place even in nuclear war, provided certain conditions of climate and ter rain make mobile mechanized warfare impossible. Lull in Figlrting Two daya after I took over WY squadron from wounded Captain Vor onov, I wae given a battlefield com mission of junior lieutenant and or dered to move out toward the Sluch River sector of the battlefront. Things had quieted down after the KoroatenZbitomir battles, and there was a lull in the fighting caused by the mild weather which turned midwinter anow into slush, and village dirt tracks into an impassable morass of mud. There wae only one paved highway in our sector, running from Kiev to Waraaw via Zhitomir, Rovno, Lutak, Kovel, and Lublin. This wee a etrate gic road of paramount importance to 11

LAST CAVALRY CHARGE the German war effort, and it was straddled by 10 armored and mech anized divieione of the 4th Panaer Army. Except for hundreds of kilw meters on both sides of this road, the vast forests and impenetrable marshes of the western Ukrehe and Poleeek Swamps were held by only 24 SS po lice and security battalions in hedgeof Holland and Belgium combined, But toward the end of 1943, the So viet High Command had moved sev eral partisan dlvisione across the Dnie~r and Pripet Rivers to set up seeret forest bases in the western Ukraine, crack down on the nation alist guerrillas, and paralyce German communications by road ambushes and railway sabotage. Strategic Situation In January 1944 the situation was as followe: . German forces: 10 divisions of the 4th Panaer AmIy with headquar ters in Kovel; 24 SS police and se curity battalions; and four armored trains patrolling the Kovel-Samy and Kovel-Rovno railroads. Soviet forces: Lieutenant Gen eral Nikolai Pukhovs 13th Army of six infantry dh%ions, arMlery, and armored units; Lieutenant General Vladimir Baranotia 1st Cavalry Corps; and Lieutenant General Sergei Sokolo#e 6th Cavalry Corps which was similar to the 1st Corps. There were, also, Major General Alexander Fiodorove Chemigov partisan dh+ sion of about 6,000 guerrillas; Major General Vasiliy A. Begmas Rovno partisan division numbering 7,500; and Major General Alexander N. Sa burovs partisan raideri of 4,000. In addition, four partkan brigades of ap proximately 2,000 men each were de ployed on communications sabotage missions about 100 to 200 kilometers behind enemy lines, while special par tisan reconnaissance detachment per formed valuable intelligence and de molitions just behind the main battle front on the enemys aide. Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas: 10,000 men ,in 20 battalions deployed in the KoveMtovno-Sarny triangle. Their policy was to harm both the Milltery Revlcw

DA, The


fnk hat remsfned ae the last dis tinctive pieee of the traditiom+l Casseek

hog fortMed positions. Even in the summer, movement of motoriced unite was impossible across the rugged, jun glelike terrain, with narrow tracks winding among dense gloomy foreeta, and horses sinking belly deep into the aoft peat surface which severed meet of the ground. From 1942 until our arrival dn the scene in January 1944, the area on both aides of the Kiev-Waraew high way was held by Soviet and Ukrainian partisans. In the beginning, the Ukrainian netioneliat guerrilla held sway over a vast territory the site 18

U2T CAVALW CSAS6E Germans and the Soviete as much as possible, but they were neutralized by Soviet patilsan unite and anti-Ukrain ian Polish nationalists. Polish forces: eeven partisan bri gades, each about 1,000 to ~200 strong, were active against the Ger mane. Three of the brigades were affiliated with the pr&Coromunist movement controlled by the Soviet High Command, wbSe four brigades forest patba and dirt trecke had dried out in the sun. On 26 January 1944 our cavalry moved out to hidden assembly areee in the fom#a along the narrow, but swift, Sluch IWer. Early next morn ing General Pukhov cent one of Wle divisions, the 297th Infantry, to break through the German lines at Dubro vitaa, a railway station and emall town located between the Sluch and Goryn

belonged to the anti-Communist Home Army controlled by the Polish Gov ernment-in-exile in London. Early in January partisan agenta reperted by radio that German motor ized and armored units were with-, drawing to winter quartere in villages, towns, and cities along the main high way. The 24 local garrisone held by German security battalions were blockaded by pafilsan unita, but the German Wlgh Command wee confident no attack on the Kovel-Rovno sector was possible before May or early June. The Germans themselves experienced dihkxdties supplying their garrisons away from the main road, and their engineers were unanimous in estimat ing that movement of organized mili tary forces wee impossible before the Jmnuf 1SS

Rivers. The Germans had turned both rivers idto fortified defense lines and massed artillery behhd the third line west of town. The 297th D.ivieion attacked with out the customary atilllery prepara tions, supported only by a dozen sal vos from KatWka multiple-rocket launchers. The Germans, especially their atilllery and mortars, fought back etltciently, and the attack bogged down between the first two @es. At that moment General Sabu$ovs par tisan raiders emerged fmm the foreat six kilometers weat of town, and rushed the German artillery positions, headquarters, hospital areas, and eup ply dumpe. German reaietance crum bled and the partkmns linked up with regular Soviet troopa at noon.


MST CAVALRY lmft6E This wee a cleesieel example of CO ord~nated eetion, involving the mod eration of partisan and regular army unite. Liaison officers from the 297th Dhision, with radio communications, had been attached to Saburovs head quarters to time the surprise at?xw.k at a crucial moment in the main bat tle. WMle Soviet infantry poured. thr6ugh the gap in the German lines, Saburovs partisans looted German stores, picked up booty from the bat tlefield, and melted away into the forest. Diiereionay Tastias They exwuted a 100-kilometer forced march in three days, moving on foot and on horsebaek across i the swamps and waterlogged foreate, and on 29 January attacked the German garrison at Maniewicze, a raiIway sta tion near Kovel. The German battalion was wiped out, an armored train which came up at that moment was blown up by mines, and the fhvn wee eeptured by the pertMana who held it until the 297th Division came up two days later. This operation was de signed to divert the enemys attention from the main show about 100 kilo meters south. On 28 January 1944 General Puk hovs army captured the railroad junc tion of Samy, and advanced west along the railway toward Kovel. On the 29th our two cavalry corps were ordered to infiltrate through the weeds behind enemy lines and attack the main towns in the rem. Sokolovs corps moved out toward Rovao, and Baranova toward Lutek. We encountered little reeietance during the first 48 hours of attack. The partbwm did a good job and the isolated German garrisons were wiped out ahead of us. Guerrilla smuts guided ua along treacherous tracks se where our az%llery, vehiclee, and sup ply wagons soon begged down and fell behhd. We lost eeme horses in the ewamps. The men could be dragged out of the quickeand-Iike mud, but the animale drowned. Aided by the partL saaz, we requisitioned horses fmm the villages we pesaed through, and lived off the land. All supply Iinea had broken down, and we were on our own. General Baranov rode with a group of officers who maintained radio con tact with corps headquarters iu the rear. From time to time, small PO+? biplanes circled overhead to drop am munition, batteries for the radios, medical supplies, and other urgently needed iteme. Our brigade had no regiments and only 10 squadrons whose strength varied from 120 to 180 horsemen. About half of the squadron were com manded by veteran Starshitum like myself who had been given a hasty battlefield commission. Heavy Oppesitien
Our two savalry corps moved on parallel courses from northeast to southwest. The plan was for us to reech the main ldghway, straddle it, and veer in opposite d]rtilone-Soko 10Veast to Rovno, and Baranov west to Lutsk. On 31 January 1944 Soko. IOVSbrigades reached the town of Klevan, 26 kilometers from Rovno, and reported encountering heavy op position. German tauke and mznzer grenadter (armored infantry) had not budged from their fortified positions, and Sokolovs horsemen had suffered heavy loseea. The enemy wee rushing reinforeemente from Kovel via Lutak; Sokolovs situation wee precarious since bbI own artWery and supply col umns bed bogged down in the muddy rear. Sokolov asked Baranov to move out

Mnitaly biew

against Lutak five hours ahead of schedule to relieve the pressure on hh flanks. The timewas 1100, 31 January 1944 when our Baikel Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Gordenko, emerged from the forest oppoeite the railroad junction of Kivertay, some 10 kilometers from Luta2c Only 1,830 me ters of snow-covered fields separated us from the ststion where German in fantry detrained from three troop trains on the sidings. Through binocu lars. we could eee another heavy train pulling into the Kivertsy junction from Kovel, with halftracke and ar tillery.

inforce the German forces around Ko vel and to fight against the partkene. In any case, they noticed ue onJy after we had eroesed about one-third of the distance separating us from the trains. We moved slowly at firet, then at a canter, paeaing into an a21-eut gallop after covering about 400 meters. The wild yelle, flashlng eteel, neighhg of horees, and the unprintable curses hollered by old Coseacke added up to some strange exhilaration and disre gard of death.

Rectangular Fermatiens The Germane saw us then, but too late. The great maes of German sol Straight Line Ilepieyment diers panicked and took cover behind Colonel Gordenko eized up the sit the tracks, under the railway wagone, uation immediately. We had no chance and between the etation buildings. whatever against the German infan That was their fatal mistake, for the try, with their machinegune and mor only way tu fight back a human-wave tars, evqn without taking into account cavalry attack is to form rectangular the halftracks and fieldpieees still on back-to-back formations, place ma their flatcars. If we dismounted and chinegune in the cornere, start firing, attacked on foot, they would destroy and keep tiring all the time. I suppose ue before we croesed half the open the Germane had no experience in re space. sieting cavalry charges. In any case, At the colonele order all 10 squad rectangular formations ae a defense rone poured out of the foreat and de against kavalry went out of fasldon ployed in a etraight line formation, at the Battle of Waterloo 150 years four rows deep. The Rubaku cheer before. leaders pranced forward, waved their Some officers tried to restore order, sabers, cursed the Germans, and ex and a few machineguns opened UP, horted the men to follow them for the but nothing could etop the charge. sake of the Soviet Union. We poured into the etation, elaehing, The lining up and cheering took hacking, and cutting down the enemy come time, perhaps 10 minutes, and soldiers with our eabers, Four equad I expected the Germans to react in rone on each flank encircled the sta some way. But they continued disem tion buildings, chasing the Germans barking from their trains, and form out of their hideouts, and slaehhg at ing up in marching columns to move them as they bunched up to resist. againet Sokolovs flank at Klevan. Major Barsukov, our executive offi Perhaps they did not see ue againet the dark background of the forest, and . cer waved my squadron on toward perhape they thought us te be the ~ the clapboard barracks of a mi2itary transit camp. We eeeured the sabers Hungarian cavalry division which was and toseed grenades into the shacks sent from the Carpatho-Ukraine to reJmmy 1S8 21

LAST CAVALRY CHM6E and barracks while galloping past them. The German soldiers who jumped out of the windows on the other side were hacked to death b~ tha sabara of Llentenant Sidorenkos 6th Squadron. We mopped up the tran sit camp, posted combat screen squads, and returned to the station where the batkle was still raging between the stationary trains. The Germane fought back with everything they had, like deeperate men doomed to certain death. They knew that the Cossacks took no pris onere, but their. resistance wae not organized. Our horeemen ruehed along the tracke, jumping from their eaddlee onto the flatcara and wagone. The riderless horees continued on their way, and the Coseacke who climbed up to the roofs of the boxcars and coaches threw grenadee down between the wheele, or stood up and sprayed the hidden Germane with submachinegun fire through the flatcar floors. The en emy eoldiere who emerged from their hiding placee under the traine were cut down by Coeeacke who pounced on them gleefully. By noon the battle was over. The ware laet cavalry charge had opened the way to Lutsk for other brigadee of our corps which now rode through Kivertsy toward the main objective. We left tbe Trofeina#a. Kommmsda (booty commando) to collect the arms and ammunition, and atrip dead and wounded enemy soldiers of their weep ons and valuablee. The Pokheremmya Komrnmufn (graves registration unit)
wae also left on the battlefield to bury


our own dead.


The Military rial published. will assist are an authority Review welcomes your comments on any mate If you An opposits viewpoint subject, or a new line of thought of your ideas. why not write an article

us and may lead to publication on a certain

for our consideration ? If you have only an idea, query us;, per hapa we can aaaist you in developing an acceptable article.


Militwy Revhw

TheProblems of International . Disarmament

CrIrt Gesteyger HE purpose of disarmament is the establishment of peace, but it is ironic to observe that the nuclear weepon i~elf has actually been tbe main obstasle te large conventional war for over 20 yeare. Just as the presence of such a

Jn making this distinction, disarma ment is understood to mean the re. duction or elimination of armaments either unilaterally or by means of multilateral agreement with or without control meezures, Arms control measures, oq the other hand, are those .

weapon can prevent war, the elimina tion of other weapons does not auto matically le8een international terrzione or ensure peace, as many disarmament enthusiasta have learned after yeere of negotiation. Since 1945 we have also leerned that the reduction of national arma ments is not absolutely neceseary in order to attain control over weapons. Today, the concept of disarmament is being supplemented by the concept of arms control. Jmsefy 1968

which regulate or limit armamenta as to size, type, deployment, or use, In this distinction between an ab stract long-term objective and the modest minimal steps already taken lice a substantial measure of diaillu

reduction of armaments. The Moscow Teet Ban Agreement of 1968 is proof of this etatement. Although it wae not a real disarmament messure, it proved to be fraught with political pitfalls. The recognition of the German Demo 29


DISARMAMENT cratic Republic as a signatory state, the provocation of the Federal Repub lic of Germany, the nonparticipation of France and Red China, and the un safe bypassing of the control problem are only the most obvious ones. The experiences of recent years have shown that a formal treaty, a =ontrO] ~ystem, or an international, control and sanction organicetion are not absolutely necessary for the adop tion of arms control measures. This ie illustrated by the unilateral, simul taneous announcements made in April 1964 by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain to cut down the production of fissionable material. InformalMethod These agreed announcements do not constitute a formal treaty, and there
are no provisions for control or sane.
tions for violators. This type of infor mal method of limiting armaments
shows that today both sides consider
agreements in the politico-armament
field possible. Additional safeguards
against setbacks will undoubtedly be
included here and there, unnecessary or excessive armament efforte pre vented or slowed down, and a certain community of interests in the explo sive field of armament and security politics established. Unfortunately, the public sees in these limited measures signs of a true relaxation of tension. Such measures tend to distract attention from the real This articte was translated and digested from the original, published in ALLGEIHEINE SCHWEXSEEBCHE MsLrrAasarT sCHlssPr {Switzcrkmd) May 1965, under tlw title, Probleme &r Ia terrmtionalen Abriistung. CePU right @ 1965 by #~TE&~mE SC~HE acEaWr. 24 difficulties of disarmament and to cre. ate the impression that all that is needed to outlaw ominons armaments is only a little more good will on the part of those involved. Since each government likes to credit its own policy with the limited results achieved, it wil! be reluctant to dash the hopes of thepoprdation by pointing out that these measnres are on]y peripheral and have nothing to do with disarmament and little to do with political relaxation. It is for this reason that such announcements must not be taken as models for broader arms control agreements, especially since they leave unsolved the central question of control and of sanctions in case of violations. Advarrtagss The Soviet Union knows how to use to her advantage the chance offered by such excessive public expectations. Following the making of the announce ments in 1964, she reiterated her pro posals for the conclusion of a non aggression pact between the NOrth Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact countries, the establish ment of a denuclearized zone in Enrope, and the mntual withdrawal of troupe etationed in central Europe. The West was left with the thankless task of pointing ont the great many political and technical difficulties of these proposals, bringing down on it self the odinm of being opposed to dis armament and relaxation. Finally, there is also the develop ment of United States-Soviet bSater alism which ie shown, in particular, in the disarmament negotiations. To date, all agreements-the hot line between Weabington and Moscow, the reduction in the production of fission able material, the test ban treaty, and the agreement not to place nuclear


DISMMAMEHT weapons in spac+have come about exclusively in b]lateral talks outdde the 18-nation disarmament conference. As matters stand, this is necessary and underetandahle. However, it in creases the tendency to make disarmam ent the province oi the two world powers in which the interests of the other nations are not adequately con sidered, and it diatrack attention from other areas where the arme race assumee dangerous forms. The current state of the negotia tion of the Is-nation conference in cover underground teats, a further reduction in the produtilon of fission able material, and cuts in armament budgets. The latter two measures are likely to be taken unilaterally and without formal agreements. The US proposal for the destruc tion of 480 United States and Soviet bombers within two yeare has little chance of success, at least not so long as the Soviet etrategic bomber fleet is inferior in number to the US fleet and would be affected more by suc~ a reduction. Besides, the Soviets at-

The Roeitw


US A-w Tu-16 Bmfger


The Soviete did not accept the US proposal for the destruction of B-47. and 2u-16 bombers
Geneva can be summed up in a few words. Although the conference has not produced any self-attained results, it hee developed inte a useful insW.u tion in which the East and the West can explore the ground for new ad vances and probe each others willing ness to make concessions. The presence of the eight nonaligned countries has a beneficial effect on the negotiations since the two major pewera have gradually learned to dispense with purely propegand]atic advances. Therefore, the proposals currently dis cussed arc at least related to reality and have prospects. of behrg accepted some day in one form or another. This applies primarily to an agrae ment on the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. It applies also to an extension of the Moscow Treaty to

tach a greater significance to t@.e bombers in the conduct of war than the Amekcans. Conversely, the United States ex hibits no inclination to accept Mos cows scheme for the destruction of all delivery weapons, with the excep tfon of a small number to serve as a mutual deterrent. The United States reasons that the Soviet propesal pro vides no adequate safeguard that a country will not secretly retah such weapons, thereby gaining a decisive superiority. Moreover, the Soviet Union under the nuclear umbrella could again bring to bear her tradi tional conventional superiority. Such objtilone against the pro posed schemes point out the problem atic nature of disarmament itself. The Geneva negotiations have not achieved ., . 25


DISARMAMENT a decisive breakthrough. The reason for this failure ia on one hand the complexity of the interrelated prob leme of the military balance, of con trol systems, and means of sanction, and on the other hand the insepara bility of security, political stability, and the regulating of conflicte. Nuclear Balance The fact that today both tbe East and the West have a strategic deter rent which is to a great extent invul nerable has led to a certain stabiliza tion of the armament balance, the socalled stalemate. Strictly speakbrg, it is what an American expert hae called the balance of imbalance, a balance between parts that are unequal in themselves. The US global superiority in strategic nuclear weapons is ap proximately balanced by the Soviet Unions regional superiority (in Eu rope) in medium-range missiles and conventional forces. Snch a balance is extremely sen sitive to any change. It is precarious in the sense that the loosening of the two alliance systems and the emer gence of additional nuclear powers al low the development of new political constellations which can seriously jeopardize the balance based on Soviet and United States eapqbilities. Besides, the Soviets, who obviously have resigned themselves to the US euperiorit y in intercontinental ballis tic missiles (ICBMS), will object to any strengthening of Western defense in Europe as it could make their re gional superiority doubtful. They did so in the case of the multilateral force and will do so again with similar projects. The balance is eensitive to all dis armament measures which do not ade quately consider the security interests of either side or are not comprehen 26 sive enough to make allowances for the political and military changes which must be expected. Some limited meaaures may be successful in secur ing the etabilit y of the nuclear bal ance for the immediate future, but they cannot ,prevent later technological weapons developments undermining this stability. For example, acqniaition of nuclear weapons by states belonging to one of the alliance systeme will have a destabilizing effect. Only mutally ac cepted restraints in the further devel opment of weapons can prevent or alleviate such a danger to the present balance. Tbe test ban agreement and the refraining from sending weapons of mass destruction into space indi cate that thk is possible, Weapons Disseminatierr Controlling the spread of nuclear weapons will be considerably more dif fmult. Both major powere have a defi nite and understandable interest in such nondissemination. However, in the years to come, tbe manufacture of nuclear weapons is likely to become cheaper and less difficult, and the rea sons for their production and acquisi tion will be ae numerous as they are tgday, An agreement on nondissemination, if it should materialize, will have to take into account several problems: the control of technological informa tion on fissionable material and, of course, on nuclear weapons them selves; furnishing of delivery means to countries which already have nuclear warheads; and, finally, the handing over of component necessary for nu clear armament such as reactors, gas diffusion facilities, and spare parts. In addition to such nondissemina tion agreements, states could under take the obligation not to manufacture Military Review

of control serves to improve-in rela tion to other countriesthe relative military etrength and security of the states possessing them. Srrbconventional Wars Such national arms limitations may promote a degree of international sta bility, but they consolidate the cur rently dominant superiority of the United States and the Soviet Union and detract from the contamination. bf the remaining world with small weapons and the resulting possibility of subconventional ware. It may be that regional arms control measures such aa the prohibition of further weapons shipments to the Middle East or the establishment of nuclear-free zonee in Africa and Latin America guard against this danger or at lezet lessen it. In Europe, where tbe two world powere are in direct confrontation, the eituation is much more complicated. The, plans, for arme control measures in central Europe generally proceed from the idea of a geographical sep aration between the power blocs either by a dmtual withdrawal of their troops ae a etarting point of a disen gagement, or by the mutual retreat of the most important weapons which amounts to the eetabliehment of a nuclear-free zone. of the numerous The history schemes proposed for both types of disengagement in Europe is a his tory of failures. Since both the United Statea and tbe Soviet Union now have a efficient number of long-range mis siles to keep each other in check, they are theoretically in a position to thin out their troops. Both powers, however, unlike France and Great Britain on the one side and a few of the Peoples Democ racies on the other, are still interested

soil, and a host of questions arise, especially the credibility of such a guarantee. The problems posed by the schemes for regional arms limitations, partic ularly in Europe, are just as numer ous. To date, efforts are mainly in the area of national arms limitations, tbe type of self-control by which a country controls its available arms by planning their use only in ,certain caees or by trying to limit the num ber of countries which are to possees certain types of weapons. This type
January 1966

DISARMAMENT in leaving at least parts ,of their forces in central Europe. There are several reasons for tbie, some political, some military. Flexible Response The strategy of flexible response developed under US Secretary of De fense Robert S. McNamarawhich lately seeme to have also influenced the Soviets-calls for the presence of a wide range of meana of defense, from conventional forces to ICBMS. The new British white paper on de fense argues against this-surely for financial rather than strategic me. sonsby pointing out that the experi ence in Cuba demonstrated that the Soviet Union can be credibly deterred from a conventional aggression only by a nuclear threat. The paper con cludes that the West could safely pr oceedto a unilateral reduction of troops in Europe. It seems that euch a strategy can only be executed if it can be handled in Europe by the major powers them selves and at their own discretion. At the same time, the presence of their troops provides a greeter protection against a surprise attack. Even though under present conditions a sur prise attack is an unlikely event, both sides will be reluctant te agree on a substantial troop reduction or with drawal of nuclear weapons nnless there are sound guarantees against euch attacks. Finally, both world powere, rightly or wrongly, consider themselves bet ter guarantors of stability in Europe than either a divided Germany or the East European states wonld he after their withdrawal. Whether the belief in the stabiliz ing function of the Soviet-United States presence ia right or wrong, it touches the basic problem of any Eu se ropean arms control agreement namely, as long as such an agreement does not render the mutual security end etebility questionable, botb major powers would have a certain interest in it. It would ease the material burden and peesibly have political and mili tary advantages such as a greater se curity against surprise attacks, a dis persal of forces armed with nuclear weapons, and thus a reduction of the danger of escalation. However, one must assume that such a. measure would inevitably rest upen the present political status IWO in Europe which, from a Europeen and a German point of view, is neither satisfactory nor acceptable ae a beeie for long-term agreements. Pelitiosl Concessions The danger cannot be ruled out that arms control by the major powers may lead to political concessions by the West which are not at all in Europes interest. As mentioned, the Moscow agreement, as welcome as it is in some aspects, has led to a reevaluation of Eaet Germany and thus to an addi tional hardening of t~ theory of the two German states w ich is advocated on the Communist SI 1 e. It ie difficult to think of agreements on European security problems to which the Soviet Union would subscribe which do not tend to legalise the status quo further. An increase in military security be comes questionable if it must be bougbt by one side at a political price. Therefore, the United States finds herself confronted with an abnoet in soluble dilemma. Either she concludes more bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union (which will contribute to global security but which might weigh on the cohmiveness of the WesG ern alliance), or she gives preference


to the interests of her treaty partners last 10 years of the disarmament ne gotiation show that the West can over the development of the bilateral escape thie danger only if it does not partnership with the Soviet Union. treat disarmament as an end in itself. This dilemma shows clearly that the Disarmament must be viewed as part greetest difficulty of all disarmament measures is to find a common denorn of a political concept which leads not only to a reduction of the danger of inator for the manifoItf and divergent war and an increase in its own secu security needs of the countries in. rity, but also to better political SOIU. volved without jeopardizing their own tiona and overcoming the statw quo. fundamental political positione. The

. . . if we love man, nething is more important than the effert te diminish dangerhalt the spread ef nuclesr power-end bring the weapons of wsr under increasing control, Prssident Lundoa B. Johneon

Jmmy 1W6



Meaningin CrisisResolution
Colonel Leilyn M. Young, United State8 Army

The United States Armv War College pnblishe8 for limited di.ctribu tiew Occasional Papers intended to foster inteveet among military profes eionala ou topics of current importance. Thie article by Colonel Youhg appeared in the firet iseue published 24 September 1965, under the title, Win in Si&aticme Short of General War: Four Ca.ce Studiee Reveal Some Common Denominate. Colonel Young, now with the Otlice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operation in Washington, graduatsd from the USA WC in Juue 19t?5.-Editor. INwhat exactly does this term mean for US military forces committed in situations short of general war? A realistic definition of win can, perhaps, be developed from an examination of four recent commitments of US military power which reveals cer tain common denominator in such cir cumstances. Theee are the 1950-53 conflict in Korea, the 1958 intervention in Lebanon, the 1962 deployment to
Thailand, and the 1962 crisie over offensive missilee in Cuba.
WMle Koraa and Cuba ranged perilously close, all four actions fall outside the, scope of gsneral war as defined by the US Jo~nt Chiefs of Staff, namely: . . . armed conflict between the nm46

jor powers of the Communist and Free Worlds in which the total resources of the belligercnte are emploged, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. Case 1. Tbe Korean Conflict On 25 June 1950 the North Koreans invaded the Republic of Korea in a The surprise, aggressive attack. United Nations and the United States were immediately involved. The limited objective for Koree
immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th Parallelwee adopted on 25 June 1950 by the United Nations Saeurity Council and was acceptad by President Harry S Truman the fol lowing day. Militaly Rsview


As the North Korean advance drove southward, President Truman ordered US air rmd naval forces, and then ground unite, into action in defense of the Republic of Korea. After two months of constant reverses, the UN forces were compressed in the Puean perimeter. Then, the amphibious land ing at Inchon took the enemy by sur prise, cut his supply lines, and thor oughly demoralised and routed Wlm. Thus, by early October 1960 UN and US forces had once again driven north to the 38th Parallel and were Vic torious. , In the first blush of this military success, UN and US statesmen and policymakera haetily abandoned the limited objective, expanding it to one of reunification of a free Korea-a etated goal of. the United Nations since 1947. As the UN forces advanced to the Yaluthe Communiet Chinese border the Chinese entered the coqflict and launched a new war. In the face of overwhelming numbers, tbe UN com mand again was forced to withdraw, finally holding in January 1951 on strong defensive positfone south of Seoul, By June 1951 the UN forces once again were at the 38th Parallel, and pcditical leaders actively sought a cease-fire, On 10 July frustrating peace ,talke began. They were to drag on for more than two years before an armietice wae signed on 27 July 1953. The military armistice eimply re stored Korea to the statwa quo ante belhm of 26 June 1950. Such a settle ment should have bqm poseible in Oc tober 1960 had the UN forces been halted at the 38th Parallel with their a~lnment of the original limited ob jective. At this point, the United Na tione and the United States had won both a military and a political victory. famarf 1333 Y

This win also would have included euch prestige feetors on the world propaganda scene as the suceees of tbe United Nations in stopping aggres sion in Korea and in demonstrating that the nations of the Free World would, and could, unite under the UN banner to fight to maintah peace. The flush of rapid military success after 12 earlier weeke 0 i retreat and heavy casualties-prompted the United Nationa to broaden its objec tive to embrace the unification of a free Korea. This-coupled with the approach to the Yalu by UN forces probably brought the Chinese Com munists into the conflict. The decision to change the objective apparently was made with little serious debate and consideration, and the new goal was hastily abandoned when its attain ment appeared impossible without spreading the battle beyond Korean territory and risking general war un der a nuclear shadow. Thus, nearly three years after the October 1950 UN and US win in Korea, t+e conflict finally was settled on the status quo ante bs!lum of 25 June 1950-the start of the contlict. Armistice came after botb the UN and the Communists had achieved military gains and suffered reveraee, had soft ened in their wills to attain their un limited objectives, had profited and lost through widespread propaganda claims, and had suffered estimated comb]ned casualties of more than two million military personnel and approx imately two million civilians. Case S. The Lebanese Intervention In 1957 Lebanon became the first and only Arab nation to accept the Eisenhower Doctrine. In accordance with the deetrine, Lebanon abrogated a traditional policy of neutrality in in ternational affairs and joined the West 31

WIN in the cold war; in turn, the United States became committed to support Lebanon. In early 1958 Arab nationalism was a strong force in the Middle East. on 1 February President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt announced the union of Syria and Egypt as the United Arab Repubiic and invited all Arab . nations t.n join. In Lebanon strong organized groups and individual, entbusieetically proNaeser, favored union with the United Arab Republic. By early May 1958 armed revolt had grown out of a gen eral strike which demanded the resig nation of Preeide#t Camille Cbemoun and eltilon of a new chief executive. As the situation deteriorated, the Lebanese Government appealed to the United Nations Security Council, charging that the United Arab Repub lic wan interfering in Lebanese int,er naI affaire. The only UN answer was to estab lish a United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon which proved ineffective and caueed the United States to assert that she would protest the legitimate Lebaneee Government if the United Natione couId not. By iete June the Lebanese President indicated that he might have to seek outside help, and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) natione urged US inter vention in Lebanon. A bluedy miiitery cuup in Iraq on 14 July caused governmental panic in Lebanon; President Cbamoun re quested immediate US intervention. President Dwight D. Eiseribower agreed. In an unopposed landhg, US forces entered Lebanon on 15 July 1958 as President Eisenhower, in a radio-television statement, spelled out the iimited objective for Lebanon: ZJnited State$ @rce8 ar8 b8ing sent to Lebanon to protsct American livm and bg their presence to assist the Government of Lsbanen in the pres ervation of Lebanone temtorkd ;m tegritg and independence, which have been deemed vital to the United States rmtional intereete and werid peace. Quieted by the presence of US forces, the internal situation in Leb anon rapidly improved. Rebel subver sion eubsided, a new Preeident was elected, and an acceptable Cab]net fi nally was installed. With tbe internal situation stabSised, tbe last American troops left Lebanon on 25 October 1958. After nearly six months of tur moil, Lebanon was restored to the 8titua quo ante. In terms of the limited objec tive, US intervention bed accomplished its missiontbe preservation of I& anons territorial integrity and inde pendence. Executed without combat and with no interference in Lebanese internal affairs, US intervention was a win in its restoration of the 8tateu quo. There were other favorable condi tions whichwhen reported in there gional and international press-fur. thered the cause of the United Statea. By intervention, tbe United Statea again proved that she, etood by her cmmnitmenta and her friend~ven a tiny one. The character of the in tervention demonstrated to the Arab wnnmmity and the developing nations that the United Statee was strong but kept b~r might in cheek and, after asaisting a friend, withdrew without harming her host. The action by the United States alao clearly demonstrated that tbe So viet Union would not come to the side of the nations of the Middie East. Tbe restraint of the United States in main taining a complete neutrfdity in interMilibfy Review

Wln nal Lebanese affairs refuted charges to $he contrary by Soviet propaganda. The Lebanese intervention was a victory+ US win. Case Ill. The Tkai Deployment A reluctant Aliy of Japan in Wo;ld War II, the Klngdorn of Thailand worked hard after V-J Day to placate the Allies. By late 1946 Thailand was admitted to the United Nations and in 1960 accepted her first military aid from the United Statea. One of the first countriee to offer armed forces for the Korean Conflict, Thailand in 1954 became a charter member of the Southeast (Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the first nation to sign and ratify the Manila Pact. Disillusioned with SEATO and con cerned about Communist activity in Laos, the Thai in March 1962 aought and obtained reeaaurance that the United Statea would provide unilateral assistance to aid the Kingdom in meet ing any aggression-either dhct or indireet. In late April 1962 the scale of Communist military pressure in northwestern Laos increased. As Pathet Lao forces moved toward the Laos-Thai border in early May 1962, President John F. Kennedyafter joint United States-Thai considera tion of a request from the Thai Gov ernmen~nnounced assistance to Thailand. On 15 May 1962 President Kennedy publicly announced the limited objec tive of the deployment of forces to Thailand and ordered: . . . additional elemente of the United Statee milita$y foreee, both ground and air, to proceed to Thai land and to ramain there until further orders. Theee forces-are to help inawre the territorial integrity of this peace ful count~. . . . This ia a defen-riva act on the part of the United Statee and
Jammy 1S66

whotlg caneietent with the United Na tions Charter. . . . The SEATO Council and the United Nations were imme&ately informed of the US, action. The next day the SEATO Council endorsed the deploy ment, and three member natione later provided token forces. Surprisingly, there were only mild Soviet and Chi nese Conmmniat proteste. Not long after the first US units landed at Udon Thani, acrose the Mekong from Laos, the Communist advance toward Thai land stopped. Withdrawal of some US forces soon began, and hy mid-Novem ber 1962 all had left. US forces, simply by their presence and without combat, thus protected Thailand from external Communist aggression, provided military stabil ity, and restored the. dntrw quo arzte. The United States had fulfilled her bilateral. pledge of assistance to Thai land, had proved her determination to support SEATO, and had demon strated to the world her willingneea to withdraw her military forces upon attainment of her announced limited political objective. The %vhf in Thailand provided fer tile material for molding world opin ion favorable to the United Statea. SEATO also was able to capitalize on the Thai action. The organizations report of 1961-62 noted that the quick reaction by SEATO and the dispatch of forces to Thailand gave clear ee surance that any SEATO nation in danger of aggression would receive immediate and powerful support. Case IV. Tbe Cuban Missile Crisis Fidel Castro ezme to power in Cuba on 1 January 1959. During the next three years, relations between Cuba and the United Statea progressively deteriorated as Castro continually moved closer to the Communist eemp. as

WIN Both the Organizztioh of American States (OAS) and the Unitad Nations were wall aware of Castros drift to ward communism. As the United States tightened and then cut off her trade and other relations with Cuba, Caetro increasingly turned to the S% viet Union and other Communist na: tions for trade and aidboth economic and military. By tbe summer of 1962 Cuba wcs armed with Soviet-provided defensive weapons manned by Cubans trained by Soviet personnel. Although vigor ously denying it publicly, the Soviet Union by early autumn 1962 had clan destinely installed nuclear-capable of fensive missiles and jet medium bomb ers in Cuba, Considering these weapene a dan gerous threat to the United States and the hemisphere, President Kennedy from 16 to 21 October 1962 prepared the United States for a showdown with the Soviet Union over the offensive weapons in Cuba. US military forces were alerted and deployed to the south eastern Unitad States, to sea in the Atlantic off Florida, and to airborne readiness for strategic nuclear attack. With all in reediness, on 22 October President Kennedy informed the American people and the world of the Cuban missile crisie. In a radio-television spaeebi Praai dent Kann&dy reviewed the Cuban sit uation and defined the limited objec tive of the United States as: . . . the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive waepene in Cub% under the supmvieion of United Nations ob servers. . . . The President then enumerated ini tial, immediate actions by the United States, including: A strict quaran tine on all offeneive military equip ment under ehlpment to Cuba. . . . 34 The next days were dramatic and tense, as a series of ,mesaegee were exchanged by President Kennedy, Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev, and Acting United Nations Sqxetary Ccn eral U Thant. Then, Chairman Khrushcbev+on vinced of President Kennedys deter mination, ,iurprised by the fait accmn pli of US military deployruenta, and convinced of the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent-backed down. Tbe Soviet leader agreed to dismantle and withdraw offensive missiles ffom the island. Flnally+ver Premier Castros protests-the Soviet Chairman also agreed to withdraw the jet bombers. Only then did President Kennedy con sent to terminate the US naval quar antine of Cuba. A return to the status quo ante of early September 1962 was the out come of the Cuban missile crisis. The United States succeeded in compelling the Soviet Union to dismantle Cuban bases for offensive mieeiles and to re move such missiles from Cuba, In ad dition, upon repeated insistence by the United States, Chairman Khrushchev eventually withdrew hls jet bombers from the island. The United Statee, however, did not succeed in atilning international in spection of the offensive missile sites in Cuba, their dismantling, and tbe removal from Cuba of the waapone. President Kennedy had conditioned his aseurance of no US invasion of Cuba on the establishment of UN ob servation and euparvision in Cuba. when this failed to materialize, the Unitad States was no longer com mitted to a policy of no invasion of Cuba. Although tbe United, States failed to gain her fuil limited objective, the Soviet Union wae willing to concede Military Mew

a return to the atatw gwo: a Com munist Cuba, efosely linked to Moscow, devoid of offensive missiles, but armed with Soviet defensive weapons, manned by Cubans trained by Soviet military pereonnel and civilian tech nicitme. In the face of Castroe refusal to accept internationiil inspection in

entire world that the United States was prepared to tigh~ven te re@ iate againet the Soviet Union with nu clear weapons, if necessary-to attArt President Kennedys limited objective. The Cuban crisis cemented tighter bonds among the membere of the OAS and revealed that cert.eki members

US A-v The peace tefks were te drsg on for more than twe years befere an armistice was signed simply reetorin.gKorea te the statue quo ante bellmn Cuba, the Soviet Union and the United States reached agreement on a verifi cation system at sea and the United States continued her aerial reconnais sance flights over Cuba. International attention was focused on the Cuban miesile crieis, and ex tensive and thorough press reports carried throughout the world the story which reflected favorably on the United States. The US pronouncement wae a clear notice to the Soviet Union, the nations of the Western Hemiephere, and the Janew 1963 would umtea m assmt tne - - txatea a military effor&the quarantine of Cubaby providing token forces. An additional victory for the United States, the Soviet Union, and the entire world was the somewhat closer rapport that developed between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev through their exchange of meesages. This fostered a climate of conciliation and led tc bilateral United States-Soviet Union discussion on dis armament in January 1963. These talks contributed to the completion of 35

WIN the nuclear test hen treaty which wee signed on 5 August 1963. Although not all conditions of Pres ident Kennedys publicly announced limited objective for tbe Cuban mis siles crisis were attained, on balance the United States did score a win in tbe confrontation with the Soviqt Union over the situation in Cuba. What common denominators) ~n be derived from an analyeis of these eeees ? In all, 10 factors can be djs. cerned which were common to at least three of the four crieis situations. The following common denominators in fluenced to come extent the US win in each crisis eituation: . The nuclear shadow, which clouds decisions. The United States, of coursq had posseeeed the nuclear bomb and the meene to employ it for five years hefore 1960. The Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device in the summer of 1949, Although the Soviets reportedly were considerably behind the United Stctee in the development of nuclear bombe and methode for their delivery, the actual Soviet nu clear capability was a cloud of doubt which ehadowed US deeisione during the Korean Conflict. Both nations have eince retined their nuclear weapons, multiplied their nuclear atockpil~, end produced ad vanced delivery syateme. Therefore, throughout all four case studies, the threat of nuclear war waa a common factor of always increasing signifi cance. The political ohjeetive, which de termines the mission for military forces. The commitment of US mili tary forces by the President is de signed to produa a situation condu cive to attainment of a stated political objeetive. This wee true in each of the four eeees etudied. 3s


The publicly announced limited objective. which - clearly informs tbe w&ld of the intention of tbe United States. This is tbe common denomina tor of greatest importance. The objec tive of US military action in each cri sis studied wae clearly and openly an nounced by the President. In three of the four casee, the goals were limited completely; in the Korean Conflict, the exception, the original objective was limited, but later this goal wee ex panded, precipitating a new war. Thla new war reeulted in a re turn to the original limited objective and ended in stalemate-an armistice on the basic of the status quo ante bellum. When attained, the announced limited objectives of each crisis re stored the statw quo ante, but failed to resolve tbe basic reason for tbe crisisthe threat of intervention, in ternal communiem, or domination by international communism. Theee dan gers remained for future solution by diplomate and etateemen. . The executive decision, which presenta tbe enemy with a fait a+ compli. The US couree of action in eech of the four situations was based on the Presidents executive decision under his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. This limited dis cussion by the ,public and the press to speculation and permitted relative se crecy. In the Cuban crisis, ,Preeident Kennedy desired to present the Soviet Union with a fait accomPl&e Cuban quarantine in being with a US posture of complete readiness. In the Lebanese intervention, President Eisenhower did not announce hie decision for the landing in Lebanon until the troops were going ashore, thus attaining a fait azcompli. The deployment of additional troops to Thailand wae eimilarly handled.

MlllteIY Reriow


But in the Korean ContKct the reverse was true: President Troman was faced with a North Korean fait ec comzii. because of ita surprise inva sion of the Republic of Korea. AU four casee indkate that the position of strength-et least initiallyrests with the successful fait ai%ompli. The awareness of the United Na tions, which provides moral support and token assistance. The United Na tions was aware of all four potential cri~is situations before they eaploded. UN military forces in a UN unified command fought the Korean Contlkt; UN stat=men discussed and debated before And during the Korean Conflict and the Lebanese intervention; UN observers inepeeted and report&t in Korea and Lebanon; and the UN Sec retary General undertook a mission to the Wlddle East in the Lebanese in tervention and attempted to serve as mediator in the Cuban crisis, While these UN contributions were of limited value in each of the four cases, the United Nations did provide an open forum for theformation and eounding of world opinion which gen eraUy was favorable to the United States. The regional allianc[which joins together friendly nations to seek the, common goal. Regional alliances link ing the United States in mutual de fense agreements with other Free World nations existed in the Cuban missile crisis and the Thai deploy ment. Individual countries of CENTO to which the United States is com mitted indirectly by bilateral treaties with each CENTO memberurged and supported US intervention in Leb anon. Some SEATO member nations dispatched token forces to Thailand; several OAS members provided token assistance in the Cuban missile crisis; Jmmry1936

and France joined the Lebanese in tervention with a token appearance of a small naval force at Beirut. Great Britahr supported the action in Lebanon by respondhg to the ap peal of Jordan who aeked for protec tion by intervention simultaneously with Lebanon. But the great value of the regional alliance in thk case wes its moral support of the actions of the United States and ita contribution to the attendant favorable impact on global opinion. The bilateral agreelnent, which promises US assistance upon request and protects against charges of im perialist intervention. In aU three ac tions except the Cuban missile crisis, the United States sent her military forces inte another sovereign state. The entries into Korea, Lebanon, and Thailand were undertaken only after a formal request to the United Stetea by the host country. Such requeeta for help under existing bilateral arreng~ mente precluded valid charg~ by the Communists of imperialist interfer ence in the internal affairs of these three c~untriee. The developing nations, the Arab community, and the nonaligned coun tries could observe that the United States responded when invited, sta bilized the situation, and departed from Lebanon and Thailand as prom ised. Only political necessity for mil itary stability has prevented the with drawal of US forces from the Republic of Korea. The defensive role, which limits US alternatives. In each of the four case studies, the announced US objec tive was to attain a limited political goal. when thh was translated into a military mission, the strategic employ ment of US military forces was in a defensive role, although the tactical 31

WIN ~sture temporarily may have been offensive. The strategic defensive lim its US alternatives. There is no choice se to where but onlythe alternative of whether the United States will face the enemy on a,potentiel battlefield of bis selection. The alternative is clear: elect not to become involved. In all four caem, the United States selected the pleoa for action by elee the Republic of Korea and to remain aloof. . The deployment of armed forces, which provides credibility to the de. clared US objective. In all four crisee, US military forces were deployed, al though for the Cuban crisis, aside from precautions for defense of the US base at Guantanamo, there wae no rewmitioning to Cuban soil. In the




King Bhumibel Adulyadej, here inspecting US treep& obtained reassurance that tbe United States would provide unilateral assistance to aid Thailand timz to commit her armed forces to tb~e crisis situations in areas dic tated by the enemy. In Korea there woe prolonged, b]tter combat, but, in the other three eases, there wee no fighting. It ap&ara obvioue that gain ing the objective witbout combat is preferable to the ,Koreap experience. However, it is as obvious that the na ture of the start of the Korean Con flict allowed for little choice. The al ternative was to ignore the plight of 3S Korean Conflict, the North Koreans held the initiative, but, in eetb of the other crises, the US Commander in Chief acted adequately early to con front the enemy with a fait accompli a deployment of US armed might. This provided credibility to the an nounced US intention to gain a limited objective. A show of military force, coupled with a believable intention to employ it, if required, is an essential ingredient of Winning in a mili Militcry Review

WIN tery commitment short of general war. The world opinion bonue, whleh raises US prestige iu the international arena. All four crieee attracted eom preheneive international prese cover age which wcs favorable to the United Statee. In the Korean Conflict,< the Lebanese intervention, and the Cuban missile crisis, the Communist propa ganda mill produced varying charges against the United States. But the conduct of the United States-by ful filling her promises to assiet a vitilm of aggreesien or subversion, by with drawing with the re$um of atability, by not interfering in her hoste inter nal affairs, and by demonstrating a willingness to fight if required-found worldwide circulation through, the press and generally overbalanced the patently false propaganda claims of the Communist camp. Just what did win involve in the resolution of these crisie situations short of general war? Attainment of the publicly an nounced limited objective of each case resulted in a return to the precrisis statue quo, leaving unsolved the deeprooted cause in each case-the danger of establishment of internal commu nism or the threat of the spread of international commu~]sm. In each in stance, a return to the stntue quo ante reestablished the more or 1sss stable situation existing prior to the crisis. This reetored to the diplomata and stateemen an opportunity to negotiate any needed settlement in a climate similar, if not identical, to the pre crieis eituation. In addition, cetiln bunusee in fa vorable world opinion accrue as. a re sult of a win. The developing na tions and the nonaligned countriee were more favorably motivated toward the United States when they observeil the United States meet her bilateral and regional commitments as prom ised, protect her host nation from the threat but carefully avoid internal involvement, and withdraw promptly and witbout persuasion with the re turn of the stability of the restored sfatua quo ante. The strength of the position of the United States in each crisie action was reinforced and her moral propri. ety was enhanced by a UN and re gional alliance awareneee and paWlci pation. Thie also broadened the base of nations supporting the United States. A wider community of coun tries receptive to the US position and deaf to the flow of anti-US propa ganda thus was assured. In addition, a bonus benefit accrued in the form of advantageous world opinion influenced by favorable inter national press coverage of the crisis and pro-US reactions in the opini n $ molding forume of the world.

1 30

Major Clinton E. Granger,Jr. UmtedStates Armu The views ezpreeeed in this arti cle are the authere and are fiot nec e8earily thoee of the Department of the Army, D8partmsnt of Defeaee, or the U. S. Army Command and General Staff CoUege.Editor. WRITER in the Military Re view urgee the countries of the Free World to reconsider their idsss of war and morality in these words: * Mea and natione can become eo een sitive that their ezietence is imperiled, eo refined in moral reepenses that theg cannot defend themeelvee against bratieh forcee.
Anth..y H.rrkan, ,-War and Militrmw lk+?ut. June 1964. m 80-84.

Moral ity,-,

The author espuusse a theme which may have gained advocates ss the ten sions of the cold war have frayed tempers and made men mindful of the goals of both Communist imperialism and the natione of the Frss World. He points out that the morality of warthe written and unwritten rulee governing the conduct of war-are an outgrowth of a particular society, in a particular state of evolution. Many of the ideee that we consider as moral dictatee on the conduct of war are a heritage from medieval Europe in the era of stand]ng armies-not that this indicatee that such a philosophy is not sound, for all rules of conduct have their roots somewhere in the past. Military Review


VICTORY AND MORALflY However, the author carries his rea soning a step further by pointing out thst warfare actually never bas been much of a civilized activity, but bas embraced the very worst traita in hu manity. Wholesale slaughter and de struction are certainly. nothing new; but in many cases have been accepted as norrna by civilizations throughout recorded ~istory. Codeof Chivalry As a comparison, the article points out that the Communist enemy which we face today does not..fight in terms of professional armies under a code of chivalry. Quite the contrary, all people and all resourcee are part of the over-all Communist macfdne, and all are required to contribute either directly or indirectly to the war effort. The author notes that for the Free World to make distinctions between uniformed soldiers and the equally vital civilian suppofi]ng the war ma chine is a fallacy which we can ill afford in terms of national survival. The article concludes that, since conflict is the natural state of affairs, and inasmuch as our present antago nist are not going to fight according to the Marquia of Queensberry rules, we should adopt an ,equally realistic philosophy, for, Nations that lose their instinct for the survival struggle . . . simply cease to exiet. Acceptance of this proposition ~ajor Clintom E. Granger, Jr., hcw served with the 45th Infantrg Divi sion in the Far Eaat, and with 9th Corp8 Headquarter on Okinawa. A graduute of the A?vped Forcee Staff CoUege in June 1965, he in the author of The NeCe88itfl for Change? which appeared in the September 1965 iezne of the MILITMWREVIEW.He b pree cwtly assigned to Headquarters, .?d Corps, Fort Hood, Texa8. hsimy 1866 would open the door to food blockades and other economic measures which would have a direct effect o,n the pres ent ability of the potential enemy to support a future war effort. It would make all the people of an enemy na tion equally individual enemiee. In ad dition, it would recognise the proposi tion that all human affairs are inevi tably in a state of conffict, and would imply that we ehould accept thk etate of, affairs as a philosophy governing our own national-moral conduct. This philosophy negates the ideal iem under which the people of the Free World strive to gain a secure seciety in which tbe inherent value ef the individual, rather than the value of the human animal to the state, is paramount. Survival Sfmggla It should be pointed out that the United States cert.zhly has not ig nored the enemy pepuiation as a part of the total war effort of the enemy. The very fact of our readineee to use vast numbers of mass destruction weaponsa readinees that has been questioned in word by Americans, but not in deed by the Communists-is adequate anewer to whether the United States has recognized the to tality of war. The United Statee has been quick to point out that, however morally dietaeteful, her nuclear capability would be need without hesitation if required to ensure survival. Surely this is not the act of a nation that has lost its instinct for the survival struggle ! Consider, as a further example, the sale of food to a nation that is a mem ber of the Communist bloc. Ce inly, the sale of foodstuffs to a Co? munist nation may be construed as feeding the enemy: hut it has other deeper 41

VICTORY ANO MOSALITY implications as well. Some Commu nists may laugh at the Free World providing the roaources to feed those who would destroy it. Others, how ever, wili consider more thoughtfully the implications of a free society capa ble of both producing food surpluses and willing to consider the require ments of human beings, regardless of their nationality. In more concrete terms, supplying food to a Communist bloc nation tende to make that nation more dependent on the Free World and, hence, less likely to sever economic or political ties by conflict. If the food were to be denied, the only course of action open to the Communist-other than open war in an effort to capture re sourceswould be to take steps to in crease internal production. It is an advantage for the Free World to have a Communist nation at least partially dependent upon it for its existence, As a p rallel, consider also the longrange eff L ts of two varying policies on the same nation. Following World War I, the A1lied treatment of Ger many contributed to continued antag onism culminating in World War II. The treatment of the defeated Ger many following World War IIat leas~ that porti~n which the West can influence-hss led to an opposite re action. Germany is now closely allied with the other nations of the Free World, and is providing a share of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force that helps to defend the Free World against communism. Much of the recovery and attitude of present Germsny is based on a postwar Allied attitude that was based on ethics and humanity. Fundamentally, Ifeeltbatwemukt reject the argument that the Free World, by retaining a sense of mo rality in the conduct of war, is losing the instinct for survival, and will go the way of the ancient civilizations that have since ceased to exist. Much of the strength of the United States lies in tbe adherence to tbe principle that human value is para. mount. Inherent in this philosophy is the necessity to conduct our political and military actions in a climate created by this ethical environment. We can recognize tbe amoraI traits in the Communist society and defeat them, while not accepting their philos ophy that the end justifies the means.

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Oltllut Ilileasurement ,

Major William E. Odem, UmiedStafes Army


O MANAGERIAL problem in the Nation equak. defense pro duction in ambiguity aid illusiveness. The Army, for exampl+like any commercial endeavor+rganizes land, labor, and capital for productive ac tivity. To be sure, ithas more of each than any private enterprise. But a business endeavor, if it faces a competitive market, can measure ite output in money terme. It can deter mine through its profits a minimum efficiency level below which it cannot operate for long. This is not to say, of couree, that determining the max imum level of efficiency, one which creates the greatest profits, is an un. ambiguous problem. Jmlmy1966

The Army, however, does not sell the cervices of its combat units in a competitive market. Holding amonop oly position, it is left with the night marish problem of decidhg what to produce and then of measuring the ac complishment of the production goals it has chosen. When armies fought with simple weapone, prebattle combat potential could be asseesed in terms of troop stren~hs and weapon inventories. Admittedly, the imponderable of brav ery and leadership could not be counted in the same fashion, but the greater the absolute advantage in ma teriel, the more certain one could be of combat superiority. 43

OUTPUT MEASUREMENT This notion of eompering military materiel levels remaine in vogoe to day, and not witkout reeeon, for who would want voluntarily to refuse the advantages of bating more of every thiigthan the enemy in the event of a conflict? Nevertheless, the concept euffers from ceti]n severe ehort cominga: . It doea not consider resource limitations. Itdoeenot take into rwcount the novel characteristics of modem weap onry. . It ignorea the problem of as eeesing the sldll levels of individuals, teame, units, and command; it is lim ited to measuring in terms of real ob jecte and cannot evaluate tactical ekill, morale, and orgsniaatiomd vali~lty. Umited Utility Str@egista working out a defenee poeture undoubtedly do find a limited utility in comparative strengths, and any strategy will dktate certain cate gories of materiel in which quantita tive advantages are essential. Unfor tunately, the more the ketter notion is not restricted to the strategic sphere where it has Patilal validity. It also finds ite way into command practices at lower levels where the variablee to width it addreeeee itself are no longer variable hut dxed by tables of organi sation and equipment. Denied the object of these physical factors, the concept is mistakenly ap plied to indicators of unit eueeeee. Major WiUiarn E. Odom ie a Rua eian linguist currently weigned to the US ilfilitmy Liaieon Miaeion in Ger many. He holo% a Maetc#8 degree from Columbia University where he studied at the Rwmiun Inetitate. Hie article, Armored Personnel Carrier8 in the Soviet Army: appeared in the June 1$65 issue of the b$mmmr R* VIEW. 44 Take, for example, a commander
(from the company UP) who in the
. proper spirit sete otit to eee that Me
unit acbievee the maximum level of
ita combat potential. In everyday lan.
guage, tbie is translated to outstand ing unit which, in turn, mee~ the
attabunent of tdgh ecores on a host of indkatora-records, inspections, teeta, and numerous data+.ollecting programs. OutputTergete Guided by the belief that more of anything will add to the units combat potential, the commander finds no dif ficulty in cheosing output targets for hia unite. He merely deereea that per fect ecorea must be gained in all areas where eucceee indkators apply. The errors in this approach are rank: . When resourcee are limited, and they alwaye are, it may be impossible to produce a perfect ecore in all areas. Even when money and equipment are abundant, pereonnel and time usually are not. e It is a mistake to view the at tabunent of higher ecoree on teete and
, ineptilone se eynonymoue with hev ing more guns, aabere, and cannone
then the enemy. Although it ie surely
arguable that having more weapone
than the enemy ie an objective ad vantage, the came ie not true in every
case of higher scores or ratinge. . An outstanding output in one area may have expended resources whlcb could have been bet@r spent elsewhere. If a company devotes ea ceeeive time to sldning shoee, few or no deficiencies may be found at a formal inew]on of personnel, but the unit weapone could be rusting from neglect. If a battalion wante to excel in sporte or in speeialiaed marke manehip, that excellence muet cost reMilltery Revbn

OUTPUT MEWREMENT sources wldch will not be available for motor maintenance training, or other output& The popularity of the more the be~r concept ie not surprising. It provides an easy way to attdn an ap pszrence of objectivit~ in eolving a truly atnbiguoua problem whil% in accepts lower ecoree in certdrt areee with the aim of producing a mix or combhation of outputs which emounta to a maximum tdal output. Operating under tlds concept, a commander finds the choice of output goals for hie unit dficult to make, but he ia leas likely to set unreelietic

Amw Nam Featwm The concept of comparing military materiei levels ignores the problem of assessing the skill levels of individuals or units comfortable but crocial iesue in mili tary production: deciding which ac tivities must be emphasized and which can be deempbasized in securing the beat over-all posture. An alternate way of viewing the commanders goal-setting problem is to see it ae an exercise in determin ing where and in what proportions hh resources ehould be committed if the units maximum combat potential is to be gained. Rather than seeking per fect scores in all areee, the commander tmuly lW wants proficiency in offensive opera tions, he knows it will cost time and equipment wear. If time is in short supply, he understands that other ac tivities must euffer. Perhaps time in a particular instance can be taken from dismounted drill and gained through extended duty hours. If this is done, parade performance stend ards must be set lower, and indicators of lawer morale beceuae of leee free time muet be accepted. Rationality in the production proc 45


OUTPUT MEASUREMESl ass certainly depends on the SSiciency of the eystem ueed for measuring out put. Military prodw%on ie complex and deee not submit only to simple counting procedures. Meaauring Salwmai How do we measure then? We meee ure by ueing, a formidable array of tests, reports, inspections, and other deta<ollevting efforts. The Army has not been remiss in eeteblishing meea uring schemes; on the contrary, so many criteria of performance, success indkatora, and testing systems are in use that they almost overwhebn the unit commander. In fact, their number suggests that their validity is suepect. The search for objectivity in indi cators or measuring standards neces sarily takes us to numbers. In an attempt to rationalize the measuring environment, we begin counting, es sessing percentages, and gathering statistics. All these numbers, however, only lead to rationality if some inher ent difficulties in using them are over come. Weighting is one of those diflicul tiee. Assume that a battalion com mander has before him several figures training inspti]on scores, veldcle deedline reports, the scores of a tech nical inspection of weapons, and the results of company savings programs. How dose he weigh each kind of figure to determine the over-all suc cess of 8ach company? Can he simply add them up and rely on the total for each unit ? #f he does, he is saying that the savings program tells him as much about combat patential as the deedline re~rte. Obviously, this is not a sensible solution. Suppose he extricates himself from this difficulty by assigning the eav ings program a relatively low weight with respect to the deadline reporta. Now he must try to select relative weights for training results on one hand and deadline reporta and teeh. nicrd inspections oti the other. These scores are all indicative of essential output factors. If a company has em. phseized training, it may do worse on the vehicle and weapon indicators than another company which spent lit. tle time training and much time on maintenance. It is all too tempting to demand equally high ecorea in beth areas end to ignore the subtle probkm of dia. criminating priorities. But the world of uniformly high indexes in all things ie unreal wifen resources are limited. Weighting among indicators is more difficult when it is nezessery to deal with many at the esme time. Combat itself ie a unified criterion in that it tests all arese of output in combina tion; weighting is implicit in that criterion. Paacatime Indiaatora In establishing a synthetic system of succees indicators for peacetime, though, weighting can only be sim plified in the same way when several output factors are measured in their natural supplementary funtilons by one indkxitor. A tank crew protilency course illustrates tlds advantage. It tesie equipment serviceability, indi vidual skills, and crew teamwork at the same time and in their mutually supporthg rolee. In contrast, if the scores from equipment ins~lons, range firing, and numerous individual and crew training tes~ are gathered separately, they present a juggling exercise in weighting to determine over-all tank crew proficiency. At best, we would not know as much about output es the live fire tank crew proficiency course tells ue. Militwy Review

OUTPUT MEASUREMENT Reliability, another ditlicuhy, sim ply cannot be assumed because too often the reporter of the figures has s vested interest in how those figures appear. Figures may become the item of production instead of the results they purport to represent. tbe shadows of the adjectival ratinge, combat ready and not combat reedy. Suppese that the platoons of a tank company are tested and receive scores of 85, 90, and 91 percent. what does the one-percent difference between the last two ecoree actually mean? What does it represent? Can tactical pro ficiency be divided into 100 equal in crements ? Hardly! If we defend these scores by saying the five-percent dif ference between 85 and 90 is more meaningful than the one-gmxnt dif ference, this is tantamount to admit ting that the scoree are purely sub jective. If one percent is meaningless, wby is five times no meaning not also meaningless ?

Troop Savings Program A simple exempIe can be found in the troop savings program., Every sol dier in a unit may purchase a savings bond each paytiay, and the unit can report 100 percent. But half of these soldiers may cash the bond after the minimum .holdhrg period and waste the money. Not only has the intended result been negated, but considerable clerical work has been wasted in the ehort-term purchase and sale of bon&. The reported 100 percent is plainly an Chackiists unreliable figore. Actually, the scores reflect an um pires judgment through a eheeklht. Meet often, when figures themselves become the object of production, they Judiciously used, a cheeklkt can help are very high, a trait which endears reduce the subjective factor inherent them to the commander; it is not sur in a tactical test, but insieting on per centages does not add substance to prising that he is reticent to expose them for the sham they are. the final judgment of ready or not ready. This was implicitly acknowl There is some difficulty, too, with edged when adjectival ratings became a figures meaning. A h]gh rate of the otlScial mode. Nevertheless, the attendance at training does not mean logic of the change has often been a high rate of learning. Nor does a missed, and the practice pereists of high score on a motor ~ol inspection assessing number scores and choeeing mean that the same vehicles will uer form well on field exercises. T~ese an arbitrary percentile to mark the line between &dy and not ready. figures merely tell the commander Perhape these ehadow ecores have where his troops were for certain pe remained so desirable because com riods of the day, and that cetiln pro mander mietakerdy believe that num cedures were followed in the motor bers are objective evidence of condi pool. To read more intu them ie un tion they have not personally verified justified, by umpiring the testa themselves. A variation of the meaning diffi A timing problem also arises when culty is quantity. Frequently, numbers ueing figuree. By the time a com or percentages are used b rate an op mander receives a figure, it may be eration or activity which defies precise a ease of closing the barn door after measuring. At one time, percentage the horse is gone. Absent without scores were used on Army Training leave (AWOL) rates are excellent ex Tests; even at present they linger in Ssnuafy 19S8


OUTPUT MEASUREMENT amplee of this. When ,a units AWOL rate ihcraeees, the commander only knows that a poor situation has ma tured and come to fruition. The mte may offer hints about morale in the pest, but it tells little of the present state of ai%ira. Deadline reports are no different. ,Theee types of indicator provide us with after-the-fact information. It centrating on developing a -positive program for the present and future, Another way in. which success in. dicetors become muddled is through indWiduals confusing them with pro. duti~on methods. In the Army, a method for producthe actMty is com monly deemed sufficient evidence that output is high simply because thet method and not some other is used.

US Amy

Tactical protkienry rannot be divided into 100 equal increments would be wrong to dismiss such data as unhelpful, but timing must be con sidered if they are to be ussd effec tively. The higher the level of com mand, the more serious the timing factor becomes. As a commander tends to adjuet to the lag time to learn about his subordinate units, he can easily fall into the habit of cwnmand by charts, ratings, and percentages. In other worde, he wiU be continually seeking remedial programs for poet errora and problems rather then cona Command maintenance management inspections and annual general inspec tions in large part amount to a veri fication that certah prescribed meth ods are actually in practice. Inasmuch as the ratings from these inspections are treated as a measure of produc tion or output, the method is equated to success. But to assume that the use of a pafilcular method equals successful output is unwarranted unless two questions can be answered in the afMilitayRovimI

to the question, Is the method concep tually appropriate tn the situation? For the automotive industry, the answer is compellingly elllrrnative. To give the same answer for basic training is to make a trainee analogoua to Assembly line a car chassis, an analogy which ia The assembly lin&he funda hardly valid. A trainee does not as mental principle of industrial mass similate training under the impersonal productionrevolutionized production conditions of the assembly line as well techniques. Ite reputation was irre- as he does when he has an opportun preachable, and not to exploit it would ity for establishing a personal rela have been senseless. The enormity of tionship with his instructors. the mobilization task facing the De The committee members cannot fense Establishment at the beginning take an individual interest in every of World War 11 offered the cue for trainee. They can only check his lear the assembly lines entrance onto the ningby means of test scores, the valid military stage. It paid its way in Io ity of which may not stand close exam gistic functions, in maintenance, and ination. The trainee quickly realizes in the handling of large emounte of that he is no longer an identifiable similar equipment, Its employment,.. human being, but only a number and however, was not limited to those a name on a roster. If he is emotion areas-it soon found ita way into ally strong, he survives and develops training as well, where its conceptual a submissive and indifferent attitude validity might be doubted. toward his military service. Even if With small cadres and large num- committee training is found tolerable hers of recruite, it was natural to em for basic training centers, tables of ploy the assembly line in basic train organization and equipment unite have ing, even more so in advanced and less cause kor using it. The best argu specialized training. By forming in ment+dre shortages-cannot be structional committees, a small cadre made for it there. could organize a series of training sta tions which would accommodate com Chain of Command / pany and often battalion-size classes. A glaring incongruity is that a com Just as an automobile chassis pro mittee arrangement bypassea and ig ceeds down the production line and nores the chain of command. It sets each worker performs his patilcular up new lines of responsibility which operation, the individual soldier pro do not coincide with the tactical com cesded from committee to committee mand channel. The ill effects are num to receive an inoculation of military erous. The definition of responsibility knowledge. It cannot be said that the becomes cloudedmembers of the system was ineffective; it trained di committee answer not only to a com visions which won battles. mittee clief, but also to a company or battalion headquarters, and contradic Perhaps under the circumstances it tory instructions are apt to be issued. was the best solution, but how valid This duality leads to neglect and con has it remained for later times? Is fusion, both of which erode the com its use alone a guarantee of maximum mand channel. output ? what answer must be given Imuafy 19s5 4a

tirmative. Is the method conceptually appropriate to the situation in wMch it is used? Do we have evidence that output ie, in feet, increased through the application of the method?

OUTPUT MEASUREMENT Squad and platoon teamwork de creases, and the evdryday training routine doea not promote it because unit leaders are occupied with their temporary committee specialties. The hahit of taking orders from one su pervisor and, in turn, commanding a permanent group of subordhatee is not instilled. The system speeialicee noncommis sioned officers and junior officers in some arwe of training while it deniee them adequate time for others. Thoee proficient in platform delivery tend to do all the formal instruction; the lees effective perform odd jobs in euppo~ jobs which hardly correct their weak nesses. Do we have reliable information that committee training actually in creases our training reaulte ? This queition !s usuaSSy begged by citiig victory in World War 11 ae evidence that output wee eatisfaetory. But did it represent the maximum poseible output ? Would the alternative unit training method have improved the results . ? commanders conduct most of the basic unit training. Personal Contact Unit leuders must master all skills and aspeeta of their jobs to teach their subordinates, and they thereby avoid the atilficiality of specialization. Responsibility ie unambiguousthe table of organiaetion and equipment defines it. Training groups are small, and personal attention can be ex ploited both for instructional purposes and to increaee morale and social co hesion. If the unit recognicee the in dhidual, he will reciprocate and rw ognize the unit with most of his energy. The measuring problem assumes a more manageable form. Each instruc tor is required to test only tho~ in dividuals or elements witbin his tac tical span of control. He has time to scrutinize individual eases for test validity and ceu judge from firsthand evidence rather than eeeondhand numbers. The company and battal ion commanders can devote more time to the conception of rational tests for their subordinate unite, teats which More closely approximate actual com bat tasks, and implicitly demand high standards of performance from indi viduals and subunits. It has been claimed that committee training permits a uniformity of method and quality of instruction and thereby ensures a uniformly welltrained produet. The grammar of this claim may be logical, but the sub etance ie not. Uniformity in method and quality of instruction is mie tekenly aeeumed to equal reliable and rational measurement of kerning. To obtain a uniformly well-trained soldier, uniformly trustworthy meas uring devices are needed. Uniformity in method may not always be essential MllitaIY Rwi~W

It seems proper to observe that even for reeruits the unit method wee ap plied universally in the German Army before andduring World War 11, Ger man mobilisation was compressed into abeut the same time frame se US mo bilization, and German cadres were no more abundant at the beginning. No eerioue etudent of military histery man doubt the tactical proficiency of those German divieione in combat. For abnost every weakoeee of the committee system, the unit method possesses a strength. The command channel is reinforced by use when the squad kaders conduct all individual training, the platoon leaders train squads and platoons, and the company

OUTPUT MEASUREMENT high output. Resources may vary from post to post and from unit to unit, and the learning ability of recruits varies from man to man. These variations compel the use of different instructional methods if the most is to he derived from the inputs. Focusing attention on method instead of on reliability in meaauring is a fundamental misconception of the task at hand. A critical examination of measuring and testing techniques will always reto uniformly

main unfinished business for the pro fessional eoldier. Only by a continuous analysis of the criteria in use, by asking the proper measurement quea tiorm, and by attacking real as opposed to illusionary issues can the Armys meaeuring system be made adequate. Without waye to know what output actually is, we are denied corrective feedback information to adjust our productive activities in a rational manner; the consequences will be a quixotic expenditure of our energies.


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Jmmfy 1936


MEN AND EQUIPMENT EN and quipment-these are the two baeic requirements for waging war. Each can be subdivided into categories-men into leaders, fighters, administrators, and several other kinds; .quipment into weaponq, trucks, wireless aeta, animals, and many more. Without going into much detail, it will be interesting, se an introduction to the modern aspect of the subject, to see how the balance be tween these. two ingredients has changed over the centuries.

shock action type of cavalry and, in one form or another, the eoldler mounted on a horse played a Ieadlng role, in war up to 1918, Another pba8e was the introduction of long-range missiles based on explosive chargea te propel and fragment tbem+rmon in place of the bow, foUowed by guns of ever-increasing range and power, then aircraft, and now the rockete and jet bombers.

Deatructive Powar Throughout the centuries of evolu tion, one trend was constan+the in HumanElartrant creasing use of equipmenk width has The human element wcs peramount become more and more complicated, with primitive man. Hie only weapons numeroue, and coetly. The climax in were a club or epear. This phase was destructive power wcc reached with followed by simple miseila-projec~ng the invention of the nuclear missile weapons euch as the sling, bow, and two decades ago. More recently, crossbow. In nearly all stages of his launching systeme capable of daHver evolution, man used animals for war ing mimilee on targeta thousands of purposes and their influence wae great. miles distant have come into being. The introduction of the camel into Theee weapons are eo powerful that Africa opened up to attack the south we are afraid to use hem, but owing ern frontier of the Roman Empire in to the deterrent policy, we have had North Africa hitherto guarded by im to continue to make and improve them. penetrable desert. Hannibals ele This iq the hiateric background to phanta (247-188 B.C.), although few the present relationship between the in number, were the terror of Me op fighting man and his equipment. Up ponents. The fabulous horsemen of to about the end of the last century, Genghia Khan (1162-1227) were the the basic military problem was the forerunners of the. armored divisions and the blitzkrieg method of warfare. provision of men and their mainte nance in large numhere in fighting Farther west, at about the same condition where they were wanted. time, the armored ldght provided the Now, complex and expensive equip ment seems to have become the main Brigadier C. N. Barclay, British concern. Army, Retired, ia the Editor of The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal. Before discussing the purely mili Cemmiasioned in the Cameroniarw tary aspect, there is one point which, (Scottieh R$@) in 1915, he served in although a political one, is funda both World Ware 1. and II. He cem mental to a proper awweement of the manded a battalion at Dunkirk and problem. Unlike the Western democra later eaw eervice in novthweet Europe cies, the Communists are bent on forc and eeutheesj Asia. Hs wae gradwated ing their way of life on the rest of from Cambsrkw Staff College, and the world. Cornmuniem by tiny 8ince his retirement in 19.48, he has means ia their cry and, of course, &voted hie time to militmy writing. Jeeeary19aa aa

MEN AND EQUIPMENT any meens~ includes war. Under these conditions the Western Powers cannot avoid military operation. The alternative is surrender to Communist tbreata and aggression. It is they who eet the pace. But because of the terri ble consequence for all in the event of a nuclear war, and the resultant activities to advice, encouragement, and the provision of comparatively in expensive equipment. Korea was, in some respects, an ex ceptional case and unlikely to be re. peated on such a large scale. Therq the war started to a proxy pattern with only Koreans taking part. Later.

deterrent policy, the Communists have to seek other means of atilning their ends. The militant side of this program is expressed in tbe liiited type of op erations with which we are familiar. For the enemy tlds kind of warfare is cheap. In ite guerrilla form it can be turned on and off quickly and easily. It does not involve either of the two major Communist powers directly they fight by proxy, confining their 54

however, CWlnese volunteers were involved in such large numbers that for all practical purposes the war changed to one between China and the United Nations, with the North and South Koreans playing secondary parta. The present war in Vietnam is more tfikal of the type of operations to be expected in the future. Not all the troubles are openly Com munist inspired. Some, such as those of the British in Cyprus, Malayeia, MilitavRwiew

MENANDEtllJIPMENT the Persian Gulf, Aden, and parts of Africa-although attributable to na tionalism, plain revolution, or civil warnearly always have a Commu nist flavor and are indirectly epon sored or encouraged from Moscow .or Peking. liro Problem loday We, therefore, have a situation in which the Western democracies are forced to maintain large forces equipped with nuclear and other highly expensive devices which they hope they will never use. At the same tbue, they must be prepared to tight, and are actually fighting, against a guerrilla-type enemy armed and equipped on a light and almost primi tive scale, but very mobile and elusive, well trained in minor tactics, and often fanatically enthusiastic. Although the pattern varies from time to time and from place to place, this, in general terms, is the kind of enemy which United States and Brit ish forces are likely to be up against for many years to come. It is also tbe kind of enemy which the Weetern fighting man, too often trained and equipped to fight hls own counter part, finds hard to beat. Having fought a long war which ended only 20 years ago, it is inevi table that the pattern of that war should be reflected in our armed forces today. However brave and skilled men might have been in World War 11, if they were deficient in essential equip ment, they could not stand up to troops possessing modern weapons in abun. dance. ProvJded men were reasonably well trained, it wae equipment which contributed meet to winning cam paigns and battles. Today, in the type of operations we have in mind, the eituation is very different. The Asiatic guerrilla oper Jmoary 196S ates in small parties and can live off tbe country. His requirements in food are modest; he does not require changes of clothhg, bat% or other amenities which the Western soldier regards es necesaitiee, Moreover, he sometimes has the sympathy of the civil population, or can overawe them by methods not tolerated in Western armiea. His tztilcs are of the hl&and run variety-sabotage, ambush, and then withdrawal to some well-eon cmded base camp, or to merge with the civil PO lation as a peacaful citizen.

In World War II aerial bombard ment against the enemye lines of com munication paid a good dkidend. A massive air attzck on a railway junc tion, port, or other installation might seriously upset the logistic arrange ments for days or even weeks, Similar results are not attainable against a guerrilla enemy. He has no welldefined lines of communication, no vital installations or ports of supply, and no lar~e concentrations of troops. The most effective offensive air action may be low-level attack againet enroll pafiles which ie difficult in jungle country. , Even in comparatively large-scale operations, where the enemy has the rudiments of a regular supply sys temas in Korea and against the French in Indochina-massive bomb ing did not disrupt the Communists plans. In the present operations in Vietnam, bombing has proved 1sss ef fective than expected and, in tbe epe cial conditions existing there, airdelde and aircraft are pafilcularly vulnera ble to attack and sabotage. The came limitation apply to heavy army equipment. Tanks and atilllery are difficult to move in tlick jungle, e5

. MENANB EWWEST across inundated ricefields, or in mountains. The metbode end tactics of the guerrillas do not offer good targets for artillery or practicable or worthwhile objectives for tanks. T@e of the Western soldlers most power- ful weapene-sircrefL artillery, and tanks-have only a liiited uee in these operations. Yet because we do have th~ and because they proved indispensable in the ~contest which

of giving it up, but should dkerd only that which has proved ineffective. Of the two main ingrdenta of%be force.&men and equipmenkmen merit the closer scrutiny. In counter insurgency operations, the eecrat of ,succees lies in having highly trained men who are hardy, resourceful, well led, and capable of operating in inhos. pitable country by day and by night for long periods-men who can beat

ended in 1945, we tend to rely on them and disregard the different cbarscter of the operations in which we are now so frequently engaged. In an age of machines and automation, it is diSi cult to realice that men sad simple things still count. We must not let the pendulum swing too far in searching for a solution to our problem. We must not give UP modern equipment just for the sake 56

the guerrillas at their own game. These troops must be technically well trained in handhg, maintaining, and repairing their weapons and other equipment. Since this equipment will be comparatively simple, thie is not . a serious problem. The other requirement ie a high etandsrd of tactkal training which ie more difficult. Technical trainingthe manipulation of au automatic rifle, Militwy Review

mortar, or Wirelws eebhas ita coun terpart in civil. Jife and comes natu raUy to most young men. Moreover, much of the training ean be ee eompliahed indeore independent of westher conditions. Tsetical training, . on the other hand, has no counterpart in civil life, requires suitable terrain not alwaya available, and is, consequently, not al ways easy to arrange. But against a guerrilla enemy there earr be no suc cess without a high standard of tac tical training.

MENANDEQUIPMENT : service system. The system produces other problems, of course, the main one being the difficulty of getting suf ficient volunteers of the right type to till the ranks. Attitude of Troops There ia one more aspect of the hu man side of the problem wOJdch merits careful consideration, namely the atti tude of the troops toward the civil population. I do not mean at the h]gher l&vele, which will be a matter of gov ernment policy, but that of the fight ing menthe unite, patrols, and com bat gmupe-who may peee through a village or town, or occupy it for a long or short period. It is probable that the inhabitant will be illiterate, very peer, and, per haps, ignorant about the causea of op eratiorm They will not be swayed by logical arguments or political slogans about freedom, demeeracy, or human rights. They will be swayed by kindly treatment, prompt payment for any goods provided or damage done, and, in some cireumetsnces, medical assist ance, and, perhaps, food and clothing. Above all, they will expect some gnar antee that, if they cooperate with the troops, they will be protected and not left to bear the brunt of reprisals by the guerrillas. Unless they can be con vinced on tbk point, it is unreasona ble for the troops to expect help. Experience over many years has shown that in operations against ter rorists and guerrillas it is d]fficult for Western troops to succeed unless they have the good will of a high propor tion of the citil inhabitenta. This is not alwaya appreciated by the troops, and instruction in the corre@ attitude should be part of a servicemans train ing. It is particularly important that it ehould be understood by junior leaders-the men who will be in s?

valueof Susprise
It ia o~viouely impossible to discuss minor ta&Lcs in detail here. There is, however, one point which is worth mentioning-the value of surprise. No offensive operation againat guerrillas is likely to succeed without a high de gree of surpriee, and this is attainable only with troops who are tactically skillful. It goes without saying that troops operating in these conditions must have a goed standard of administra tive training which should include first aid, hygiene, individual cookhg, im provised shelter, and the repair of equipment and clothing. With forces which include a high proportion of shor%-service men, it is , comparatively easy to reaeh a good standard of technical training, but it is ~atilcularly difficult to teach tsc tical training. Thla was the experience of British forces under National Serv ice when many of our unite consisted of about equal numbers of long-service regulars and ehort-service National Servicemen. 1 think I reflect the view of most commanders of fighting units when I say that the atwdard of taetieal train ing has greatly improved since the British adopted the all-regular, long Janmfy 1SSS

MEN ANil EWIIP?4EIW charge of patrols and small combat groups operating independently. The actual circumstances of eSch particular case, will, of eeuree, be a matter for briefing at the time. There have been many iimtancee in Britiih experienc+pafllcularly in Malaya during the terrorist activities there when correct behavior by the troops has turned a hostile or neutral popu lation into a Flendly and cooperative one. ter of operations and maintain them in the conditions visualized in tlds kind of warfare. Fast ships and trane pert aircraft are neeeaeary to get them from the home country or main base to the theater of operations. Lending craf~ binding ships, and hel icopter may be required to transport the troeps ashore.


i.igbbtecc cnd Simplicity Once they have arrived, and are op erating againat the enemy, the main requirement for equipment is light Wectem Okadvantagei Insofar as equipment is concerned, ness and simplicity, consie.tent with it will be apparent that the Weetern reasonable efficiency. Napoleon is re tighter starts with certain inherent puted to have said tl@ he preferred Aizsdvantagm. His guerrilla enemy a moderately brave hum in the firing line to a Bayard 25 kilometers away knows the country, speaks the local language, and probably has the sym too tired to reach the battlefield. We pathy of the local ~nhabitsnta. He is might translata this into a moder ately equipped man who is mobile, at least partly immune to local dis and in the right place, rather than one eases, can live off the countryside, and too overloaded with weapons to move. has innumerable ether advantages. There have been many instancez I have tried to show how the Weet particularly in World War I-of erner can, and, indeed, must compen British soldiers being grossly over sate for these disadvantages by a su loaded with unsuitable, eometimes use perior standard of training. Neverthe less, equipment, and I have no doubt less, this is not enough; he must also that US treeps have euffered in the be given the beat equipment modern same way. technology can devise. But it must be equipment suitable for the purpose, In spite of th~e generalizations, not that which bee been designed for it must he borne in mind that every an entirely different type of war. theater of war requires different treatment. British troops are engaged Heayy equipment . which ean be in sporadic operations in Malaysia moved only in countries with good and the Aden hinterland. In Malay mmnnunications should be discarded. sia, they are fighting a jungle and If bomber aircraft are used, it is pref river war where short-range weapons erable, if practicable, that they should are required and transport is limited operate from carriers. Until such time to river boats, the helicopter, and es the likely enemy develops under sometimes light trucks, but more often water or efficient overhead means of men must move on their feet. Tanks attacking carriers, aircraft so beeed and other heavy equipment are mostly are much 1sss vulnerable to hostile fire useless. In Aden, on the other hand, and sabotage then lend-baaed planes. there are wide-own spaces rind moim A careful survey should, of course, tains where longer range weapons are be made of modern equipment which required and trucks, armored ears, is neeeeenry to get troops to the thee ee. Milltcfy Review

MEN AND EQUIPMENT The essence of all I have explained and, occasionally, light tanks can oper can be summarized in a few sentencee. ate freely. Characteristics of the equipment ra Although highly complicated and expensive nuclear weapons are neces qoired in operations of this kind vary: Personal weapons and manpack sary for the present deterrent poticy, it is men-ordinary fighting men with equipment should be lightweight qnd less sophisticated equipment-wbo are rugged. This applies t? all small arms actually fighting, keeping the peace, weapons, light mortars, ammunition, wireless sets, and rations. and deciding important issues all over Heavier weapons, including me tbe world. The tendency in the West is to un dium and heavy machineguns, light artillery, medhm and long-range derrate tbe guerrilla-type enemy and place too much reliance on heavy wireless sets, and other iteme which might be required in open terqain, equipment which has been designed for other purposes. should all be helicopter loads. In cer The guerrilla soldiers opposing the hin circumstances, where road condi tions permit, light tanks, armored Weet today are no longer the under cars, and heavier equipment may be fed, badly equipped, badly led, and included. badly trained men of a past era. They are highly efficient fighters who are Supporting equipment, such as trucks, riverboats, helicopter, and usually supported by one of the giant aircraft which, although not handled Communist countries. To deal with them effectively, Western troops must by the fighting troops, may be re be superbly trained, both tactically quired to supply and reinforce the and technically. They must be sup fighters, evacuate wounded, and gen ported by the best weapons and other erally keep the troops operational and equipment procurable, but it must he mobile, will vary greatly accordhg to suitable for the purpose. the terrain and nature of operations. ,

Jmmty 1S$6.



Chinese Views

on Escalation
Davis B. B&row

The viewe ezpreesed in thie article are the authove and are not rzeceesarilg thoee of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Atomic Energy Comm&wm, or ang agenc# of the Department of Defenee. Editor. FOCUS on ~ the Chinese re fimes viewe as. exprecsed in their own publications enablee us to see two important differences betwsen Chinese and Weetem attitudes on escalation. Peking spokesmen plsce much greater emphaeis on psycholog 60

ical and political opera$ione ae forms of escalation and as instruments to manage escalation. Their statement also differ in their poeitive evaluation of asymmetrical forme of escalation, that is, of ware where military escalation by Chinas enemy is not matched either by the Psoplee Republic of China or her proxiee. Escalation is here used in a broad sense tu include expaneion of war in geographical, formally military
Unlew otherwise indicated, all references to Chins In thfs mtlcle sre to Communist China the Peoples Republic of Chins.



ESCALATION (troops mad weapons), and political ways. When views are attributed to Chinese: I mean views expressed se being correct in China main. land publications. No assumption is made that these are common to. all Chinese officials. . Chinese Objectives The Chinese leadership assesses the desirability and feasiblJity of particular forms of escalation in . termaof their general policy objective and the intsrmadiata ends which they believe thatthis entails. Simply, the pekingregime wants to become the leader of, the developing countries at the expense of the United States and tbe Soviet Union. The leadership model which the Chinese hope to im plement ie that of suzerainty, used by Imperial China, rather than that of tbe baggage train governments, used by the USSR in Eastern Europa after World War II. We can note that tbis model does not necessarily imply that the Chinese haveto escalate for eign wars to the point of eccupying contested territory, To attain its foreign policy goal, the Pekhg regime simultaneously seeks to discredit and exclude other foreign influences-whether Wash ington, Moscow, or New Delhifrom , target societies, and to persuade key groups in these societies to admire Chinese policies and accomplishments. Accordingly, C h i n es e Communist Davis B. Bobrow is a member of the Dikectors Division of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Ten nessee. A former Assietant Profess&r in the Department of Politics, and Research Aseociate in the Center of Intern+omnl Studies at Princeton University, he is the author of nu merou# articles on Chirze8e mih%aW aflaira.
Jatumy 1886

Party leaders try to communicate three complicated images to the de veloping nations. Three Images The first is that Chinas opponents are both militarily weak . and dan gerous. The Chinese expect this image to suggest that the United States can be expelled from southeast Asia, but that Chinese militancy and sup port are needed te cope with the United States. The second image is that Chinas opponents are both pcditically domi neering and devious. To the extent that this image is accepted, leaders of the developing natione will feel the need to minimise involvement with these enemiee and to reject their offers of protection and assistance. The third image, and perhape the most complicated, is t,hat of tbe Peo ples Republic of China. The Chinese want their own and foreign popula tions to perceive the msinland as both backward and weak, and modern and strong. The first pair of at tributes is meant to suggest that many detieloping nations hate prob lems similar to those of China, and that China starts at a disadvantage relative to the superpower. The sec ond pair is meant to suggest that China has and will continue to man age these problems and dkadvantages impressively. The morale which the regime wante its own people to draw are the need for abstinence and ef fortand tbe inevitability of domestic improvement and international stat ure. The morals which the regime wants ite foreign audience to draw are the helpful relevance of the Chi nese experience to national develop ment and the ability of the Peking regime to hurt those who oppose Chi ne8e policy.

Chinese perceptions of their capa bility provide some insight into how and why they believe they can man age escalation and its consequences. The Chinese base their capability .+stimates on tbres maxims: Political and psychological as sets are inseparable from military capabilities. Accordingly, the abifity of the Peoples Republic of China to maintain *e level of eaealation its in their industrial base can produce nuclear warheads, delivery systems, and equipment for meehznized land warfare. However, Chinese leaders do not imply that they cannot deter es calation to nuclear and conventional levels, or that they cannot cope with an opponent who escalates to these levels. The Chinese maintain that their fledgling nuclear capability and their

Should the etxalation omnr, Peking analysts expect to COPS with it not by reciprocal escalation, but with the military guile expounded in Chairman Mao Tse.tungs writings officials prefer cannot be established without considering political and psy chological factors. Capability estimates tend to be overly optimistic. ,. Professional officers tend to es eelate and to prefer tbe total use of their troops and weapons. The last two maxims suggest that Chinese leadera tend to downgrade the capability estimates of their de fense establishment. Peking officials are acutely aware of the limited Chinese nuclear and conventional war capabilities. They recognize that only massive growth 82 ordinary aircraft can convince Asian leaders that their cities are hostage against US nuclear attack on China, and that, indirectly, this should re strain the United Statee from bomb ing the mainland. Even if they cannot use threats of reprisal to deter tbe United States from nuclear escala tion, the Chinese leaders believe that they can reduce the gains which our officials expect from nuclear attack. Accordingly, increases i~ Sine. American tension are accompanied by increased empbaeis on the dispersed locations of Chinese countervalue tar gets, the self-sustaining, cellular naUiliiary Review

ESCALATION ture of rural Chinese society, and the by which the Chinese Communist Party took power, the Chinese are expert in such wars, unlike conven tional and nuclear combat. Finally, the Chinese aatimate that their ability to manipulate political and psycho logical factors determines the outcome of national liberation wars more than the outcome of nuclear and con ventional wars. However, it would be incorrect to assume that the Chinese believe that they and their proxies universally

. capabilities of the militia for broken.

bac~ war. Tbe Chinese expect these capabilities to enable them to build a significant nuclear deterrent force and, in the meantime, to deter the United States from a nuclear attack on the Peoples Republic of China. The Chinese also believe that they may be able to deter, and can cope with, a war which their opponent es calates to the conventional level of the Korean War, for example. They expect to deter the opprment hy aroua ing fears of becoming bogged down, of being outnumbered, of domestic public resentment, and of foreign condemnation. Should the escalation occur, Peking analysts expect to cope with it not hy reciprocal escalation, but with the military guile expounded in Mao Tse-tnngs writinge. Conventional War With regard to conventional war, the Chinese do not dismiss tanks and mobile artillery as unimportant, but they do dismiss them as insufficient for victory. However, the Chinese do not seem to believe that they or their proxies can cope with enemy escala tion to conventional war except when certain requirements. are met. The Chinese proxy must have competent kedersbipr effective political organi- zation, a sw+soned army, and popular ity with the general population. If Chinese troops are needed, the theater of war must border the Chinese mainland, In contrast, the Chinese seek to bring conflicts to the level of na tional liberation wars, and believe that they can both manage and win wars at that level. Becauee the Chi nese initiate such wara, they can pick targets which are particularly vul ~erable. Because this was the ronte
January 19SS

Irrcreeees, in Sino-Amerieerr tension are accompanied by increased emphasis 6n the capabilities of the militia for hroken

back war have the capability to escalate to the guerrilla war level. Peking analysti realize that such escalation is futile until their proxies have developed a political and military strategy appro priate to their environment, developed committed cadres, and organized a reliable army, Premature escalation may eliminate a promising proxy. A major set of perceptions which ahape the Chinese position on escala tion is their estimate of the obstacles which the United States and her as sociates pose for Pekings objectives. . W

Chinese spokeemen describe US Cs@bilitiea as powerful, but unequal to the ambitions and commi~enta of Washington leaders; America can not increase her military commit ments on one front witbout seriously weakening her posture on another; and the etfcctiveneas of US military sad economic resources is signifi cantly curtailed by political and Psy chological limitations. hawed OestruationForaes The Peking regime recogniaee that what Secretary Robert S. McNamara calls our assured destruction forces can intilct immense damage and act as a potent instrument of deterrence and persuasion. However, it also seems to the Cbineee that we are un likely to escalate to the use of these weapons because our leaders fear nu clear reprisals, and hesitate to destroy the possible economic spoils of a war. Chinese eanlysta ataa believe that US threata of nuclear escalation can be made costly ta our Ckwernment. With judicious propaganda thwe threate can create boomerang efTeeta in terms of the trust of US citisene in their leadere, of US alliea in Washington officials, and of neutrale in US good will. Our conventional war capabilities are perceived se our one greet etrength which Washington oflicials are likely to commit to war. The Chinese perceive that conventional war ie particularly compatible with our economic base and the intereata of our economic and military elites. The Chjneae do not doubt that we can confront them with a ebnventional war effo-they do doubt that we can sustah it and achieve conclusive victory in the field. Peking analysta reason that our ground t.rbops are too few, soft, and e4

politically uninvolved for ue to ab trite the Chinese proxy. Accordingly, the United States will rely heavily on more complicated weaprma, euch es napalm bombs, which the Chinese feel play into their handa by inSict ing casualties on the local population and alienating them from us and our local associates. The Chinese expect three develop ments to produce pressure from the US voters and Washingtons allies to deescalate and end the war: civilian casualties in tbe theater of war; tbe loss of US troops without visible mili tary success; and the possibility of further escalation by US reliance on airpower. The Chinese also believe that. tbe United States has only a token capa bility for eublhnited war, and. if we use it, that it will boomerang in ways similar to a conventional war effort. In contrast to conventional war, Peking analysta do not expect Washington officials to initiate aublimited war.

Chinese experta conclude f r o m their analyses that the capabilities available to Washington and Peking are the reverse of each other. They believe that the leaders of the Peo ples Republic of China and the United States prefer different levels of escalation. Given the Cbhwee per ception that the mainland would he at a disadvantage in the wars which US leaders would like to fight, the challenge to Chinese policy is how to inhibit the United Statee from im plementing her escalation prefer ences. The Chinese leadership believes that the objective of our policy is the elimination of Chinese communism. Further, they believe that US elites intend to pureue this goal in a eeries

of steps which subdue surrounding territories first and culminate in an attack on the Chinese mainIand. These beliefs imply to the Chinese th8t there must be escalation at bet to the leveJ of sublimated war. TheY also imply that the Chinese need not greatly fear a eudden US nuclear strike against the mainland. Between tbeee peints on the escala tion ladder, the Chinese believe that they ean manipulate US policy by af feeting the cost-gsin expectations of US officiale. So long as Washington policymakers believe that nuclear war will on balance produce negative re sults, they will opt for limited ware. However, they will do so on the basis of an unreelistieelly optimistic e&i mate of the capabilities of the two sides. Pekhg analyste predict that the resultant tendency will be that unexpectedly costly wars will become a liability to the US Government which will seek some face-saving esIXPC from the consequences of an extended war? Conffict Spectrum The Chinese believe that the highly differentiated conflict spectrum used in our military planning makes Pe kings attempts to manipulate our expectations both safe and faesible. These attempts are safe, they say, because Washington w i 11 esealate gradually, for example, from bombing raide in Vietnam south of the 18th Parallel to strikes north of the 20th Parallel. They are feasible bemuse the slow pace of US escalation pro vides efficient time for the Chbwae proxy to develop militarily, for our domestic opinion to oppose continued miHtarY sacrifice, and for fears of escalation in the United States, the theater of war, and allied eepitale to inhibit Washington officials. Jmnmy 190S Peking analyste point out that the United States has, in fset, not es calated to nuclear war or even to prolonged conventiona~ war in re sponse to crieee involving Laos, Hun gary, Cuba, Korea, the Sues Canal, and west Irian. They argue that our military behavior reeord since World War II eupporte their view that es calation can be successfully managed by Communist and nationalist move ments. Of caurse, tbeee epokesmen are esreful te point out that inhibit ing US use of nuclear weapons is difficult if Washington oficials feel immediately threatened with nuclear attack-for example, our reaction to Nikite Khrushchevs location of mis siles in Cuba. Cfiinsse Benefits To the extent that they can restrict American escalation while producing some US miJitary response, the Cbh nese expest ta benefit. Each time we ,either restrict or downgrade our es: ealation, the Chinese expect revolu tionaries to be less deterred by our military guarantees. Each Ulme we escalate h the point of sending US treepe to developing nations, the Chi nese expect the imperialist image of the United Statea and the nation alist image of Pekinge proxy to he
In addition, each time US weapons kill civilians and damage property in the theater of war, the Chinese expeet the involved population and reaidente of foreiga eountriee to resept our leadership. Each time we eacdete to the sublimated or conventional war levels witbout achieving decieive vic tory, the Cldnese expect the foreign leaders assosiatad with Waabington to lose some faith in tbe usefulness of an Ameriean military shield. The goals, beliefs, and eatimatee w

which have beeq summeriaed lead Chinese officials, I believe, t~ eight conclusions about escalation: Chinese leaders plan to commu nicate to all their audien~ t home, in the developing countries, and in the United States-that Washington offici@s will escalate unless deterred. Peking analysts expcet acceptance of this communication to undermine US pursuit of a flexible respense strat egy. Our military actions will be seen as a prelude to massive escalation rather than as a limited response to insurgency. If they can eatahlish this perception, Chinese leaders expect to gain, whatever the United States doea. If we do not e~alate, Peking can claim the credit for the remain ing seven policiee. If we do escalate, Peldng can claim that the fault lies with other governments which did not accept the Chinese interpretati~n of US intentions. . Chinese leaders plan to commu nicate to US officials that the Peoples Republic of China has the will and the ability to survive and to respond to any form of US escalation. This policy is a logical eempanion to the one just presented. Peking must practice deterrence to balance our predisposition to exploit US miiitery technology and industrial war poten tial. o Chinese leaders plan to advocate unilateral escalation of civil discon tent to national liberation war in the developing states. It seems to them that this is their most coat ef fective policy option to increeee chines international stature and prevent US eaeelation harmful to Pe king. . Chinese leaders plan to avoid initiating escalation above the level of fmblimited war. This unilateral 60

restraint ranges fmm no first use of nuclear weapons to, in many cssse, no second use of airpower and modem tastical weepone. Of course, this Chinese policy reflecte a limited arsenal. However, it also reflects predictions about the efficacy of US escalation and the extent to wh]ch we will climb higher on the escalation ladder than our pro-Chinese oppo nents. Apparently, Peking anslysts believe that if China and her proxies do not reciprecste US escalation, it will halt at a level they can handle. They believe that the next three poli cies will confirm their preditilons. Chinese leaders plan to respend to US military escalation with pcditi cal and psychological escalation. In the theater of war, this Chinese pol icy takes the form of psychological warfare designed to create dissension among their opponents. For example, they have ssseciated the recent as ssesinations of captured Americans with the execution of Viet Cong cap tives by the South Vietnamese Gov ernment. Outside the theater of war, the Cldnese try to persuade otherh that the United States has escalated the war to a point extremely danger ous for world peace, and also attempt to generate vocal and violent condem nation of US policies. . Chhwse leaders pisn to respond to US military escalation in a partic ular war with national liberation ware and diversionary military ap pearances in other places. The Cht nese reason that eecalatilon in geogra phy, but not in weapons or troop commitments, does not provoke fur ther US military eacelation. They exi=t it to inbib]t US conventional war moves by thinning out scarce US ground troops. As we are made to rush about from one part of the Milltefy Rwitll

ESCALATION conflict ladder, the pelfcy objectives world to another, the Chhae eapect of the Peoples Republic of China Washington oillcials to feel a need to would have to be sharply modified and restrict the number of troops sent to the United States and the Soviet anY one conflict site. Accordingly, the Union appeased. Chineee ability to cope with US con ventional war escalation increases. For tbe immediate future we can Peking analyete also expect the initfa-, expect that Chinese leaders will not tion of sublimated waks in several eigniticently eeealate ware. They wiS other locations to influence the gov attempt first to deter and then to emmente ef the developing. countries. stabilize US escalation. We can also Tbe Chbiese reaeon that these gov expect Cbineee views on eeeelation to ernments care more for their own change if and when Peking amdyete fate than for that of the society we find that they have mistakenly be have escalated to defend. In an at lieved that China can benefit from a tempt to avoid revolution in their conflict, even though we esselate to country, leadere of these governments conventional war. may Pressure Washhtgton officiale to To bring Chinese policy to this point deescalate. of major revfew, the United States Ctdnese leaders intend to re and her associate will have to demon spond militarily in the same theater strate to Chimme officials that we ean of war when US eecelation reaches and will maintain conventional war their borcfere. Given the Chinese commitments capable of immobilizing image of US intention, Pekhlg of national liberation> movements with ficials perceive that otherwise the out destroying the eocial fabric and next US step wiS be an attack on the politieel autonomy of our associate. mainland. Even in thle case, whkh We wiff a!so have to demonstrate most conforme to a Cldneee policy of that tbe Chinese Communists and imitative escalation, the C h i n es e their proxiee eennot credibly present probably intend to eecalate to a notch our accomplishment as a de fucto below the level of tbe US commit Communist victory-for example, the ment. For example, Peking will prob industrialized United States stale ably employ volunteers rather than mated by the military establishment official personnel of the Peoples Lib eration Army. , of a small and underdeveloped coun try. Only if we eucceed with these Chinese leaders intepd to ac. demonstrations can we confront Chi quire, with deliberate s@ed~ the nese Ieadere with an unpleeeant technology for credible threats of choice between trying to match our nuclear escalation. They contend that escalation or withdrawing eupport if China dose not develop the ability for national liberation ware. to move te the nuclear rung on the

JaRueIY 1906

The Decision of ~ PADDY ORO~KE

Lieutenant Colonel Harry J. Maihafer, Vu-fed Stafes Arm#

HERE has always been a need for young American command ers to accept responsibility and make decisions on their own. The circum stances under which such decisions have to be made are frequently ambig uous, and it is usually apparent to the commander that he may sul%erdis aster from his actions regardless of which alternative he chooses. w

Such was the case with a young American Civil War commander on 2 July 1863 at Gettysburg. Hie name was Patrick Henry ORorke, and he made one of the most crucial split sacond decieions of the Civil War. It happsned on the second day of the battle. Some say Gettysburg was the turning point of the war, and a high point of the engagement wae the f4ilitIIY Rwi8w

struggle for Little Rormd Top. The battle leeted three days, and for the first day and a half the action had favored the South. By Thursday after noon, 2 July 1S63, a Union line had been established. No one knew if it could hold. Troop Oaployment Northern truops were deployed fet ing west. On the right, the 12th Corps bent back at Culps Hill. Next, from right to left, the Ilth, lst, 2d, and 3d Corps etretched along Cemetery Ridge. The line angled south toward Round Top and IJttle Round Top, the two hille where the Army of the Potomac would anchor ita left flank. Or would it? On the left, General Daniel E. Sickles had marched his3d Corps forward to what he considered better ground. In the procese, he gave up the ridge line, and was nowhere near the Round Tops. Lee sent Longstreete corps moving toward the dangling left flank. The envelopment didnt get all the way around. Insteed, it caught on the eharp edge of Sickles line. The Peach Or chard and the Wheat Field, pleasant patches of sleepy farmland, became bloudy names in American history. Union General George Gordon Meade Lieutsmwst Coloiwl HmvyI J. Mai hafer, a graduate of thq 1964 Regc@ lar Course of the U. S. Army Com mand and GeneraZ Staff CoUege, & now enroUed in the Graduate School of the UniveraitU of Miaevwm.He saw combat with the Zbth Infantqt Diui aion in Korsa; wm an inatrueter in the O~e of MilitaW Psychology and Leadership, Department of Tactics, United Statsa Militaw Academy; and ww Secretar# of the General Staff, 7th Logistical Commaad, in Korea. He is the author of The Wrong Reasorw which apy)cared in the November 1965 issue of the MILITABY REVIEW. JanuwylSW committed his reserve and told crusty
George Sykes to use hie 5th Corps and support the crumbling left flank.

The Sth Corps was a goed one. It had fought well at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville and had seen eeveral of its key leaders promoted to higher jobs. Indeed, Meade, the new com mander of the Army of the Potomac, had moved up from the 5th Corps onty three daya before the battle. His de parture had caused the usual shutlle upward. Sykes, commander of the 2d Division, had teken over the corps. His job went to Romeyn B. Ayres, who had led the lat Brigade of the division. Perhape the meet dramatic advance ment wae that of young Captain Stephen H. Weed. As commander of the 5th Corps artillery, he had dis tiuguiehed himself at ChanceUorsviUe. Now he was promoted directly from captain to brigadier general and given command of a brigade in Ayree di vision. New Orders Arriw The 5th Corps was tired. The day before it had marched into Pennsyl vania from Union Mllle, Maryland. At twilight, when it thought its days march was over, new orders had come. Under a fuU moon, the corps marched 21 more kilometers. It stopped at 0100. Some tried to sleep, but at 0400 they were roused again and marched five more kilometers into Gettysburg. However, the hectic night became a case of hurry up and wait. During the morning and early afterncan of 2 July, men of the 5th Corps kept shifting from place to place, taking catnaps es best they could. Then came the order to move into battle. On your feet and fall in ! The dusty men shouldering arms were the 140th New York Volunteers from Rochester. Officially, they were the w

PADDY ORORKE Monroe County Regiment: but after a few foreed march- they had started calling themselves the Rochester Race Horses. Many of them were Irish im migrants, as was their colonel, 27 yeer-old Paddy ORorke. Paddy ORorke was a most improb able man. He had been brought to America as a year-old infant. In a time when most of the Irish were dill illiterate, he had won distinction in the public schools of Rochester. He had even been offered a scholarship, but turned it down because of the need to ge to work. A few years later, when opportunity knocked again, he was able to accept., This time it was an appointment to West Point. First in Class Of the 79 cadets who entered tbe Military Academy in 1857, some 45 failed to finish. Of these, 22 had re signed because of the war clouds on the horizon. Among those who stayed, Paddy ORorke, the likable young man with the Irish brogue, was considered a brain. He hit the books hard, yet still found time to read the novels of Charles Dickens and James Cooper in the cadet library. On graduation day, 24 June 1861, Patrick ORorke stood first in his class. He was cheered, but, traditionally, the loudest cheer at a West Point graduation goas to the class goat, tbe man who finishes last. In 1861 his name was George Armstrong Custer. Classmates kidded each other as they headed for JVashington to pick up their ordere. Promotions or cof finsY they laughed. it was rather pro phetic. They were only moments away from the Civil War. Among every five of them, one would become a general, one would be killed in action. Raw volunteer units were arriving at the Capital at the same time as

the new second lieutenants. Regular Army officers were grabbed off quickly. On 21 July, less than a month after graduation, 21 members of the class saw action at Bull Run. ORorke, although he had been com missioned an engineer, was sent as an aide to General Daniel Tyler, com mander of a division of Connecticut Militia. In his report of the battle, Tyler praised Paddya prompt and gallant assistance, even mentioning come valuable reporte sent from Pad dys observatory at the top of a tall pine- tree. Acting as aide, courier, and tree climber, the new lieutenant dis tinguished himself, even though his horse was shot from under him in the prucess. Engineer Assignment When the smoke from Bull Run had cleared, Lieutenant SYRorke was given his first engineer troop assignment. Late in 1861 bis unit joined an expedi tionary corps on the Georgia coast. At the time, the Confederates had aban doned all coastal towns south of Charleston except Savannah which was defended by Fort Pulaski at tbe mouth of the Savannah River. ORorkes name kept appearing in the dispatches. Apparently, his com bination of imagination and boldness won the attention of Brigadier Gen eral Quincy A. Gillmore, chief engi neer of the expedition. On 29 January 1862 Gillmore sent ORorke on a dar ing reconnaissance. He and another officer went up the river in a small boat. They worked all night exploring small river islands. Their aim was to find locations suit able for gun positione. Wallowing through the marehland in the dark ness must have been a wretched ex perience, yet ORorkes report was matter-of-fact and thorough. Some of

PAtlDY ORORKE hh phrases show a keen appreciation for detd: Ftnwcd a .coit of ifry bronm-cla~, with a substratum of black mold; surface of gvound about $% feet above high u!ater. Beet gpound and beet position, m far as ceutd be determined in the. dark, about 100 yards. south of the north point of Wand. Next vowed care fully up the river to Elba Island; had come diflicnlty in finding k? in conse quence of inaccuracy of map. FirraUrI rowed up to north end of it, landing about six timee and examining chore to withh earehot of Fort Pulaski General Gillmores report describ~ the reeulta, but only hints at the ooz ing black mud in which they worked: Zkuiug the night of the 10th, Lt. ORorke with a partg of vokmteer eu girceerw, commenced the magazinee and platforma at Venue Point. The party concealed their work at day break and withdrew. The platforms were made bg raising the surface five or six inches with sand carned over in bage. On this 8and foundation thick pkmke parallel with the direc tion of fire were laid nearby, not quite I in contact w[th each other. At mght angles to theee the deck pfanks were laid, giving a platform nine feet bg 17 f eet. The floor of the magazine was 18 inches above the natural 8urface, reeting on sand bag8. It muet have shocked the defendere of Fort Pulaskl to he faced by guns ricing out of the marshes of Venus Point. In any case, the fort surren dered shortly thereafter. The Savan nah River was open to the Union.

pioneer Balloonist In MaM, the steamer Mayflower chugged up the river, stopping about five kilometers from Savannah. A strange contraption was unloaded. Di recting the operation was a civilian pioneer ballooneet John B. StarkAn early balloon aecension weather. Some said he was a crackpot, but Starkweather insisted Ida gas and adjacent ground. Found elmre im bag had real military value. Now he practicable fer landing without cauae was going to prove it. waying out; ground above the upper Thie time they wouldnt have to half of Wand aU a soft marah, not trust the unsupported observations of practicable for batteriee. a civilian. Starkweather had found a All in all, it was a remarkable re professional eoldier willing to accom port to have been made by a green pany him aloft. Up they went, and in lieutenant, or by anyone else, for that the proe~s discovered four or five matter. companies of Conf aderates whose prae Paddy gained a reputation for night ence had gone undetected. The fllght operations. Two weeks later he was had been a success, both for Stark at it again. In the dark, he led a group Januny 1S60 71


PADBY ORORKE weather apd for his passengerLieu tensnt P. H. ORorlie. In the fall of 1862, Paddy went home to Rochester. Hia town was forming a regiment, and he was to be its colonel. The regiment joined the 12th Corps near Washington. In December, arrangement were made to have it assigned to a brigade in the 5th Corps. The brigade com mander was General Gouverneur K. Warren who had been a math instruc tor of ORorke at West Point. Both men were topographhal engineers. Some considered that Paddy was War rens protege, although Warren him self was only 32. Through the winter and spring, the regiment did its work well. At Fred ericksburg it fortified positions in the town itself, luckily being spared the bloody slaughter of Maryes Heighta. Then Warren left to be chief engi neer for the Army of the Potomac. He recommended the colonel of the 140th as his successor. At the age of 27, Paddy ORorke became a brigade commander. Chancellorsville Paddys finest hour with the bri gade came at Chancellorsville on 1 May. On a day of Union revereals, his men stood firm. Sykes, hie division commander, wrote of the days action: Toward sundown, the enemy ad vanced to the left of mg camp in etrawg force, but the brigade of Col. ORorke . . . handsomely repulsed him, and he gave ue no further troubte. In June, the changes took place that were mentioned earlier. Sykes became corps commander and Ayres, one of Paddys fellow brigade commanders, took command of tbe divieion. Then, for come unexplained reason, Paddy was bounced back and returned to command of hie original regiment. 12


As far as we know, O~orke never murmured about thle atrange revereal in his surging career. Even when Stephen Weed was promoted from captain to brigadier general and placed over h]m, he accepted the change loy ally. After all, Weed (West Point 1854) was his senior in the Regular Army. It caused many to wonder, however. Was someone jealous of the brilliant young Irishman ? Obviously, this wouldnt have happened if his fellow engineer Warren were etill on hand. Was it just coincidence that now his superiors in the chain of command Weed, Ayree, and Sykeewere all former artillerymen ? in any caee, the Rochester Race Horses were glad that Paddy wae back to lead them. Ae the guns of Gettysburg roared in the dietance, they moved in column toward the Union left. ORorke and his adjutant, young Captain Porter Farley, rode in front. Reinforce Sickles Position But what wae happening on the left ? Earlier, of course, Meade had seen the potential danger of Sicklee exposed position and had ordered it reinforced. Meade was accompanied by Warren, now a major general and his chief engineer advisor. With Meades approval, Warren galloped off to 100k at the left flsnk. He guided his horse toward Little Round Top. Unlees he was mistaken, that was the critical piece of terrain in thie sector. If the Confederate planned to strike the left, they would probably be massing in those woods to the west on the other side of the Emmitsburg Road. Warren found a battery of rifled artillery and asked them to fire a ronnd into the line of woode. The treee concealed John. B. Hoode Tex-


PADDY ORORKE ms. As the shot winged past, a thou sand heads turned to follow the sound. The quick turning, and the accompany ing motion of guna and bayonets, made the woods come alive for an instent. The ripple gave Warren bis anawer the attack was coming on the left. He cent off riders to &k that rein forcements be sent to Little Round Top. Then he puehed up the hill to get a better look. At the top he found only a signal detachment. Just then the at tack started on Sickles men at the Peach Orchard. Fake Activity Time papsed, and no reinforcements had reached Warren at the ammnit. He was beginning to feel rather naked. Musket bslle began to fly past, and tbe signal men understsndahly decided it was time to fold their flags. Dont leave: said Warren. Way anything, just give the impression of activity. The flags stayed, and, in Warrens words, the eignal officer kept waving them in defiance. Warren probably didnt realize it, but one of his messages had brought a brigade to the lower slopes of Lktle Round Top. Off to his left, obscured by the rocks and trees, men were grap pling furiouely with Hoods Texans. Then the Union force faltered. Men in butternut came pouring through. . They were joined by more, coming from a wild rock formation called Dev ils Den. Bruce Catton described the scene in Glory Road: Here was unrelieved and final die aeter, coming on fast and ~ell{ng like Jiends, for if the rebrle ever got Litt[e Round TOP the whole of Cemeter~ Ridge would have to be. abandoned and the battle would be loet once and jor all. Warren pounded back down the hill hnnary13S0 . Iooklng for help. Near the base of Little Round Top he spotted some troops moving toward the Peach Or chard. Could he divert them in time to beat the rebels to the crest? He might. if their commander would take an order from a mere staff officer. Warrens heart jumped. lt was part of his old brigade. He recognized ORorke at the head of the column. Warren, coming on hard, began shout inq from 45 metere away. Bring your

Msjor Genersl George Sykes

men up here, Paddy. Theres not a moment to lose. I dant~ ORorke protested. Gen eral Weed is expecting me up ahead. Never mind thatfl eaid Warren, 111take the responsibility. Both he and ORorke knew that was impossible. As a etatf officer, Warren had no authority to divert troops from an aseigned mission. Only their com mander could do that. But there was no time to find the commander. Thie was Paddy ORorkea moment of truth. No one could criticize him 73

PADDY ORORKE if he stuck to the orders of his bri gade and division commanders. On the other hand,. failure to follow those or ders might well lead to a court-martial. What if the absence of Paddys regi ment led to a disaster in the 3d Corps area ? He had juet been dropped back from brigade to regimental com mander, so even the uncomplaining ORorke knew he had to watch his step. However, he trusted Warrens judgment. If Warren said this hill was critical, Paddy was willing to bet it w s: Al 1 this must have flashed through Paddys mind in less time than it takea to tell. A century later, a field manual would say: The leader must be will ing to accept responsibilityy and make decisions. Seize tbe Initiative Follow me, said ORorke, heading straight up the slope of Little Round ToP. Down the Peach Orchard Road came a battery of six 3-inch rifles, led by Lieutenant Charles Hazlett. Warren urged them to come along. 1 may not be able to do much damage with these gune, general, aaid Hazlett with a grin, but at least I can give the in fantry a little confidence. Years later, men of the 140th re membered double-timing their way up Little Round Top. Wild-eyed horses from Hazletts battery came breaking through their ranks as the gunners lashed them upward. The ground became too rough for riding. ORorke jumped down and tossed his reins to the sergeant major. At his side wae Captain Farley who described the scene later: As we reached the crest, a.never-to be-forgotten +cene. bur8t upon ue. A great baein lag before us full of smoke and jire and literally swarming with 14 riderlese horeee and fighting, fleeing and pursuing men. The air was satw rated with the srdphurous fumes of battle and wae ringing with the shout8 and groane of the combatan te. The zoiht cries of charging tines, the rattle of musketry, the booming of artillery, and the shmeks of the wounded were the orchestral accompa?dmente of a scene ver~ much like hell itself-as terrific as the u,arring of Miltons fiends in pandemonium. The whole of

US Armv


Major Gsnsral Gouverneur K. Warren Sickles ~orps and macw othsr troops that had been sent to its support in that ill chosen hollow were being slaughtered and driven befors the im petuoue advance of Longetreet. But, fascinating as was this terrible scene, we had no time to spend upon it. Bloody work was ready for us at our very feet. The Confederates were juet below the creet, and coming straight for the top. There was no time to execute the maneuver which would bring the regMiliirv Review

PADDY ORORKE into proper line of battle. There was no time to load the muskets or even to fix bayonets. If the 140th hes itated at all, the enemy would be on them and pushing them from the crest. Paddy didnt heeitate. He drew his saber and flashed it in the sunlight. Only the thickness of his brogue showed he was a little more excited than ueual. Thie way, boysfl he said. He ruehed straight at the enemy, the men of hls regiment right along with him.

too was hit. Hazlett fell dead across Weeds body. At laet the fighting zlackened. The peak stayed in Union hande. Gettys burg kept going another 24 hours. The war lasted nearly two more years. The roads from Devils Den and Little Round Top, however, were all leading to Appomattox Courthouse.

Meaning of Struggle What was the significance of the L;ttle Round Top etruggle? Meade, commander of the winning side at Gettysburg, said: Body ForOO Bruce Catton called it as strange But for ths timely advancs of the a counterattack as the army ever saw. 5th Corps and ths prompt sanding The initiative was seized without bay of a portion on Round Top, whsre thev onets or loaded muskets, merely ,by met ths snemy almoet on the crest and the force of running bodies. The Con had a desperate jight to secure the po federates paused, and the men from sitionI say but for these circum New York dropped into line, taking stances the enemy would have secured cover as beet they could among the Round Top, planted his artillerv there, recks and brush. Now they began to commanding the whule battlefield and load and to fire. The Confederate what the rewdt would have been I charge broke. The Texans fell back, leave you to judge. leaving behind some riddled bodies. Matthew Steele, whose American Some of them, too intermingled to Campaigns has been studied by a gen withdraw, threw up their hands. The eration 0$ cadets, wr@e that: Southerners re-formed and charged One can almost show that everu de again. From above, the guns of Haz feat of the Civil War happened be letts battery roared. cause someone was slow; somebody tYRorke moved from place to place, stopped to reet,. or lost his way, or disdaining the partial cover offered , marched too slowlti, or waited for by the bouldere. As the second charge somebody else to get out of the road, was beaten off, a bullet caught him in or waited for etiebody to join, or the neck. Paddy ORorke dropped in waited to get hie orders. stantly, dead without a word. He was probably right, but he should have mentioned the corollary: The fighting continued, but the we needed then, we need now, and we rebel charge had reached its crest. By zball always need, men who are not thiz time, Stephen Weed had brought afraid to make decisions. We need men up the rest of KIS brigade. Warren, who will obey ordere, but who are still. talking to Hazlett, was wounded willing to exceed those orders when the zlightly in the neck. Weed, also near situation demands it. Hazletts battery, fell with a mortal This wae the Ieeson taught by Paddy wound. He gasped eomething that ORorke. sounded like my sister. Hazlett bent In 1SS9 men of the 140th New York to catch his words, and just then he January 19S6 75

PADDY ORORKE Volunteers climbed Little Round Top again. They met to dedicate a monu ment to their former leader. The words of that generation were flowery by our standards, but their sincerity comes through. His comrades sang his praises, and Paddy would probably have been embarrassed if he had beard them: We have known many men since the day he died. Let each of us recall the one among the~ who posseeeed com bined, the grace of form and carriage, the modeetg, the purity and honest~ of character, the amiable temper, tlu intellectual force, the commanding im jluence over others, the knightlg as. compliehments of his prof eeeien, ani above all, the proved courage of Col, Patrick ORorke, who here died at th$ head of hie regiment. . . . He wae a very perfect, gentle knight. Warrens tribute to Paddy was sire. He wae glorious. pier:

Fitting Words
1 hope you are sorry for shooting off my leg at 6ettfshurg. This is Daniel E. Sickles reminding his former Confederate foe, James Longstreet, of the wound he had suetahed on that Pennsylvania battlefield, during July 186S. The meeting of the two fighting cocks was occasioned by a Saint Patricka Day banquet in Atlanta in 1892. In reminiscences over potatione of Irish punch, Longetreet delicately hinted that his one-legged friend ehould ~e thardrful tn him for sparing hie eecond limb. And so it went on and on. Both of the opposing gener ale had bean criticized for their tactical action+ ickles for placing his troops in the Devils Den and Longetreet for delayipg the attack on the final day of the battle. They ended tbe celebration on a mutually emp athetic note.

Military Review

Marshal Lin Piao, Red Chinese ArmLI

The racently announced doctrine of Marshal Lin Piao, Red Chinae Minieter of Defense, which rests on a foundation of war and violent revo lution, was greatly deplored by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg during his major address to the United Nations Assembly on 23 September. The Lin statement wae published earlier in September in all Chinese newspapers and republished widely throughout the world. Terming this incredible manifesto the antithesis of everything the United Nations stands for, Am bassador Goldberg declared: It is a call to change world order by force and violowce in a period where force and violence can lead to the most disastrous consequences for the entire world. It leavee no room for differonee of tradition, of culture, or of national wratkm, or for the legitimate right of every people, large and small, to choose their own eocial and economic order their own wav. It leaves no room for genuine self-determination. It eeeke to squeeze everp nu tkwt and everg people wfthin the grip of Chinese Communist conformity. . . . The apoetles of this phitoeophy are todag attempting to transform the oountrg of South Viet-Nam into a proving ground for their theoriee. This



challenge must be, met--not in the intereets of ang single nation-but in the interests of each member of thie organization. It must be met in particular in the intereets of the smaller nation-c who cherid thin-v right to choose and follow their own path of national development. This is an excerpt from Marshal IAn Piaos epsech.Editor. The history of peoples war in China and other countriee provides conclu sive evidence that the growth of the peoples revolutionary forces from weak and small beginnings into strong and large forces is a univereal law of development of claes etruggle, a universal law of development of peo plee war. A peoples war inevitably meets with many difficukiee, with ups and downs and setbacks in the course of its development, but no.force can alter its general trend toivard inevit able triumph, Oespise the Enemy Comrade Mao Tse-tung points out that we must despise the enemy stra tegically and take full account of him tactically. To despiee the enemy stra tegically is an elementary r.equira ment for a revolutionary. Without the courage to despise the enemy and without daring to win, it will be im possible to make revolution and wage a PeOPles War, let alone to achieve victory. It ie impossible to win victory in a peoples war without taking full ac count of the enemy tactically, giving great attention to the etudy of the art of etruggle, and adopting appro priate forme of struggle in each

THE basis of the lessons derived from the peoples ware in China, Comrade Mao Tse-tung ad vanced the famoue thesie that politi cal power grows out of the barrel of a gun. He clearly pointed out: The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the iesue by zoar, is the central tack and the high est form of revolution. This MarzistLsninist principle of revolution holde good universally, for China and for all other countriee. Recognizing Revolutionaries In the last analyeie, whether one dares to wage a tit for tat struggle against armed aggression and sup pression by the imperialists and their lackeye, whether one dares to fight a peoples war againet them, is tanta mount to whether one dares to embark on revolution. This ie the meet effec tive touchstone for distinguishing genuine frem fake revolutionaries and Mavxist-Leniniet.% In view of the fact that some peu ple were atllicted with the fear of the imperialists arid reactionaries, Com rade Mao Tse-tung put forward his famous thesis that: All rsactianariea are paper tigere. In appearance, the %eactiowariee are terrifying, but in realitg they are not eo powsrful. From a long-term point of visw, it is not the reactioaariee but the people who are reallg powerful. 7a

It must he emphasized that Com rade Maos theory of the establish ment of rural revolutionary base areae and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed nations and peoples. It is particularly important for the revo lutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America againet imperial ism and ite Iackeya. Many countries in Asia, Africa, and

PEOPLSSWAR Latin America are now being sub jected to aggression and enslavement on a serious scale by ths imperialists headed by the United States. The baaic politiral and economic conditions in many of tbeee countries have many similarities to those which prevailed in old China. As in China, the peasant question is extrem~ly important in these regions. The peasante constitute the main force of the national demo cratic revolution against the imperial ists and their lackeya. Seizs large Cities , In committing aggression against these countries, the imperialists usu ally begin by seizing the big citiee and the main linee of communication, but they are unable to bring the vast coun tryside completely under their control. The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the broad areas in which the revolutionariee can maneu ver freely. If North America and Western Eu rope can be called the cities of the world, then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute the rural areae of the world. Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for vari ous reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and Westi Europeen capitalist countries, while the peuples revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolu tion also preeenta a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysia, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the rev olutionary struggles of the Asian, Af rican, and Letin-American peoples who make up the overwhelming ma jority of the worlds population. The

Socialist%ountries ehould regard it es their internationalist duty to SUppOrt the peoples revolutionary straggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, October Revelation The October Revolution opened up a new era in the revolution of the op., pressed nations. It built a bridge be tween the Secialist revolution of the proletariat of the West and the na tional democratic revolution of the colonial and aemicolonial countries of the Eaet. The Chinese revolution hiw successfully solved the problem of how to link up the national democratic with the Seeialiat revolution in the colonial and semicolonial countries. Comrade Mao has pointed out that eince the October Revolution, antiimperialist revolution in any colonial or semicolonial country is no longer part of the old bourgeois, or capitalist, world revolution, but is part of the new world revolution, the proletzrianSocialist world revolution. Comrade Mao Te&tung made a cor reet distinction between the two rev olutionary stagesthat is, the na tional democratic and the Socialist revolutions; at the same time, he cor reetly and closely linked the two. The national democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the Seeialiet revolution, and the Secialist revolu tion is the inevitable sequel to the national democratic revolution. There is no great wall between the two rev olutionary stagee. But the Socialist revolution is only possible after the completion of the national democratic revolution. The more thorough the na tional democratic revolution, the bet ter the conditions for the Socialist revolution. The Khrushchev revisionists are now actilvely preaching that socialism can be build without the proletariat

and without a genuinely revolutionary party armed with the advanced pr& terien ideoiom . and they have cast the fundamental tenete of iarxiam-Lenin ism to the four winds. The revision ists purpeae is solely to divert the oppressed nations from their struggle against imperialism and sabotage their national democratic revelation, all in the service of imperialism. The Cbineee revolution provides a fmcceseful hmeon for making a thorGerman militarism as ite chief sc compfims in unleashing a world war. It ie the most rabid aggramor in hu man history and the. most ferocious common enemy of the people of the world. Every people or country in the world that wants revolution, indepen dence, and peace cannot but direct the spearhead of its struggle against US imperialism. At present, the main battletleld of the fierce struggIe between the people

Comrade Mao advemed the famous thesie that politieel power grows out of the barrel

of a gun ohghgoing national democratic revo lution under the leadership of the pro letariat; it likewise provides a suc cessful lesson for the timely transition from the national democratic revolu tion to the Socialist revolution under the leadership of the proletariat. Since World War II, US imperial ism has stepped into the shoes of Ger man, Japanese, and Italian fascism and has been trying tu build a greet American empire by dominating and enslaving the whole world. It is ec tively fostering Japanese end West

of the world on the one side and US imperialism and its lackeys on the other is the vast area of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The contradiction between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United Statea is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world. The struggles waged by the differ ent peoples against US imperialism reinforce each other and merge into a torrential, worldwide tide of opposi tion to US imperialism. The more sucHilifefyRavisn


. ceesful the development of peoples war in a given region, the larger the number of US impenaliet forces that can be pinned down and depleted there. When thp US aggressors are hard prceeed in one place, they have no alternative but to lme~n their grip on others. Therefore, the conditions be come more favorable for the people eleewhere to wage etrugglee against US imperialism and its lackeya. Everytldng ie divisible. And so ie this CO1OLWUS of US imperialism. It em be split up and defeated. The peo plca of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other regione can destroy it piece by piece; come etriking at ita head and others at ite feet. That ie why the grentest fear of US imperiti]em ie that peoples wars will be launched in different parta of the world-and par ticularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America-and why it regarde peoples war es a mortal danger. Rdianca on Nuclear Weapons US imperialism reliee solely on its nucleer weapons to intimidate people, but these weapone cannot save US imperialism from ita doom. Nuclear weapons cannot be used lightly. Mora over, the US monopoly of nuclear weapone has long been broken; US imperialism has these waapone, but, othera have them too. If it tbreatena other countries with nuclear weapons, US imperialism will expose ita own
country .reaeon, to the same threat. For this

oda of modern warfarq in the final analysie the outcome of a war will be decided by the auetained fighting of the ground forcee, by the fighting at close quarters on battletiehie, by the political consciousness of the men, and by their courage and epirit of eaeri ilce, Here, the week points of US im perialism will be completely laid barq whSe the superiority of the revohl tionary people will be brought into full play. The reactionary troope of US im perialism cannot poseibly be endowed with the courage and tbe spirit of sacrifice possessed by the revolution ary people. The spiritual nuclear bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the phyeicel nuoleer bomb. Vietnam Vietnam is the most convincing current 1eaemple of a victim of ag gression defeating US imperiti]em by a peoples war. The United States has made South Vietnam a testing ground for the euppreesion of peoplee war. Sbe haa carried on thie experiment for many years, and everybody can now ass that the US aggressors are unable to fmd a way of coping with peeplea war. The more they escalate the war, the heavier will be their fall and the more diseetroue their defeat. The people in other parta of the world will see still more clearly that US im perialism can be defeated, and that what the Vletnameee people can do, they can do, too. The Kbrnahcbev revieioniete have come to the rescue of US imp&aWm just when it ia most panic etrieken and helpless in its efforte to cope with peoplee war. Working hand in glove with the US imperialist, they are do ing their utmost to spread all kinds 81

it will meet with etrong op position, not only from the people else where, but aleo inevitably from the people in its own country. Even if US imperialism brasenly uses nuclmr weapons, it cannot conquer the people, who are indomitable. However highly developed modem weapons and technical equipment may be and however complicated the meth-


PEOPIES WAR of arguments against peoples war, and, wherever they can, they are scheming to undermine it by oveti or covert means. This is tantamount to saying that anyone without nuclear wespone is destined to come to grief, and must either capitulate to the enemy when confronted with W nuclear weapons or come under the protection of some other nuclear power ant submit te ite beck and call. Ient this the jungle law of survival per excellence? Isnt thh helping the imperialiete in their nuclear backmail ? Isnt this openly forbidding people to make rev olution ?

Nuclear Blackmail The fundamental reason why the Khrushchev revisionista are opposed to peoples war is that they have ,no faith in the masses and are afraid of US imperialism, of war, and of rev olution. L]ke all other opportunista, they are blind to the power of the messes and do not believe that the revolutionary people are capable of Conventional Forces Irrsigniticarrt The Khrushchev revisionists assert defeating imperialism. They eubmit that noclear weapons and etrategic to the nuclear blackmail of the US rocket units are decisive wh]le con imperialist and are afraid that, if ventional forces are insignificant, and the oppressed peoples and nations rise that a miiitia ie just a heap of human up to fight peoples wars or the peo flesh. For ridiculous reasons such as ple of Socialist countries repulse US these, they oppose the mobilisation of imperialist aggression, US imperial and reliance on the masses in the So ism will become incensed, they them cialist countries to get prepared to selves will become involved, and their use peoples war against imperialist fond dream of Soviet-United ,States aggression. They have staked the cooperation to dominate the world will whole future of their country on nu be spoiled. clear weapons and are engaged in a Ever since Lenin led the Great Oc nuclear gamble with US imperiaiiem, tober Revolution .to victory, the expe with which they are trying to strike rience of innumerable revolutionary a political deal. wars has borne out the troth that a Their theory of military strategy revolutionary people who rise up with is the theory that nuclear weapons oniy their bare hands at the outset decide ever@bing. Their line in army finally succeed in defeating the ruling building ie the beurg@is line which classea who are armed to the teeth. ignores the human factor and sees only The poorly armed have defeated the the material factor and wbicb regards better armed. Guerrilla forces have. technique as everything and politice ultimately defeated regular armies. as nothing. And so on and so forth. Things stub The Khrushchev revisionists main bornly develop in a way that runs tain that a single spark in any part counter to the aesefi]ons of the revi of the globe may touch off a world sionist, and facts are slapping them nuclear conflagration and bring de in the face. struction to manl&d. If tbh wera The Khrushchev revieioniste insist true, our planet would have been de that a nation without nuclear weap etroyed time and time again. one is inqapable of defeating an en There have been ware of national emy with nuclear weapons, whatever liberation throughout the 20 years methods of fighting it may adopt. 82 Militcry R*VICW

PEOPI.ES WAR since World War II. But bee any sin gle one of them developed into a world war ? Ien it true that the US imper ! na for a world war have ialist P1 bean upset precisely because of the wars of national liberation in Asia, Africa, and Latin Arqerice? By con treek those who have done their ut world without weapons, without armed forces and without ware will come into being. The kind of rubbish peddled by the Khrushchev revieioniste has already taken a great toll of Jives in a num ber of countries. Are theee painful lessons, paid for in blood, still insuf-

The more suere&ful the peoples war in a given reaien, the more US imbmkdiet forces
that ean be pinned dewn and debdstsd theaceordiag to Merebel I&

most to stamp out the sparks of propies war have, in fact, encouraged US imperialism in ita aggressions and wars. The Khrushchev revisioniete claim that if their general line of peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition and peaceful competition is followed, the oppressed will be liberated and a Jmwy 1968

ficient ? The eesence of the general line of the Khrushchev revisionista is nothing other than the demand that all the oppressed peoples and=nations and all the countries which hve won independence should lay down their ams and place themselves at the mercy of the US imperialists and their lackeys who are armed to the teeth. 83

PEOPLESWAR The Khrushchev revisionists shout at the Chinese people standing in the forefront of the fight for world peace: You are bellicose ! Gentlemen, your abuse adds to our credit. It is this very bellicosity of ours that helps to prevent imperialism from unleash ing a world war. The Khrushchev revi sionists regard imperialists like Ken nedy and Johnson as sensible and describe us, together with all those who dare to carry out armed defense against imperialist aggression, as bellicose. This has revealed the Khrushchev revisionists in their true colors as the accomplices of imperial ist gangsters. Clear.Cut Attitude Our attitude toward imperialist wars of aggression has always been clear-cut. First, we are against them, and, second, we are not afraid of them. We will destroy whoever attacks us. As for revolutionary wars waged by the oppressed nations and peoples, we invariably give them firm support and active aid. It has been so in the past, it remains so in the present, and, when we grow in strength as time goes on, we will give them still more support and aid in the future. The struggle of the Vietnamese peo ple against US aggression and for na tional salvation is now the focus of the struggle of the people of the world against US aggression. Tbe determi nation of the Chinese people to sup port and aid the Vietnamese people in their struggle against US aggression and for, national salvation is unshak able. No matter what US imperialism may do to expand its war adventure, the Chinese people will do everything in their power to suPport the Viet- namese people until every single one of the US aggressors is drivenout of Vietnam. 84 The US imperialists are now clam oring for another trial of strength with the Chinese peeple, for another large-scale ground war on the Asian mainland. If they insist on following in the footsteps of the Japanese Fas cists, they may do so, if they please. The Chinese people definitely have $yays of their own for coping with a US imperialist war of aggression. Our methods are no seeret. The most im portant one is still mobilization of the people, reliance on the people, making everyone a soldler, and waging a peo ples war. We want to tell the US imperialists once again that the vast ocean of sev eral hundred million Chinese people in arms will he more than enough to sub merge your few million aggressor troops. If you dareto impose war on us, we shall gain freedom of &tion. It will not be up to you to decide how the war will be fought. We shall fight in the ways most advantageous to us to destroy the enemy, and .$wher ever the enemy can be most eamly de stroyed. Since the Chinese people were able to destroy the Japanese aggres sors 20 years ago, they are certainly still more capable of finishing off the US aggressors today, Taiwan Province It must be pointed out in all serious ness that, after the victory of the war of resistance, Taiwan was returned to China. The occupation of Taiwan by US imperialism is absolutely unjusti fied. Taiwan Province is an inalien able part of Chinese territory. The US imperialists must get out of Taiwan. The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan. In commemorating the 20th anni versary of victory in the war of re sistance against Japan, we must also point out in all solemnity that the Militrry Review

PEOPLESWAR Japanese militarists fostered by US imperialism will certainly receive stilll severer punishment if they ignore the firm opposition of the Japaneae people snd the people of Asia, again indulge in their pipedreams and resume their old road of aggression in Asia. US imperialism is preparing a w-orldwar. But can this save it from its doom ?. World War I was followed by the birth of the Socialist Soviet Union. World War H was followed by the emergence of a series of Socialist countries and many nationally inde pendent countries. If the US imperi sliste should insist on launchhg a third world war, it can he stated cats- , gorically that many more hundreds of millions of people will turn to sucial iem; the imperialists will then have little room left on the giObe; and it is possible that the whole structure of imperialism will collapse. We are optimistic about the future of the world. We are confident that the people will bring to an end the epoch of wara in human history. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out a long time ago that war, thk mon eter: . . . will be jinall~ eliminated by the progrese oj human societ~, and in the not too distant future too. But thers ,ia only one way to eliminate it and that L+ to oppoee war with war, to oppose countsvrevolutkma<g war with revolutionary war. All peoples suffering from US im perialist aggression, oppression, and plunder, unite ! Long live the victory of peoplee war !


To assure uninterrupted dslivery of your Mifitary Review, be sure to submit promptly both your old and new address, including 21P code-four weeks in advance, if poseible. Addrees to Military Review Subscription Service, Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col lege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

January 15S6

HE flag incidents in the Pan ama Canal Zone in January 1964, which precipitated a diplomatic crisis between the governments of the United States and Panama, drama tized two truths about international relations-their tenuous nature and the crucial influence the indhidual citizen exercises over such relations. Perhaps President Dwight D. Ei senhower had theee truths in mind when he called a conference in 1957 of 150 leaders from 40 different fields of American life to outline for the first time the b~sic framework of his now famous People-to-People Program. The failures of great statesmen and traditional diplomacy throughout mankinds history de-

Eigbt years later, it is difficult to assess the true impact of the program with any degree of exactitude. By its very nature, the cumulative result of thousands of friendly associations with people of other lands is not mess. urable. Nevertheless, despite occa sional setbaeks such as the Canal Zone incidents, those thousands of Ameri cane who have participated in this great effort with countless individuals of other countries are convinced that such contacts form a significant basis for those minimum essentials of last ing peace-mutu,al respect and under standing. . The success of any great adventure requiree the setting of attainable in termediate objectives. Secure peace of

People Diplomacy and World

manded a visionary new approach to the idealistic goal of global peace. President Eisenhowers concept was certainly new and potentially the most visionary attempt of the decade to solve mans age-old problem of world conflict. Brietly, his program urged the promotion of mutual understanding among natione by broadening contacts among people in the interest of world peace. Such contacts, in his view, would transcend national and ideolog ical herders on a true person-tu-person basis. 8s the world, is certainly too remote as an initial goal for the people-to-peopls effort. But an effort directed toward improving the security of the United States and the Free World appears realizable as a first step and, in it self, would contribute to the larger goal. Economic strength, alliances, the presence of US and allied military forces all over tbe world, a retaliation capability, an increasing conventional warfare posture, and innumerable other factors are specific assets of our
Military Review

own and the Free Worlds security. Within this framework, the People-toPeople Program constitutes a vibrant force in support of the total effort. While thie program is essentially civilian directed, the role of the mil itary services in furthering it is a significant one. To get the whole mat ter into clearer focus, we might look at the military role in the people-to people effort from this angl+the Cabinet-1evel agenciee operate largely on a day-to-day, short-term baais and conduct the maje~ portion of their
January 1966

business overseas with todays leadere. This is inevitable because of the nature of their activities. The military forces, on tbe other hand, except in active theaters like Vietnam, operate almost exclusively on a long-range planning basis. By neceesity, then, the development of to morrows Ieadere becomes a critical concern of the military services. Thie ie es~ecially true when one realizes that many of those individuals will be come political ae well as military lead ers. It is a fact of national life, 87

PEOPLE OiPLOI#ACY whether we like it or not that mili tary officers of na$~ns all over the Free World have attained and con tinue to attain poeitions of great po litical stature. The far-flung activities of the US Army alone provide an opportunity for influencing literally hundreds of these potential leaders in and from countrke all over the world. As a matter of fact, the hold etatement that the US Army has more contacts with foreignera on a daily baais than all other agenciee of the US Government combmed has been made and hae never been dieputad. Meeting Ground One might ask, Where is rdl this meeting ground ? It ia primarily the interchange which takes place just by virtue of the presence of US troops all over the world. It varies from a brief transection betsveen a US aoklier and a 10CS1 shopkeeper to a more formal official and social interchange at the Chief of State or general officer level. It may take generations to assess the true impact of large forces sta tioned for long periods in euch cmn triee ae Germany and Japan. Yet there is hardly a German or a Japanese in Colonel David M. Rameeu, Jr., United Statee Armu, Retired, ie an A.wietnnt PTOfe880T of Management at the Florida State Univer8itzte School of BUein88e. Before hie fetir8 ment in June 196.4, he wae a member of the facultu at the U. S. Army Com tmwui and Geaeral Staff Co.lUge. He holds un M.S. in Induetrkd Manage ment from the Georgia Institute of Technology: Colonel Ramee#e article, Matmgement or Command?, pub lished in the September 1961 issue of the MfLmAUY REVIEW, received the eecemf+lace award in the MILXTASY Ravnnv Amnad Awarde competition. what were the US occupation zonee who hae not been affected by the pree. ence of the US ArmY for the last 20 yeare. r Army Contaots
Otlicial Army activities in the
United States and overseas which pro vide thousands of daily person-to-per eon contacte with foreign pereonnel can he divided into: . Liaison visite and orientation tours. Education and training.
. Disaeter relief.
Combhed staff and integrated command operations. . Military resistance. Vkitora who come to the United Statee under Army sponeorehip are shown such types of instsllatione cc centers of all branches of Govern ment, the Pentagon, service schools and colleges, and troop training feeil ities. Allied studente attending US military service echoole also patilci pate in orientation toure to points of educational, cultural, governmental, and economic intereat as regular fea tures of school curriculums. Whether relatively long-term atu dente or ehort-term visitors, all re ceive extensive briefinga on activities at each site and, of course, confer with host officiale on military mattars of mutual interest. Ae one indication of the volume of foreign visitors, over 36o annually visit tbe U. S. ArmY Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kmqes, alone. These gueeta range in military rank all the way to four-star general, and in civilian rank to Ambassador and Cabinet Minieter. Of course, the ArmY, much leas Fort I.+avenworth, is host to only a relatively emall por tion of the to.j..alnumber of euch visi tore to the United Statee. Mllitsry Revhw


PEOPLE DIPLOMAOY The various Army units in overseas areas also have many allied militery and civilian visitors. These liaison vis its and orientation tours involve visita to v8rious types of US unite and in stallations to see how our Army. does business in mrmy fields. Conferences with US personnel on matters of mu tual intareat and concern to the de and one-half months. Allied studenta are also included in still greeter num bers in short courses organised for speeiftc purposes. In addition to formal schooling, speeialiced training is frequptly pre vided for allied personnel on specific weepons syatame. For exernple, the complexity of the Nib Hemule.r fire


students from the U. S. ArmyCommand and Genersl Ststf College st Fort

Ksnees, vieit a Isrge sirlinee overhaul Missnuri

base st nesrby Kaneee City,


fense of the Free World constitute an integral element of most of such visits. That the United States obvi ously benefits from these conticte in terms of better. coordinated defense posture almoat goes witbout saying. US military service schools scat tered across the Nation offer allied officers and enlisted men tactical, ad ministrative, and teehnical courses of study, ranging in length generally from a regular course of 10 months duration to an associate course of four Janmry 16SS

control and missile syetem dictates that the training be conducted at the place beet organiaed for the purpose. That place is Fort Bliss, Texee, where the complete treining cycle for eadrea from other countries hse been pre sented. In the process, these cadres fire missiles with the identieel equip ment they will be issued when they arrive in their home countries. The ArtnY operates a variety of schools in overseas arees ranging from technicel service operations to nuclear 89

PEOPLE oiPi.oMAcY weapons, and many aiiied students at tend selcctad courses in thoee schools. The US Armye Caribbean School in the Canel tine alone has graduated over 10,000 Latin-American studente from a number of tactical, administra tive, logistiq and technical courses of etudy. On-the-job training at US Army installations in epecillc technical fields eupplemente thk formal schooling. Training ranges from instructing al lied cadres on operation and mainte nance of Honest John rockete to teaeh ing allied personnel methods of cetab liehing eurvey control for purposee of mapping their own countries. Wstufol olssStOrS Perhape nothing has improved the image of the United States more than the ArmYs record of timely assistance to our aliiea in instances of natural dwter. Recent examples owmrcd after the dkmetrous earthquakes in Chile (1960), Peru (1960), Iran (1962), and Yugoeiavia (1963), and the devastating floods in Costa Rka and Nicaragua in 1960. In a matter of hours the ArmY, in conjunction with the other services, provided bedding, clothing, food, medbxl eupplies, and assistance in restoration of communi cations. The promptness and extant of this kind of help ie always warmly received by grateful nations. The great va?ue to the United Statee of these acta of friendship lies in the visible evidence of American cencern for human euf fering which is projected to the PSO ple affected. The payoff, of course, -is our demonstrated ability and wiSing neee to work side by side with them and translate this concern into accom plished deeds on a true partuershlp basis. Another eatremely fruitful meeting 30 ground overseas exists in the many international combined staffs and in. tegrated commands in which the Army pa~lcipates. Examples, which have practically become household worde, are the North Atlantic Treaty Organi zation and the Southeast Ask+ Treaty Organisation, to name only two such commands. US representation on these staffs varies all the way from a head quarters where we furnish many more officers than any other nation to one where we are represented by only one or more liaison ollbxwe. When working in a combined head quarters, an individual inevitably finishee such an aeeignment with a far better understanding of the other fel low and his problems and philosophies, The ability of these international groups of military personnel tocoor dbate and ceoperate etfactively gene rates the kind of mutual understand ing and respect which is not only a goal of the People-to-People Program, but an abaoluta nccwsity to Frac World security. MilitaryAssistsnss Programs Headlines of the Nations newepa .pers adequately publicise the impact of our foreign military assistance pro gram, especially in ita application to Vietnam, Korea, and other areas of active wnflict between military forces, What these awounta generall~ fail to report, however, is the worldwide ex tent of this program in terms of the number of interpersonal relationships developed from it. The US Anhy nctu ally has over 8,000 of ita personnel administering miiitary aid in nearly 60 foreign countries. The tremendous opportunity these potential ambassadors of goed will have to further the peaceful aims of US foreign policy is self-evident. In many rcapecta, their atWudcs toward

PEOPLE 01PL0MAC% and influence on literally thoueands of foreign allies and neutrals may have a decisive bearing on the kind of world wtdch will be built in the future. Fortunately, through careful eelec tion and preparation, ArmY miesion personnel have created and sustained an over-all superb image of the United Statea abroad in the minds of friend, doubter, and foe alike. These dedi cated Americans and their families actively pa~lcipate in community af faire, and, through constant 8seoeia tion with current artd future leaders, military and civilian, they can and do establieh solid and lasting multina tional friendebipe. Consequently, in yet another way, the inspiring peeple to-people concept is transformed from an idea to practical action. There is, of course, no acientitlc way of accurately measuring the value of the thoueande of person-to-person contacts made every day with allied personnel all over the world, Yet there seems to be no queetion in the minds of knowledgeable people that tbe con-

tacte made are invaluable to our own security and the eeeurity of the entire Free World. The exchange of ideaa and information which takea place cannot help but create better underetandktg, greater tolerance, and a firmer baeh of mutual trust and reapeet for one another among the Patilcipating indi viduals and nations. The important point ie that the accent is not on Gov ernment-directed or controlled activi ties, but on the free and apontaneoualy accepted role of tbe motivated citisen as a personal ambaeaador of good will. Ranging from casual friendehipe to ground maneuvera of the militsry forcee of international alliances, these contacte have probably broken more barriera ko understanding than all other previous efforte to this end in recorded history. Political diplomacy hae failed to achieve world understanding. Perbapa people diplomacy can. Surely, the ulti mate goal of peace on earth, good will to men clearly warrante renewed effort on the part of each of us to contribute what we can to it. ,

1 There are some things that are not changing. The ArmY has always con sidered people te be its most precieus resource. As we move confidently into the futur% we rely on the American men and women in uniform as our beat weapon and most valuable asset. General Earle G. Wheeler

Jmlwy 1SE6


.. .



Major Robert M. Springer, Jr. United States Armg

WORLD War II afteraction re port on the effectiveness of our wartime tactical communications in the tropical rain forests of the South Pacific stated quite baldly that radio communications were unsatisfactory for all types of sets. We have come a long way since that report, dated 194S, wcs prepared. But have all of our improvements and new developments made it possible for us to achieve reliable communications in the tropical rain foraats and other areas of southeast Asia? Or do we still live with many of the same problems that plagued our World War 11 sol diere who had to operate in that en vironment ? Southeast Asia is not, of course, all jungle. Mountahs and hills comprise mora than 60 parcent of the total area. 62

These mountains and hills do cause difficulties with line of sight radio equipment, euch as the standard US Army t.acticel sets, and also compli cate the task of laying wire since nor mally there are few roads in the moun tains. While they have relatively little effsct on AM, high fraquency radio on long-range (skywave) transmimion, the mountains do reduce short-range (groundwave) transmission distances. Radio relay is often used in the mounti:nous terrain, and under proper conditions where high moun tains are widely spaced, excellent rangae are pussible when the stations are et+tablished on h]gh ground. In the plateau areas of southeast Asia, conditions are favorable for all typas of communications, and charac teristics are generally similar to those
Militlfy Ibviaw

,, i

COMMUNICIWIONS TASK found in like landforms in the temper ate sones. Lowland Araas The major obstacles to effective tec tical communications in eouthcaet Asia are usually found in the lowland areas--in the paddy lands, tro~cal rain forests, and in the dense man grove swamps along the rivers and seashores. Becauae these areas con. stitute tbe inajor food-producing re gions, a large pertion of the popula tion of each country ia located in the lowlands. And it is in those areaa that the major contKcts since World War II have occurred. Military operations are difficult to conduct in the lowlands, and commu nicators trying to provide command control are often unable to cope with the unusual or unexpected problems which thgy are called upon to solve. These probleme exist in all the major means of taetlcal electronic conmmni cationsAM and FM radio, radio re lay, and wire. Effective radio communication in the lowlands of aoutheest Asia nor mally is not possible unless special techniques are used, particularly when ebort-range equipment ia employed in tbe tropical rain foreate. Many re search etudles have been made on thla subject, and some are etill underway, Major Robert M. Swnger, Jr., i-s with the Dep+wtment of the Armu8 Ofie of the Deputw Chief of Staff for MWaW Opsratione. He received hie M.A. frem Stattford Univwsitu Graduate School, and completed the Smng 1965 Aeaooiate Couree at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He e.erved with the let Cavalry Division in the Korean War, and from 1988 to 1984 was Signal Operations Advieor with the Joint United States Military Advieorp Group in Thailand. January1966 in Thailand, South Vietnam, and Ma laya. Progress is being made, but the problem is far from solved. The primary reason for the appar ent inability to communicate by r~lo in the dense jungle is the extraordi nary attenuation of radio signals whkh reauka from the heavy foliage. One study made in Vietnam found that the range of tactical radio equip ment often ie reduced hy as much as 90 percent. Maw Equipmant Despite strong evidence tu the con trary, there are techniques which will permit radios te be effectively used in the jungle, although their perform ance often may not be ae good as that normally experienced under better condltione. Moreover, new equipment now being delivered to the using unite such ae the AN/PRC-Z5 keriea ra dios-has characteristfca more favor able to jungle communications than the sete being replaced. Teste and actual experiences in the field, utilizing special techniques and taking advantage of the new equip ment, h~ve shown that division and lower level communications can he made to perform in an acceptable manner. Of all types of electronic connnuni cation equipment, the low-power, fine of sight FM radios probably are the most difficult to use successfully in the tropical rain forest or in tractc devoted to rubber tree cultivation. These radios, however, may perform satisfactorily on paddy land, in sa vanna grasslands, or in.the mountilns. But since the low-pewer FM equip ment is the primary communications means of the US Army and the Mili tary Assistance Program-supported Army tactical unitq of battalion eize and lower, the failure of this equip &l

COMMUNICATIONS TASK ment to operate satisfactorily can cause a complete loss of command con trol. The tactical FM sets now in use normally have red-type rmtermas which develop a vertical electromag netic wave. In the tropical rain forest, this vertk%l wave is attenuated rap idly by the foliage which absorbs the energy radiated from the antennas. ~.p.,. . , designed for tactical use bes increased output power. Increased power, how ever, requires a heavier transmitter to accommodate larger tubes and other compmrenta. Too, more powerful transmitters require greater power sources which means, in practical terms, more weight. Since the normal puwer soorces are batteries and .gasofine or handcrank



obstacles to e6&&e teetieal eomrnkniee~oknin s&thesst Asia.

The range ef

taeticel radios

often is reduced by as much as !8) percent.

Researchers who attempt tu improve the refinability of the tactical FM equipment operate on the theory that the attenuation caused by the foliage can be overcome either by incr-ing the outpnt power or by improving the antenna system so that the ava~lable power can be more eiliciently radihted. Increasing the outpnt power is eer tahly a deeireble objective, and meet of our new equipment which has been et

generators, and because fast-moving tactical units are restricted in the amount of extra weight they can carry, the latter naturally object to slowing their movements by carrying extra quantities of batteries. Gasoline generatore have fimited application because of their weight, noise, and need of petroleum, oifs, and lubricants (POL) supply. Handcrank generators have always been unpopular among MilscryReview

COMMUNICATIONS TASK troops who may be physically ex hausted. Moreover, an increase in power requires a propo~lonal increase in the physical energy required to crank hand generatore, perhape to the degree that it may be impossible for one man to turn the crank. Improving our antinna systems eo that the available power ie more ef fectively radiated eeeme to me to be the beet practical solution. Needless to say, to ob~ln a better radiated signal, the most etftcient antenna should be ueed and must be placed in an advantageous, position where transmission paths will not be af fected by jungle foliage. Held Espedkmt Antennas Studiee in the Malayan jung16 in dicate that FM rangee for tactical equipment cap be doubled by con structing epecial field expedient an tenna%horiaontal doublebin pref erence to the &xt or whip antenna is sued with the equipment. More recent etudies in %%tnam have shown that expedient antennae (horizontal yagi), eesily constructed in eeveral hours or Ieee from bamboo and field wire, in creaeed power by many thee over the etandard rod or whip antenna. A test of thie field expedient an tenna in Tbeiland ueing the etendard US Army low-power FM sets was very successful. A maximum range of 28 kilometer was obtained, as opposed to a rated range of five to eight kilo meter with the rod antenna for the particular aet teeted. A major diead vantege of thk high-gain antenna is that the radiated signal is unidirec tional and must be Winted exactly in the dirtilon of tiie other station. When studying either of these ap proaches, consideration must be given to the weight and complexity of the system under discussion. At company Jmm$ Iwo level or higher, where vehicles are often available, the weight problem ie important but not critical. At platoon and lower level, though, the weight of the equipment often will be the limi~ ing factor. For this reason, moat of the r~ quired equipment and materials should be lightweight, The materials necessary to cpnetruct the field ex pedient antennas, for example, will weigh only a few pounds, and will be Available ksmlly. .: Certainly, the expedient systems are more complex than the standard eye teme, but they are not complex to the degree that they cannot be unders tood by the average eoldier. The most important factor in keeping the ex pedient eyeteme eimple and eaeily con structed ie to use as few frequencies as poseible so that the antennae will not have ti be redesigned and recut.

Many eystems have been teated to eeek a means for raising the light tac tical antennae to the height of the tree canopy, thereby avoidhg the attenua tion caqsed by the foliage. Most of these systems are based upon the prin ciple of throwing a long, weighted atring over high tree branches in such a way that It loops over the branches. The antenna can then be hoieted UP by pul$ing downward on the free, weighted end of tbe string. The problem, of course, is to get the weighted end of the string up to the top branchea. Carbon dioxide guns and the Ml rifle with grenade launcher were investigated by one group as a means for accomplieh]ng thle, with only minor succese. An Australian Army operational research group also investigated a number of poeeibilitiee, includhg a epecially constructed croes bow. This group etated with obvioue as

COMMUNICATIONS TASK tongue in cheek The reintroduction of the crossbow into the service is not recommended. . . . The most commonly used eystem, and a practical one which wopks well if the canopy is not toe high, is the simple throwing stick to which is at tached the hoisting string. Utilizing the throwing stick, properly weighkd, and old-fashioned human muscle were used to raise antennas in World War II, and have been tried in Malaya and Vietnam. So long se the balloon can be maintahed aloft, excellent com munications are possible. But balloons can be blown down by strong winds or knocked down by heavy thundershowers, and the anten nas may twist and eventually break. The bslloona are visible to the enemy,

pewer with good aim, a trained crew can raise a high-gain doublet antenna in a jungle clearing in less than 10 minutes. This method was used by United Kingdom troops in Malaya, but it is not part of standard US Army traihing. Other methods of raising antennas above the jungle canopy are being teeted with come progress, partkn larly in the uee of balloons. Balloons w

are easily tom by theme, and require a supply of hydrogen or helium. De spite these disadvantages, there are many applications for balloons, par ticularly at locations not on the im mediate frontlinee. Spring mseta have some application if the canopy ie not too high. Where heights of 24 maters or more are re quired, however, the masts are too heavy to be carried by feet-moving
Militely Review

COMMUNICATIONS TASK troops. Experiments with an un. manned helicopter demonstrated that, although the helicopter could easily raise the antenna, fuel requirements were more than combat troops could carry without support vehicles. ~este also have been made with rockets, ba cookas, naval throwing guns, under water spear guns, catapults, slings, caeting rods, and vacuum guns, all with only minor success. For medium and long-distance trahemiesions, AM communications at high frcquencise are used. The emitted signals are +eflscted from the ionosphere and thus avoid the at@u ation @ which the line of eight WM signals are subjected. At higher level headquarters, the AM mode is used primarily as a backup for radio relay systems, but at lower levels, such ae division or brigade, it may become the primary means of communication. communicating under these conditions is CW (code) sent and received by well-trained operators. Military exer cises in southeast Asia have demon strated on numerous occeeions that there ie a good poeeibility of complete lose of command control by headquar ters which depend too heavily on voice and teletype communication, and which do not have adequate numbers of trained CW opsratore etanding by ,in case the more sophisticated meane cannot be utilised. Fortunately, all equipment capable of transmitting on voice or teletype can be converted easily to CW. The problem, then, is one of ensuring that all operators are trained to use the CW mode. Since the US Army has in recent years emphasised the more so phisticated meanq of teletype, CW training often has been neglcctcd. Commanders of units going to south east Aeia ehould ineiet that the CW training of all their operators rs ceives a high priority. Night Contact Frequency selective fading and the complete lose of contact at night are common occurrences in southaset Asia, as in many other parts of the world. Sometimes contact can be re gained by switkhlng to lower fre@en cies; often with medium and lowpower sets, however, frequency chang ing cannot overcome the fading. Units gtiing to this area should ensure that they have been allocated su5cient frc quenciee, particularly in the low bands, to communicate at night. Com manders should realise that there will be periods when no amount of fre quency juggling and technical skill can overcome natural conditions. They must understand that there will be times at night when contact via AM radio will be loet. s?

Man-Mada Intarfaranca
In all arees of the world, AM com munications are subject to man-made frequency interference, fading, and atmospheric noise. In southeast Asia, man-made interference is particularly bad, although the difficulties caused by fading and atmospheric noise also can be serious. Problems witli man-made interfer; ence are due, in part, to the absence of effective government frcquency control regulation by the countries of the area. In many of the southeast Asia nations, there are a large number of stations operating on unauthorised frequencies which may be the same frequencies allocated for tactical mili tcry use. Beeause of this interference, veice and teletype tranemissione which require relatively highquality circuits free from spurioue emissions are not intelligible. The only really reliable means of

COMMUNICATIONS TASK Radio relay systems wldch provide 12 or more voice circUita at eaeh ter minsl are a common and normally reli able means of electronic corhrnunica
tions in southeast Asia. These systems are used up and down the mountah

spine of central Malaya and in Sing apore. Thay are also employed in

quantities of POL. to the sites, and the maintenance of electronic equipment, vehicles, and generators. Assurately drawn and contoured maps are an important aid in deter mining site kwations, and they are often necessary in seleeting terrain which affords line of sight transmis-

US Anw


Members of the 16th Signal Ssttslion it work in the teletype eertion of the message renter at 6th ArmY Headquarters at Finsehhefen, New Guine& in May 1944

and northeast Pofilons and through out most of South Vietnam. The main difficulties encountered in the installation and operation of radio relay eysteme in eoutheaat Asia are primarily nontechnical. Nevertheless, they are troubleaomethe shortages of maps, a lack of roads into the high elevation sites, a lack of pure water and medics) fssilitiee in the site areas, the difficulty of transporting large 98

should be on high ground; have good road connections, good drainage, be free from excessive vegetation, and, if in a danger area, be near friendly troop unita. Detailed maps are not available for some areae of southeast Asia. More time and effort must then be planned physically to eeareh for possible sites by helicopter, in vehi cles, or on foot. The lack of roads in many areas is
Milibry Ruirw

COMMUHICATIOSS TASK en extremely ditllcult problem, often the most serious problem whid must be considered. The few roads that do exist were constructed in relatively low terrain, in valleys, and occasion ally on ldll elopes. Since the line of eight tranemissitm characterietice of radio relay equip ment require that it be located on the highest ground available, the lack of existing roade to the high ground means that the equipment must be in stalled by helicopter, or special access roads must be built. If these measures cannot he taken, th~ equipment will have to be located along the exieting roads and the extra range advantage of the high ground will be lost. Lo cating equipment on lower ground may double equipment and personnel requirements because additional sta tions will be needed. ters must receive special &tention. A high rate of vehicle failure may be expected, particularly in the rainy %ea son when the existing roads often be come badly rutted. Prescribed opera tor maintenance, if strictly enforced, will lessen the vehicle maintenance problem, One action which is essential is the observance of the commoneessae rule that vehicle speeds must be kept at a bare minimum. Wire 3ystams Wire communication includes botb the common field wire found in tac tical units and the multipair cable found at division level and higher in semipermanent and permanent mili tary systems. WMle the wire mode has the advantage of normally providing reliable communications at low cost, in southeast Asia there are special considerations which are of impor tance in planning wire systems. Generally, wire is useful when em ployed by conventional tactimd unite in jungle operations, but it is most unsuitable for long-range semiperma nent and permanent military systems. Field Manual 91-30, Jungle !fraini?zg and Operations, states that, for con ventional tactical units in jungle op erations, The limitations imposed by the jungle on tbe other means of com munications cause greater dependency upon wire. This statement can be fully supported by experiences in jun gle operations in World War II, the Malaya campaigns in the 1960s, and in Vietnam. For example, one report during World War II observed, Wire was much used [in New Guinea]. At Buns, one infantry battalion with two artillery battalion attached, laid 896 miles of wire, From Burma came a report that All assault wire wee ex pended and wire was primary means of communication. . . . aa

Maintenance Problama
The maintenance of &uipment on isolated radio relay sitee ie also a ma jor problem. Gasoline generators which provide eleetric power cause the greatest dficulty. If possible, gaso line generators should be replaced with diesel generators, since the lat ter are more eosily maintained. It ie possible to overcome the gen erator maintenance problem if each, site ie provided with a minimum of three generators; on-call generator repairmen are stationed at centrally located sites for dispatch; generator oil is changed regularly; epeeial train ing is given to site personnel in sim ple repair techniques; and if there is a regular flow of generator spare parts. Electronic and vehicle maintenance probleme also can be serious. Elec tronic equipment must be moisture and fungus proofed, and in the dry seasons when dust is a problem, tllhmafy 1W6

COMMUNICATIONS TASK Any planned utiliWtion of tactical troops in southeast Asia should take into account this grezter dependency on tactical wire, a dependency wh;ch may be reflected in greater usage ratee than would be expected in Europe. A common method of puttbg down field wire in jungle operations is to use helicopters or light aircraft to lay the wire acrose the treetup canopy. While this method is an excellent ex pedient, it also results in excessive Ioeses of field wire since it is usually not possible to recover wire once it has been laid in this manner. There are certain -other special con siderations in using wire for tactical opqratione in the jungle: . Pos~ible damage to wire from the necessity of laying it on the few available and, consequently, heavily traveled jungle trails. . Moisture, which causes extreme attenuation of transmission signals. . Poseible loss of security because of the capability of the enemy for in filtrating and wiretapping. The damage to wire from laying it on jungle trails can he prevented, par tially at least, by overheading or bury ing it. The attenuation caused by moisture often cannot be prevente~ but it can be overcome to some degree by using a twisted pair for each aide of the circuit, and by the use of tele phone repeaters when available. The utilization of wire for semi permanent systems over longer ranges preeenta a different set of problems which makes this form of communica tion normally 1sss desirable than radio and radio relay. The greet disadvan tage ie the extreme vulnerability of wire and cable to sabotage. The uee of wire in Vktnam over long dietaneea is, of eourae, out of the question when Communiet-dominated areas muet be crossed. Even in Thai land, acountry with little or no overt Communist activity, upcountry tele communications systems have been built to rely on radio relay rather than wire, partly because of tbe concern over the vulnerability of the wire, Another dieadvantage in some areas is the lack of trees suitable for tele phone poles. A World War II report on the use of telephone poles during the construction of the Ledo Road stated that Trees used for pole lines, though indigenous, proved especially attractive to inseeta and had to be quickly replaced, often in a few months. The rapid decay process caused by high temperatures and moisture in creases the replacement factor of tele phone poles. In upcountry Thailand, a country with large stande of teak forests, concrete rather than wooden telephone poles are utilized whenever possible, despite the higlt cost of con

Commanders who are faced with op erating in southeast Asia should take special steps to ensure that they will have good communications. They should require that their troops re ceive special training in those field expedient antennae known to be effee tive in the jungle, and in antenna rais ing techniques; they ehould eneure that radio operators are fully trained in CW; they ehould protilde initial engineer support for radio relay cites and require that theee eitee be prop erly protected; and they should fur ther ensure that their unita carry large reserwe stocks of field wire. Theee steps, if properly taken, till go a long way toward ensuring good com munications when good communica tions are needed.


RWiOW MilitaIY

Miniguns The Army Weapons Command at Rock Island, Illinois, reeently awarded
a contract Miniguns for production for helicopter. of rapid fire

The Army procurement represents the first production application of the 7.62-millimeter Minigzms to helicop ters. The lfinigun has a maximum rate of tire of 6,000 rounds uer minute.

copter armament eubsystem. It also calls for a production quantity of Minigun pods to meet both Army and Alr Force requirement. The Xitf-21 is a double-turret weapon syetem, with bne turret mounted on each side of the heli copter. In addition to the Minigun, the XM-Zl features a2.75-inch rocket launcher. The Minigun pod is a self-contahed weepon system for light aircraft such as the A-lE Skgraider. The pod, which hangs from a standard bomb rack, contains 1,500 rounds of 7.62 millimetet ammunition, a linklees feed system, and the eix-barrel Minigun. News release. TH-13TTrainer The Army has ordered 91 additional TH-l$T light instrument trainer heli copters. The trainer is a two-place, turbo aupercharged ship which ia being used at Fort Rucker, Alabama, for advanced inetrtiment training to increase pilot proficiency. It is the miJitary counterpart of a three-place helicopter now in commer cial service.-News relesae.



The Minigun

is shown mounted helicopter

on a

The lightweight weapon, based on the Gatling principle of rotating barrels, is 29 inches long and weighs 34 pounds. The contract covers production of the Miniguna and ancillary equip ment forthe Armya new XM-W heliJanmry 1936



MILITARY NOTEA stoner 63 . The Army has reportedly purchased 1,000 Stoner 69 weapons for testing. The basic weapon (MR, Nov 1963, P 98) is an assault rifle which can ba come a carbine, a magazine-fed light I

Ca!iiwa Stoner G.W*

6S assault ritle

macbinegnn, a belt-fed light mzehine gun, a medium machinegun, or a fixed machinegun. A1terationa can be performed by changing key components. Tools are not required. In the rifle and carbine versions, the Stone? 69 weighs 7.8 poundz. It weighs 10.62 pounds in the medium machinegun assembly. The Stoner 69 fires 5.56-millimeter ammunition and has a muzzle velocity only sligbt& less than the standard 7.62-millimeter NATO round. Ite en ergy at 300 and 600-yard ranges, how ever, is only about one-tilrd that of the 7.62-millimeter round.-Newe item. MIRAGE Radar StOP@ A new miniaturized radar scope hae resulted from an Air Force contract. The display, called the MIRAGE (Mi croelectronic Radar Indkntor for Ground Equipment), weighe leas than 65 pounds. me manufacturer expects the de vice to he useful for tactical radar displays and air tratllc control. It can also be used with lightweight airborne equipment for navigation and target location or adapted for abipbeard and submarine sonar equipment.-News release.

Lormr Rarme Zeus ~ new, ionger range version of the Zcwe antimiezile miesile will be devel oped for the Nike X system under an Army contract, Although similar in configuration to the preeent model, the modified Zewz will be slightly longer and heav ier and use two eolid propellant en gines. It baa been dubbed the DM15X2. Zem is one of the two interceptor missiles in the Nike X syetem; the other iz the shorter range Sprtnt, de eigned for cloee-in intercepts. The nuclear-armed Zeus is guided by ground radar and computere to de etroy intercontinental and submarinelaunched ballistic miseiles while still outeide the earths atmosphere.DA releaee. Water Puritleation The ArmY will test the new re verse ozmozis water purification tech nique to determine its feasibility for eupplying fresh water to troops in the field. A small (1,000 gallons per day) pilot plant has bean purchased by the Army Materiel Command. In the reverse oamosia purifying method, water is forced through a cellophane-like membrane to eliminate pollution, salt from see water, bec teria, chemicals, radioactivity, and a host of conteminanta. The process is eimple and does not require heating, boiling, or adding chemicals. The ArmYs mobile water purifying equipment is deeigned to be easily transported by truck, trailer, aircraft, or helicopter. Various sizez are em ployed, to supply unita as small as a squad or as large as an entire division. A series of tests of the techniques capability will be conducted to see how it handles an aeeortment of water contaminant8.-Newe release. MllitwyRovbw


DM8im, Tlw Boeing Cmnpan


An armed version of the CH-,$7A Chinook helicopter hae been developed and will be tested by the Army Ma teriel Command. Mounted on the nose of the aircraft is an M6 40-miSimeter grenade launcher which is ,cspable of firing several hundred rounds at a high cy clic rate, This turret-mounted weapon is co~ trolled by the copilot who is able to cover an extensive area on either side of the flightpathof the aircraft. Com plementing this nose turret, a pylon on each side of the aircraft carries a 20-miSimeter gun and either a 19 round, 2.75-inch rocket pod or a 7.62 millimeter G4t&zg machinegun. . Protecting the flankeof the aircraft are five gunnere etationed in the es bin who are provided with either a 7.62-millimeter or a .50-caliber ma chinegun on flexible mounts. One gun JMumy 1SS6

is mounted on the rear-loadhg ramp of the cargo compartment. From this vantage point, the-gonner can protect the aircraft from ground fire after passing the target-a capability not present in exieting armed helicopters. The Chinook aleo has a new type of steel armorplate built into the crew seats which completely covers the toreo, and other steel plates that pro tect component of the aircraft. ?dksions of the armed Chinook might include protecting troop-csrry ing helicopters in the landing sene and furnishing suppressive fire in the im mediate area during disemharkation. Plans for deployment of tlds evalu ation aircraft configuration have not yet been announced. Chinook aircraft organic to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) are presently in combat in South Vietnam. News release. 109

The Bmw

Vertol Dioisicm,


A working scale model of a tilt floet helicopter was recently made pub lic for the first tiie by a major air craft manufacturer. The deeign concept is a result of a deeign feasibility etudy accomplished under contract from the Navys Bu r,eau of Weapons. The object of the study is to con vert a helicopter to a tilt-float config uration. The application of tilt-ffoata to heli copter and vertical and ehort takeoff landing aircraft may be useful for antieubmerine warfare, rescue, oceen omphy, reeeereh and strike euppo~ and other uses. The fundamental purpose of this

design is to place a vehicle on tilt tloats above the water in heavy eeee to provide an exceptionally steady platform for an indefinite period with out power.. It is expected that less than one degree of pitch and two degrees of roll will be attained in 2.6-meter waves. The tik-floata are retraeted during tlight and extended prior to landing in the water. In addition, it bee been reported that the aircraft hae the option of landing on the water, in high eees, with excellent amphibious capability with the tilt-lloata retraeted.-News release.
Military Rwlew




The Malay&an Government has or dered four more patrol craft of the Sri Keduh type from England, accord ing to a European source. Ten unite of these fast 96-ton standard &laplacement patrol crhft are alreedy in service with the Malaysian Navy. News item.

FRANCE M 330 Helicopter

The French SA 9.+30 helicopter now being teeted was developed to meet an army requirement for a helicopter capable of ground support and Iogis tic transport, The medium-sised craft is equipped

ALGERIA Airorsft
In addition to a recmmaissance and a helicopter squadron equipped with French materiel, the Algerian forces reportedly have about 40 MiG-17 fighter bombers supplied by the So. viet Union.News item.
Fltwwehr ..d lechnik Sketch

21113STruck The new Soviet ZIL135 truck is 12 meters long and has two 180-horse power engines, one for the four wheels on the left and one for the four wheele on the right. Two front and two rear wheels can be steered. All eight wheels are driving wheels; The ZILI$5 with an empty weight of 10 tons has a payload of 10 tons. Compared with other trucks, the of ficially announced capacity of the ve , hicle is remarkably high. For inetance, the empty weight of the ZIL157 is eix tons with a payload of 2.5 tons, and the URAL975 has an empty weight of 8.6 tona with a paylead of 4,6 tons. A variant of the ZIL1S5 truck has six large wheels approximately 170 centimeters in diameter and can op erate in anew-covered terrain. The modified version, ueed as a per sonnel carrier and prime mover, has cabin space for 14 persons.News item.
January 1S33

with the standard armament and heq. an all-weather capability. It carries 12 fully equipped troope or an equiva lent load. . Powered by twin-turbine engines, the helicopter atihs a maximum cruieing apeed of 180 miles per hour. It has a range of 360 miles. The empty weight of the helicop ter is 7,200 pounds, and tbe normal takeoff weight ie 13,200 pounds. News item.

COMMUNIST CHINA Armam&rtIndustry

A Nationalist Chinese publication reports that the Red Chinese arma ment industry includes 36 aircraft factories, 129 arms factories, and two plants for the production of military vehiclee. One aircraft factory in Mukden is said to have a capability of assembling 30 MiG-17 jet fighters per month. Also hated in Mukden is the most impor tant arms factory which reportedly produces mechineguns, tanks, mor tare, antiaircraft cannon, recoilless guns, and heavy machheguns. The largest automobile factory in Chang chun manufacture three and five-ton military trucke.-Newe item. loa


Vahicles Use Turbine Power




The Swedish ArmY has announced the+development of two new military vehlclee whlcb use gas turbine engines ae boost power. The vehicles are a selfpropelled, 155-miS[meter gun and a self-propelled antiaircraft - weapon equipped with two automatic 40-milli meter guns. The new 155-millimeter gun, now in production, is a tracked vehicle weighing 48 tone. It hae a rapid fire capability and can fire 14 rounds in 4$ seconde with a range of more than 25 kilometers. The veldcle is manned by a crew of four to seven men. antiaircraft 40-millimeter The weapon is aleo a tracked vehicle which has great mobility and high firepower and is equipped with radar and auto matic tracking equipment. The veld cles turret can rotate 860 degrees in :, > ., , :.-::. J:,.<. ., 1.5 seconds. The 40-miSimeter gunw The Boeing C.nn$anW Photos can be used against targete on the Self-propelled, 40-millimeter antiaircraft ground es well es in the air.News vehicle releaee.





AUSTRALIA 0aJens8 Buiidup

Australias commitment in south east tila increassd recently as 35o troops were sent to Vietnam. The new Vietnam commitment will build up the Australian combat force to a 1,400-man battalion group. Total strength of the Australian Army forces wiil reach 40,000 by 1967. The 350 extra troops for Vietn~ will go to support unite, including atilllery, engineer, armor, signal, avi ation, and logietic elements. In Vietnam, Au$tralia has the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, a logietic support company, a 100-man advisory training team, and a head quarters unit in Saigon.News re lease. Gun Tested A new submachinegun, the Fl, is undergoing final triale at the Hols worthy Army Camp in New Scuth Wales. The weapon has been devel oped as a replacement for the OweTZ gun which was developed in 1941 and since used extensively by Australian troops. The magazine of the new eubma ckdnegun holds 34. rounds of nine miilimeter ammunition that is inter changeable with weapons used by the United States and NATO alliance countries. The F1 has a rate of fire of 600 to 650 rounds a minute. It weighs seven pounds three ounces compared with the Owen guns nine pounds eight ounces.Newe release. itaiian Jata For RAAF The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) plans to buy 108 Italian dfacchi jet trainers. The aircraft are to be built in Australia. The Australian Minister for DeJenuary 1sS6

fense said the Efacchi trainer would ultimately replace the Winjeet pro pei$er-driven aircraft and the Vr6m pire jet trainer aircraft of the RAAF. The first 12 aircraft will be in service by March 1968. The Mucchi is a two-seater, 500 mik-per-hour jet.News release.

WEST 6ERMANY Airhasein Portrrgai

A Central German Liaison Agency direeta all work in Portugal connected with the construction of a German Air Force base at Beja, southeaet of Liebon. The development of Beja, the larg est German base in a foreign country, began in 1963 and ie scheduled to be completed between 1968 and 1970. Beaidee hangars and workehope, two runways are being built.Newe item. Army Aviation The Weet German Army has re portedly decided to leave to the air force all battlefield surveillance, tar get reconnaieeance, and ground eup port ~iseions from the air and will diepense with the army air units serv ing these missione. The army will use only helicopters, and these will be mainly for traneport and liaison mis sions. A major reason for this deci sion is eaid to be the shortage of per sonnel, particularly in army aviation units.-News item. EAST GERMANY Miiit& Aid To NorthYiatnam Eset Germany has reportedly be come an important supplier of weap ona for the Vlet Cong. The arms de liveries are shipped through Moscow for the purpose of coordination, and consist mainly of heavy machlnegons, flamethrower, and mortare.-News item.


THE WEBTERN FRONT 19144918. By John Tarraina. 2S1 Pagas. J, B. Lippbraott Co., Philadelphia, Pa., 1BS5. $4.95. BY MAJ JACK G. CALLAWAY, USA The question continues to be asked: Was the bloodbath on the Western Front inevitable? Was there no other way? The author, in presenting the British view, offers a convincing argu. ment in support of the opinion that there was no other way. In developing hh argument, he ex plains why the Schlieffen plan failed, the reason for the mass mutinies in the French Army, and the develop ment of the etalemate that produced trench warfare. He also discusses the necessity for the British to assume the major responsibility for the con duct of the war, and why it was pos sible to obtain a decision over the Cen tral Powers only on the Western Front. The author examines the Battles of Guise, Passchendaele, and Amiene, and the leadership of the British, the Germans, and the French. The losses on the Weetern Front, in the authors view, are not excep tional when compared with those of our own Civil War or those of the Soviets in World War II. The peycho logieel chock such losses produced in the nations involved in World War I was due to their failure to produce desisive results. Mr. Terraine, one of Englands fore most military analysts, has produced an excellent hock that is impressive because of its vast scope. loa

SECURITY IN DISARMAMENT. Editad by Riahsrd J. Bamat and Riahard A. Fallr.440 Psgas. Princaton UnivarsJty Prass, Prince. ton, N. J., 19S5. $10.00. BY LT COL GEOUGE D. EGOESS,JR., USA This is, essentially, an updating of selected potiions of two contract studies previously commissioned by the US Arms Control and Disarma ment Agency. It is an attempt to re consider, in light of the political events and technological development of, the past four years, the feasibility of choosing arms control and dis. armament as a national seeurity strategy. Eleven scholars examine three major aspects of tbe arms control and dis armament problem: making a mean ingful start toward disarmament; re- taining sufficient freedom of action to defend national interests; and creat ing, within a disarmed international society, a political environment %nit able for the resolution. of conflict and for the promotion of national and hu man interests. The editors and contributors make no attempt to reeommend concrete and comprehensive action programs in any of these areas. It is their purpose to stimulate further study and discussion of the issues by identifying the ob stacles to disarmament and by ana lyzing alternatives open to American policymakers. The military reader will find much to engage hls interest in thk collection of eseays. Milite~ Review

MiLITARY BOONS probability is that force will be em ployed in a more civilized manner. The payehological factor is domi nant in situations where material force is not usable. The area of free dom of action in which military force can be used is reduced, although the availability of thk force is important. The art of etrategy is in maddragthe beet use of the limited and constantly This small, interesting bock by a changing area where military re retired French general is destined to . sources may be employed. be a classic. Far from serving solely , This strategy cannot be just miSi as an introduction to strategy: it tary. It must utilize the proteen forme will lead readers toward new and fruit of national power. Each department ful thinking about present and future (ministry) must have its own over-all world conditions. strategy for its field of responeibllity. The author comments on each of Total strategy is the orchestration of the well-known strategists from an these many fields by the head of gov cient times to modern, with special ernment. attention to those who were blinded It is interesting to note a French by the black and white theories of the author of thie stature who feels that: 19th century. He criticizes Americans the credibility of a second-rank nation bemused in mathematical evaluation threatening to use countercity nuclear of past probabilities and who rely on weapons involves irrational action; weapons, an armaments race, and the size of a viable state must soon be space techniques. He stresses the im affected and international entities will portance and scarcity of original form; an international force wili be thought and the danger of rigid or feasible; the deeline of the West comes partial hypotheses, noting that, while froq its lack 6f a united front; and any innovation in strategy may be a rather than thhking and calculating, major hazard, all routine is fore the West is merely trying to apply doomed to failure: juridical or moral principles. General Beaufre is at his best in THE DECiSiON TO OROP TNE BOMB. By Len the thorough analysis which he gives Ciovznn.Rti and Fred traad. %ld Pagas. to strategyweighing it as an art and Ceward.McCann, inc., New Yerk, 1SS5. not as a science. He insists that strat $B.OD. egy is primordial, that it is a danger BY MAJ CHASLESL. MCNEILL, USA ous misconception to believe tbe evo A penetrating account of the per lution of strategy depends on tactics sonalities involved in the conception, or techniques. development, and ultimate delivery of The Beaufre concept is that as a the first atomic bomb upon HiroaKlma. consequence of nuclear weapons we The conflicts of philosophy, tbe moral are getting further away from all-mat and political issues raised, and the conflict. Only miscalculation can cause events leading to the decision to use a major war. Yet, ironically, both war this awesome weapon are examined in on the grand scale and peace in its de~ll. true sense may now be buried. The AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGY. Witir Par tiorrlarRafaranoe to Problems of Bafencs,
Politiss and DIplomaoy in the Nuclear Aga.
By BdrrdralDArm6e Andrt Bearrfre.Witfr a
Prefzoe by Captain ES.N. Liddeii ffzrt and
Transiztad fry Majer Sanerzi il. N. Barry.
138 Pages, Fraderiok A. Praeger, inc.,,New
York, 1SS5. $4.95. .



MILITARY BOOKS TWE CRISJS CAME. Simulating International Confliat. By Sidnay F. 6iffln. 191 Pages. Doubladay & Co,, Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1s65. $4.B5, BY MAJ ROBERT L. BURKE, USA o A sophb+tieated descendant of these and e+ier traditional war games, crieis gaming has begun to receive the attention of a number of modern de- fense analysts. The simulations of international crisee in these gamee hae generated enthusiasm among those whoee etudies necessitate predicting the couree of future events. None of them, including General Giffin, feel the technique is a panacea. All of them feel it is a useful tool which has yet to be fully ex ploited. General Giffin, a Research Aesuciate of the Institute for Defense Analyses, describes the techniques used in a crieis game and presenta two eample scenarioe: a reconstruction of the 1962 Cuban crisie and a fictional crieis, Kashmir 1967. Very little has heen published on this subject; General Giffins beok fills a preeent need for thoee interested in strategy and public affaire. military strategy, alliances, national power, the East-West conflict, eco nomic tools, diplomacy, and a discus sion of the developing nations. The author is well qualified in thk field both as an academician and ae an experienced diplomat. He was a professor at the University of Ala bama for four years and eince 1951 has been a professor at Syracuse Uni versity. In addition, he epent 17 years in the Polish ~oreign Service. TNE NATIONAL GUARO IN POLITICS. Oy Mar. tha Osrthick. 202 Pagss. Narvard University Prass, Cambridge,Mass,,1965.$4.95. BY JOHN R. CAMERON
This book, a political history of the

INTERNATIONALPOLITICS IN A REVOLU. TIONARVAGE.By W. W..Krdski. B09 Pages. J.B. J.Jppincott Co.,Philadatphla, Paw1BB4. $8.B5.

An excellent text on international relations, in a readable style well suited for the nonprofeeeional political scientist. The eclectic approach used by Professor Kulski in selection of subject matter; pertbxdarly his avoid ance of ueing current probleme and policies as apringboarde, makes tbk hook of lasting value to the uninitiated in the field and to the military reader. Among the topics he covers are:

National Guard Association (NGA), is a chronicle of the techniques and baeee of power of an association which has probably been the most effective military lobby. The probleme of the guard result from several significant changee in the nature of its environment. Execu tive administration of defense has become more complex and the Con grees more occupied. Thue, there is less ability to grant the informal ac cess upon which the early successes of the NGA depended. The change from state guard organisations with political power beeca in those states to a Federal organioetion with lees ened political euppert in the home stAtee has further reduced the effee tivenees of the association. Congress bas demonstrated varying intereste and degrees of cooperation, and much of the NGAs success came when its aims could be combined with those of Congrees. The author demonstrates that the National Guard faces many serious challenges in this era in which tradk tional military policies are changing.


BOOKS its genesis by Lenin to 20th century embellishments by Maw Giap, and Guevara is the most interesting part of the work. Particularly vaiuabie is the authors development of a model of Communist insurgency warfare On 25-26 February 1965 sixty schol based upon logical, four-phased cel ars and men of affiirs gathered at iular development of the phenomenon. Princeton for a conference on The Major Pustay proposes a US re United States and Communist China. eponse, and opens up many possi This publication includes six papers bilities for a better US posture in de preeented at this meeting as well as an, address given concurrently by Pro ,testing and coping with Communiet insurgency. However, he offere an or fessor George F. Kennan. ganizational framework which may Thie acrose-the+oard analyeis of introduce yet another coordination Communiet China and her challenge level. to the ,United States in Asia and south The authore hope is that an order east Asia is unusually thought-pro ing, a aystematizstion and a proper voking. Discerning appraisals cut orientation for counterinsurgency op through the haze which surrounds erations will be developed through Communist China and imaginative uee of the material proffered. Al suggestion give new encouragement though the book falis short of achiev to those who muet deal with the Com ing this aim, it is a commendable and munist Chinese problem. readable effort, well worth perusal by In short, this book gets down to the general military reader and of par cases; clarifies Communist Chinas po tential; reaffirms continuance of COm ticular pertinence to the student of in ,surgency and countere thereto. munist Chinas aggressive line; and suggests strategies for the United THE LONG FUSE. An Interpretation of the States which can limit the expansion Origins trf World War i. By LaurenceLafore. of Commnnist Chinas power in Asia 282 Pages. J. B. tippincott Co,, Phiiadei and southeaet Asia. phia, Pa., 1B65. $4.50. BY IBT LT FRANZ L. HELBIG,USA cOUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE. BY Major THE UNITEO STATES AND COMMUNIST CHINA. Ediied by William W. Lockwood.71 Pages. Princaton University Prass, Princa. ton, N. J., 1BB5.$4.00 paparbound. COL ALBERT H. SMITH,JR., USA

John S. Pusfay,United States Air Force. 194Pages. The FreePress, MawYerk, 1965.

Major Pustay, Aesociate Professor of Political Science and Aesistant Dean at the US Air Ferce Academy, uees a detailed anaiysis of Communist insurgency warfare as a backdrop for a. proposed doctrine relative to the in cumbent regimes response and for a proposed US response. His treatment of the evolution of Communist insurgency warfare from January 1sss

A well-written historical analysis which successfully avoids a discussion of the unanswerable question of war guilt and blame. As Mr. Lafore skillfully retraces the evente which led to the catastrophe, his evidence points to the fact that political and mifitary Ieadera did not envieage the cataclysmic horror, but rather a short, limited war. The books assertion that the threat to the integrity of Austria-Hungary posed by Serbia and Serb nationalism eventually led to war ie well supported. 111


REFORM. New Forces for Change in IN VENEZUELA, 1810-1910. By
Latin America. Edited by William V. Robert L. Gilmore. 211 Pages. Ohio
DAntonio and Fredrick B. Pike. 276 University Press, Athens, Ohio, 1964.
Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., $5.00. New York 1964.$5.95. BY LT COLWILLIAM L GOSDON, USA BY LT COL JAMES J. USSANO,USA Dr. Gilmore, Associate Professor of The political, economic, psychologi History at Ohio University, has long cal, and sociological forces at work in been interested in the nature and Latin Americas revolution of rising causes of caudillism, which he defines expectations are examined in rela as the union of personalism and vio tionehlp withand epeeific focus upon lence for the conquest of power. the role of religion which, in Letin His etudy of caudillism led him to America, is, fundamentally, the Ro conclude that it was not a form of man Catholic Church. militarism, ae is generally supposed. The caudillo, or man on horseback, The authore, professors at the Uni was not a soldier in the commonly ac versity of Notre Dame, have edited a cepted senee, and he met his demise timely collection of eesaye and panel only when a professional military discussions by prominent political leaders, churchmen,, and political imd group arose to contest him. social scientists from both Latin The book is a careful study of Vene zuelan eociety, its caudillos, militia, America and the United States. One of the participants is Eduardo Frei and military institutions during the Montalva, President of Chile. 19th century. It documents thoroughly the entrepreneurial political vio While presented clearly as a poten lence of this period of turbulent so tially dominant force, it remaine to cial development. be seen whether the Cburcb can be expected to act ae an ideological force ZARUMILLA-MARAN6N: The Ecua for either strengthening or impeding dor-Peru Dispute. By David H. Zook, the Latin-American movement toward Jr. 331 Pages. Bookman Associates, a greater realisation of freedom and Inc., New York, 1964.$6.00. democracy. Complex issues are shown BY COL MITCHELGOLDE$ITHAL, USA from divergent points of view, thus providing the reader a basis for per This book is a echolarly treatise on sonal evaluation. one of the most enduring international Although the book does not, furnish - tension areas in South America. The any definitive answers, it provides a author objectively attempts to breathe meaningful ineight into a force which some understanding into a relatively may be a aignificent element in the little-known and understood interna future of Latin America. tional dispute,


MllitNY ROVieN