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Introduction

Subjectivization

This book imagines and articulates an architectural subjectivity privileged as impersonal effects, to be explored in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari, by retracing steps taken earlier, in the 1970s and 1980s, by cultural and architectural protagonists in the United States and Japan. The following discussions pursue a more abstract and, therefore, timely investigation of the form and function of impersonal effects in the architectural encounter. Subjectivity is, for Deleuze, not a person, but a power given to immanent forces to act and to produce effects in the world. In short, it is the field of what I call subjectivization, meaning the potential for and event of matter becoming subject, and the multiple ways for this to take place. Deleuze, in fact, tends not to use the word subjectivity, speaking instead of affectsthe capacity to affect and be affectedand pre-personal singularities, meaning those irreducible qualities or powers that act independently of any particular person. To walk, to see, to lovethese are general or anonymous capacities that function in a very real sense prior to the personological subject. Singular, here, does not mean specific or rare, but the reverse: the functions to sleep or to laugh are singular because sleeping and laughing always retain a certain abstract quality or impersonality, no matter who sleeps or laughs. For Deleuze, the world is composed of so many singularities, which together resonate silently toward a mystery of something always already yet to come. The subject is understood, therefore, not as identity but as a convergence of singularities immanent to an encounter. Deleuze is critical of both phenomenology and psychoanalysis, as still engaging a classical (Cartesian) notion of subject as individual or free agent, a form of subjectivity premised on the separation of the subject and the object of that subjects attention. In Deleuzes worldview, the ordinary identity, the I of the representational ego, is a surface effect of impersonal processes of differentiation and the repetition of pre-personal singularities. What I call the impersonal effects are the inchoate, not-yet-determined fragments of architectural encounter, as opposed to the personal effects of identity, individuality or the constituted collective. Effect is not, in Deleuzes sense, ephemeralan effect of something more primary; but rather, like a magnetic effect, it is a productive force, an effect that works and creates. By extension, the project here is to find and express, by architectural means, the image of effects. (Image, here, does not mean a photograph or a media image; but, rather, a live arrangement of effects at large in the world, like the realist cinema and its image advocated by Andr Bazin.) What qualifies such a pure (unmediated
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Architecture for a Free Subjectivity Copyrighted Material


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Anonymous Encounter

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While to speak of the subject in these termsto rid ones self of identityis a difficult thing, we might say architecture is already such a singular encounter and de facto deindividualization of self. There is, as soon as I step into a room, a street, or a town, a palpable mystery of the singularity of the eventto walk inside, to see an unfamiliar street, to explore an unknown town. In that moment, each instance echoes and anticipates every other, past and future, of this primitive encountera type of eternal return, echoing Nietzsches vision at Sils Maria and embedded in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It is this anonymous sense of a primary realm for the production for subjectivity that lies beyond the individual, spatio-temporal experience I call mine. Such an encounter does not signal an in-between, a space between persons and concrete forms, as troubled for decades by architectural criticism and first made a tenet of High Modernisma conundrum stretching back to Immanuel Kant and all the arguments about what is knowable. Rather, it is an event that comes before the crystallization of all things, it is the abstract surface of all singularities coming into being. Neither the space of appearance of twentiethcentury phenomenology nor a strange materialization of the Platonic chora, the event of impersonal effects is the unnamable process of architectural and architectonic encounter. Wim Wenders film Wings of Desire2 opens with a singular image of Berlin, the audience hears a white noise of intimate thoughts, the city as neutral surface for subjectivizational processes. Two angels receive this continuous flow of
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and unmediatic) image is simply the mode in which it causes multiple effects to proliferate. Unlike personal effects (a watch, a ring, a condominium) that cling to the personal body, the impersonal effects of architecturesuch as those of a street, a store, or the bathroom at a partybelong to everyone and to no one; they envelop the body from a distance, even when they are up close. However, the impersonal effects can always become repersonalized in their derivative mode where architecture becomes objectified, the object of a proprietary relationship (such as my house) where subject/object relations are restored.1 Personal effects in architecture generally produce a formalist typology of effects, invoking a suite of terms such as plan and gestaltin other words, the entire discursive apparatus of design. But this is not to criticize such formalistic measures per se. Only the most rigid and stultifying formalisms (for example, those that prescribe architecture in advance and re-inscribe the proprietary status of building, author, resident) must be avoided when discussing or isolating impersonal effects. Architecture is not merely what is made or planned, what is drawn or built. It also creates, alters, and conditions interlocking subjectivized fields.
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Introduction Copyrighted Material


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The Return of the Subject While Deleuze is responding to a history of subjectivity that attempted to depart from classical metaphysicsand the Platonic subjectivity which marks its beginning7 (a self)contemporary architectural theory since the Second World War could be similarly narrated via a history that attempts to extricate itself from modernism and modern subjectivity. The emergence of modernity in architecture has been typically historicized as the defining moment for a certain conception of subjectivityviz., the subject thought of as autonomous individuality or constituted selfas originating agent and will. The epitome of this point of view occurred in German Idealism. Architectures contemporary problem of
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synchronized, live effects where it is no longer specific individuals who speak, but the city that has become singularized, an anonymous it speaks. There is in architecture a singular movement of the encounter itselfthe it encountersa pure generality, by which the loose effects portend other possible connections to other possible registers; by which every encounter belongs to everyone and to no-one. This movement of the encounter comes before the formation of static (nominal) things; it is for Deleuze the entirely neutral and impassive fourth person singular,3 thus, in his vivid illustration: the battle hovers over its own field, being neutral in relation to all of its temporal actualizations, impassive in relation to the victor and the vanquished, the coward and the braveNever present but always yet to come and already passed, [it is] graspable only by the will of anonymity which it itself inspires.4 To enter any encounter, in this sense, is to enter into the mysterium of all encounters, without actualizing them. The effects are what give architecture its inherent mystery, the suggestion of another world, something not seen in the instantiation of a simple building. This does not mean that cities, buildings or interiors becomes persons, but that architecture works by entering into anonymous processes of subjectivity the production of effects that speaks of multidimensionality. Lived experience is altered as a result, and the nature of cognizing architecture and its milieu shifts to a non-discursive, phenomenal space-time that is vivid, corporeal, cinematic. For Deleuze, of course, the new transcendental field,5 having now acquired its own special form of subjectivity, acts like a quicksand from which the individuated subject will no longer be able to be rescued. Here, the drowning subject will be captured, in slow motion, for the reason that in architectures discipline the subject remains firmly entrenched; the name of the subject must be retained, initially, and interrogated. For Deleuze, who is operating from within a long philosophical tradition, and situating it historically, as part of the genealogy of subjecthood and the ongoing crisis of postmodernity, this process is already perceived to be a fait accompli; there is no longer any need to name a subjectthe subject, for Deleuze, being a philosophical concept, a Cartesian illusion.6
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Architecture for a Free Subjectivity Copyrighted Material


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subjectivity is precisely the contestation of modern autonomy (of conflicting notions of will and agency and its formal independence), and its separation of subject and objectlong regarded as insufficient to account for the sheer force and creativity of the architectural encounter. The contemporary project, then, seeks to substitute the modern subject of architecture as self-determination with one that is seen to emerge from and be determined by impersonal systems and processes of production, by internal forces prior to the formation of fixed identities. Such a project of substitution reaches its apotheosis in the contestation of the very historiography of the modern subject. The critique of the received conception of modern subjectivity as represented in the work of Sigfried Giedion extends from contemporary and postmodern architectural discussion to the Frankfurt School polemics of Georg Simmel and Max Weber, to which this architectural discussion refers. In this long-standing critique, the rise of modernity is seen to have produced a subjectivity that is not self-determining, but that is fragmented and colonized by the rise of capitalist industrialization and the overwhelming, material processes of production, which are suddenly beyond the grasp of any individual. It is this exacerbated subject dispersed across an increasingly bewildering myriad of abstract, somewhat sinister systemsthat becomes the essential condition of modernity. In this contemporary, post-Giedion discussion, the humanist subject typically identified with modernism, by contrast, is seen as an ideological effect of modern architectures discourse, which denies the real status of the subject.8 The exemplar of this ideological subject is the fictional character Howard Roark, Ayn Rands vision of modernist autonomy and self-interest, in The Fountainhead.9 The construction of a modern, heroic subject was later seen as a compensatory mechanism for the corrosive and dehumanizing processes of modernization. The real, splintered and compromised condition of the postwar subject can be thought to lead directly to a form of cultural resistance that seeks to salvage a humanism lost. This attempt to recuperate autonomous humanist subjectivity, manifest in the very insistence of a unified modern subject, which suggests a third model that is perhaps closer to the subjectivity of the central narrator in the film Fight Club: a subject who, having lost all identity (he no longer has a name), creates an allknowing avatar named Tyler Durden, the image of pure autonomya self-styled superhuman he wishes he could be, yet simultaneously believes he has already become.10 It is the simultaneous wish and failure to sustain the image of the autonomous subject herethe very failure to re-insert the classical subjectthat becomes definitive of the modern project. Attempts to rehabilitate the humanist subject are not simply disconnected quarrels of historiography, nor are they mere theoretical paradigms; they are, rather, the key to understanding architectures contemporary productions of subjectivity. The historical failure to retire the humanist subject, from the 1970s to the present, and the failure of the contemporary program of substitution, represents the defining problem of architectures postmodern caesura.11
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Introduction Copyrighted Material


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After World War II, various instantiations of phenomenologically inflected architecture attempted to salvage the field of the subject, which was thought to have been undermined by modernism, by addressing some of its neglected conditions; viz., feminist, environmental, social, and populist concerns. Yet phenomenology in architecture did not alter the aesthetic formula of a Cartesian subject who stands outside a passive object of contemplation. Phenomenology, premised as it is on a representational schema of a subject who is inserted into a transcendental field of knowledge from which she decodes or extracts meaning, posits a representational schema of subjectivity that can be seen to have survived all deconstructive postmodern formalisms, and to have led only to the insistence of the subject. If Kenneth Framptons Critical Regionalism re-inserted the humanist subject, centered by a constituent place that stabilized identity, and postmodern historicism reproduced a time when the subject was secure, even the work of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown could be seen as an attempt to humanize the banal American highway and strip mall, to re-insert the phenomenal subject as a constituted reader of the landscape of mid-century American cities.12 These socalled postmodern movements were, literally, an attempt to re-insert a subjectivity that had been stripped from architecture and culturefrom the ethos of postwar corporate modernism to early-1970s formalism.13 If modern architecture has been valorized or criticized for placing the subject in crisis, then postmodernism could be seen as a disappointed or melancholic reaction to the failed, serial re-inscription of the humanist subject traceable to the inherent utopian premises of modernity. For this reason, Fredric Jameson has attempted to suggest the emergence of a post-postmodern modernity, albeit one that is stalled by the postmodern caesura. Outside this internal phenomenological discussion in architecture there is a vast external literature on subjectivityfrom philosophy to psychoanalysis and social theorythat has been called upon to aid in the war against the modern subjectbeginning with Freud and Nietzsche and leading to a family of French theorists, including Lacan, Foucault, Sartre, and Derrida. These poststructuralist thinkers have, each in their own manner, pursued the indiscernibility of the subject in the object by broadly addressing the subjects encounter with representational (ideational) systems. For Lacan, the subject is a signifying effect of the unconscious,14 while in Foucault the subject is a discursive function of power structures and institutional mechanisms. In Derrida the subject is a function of language, an apparition or specter caught in the aporias of language, of textualityshe becomes a subject only by conforming to the system of rules within language, by conforming to diffrance, the very gap in representational orders between the symbolic and the real.15 In the 1980s, deconstructivist architects and theorists reading Derrida attempted to rework the problematic of architectures lingering modernist subjectivity within the framework of textualitya set of formal relations, in the architectural encounter, by which a building can be decoded or read (or by which it decodes
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Architecture for a Free Subjectivity Copyrighted Material


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Dissolution of the Subject Deleuze and his collaborator, the Lacanian psychiatrist Flix Guattari, offer architecture (both then and now) a substantially different version of subjectivity than that of their contemporaries, a schema that escaped architectures attention during the intense reading of psychoanalysis and poststructuralism in the 1980s, which Deleuze and Guattari stridently opposed. Deleuze and Guattari eschew the linguistic conception of subjectivity, and provide architecture with a model that speaks to the material, aesthetic basis of all subject productionscounter to the overwhelming discourses on textuality now synonymous with postmodernism.
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itself by the very agency of representational values). However, even the so-called decentered subject of deconstructivist architecture reproduced an absent subject. If modern architecture reproduced a mythical, centered subject, the typologies of deconstructivism generated a missing subject as spectral aporia or doubt (which hovers ghostlike about its tangled planes). All postmodern formalisms, in turn, premised as they are on representational schemata, fail to grasp the real subject productions immanent to architecture, the anonymous architectural subjectivity irreducible to an individuated subject, or to the building as edifying object or constituted whole. What is important here is that the architectonic nature of representation automatically suggests one form or another of the subject, whether reducing it to trace (in the rejection of all forms of defining ideological content) or to ultra-mediated captive of semi-sinister forces. The articulation of the posthumanist subject in architecture has only succeeded in proving the persistence of its humanist double. The routine de-territorialization and re-territorialization of the subject in formalist architectures since modernisms collapse is inextricably bound to its past iterations, as unresolved crisis. In this way, past architectures haunt present-day architectures, and the necessity of an elective amnesia (as, for example, formulated within modernist architecture) is seductive. It is, instead, something else that is requiredin other words, impersonal effects. The question arises: how were these poststructuralist theories inadequate to architectures crisis of subjectivity? The argument cannot be that the architects misinterpreted or misunderstood Lacan or Derrida, though some claim they did. In architecture the problem was consistently narrated as an overvaluation of the text, of linguistic codes, the reduction of subjectivity to textuality, and a severance from the very materiality of the architectural encounter in which the real productions of subjectivity take place. But the weakness of textuality as a model for architectural thinking sidesteps a more fundamental error: namely, the investment in the subject, even a decentered one, which by its very grammatic artifice always isolates subjectivity from architecture in a representational schema that, like a digital loop, always reproduces the same humanist subject. Architectures problem of subjectivity can be thought of in this way, as a reflex of the mechanism of representation, which guarantees the return of the lost subject.
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Introduction Copyrighted Material


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Why Not Deleuze?

Deleuze has been of central interest to architectural discourse since the 1980s, nourishing important debates on architectures contemporary questions of process, form, technology, and information. Manuel De Landa, the artist and philosopher, for example, and the architects Bernard Cache and Greg Lynn, contributed to a dominant body of work, of the last 15 years, on architecture and Deleuze, the unwavering and explicit focus of which was Deleuzes philosophy of Henri Bergson on time, virtuality and movement.18 Despite the, albeit relatively few, works on subjectivity produced by contemporary Deleuze and Guattari scholars involved with architecture,19 a theory of subjectivization has never gained significant ground within architectural discourse or practice, and in many senses Deleuze has been summarily abandoned by many of the protagonists who first adopted him 20 years ago. Those endangered
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What is unique in Deleuze and Guattaris thinking is their conviction in an immanent subjectivity of the aesthetic object itself, unmediated by any interpretive content. To be clear, Deleuze and Guattari declare that the aesthetic object does not merely take part in the production of subjectivity, but that it constitutes its own, as non-sentient subjectivity. The fertilization of an egg, a wild bushfire, an architectural workthese all can be thought to constitute veritable subjectivities, in the sense that they are self-driven and produce substantive effects. Subjectivization under such conditions means the creative facility to generate something newthat is, the potential to produce real effects in the world.16 If the Foucauldian subject (however grotesquely mediated) is produced by the institutions of schools and prisons, and the Lacanian subject exists as a remnant in the schema of desire as manque (lack), for Deleuze there simply is no longer a subject; there are only physical expressions driven toward specific productionsin other words impersonal effects that populate somewhat unpredictable or constantly changing fields of subjectivization.17 There is no problematic of substitution here, because subjectivity is no longer a by-product of objecthood (the other of the object/thing) but, instead, purely immanent to the real. Deleuze and Guattaris schema of an impersonal subjectivity speaks to architectures long-standing crisis of subjectivity even as it reformulates it. As a step beyond poststructuralist paratactics, this effects-based formulation of subjectivity brackets the spectral effects of the representational orders privileged in the more rigorous and abstract forms of postmodernism. What emerges, however, by way of revisiting Deleuze and Guattari, is an order of effects that sees the dissolution of the normative subject, and, as we will see in 1980s New Wave Japanese architecture and European and American postmodern cinema, a new formulation of subjectivization that tests the very premise of architectural subjectivization derived from actually existing effects.
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architectural publications that directly engaged Deleuzes theory of subjectivity were produced in a self-consciously oblique manner to the dominant American architectural discourse of their times,20 the focus of which was science and technoscience, the rapture of the virtual, and all that emerged under the pseudo-scientific veil of emergence in late-modern architectural theory. This neo-liberal architectural discussion surrounding Deleuze lies parallel to and is associated discursively with a longer, left-leaning affiliation between architecture and Deleuze tracing back to the Italian Autonomia movement of the 1970s, which engaged the then (and still) unanswered questions concerning subjectivity, the modern city, and the metropolis in Guattari and Deleuzes radical thought.21 The now distorted relationship between architecture and Deleuze, which miraculously sweeps aside the problem of subjectivity central to Deleuze and Guattaris radical project, invokes by omission or distortion architectures long-standing complicity with forms of subjectivization and subjection. What has been manifestly left out of the discourse is subjectivityalthough subjectivity is arguably the chief concern of Deleuzes philosophy. From his first book, Empiricism and Subjectivity, on Humes philosophy of the practical subject,22 to his writing on Bergsons theory of consciousness in the Bergsonism, to The Fold, on Baroque architecture and subjectivity,23 to his fanatical collaboration with Guattari in Anti-Oedipus (the post-Freudian, post-Marxist critique of capitalist subjectivity, and its sequel, A Thousand Plateaus24 which ushered in the new field of subjectivization)Deleuzes entire oeuvre can be read as an obsessive and compulsive exploration of subjectivizational processes. The question remains: why was the question of subjectivity not permitted? The refusal of subjectivity in the dominant theoretical discourse of architectures recent past invokes two key historical moments surrounding the reception of Deleuze. The first is the postmodern lacuna of the 1970s and 1980s that engaged a generation of French poststructuralist thinkers on the left, namely, Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, Baudrillard, and Viriliobut not Deleuze or Guattari. Why, in the 1980s, when psychoanalysis was de rigueur, were Deleuze and Guattari, for whom the question of subjectivity was paramount, omitted from the architects discussions on subjectivity? One possible responseand this is pure speculation on my partis that when poststructuralism was the dominant theoretical framework for architecture, when the anxious problem of the subject could still be posed, Deleuze and Guattari were perhaps seen as still belonging to the kind of radical left, Marxist affiliate to which architecture had already been exposed (in the critical discussions of the 1970s) and had consciously left behind.25 As Rajchman writes: The moment was no longer right for A Thousand Plateaus, and Deleuze was disappointed with its reception.26 Psychoanalysis and French poststructuralism, alternatively, provided the framework for reworking subject/object relations, unburdened by the unanswerable questions of Marxist and post-Marxist critique. The second moment occurred in the early 1990s, with the emergence of the so-called post-critical movement, and continues today. This politically
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Introduction Copyrighted Material


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conservative architectural movement was more given to formalistic motives of another order than those of the postmodern moment, to which the formers protagonists developed a decidedly anti-theoretical leaning. Deleuze and Guattari were and are here, in name at least, but the post-critical movement and its scientistic and pseudo-realist ethos evacuates any question of subjectivity along with anything else that is not immediately present. The last ten to twenty years could be described as a shift away from the questions of subjectivity and the social, which were traditionally associated with theory and cultural studies, toward a neo-conservative discussion concerned with architectural form and its means of genesis. This formal discussion focused on process (diagram and genealogy), time (iteration and sequence), and information (the post-critical, new determinism). The movement included the architects Rem Koolhaas, Ben Van Berkel, Lisa Anne Couture, and Hani Rashid, and the theorists Manuel De Landa and Bob Somol. By the early- to mid-1990s, the thoroughgoing indictment of both poststructuralism and the exorbitant theoretical investments of postmodernism that had already swept through architecture led to a rapid turning away from subjectivity, and, further to this, the questioning of the validity of theory itself.27 Deleuze, who espoused a realist, anti-postmodernist stance, was ushered into architectural discourse at this exact momentone that some celebrate as the end of theory.28 The fatal error in this conservative discourse, however, is that for Deleuze, subjectivity is real and not abstract whatsoever. This is, further, not a simple matter of the architects taking Deleuze in another direction, as some have argued;29 it is the bleeding dry of Deleuze and Guattaris antifascist project, in which the question of the subject is central. The friends of todays postpolitical discussion dismiss the role of ideology in contemporary architectural production, as if all forms of ideation are suspect. Their quotation of Deleuze, avant la lettre,30 depicts the market economy as an all-engulfing, decentralized or rhizomatic structure to which architecture coolly responds without the interference of critique (which has become a synonym for ideology). This self-styled, independent discourse is clearly an example of what was once called ideological smoothing,31 but for this very reasonin its glib disavowal of ethics and its embrace of neo-liberal valuesit is strongly ideological. The smoothing of the concept rhizome as a new architectural paradigm, counter to Deleuze and Guattaris proto-anarchic formulations of rhizome, functions as a new metatheory (the economy) that might miraculously account for everything desirable in the neo-liberal worldview and, worse, permit anythingincluding the closing of multiple worlds to one unitary model given over to global capital. In one of the earliest English publications of the essay Rhizome, in On the Line,32 capital was theorized as a vast, uncontrollable, self-driven organism; however, Deleuze and Guattaris Marxist critique called for the articulation of new forms of subjectivity, not its repression and passive submission to capital. The conservative articulation of an immanent field of immaterial capital as penultimate program for architecture, displacing Tafuris ideology of the plan,
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Notes
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Personal effects, by the same token, are free to become impersonalized: a ring can be stolen or lost and travel to a pawn shop where it is passed on, then liquefied to make another ringor something else. 2 Wim Wenders, Wings of Desire (Der Himmel ber Berlin), VHS (1987; New York, 1988). 3 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (London, 2004), p. 116. Deleuze is quoting Lawrence Ferlinghettis poem Uses of Poetry and essay Poetry as News. 4 Ibid., pp. 11618. 5 I am thinking first of the book on Hume and the idea of empiricism that opposed transcendentalism as a methodology; namely, Deleuzes critique of Husserls transcendental fieldfor Husserl the field or region of pure consciousness (das reine Bewutsein) of a transcendental subject. For a discussion of the new transcendental field, see Deleuze, Logic, pp. 11819. 6 A Philosophical Concept is Deleuzes essay title and response to Nancys question Who Comes after the Subject? See Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy, eds, Who Comes after the Subject? (New York, 1991). 7 To be precise, Deleuzes critique refers to Descartes cogito: the ego, selfconsciousness, and its foundation in the self-certainty of I think, therefore I am. Yet it is presumably meant as a critique of the Greek as much as it is of the modern concept of the subject. (Nietzsche, for example, has both in his sights). Deleuzes concept of prepersonal singularities seems to invert Platos and Aristotles subject: the substrate (viz., the logical-grammatical subject, that of which something is predicated), that is, that which is independent and self-supporting, that which bears properties. The modern subject, in turn, can be seen to be a transformation of the classical subject but still dependent upon it. The ego is also independent, self-subsistent; it has or acquires properties (a character, experiences, etc.) but does so environmentally or deterministically. Leibnizs monad may have been the last instantiation of a premodern soul in philosophy.
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is nonetheless on the wrong side of ideology33it is regressive. As such, and at best, the anti-Marxist, post-critical field is ultimately determined by melancholia and cynicism. At its worst, it might actually usher in everything it claims to be opposed to. The disavowal of theory and the necessity of critique is in itself what permits the neutralization of the subject and the anaesthetization of a radical philosophy devoted to the singular interrogations of subjectivization. A subterfuge holds sway wherein Deleuze and Guattari are paradoxically invited to authorize the construction of a mythical world of disembodied flows and markets, but once they arrive at the partythey are not permitted to speak. These are precisely the historical conditions that make subjectivization important now.
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Introduction Copyrighted Material


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11

8 For an illuminating discussion on this issue, see K. Michael Hays, Modernism and the Posthumanist Subject: Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer (Cambridge, MA, 1995), p. 13. 9 Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead (Indianapolis, 1968). 10 David Fincher, Fight Club, DVD (1999; Beverly Hills, 2000). 11 See Antonio Negri, Modern and Postmodern: The Caesura, in The Porcelain Workshop: For a New Grammar of Politics, trans. Noura Wedell (Los Angeles, 2008), pp. 1328. 12 Nonetheless, Denise Scott Browns studio should not be conflated with regionalism or an erudite historicism. Those phenomena were part of the search for meaning thought to be lacking in modernist architectural production, but here she and her colleagues sought to find it in popular culturethat is, Pop. See Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour, Learning from Las Vegas (Cambridge, MA, 1972). 13 The structural-linguistic model for architectural objecthood produced in formalist architecture of the 1970s (including Rossi, Scarpa, Stirling, and Hejduk) was criticized by certain Marxist critics (for example, Tafuri, Cacciari, Scolari, and Francesco Dal Co) as disregarding the subject and the social field in its overvaluation of the hermetic architectural objectthat is, Tafuris architecture of the boudoir. See Manfredo Tafuri, LArchitecture dans le Boudoir: The Language of Criticism and the Criticism of Language, Oppositions 3 (1974): pp. 3762. Tafuri expanded upon this negative critique of architecture disconnected from actually existing subjects and actually existing social conditions in The Sphere and the Labyrinth: AvantGardes and Architecture from Piranesi to the 1970s, trans. Pellegrino dAcierno and Robert Connolly (Cambridge, MA, 1987), first published as La sfera e il labirinto: Avanguardia e architettura da Piranesi agli anni 70 (Turin, 1986). 14 Note that Lacan considered himself a structuralist, and his project was to translate Freuds work into structural-linguistic terms. The subject is constructed from the presubjective drives, but they are immaterial (psychic) conditions based on loss. 15 Jacques Derrida, Diffrance, in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1982), pp. 128. 16 Arguably, architectural historians have always been aware of architectures productive capacity. But in almost every schema, the subjectivity of architecture is made subservient to the production of subjects by the architecture. The kind of immanent relationship between subjectivity and the aesthetic image does appear much earlier in the German aesthetic theories of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centurythe so-called Vienna School (the Wiener Schule der Kunstgeschichte), which included Alois Riegl, Heinrich Wlfflin, and Wilhelm Worringer. The school was instrumental in establishing a formalist art history, though its members did not agree on the key notion of what constitutes the real. With Riegl, in particular, the idea of artistic will (Kunstwollen) remains the lynchpin of all questions regarding representational orders. He identified two types of artistic volition: one that is constructive; and one that is optical or subjective. The former attempts to subordinate the world to its will, while the latter wishes to receive the world. See Margaret Iversen, Aesthetics of
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Architecture for a Free Subjectivity Copyrighted Material


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Disintegration, in Alois Riegl: Art History and Theory (Cambridge, MA, 1993), pp. 3247. Deleuze and Guattaris theory of objecthood conjures this earlier historical discussion, and they cite Riegl in A Thousand Plateaus. 17 The idea of an impersonal subjectivity residing in pure immanence can be seen in Foucaults concept of the impersonal voice of discourse, which as mentioned earlier Deleuze adopted in Logic, p. 116. See also Jean-Paul Sartre, La transcendance de lEgo. Esquisse dune description phnomenologique, in Recherches Philosophiques 6 (193637): pp. 85123. He wrote: We should like to show here that the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world. It is a being of the world, like the ego of another (my translation). 18 The most memorable Deleuze books in this vein included Manuel De Landa, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (London, 2002); Sanford Kwinter, Architectures of Time: Toward a Theory of the Event in Modernist Culture (Cambridge, MA, 2001), Greg Lynn, Animate Form (New York, 1999); and Bernard Cache, Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories, ed. Michael Speaks, trans. Anne Boyman (Cambridge, MA, 1995). These books have received so much exposure that they do not require further exposition or introduction. 19 A coherent account of Deleuzes project of subjectivity is provided in John Rajchman, The Deleuze Connections (Cambridge, MA, 2000); see also Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham, 2002), which addresses Deleuzes concept of virtuality as a model of consciousness; Massumi, ed., A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari (New York, 2002), including Massumis introduction, Like a Thought, Ibid., p. 17; Paul Bains, Subjectless Subjectivities, in ibid. and Gary Genosko, ed., A Guattari Reader / Pierre-Flix Guattari (Oxford, 1996), although it could be said all of Genoskos work on Guattari is immersed in subjectivity. 20 The book by Anthony Vidler, Warped Space: Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture (Cambridge, MA, 2000) is a rare collection that frames the architectural production influenced by Deleuze from the perspective of psychoanalysis, importantly tying Deleuze to the problem of subjectivity in modern architecture, and situating The Fold vis--vis the architectural subject. See also Georges Teyssot, The Mutant Body of Architecture, in Flesh: Architectural Probes, ed. Elizabeth Diller and Ricardo Scofidio (New York, 1994), where Teyssot adopts a FoucauldianDeleuzian model of the body to discuss the psychoanalytically inflected work of the then theoretical-academic practice of Elizabeth Diller and Ricardo Scofidio, both teaching at Princeton University School of Architecture (where Vidler was also Chair of Architecture from 1990 to 1993). Teyssot can be linked to the longer Foucauldian trajectory and discussion from the 1970s that does not feature in the recent architectural discussion surrounding Deleuze. Genosko, to reiterate, has written at length on Guattaris revolutionary project toward an impersonal architectural subjectivity. 21 Today this discussion continues in the movement in the contemporary Left, surrounding the book by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA, 2000), and regarding globalization, technology, and urbanism. What is missing in
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these discussions, however, is an examination of the aesthetic object, a reformulation of architectural encounter. 22 Deleuze, Empirisme et subjectivit. Essai sur la Nature Humaine selon Hume (Paris, 1953), translated by Constantin V. Boundas as Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Humes Theory of Human Nature (New York, 1991). 23 Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis, 1993). Originally published as Le pli: Leibniz et le Baroque (Paris, 1988). 24 Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (London, 1988). 25 The unremitting indictment by the Venice School had more or less left architecture paralyzed. This, of course, is not to say that Foucault and Derrida were politically conservative, only that Deleuze was more strongly associated with radicality, with Anti-Oedipus and the post-68 moment of French Marxism. 26 Rajchman, Deleuze Connections, p. 25. 27 In French, as Lotringer points out, there is no such thing as theoryonly pense, meaning thought. See Sylvre Lotringer and Sande Cohen, eds, French Theory in America (New York, 2000). This conflation of French thought and theory has an historical significance in the sense that the rejection of French thinking within architecture and the disavowal of theory came to be one and the same thing. 28 The proponents of the so-called postpolitical erafor example, Robert Somol, Stan Allen, Sarah Whiting, and Michael Speakscelebrate a shift from theory (within modernism) to intelligence (in the current supermodernism), dismissing the role of ideology in contemporary architectural production altogether. This postpolitical posture was the subject of the controversial Projective Landscape Stylos Conference held at the Delft University of Technology, March 1617, 2006. Ironically, the term postpolitical, adopted in this discourse, is, in fact, a revolutionary term used by the Italian Autonomists of the 1970s, but exploited here for totally different purposes. 29 Deleuze, of course, encourages his readers to take whatever they like from A Thousand Plateaus and to make something new, to treat it like a toolbox. But the screening out of subjectivitygiven architectures longstanding neurosis with subjectivity, taken together with Deleuze and Guattaris sustained polemics on subjectivityis neither incidental nor unimportant. 30 Here the use of Deleuze is indirect, contrary to the earlier direct appropriations of the essay Rhizome or the book The Fold. 31 Hays, Architecture Theory, Media, and the Question of Audience, in Assemblage: Tulane Papers: The Politics of Contemporary Architectural Discourse, no. 27 (1995): p. 44. 32 Deleuze and Guattari, On the Line, trans. John Johnston (New York, 1983). 33 What we are seeing today is a hijacking of Deleuze by the Rightprecisely what Jean-Jacques Lecercle in his essay, The Pedagogy of Philosophy, in Radical Philosophy 75 (Jan.Feb. 1996), p. 44, depicted in his observation of a yuppie in the Paris underground reading Deleuze and Guattaris What Is Philosophy?
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